

C# 10238397

FC: 4S S# 10238397

BR: 4S L# 42090900


SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY



3 2911 02696283 7

c.9

SYRACUSE
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



~~DATE LOANED~~

DATE DUE

22 Sep '52 MW

5 Oct '54 JS

8 Jun '55 BG

103 Oct '56 VD

20 Sep '57 SK

26 Oct '59 TK

~~25 Nov '59 NI~~

~~25 Nov '59 NI~~

30 Jan '60 TK

30 Nov '60 KB

27 Mar '62 MS

17 Dec '62 BH

RESERVE ROOM

12 Feb '63 PW

6 JAN '65 LC

27 OCT '65 SB

31 DEC '65 NR

8 JAN '66 NR

14 MAR '66 MK

9 JUN '67 LD

2 JUN '70 AN



OUTLINES OF INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY

A TEXTBOOK OF READINGS IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE

638

BY

CLARENCE MARSH CASE, A. M., PH. D.

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
RECENTLY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, STATE UNIVERSITY
OF IOWA; SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES IN PENN COLLEGE



NEW YORK
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY

OUTLINES OF INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY

A TEXTBOOK OF READINGS IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE

BY

CLARENCE MAGNELL CHASE, A. M., Ph. D.

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REVISED BY THE AUTHOR

COPYRIGHT, 1924, BY
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY, INC.



NEW YORK

COMPANY

PRINTED IN THE U. S. A.

PREFACE

THIS book is the product of the school-room, and is designed to meet the actual requirements of classes, as suggested by the writer's experience in teaching sociology. The volume is planned to provide full work for a college or university class reciting three times a week during a semester of eighteen weeks, where used as the only text; and for a year's work where used in conjunction with some other text-book. If it is found desirable to shorten the course, the first chapter of Part I. may be omitted; also some of the chapters of Parts II. and IV. The *General Introduction* is addressed principally to the teacher and general reader, rather than to the student, and may be omitted. The chapters are in most cases of such length that they constitute each a separate, single assignment; and where too long for this they divide into two assignments of similar length. The usual number of pages covered is that which experience with students has shown can be mastered by them when carefully analyzing materials of the kind here presented. This statement applies to the work regularly assigned for the whole class, leaving special reports on the *Additional References* after each chapter to be assigned according to the capacity and needs of the particular class or student. The *Additional References* are supplied for this purpose, while the *Exercises* are designed to furnish a basis for general class discussion.

The present volume may be used as a *source-book* in connection with any standard sociology text-book; or it will serve as the *class-text* for those teachers who believe, with the present writer, that a stimulating way to teach sociology is to place the materials from authoritative sources, either with or without a regular text-book, directly in the hands of the student. This is the method which the writer has used for many years with satisfactory results. There are of course others who have pursued the same method, particularly the staff at the University of Chicago, as reflected in the notable text-book, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by Professors Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess.

In addition to the increased interest and vitality lent by this method to the work of the class-room, the use of a book of readings solves a great and growing difficulty faced by librarians in attempting to serve classes from which considerable collateral reading is required. When no accounting for such reading is exacted by the instructor little harm, or good, results. But where class discussions are based upon the collateral reading, as is most highly desirable, the pressure upon the school library becomes heavier than can be met. In the case of the smaller schools even single copies of the assigned books, magazines, or pamphlets are often lacking; while in the larger institutions the number of students in the course becomes too large to be served satisfactorily even by the use of duplicate copies of the various titles. The use of a book of readings, such as the present volume, seems to be the only solution for both these difficulties. At the same time it releases the single copies of miscellaneous titles for use by those making research and preparing special reports.

There is no attempt, in this general introductory text-book, to present bibliographies on any phase of the subject. That is left for books which treat intensively more limited portions of the field, and of these there are splendid examples to be easily obtained. For the more theoretical discussions of Part I., here entitled Social Evolution, Professor T. N. Carver's *Sociology and Social Progress* is valuable. For Part II., the *Source Book for Social Origins*, by Professor W. I. Thomas, is the highest authority, and is equipped with exhaustive bibliographies. *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by Professors Park and Burgess, contains the most complete materials for Social Processes; while, for Part IV., extremely valuable materials and bibliographies will be found in Professor A. B. Wolfe's *Social Problems*, and in *Social Problems and Social Policy*, by Professor James Ford.

In the present volume, the *Additional References* at the end of each chapter are given, without any effort at bibliographical completeness, for actual use by the class, and are usually accompanied with some comment aiming to indicate the nature of the passages referred to. They cite, in most cases, standard works to be found in most libraries, while the less available sources are quoted in the Readings. The list of titles at the end of the volume is placed there, with publishers' names, purely for the convenience of teachers and others who may wish to order the books referred to. It makes no pretense to being a bibliography of the subject.

My debt to many writers and publishers is specifically acknowledged in connection with each selection quoted, but I wish to emphasize it here, and to say that I have taken the liberty to include their discussions under captions of my own choosing in many instances, and to eliminate their foot-note references in all cases. I do not believe, however, that I have done violence to the thought of any writer.

I take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the hearty encouragement and valued suggestions of Professor Emory S. Bogardus, Professor William E. Smith, and others of my colleagues in the Department of Sociology at the University of Southern California.

The librarians to whom I have had occasion to apply for many favors have been helpful and efficient. I wish to mention Miss Grace Wormer, at the library of the State University of Iowa; Miss Grace M. White, of the Sociology Department of the Los Angeles Public Library; and Miss Charlotte M. Brown, with her assistants, in the library at the University of Southern California.

The counsel and assistance of my wife has been so unremitting, varied, and helpful that she might be regarded, with justice, as virtually joint author of the book.

CLARENCE MARSH CASE

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
INTRODUCTION	xv
1. The Nature of Science.....	xv
2. Nature of the Social Sciences.....	xvii
3. The Field of Sociology.....	xviii
4. The Special Social Sciences.....	xxii
5. Subjective and Objective Aspects of Social Theory.....	xxiii
6. The Laws of Social Evolution.....	xxiii
7. The Interpretation of Social Evolution.....	xxv
8. The Culture Concept in Social Science.....	xxix

PART ONE: SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Social Evolution and Related Ideas

CHAPTER I. NATURE AND FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.....	3
---	---

A. History.

1. Transition from the Old to the New Conception of History. <i>Herbert Spencer</i>	5✓
2. The New History. <i>James Harvey Robinson</i>	9
3. The Distinctive Contribution of History to the Social Studies. <i>Report of the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools</i>	14

B. Political Science.

4. The Nature and Field of Political Science. <i>Sir J. R. Seeley</i>	15
5. The Distinctive Contribution of Political Science to the Social Studies. <i>Report of the Joint Commission</i>	18

C. Economics.

6. Economics as the Money Measurement of Business Motives. <i>Alfred Marshall</i>	18
7. Economics as the Organization of Free Enterprise. <i>Frank H. Knight</i>	21
8. The Distinctive Contribution of Economics to the Social Studies. <i>Report of the Joint Commission</i>	22

D. Sociology

9. The Distinctive Contribution of Sociology to the Social Studies. <i>Report of the Joint Commission</i>	23
10. The Field of Sociology. <i>George E. Howard</i>	25
Exercises	27
Additional References	28

CHAPTER II. NATURE OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA: THE SUPER-ORGANIC.....	29
--	----

1. Spencer's Original Use of the Term. <i>Herbert Spencer</i>	29✓
2. The Super-Organic as a Fourth Order of Phenomena. <i>A. L. Kroeber</i>	35✓
3. Contemporary Exposition of the Super-Organic. <i>A. L. Kroeber</i>	41
Exercises	48
Additional References	48

CHAPTER III. CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA	50
1. Definition of the Folkways, the Mores, and Institutions. <i>William Graham Sumner</i>	50
2. Ceremonial Institutions and Social Control through the Folkways. <i>Herbert Spencer</i>	65
Exercises	70
Additional References	71
CHAPTER IV. PERSONAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL VALUES.....	72
1. The Four Fundamental Wishes. <i>William I. Thomas</i>	73
2. The Physical Basis of the Wishes. <i>Louis Berman</i>	74
3. Primary Groups the Nursery of Human Nature. <i>Charles H. Cooley</i>	76
4. Attitudes and Social Values. <i>William I. Thomas</i>	81
Exercises	87
Additional References	87
CHAPTER V. RACE AND CULTURE.....	89
1. Anatomical Characters of the Human Brain in Black and White Races. <i>Franklin P. Mall</i>	89
2. Racial Differences in Mental Traits. <i>R. S. Woodworth</i>	94
3. Temperament, Tradition, and Nationality. <i>Robert E. Park</i>	102
Exercises	104
Additional References	104
CHAPTER VI. ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE.....	106
1. Climate and the Evolution of Civilization. <i>Ellsworth Huntington</i>	106✓
2. Classes of Geographic Influences. <i>Ellen Churchill Semple</i>	109
3. Limited Influence of Environment. <i>Robert H. Lowie</i>	123✓
Exercises	127
Additional References	128
CHAPTER VII. NATURE AND COURSE OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION.....	120
1. Social Evolution as Continuity of Achievement. <i>Lester F. Ward</i>	120✓
2. Ethnical Periods in Social Evolution. <i>Lewis H. Morgan</i>	135✓
3. Culture a Closed System. <i>Robert H. Lowie</i>	143✓
4. On the Non-Existence of Innate or Uniform Laws of Social Evolution. <i>Robert H. Lowie</i>	147✓
5. Rational Selection of the Maintenance Mores (Industrial Customs) as the Mainspring of Social Evolution. <i>Albert Galloway Keller</i>	153
Exercises	156
Additional References	157

PART TWO: SOCIAL ORIGINS

Meaning of Social Origins

CHAPTER VIII. THE STAGES OF CULTURE.....	163
1. Lubbock's Four Epochs. <i>Sir John Lubbock</i>	163
2. On the Tasmanians as Representatives of Palaeolithic Man. <i>Edward B. Tylor</i>	165✓
Exercises	172
Additional References	173
CHAPTER IX. THE STAGES OF CULTURE (Continued).....	174
1. Origins of the Copper and Bronze Technique. <i>Guide to the British Museum</i>	174
2. The Metal Ages. <i>A. H. Keane</i>	188

CONTENTS

ix

3.	On the Early Use of Iron. <i>Sir John Lubbock</i>	195
	Exercises	199
	Additional References	200
CHAPTER X.	ORIGINS AND DISPERSION OF RACES.....	201
1.	The Differentiation of Mankind into Racial Types. <i>Sir Arthur Keith</i>	201
2.	Factors in the Movements of Peoples. <i>A. C. Haddon</i>	213 ✓
3.	Distribution of the Principal Human Divisions. <i>A. H. Keane</i> ..	220
	Exercises	229
	Additional References	230
CHAPTER XI.	ORIGINS AND DISPERSION OF RACES (<i>Concluded</i>).....	231
1.	Theory of Dispersion from a Vanished Southern Continent. <i>A. H. Keane</i>	231 ✓
2.	Theory of Dispersion from Central Asia. <i>Clark Wissler</i>	235 ✓
3.	Probable Origins of Caucasian Peoples. <i>A. H. Keane</i>	238
4.	Supposed Origin of the Bushmen. <i>George W. Stow</i>	239
5.	Traditional Wanderings of the Hottentots. <i>George McCall Theal</i>	244
	Exercises	252
	Additional References	253
CHAPTER XII.	LANGUAGE AND GROUP-LIFE.....	254
1.	The Festal Origin of Human Speech. <i>J. Donovan</i>	254
2.	Human Vocal Powers as the Key to Cultural Evolution. <i>Charles A. Ellwood</i>	256
3.	The Secret Language of Masons and Tinkers. <i>A. T. Sinclair</i> ...	260
	Exercises	266
	Additional References	267
CHAPTER XIII.	EDUCATION AND SOCIAL HEREDITY.....	268
1.	The Nature of Civilization and Its Relation to Education. <i>Alexander A. Goldenweiser</i>	268 ✓
2.	Education Outside of Schools. <i>Joseph K. Hart</i>	271
3.	A Puberty Ceremony of the Mission Indians. <i>Horatio N. Rust</i>	278
	Exercises	281
	References	282
CHAPTER XIV.	INVENTIONS AND INDUSTRIES OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES.....	283
1.	Invention and Discovery Among Primitive Peoples. <i>Friedrich Ratzel</i>	284
2.	On Inventive Genius Among Primitive Peoples. <i>Otis T. Mason</i>	291
3.	Hunting and Butchering Game: Omaha Tribe. <i>Fletcher and La Flesche</i>	294
4.	The Building of the Eskimo Kaiak. <i>John Murdock</i>	298
	Exercises	304
	Additional References	305
CHAPTER XV.	PRIMITIVE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS.....	306
1.	Faith as a Factor in the Economic Life of the Amerind. <i>Albert Ernest Jenks</i>	306
2.	The Ritual of the Maize: Omaha Tribe. <i>Fletcher and La Flesche</i>	310
3.	Property-Right in Wild Eagles Among the Hopi. <i>J. Walter Fewkes</i>	315
4.	Private Property in Intangible Goods Among Primitive Peoples. <i>Robert H. Lowie</i>	319
	Exercises	325
	Additional References	326

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVI. PRIMITIVE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION	327
1. Theoretical Analysis of the Concept of Kinship. <i>B. Malinowski</i>	327
2. Rudimentary Human Groups. <i>Edwin Sidney Hartland</i>	335
3. The Meaning of The Tribe. <i>Gerald C. Wheeler</i>	340
4. Totem, Taboo, and Magic. <i>F. Stuart Chapin</i>	344
Exercises	347
Additional References	348
CHAPTER XVII. FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW	349
1. The Beginnings of Punitive Law. <i>R. R. Marett</i>	349
2. The Psychology of Punitive Justice. <i>George H. Meade</i>	353
Exercises	364
Additional References	365
CHAPTER XVIII. SOCIAL ROOTS OF RELIGION	367
1. Social Genesis of the Religious Attitude. <i>Irving King</i>	367
2. Religion as the Solution of Group Crises. <i>R. R. Marett</i>	381
Exercises	385
Additional References	386
CHAPTER XIX. PRIMITIVE ART	387
1. The Original Sources of Art. <i>Yrjo Hirn</i>	388
2. Motives in the Conventionalization of Primitive Art. <i>Franz Boas</i>	394
3. The Realistic and the Conventional in Primitive Art. <i>Alexander A. Goldenweiser</i>	400
4. Motifs in Prehistoric Peruvian Design. <i>Charles W. Mead</i>	403
Exercises	411
Additional References	411

PART THREE: SOCIAL PROCESSES

Nature of Social Processes

CHAPTER XX. SUB-SOCIAL PROCESSES	417
1. The Growth of Population. <i>Edward A. Ross</i>	417
2. The Accumulation of Wealth. <i>Edward A. Ross</i>	423
Exercises	427
Additional References	428
CHAPTER XXI. SOCIALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL	429
1. Personal Isolation. <i>William Healey</i>	430
2. Communication. <i>Emory S. Bogardus</i>	435
3. Acquaintance. <i>Georg Simmel</i>	438
4. Friendship. <i>Georg Simmel</i>	443
5. Assimilation. <i>Truman Michelson</i>	445
Exercises	447
Additional References	448
CHAPTER XXII. DIFFUSION OF CULTURES	449
1. Pitcairn Island: A Case of Geographical Isolation. <i>Mrs. Scoresby Routledge</i>	450
2. The Jewish Community and Social Isolation. <i>Israel Cohen</i>	456
3. The Contact of Peoples. <i>W. H. R. Rivers</i>	460
4. The Culture Pattern. <i>Clark Wissler</i>	464
5. Diffusion and Parallelism. <i>A. L. Kroeber</i>	468
6. Accommodation. <i>U. G. Weatherly</i>	474
Exercises	479
Additional References	480

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER XXIII. CREATION OF SOCIAL VALUES.....	482
1. Interaction of Attitudes and Social Values. <i>Emory S. Bogardus</i>	482
2. Community as a Creative Process. <i>Mary Parker Follett</i>	485
3. Social Estrangement Through Divergent Values. <i>Victor S. Yarros</i>	491
Exercises	496
Additional References	497
CHAPTER XXIV. SOCIAL OPPOSITION	498
1. Competition and the Struggle for Life. <i>Charles Darwin</i>	499 ✓
2. Economic Competition. <i>Thomas N. Carver</i>	501
3. Conflict. <i>Gustav Schmoller</i>	505
4. Exploitation. <i>Edward A. Ross</i>	509
Exercises	514
Additional References	515
CHAPTER XXV. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION	516
1. Caste and Class in India. <i>E. J. Rapson</i>	517
2. Indian Caste Regulations. <i>William S. Lilly</i>	521
3. Class Domination Defined. <i>Gustav Schmoller</i>	524
4. Stratification as a Social Process. <i>Albion W. Small</i>	528
Exercises	532
Additional References	533
CHAPTER XXVI. EQUALIZATION OF OPPORTUNITY.....	534
1. Decline of Caste in India. <i>A. S. Woodburne</i>	535
2. The Evolution of Democracy. <i>Charles A. Beard</i>	539
3. Extension of the Public Interest. <i>Nathaniel R. Whitney</i>	544
Exercises	548
Additional References	549
CHAPTER XXVII. SOCIAL CO-OPERATION	550
A. Individual Ascendency	
1. Personal Ability. <i>Hutton Webster</i>	551
2. Prestige. <i>Lewis Leopold</i>	557
B. Social Ascendency	
1. Consensus:	561
a. Consensus Defined. <i>John Dewey</i>	561
b. Consensus and Prestige in the Government of England. <i>Walter Bagehot</i>	563
2. Social Control. <i>Edward A. Ross</i>	566
C. Mutual Aid. <i>P. Kropotkin</i> . Exercises	577
Additional References	578
CHAPTER XXVIII. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION	579
1. Organization as the Unconscious Co-ordination of Adaptive Activities. <i>Charles H. Cooley</i>	580
2. Social Institutions. <i>Hetherington and Muirhead</i>	585
3. Free Communication. <i>Edward A. Ross</i>	588
4. Public Opinion as a Process. <i>Charles H. Cooley</i>	589
Exercises	592
Additional References	592
CHAPTER XXIX. GROUP BEHAVIOR	594
1. The Cane Ridge Camp-Meeting of 1800: A Case of Crowd Con- tagion. <i>Frederick M. Davenport</i>	595
2. The Reign of Fashion. <i>Edward Bellamy</i>	598
3. The Crusades as Mass Movements. <i>Philip V. N. Myers</i>	603
Exercises	607
Additional References	607

CHAPTER XXX. GROUP EXPANSION	609
1. Enlargement of the Peace-Group Through Social Evolution. <i>Franklin H. Giddings</i>	611
2. An Earlier League to Enforce Peace. <i>Joseph G. Pyle</i>	613
3. Recent Steps in World Organization. <i>World Peace Foundation</i>	618
Exercises	622
Additional References	623
PART FOUR: SOCIAL PROBLEMS	
<i>Definition and Classification of Social Problems</i>	
A. Problems of Physical Environment	
CHAPTER XXXI. UTILIZATION AND CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES..	631
1. Significance of Utilization. <i>Franklin H. Giddings</i>	632
2. The Meaning of Conservation. <i>Richard T. Ely</i>	633
3. The Principles of Conservation as Applied to Different Resources. <i>Charles R. Van Hise</i>	638
4. Early History of the Conservation Movement. <i>Charles R. Van Hise</i>	642
Exercises	646
Additional References	647
CHAPTER XXXII. EPIDEMIC DISEASES AND PUBLIC HEALTH	648
1. Social Nature of Sickness and Health. <i>Rudolph M. Binder</i>	649
2. Social Medicine. <i>René Sand</i>	653
3. A Public Health Program. <i>Ellen Lovejoy</i>	655
Exercises	663
Additional References	664
B. Problems of Population	
CHAPTER XXXIII. MALTHUSIAN ASPECTS	665
1. The Principle of Population. <i>Thomas R. Malthus</i>	665
2. The Necessity of an Adaptive Fecundity. <i>Edward A. Ross</i>	671
Exercises	676
Additional References	677
CHAPTER XXXIV. EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION	678
1. Immigration as a Problem in Social Control. <i>Henry P. Fairchild</i>	679
2. The Immigrant and Community Planning. <i>Grace Abbott</i>	685
3. Immigration and the Quality of the Population. <i>Edward B. Reuter</i>	688
Exercises	695
Additional References	696
CHAPTER XXXV. RURAL DEPLETION AND URBAN CONGESTION	697
1. Rural Depletion and Institutional Decline. <i>Willbert L. Anderson</i>	697
2. Socialization vs. Urbanization in Country Life. <i>C. Walter Fiske</i>	703
3. The Menace of Great Cities. <i>James Bryce</i>	707
4. Country vs. City. <i>Warren H. Wilson</i>	712
Exercises	717
Additional References	717
CHAPTER XXXVI. RACE PROBLEMS	719
1. Race Friction in South Africa. <i>Mohondas K. Gandhi</i>	719
2. Negro and White Contacts in Chicago. <i>Chicago Commission on Race Relations</i>	724
Exercises	748
Additional References	749

CONTENTS

xiii

CHAPTER XXXVII. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL INADEQUACY	750
1. The Meaning of Social Inadequacy. <i>Harry H. Laughlin</i>	751
2. Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims. <i>Francis Galton</i>	754
3. Value and Limitations of Eugenics. <i>Leonard T. Hobhouse</i>	759
Exercises	765
Additional References	766
C. Problems of Social Organization	
CHAPTER XXXVIII. POVERTY AND RICHES	767
1. The Emergence of Poverty. <i>John L. Gillin</i>	768
2. The Nature of Poverty and Pauperism. <i>Edward T. Devine</i>	769
3. Distribution of Wealth in the United States. <i>National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.</i>	773
4. Inequalities of Consumption. <i>Sidney and Beatrice Webb</i>	776
5. The Social Theory of Private Property. <i>Richard T. Ely</i>	779
Exercises	787
Additional References	788
CHAPTER XXXIX. CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT	789
1. The Sociological View of Crime. <i>Enrico Ferri</i>	790
2. The Remedial Treatment of Crime. <i>George H. Mead</i>	792
3. The Delinquent as a Person. <i>Ernest W. Burgess</i>	796
Exercises	802
Additional References	803
CHAPTER XL. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CHILD WELFARE	804
1. The Medico-Psychological Study of Delinquents. <i>Healy and Bronner</i>	805
2. Nutrition Clinics. <i>William R. P. Emerson</i>	812
3. Mental Hygiene. <i>William M. White</i>	819
Exercises	828
Additional References	829
CHAPTER XLI. UNEMPLOYMENT, DISABLEMENT AND SOCIAL INSURANCE....	830
1. Meaning of Unemployment to the Workers. <i>Philip Klein</i>	831
2. Effects of Unemployment. <i>Philip Klein</i>	837
3. A British Factory's Plan for Enhancing Security of Life. <i>B. Seeborn Rowntree</i>	841
4. Sickness and Social Insurance. <i>Warren and Sydenstricker</i>	847
Exercises	850
Additional References	851
CHAPTER XLII. PUBLIC RECREATION AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION.....	852
1. Unsocial Aspects of Public Recreation. <i>Richard H. Edwards</i> ..	853
2. Community Organization as a Phase of the Play Movement. <i>Clarence E. Rainwater</i>	857
3. Nature of Community Organization. <i>Clarence E. Rainwater</i>	864
Exercises	866
Additional References	867
CHAPTER XLIII. IGNORANCE	868
1. Social Bearings of Ignorance and Knowledge. <i>Lester F. Ward</i> ..	869
2. Aim and Method of Social Education. <i>Arthur J. Todd</i>	879
3. The Intellectual Aspect of Ignorance. <i>L. L. Bernard</i>	885
Exercises	890
Additional References	891
D. Problems of Social Idealism	
CHAPTER XLIV. CAPITAL AND LABOR.....	893
1. The "Open" and "Closed" Shop. <i>John Calder</i>	894

2.	The Claims of Capital. <i>John Calder</i>	896
3.	The Demands of Labor. <i>Sidney and Beatrice Webb</i>	901
4.	A Way Out of Industrial Conflict. <i>B. Seeböhm Rowntree</i>	905
	Exercises	909
	Additional References	910
CHAPTER XLV.	PROGRAMS OF SOCIAL REFORM.....	911
1.	Socialism. <i>Bertram Benedict</i>	912
2.	Guild Socialism. <i>Sidney G. Hobson</i>	914
3.	Syndicalism. <i>J. Ramsay MacDonald</i>	918
4.	Justifiable Individualism. <i>Frank W. Blackmar</i>	921
	Exercises	925
	Additional References	926
CHAPTER XLVI.	NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.....	928
1.	Progress vs. Evolution. <i>Leonard T. Hobhouse</i>	939✓
2.	The Outlook for Physical, Intellectual, and Social Evolution. <i>Edwin G. Conklin</i>	933
3.	Social Progress through Better Adjustments. <i>William F. Ogburn</i>	935
4.	On the Possibility of a Science of General Welfare. <i>James Q. Dealey</i>	941
	Exercises	944
	Additional References	945
APPENDIX		947
INDEX OF PERSONS.....		955
INDEX OF TOPICS.....		961

INTRODUCTION

1. The Nature of Science

THE viewpoint assumed in this book is that "science" is simply systematically organized knowledge concerning observed phenomena. Such a definition is not only in accord with the *étymology* of the word, which comes from the Latin *scire*, meaning simply *to know*, but it avoids at one step all the narrow distinctions with which academic specialization has confused the subject. Thus one could probably find some one on almost any university campus who would assert that *mathematics* is the only true "science," while some of his nearest associates might agree with him if only the *physical* studies were admitted to that distinction. In more recent decades, the students of *biological* phenomena, apparently well disremembered of their own former exclusion from the circle of the elect, have so far made themselves at home in it that one often hears the word "science" used, even in faculty discussions and literature, to designate exclusively the physical and biological departments. Recently, however, investigation of *mental* phenomena has become so exact and systematic that *psychology* is sometimes recognized by the academic legitimists as falling within the scientific pale, thus leaving the *social* studies, notwithstanding one of them is actually known as political "science," to grope in the outer darkness, along with *philosophy* in all its branches.

In such academic disputations it is apparent that "science" means merely that field of investigation whose methods and data measure up to some standard of thoroughness held by the particular speaker in question. Furthermore it is evident that the standard is one of *quantitative* exactness, as measured by the facility with which the generalizations of the "science" under consideration can be expressed in mathematical terms. This contains a measure of truth, but may easily be exaggerated, while it becomes an absurdity when mathematics itself is made to appear, in any sense, the supreme, if not the only, science. For the truth is that mathematics is not a science at all, as Lester F. Ward long ago showed with unanswerable clearness.¹

¹ *Pure Sociology*, by Lester F. Ward, pp. 47, 145. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1903.) *Applied Sociology*, 306-307. (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1906.)

The student of mathematics does not, as a mathematician, *know* anything whatsoever about the world of concrete reality. This is true because mathematics is not a body of knowledge with respect to any order of phenomena in the objective world. It deals with *concepts*, and is a kind of quantitative logic, purely subjective in its essential nature. But this is not to say that it is not an immensely valuable discipline. Quite the contrary. While one who knew *only* mathematics, even if he mastered it all, would know nothing about the objective, phenomenal world, he would be in command of an incomparable mental equipment for the accurate explanation of natural phenomena if he were to turn his mathematically disciplined mind to their systematic investigation. Thus it is that *pure* mathematics, far from being the one single science, is no science at all. It is, however, the measure of accuracy for all sciences, or the "standard of positivity," as Comte expressed it.²

The more or less exclusive claims of the other sciences rest upon their use of mathematical, quantitative reasoning, and are inadequate in two ways. In the first place their mathematical accuracy is only a question of degree, as compared with one another; and, secondly, mathematical reasoning is not the only method of exact thinking. No one who has noticed at all the procedure of careful students, even in the fields of historical, ethical, or aesthetic values farthest removed from quantitative considerations, will longer cherish the obsolete notion that painstaking observation, systematic classification, and rigid analysis are the prerogatives of workers in any field of human thinking. The same attitudes of mind and method of procedure are now to be met in every branch of investigation, and it is the assumption in this book that it is a mere confusion of terms to give to the word *science*, which, historically and logically speaking, designates just this systematic investigation of reality, any narrow or private interpretation.

Such a private, or at least special, interpretation is met in the reasonings of those who propose to use the word *science* to indicate only those branches of study which seek primarily to arrive at abstract generalizations, laws, and principles.

² See the *Positive Philosophy* of Auguste Comte, translated by Harriet Martineau, Vol. I., p. 35 (Bohn's Philosophical Library edition). Also *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*, by James Q. Dealy, pp. 52-53. (New York, D. Appleton Company, 1920.) As Comte remarks, the argument applies only to "abstract" (*i.e.*, pure) mathematics.

This distinction is very ably elaborated in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by Park and Burgess (Ch. I.), and it is there especially accredited to the German historian of philosophy, Wilhelm Windelband. But while the authors named are plainly distinguishing between history and *natural* science, others are less discriminating, so that one can trace in current discussion a tendency to blur this clear and valid distinction between history and *natural* science, by substituting the term *science* in general for *natural* science, and thus making it appear that the historical studies (history proper, archaeology, anthropology, ethnology, etc.) are in sharp contrast as to method with *science*, whereas they are themselves worthy and fruitful branches of science itself.

If one steers clear of this confusion, and recognizes that all systematically organized research and knowledge in every realm of phenomena is equally a form of science, it is then proper to recognize that there are several different orders of natural phenomena, and two distinct, yet inseparable, methods of thinking about them which traverse all these orders. No one has expressed the situation more clearly than Professor Kroeber, in the article quoted below. (Chapter II, Reading No. 2.) The four orders are the inorganic, the vital organic, the mental organic, and the super-organic, or social. In every one of these fields of investigation the student may proceed either by the historical method, which seeks to *depict* concrete reality in all its concreteness, or by the analytic, processual method, which tries to give an account in terms of abstract generalizations, mechanisms, processes, laws, and principles. The distinction will not be further elaborated here, since the reader may refer to the passage quoted below. It is the purpose simply to point out in this place that we have here, not history versus science, but the contrast between the historical and analytical aspects of science itself.³

2. Nature of the Social Sciences

The social sciences deal with the fourth order of natural phenomena, namely the super-organic or social, the nature of which will be found set forth in the selections of Chapter II., below. They deal primarily

³ For further discussions on the relations between the various sciences, see *The Foundations of Science*, by W. C. D. Whetham, London. No date. (T. C. and E. C. Jack.) Also *The Meaning of Social Science*, by Albion W. Small. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1910.)

with culture, as explained more fully in the following paragraphs. Culture itself is a phenomenon which has no existence for any of the sciences devoted to the strictly physical, organic, or mental orders of fact; nor can the comprehension of it be reached by combining the viewpoints of the physical, biological, and psychological sciences, which deal with the first three orders of phenomena. The super-organic constitutes a distinct, but of course not an isolated or detached, order of facts in the phenomenal, objective world, and it has to be studied by analyzing it on its own ground and in its own terms, and not by extending over it the notions and terms arrived at in the sciences which study the lower, if not simpler, orders of phenomena. This recognition of the distinctive nature of culture, and of the necessity for comprehending it as a distinct order of facts which must suggest its own method of study, is one of the most significant aspects of social science today. Of course no one doubts that knowledge of psychology and biology, or even of physics and mathematics, is invaluable to the social student, but that is far from saying that a mastery of those sciences will make of him a *social* scientist in any sense of the word. He becomes the latter only when he goes straight at the investigation of the realm of the social or cultural phenomena, seeking to apprehend it in its own terms, although with all the contributory training in other orders of science he may be so fortunate as to muster.

3. The Field of Sociology

The earlier sociologists were accustomed to make comprehensive, even extravagant, claims for the new study, but they did not succeed in establishing its exact position in a logical classification of the sciences. This is true especially of such pioneers as Comte, Spencer, Ward, Giddings, and Small. In the effort they were encouraged, as is well known, by the narrowness and barrenness of the older social sciences, notably history and political economy. Thus Ward, in an article on "The Place of Sociology Among Sciences,"⁴ quotes the English economist Mill's description of a larger social science which he left unnamed. The description however, in Ward's view fits the new science of "Sociology" which Ward, following Comte, assigned to the exalted position of "cap-sheaf and crown of any true system of classification of the sciences," (declaring that) "it is also the last and highest landing on the great staircase of education."

⁴ In the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I. (1895).

Almost a decade later Professor Small discussed, in the same journal, the question "What Is a Sociologist?"⁵ In so doing he was led, in replying to certain critics, to say: "In general . . . a sociologist is a man who is studying the facts of society *in a certain way*." That way seemed to Small to be "in the *spirit of a philosopher*." More explicitly he held that "the name 'sociologist' belongs, then, to all students of society who think of human life, past, present, and future, as somehow bound together, and who try to understand any particular fragment of human life which they may study by making out its bearings upon and its being-borne-upon-by all the rest of human life." But this unifying of our conceptions of life is the task of *philosophy*, and the sociologist adopting Small's conception of his field may find difficulty in distinguishing it from the province of philosophy. Professor Small himself seems to admit this when he goes on to say: "The sociologist is the man who tries to fill the place in our scientific age which the old-fashioned philosopher occupied in the ages of metaphysical speculation."

Small's conception of the scope of sociology was so vast that nothing short of omniscience would seem able to cover it. Thus he says:

The desideratum is to be able to say, for instance: "The American people are in such and such a situation; such and such are the chief issues now pending; the other issues fall into such and such subordinate relations; in view of these facts the conduct of the American people should be turned in such directions, so as to procure such and such results." (*Ibid.*, p. 33.)

It should be pointed out in fairness that, while Professor Small minced no words in magnifying the scope of sociology, he shows in numerous articles and in his book, *The Meaning of Social Science*, anything but an academically partisan spirit. On the contrary he suggests that sociology in this larger sense will have to be the work of a great number of scholars from various related fields of social science all working together as a single co-operating band. Indeed, he is willing to share the title widely, adding that "there are sociologists who prefer to call themselves psychologists, or historians, or economists, or political scientists, but their proper classification is indicated by the fact that they, consciously or unconsciously, work from a point of view that is strictly sociological."

The authors of an authoritative work on *Modern Views of Matter*

⁵ Cf. *loc. cit.*, Vol. VII (1914).

and *Electricity*⁶ remark that "It is characteristic of the modern standpoint that it permits a blending of all the physical sciences into a single world view, which grows in unity with the years." Likewise Professor Small expects to see sociology, conceived if necessary as an "academy of social sciences," merge, or at least pool, all the special viewpoints working toward the objective determination of social valuations, and of means for attaining them.

The critics of sociology are prone to overlook or forget that there is scarcely any social science that has not at times laid claim to the office of general societal guide. For instance, let us take ethnology, a painstaking, indefatigable worker in out-of-the-way places and among primitive peoples, and notice its recent aspirations:

As the engineer calls on the physicist for a knowledge of mechanical laws, so the social builder of the future who should seek to refashion the culture of his time and add to its cultural values will seek guidance from ethnology, the science of culture, which in Tylor's judgment is "essentially a reformer's science."⁷

Ethnology thus qualifies as a strong rival of sociology, but society at large is not going to ask much advice from either of them, or of any evaluating science, in the matter of goals, or policies, as the World War amply demonstrated. The popular attitude is really "Every man his own sociologist," while so far as rulers are concerned they seek only the advice of specialists and technicians who can tell them *how* to do the things they have decided upon.

On the other hand *social psychology* is a close collaborator, if not rival, of both sociology and ethnology. In a most illuminating paper on "The Province of Social Psychology,"⁸ Professor W. I. Thomas wrote as follows:

. . . the province of social psychology is the examination of the interaction of the individual consciousness and society, and the effect of the interaction on individual consciousness on the one hand and on society on the other. If instead of claiming for social psychology a separate class of phenomena, we accept this view, and regard it as an extension of individual psychology to the phenomena of collective life, we have immediately a set of problems not included in the programs of other sciences.

⁶ By Comstock and Troland, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

⁷ *Culture and Ethnology*, by Robert H. Lowie, p. 97. New York, 1917. In an earlier passage (p. 5) Dr. Lowie says that "Culture is, indeed, the *sole and exclusive* subject-matter of ethnology." Italics mine.

⁸ In *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X. (1904), pp. 445-455.

Its intimate relation to ethnology is suggested by the fact that Professor Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins* appeared with the sub-title, "Ethnological Materials, Psychological Viewpoint." In his recent work (in collaboration with Florian Znaniecki), *The Polish Peasant*, Professor Thomas shows⁹ that social psychology is the general science of the subjective side of society (*i.e.*, the social attitudes), while sociology, in his thought, must divide the objective side (the social values) with economics, political science, and other special sciences. The whole group, with these special social sciences on the one hand and social psychology upon the other, he includes under the general head of "social theory."

In this connection it is of interest to note that Professor Kroeber, in his article on "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," quoted in Chapter II., below, divides the field of the fourth order of phenomena, namely *the superorganic*, between social psychology and culture history, which is another name for ethnology. Social psychology, in his system also, as in that of Thomas, treats of the subjective side of society, and works by the processual, abstract method, while culture-history treats of the objective side and uses the historical, depictive method. The two are not brought together, in his discussion, under a single category, but it would probably have to be either social theory or sociology.

It is not my purpose to attempt a definitive answer to this question in this book, although the problem will be touched upon again in the later pages of this Introduction. The practically important thing is to distinguish between sociology as a category in a rigidly logical classification of the sciences, and sociology as a social movement, a real going concern reflected in a vast and growing number of academic courses, an extensive organization of social work, and a considerable literature both periodical and occasional. I shall not take space to indicate its marked influence on all the other social sciences, as could easily be done. We are concerned with it in this course as a convenient name for all the tendencies mentioned, both academic and social, and for others not mentioned. It would be mere pedantic quibbling to deny sociology a respectable standing in this sense. It may indeed prove to be the leaven in the social sciences which, while leavening the whole lump with a more liberal, broad, and truly human point of view, is destined eventually itself to disappear. That is a

⁹ See the "Methodological Note" preceding Vol. I. *op. cit.*

question to be answered more by the logic of events than by the logic of the sciences. I do not, however, agree with some who have likened sociology to a *tower* around which the other social sciences are clustered. It does not thus overlook or overlord them, but is at most like a common *courtyard* into which they open, through which they must pass to and fro in bringing their more or less separate inquiries to a common point of view, and possibly sooner or later to a single body of organized knowledge about human society and culture.

The sociological value of all these sciences will be determined by their ability to throw light upon the nature, evolution, and significance of culture. We shall therefore devote the remaining pages of this Introduction to a discussion of the increasing importance of this idea in current social theory.

4. The Special Social Sciences

Let us next notice the relation of some of these special social sciences to the several parts of this book. In Part I., I have attempted to set forth some of the fundamental notions or concepts that are prerequisite to the study of social phenomena within the field of any and every social science. Among these are the nature of super-organic phenomena; the distinctions between such of their forms and phases as folkways, *mores*, and institutions; the nature and mutual interaction of personal attitudes and social values; and the relative importance, in social evolution, of race, environment, and culture. In developing these ideas dependence is necessarily placed mainly upon social psychology, anthropology, anthropo-geography, and ethnology.

In Part II. the point of view is mainly historical, and draws primarily upon anthropology and ethnology. Anthropology, as here used, means the study of man's place in the organic life-series, and the investigation of prehistoric races and cultures. Thus the chapters on the stages of culture are strictly anthropological in character. The other chapters in Part II. draw upon ethnology and anthropology in varying proportions, whether we use the term ethnology in its older sense as the study of human races, or in the modern way as the science of culture, thus far dealing particularly, but not necessarily or always, with that of primitive peoples.

In Part III., dealing with social processes, the point of view is that of social psychology and sociology, if by "social psychology" we may understand the study of the interaction of individual minds with one

another and with the group of which they form a part; and if by "sociology" we may designate especially the study of the associational forms, rules, and institutions of society.

In Part IV., is presented, under four main categories, a list of so-called social "problems," for whose discussion dependence is largely placed upon statistical, economic, and ethical viewpoints.

5. Subjective and Objective Aspects of Sociology

It is my conviction that an introductory course should make large use of the historical, depictive method. By so doing the materials chosen are necessarily more concrete and picturesque, and they provide the student with a body of useful and interesting facts. This has a double advantage. In the first place he is sure to learn something from the course even if he does not fully analyze these facts; and in the second place he has possession of a body of materials which will give assurance that his generalizations, if ever arrived at, will not be mere glittering generalities unrelated to concrete reality. I have therefore tried to present a collection of information, valuable in itself, as a basis for analysis and generalization, rather than as purely illustrative material for the clarification of a system of concepts. There is of course a set of concepts presented here in the titles and sub-divisions of the various chapters. I hope that there will be accomplished the two-fold object of conveying to the reader a collection of worthwhile information, and of guiding him to the mastery of a system of working concepts for the better understanding not only of the materials here presented, but also of social phenomena in general.

6. The Laws of Social Evolution

While the several social sciences, especially economics and political science, have worked out a few sequences which seem to govern the particular classes of phenomena with which they are respectively engaged, the number of these is relatively small, their permanence questionable, and their correlation from field to field scarcely demonstrated. For instance, if there is any regular order of sequence in the development of the various forms of government and the State, it is questionable if there is any causal connection between this political series and the stages of industrial society worked out in the field of economics. Still less is it possible to show any unvarying connection

between these two phases of society and the collective life of a human group in all its aspects, domestic, social, religious, educational, and so on. In short, it must be confessed that few, if any, universal and objectively valid laws of social evolution have been ascertained thus far.

I am not unmindful here of the elaborate exposition of social evolution set forth by Karl Marx and his school. In fact it would seem to be more plausible and self-consistent, as well as more consonant with current history, than the system expounded by thinkers professing a more rigidly scientific impartiality. Yet who will maintain that we have in orthodox socialism and the economic interpretation of history an adequate account of social evolution on the whole? or in William Graham Sumner's dictum that a "strain toward consistency" in the *mores* causes all the ways and institutions of society to conform to changes in the modes of getting a living, or, in his characteristic phrase, "the maintenance *mores*." His disciple, Professor A. G. Keller, has elaborated this idea in his notable book, "Societal Evolution," which is one of the ablest expositions of the subject of this section. Yet Keller's work, and that of Sumner before him, is not essentially different from the historical materialism of the Marxian socialists in so far as its interpretation of social evolution is concerned.

Earlier students of this problem were led to work out somewhat detailed and definite schedules showing the stages through which society is prone to pass in its evolution from the lowest status of savagery to the highest status of civilization thus far attained. Among these we mention especially the early American ethnologist, Lewis H. Morgan, as one offering a very clear-cut and definite series of steps marked out by the advent of inventions and discoveries, mostly in the field of technology.¹⁰

But actual societies do not always follow these stages, so that they possess at best only a partial and retrospective value. In a word, the laws of social evolution are not known in any comprehensive sense. It would seem that social evolution, or more specifically cultural evolution, is a learning process on the part of a group, which process is largely governed by historical accidents such as the presence of genius at the favorable moment, contact with other cultures or culture-traits and products, perhaps pure historical and psychic accidents, and above

¹⁰ Cf. *Ancient Society*, by Lewis H. Morgan.

all by the vocal power to communicate with companions and to transmit results by tradition to succeeding generations. The results are further modified by the pre-existing culture within the group, which itself may be the product either of diffusion throughout the world from a single center, as some affirm of the wheel and domestication of cattle, or of independent origin, as in the case of the bow and arrow.¹¹

The first-hand researches, particularly of American ethnologists, into the actual nature and history of primitive cultures tend thus far to show that human culture constitutes in the main a closed system, largely independent of environment, and not closely, if at all, correlated with race in the sense of characters transmitted by the Mendelian laws of heredity. On the other hand, any given culture is mainly to be explained in terms of co-existing and pre-existing culture. The all-important cause of social evolution would thus seem to lie in culture *contacts*, and in the elaboration of a culture within its own group system. Furthermore, culture traits, or culture patterns, as they are termed by some ethnologists, are not discernibly related as cause and effect among themselves. That is to say, in the language of statistical method, one culture pattern, such as the pottery complex, is not positively correlated with another, such as the maize complex, although these two do seem to be connected with a third factor, namely the geographical environment; but here the last-named acts only as a limit-setting area.¹² On the whole the evolution of culture apparently follows no law of development thus far established, except the law, if such it may be called, of pure historical accident.

7. The Interpretation of Social Evolution

We are thus brought to the question of the correct interpretation of the facts of social evolution, for, as we have attempted to suggest, the process known as social evolution is almost solely a matter of the development of culture. This being true, the methods and concepts of *organic* evolution do not directly concern the student of social

¹¹ Cf. "Theories of Cultural Evolution," by Charles A. Ellwood, *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXIII., 6 (May, 1918); "Diffusion vs. Independent Origin," by A. A. Goldenweiser, in *Science*, N. S. Vol. 44, No. 1137; "Some Objections to Mr. Elliott Smith's Theory," by Philip Ainsworth Means, *Ibid.*; "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," by A. A. Goldenweiser, in *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 26-27; and similar literature.

¹² Cf. Wissler: *The American Indian*, 351, and *passim*; Lowie: *Culture and Ethnology*, Ch. IV.

evolution, simply because they are irrelevant to the phenomena under consideration, and this for several reasons.

In the first place the distinctive subject-matter of organic science is found in the phenomena of physical heredity, as expressed in the laws of Mendelian descent. But culture does not inhere in the germ-plasm, it is not correlated with racial traits, and it moves in a realm, the super-organic, entirely outside the scope of biological science. Moreover, nothing is farther from being emphasized in modern biology, it would seem, than the accumulation and hereditary transmission of acquired traits; while, on the other hand, ethnology, and all the social sciences, in so far as they have given up the attempt to make the study of society an extension of biology, stress nothing so much as the *accumulation* of socially acquired ways of thinking, speaking, feeling and doing, along with their implements and products, which, taken all together, becomes a constantly swelling stream of culture, transmitted in the form of tradition by means of social inheritance. As Dr. Wissler words it, "cultural phenomena may . . . be defined as the acquired activity complexes of human groups."¹³

The second reason for maintaining the irrelevance of biological evolution to social interpretation lies in the fact that the human material of which society is composed, or, more accurately, which represents the raw materials of society, has not changed appreciably since the end of the glacial period, nor even since times much more remote. The Neanderthal race, the most ancient stem that is really identified as a human race, was characterized by certain crudities of skeletal structure, such as the flexed knee and the absence of the cervical curve in the spinal column, but we are told that its skull capacity was great enough to elicit comment from both Darwin and Broca.¹⁴ The Crô-Magnon race, immediately following it among the glaciers and the herds of woolly mammoths, possessed likewise a remarkable cubic capacity in the way of brain space, and also a better frontal development, although the Neanderthals were not necessarily deficient in this respect. There can be no question, however, about the Crô-Magnons, since their skulls, compared on twelve points with those

¹³ "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture," by Clark Wissler, *Science*, N. S. Vol. XLIII., No. 1102 (Feb., 1916). See also "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," by A. L. Kroeber, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII., No. 5 (March, 1918).

¹⁴ Cf. *Men of the Old Stone Age*, by Henry Fairfield Osborn; p. 235. New York, 1915.

of ten other races, showed them to rank at the top of the finest races of ancient or modern times.¹⁵ Moreover, their bodily proportions were magnificent, the males, in the most favorable period and habitat, averaging over six feet in height, with other dimensions in proportion. Yet these splendid people were so low in culture, if we forget their marvelous works of art in stone and bone, that they lurked in the mouths of dank and dripping caves, dressed in skins, and possessed, apparently, no tools more elaborate than unpolished flints. Furthermore, to those who would correlate culture with bodily characters racially transmitted, it should be pointed out that probably the finest race in modern times, speaking in terms of bodily perfection, dwelt, not in Greece or in Nordic Europe, but in the isles of the Pacific, and created merely the simple culture of Polynesia.

Here one might object that racial differences are not registered in the shape of the skull or its cubic capacity, or even in the shape and size of the brain itself, but in some improvement of *texture* too minute for our crude methods to discriminate, even if the brains of ancient men had not vanished long ago, leaving only their outworn cranial shells for the diversion of anthropometrists. This may indeed be true, but we need only to point out that it is no more than an hypothesis, in support of which no proof is offered. On the contrary such facts as have come to the writer's notice—for example the anatomical investigations of Mall and the mental measurements of Woodworth—reveal no discernible differences in mental capacity between existing races that are marked by as great a divergence of personal appearance and culture as that which separates modern from Palaeolithic man.

Professor Edwin Grant Conklin, in his Princeton lecture, for 1920, squarely tackled the question, "Has Human Evolution Come to an End?" Space will not permit an abstract of his argument, but his unequivocal conclusions are as follows: "For at least 10,000 years there has been no notable progress in the evolution of the human body. The limits of physical evolution have apparently been reached in the most perfect specimens of mankind. . . . There has been no progress in the intellectual capacity of man in the past two or three thousand years, and it seems probable that the limits of intellectual evolution have been reached in the greatest minds of the race."¹⁶

Professor Conklin justly remarks that "undoubtedly eugenics and

¹⁵ Cf. Osborn, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

¹⁶ *Princeton Lectures*, Vol. I., Number One. See also his *The Direction of Human Evolution*. New York, 1921.

education can do much to raise the intellectual level of the general mass, but it cannot create a new order of intellect." This, it would seem, is true because new types arise through mutations, as "sports," and are fixed by inbreeding through isolation, which is impossible among men, because of the hybridization and constant contact of all human races. Therefore the new types of mutants would probably be "swamped." Eugenics can hope to eliminate the unfavorable deviations and increase the favorable to some extent, but it cannot hope, even under most favorable auspices, to produce a higher type, or, in statistical terms, cause the items to cluster around a different mode.

In psychology we find a valuable aid to social interpretation, but its explanations, being perfectly general, or universal in application, fail to explain the particular concreteness of human cultures. Psychology deals with innate qualities, so that while it may explain the vocal propensities of man it cannot account for such a distinctly acquired, super-organic, and peculiarly social phenomenon as a particular national or tribal language. Indeed, Dr. Wissler proposes that psychology and ethnology, *i.e.*, culture-history, should divide the field of human phenomena in which they are now working jointly, on the basis of innate, or racially inherited traits, which he holds to be the field of general psychology, while the acquired traits, which make up the substance of culture, are held to be the peculiar province of ethnology and the proper subjects for historical method.¹⁷

Social psychology, however, expounds and partially explains certain group activities which are distinctly social, as in Professor Graham Wallas's work on "Human Nature in Politics," or Cooley's illuminating discussions of "Human Nature and the Social Order." Professor McDougall and Professor Ellwood, in their text-books both bearing the title "Social Psychology," present more systematic accounts of the mind in its group setting and relations; while Professor Thomas has formulated a distinct and fruitful method. But, if Professor Kroeber is right, social psychology aims at the formulation of group processes in abstract and universally applicable terms, and in so far as it succeeds in explaining group mental processes in general it will fail to interpret concrete, historical culture-complexes in particular.

¹⁷ *Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture*, Ibid.

8. The Culture Concept in Social Science

No one knows better than those working in the field of sociology itself that a vast deal of its voluminous literature could be swept away without serious loss to science or philosophy. This is possible because most of the scant century that has elapsed since Comte began the systematic study of society has been largely wasted in developing a false trail blazed by Herbert Spencer and his followers. It is only in recent years that we are coming to see that this trail leads nowhere except into a jungle of organicist analogies and pseudo-social biological notions, through which the real territory and field of the social sciences can never be reached.

Far from being an extension of biology, the social sciences begin where biological sciences end, and that is at the level where *culture* appears. Culture itself is, in the generally accepted definition by the veteran anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." It is a phenomenon exclusively human and social. That is to say, culture is not the possession, so far as yet shown, of animals, and, on the other hand, no *human group* was ever found lacking a culture of relatively high complexity. In this respect a tremendous gulf separates man and the lower forms of life, the anthropoid apes and social insects not excepted. The social sciences all operate on this side of the gap, and the only kind of evolution with which they are directly concerned is *social* evolution.

Social evolution has actually taken place, and it is the distinctive task of the social sciences to understand and control it. In so far as the knowledge of organic and cosmic evolution is necessary to lend reality to social evolution in the mind of the student, it becomes a pre-requisite, to be sure, but it furnishes neither the basic concepts nor the method of study for the social sciences. In fact the physical and biological sciences as such know nothing about the existence of culture, and the same may be said for individual, though not for social, psychology. As described by Thomas ("Methodological Note" in Volume I. of *The Polish Peasant*), social psychology is the general, interpretive science of the subjective side of society, serving as an instrumental discipline for all the social sciences, each of the latter having for its distinctive field some special class or classes of social

values. These social values themselves are defined as those things in the natural or social environment which have acquired a *meaning* for the members of the group, by serving as actual or possible objects for their activities, *i.e.*, their *attitudes*.

It is the thesis of this chapter that social values, expressed in the comprehensive term *culture*, constitute the distinctive and only field of the social sciences. This order of reality presents a distinct field of phenomena and should be studied by whatever methods its unbiased examination suggests, without regard, except for philosophical or inspirational considerations, to any other field of study or order of phenomena.

The above remark concerning Mr. Spencer's organicist analogies was not meant to voice any lack of appreciation for his transcendent ability or his real service, as a pioneer in sociological thinking. The fact is that Spencer clearly grasped the nature and significance of culture, although he neglected to develop the idea. The significant phrase, "the super-organic," was apparently originated and defined by him as early as 1876. Recent writers have elaborated this concept in an illuminating way, and it is becoming one of the most fundamental ideas, if not the most fundamental, in the entire terminology of the social sciences. The following sentences from Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* (Vol. I., Ch. 1) will show how clearly he grasped the concept:

Of the three broadly-distinguished kinds of Evolution, we come now to the third . . . Super-organic Evolution . . . I mean that accumulation of super-organic products which we commonly distinguish as artificial, but which, philosophically considered, are no less natural than all others resulting from evolution. (After specifying material appliances, language, science, customs, philosophies, and arts, he goes on to say:)

All these various orders of super-organic products, . . . form together an immensely-voluminous, immensely-complicated, and immensely-powerful set of influences. During social evolution these influences are ever modifying individuals and modifying society, while being modified by both. They gradually form what we may consider either as a non-vital part of the society itself, or else as an additional environment, which eventually becomes even more important than the original environments — so much more important that there arises the possibility of carrying on a high type of social life under inorganic and organic conditions which originally would have prevented it. . . . As societies progress in size and structure, they work in one another, now by their war-struggles and now by their industrial intercourse, profound metamorphoses. And the ever-accumulating, ever-complicating

super-organic products, material and mental, constitute a further set of factors, which become more and more influential causes of change. (*Ibid.*, pp. 3-8; 14-16.)

Investigators in the field of ethnology, particularly in the United States, have recently made valuable contributions to social science in their researches into the nature of the super-organic, or cultural, phenomena. Thus Professor A. L. Kroeber, in the article already referred to above, says:

We begin . . . with the belief in the equal reality of four kinds of phenomena: those of matter and force as such, those of life as such, those of consciousness, and those of social life or culture. These four varieties of facts of experience may also be denominated as the inorganic, the directly organic or vital, the mentally organic or psychic, and the civilizational or superorganic or, better, superpsychic.

Professor Kroeber complains of Spencer, because while employing the term, as we have shown, "these superorganic products, or civilization . . . are treated by Spencer absolutely on a level with suborganic factors." (*Ibid.*) Writing elsewhere, under the title "The Super-organic" (in *The American Anthropologist*, April-June, 1917), Kroeber suggests that the utter divergence between social and organic forces will perhaps never be fully grasped until the mentality of the so-called social insects, the bees and ants, is thoroughly realized. Social the ant is," he admits, "in the sense that she associates; but she is so far from being social in the sense of possessing civilization, of being influenced by non-organic forces, that she would better be known as the anti-social animal."

On the other hand we read further that, with the advent of culture, which occurred among the men of Neanderthal and Le Moustier during glacial times at the latest, "A new factor had arisen which was to work out its own independent consequence, slowly and of little apparent import at first, but gathering weight, and dignity, and influence; a factor that had passed beyond natural selection, that was no longer wholly dependent on any agency of organic evolution, and that, however rocked and swayed by the oscillations of the heredity that underlay it, nevertheless floated unimmersibly upon it."

Among other ethnologists who have helped to clarify our conceptions with respect to this fourth order of phenomena, aside from Dr. Franz Boas, the leader of the newer school of American ethnologists, author of *The Mind of Primitive Man* and innumerable monographs, one calls

to mind Dr. Robert H. Lowie, who, in his *Culture and Ethnology* (New York, 1917), shows the relative inadequacy of geography and psychology to explain the actual facts of any concrete culture, and holds that a culture is a largely self-caused and closed system, explainable principally in terms of co-existing or pre-existing culture. Professor A. A. Goldenweiser, in his *Early Civilization* (New York, 1922), takes less radical ground with respect to the influence of general psychological elements, but he, also, reduces the racial and environmental factors to relative insignificance; while Dr. Clark Wissler, in his book, *The American Indian* (New York, 1922), and in other of his writings, takes substantially the same ground, laying special stress upon *historical* explanation. (See his article, "Historical and Psychological Interpretations for Culture," in *Science*; N. S. Vol. XLIII., No. 1102, Feb. 11, 1916.)

To those accustomed to think of ethnology as the study of races it may sound strange to hear these writers spoken of as ethnologists, but not so to any one who has followed the more recent development of this branch of anthropology. Along with discovery that the essential differences between human races usually turn out to be differences in the accumulated super-organic products of the group-experience, there has gone a shifting of attention from the physical and mental criteria of races to their respective cultures or civilizations. This movement of thought has been so marked in the case of ethnology that Dr. Lowie is emboldened to say that "culture is, indeed, the sole and exclusive subject-matter of ethnology." (*Op. cit.*)

Whatever may be the final division of labor between the various social sciences, it is worthy of note that the earliest American sociologist, Dr. Lester F. Ward, held more or less implicitly from the start the thesis which he declared explicitly in his *Pure Sociology* (New York, 1903), namely that "the subject-matter of sociology is human achievement." (*Op. cit.*, p. 15.) The sum total of achievement he calls "civilization," and in his conception of it *institutions* occupied a large place. In fact he says: "All achievements are institutions, and there is a decided gain to the mind, in seeking to determine the true subject-matter of sociology, to regard human institutions and human achievements as synonymous terms, and as constituting, in the broadest sense of both, the field of research of a great science." (*Ibid.*, p. 31.)

Ward thought that sociology should concern itself only with the

institutions of the historical, or "civilized" races, leaving primitive cultures to anthropology, but this distinction is breaking down at present. For instance, Goldenweiser argues, in his *Early Civilization*, that all cultures from the lowest to the highest reveal the same principal elements in various stages of development; while Professor William F. Ogburn, another adherent of the same school of thought, has begun the significant task (in his recent book entitled *Social Change*, New York, 1922), of applying some of the cultural concepts of ethnology to the study of modern, contemporary society.

With the above-mentioned qualification, we may say that Ward was completely in line with the most recent thought in social science, in constantly laying the main emphasis upon the super-organic, or cultural phenomenon; and he also perceived with unsurpassed clearness some of its essential characteristics, among these the fact that no animal possesses it; that it *accumulates*; and that it is transmitted solely by tradition, or *social* inheritance. Despite his constant disposition to expand his discussion into a cosmic philosophy, and notwithstanding his habit, natural to a distinguished palaeontologist such as he was, of building an imposing biological evolutionary approach to all his discussions of social and cultural phenomena, the discriminating reader of Ward's works can hardly fail to recognize the striking modernity and present significance of the more original aspects of his thought. I refer again to his emphasis upon achievement, institutions, civilization — in other words the culture concept of modern ethnologists, or the "social values" of Professor Thomas.

It will be recalled that Ward avowed a warm regard for Major J. W. Powell, long associated, as a government ethnologist, with the Smithsonian Institution, where Ward also spent the middle years of his life. The mutual admiration felt by these two scholars was directed not only to personal qualities, but each held the other in the very highest esteem for sheer intellectual power, and their social philosophy seems to have been in substantial agreement. Therefore it is of peculiar interest to note that Major Powell, in a series of articles which began with the first issue of the *American Anthropologist*, definitely classifies sociology as "the science of institutions." (*Loc. cit.*, N. S. Vol. I., No. 3, July, 1899). In so saying, he defended, even more explicitly, the position taken by Ward about the same time, and which was apparently the joint product of their closely associated thinking.

This is all the more interesting when one observes that precisely the

same field has been assigned to sociology in one of the most recent and most notable studies produced within the field of social theory. I refer to the position taken by Professor W. I. Thomas in the work already referred to, wherein he suggests that "sociology, as theory of social organization, is . . . a special science of culture like economics or philology. . . ." (*Op. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 33.) Its business, according to Professor Thomas, is to study especially "the rules of behavior, and the actions viewed as conforming with these rules, (which) constitute with regard to their objective significance a certain number of more or less connected and harmonious systems which can generally be called *social institutions*, and the totality of institutions found in a concrete social group constitutes the *social organization* of this group." (*Ibid.*)

Let us now quote again from Major Powell, in order to see how strikingly similar are the views of Thomas to those uttered by Powell (and also by Ward, as has been shown) nearly two decades earlier:

An institution is a rule of conduct which men make by agreement or which is made for them by some authority which they recognize as such. Many, perhaps most, of these rules are of great antiquity and are observed as customs, but new rules or modifications of rules are instituted from time to time as the exigencies of society demand. Thus an institution is a recognized law of conduct devised by men. Law and institution are often synonymous terms. We use the term law from the standpoint of considering the rule; we use the term institution from the standpoint of considering the origin of the rule. I prefer to define sociology as the science of institutions rather than as the science of law, because in the term sociology I wish to include a study of the law itself and also to consider in what manner it originates and by what agency it is enforced, whether by sanctions of interest, sanctions of punishment, or sanctions of conscience. (*Loc. cit.* p. 475.) . . . When we examine the subject-matter of any treatise on sociology we usually find it dealing with the laws of institutions by which conduct is governed, and with the attempt to enforce these laws by governmental, moral, customary, ceremonial, and fashionable sanction. . . . sociology is the science of the control of human activities, not by mechanical devices as in mechanics, but by institutional devices. (*Ibid.*, p. 477.)

In conclusion, let me say that I do not presume, least of all in this brief essay, to determine the field of sociology. While Ward, Powell, and Thomas were probably right in their agreement that it

deals especially with social rules and institutions, including the *attitudes* produced by those rules (Thomas, *Ibid.*), the whole problem awaits more exact statement. In any case it should be repeated that the content of "sociology," as the convenient name for a somewhat complicated movement of thought, study, and social endeavor, will not necessarily be found to be identical with its final connotation as a specific division in a severely logical classification of the sciences. Instead of social psychology and sociology, taken together under "social theory," as in the terminology of Professor Thomas, it might conceivably turn out to be an expanded ethnology and collective psychology included under the inclusive word, "sociology."

So far as method is concerned, we can of course never completely separate the processual or abstract procedure from the historical or depictive. One is as truly "scientific" as the other, and each implies the other. This holds with especial force for the social sciences, because every human group, or society, is a more or less unique thing, requiring to be explained partly by historical methods. Social psychology, of the kind which possesses value for the social sciences, is essentially the science of *attitudes* — not those organic or "natural" attitudes which one sees tabulated in text-books on general psychology, because they, being common to all individuals, explain little or nothing of the concrete variety of social life. Social psychology, on the other hand, studies the *social*, or *cultural* attitudes, which are themselves the products of time and place. They arise, not merely out of a common, even universal, mental endowment, but from the interaction of pre-existing attitudes and social values. The content of those values, that is to say their *meaning* as objects of human activities, or attitudes, is itself a product of the historical life-process of the particular group in question. It is therefore always more or less unique, and demands for its complete explanation recourse to historical considerations, particularly those of culture-history, or, as more commonly known, ethnology.

Whether we call this general field sociology or social theory seems to me less important than that we recognize clearly its two fundamental aspects. The one interprets the subjective side of society, deals mainly with social *attitudes*, and is now inaccurately known as social psychology; the other studies the objective side of society, is concerned primarily with *social values*, and is now being developed jointly by ethnology and sociology. Taking the Latin *societas* as its key-

word, and following the lead of Sumner and Keller in their derivation from this group-term of the adjective "societal," it probably *should* be, and more than probably will *not* be, known as societology.¹⁸

The conception of sociology underlying the present volume will be found embodied in the outline of concepts represented by the titles of the several Parts and Chapters, with their sub-divisions, and in the Introductions to the several Parts and Chapters, especially in the General Introduction at the beginning. In the view of the present writer sociology is the study of group behavior in both its subjective and objective aspects; the objective side being portrayed by anthropology and ethnology with their illuminating studies of culture (the "social values" of Thomas as developed in "Methodological Note" to Vol. I., of *The Polish Peasant*) and the subjective side being supplied by social or group psychology, with its elucidation of social attitudes. Only by the study of these two in their mutual interaction can we in any field of social science make an adequate beginning in the study of group behavior. It will be observed that sociology in this case rests upon two distinct sciences, namely anthropology, including ethnology, and social or group psychology, neither of which alone gives a complete account of the whole of social behavior in its inner and outer aspects. Their simultaneous examination and interpretation is the task of pure sociology. In its applied aspects, dealing with social problems, it necessarily draws heavily upon the special fields of economics, statistical method, and political science.¹⁹

¹⁸ If it were possible to ignore the *history* of terminology, and substitute more exactly descriptive terms, *psychology* would denominate that science which studies the mental processes of the individual; while *social psychology* would name that study which investigates primarily the mental processes of the individual also, but views them as modified by contact with other mentalities. Both of these disciplines are essentially concerned with the individual mentality; hence both are properly called "psychology." Two related disciplines are interested fundamentally in the *group* rather than the individual. The first is now known by some as *collective psychology*, but it should perhaps be called *sociology*, because its main concern is with the *socius*, or rather with the *socii*, or comrades, who are considered not as individuals but as interacting members of the collectivity. Last would come *societology*, which considers the *societas*, or society, in its objective aspects, both material and immaterial, studying primarily not man himself, whether viewed individually, socially, or collectively, but man in the sense of the human group and its products, particularly its culture, which is a comprehensive term for all the social values.

¹⁹ A more complete statement of the present writer's views concerning the contribution of sociology to the social sciences will be found in the annual proceedings of the California Academy of Social Sciences, 1924.

PART ONE
SOCIAL EVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

The seven chapters included in Part I deal with fundamental notions which underlie all the social sciences. So far as sociology in particular is concerned, they fall under such time-honored categories as social "structures" or "products," and social "forces."

For example, under social *structures* one might include the following chapters on the super-organic and on the classification of social phenomena; while under the head of social *forces* would come the discussions below on attitudes and values, race, culture, and perhaps that on environment.

The term "social forces" is itself one that has not been unanimously accepted among sociologists. Assigned to first importance in the sociological system of Lester F. Ward and defended by numerous other sociologists, it has nevertheless been vigorously attacked, as philosophically unsound, by Professor E. C. Hayes. His paper, with the accompanying discussion, will be found in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 16, pp. 613, 642. If we accept the phrase "social forces" as signifying simply the constant and active factors in social processes, it will embrace, as indicated above, those phenomena which are discussed in the chapters on attitudes and values, culture, race, and environment. The remaining chapters of Part I deal either with social products and structures or with the general process of social evolution, which results from the interaction of social forces and social products. That is to say, from new attitudes acting upon existing values new attitudes are aroused; while values, under the impact of existing attitudes, are transformed into new values. This process of mutual interaction is most clearly elucidated by Professor W. I. Thomas in the passage quoted in Chapter V. below, and also in his other writings.

In other words social *products* are at the same time social *forces*. All we need to point out here is the fact that for our present purpose the phrase "Social Evolution" signifies this whole comprehensive interacting social process, and we have only to add, for the benefit of those accustomed to give prominence to such terms as "social forces" and "social products" (or "structures") that the full title of this Part of the present work might just as well have been given as "Social Evolution: Its Forces and Products." Broadly interpreted, however, that is the theme of the present volume as a whole.

So far as the present writer's position is concerned, it is held that when one has discussed social origins and social processes, not to

mention social problems, there is no need for separate and formal treatment of social "structures" as such. The most that could be done at that would be to offer a purely descriptive and static account,¹ which would be neither valuable nor interesting—all that is really significant in social anatomy being already expressed or implied in our treatment of social origins and processes, both of which are concepts requiring a dynamic interpretation and necessarily involving a more or less explicit consideration of the so-called social forces. But these mooted subjects are all comprehended under social *evolution*; and the viewpoint of the present volume on that subject will be found more fully stated in the Introduction preceding this chapter.

There may be those who will notice the omission of "Human Nature" from our chapter titles, especially since it is becoming more customary to treat that subject explicitly in works on social science. As for that, it needs only to be remarked that the omission in the present work is merely one of form, the substance of the materials on human nature being scattered throughout the volume, in numerous chapters, among which it will suffice to mention here only those on Folkways (III.), Attitudes (IV.), Race (V.), and Socialization (XXI.).

¹ The words "static" and "dynamic" are used here as Comte first used them, to signify emphasis upon social order and social change, respectively. (See *The Positive Philosophy*, Auguste Comte.)

CHAPTER I

NATURE AND FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE method used in presenting the subject of this chapter will be to permit each of the social sciences to speak for itself, in the persons of some of its own representative authorities. In so doing, selections are offered, first, from the writings of some individual or individuals specializing in the given field, and second, from the *Report of the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools*. This Joint Commission was constituted by the appointment of two members from each of the following societies: The American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, the American Political Science Association, the National Council of Geography Teachers, and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business.

In December, 1922, the Joint Commission made a report to the appointing bodies by presenting some "formulations" concerning "the distinctive contribution of each field of study" comprised within the territory of the scientific societies which appointed it. In so doing the Commission said in part: "In formulating these statements the Joint Commission tried to secure a consensus of expert opinion. It made preliminary inquiries from 100 historians, 100 political scientists, 100 geographers, 100 sociologists and 100 economists. It then sent out to committees of 100, for further suggestions and criticisms, a formulation of the distinctive contribution of each field. On the basis of the replies received, the representatives of each field worked out, in coöperation with the other members of the Joint Commission, the tentative formulations" [quoted below].

HISTORY

1. Transition from the Old to the New Conception of History

Herbert Spencer, the great English synthetic philosopher, was the pioneer in demanding a real history of culture in place of the empty catalogues and inconsequential gossip of the traditional historians. The

selection below was first published in book form in 1860, as the first chapter in his epoch-making little volume on "Education."¹

From the parental functions let us now pass to the functions of the citizen. We have here to inquire what knowledge best befits a man for the discharge of these functions. It cannot be alleged, as in the last case, that the need for knowledge fitting him for these functions is wholly overlooked; for our school courses contain certain studies which, nominally at least, bear upon political and social duties. Of these the only one that occupies a prominent place is History.

But, as already more than once hinted, the historic information commonly given is almost valueless for purposes of guidance. Scarcely any of the facts set down in our school-histories, and very few even of those contained in the more elaborate works written for adults, give any clue to the right principles of political action. The biographies of monarchs (and our children commonly learn little else) throw scarcely any light upon the science of society. Familiarity with court intrigues, plots, usurpations, or the like, and with all the personalities accompanying them, aids very little in elucidating the principles on which national welfare depends. We read of some squabble for power, that led to a pitched battle; that such and such were the names of the generals and their leading subordinates; that they had each so many thousand infantry and cavalry, and so many cannon; that they arranged their forces in this and that order; that they manoeuvred, attacked, and fell back in certain ways; that at this part of the day such disasters were sustained, and at that such advantages gained; that in one particular movement some leading officer fell, while in another a certain regiment was decimated; that after all the changing fortunes of the fight, the victory was gained by this or that army; and that so many were killed and wounded on each side, and so many captured by the conquerors. And now, out of the accumulated details which make up the narrative, say which it is that helps you in deciding on your conduct as a citizen. Supposing even that you had diligently read, not only *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, but accounts of all other battles that history mentions; how much more judicious would your vote be at the next election? "But these are facts—interesting facts," you say. Without doubt they are facts (such, at least, as are not wholly or partially fictions); and to many

¹ *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*, by Herbert Spencer; pp. 64-70. (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1898. Reprinted by permission.)

they may be interesting facts. But this by no means implies that they are valuable. Factitious or morbid opinion often gives seeming value to things that have scarcely any. A tulipomaniac will not part with a choice bulb for its weight in gold. To another man an ugly piece of cracked old china seems his most desirable possession. And there are those who give high prices for the relics of celebrated murderers. Will it be contended that these tastes are any measures of value in the things that gratify them? If not, then it must be admitted that the liking felt for certain classes of historical facts is no proof of their worth; and that we must test their worth as we test the worth of other facts, by asking to what uses they are applicable. Were someone to tell you that your neighbor's cat kittened yesterday, you would say the information was worthless. Fact though it might be, you would say it was an utterly useless fact—a fact that would in no way influence your actions in life—a fact that would not help you in learning how to live completely. Well, apply the same test to the great mass of historical facts, and you will get the same result. They are facts from which no conclusions can be drawn—*unorganizable* facts; and therefore facts which can be of no service in establishing principles of conduct, which is the chief use of facts. Read them, if you like, for amusement; but do not flatter yourself they are instructive.

That which constitutes History, properly so called, is in great part omitted from works on the subject. Only of late years have historians commenced giving us, in any considerable quantity, the truly valuable information. As in past ages the king was everything and the people nothing; so, in past histories the doings of the king fill the entire picture, to which the national life forms but an obscure background. While only now, when the welfare of nations rather than of rulers is becoming the dominant idea, are historians beginning to occupy themselves with the phenomena of social progress. That which it really concerns us to know, is the natural history of society. We want all facts which help us to understand how a nation has grown and organized itself. Among these, let us of course have an account of its government; with as little as may be of gossip about the men who officered it, and as much as possible about the structure, principles, methods, prejudices, corruptions, etc., which it exhibited: and let this account not only include the nature and actions of the central government, but also those of local governments, down to

their minutest ramifications. Let us of course also have a parallel description of the ecclesiastical government — its organization, its conduct, its power, its relations to the state: and accompanying this, the ceremonial, creed, and religious ideas — not only those nominally believed, but those really believed and acted upon. Let us at the same time be informed of the control exercised by class over class, as displayed in all social observances — in titles, salutations, and forms of address. Let us know, too, what were all the other customs which regulated the popular life out of doors and indoors: including those which concern the relations of the sexes, and the relations of parents to children. The superstitions, also, from the more important myths down to the charms in common use, should be indicated. Next should come a delineation of the industrial system: showing to what extent the division of labor was carried; how trades were regulated, whether by caste, guilds, or otherwise; what was the connection between employers and employed; what were the agencies for distributing commodities; what were the means of communication; what was the circulating medium. Accompanying all which should come an account of the industrial arts technically considered: stating the processes in use, and the quality of the products. Further, the intellectual condition of the nation in its various grades should be depicted: not only with respect to the kind and amount of education, but with respect to the progress made in science, and the prevailing manner of thinking. The degree of aesthetic culture, as displayed in architecture, sculpture, painting, dress, music, poetry, and fiction, should be described. Nor should there be omitted a sketch of the daily lives of the people — their food, their homes, and their amusements. And lastly, to connect the whole, should be exhibited the morals, theoretical and practical, of all classes: as indicated in their laws, habits, proverbs, deeds. All these facts, given with as much brevity as consists with clearness and accuracy, should be so grouped and arranged that they may be comprehended in their *ensemble*; and thus may be contemplated as mutually dependent parts of one great whole. The aim should be so to present them that we may readily trace the *consensus* subsisting among them; with the view of learning what social phenomena co-exist with others. And then the corresponding delineations of succeeding ages should be so managed as to show us, as clearly as may be, how each belief, institution, custom, and arrangement was modified; and how the *consensus* of preceding structures and func-

tions was developed into the *consensus* of succeeding ones. Such alone is the kind of information respecting past times, which can be of service to the citizen for the regulation of his conduct. The only history that is of practical value, is what may be called Descriptive Sociology. And the highest office which the historian can discharge, is that of so narrating the lives of nations, as to furnish materials for a Comparative Sociology; and for the subsequent determination of the ultimate laws to which social phenomena conform.

But now mark, that even supposing an adequate stock of this truly valuable historical knowledge has been acquired, it is of comparatively little use without the key. And the key is to be found only in Science. Without an acquaintance with the general truths of biology and psychology, rational interpretation of social phenomena is impossible.

2. The New History

The preceding selection is taken from the works of a synthetic philosopher, although it deals with history. This is contrary to the plan of this chapter, which is to permit the several social sciences to speak for themselves in the words of their own authoritative representatives. Exception is made in the case of Spencer because he seems to have been the real pioneer in demanding the reform of history, despite the fact that he was not himself a historian.

In his widely quoted essay on "The New History," Professor Robinson presents abundant evidence which shows that the traditional catalogue of military and political events was still parading itself as history seventy years after Spencer exposed its social worthlessness. In the following selection we omit Professor Robinson's admirable analysis and examples of the old pseudo-history, in order to quote more fully his conception, as a professional historian, of the *new history*.²

Hitherto writers have been prone to deal with events for their own sake; a deeper insight will surely lead us, as time goes on, to reject the anomalous and seemingly accidental occurrences and dwell rather upon those which illustrate some profound historical truth. And there is a very simple principle by which the relevant and useful may be determined and the irrelevant rejected. Is the fact or occurrence one which will aid the reader to grasp the meaning of any great period of

² *The New History, Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook*, by James Harvey Robinson, Professor of History in Columbia University; pp. 15, 17, 23. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1912. Reprinted by permission.)

human development or the true nature of any momentous institution? It should then be cherished as a precious means to an end, and the more engaging it is, the better; its inherent interest will only facilitate our work, not embarrass it. On the other hand, is an event seemingly fortuitous, isolated, and anomalous,—like the story of Rienzi, the September massacres, or the murder of Marat? We should then hesitate to include it on its own merits,—at least in a brief historical manual—for, interesting as it may be as an heroic or terrible incident, it may mislead the reader and divert his attention from the prevailing interests, preoccupations and permanent achievements of the past.

If we have not been unfair in our review of the more striking peculiarities of popular historiography, we find them to be as follows:

(1) A careless inclusion of mere names, which can scarcely have any meaning for the reader and which, instead of stimulating thought and interest, merely weigh down his spirit.

(2) A penchant more or less irresistible to recite political events to the exclusion of other matters often of far greater moment.

(3) The old habit of narrating extraordinary episodes, not because they illustrate the general trend of affairs or the prevailing conditions of a particular time, but simply because they are conspicuous in the annals of the past. This results in ludicrous disregard of perspective which assigns more importance to a demented journalist like Marat than to so influential a writer as Erasmus. . . .

It is true that it has long been held that certain lessons could be derived from the past,—precedents for the statesman and the warrior, moral guidance and consoling instances of providential interference for the commonalty. But there is a growing suspicion, which has reached conviction in the minds of most modern historians, that this type of usefulness is purely illusory. The present writer is anxious to avoid any risk of being regarded as an advocate of these supposed advantages of historical study. Their value rests on the assumption that conditions remain sufficiently uniform to give precedents a perpetual value, while, as a matter of fact, conditions, at least in our own time, are so rapidly altering that for the most part it would be dangerous indeed to attempt to apply past experience to the solution of current problems. Moreover, we rarely have sufficient reliable information in regard to the supposed analogous situation in the past to enable us to apply it to present needs. Most of the appeals of inexpensive

oratory to "what history teaches" belong to this class of assumed analogies which will not bear close scrutiny. When I speak of history enabling us to understand ourselves and the problems and prospects of mankind, I have something quite different in mind, which I will try to make plain by calling the reader's attention to the use that he makes of his own personal history.

We are almost entirely dependent upon our memory of our past thoughts and experiences for an understanding of the situation in which we find ourselves at any given moment. To take the nearest example, the reader will have to consult his own history to understand why his eyes are fixed upon this particular page. If he should fall into a sound sleep and be suddenly awakened, his memory might for the moment be paralyzed, and he would gaze in astonishment about the room, with no realization of his whereabouts. The fact that all the familiar objects about him presented themselves plainly to his view would not be sufficient to make him feel at home until his memory had come to his aid and enabled him to recall a certain portion of the past. The momentary suspension of memory's functions as one recovers from a fainting fit or emerges from the effects of an anaesthetic is sometimes so distressing as to amount to a sort of intellectual agony. In its normal state the mind selects automatically, from the almost infinite mass of memories, just those things in our past which make us feel at home in the present. It works so easily and efficiently that we are unconscious of what it is doing for us and of how dependent we are upon it. It supplies so promptly and so precisely what we need from the past in order to make the present intelligible that we are beguiled into the mistaken notion that the present is self-explanatory and quite able to take care of itself, and that the past is largely dead and irrelevant, except when we have to make a conscious effort to recall some elusive fact.

What we call history is not so different from our more intimate personal memories as at first sight it seems to be; for very many of the useful and essential elements in our recollections are not personal experiences at all, but include a multitude of things which we have been told or have read; and these play a very important part in our life. Should the reader of this page stop to reflect, he would perceive a long succession of historical antecedents leading up to his presence in a particular room, his ability to read the English language, his momentary freedom from pressing cares, and his inclination to center

his attention upon a discussion of the nature and value of historical study. Were he not vaguely conscious of these historical antecedents, he would be in the bewildered condition spoken of above. Some of the memories necessary to save him from his bewilderment are parts of his own past experience, but many of them belong to the realm of history, namely, to what he has been told or what he has read of the past.

I could have no hope that this line of argument would make the slightest impression upon the reader, were he confined either to the immediate impressions of the moment, or to his personal experiences. It gives one something of a shock, indeed, to consider what a very small part of our guiding convictions are in any way connected with our personal experience. The date of our own birth is quite as strictly historical a fact as that of Artaphernes or of Innocent III; we are forced to a helpless reliance upon the evidence of others for both events.

So it comes about that our personal recollections insensibly merge into history in the ordinary sense of the word. History, from this point of view, may be regarded as an artificial extension and broadening of our memories and they may be used to overcome the natural bewilderment of all unfamiliar situations. Could we suddenly be endowed with a Godlike and exhaustive knowledge of the whole history of mankind, far more complete than the combined knowledge of all the histories ever written, we should gain forthwith a Godlike appreciation of the world in which we live, and a Godlike insight into the evils which mankind now suffers, as well as into the most promising methods for alleviating them, *not because the past would furnish precedents of conduct, but because our conduct would be based upon a perfect comprehension of existing conditions founded upon a perfect knowledge of the past.* As yet we are not in a position to interrogate the past with a view to gaining light on great social, political, economic, religious, and educational questions in the manner in which we settle the personal problems which face us — for example, whether we should make such and such a visit or investment, or read such and such a book, — by unconsciously judging the situation in the light of our recollections. Historians have not as yet set themselves to furnish us with what lies behind our great contemporaneous task of human betterment. They have hitherto had other notions of their functions, and were they asked to furnish answers to the questions that a person

au courant with the problems of the day would most naturally put to them, they would with one accord begin to make excuses. One would say that it had long been recognized that it was the historian's business to deal with kings, parliaments, constitutions, wars, treaties, and territorial changes; another would declare that recent history cannot be adequately written and that, therefore, we can never hope to bring the past into relation with the present, but must always leave a fitting interval between ourselves and the nearest point to which the historian should venture to extend his researches; a third will urge that to have a purpose in historical study is to endanger those principles of objectivity upon which all sound and scientific research must be based. So it comes about that our books are like very bad memories which insist upon recalling facts that have no assignable relation to our needs, and this is the reason why the practical value of history has so long been obscured. . . .

Society is today engaged in a tremendous and unprecedented effort to better itself in manifold ways. Never has our knowledge of the world and of man been so great as it is now; never before has there been so much general good will and so much intelligent social activity as now prevails. The part that each of us can play in forwarding some phase of this reform will depend upon our understanding of existing conditions and opinion, and these can only be explained, as has been shown, by following more or less carefully the processes that produced them. We must develop historical-mindedness upon a far more generous scale than hitherto, for this will add a still deficient element in our intellectual equipment and will promote rational progress as nothing else can do. The present has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has now come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance.

The "New History" is escaping from the limitations formerly imposed upon the study of the past. It will come in time consciously to meet our daily needs; it will avail itself of all those discoveries that are being made about mankind by anthropologists, economists, psychologists, and sociologists—discoveries which during the past fifty years have served to revolutionize our ideas of the origin, progress, and prospects of our race. There is no branch of organic or inorganic science which has not undergone the most remarkable changes during the last half century, and many new branches of social science, even the names of which would have been unknown to his-

torians in the middle of the nineteenth century, have been added to the long list. It is inevitable that history should be involved in this revolutionary process, but since it must be confessed that this necessity has escaped many contemporaneous writers, it is no wonder that the intelligent public continues to accept somewhat archaic ideas of the scope and character of history.

The title of this little volume has been chosen with the view of emphasizing the fact that history should not be regarded as a stationary subject which can only progress by refining its methods and accumulating, criticizing, and assimilating new material, but that it is bound to alter its ideals and aims with the general progress of society and of the social sciences, and that it should ultimately play an infinitely more important rôle in our intellectual life than it has hitherto done.

3. The Distinctive Contribution of History to the Social Studies ³

The distinctive contribution of history to the social studies is to portray human events and activities as they actually occurred; its guiding principles are continuity and development. Therefore these events and activities are not regarded as isolated and unrelated or as of equal importance. Every condition or event is conceived to be related to something that went before or to something that comes after. Conditions and events are deemed important in so far as they serve to throw light upon some course of development. More briefly, then, the special and peculiar function of history is to trace development.

History places, and helps to explain, successive stages in the development of mankind. It constantly extends backward the memory of living men and gives them a sense of perspective to aid them in forming their judgments on contemporary affairs. In the light of history our most valued social possessions are seen to be deeply rooted in the past but the world is viewed as undergoing a continuous process of adjustment and change. Finally, history seeks to give students an intelligent notion of those human activities, decisions, and achievements which lie behind our present-day institutions and problems.

³ From the *Report of the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools*. 1922.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

4. The Nature and Field of Political Science⁴

[The following extract is not very recent, but is chosen because of its remarkable lucidity and the fact that it still seems to express the viewpoint of authorities in this field.]

In my view a science has for a very long time past been insensibly growing up by the side of history, and every one has perceived that it has some connection with history, and must draw a great part of its materials from history; this is political science. On the other side, within the department of history itself, it has been more and more felt that the accumulation of facts suggested the possibility of a science; what was to be done with them if no generalizations were possible which might reduce them to order? But all this time it has been overlooked that the science which lay so near to history was itself the very science which historians were calling out for.

And now I must tell you more distinctly what I mean by political science.

We start of course from the fact that man is a social or gregarious animal, but we deal, not with the sociability of man simply, but with one peculiar phenomenon connected with it. For the sociability of man has many aspects, and brings into existence several sciences; for example, the science of language and economic science. The phenomenon in question is this. As a matter of course human beings, like other animals, are united together in families, and we might be prepared to find the family tie stronger and the family organization somewhat more developed in them than in inferior animals. But we observe something more, something which when we think philosophically, — that is, when we contemplate it as if we had not been familiar with it all our lives, — is very surprising and unexpected. We find that men have another bond of union beyond that of the family, and another higher organization.

In nature there is seldom breach of continuity, and so this higher organization is seldom quite distinct from the family, and sometimes might be explained away as if it were not distinct at all. Usually,

⁴ *Introduction to Political Science*, by Sir J. R. Seeley, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge; pp. 13-18. (London and New York. Copyrighted by the Macmillan Company. 1896. Reprinted by permission.)

however, it is tolerably distinct. Almost in any place, in any circumstances where a human being might be found, if you questioned him you would find that he considered himself to belong to some large corporation which imposed duties and conferred rights upon him. Each man has a name which belongs to himself alone, and another name which he has in common with all other members of his family; but if you would describe him and class him sufficiently you must learn a further fact about him, you must know to what state he belongs. State? But what is state?

When I say "I am an Englishman," what do I mean? Does it refer to my parentage or family? Well! I cannot absolutely say that it does not. I regard myself as being in some sort of kin to other Englishmen, as though we were all alike descended from some primitive Angelus. I feel this very strongly in the presence of foreigners, for I find that they speak a different language and seem both mentally and bodily of a somewhat different type. But whether it really is so is after all of no practical importance. I am an Englishman, and should be so just as much if my ancestors were Frenchmen. And yet that I am an Englishman and not a Frenchman is all-important to me.

Mankind fall into classes in different ways according to the observer's point of view. The anthropologist divides the species according to some bodily difference; *e.g.*, Blumenbach according to color, Retzius according to the shape of the skull, recent anthropologists according to the character of the hair. The ethnologist introduces new distinctions founded upon language, and these are distinctions unknown to the anthropologist. He talks of Indo-Germanic and Semitic races; but the anthropologist protests that he knows of no such distinction, and that to him all the races called Indo-Germanic and all the races called Semitic appear to belong to one variety. Now in political science the groups are different again. Language, bodily conformation, decide nothing here. We and the Channel Islanders speak different languages, we and the Anglo-Americans speak the same; but in political science we and the Channel Islanders are in the same class, we and the Anglo-Americans in different classes, because here men are grouped according to states.

The division of mankind into states is of vast importance, first, because of its universality; secondly, because of its intensity and the momentous consequences it has had. When I speak of its universality I admit that I stretch considerably the meaning commonly given to the

word state. In the Greek or Roman, or in the European sense of the word, the state has been and is by no means universal; on the contrary, it is somewhat rare among mankind. But we want some one word to denote the large corporation, larger than the family yet usually connected with the family, whatever form it may assume, and the word state is the only word which can be made to serve this purpose. Sometimes it would be better called a tribe or clan, sometimes a church or religion, but whatever we call it the phenomenon is very universal. Almost everywhere men conceive themselves as belonging to some large corporation.

They conceive themselves too as belonging to it for life and death; they conceive that in case of need this corporation may make unlimited demands upon them; they conceive that they are bound, if called upon, to die for it.

Hence most interesting and memorable results follow from the existence of these great corporations. In the first place, the growth and development of the corporations themselves, the various forms they assume, the various phases they pass through; then the interaction of these corporations upon each other, the wars they wage, the treaties they conclude, all the phenomena of conquest and federation; then again the infinite effects produced upon the individual by belonging to such a corporation, those infinite effects which we sum up in the single expressive word civilisation; here, you see, is a field of speculation almost boundless, for it includes almost all that is memorable in the history of mankind, and yet it is all directly produced by the fact that human beings almost everywhere belong to states.

This peculiar human phenomenon then, the state in the largest acceptance of the word, distinct from the family though not unconnected with it, distinct also from the nation though sometimes roughly coinciding with it, is the subject of political science. Or since the distinctive characteristic of the state, wherever it appears, is that it makes use of the arrangement or contrivance called government, we may say that this science deals with government as political economy deals with wealth, as biology deals with life, as algebra deals with numbers, as geometry deals with space and magnitude.

Such is the subject of the science. The problems it presents will evidently arrange themselves under two heads. First will come those presented by the internal structure and development of the state itself, the manner in which government enters into it, and the machinery

through which government works; then will follow the problems of the interaction of one state upon another, or the external action of the state.

5. The Distinctive Contribution of Political Science to the Social Studies⁵

Political science is the study of the state, a term which includes all forms of political organization. It deals with the life of men as organized under government and law. As its distinctive contribution to the social studies, it gives an understanding of social control by means of law and of the promotion of general welfare by means of governmental action.

Political science includes a study of the organization and the activities of states, and of the principles and ideals which underlie political organization and activities. It deals with the relations among men which are controlled by the state, with the relations of men to the state itself, and with those aspects of international life that come under political control. It considers the problems of adjusting political authority to individual liberty, and of determining the distribution of governing power among the agencies through which the state's will is formed, expressed and executed.

Political science seeks to develop in individuals a sense of their rights and responsibilities as members of the state, and a realization of the significance of law. It substitutes accurate information and intelligent opinion for emotions and prejudices as a basis for forming judgments in politics and world affairs.

ECONOMICS

6. Economics as the Money Measurement of Business Motives⁶

Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.

Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth, and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of man. For man's char-

⁵ Report of the Joint Commission.

⁶ *Principles of Economics*, by Alfred Marshall, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Cambridge, Fifth Edition, pp. 1-2; 14-15; 25-26. (London. Copyrighted by the Macmillan Company. 1907. Reprinted by permission.)

acter has been moulded by his every-day work, and the material resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence unless it be that of his religious ideals; and the two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the religious and the economic. Here and there the ardors of the military or the artistic spirit has been for a while predominant: but religious and economic influences have nowhere been displaced from the front rank even for a time; and they have nearly always been more important than all others put together. Religious motives are more intense than economic; but their direct action seldom extends over so large a part of life. For the business by which a person earns his livelihood generally fills his thoughts during by far the greater part of those hours in which his mind is at its best; during them his character is being formed by the way in which he uses his faculties in his work, by the thoughts and the feelings which it suggests, and by his relations to his associates in work, his employers or his employees. . . .

Economics is a study of men as they live and move and think in the ordinary business of life. But it concerns itself chiefly with those motives which affect, most powerfully and most steadily, man's conduct in the business part of his life. Every one who is worth anything carries his higher nature with him into business; and, there as elsewhere, he is influenced by his personal affections, by his conceptions of duty and his reverence for high ideals. And it is true that the best energies of the ablest inventors and organizers of improved methods and appliances is stimulated by a noble emulation more than by any love of wealth for its own sake. But, for all that, the steadiest motive to ordinary business work is the desire for the pay which is the material reward of work. The pay may be on its way to be spent selfishly or unselfishly, for noble or base ends; and here the variety of human nature comes into play. But the motive is supplied by a definite amount of money: and it is this definite and exact money measurement of the steadiest motives in business life, which has enabled economics far to outrun every other branch of the study of man. Just as the chemist's fine balance has made chemistry more exact than most other physical sciences; so this economist's balance, rough and imperfect as it is, has made economics more exact than any other branch of social science. But of course economics cannot be compared with the exact physical sciences: for it deals with the ever changing and subtle forces of human nature.

The advantage which economics has over other branches of social science appears then to arise from the fact that its special field of work gives rather larger opportunities for exact methods than any other branch. It concerns itself chiefly with those desires, aspirations and other affections of human nature, the outward manifestations of which appear as incentives to action in such a form that the force or quantity of the incentives can be estimated and measured with some approach to accuracy; and which therefore are in some degree amenable to treatment by scientific machinery. An opening is made for the methods and the tests of science as soon as the force of a person's motives — *not* the motives themselves — can be approximately measured by the sum of money which he will just give up in order to secure a desired satisfaction; or again by the sum which is just required to induce him to undergo a certain fatigue. . . .

Perhaps the earlier English economists confined their attention too much to the motives of individual action. But in fact economists, like all other students of social science, are concerned with individuals chiefly as members of the social organism. As a cathedral is something more than the stones of which it is made, as a person is something more than a series of thoughts and feelings, so the life of society is something more than the sum of the lives of its individual members. It is true that the action of the whole is made up of that of its constituent parts; and that in most economic problems the best starting-point is to be found in the motives that affect the individual, regarded not indeed as an isolated atom, but as a member of some particular trade or industrial group; but it is also true, as German writers have well urged, that economics has a great and an increasing concern in motives connected with the collective ownership of property and the collective pursuit of important aims. The growing earnestness of the age, the growing intelligence of the mass of the people, and the growing power of the telegraph, the press, and other means of communication are ever widening the scope of collective action for the public good; and these changes, together with the spread of the coöperative movement, and other kinds of voluntary association are growing up under the influence of various motives besides that of pecuniary gain; and they are ever opening to the economist new opportunities of measuring motives whose action it had seemed impossible to reduce to any sort of law. . . .

To conclude provisionally: economists study the actions of indi-

viduals, but study them in relation to social rather than individual life; and therefore concern themselves but little with personal peculiarities of temper and character. They watch carefully the conduct of a whole class of people, sometimes the whole of a nation, sometimes only those living in a certain district, more often those engaged in some particular trade at some time and place: and by the aid of statistics, or in other ways, they ascertain how much money on the average the members of the particular group they are watching are just willing to pay as the price of a certain thing which they desire, or how much must be offered to them to induce them to undergo a certain effort or abstinence that they dislike. The measurement of motive thus obtained is not indeed perfectly accurate; for if it were, economics would rank with the most advanced of the physical sciences, and not as it actually does with the least advanced.

7. Economics as the Organization of Free Exchange⁷

Economics, as we have observed before, is the science of a certain form of organization of human activities. The fact of organization still further limits the scope of the discussion to the rationalistic view of activity as directed to the satisfaction of wants conceived as given and permanent entities. Conduct itself is necessarily forward-looking, but organized conduct is still more so. Any machinery of organization implies relatively much taking thought, since it requires time for its development and time for its operation. A most essential feature of economic organization as it exists is its anticipation of the wants of the consumer over a long and ever longer period of production; and this anticipation implies stability in the character of the wants themselves.

A clear view of what we are doing demands special emphasis on this character of economic theory as the science of a system of organization. Human activity might be relatively unorganized or it might be organized in many different ways. History, and especially modern history, is largely the story of progressive organization and its changes in form. Organization is nearly synonymous with division of labor. In organized activity individuals perform different tasks, and each enjoys the fruits of the labor of others. The two fundamental problems

⁷ From *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit*, by Frank H. Knight; pp. 54-55. (Boston and New York. 1921. This selection is used by permission of, and special arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.)

of organization are the assignment of tasks and the apportionment of rewards. In unorganized action each person performs all the tasks by whose performance he benefits, and his reward is the immediate, physical benefit of his own work. But when men work together some machinery must be provided to give each his special work and to determine the amount of the results of others' effort which he shall obtain and the amount of his own product which he shall give up to others.

Modern industrial society, the "existing economic order," performs this twofold task chiefly through free agreement and voluntary exchange between individuals themselves. Economic theory is the analysis of this mechanism, viewed for the scientific purpose of simplification as the only form of human relation.

8. The Distinctive Contribution of Economics to the Social Studies⁸

The distinctive contribution of economics to the social studies is the understanding it gives of the processes by which men get a living. A very large part of human activity is devoted to the process of getting a living. One of the most significant things about our world is the fact that nature does not gratuitously supply all, or even many, of the commodities and services desired. In consequence, we "struggle" to get a living; we learn to "economize" (in the broadest sense of that term) in the selection and utilization of effective means of gaining desired ends. These activities are *our economic activities*. They are carried on largely in group life and, even when most individual, are affected by group life. Economics, then, promotes a realization of what it means to live together and an understanding of the conditions essential to living together well, because it helps to explain the organization and functioning of an evolving society from the point of view of the social processes of making a living.

Economics sets forth, for example, certain aspects of our specialization, our interdependence, our associative effort, our technological struggle with nature, our pecuniary organization of the production and sharing of goods, our utilization of labor under the wage system, our market exchange, our international economic relations, our scheme of private property and competitive effort — all of which have become vital parts of our present social organization — and it shows how all

⁸ Report of the Joint Commission.

of these function in enabling us to work and to live together. Concerning these economic processes certain generalizations or laws have been worked out and they are available as standards or guides for individuals and for groups.

Living together well in a democracy will be furthered if its people take an intelligent part in the guidance of the process. It is in this connection that it becomes peculiarly important that there should be a widespread knowledge of economic generalizations. Since a large part of our activities are economic activities, problems of competition, combinations of capital and of labor, distribution of income in relation to the common welfare, trade, transportation, and finance (to cite only a few) will always receive a large share of attention by every society which is concerned in restraining, regulating and promoting economic activities that affect the social welfare. If democracy is to succeed, a large number of its members must learn to form intelligent judgments upon economic issues — to make those wise choices between alternative courses of action which are the real essence of "economy" broadly conceived. They can do this only provided they come to know the general plan or organization of our economic life, and to appreciate the existence and character of economic law in both domestic and international relations.

SOCIOLOGY

9. The Distinctive Contribution of Sociology to the Social Studies⁹

The distinctive contribution of sociology to the social studies is to show that, however much may be allowed for individual initiative and for natural environment, human life has been conditioned more by its social setting than by any other cause. Understanding of the social setting results from study of society as a composite unity made up of many interrelated groups and carrying on many independent activities all of which are conditioned by certain ever present types of causation. The multitudinous and repetitious manifestations of these types of causation are more or less subject to statistical treatment and make up those trends of social change a full statement of which would be social laws. Sociology studies the various forms of causal relations between the activities of individuals that are always

⁹ Report of the Joint Commission.

occurring in homes, schools, neighborhoods, crowds, publics and wherever human beings meet, and that give rise to public opinion, customs and institutions.

Sociology also studies the problems of population as affecting all types of social activity, the effects of small and large numbers, of sparse and dense distribution, of differences in the quality of the individuals who compose the population, both their inborn traits as determined by racial and family heredity, and the acquired traits which result from prevalent vices, diseases, occupation and mode of life. This branch of sociology includes certain aspects of the problems of immigration, eugenics and public health.

It studies the causes, prevention, and treatment of poverty and crime.

It makes a comparative study of different societies, including the most primitive, which reveals the social origins and the method of progress. This comparative study shows that nothing is too repugnant to us to have been customary somewhere and that we must be slow to think that anything is too ideal to be possible sometime, for customs and institutions are as variable as the states of mind and feeling which issue from social causation.

The study of sociology tends to dissolve the prejudices and bigotries which are the chief obstacles to social co-operation by showing that such prejudices are mostly formed at an age when rational judgment on fundamental problems is impossible, and that in the overwhelming majority of instances those who differ from each other most radically would hold similar opinions and sentiments if they had been moulded by similar influences.

Sociology affords a clear view of the aims of education for it shows that distinctively human nature is second nature socially acquired and that if from birth one could be excluded from all social contacts he would remain a naked savage and a dumb brute. It illuminates the methods of education by its study of the effects of social contacts, and it supplies materials for moral instruction in the schools by its study of the relations between society and the individual and of the interdependence of groups. Such study presents in its full light the fact that all social life is team-work. It tends to evoke the spirit of co-operation. It reveals grounds for ethical requirements and sources of ethical incentive.

10. The Field of Sociology¹⁰

Scarcely any event in the history of learning is more dramatic or more enlightening than the struggle of sociology for recognition as a science and especially for its acceptance as an academic discipline worthy of full rank and privilege. Yet the event is not unique. It is but the latest — perhaps the most remarkable — example of a contest which many a new — many an upstart or plebeian — science has had in order to win a place beside the older disciplines. In its rise did not even astronomy leave martyrs by the way? This “jealousy of science” is a very curious phenomenon; but it is perhaps not hard to explain. Is it not due at once to the pride and to the conservatism of learning? Like the ancient *trivium* and *quadrivium*, it is perhaps natural that the orthodox or time-sanctioned studies should become a privileged oligarchy, assuming that they have explained all the phenomena of the cosmos worthy or capable of scientific treatment; and that their votaries should feel it their duty to challenge the credentials of any new claimant of scientific honors.

How rich and varied is the program of studies which the college or university now displays compared with the meager list of a few decades ago! What an amazing transformation has taken place within my own years of college study and teaching! Biology, for instance, was long excluded from full academic franchise. It was criticised as a study devoid of genuine disciplining or scientific value; and, besides, in some quarters biology was anathema; for did it not reek with the tainted breath of evolution and Darwinism? In the colleges of the eighteen-seventies — often in those of a much later time — modern languages were grudgingly admitted as bi-activities, if indeed any place at all could be found for them in their cramped curricula. Even the English language and English literature were denied an honorable place in the schedule of prescribed studies; for did they not lack the mysterious quality of “scientific discipline” which the “classics” were supposed to possess in a preëminent degree? Occasionally, to still the rising clamor of rude philistines for something more recent and more useful than that provided by the conventional programs, a sop was tossed to the crowd in the form of a “side-line” of subjects consisting

¹⁰ From “Sociology: Its Critics and Its Fruits,” by George Elliott Howard, in *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VI., No. 4 (April, 1922); pp. 1-3. Reprinted by permission.

usually of a melanges of English literature, modern science, and French or German, seasoned perchance with a "pinch" of history; but the half-ashamed graduate was not decorated with the proud title of "bachelor of arts." He had to content himself with some such humble degree as "bachelor of philosophy"; although that label might imply as little of philosophy as the more aristocratic badge implied of art.

However, it is the case of the social sciences which at this time chiefly challenges our attention. In America it is scarcely four decades since the oldest of these subjects won a really important place in college education. First history, then economics, and then political science, each reluctantly, was admitted to full academic franchise; but each had to run the gauntlet of hostile criticism. Each was challenged to validate its scientific quality and to demonstrate its relative fitness to be accredited as an educative discipline. In fact, with very few exceptions, it was not until about 1885 that separate chairs of history began to appear. "It is all very well," sadly conceded my colleague, a professor of Greek in those days, "that students should *read* some history; but is it quite right to induce them to spend so great a share of their precious time on an easy culture subject to the neglect of the really scientific disciplines?" Surely you recognize the tone! The portentous hegira had already begun!

Greater trouble was at hand. The differentiation of the social sciences was not yet complete. A still more audacious claimant for scientific recognition now sought admission to the temple of learning. For the study, which Auguste Comte placed at the head of his "hierarchy" of the sciences and which in 1839 he named "sociology," had for its function the boldest, the hardest task which the human mind had thus far conceived: the exploration and explanation of social life as a whole. General and persistent has been the militant reaction of conservatism. The attempt of the sociologist to reveal law and cause; to disclose orderly process in the molding of personality and group-behavior in their mutual inter-relations; to demonstrate the reality of the social control of phenomena, of institutions, commonly regarded as beyond the limits of human power: such hardihood, it is not surprising, has evoked wide-spread criticism, sometimes calm and helpful, often violent, and occasionally lapsing into ridicule, even among disciples of the sister social sciences.

Exercises

1. What peculiar value attaches to the words of the Joint Commission on Social Studies?
2. On what grounds did Spencer indict the history of his day? To what extent does it hold true today?
3. What, in Spencer's view, are the proper tasks of the history writer?
4. What benefit does he expect from the study of history in this sense? Have recent events tended to justify his hope?
5. How fully do Robinson's criticisms of history coincide with Spencer's?
6. Show, by reference to Robinson's account of personal experience, just how historical knowledge can be made of use in current affairs.
7. Critically compare the statement of the Joint Commission with those of Spencer and Robinson.
8. What is the relation between political science and history, according to Seeley?
9. How widely should one interpret Seeley's conclusion that the *state* is the subject-matter of political science?
10. Indicate the several specific problems with which political science deals.
11. What is the practical value of this science?
12. What is the field of economics according to Marshall?
13. Why is it more accurate than other social sciences?
14. What kind of motives does the economist measure? How does he measure them?
15. What does Knight mean by saying that economics is the analysis of a certain form of *organization*?
16. Is Knight's definition more, or less, inclusive than Marshall's? Is it more, or less, objective?
17. What social benefits does the Joint Commission see in the study of economics?
18. According to the Joint Commission, what is the distinctive contribution of sociology to the social studies?
19. What central idea, if any, unites all the various inquiries of sociology named by the Joint Commission?
20. What practical social benefits result from the study of this subject?
21. What rôle does Howard indicate for sociology, and why is it opposed by older sciences?
22. Compare the above statements concerning the field of Sociology and related sciences with that presented in the Introduction to the present volume, particularly Section 8.

Additional References

1. Comte, Auguste: *Positive Philosophy* (Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau), Vol. I., pp. 23-35. Contains the famous discussion on the "hierarchy" or classification, of the sciences, by the so-called "father of sociology."
2. Dealey, James Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*; Chapter V. Discusses Comte's "hierachy of the sciences," and the nature of modern sociology.
3. Leacock, Stephen: *Elements of Political Science*, pp. 6-12. Treats of Political Science in relation to other sciences.
4. Seligman, Edwin R. A.: *Principles of Economics*, pp. 6-8. Distinguishes the terms "economics" and "political economy."
5. Smith, Goldwin: "The Treatment of History," in *Annual Reprints of the American Historical Association*, 1905 p. 67, *passim*. Discusses scientific and philosophical methods in the writing of history.
6. Ward, Lester F.: *Pure Sociology*, pp. 65-71. An account of Ward's dispute with Spencer over Comte's classification of the sciences.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA: THE SUPER-ORGANIC

1. Spencer's Original Use of the Term

THE phrase "the super-organic" was originated and defined by Herbert Spencer in 1876. Recent writers have elaborated the idea in a very illuminating way, and the concept is becoming one of the most fundamental, if not the most fundamental, for all the social sciences without exception. The following selections from Spencer will show how clearly he grasped the distinctive character of social phenomena.

SUPER-ORGANIC EVOLUTION¹

Of the three broadly-distinguished kinds of Evolution, we come now to the third. The first kind, Inorganic Evolution, which, had it been dealt with, would have occupied two volumes, one dealing with Astrogeology and the other with Geogeny, was passed over because it seemed undesirable to postpone the more important applications of the doctrine for the purpose of elaborating those less important applications which logically precede them. The four volumes that have followed *First Principles*, have dealt with Organic Evolution: two of them with those physical phenomena presented by living aggregates, vegetal and animal, of all classes; and the other two with those more special phenomena distinguished as psychical, which the most evolved organic aggregates display. We have now to enter upon the remaining division — Super-organic Evolution.

Although this word is descriptive, and although, in *First Principles*, III. I have used it with an explanatory sentence, it will be proper here to exhibit its meaning more fully.

While we are occupied with the facts displayed by an individual organism during its growth, maturity, and decay, we are studying Organic Evolution. If we take into account, as we must, the actions and reactions going on between this organism and organisms of other

¹ *The Principles of Sociology*, by Herbert Spencer, Vol. I., pp. 3-8, 14-16. (New York, D. Appleton Company, 1878. Reprinted by permission.)

kinds which its life puts it in relation with, we still do not go beyond the limits of Organic Evolution. Nor need we consider that we exceed these limits on passing to those groups of facts which the rearing of offspring frequently shows us; though here, in parental coöperation, we see the germ of a new order of phenomena. While recognizing the fact that the joint actions of parents in fostering their young, foreshadow processes of a class beyond the simply organic; and while recognizing the fact that some of the products of these joint actions, such as nests, must be taken as foreshadowing products of the super-organic class; we may fitly regard (Super-organic Evolution as commencing only when there arises something more than the combined efforts of parents.) There can of course be no absolute separation. If there has been Evolution, that form of it here distinguished as super-organic must have arisen by insensible steps out of the organic. But we may conveniently mark it off as including all those processes and products which imply the co-ordinated actions of many individuals — co-ordinated actions which achieve results exceeding in extent and complexity those achievable by individual actions.

There exist various groups of super-organic phenomena, of which certain minor ones may be briefly noticed here by way of illustration.

Of such the most familiar, and in some respects the most instructive, are furnished by the social insects. The processes carried on by these show us co-operation, with, in some cases, considerable division of labour; as well as products of a size and complexity far beyond any that would be possible in the absence of united efforts.

It scarcely needs to particularize these truths, as shown us by bees and wasps. All know that these form (though, as we shall presently see, only in a qualified sense) communities — communities such that the units and the aggregates stand in very definite relations. Between the individual organization of the hive-bee and the organization of the hive as an orderly aggregate of individuals with a regularly-formed habitation, there exists a fixed connection. Just as the germ of a wasp evolves into a complete individual; so does the adult queen-wasp, the germ of a wasp-society, evolve into a multitude of individuals with definitely-adjusted arrangements and activities. That is to say, the growths and developments of these social aggregates have analogies with the growths and developments of the individual aggregates. Though the structures and functions shown us by the community are less specific than those shown us by the individual, yet

they are specific in a considerable degree. As evidence that Evolution of this order has here arisen after the same manner as the simpler orders of Evolution, it may be added that, among both bees and wasps, different genera exhibit it in different degrees. From kinds that are solitary in their habits, we pass through kinds that are social in small degrees to kinds that are social in great degrees.

Among some species of ants the process of Super-Organic Evolution is carried much further — some species, I say; for here, also, we find that unlike stages have been reached by unlike species: the societies they form vary immensely, both in size and complexity. Among the most advanced, division of labour is carried so far that different classes of individuals are structurally adapted to different functions. Sometimes, as among the white ants, or termites (which, however, belong to a different order of insects), there are, in addition to males and females, soldiers and workers; and it has recently been shown that there are in some cases two kinds of males and females, winged and unwinged: making six unlike forms. Among the *Sauba* ants there are, besides the two developed sexual forms, three varieties of forms sexually undeveloped — one class of indoor workers and two classes of outdoor workers. Beyond the division of labour among individuals of the community thus diversely constructed, we find, in some cases, a further division of labour achieved by making slaves of other ants. We see, also, that there is a tending of other insects, sometimes for the sake of their secretions and sometimes for unknown purposes; so that, as Sir John Lubbock points out, some ants keep more domestic animals than are kept by mankind. To which we must add that among members of these communities, there is a system of signalling equivalent to a rude language, and that there are elaborate processes of mining, road-making, and building — building of which the methodical character may be judged from the statement of Tuckey, who, in Congo, “found a complete banza (village) of ant-hills, placed with more regularity than the native banzas”; or from the statement of Schweinfurth, who says a volume would be required to describe the magazines, chambers, passages, bridges, contained in a *termites’* mound.

But, as hinted above, though social insects exhibit a kind of evolution much higher than the merely organic — though the aggregates they form simulate social aggregates in sundry ways; yet they are not true social aggregates. The evolution we see in them is, in essential respects, intermediate between the organic and the super-organic, as

here to be understood. For each of these societies is in reality a large family. It is not a union among like individuals substantially independent of one another in parentage, and approximately equal in their capacities; but it is a union among the offspring of one mother, carried on, in some cases, for a single generation and in some cases for more; and from this community of parentage arises the *possibility of classes having unlike structures and consequent unlike functions*. Instead of being allied to the specialization of function which arises in a society, properly so called, the specialization of function which arises in one of these large and complicated insect-families, is allied to that which habitually arises between the sexes. For instead of two kinds of individuals descending from the same parents, there are several kinds of individuals descending from the same parents; and instead of a simple co-operation between two differentiated individuals in the rearing of offspring, there is an involved co-operation among sundry differentiated classes of individuals in the rearing of offspring.

The only true rudimentary forms of Super-organic Evolution are those to be found among certain of the higher types of vertebrata.

Some birds form communities in which, beyond mere aggregation, there is a small amount of co-ordination. Rooks furnish the most familiar instance. Among these we see such integration as is implied by the keeping-together of the same families from generation to generation, and by the exclusion of strangers. There is some rude form of government, some recognition of proprietorship, some punishment of offenders, and occasionally expulsion of them. A slight specialization is shown in the stationing of sentinels while the flock feeds. And there is usually an orderly action of the whole community in respect of times of going and coming. Clearly there has been reached a co-operation comparable in degree to that shown us by those small assemblages of the lowest human beings, in which there exist no governments.

Gregarious mammals of most kinds display little more than the union of mere association. In the common tendency towards supremacy of the strongest male in the herd, we do, indeed, see a faint trace of governmental organization. Some degree of co-operation is shown for offensive purposes, by animals that hunt in packs, and for defensive purposes by animals that are hunted; as, according to Ross, by the North American buffaloes, the bulls of which assemble to guard the cows during the calving-season against wolves, bears, or other enemies. Certain gregarious mammals, however, as the beavers, carry social

co-operation to a considerable extent; and their joint actions yield remarkable products in the shape of habitations. Finally, among sundry of the *Primates*, gregariousness is joined with some subordination, some combination, some display of the social sentiments. There is obedience to leaders; there is union of efforts; there are sentinels and signals; there is some idea of property; there is some exchange of services; there is adoption of orphans; and anxiety prompts the community at large to make efforts on behalf of endangered members.

These classes of truths, which, by one having adequate knowledge, might be enlarged upon to much purpose, I have here set down and illustrated for several reasons. Partly it seemed needful to point out that beyond organic evolution, there tends to arise in various directions a further and higher order of evolution. Partly, my object has been to give a comprehensive conception of this Super-organic Evolution, as not of one kind but of various kinds, determined by the characters of the various species of organisms among which it shows itself. And partly, the facts have been referred to with the view of suggesting that Super-organic Evolution of the highest order, arises out of an order no higher than that variously displayed in the animal world at large.

Having observed thus much, we may henceforth restrict ourselves to that form of Super-organic Evolution which so immensely transcends all others in extent, in complication, in importance, as to make them relatively insignificant — almost too insignificant to be named at the same time. I refer, of course, to the form of it which human societies exhibit in their growths, structures, functions, products. To the phenomena comprised in these, and grouped under the general title of Sociology, we now pass.

[In his second chapter Mr. Spencer treats of "The Factors of Social Phenomena." These he finds to be the character of the units (individuals) and the conditions under which they exist. The latter, called by him the "extrinsic factors," Spencer breaks up into climate; flora and fauna; the progressive modifications of these through social activities; the increasing size of the social aggregate; and the reciprocal action of the individual and his group in modifying each other. He then proceeds to what he terms "the influence of the super-organic environment." After mentioning "the action and reaction between a society and neighboring societies," he concludes the chapter with the following brief but lucid account of what is now known to social science as *culture*:]

There remains in the group of derived factors one more, the potency of which can scarcely be over-estimated. I mean that accumulation of super-organic products which we commonly distinguish as artificial, but which, philosophically considered, are no less natural than all others resulting from evolution. There are several orders of these.

First come the material appliances, which, beginning with roughly-chipped flints, end in the complex automatic tools of an engine-factory driven by steam; which from boomerangs rise to thirty-five ton guns; which from huts of branches and grass grow to cities with their palaces and cathedrals. Then we have language, able at first only to eke out gestures in communicating simple ideas, but eventually becoming capable of expressing highly-complex conceptions with precision. While from that stage in which it conveys thoughts only by sounds to one or a few other persons, we pass through picture-writing up to steam-printing: multiplying indefinitely the numbers communicated with, and making accessible in voluminous literatures the ideas and feelings of innumerable men in various places and times. Concomitantly there goes on the development of knowledge, ending in science. Counting on the fingers grows into far-reaching mathematics; observation of the moon's changes leads at length to a theory of the solar system; and at successive stages there arise sciences of which not even the germs can at first be detected. Meanwhile the once few and simple customs, becoming more numerous, definite, and fixed, end in systems of laws. From a few rude superstitions there grow up elaborate mythologies, theologies, cosmogonies. Opinion getting embodied in creeds, gets embodied, too, in accepted codes of propriety, good conduct, ceremony, and in established social sentiments. And then there gradually evolve also the products we call aesthetic; which of themselves form a highly-complex group. From necklaces of fish-bones we advance to dresses elaborate, gorgeous, and infinitely varied; out of discordant war-chants come symphonies and operas; cairns develop into magnificent temples; in place of caves with rude markings there arise at length galleries of paintings; and the recital of a chief's deeds with mimetic accompaniment gives origin to epics, dramas, lyrics, and the vast mass of poetry, fiction, biography, and history.

All these various orders of super-organic products, each evolving within itself new genera and species while daily growing into a larger whole, and each acting upon the other orders while reacted upon by

them, form together an immensely-voluminous, immensely-complicated, and immensely-powerful set of influences. During social evolution these influences are ever modifying individuals and modifying society, while being modified by both. They gradually form what we may consider either as a non-vital part of the society itself, or else as an additional environment, which eventually becomes even more important than the original environment — so much more important that there arises the possibility of carrying on a high type of social life under inorganic and organic conditions which originally would have prevented it.

Such are the factors in outline. Even when presented under this most general form, the combination of them is seen to be of a complicated kind.

Recognizing the primary truth that social phenomena depend in part on the natures of the individuals and in part on the forces the individuals are subject to, we see that these two fundamentally-distinct sets of factors, with which social changes commence, become progressively involved with other sets as social changes advance. The pre-established environing influences, inorganic and organic, which are at first almost unalterable, become more and more altered by the actions of the evolving society. Simple growth of population as it goes on, brings into play fresh causes of transformation that are increasingly important. The influences which the society exerts on the natures of its units, and those which the units exert on the nature of the society, incessantly co-operate in creating new elements. As societies progress in size and structure, they work in one another, now by their war-struggles and now by their industrial intercourse, profound metamorphoses. And the ever-accumulating, ever-complicating super-organic products, material and mental, constitute a further set of factors, which become more and more influential causes of change. So that, involved as the factors are at the beginning, each step in advance increases the involution, by adding factors which themselves grow more complex while they grow more powerful.

2. The Super-Organic As a Fourth Order of Phenomena

Investigators in the field of ethnology, particularly in the United States, have recently made valuable contributions to social science in their studies of the nature of *culture*. Of the two selections from Professor Kroeber which follow, the first is valuable not only for its recognition of the nature and importance of social phenomena, but

also for his clear distinction between the depictive and processual methods in the study of any order of phenomena whatsoever.

Psychic² and superpsychic phenomena either possess or do not possess the actuality of immediacy for us. There are those for whom even mental experience appears to lack reality; there are others for whom its reality is unquestionable and basic; and of this class every psychologist who is a true psychologist must in the nature of things be. It would therefore be a waste of time to attempt to prove these actualities. The one question of moment concerning them is whether the assumption of an actuality can be put to profitable use. If it leads to fuller understanding of any group of phenomena or events, or if it can be applied practically, any assumption and the method flowing from it are justified. Ethnologists, historians, and sociologists are evidently convinced of the actuality of social phenomena as distinct from other kinds of phenomena. It matters little that many of them have not formulated this conviction and may hesitate to avow it. They use it.

No attempt will therefore be made here to establish the actuality of cultural phenomena. But thought about the nature of these phenomena often still is so timidly halting that it is perhaps worth while to examine some of the consequences of an application of the assumption of the reality of culture.

We begin then with the belief in the equal reality of four kinds of phenomena, those of matter and force as such, those of life as such, those of consciousness, and those of social life or culture. These four varieties of facts of experience may also be denominated as the inorganic, the directly organic or vital, the mentally organic or psychic, and the civilizational or superorganic or, better, superpsychic. The physicist who operates in the realm of the organic may cherish the conviction that all organic phenomena are in the end wholly and absolutely resolvable into inorganic factors. He does not, however, insist that the expressing of organic data in organic terms is misleading. He does not even announce that it is useless. Nor does he tolerate organic science only as a secondary activity after its rooting in the inorganic has been completely traced at every point. If he held any such attitude he should have to maintain that biology is justified only after it were known exactly what life is in terms of

² "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," by A. L. Kroeber, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 5 (March, 1918), pp. 635-650. Reprinted by permission.

the inorganic. Now that knowledge is to the biologist perhaps the ultimate goal of his work. It certainly is not his first task, else his biology would be only pure physics and chemistry. As a biologist he accepts life as something given, and inquires into its form and processes as such.

The attitude of the psychologist is parallel. He may share with the biologist and chemist the conviction that consciousness rests absolutely on an organic basis, and through this on an inorganic basis. But as a psychologist his business is the determination of the manifestations and processes of consciousness as consciousness. Such a task may not appeal to some. The opportunity then lies before them to interpret consciousness in organic terms. But if they exercise this choice they irrevocably resign all claim to the pursuit of psychology in favor of the practice of physiology.

And so with those who envisage social phenomena. Their alternative is to treat them in social terms, or in material, vital, and mental terms. There is no quarreling with the latter course. But neither can an a priori condemnation of the former method be tolerated. In one case the aim is a physics, biology, or psychology of social phenomena; in the other, a sociology, or history of social phenomena.

Unless, then, one is ready to take an uncompromisingly monistic attitude and maintain that there is only one science, it is necessary to admit at least four kinds of sciences: physical and chemical, in the realm of the inorganic; biological, in the domain of the organic as such; psychological, concerned with the psychic aspects of the organic or the mental as such; and social, operating with superorganic phenomena.

There is, however, another division that runs across knowledge. Data may be viewed directly as they present themselves; or we can seek to pass through them to the processes involved. On this basis the sciences are either historical and only incidentally concerned with mechanisms, or unhistorical and wholly devoted to the determination of mechanisms. The application of this classification results in a total of eight groups of sciences, which may be arranged as follows:

	Formulation of Processes	Depiction of Phenomena
<i>Superorganic phenomena</i>	Social psychology	Culture history
<i>Mental organic phenomena</i>	Psychology	Biographic history
<i>Vital organic phenomena</i>	Physiology	Natural history
<i>Inorganic phenomena</i>	Physics, chemistry	Astronomy, geology

There is no idea of a sharp line between the explanatory and the depicting sciences. Rather they are only extremes of method, between which lies an indefinite series of transitions. The pure systematist in natural history, for instance, describes facts or narrates the sequence of events// The evolutionist has definitely entered the field of processes. But these are still vague. They are so broadly conceived as to be quite generally applicable, and yet they can scarcely be directed to serve the more positive understanding of specific data. It is probably this loose universality that has rendered Darwinism so enormously influential in modern thought as a whole and so unproductive as a biological instrument. The genetist, in the path of Mendel, and the cell biologist are still entirely on the plane of the organic, but are farther removed, the latter especially, from consideration of things as they present themselves. On the other hand, the genetist and cell biologist are dealing with sufficiently specific processes to make prediction possible. The pure physiologist, finally, decomposes the actual phenomena of life just as far as he can, and thereby is the more able to isolate vital mechanisms as such. And it is only he, in the whole domain of biology, who attains results that are convertible into factors of the underlying inorganic dimension, or which will serve to express in doubly lower terms the processes formulated on the psychic plane.

We must therefore recognize in each of our four orders of study a sequence leading from the wholly depictive extreme of science to the thoroughly mechanistic or processual one. It is only at the latter end that the sciences of one plane begin to have direct contacts with those of the other planes. . . .

It is true that what is ordinarily called science as distinguished from history, that is, the kind of science which resolves into quantitatively describable factors or operates with them, has practically no achievements to its credit in the plane of the superorganic. It might therefore be doubted whether such a science is possible in the superorganic plane of culture. It is certainly of the utmost importance to realize that whatever the processual method of science may accomplish with cultural material is as yet only a hope and a possibility. Assertions that anything definitely utilizable has been attained in this respect are delusions that prevent endeavor. But on the other hand analogy alone is sufficient to demonstrate the possibility, even the probability, of an "exact" science being developed which shall be able to deal

with some effectiveness with civilizational phenomena. That such a science will always remain outstripped by the sciences that deal with the processes of the psychic, the vital, and the inorganic, experience leads us to expect; but the very development of these in their sequence renders the prediction of the impossibility of a true social science rash.

There is no a priori reason visible, accordingly, why a science of cultural mechanics, or social psychology, or sociology is impossible; and inquiry shifts to the problem why this possibility has heretofore been so largely or wholly unrealized. That it is at least almost wholly unrealized is clear from the fact that it is difficult to encounter a student trained in the methods of the "exact" sciences who believes otherwise. Historians often incline to the same opinion; and even among professed sociologists there are not wanting those who admit that the attainments of their discipline are empty boasts, and who with all faith in its future are in present distraction as to the course it should follow. Sociology, in short, is a possible and indicated science, but actually is little else than a name and a claim. Why this is so is the question we face.

The reply appears to be that sociologists have not contented themselves with operating in the plane or dimension of their material, but have attempted to force results by appropriating processes determined in other planes and applying these to their special phenomena. Proceeding from the data of human history, they have recognized the fact that these might be capable of generalized interpretation as well as of concrete depiction. They have therefore set up their science, but having nothing forthwith to hand with which to fill its frame, they have reached into psychology and biology and the inorganic sciences to give substance to its emptiness. Thereby they have impeded, perhaps largely blocked, the slow and natural but alone healthy growth that might have taken place toward an understanding of the social factors that are contained in social phenomena. . . .

If Comte founded, Spencer established, sociology. It was he who first employed the word "super-organic." Spencer certainly held the concept of culture. He speaks of a factor of social phenomena "the potency of which can scarcely be overestimated. I mean that accumulation of super-organic products which we commonly distinguish as artificial." "These various orders of super-organic products . . .," he says, "each acting on the other orders while reacted on by them,

constitute an immensely-voluminous, immensely-complicated, and immensely-powerful set of influences. . . . They gradually form what we may consider either as a non-vital part of the society itself, or else as a secondary environment, which eventually becomes more important than the primary environment."

But these superorganic products, or civilization as we should call them, are treated by Spencer absolutely on a level with suborganic factors. His first words on the factors of social phenomena refer to the inorganic.

"The behavior of a single inanimate object depends on the co-operation between its own forces and the forces to which it is exposed. . . . Similarly with any group of inanimate objects. Be it a cartload of bricks shot down, a barrowful of gravel turned over, or a boy's bag of marbles emptied. . . . It is equally so when the discrete aggregate consists of organic bodies, such as the members of a species. . . . It is thus, too, with aggregates of men. Be it rudimentary or be it advanced, every society displays phenomena that are ascribable to the characters of its units and to the conditions under which they exist."

Social phenomena may be explicable by beginning with a comparison to a cartload of bricks; but it is clear that they will never be explained on a superpsychic basis in this way. In fact, Spencer thinks less frequently of culture than of the associations of individuals that carry culture.

Of the social insects, Spencer says with sound discrimination that their societies "simulate social aggregates in sundry ways; yet they are not true social aggregates." But the reasons given for this statement are the weakest that could be alleged: each aggregation of these insects is in reality a large family; and it comprises sexlike classes of dissimilar structure and function instead of promoting the specialization characteristic of a true society. True as they are, these points are irrelevant. One of the characteristics of culture is precisely that it is independent of organic kinship. It can be carried wholly by individuals of the same ancestry, and just as wholly by unrelated individuals. The same holds true of the other traits mentioned. Civilization certainly permits of specialization, but just as certainly can take a form in which the differentiation of individual activities is minimal. Nor is culture incompatible with the existence of classes of unlike structure. It is true that the only hereditarily given classes

among the bearers of culture are the sexes. Yet in principle there is no difference between a society composed of two or one composed of six sexes, and a culture resting on a human species of a plurality of sexes is more easily conceivable than such a species. The real differences between the cultural society of man and the cultureless pseudo-society of the ants and bees fail to impress Spencer. That the social insects do not learn or acquire knowledge as groups; that they totally lack tradition; that substantially all their activities are inborn and determined by organic heredity, or depend on individual psychic experience acting upon hereditary faculty; in short, that they totally lack any body of "superorganic products" that is carried along from individual to individual and from group to group independent of the nature of these individuals and groups—all these essential characteristics of the superpsychical, or cultural, Spencer passes over without a word. We must indeed credit him with some foreshadowing anticipations of an understanding of the superorganic; but he certainly lacks an active conception thereof. . . .

Of course there can be little doubt that connections between the super-psychic and the planes of phenomena that underlie it will ultimately be established in the most satisfying degree. But it is one thing to have this faith, another to build a science upon its profession. Sociology needs a specific sociological content and specific sociological methods if it is to be sociology. This obvious truism should not need statement—but it does need it. . . . It would appear, then, that there is no evident reason, either in principle or in the fact that efforts have so far been largely impotent, why a science that shall formulate (social processes in terms of social factors is impossible) And there is some reason, in the analogy furnished by the interrelations of the other sciences, to believe that such a science is possible, provided only that it consistently views social phenomena and forces as cultural, and not as aggregations or products of psychic phenomena and forces.

3. A Contemporary Exposition of the Super-organic³

[Concerning the difference between *organic* and *social* evolution.]

It has long been the custom to say that the difference is that between body and mind; that animals have their physiques adapted to their circumstances, but that man's superior intelligence enables him to

³ "The Superorganic," by A. L. Kroeber, in *The American Anthropologist*, N. S. Vol. 19, No. 2 (April-June, 1917), pp. 163-213. Reprinted by permission.

rise superior to such lowly needs. But this is not the significant point of the difference. It is true that without the much greater mental faculties of man, he could not achieve the attainments the lack of which keeps the brute chained to the limitations of his anatomy. But the greater human intelligence in itself does not cause the differences that exist. This psychic superiority is only the indispensable condition of what is peculiarly human: civilization. Directly, it is the civilization in which every Eskimo, every Alaskan miner or arctic discoverer is reared and not any greater inborn faculty, that leads him to build homes, ignite fires, and wear clothing. The distinction between animal and man which counts is not that of the physical and mental, which is one of relative degree, but that of the organic and social, which is one of kind. The beast has mentality, and we have bodies; but in civilization man has something that no animal has.

That this distinction is actually something more than that of the physical and mental, appears from an example that may be chosen from the non-bodily: speech. . . .

[Millions of people still hold the naïve belief in "an inherent and congenital language of man." Historical legends recall two vain experiments by rulers to ascertain it by isolating children.] . . . "Faith dies hard, however; and we may suspect that it would take a third trial, under modern chosen and controlled conditions, to satisfy some natural scientists that speech, for the human individual and for the human race, is wholly an acquired and not a hereditary thing, entirely outward and not at all inward — a social product and not an organic growth. . . .

It is only in small measure a question of high and low as between man and animal. Many purely instinctive activities of the beasts lead to far more complex and difficult achievements than some of the analogous customs of this or that human nation. The beaver is a far better architect than many a savage tribe. . . .

The utter divergence between social and organic forces will perhaps never be fully grasped until the mentality of the so-called social insects, the bees and ants, is thoroughly realized. Social the ant is, in the sense that she associates; but she is so far from being social in the sense of possessing civilization, of being influenced by non-organic forces, that she would better be known as the anti-social animal. . . .

Heredity saves for the ant all that she has, from generation to generation. But heredity does not maintain, and has not main-

tained, because it cannot maintain, one particle of the civilization which is the one specifically human thing. . . .

[The "uniquely marvellous" mind of Aristotle enabled him to see that man is a political, i.e., *social* animal.] "With this basic formulation more than two thousand years old, and known to all the generations, there is something puny, as well as obstinately destructive, in the endeavor to abrogate the distinction, or to hinder its completest fruition. . . .

[The masses, and also many men of eminent learning, believe in hereditary racial differences.] And yet, it must be maintained that not a single piece of evidence has yet been produced to support the assumption that the differences which one nation shows from another — let alone the superiority of one people to another — are racially inherent, that is organically founded. . . .

There have been some attempts to investigate so-called racial distinctions with the apparatus of experimental psychology. The results incline clearly toward confirmation of the doctrine of the non-existence of organic differences. But too much stress may not as yet be laid on this conclusion, because what such investigations have above all revealed is that social agencies are so tremendously influential on every one of us that it is very difficult to find any test that, if distinctive racial faculties were inborn, would fairly reveal the degree to which they are inborn. . . .

The Copernican doctrine that the sun does not go round the earth seemed to be refuted by daily observation. But there is almost as fundamental a shifting of mental and emotional point of view, as absolute a turning upside down of attitude involved when the current thought of today is asked to view civilization as a wholly non-organic affair, as when the Copernican doctrine challenged the prior conviction of the world. Most ethnologists, at any rate, are convinced that the overwhelming mass of historical and miscalled racial facts that are now attributed to obscure organic causes, or at most are in dispute, will ultimately be viewed by everyone as social and as intelligible only in their social relations. That there may be a residuum in which hereditary influences have been operative, it would be dogmatic to deny; but even this residuum of organic agencies will perhaps be found to be operative in quite other manners than those which are customarily adduced at present. . . .

It has already been shown that if there is anything that heredity

does not do, it is to accumulate. If, on the other hand, there is any one method by which civilization may be defined as operating, it is precisely that of accumulation. . . .

Of all the comminglings of the cultural with the vital, that which has crystallized under the name of the eugenics movement is the most widely known and of directest appeal. As a constructive program for national progress, eugenics is a confusion of the purposes to breed better men and to give men better ideals; an organic device to attain the social; a biological short cut to a moral end. It contains the inherent impossibility of all short cuts. . . .

If social phenomena are only organic, eugenics is right, and there is nothing more to be said. If the social is something more than the organic, eugenics is only an error and unclear thought; at whose child-likeness the future will smile, and then pass on. . . .

The remainder of the opposition has been caused by Galton, Pearson, and their adherents themselves, who have not confined themselves to their well-supported conclusions, but have pressed on to further inferences that rest only on assertion. That heredity operates in the domain of mind as well as that of the body, is one thing; that therefore heredity is the mainspring of civilization, is an entirely different proposition, without any necessary connection, and certainly without any established connection, with the former conclusion.

. . . The reason why mental heredity has nothing to do with civilization, is that civilization is not mental action but a body or stream of products of mental exercise. . . .

The Darwinian doctrine relates, it is true, to the race; but the race, except as an abstraction, is only a collection of individuals; and the bases of this doctrine, heredity, variation, and competition, deal with the relation of individual to individual, and against individual. The whole key of the success of the Mendelian methods of studying heredity lies in isolating traits and isolating individuals.)

But a thousand individuals do not make a society. They are the potential basis of a society; but they do not themselves cause it and they are also the basis of a thousand other potential societies.

A hundred Aristotles among our cave-dwelling ancestors would have been Aristotles in their birthright no less; but they would have contributed far less to the advance of science than a dozen plodding mediocrities in the twentieth century.

Ericsson or Galvani eight thousand years ago would have polished

or bored the first stone; and in turn the hand and mind whose operation set in inception the neolithic age of human culture, would, if held in its infancy in unchanging catalepsy from that time until today, now be devising wireless telephones and nitrogen extractors. . . .

. . . The progress of civilization is independent of the birth of particular personalities; since these, apparently averaging alike, both as regards genius and normality at all times and places, furnish the same substratum for the social.

Here, then, we have an interpretation which allows to the individual, and through him to heredity, all that the science of the organic can legitimately claim on the strength of its actual accomplishments; and which also yields the fullest scope to the social in its own distinctive field. The accomplishment of the individual measured against other individuals depends, if not wholly then mainly, on his organic constitution as compounded by his heredity. The accomplishments of a group relative to other groups, are uninfluenced by heredity because sufficiently large groups average alike in organic make-up. . . .

The difference between the accomplishments of one group of men and those of another group is therefore of another order from the difference between the faculties of one person and another. It is through this distinction that one of the essential qualities of the nature of the social is to be found. . . .

To know the precise reactions in Darwin's nervous system at the moment when the thought of natural selection flashed upon him in 1838, would involve a very genuine triumph of science. But it would mean nothing historically, since history is concerned with the relation of doctrines such as that of natural selection to other concepts and social phenomena, and not at all with the relation of Darwin himself to social phenomena or other phenomena. . . .

There are those, of mechanistic proclivities and interests, who hold that it is only when historical events are explained on a basis like that assumed in our example [above], that history will have any significance. They have pressed their view, sometimes by assertion, more often by implication, until it has come to be widely accepted. But it is true only if a single method of thought is the sole one to be accorded validity and justifiability. If the ability to weigh the moon renders Shelley's poetry a useless superfluity, well and good: there is nothing more to be said. There actually are people fanatic enough to take such a stand. But if scientific methods give science, and

artistic exercise yields literature, and the two do not exclude each other because they do not come into conflict and are not even comparable; if the justification of each is in its results and not in any toleration extended by the other; and if the truly unforgivable sin with the crown of futility is not to practise one without regard to the other but to try to practise one by means of the other; — then, too, it is at least conceivable that there may be a third activity, neither science nor art in their strict senses, but history, the understanding of the social, which also has an aim that cannot be denied and whose justification must be sought in its own results and not by the standard of any other activity. That is all that history as an intellectual manifestation can ask; but that it must ask. Mechanistic science has accomplished wonders in a brief space by adhering ever more rigidly to its own peculiar methods, and allowing no limits to be set to its application of these methods. Yet that a tool has proved its service for a purpose, does not affect the value of other purposes or the utility of other tools for these other purposes.

, History, then, justifies itself in proportion that it is mechanistically “unscientific”: that it has its own method, its own equivalent to the causality of science; and, in one sense, its own material. Not that there is a range of subjects that can be delimited and assigned respectively to science and to history. In fact, the applicability of science to any and all domains of human cognizance must be expressly affirmed. But the same phenomenon can after all be viewed with different ends. The social is scientifically resolvable; but it is resolvable through the individual — the organic and psychic individual. History deals with the social without the medium of the individual. . . .

As then, there are two lines of intellectual endeavor in history and in science, each with its separate aim and set of methods; and as it is only the confounding of the two that results in sterile negation; so also two wholly disparate evolutions must be recognized: that of the substance which we call organic and that of the other substance called social. Social evolution is without antecedents in the beginnings of organic evolution. It commences late in the development of life — long after vertebrates, after mammals, after the primates even, are established. Its exact point of origin we do not know, and perhaps shall never know; but we can limit the range within which it falls. This origin occurred in a series of organic forms more advanced, in general mental faculty, than the gorilla, and much less developed than

the first known race that is unanimously accepted as having been human, the man of Neanderthal and Le Moustier. . . .

A new factor had arisen which was to work out its own independent consequence, slowly and of little apparent import at first, but gathering weight, and dignity, and influence; a factor that had passed beyond natural selection, that was no longer wholly dependent on any agency of organic evolution, and that, however rocked and swayed by the oscillations of the heredity that underlay it, nevertheless floated unimmersibly upon it.

The dawn of the social thus is not a link in any chain, not a step in a path, but a leap to another plane.

There are a hundred elements of civilization where there was one in the time when the Neanderthal skull enclosed a living brain; and not only the content of civilization but the complexity of its organization has increased a hundredfold. But the body and the associated mind of that early man have not, by any scale that can be applied, attained a point a hundred times, nor even twice, as fine, as efficient, as delicate, or as strong, as they were then; it is doubtful if they have improved by a fifth. There are, it is true, those who make the contrary assertion. Yet it seems the fair-minded must avow that such assertions rest not on any objective interpretation of the facts, but on a wish to find a correlation, a desire to make the thread of evolution a single, unbranching one, to see the social only as organic.

Here, then, we have to come to our conclusion; and here we rest. The mind and the body are but facets of the same organic material or activity; the social substance — or unsubstantial fabric, if one prefers the phrase, — the existence that we call civilization, transcends them utterly for all its being forever rooted in life. The processes of civilizational activity are almost unknown to us. The self-sufficient factors that govern their workings are unresolved. The forces and principles of mechanistic science can indeed analyze our civilization; but in so doing they destroy its essence, and leave us without understanding of the very thing which we seek. The historian as yet can do little but picture. He traces and he connects what seems far removed; he balances; he integrates; but he does not really explain, nor does he transmute phenomena into something else. His method is not science; but neither can the scientist deal with historical material and leave it civilization, nor anything resembling civilization, nor convert it wholly into concepts of life and leave nothing else to be done.

What we all are able to do is to realize this gap, to be impressed by its abyss with reverence and humility, and to go our paths on its respective sides without self-deluding attempts to bridge the eternal chasm, or empty boasts that its span is achieved.

Exercises

1. How does Spencer distinguish super-organic from organic evolution?
2. In what ways do the social insects manifest super-organic phenomena? In what way do they come short of the super-organic?
3. Indicate the varying development of the super-organic among different orders of creatures.
4. What is the true nature of the super-organic, as described by Spencer?
5. Are all *social* phenomena super-organic? Are all super-organic phenomena social?
6. What is meant by the assertion that the super-organic phenomena constitute a fourth order?
7. Distinguish the two fundamental methods of study, and show how they apply to each of the orders of phenomena.
8. Why has so little progress been made in the processual study of the super-organic phenomena?
9. State Kroeber's criticism of Spencer's account of the super-organic.
10. What, according to Kroeber, is the essential distinction between the animals and man?
11. Is the ant the social, or the anti-social, insect?
12. What common misconception with respect to language is pointed out by Kroeber?
13. In what respect is the view that civilization is a non-organic affair a revolutionary one?
14. Show the relative unimportance of the individual in the progress of civilization.
15. Explain this statement: "History, then, justifies itself in proportion that it is mechanistically unscientific."
16. In what sense is it true of the historian that "his method is not science"? Compare this assertion with the views expressed in the *Introduction*.

Additional References

1. Ellwood, Charles A.: "Theories of Cultural Evolution," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII., No. 6. (May, 1918.) Explains and evaluates various theories.

2. Lowie, Robert H.: *Culture and Ethnology*, Chapter IV. A very clear account of culture as affected by contact with other culture.
3. Ogburn, William F.: *Social Change*, Part I. A clear explanation of culture in non-technical language and treating its modern aspects.
4. Sapir, Edward: "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX., No. 4. (Jan., 1924). Especially valuable for definitions of the term "culture."
5. Wissler, Clark: *Man and Culture*, Chapter IV. Deals with the content of culture. The whole volume is invaluable as a systematic analysis of the nature of culture.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

1. Definition of the Folkways, the Mores, and Institutions

FOR the understanding of fundamental social concepts no more important contribution has been made than William Graham Sumner's analysis of the *folkways* and related social phenomena. The following extracts are chosen with the purpose of enabling the reader to grasp his distinction between the *folkways*, the *mores*, and *institutions*. It will be observed that the three represent stages in a single process whereby groups, more or less unconsciously, adjust their thought and conduct to the life-problem, as set by the character of their own members and the social and physical environment which they confront.

Definition¹ and mode of origin of the folkways. If we put together all that we have learned from anthropology and ethnography about primitive men and primitive society, we perceive that the first task of life is to live. Men begin with acts, not with thoughts. Every moment brings necessities which must be satisfied at once. Need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it. It is generally taken for granted that men inherited some guiding instincts from their beast ancestry, and it may be true, although it has never been proved. If there were such inheritances, they controlled and aided the first efforts to satisfy needs. Analogy makes it easy to assume that the ways of beasts had produced channels of habit and predisposition along which dexterities and other psychophysical activities would run easily. Experiments with new-born animals show that in the absence of any experience of the relation of means to ends, efforts to satisfy needs are clumsy and blundering. The method is that of trial and failure, which produces repeated pain, loss, and disappointments. Nevertheless, it is a method of rude experiment and selection. The earliest efforts of men were of this kind.

¹ *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals*, by William Graham Sumner; Sections 1-3; 7-8; 23; 28-34; 63-66. (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1906. Reprinted by permission.)

✓
Need was the impelling force. Pleasure and pain, on the one side and the other, were the rude constraints which defined the line on which efforts must proceed. The ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain is the only psychical power which is to be assumed. Thus ways of doing things were selected, which were expedient. They answered the purpose better than other ways, or with less toil and pain. Along the course on which efforts were compelled to go, habit, routine, and skill were developed. The struggle to maintain existence was carried on, not individually, but in groups. Each profited by the other's experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which proved to be most expedient. All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena. Instincts were developed in connection with them. In this way folkways arise. The young learn them by tradition, imitation and authority. The folkways, at a time, provide for all the needs of life then and there. They are uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable. As time goes on, the folkways become more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative. If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have done so. A sanction also arises from ghost fear. The ghosts of ancestors would be angry if the living should change the ancient folkways.

The folkways are a societal force. The operation by which folkways are produced consists in the frequent repetition of petty acts, often by great numbers acting in concert or, at least, acting in the same way when face to face with the same need. The immediate motive is interest. It produces habit in the individual and custom in the group. It is, therefore, in the highest degree original and primitive. By habit and custom it exerts a strain on every individual within its range; therefore it rises to a societal force to which great classes of societal phenomena are due. Its earliest stages, its course, and laws may be studied; also its influence on individuals and their reaction on it. It is our present purpose so to study it. We have to recognize it as one of the chief forces by which a society is made to be what it is. Out of the unconscious experiment which every repetition of the ways includes, there issues pleasure or pain, and then, so far as the men are capable of reflection, conviction that the ways are conducive to societal welfare. These two experiences are not the same. The most uncivilized men, both in the food quest and in war, do

things which are painful, but which have been found to be expedient. Perhaps these cases teach the sense of social welfare better than those which are pleasurable and favorable to welfare. The former cases call for some intelligent reflection on experience. When this conviction as to the relation to welfare is added to the folkways they are converted into mores, and, by virtue of the philosophical and ethical element added to them, they win utility and importance and become the source of the science and the art of living.

Folkways are made unconsciously. It is of the first importance to notice that, from the first acts by which men try to satisfy needs, each act stands by itself, and looks no further than the immediate satisfaction. From recurrent needs arise habits for the individual and customs for the group, but these results are consequences which were never (conscious,) and never foreseen or intended. They are not noticed until they have long existed, and it is still longer before they are appreciated. Another long time must pass, and a higher stage of mental development must be reached, before they can be used as a basis from which to deduce rules for meeting, in the future, problems whose pressure can be foreseen. The folkways, therefore, are not creations of human purpose and wit. They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational reflection or purpose. From this it results that all the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, having the nature of the ways of other animals, only the topmost layers of which are subject to change and control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics, and religion, or by other acts of intelligent reflection. We are told of savages that "It is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonial usages of a savage people. Custom regulates the whole of a man's actions, — his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress towards a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, men-

tally, morally, or spiritually." All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation. . . .

All origins are lost in mystery. No objection can lie against this postulate about the way in which folkways began, on account of the element of inference in it. All origins are lost in mystery, and it seems vain to hope that from any origin the veil of mystery will ever be raised. We go up the stream of history to the utmost point for which we have evidence of its course. Then we are forced to reach out into the darkness upon the line of direction marked by the remotest course of the historic stream. This is the way in which we have to act in regard to the origin of capital, language, the family, the state, religion, and rights. We never can hope to see the beginning of any one of these things. Use and wont are products and results. They had antecedents. We never can find or see the first member of the series. It is only by analysis and inference that we can form any conception of the "beginning" which we are always so eager to find.

Spencer on primitive custom. Spencer says that "guidance by custom, which we everywhere find amongst rude peoples, is the sole conceivable guidance at the outset." (Custom is the product of concurrent action through time.) We find it existent and in control at the extreme reach of our investigations. Whence does it begin, and how does it come to be? How can it give guidance "at the outset"? All mass actions seem to begin because the mass wants to act together. The less they know what it is right and best to do, the more open they are to suggestion from an incident in nature, or from a chance act of one, or from the current doctrines of ghost fear. A concurrent drift begins which is subject to later correction. That being so, it is evident that instinctive action, under the guidance of traditional folkways, is an operation of the first importance in all societal matters. Since the custom never can be antecedent to all action, what we should desire most is to see it arise out of the first actions, but, inasmuch as that is impossible, the course of the action after it is started is our field of study. The origin of primitive customs is always lost in mystery, because when the action begins the men are never conscious of historical action, or of the historical importance of what they are doing. When they become conscious of the historical importance of their acts, the origin is already far behind. . . .

Process of making folkways. Although we may see the process of

making folkways going on all the time, the analysis of the process is very difficult. It appears as if there was a "mind" in the crowd which was different from the minds of the individuals which compose it. Indeed some have adopted such a doctrine. By auto-suggestion the stronger minds produce ideas which when set afloat pass by suggestion from mind to mind. Acts which are consonant with the ideas are imitated. There is a give and take between man and man. This process is one of development. New suggestions come in at point after point. They are carried out. They combine with what existed already. Every new step increases the number of points upon which other minds may seize. It seems to be by this process that great inventions are produced. Knowledge has been won and extended by it. It seems as if the crowd had a mystic power in it greater than the sum of the powers of its members. It is sufficient, however, to explain this, to notice that there is a co-operation and constant suggestion which is highly productive when it operates in a crowd, because it draws out latent power, concentrates what would otherwise be scattered, verifies and corrects what has been taken up, eliminates error, and constructs by combination. Hence the gain from the collective operation is fully accounted for, and the theories of *Völkerpsychologie* are to be rejected as superfluous. Out of the process which has been described have come the folkways during the whole history of civilization.

The phenomena of suggestion and suggestibility demand some attention because the members of a group are continually affecting each other by them, and great mass phenomena very often are to be explained by them. . . .

Folkways due to false inference. Furthermore, folkways have been formed by accident, that is, by irrational and incongruous action, based on pseudo-knowledge. In Molemo a pestilence broke out soon after a Portuguese had died there. After that the natives took all possible measures not to allow any white man to die in their country. On the Nicobar islands some natives who had just begun to make pottery died. The art was given up and never again attempted. White men gave to one Bushman in a kraal a stick ornamented with buttons as a symbol of authority. The recipient died leaving the stick to his son. The son soon died. Then the Bushmen brought back the stick lest all should die. Until recently no building of incombustible materials could be built in any big town of the

central province of Madagascar, on account of some ancient prejudice. A party of Eskimos met with no game. One of them returned to their sledges and got the ham of a dog to eat. As he returned with the ham bone in his hand he met and killed a seal. Ever afterwards he carried a ham bone in his hand when hunting. The Belenda women (peninsula of Malacca) stay as near to the house as possible during the period. Many keep the door closed. They know no reason for this custom. "It must be due to some now forgotten superstition." Soon after the Yakuts saw a camel for the first time smallpox broke out amongst them. They thought the camel to be the agent of the disease. A woman amongst the same people contracted an endogamous marriage. She soon afterwards became blind. This was thought to be on account of the violation of ancient customs. A very great number of such cases could be collected. In fact they represent the current mode of reasoning of nature people. It is their custom to reason that, if one thing follows another, it is due to it. A great number of customs are traceable to the notion of the evil eye, many more to ritual notions of uncleanness. No scientific investigation could discover the origin of the folkways mentioned, if the origin had not chanced to become known to civilized men. We must believe that the known cases illustrate the irrational and incongruous origin of many folkways. In civilized history also we know that customs have owed their origin to "historical accident,"—the vanity of a princess, the deformity of a king, the whim of a democracy, the love intrigue of a statesman or prelate. By the institutions of another age it may be provided that no one of these things can affect decisions, acts, or interests, but then the power to decide the ways may have passed to clubs, trades unions, trusts, commercial rivals, wire-pullers, politicians, and political fanatics. In these cases also the causes and origins may escape investigation.

Harmful folkways. There are folkways which are positively harmful. Very often these are just the ones for which a definite reason can be given. The destruction of a man's goods at his death is a direct deduction from other-worldliness; the dead man is supposed to want in the other world just what he wanted here. The destruction of a man's goods at his death was a great waste of capital, and it must have had a disastrous effect on the interests of the living, and must have very seriously hindered the development of civilization. With this custom we must class all the expenditure of labor and

capital on graves, temples, pyramids, rites, sacrifices, and support of priests, so far as these were supposed to benefit the dead. The faith in goblinism produced other-worldly interests which overruled ordinary worldly interests. Foods have often been forbidden which were plentiful, the prohibition of which injuriously lessened the food supply. There is a tribe of Bushmen who will eat no goat's flesh, although goats are the most numerous domestic animals in the district. Where totemism exists it is regularly accompanied by a taboo on eating the totem animal. Whatever may be the real principle in totemism, it overrules the interests in an abundant food supply. "The origin of the sacred regard paid to the cow must be sought in the primitive nomadic life of the Indo-European race," because it is common to Iranians and Indians of Hindostan. The Libyans ate oxen but not cows. The same was true of the Phoenicians and Egyptians. In some cases the sense of a food taboo is not to be learned. It may have been entirely capricious. Mohammed would not eat lizards, because he thought them the offspring of a metamorphosed clan of Israelites. On the other hand, the protective taboo which forbade killing crocodiles, pythons, cobras, and other animal enemies of man was harmful to his interests, whatever the motive. "It seems to be a fixed article of belief throughout southern India, that all who have willfully or accidentally killed a snake, especially a cobra, will certainly be punished, either in this life or the next, in one of three ways: either by childlessness, or by leprosy, or by ophthalmia." Where this faith exists man has a greater interest to spare a cobra than to kill it. India furnishes a great number of cases of harmful mores. "In India every tendency of humanity seems intensified and exaggerated. No country in the world is so conservative in its traditions, yet no country has undergone so many religious changes and vicissitudes." "Every year thousands perish of disease that might recover if they would take proper nourishment, and drink the medicine that science prescribes, but which they imagine that their religion forbids them to touch." "Men who can scarcely count beyond twenty, and know not the letters of the alphabet, would rather die than eat food which had been prepared by men of lower caste, unless it had been sanctified by being offered to an idol; and would kill their daughters rather than endure the disgrace of having unmarried girls at home beyond twelve or thirteen years of age." In the last case the rule of obligation and duty is set by the mores.

The interest comes under vanity. The sanction of the caste rules is in a boycott by all members of the caste. The rules are often very harmful. "The authority of caste rests partly on written laws, partly on legendary fables or narratives, partly on the injunctions of instructors and priests, partly on custom and usage, and partly on the caprice and convenience of its votaries." The harm of caste rules is so great that of late they have been broken in some cases, especially in regard to travel over sea, which is a great advantage to Hindoos. The Hindoo folkways in regard to widows and child marriages must also be recognized as socially harmful.

How "true" and "right" are found. If a savage puts his hand too near the fire, he suffers pain and draws it back. He knows nothing of the laws of the radiation of heat, but his instinctive action conforms to that law as if he did know it. If he wants to catch an animal for food, he must study its habits and prepare a device adjusted to those habits. If it fails, he must try again, until his observation is "true" and his device is "right." All the practical and direct element in the folkways seems to be due to common sense, natural reason, intuition, or some other original mental endowment. It seems rational (or rationalistic) and utilitarian. Often in the mythologies this ultimate rational element was ascribed to the teaching of a god or a culture hero. In modern mythology it is accounted for as "natural."

Although the ways adopted must always be really "true" and "right" in relation to facts, for otherwise they could not answer their purpose, such is not the primitive notion of true and right.

The folkways are "right." Rights. Morals. The folkways are the "right" ways to satisfy all interests, because they are traditional, and exist in fact. They extend over the whole of life. There is a right way to catch game, to win a wife, to make one's self appear, to cure disease, to honor ghosts, to treat comrades or strangers, to behave when a child is born, on the warpath, in council, and so on in all cases which can arise. The ways are defined on the negative side, that is, by taboos. The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to them to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. This is because they are traditional, and there-

fore contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral ghosts. When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis. The notion of right and ought is the same in regard to all the folkways, but the degree of it varies with the importance of the interest at stake. The obligation of conformable and co-operative action is far greater under ghost fear and war than in other matters, and the social sanctions are severer, because group interests are supposed to be at stake. Some usages contain only a slight element of right and ought. It may well be believed that notions of right and duty, and of social welfare, were first developed in connection with ghost fear and other-worldliness, and therefore that, in that field also, folkways were first raised to mores. "Rights" are the rules of mutual give and take in the competition of life which are imposed on comrades in the in-group, in order that the peace may prevail there which is essential to group strength. Therefore rights can never be "natural" or "God-given," or absolute in any sense. The morality of a group at a time is the sum of the taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which right conduct is defined. Therefore morals can never be intuitive. They are historical, institutional, and empirical.

World philosophy, life policy, right, rights, and morality are all products of the folkways. They are reflections on, and generalizations from, the experience of pleasure and pain which is won in efforts to carry on the struggle for existence under actual life conditions. The generalizations are very crude and vague in their germinal forms. They are all embodied in folklore, and all our philosophy and science have been developed out of them.

The folkways are "true." The folkways are necessarily "true" with respect to some world philosophy. Pain forced men to think. The ills of life imposed reflection and taught forethought. Mental processes were irksome and were not undertaken until painful experience made them unavoidable. With great unanimity all over the globe primitive men followed the same line of thought. The dead were believed to live on as ghosts in another world just like this one. The ghosts had just the same needs, tastes, passions, etc., as the living men had had. These transcendental notions were the beginning of the mental outfit of mankind. They are articles of faith, not rational convictions. The living had duties to the ghosts, and the ghosts had rights; they also had power to enforce their rights. It behooved the living therefore to learn how to deal with ghosts. Here we have a complete

world philosophy and a life policy deduced from it. When pain, loss, and ill were experienced and the question was provoked, Who did this to us? the world philosophy furnished the answer. When the painful experience forced the question, Why are the ghosts angry and what must we do to appease them? the "right" answer was the one which fitted into the philosophy of ghost fear. All acts were therefore constrained and trained into the forms of the world philosophy by ghost fear, ancestral authority, taboos, and habit. The habits and customs created a practical philosophy of welfare, and they confirmed and developed the religious theories of goblinism.

Relation of world philosophy and folkways. It is quite impossible for us to disentangle the elements of philosophy and custom, so as to determine priority and the causative position of either. Our best judgment is that the mystic philosophy is regulative, not creative, in its relation to the folkways. They reacted upon each other. The faith in the world philosophy drew lines outside of which the folkways must not go. Crude and vague notions of societal welfare were formed from the notion of pleasing the ghosts, and from such notions of expediency as the opinion that, if there were not children enough, there would not be warriors enough, or that, if there were too many children, the food supply would not be adequate. The notion of welfare was an inference and resultant from these mystic and utilitarian generalizations.

Definition of the mores. When the elements of truth and right are developed into doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane. They then become capable of producing inferences developing into new forms, and extending their constructive influence over men and society. Then we call them the mores. The mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow. . . .

The mores and institutions. Institutions and laws are produced out of mores. An institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure. The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or perhaps only a number of functionaries set to co-operate in prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture. The structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests of men in society. Institutions are either *crescive* or enacted. They are *crescive* when they take shape in the mores, growing by the instinctive efforts by

which the mores are produced. Then the efforts, through long use, become definite and specific. Property, marriage, and religion are the most primary institutions. They began in folkways. They became customs. (They developed into mores by the addition of some philosophy of welfare, however crude. Then they were made more definite and specific as regards the rules, the prescribed acts, and the apparatus to be employed. This produced a structure and the institution was complete. Enacted institutions are products of rational invention and intention. They belong to high civilization. Banks are institutions of credit founded on usages which can be traced back to barbarism.) There came a time when, guided by rational reflection on experience, men systematized and regulated the usages which had become current, and thus created positive institutions of credit, defined by law and sanctioned by the force of the state. Pure enacted institutions which are strong and prosperous are hard to find. It is too difficult to invent and create an institution, for a purpose, out of nothing. The electoral college in the constitution of the United States is an example. In that case the democratic mores of the people have seized upon the device and made of it something quite different from what the inventors planned. All institutions have come out of mores, although the rational element in them is sometimes so large that their origin in the mores is not to be ascertained except by an historical investigation (legislatures, courts, juries, joint stock companies, the stock exchange). Property, marriage, and religion are still almost entirely in the mores. Amongst nature men any man might capture and hold a woman at any time, if he could. He did it by superior force which was its own supreme justification. But his act brought his group and her group into war, and produced harm to his comrades. They forbade capture, or set conditions for it. Beyond the limits, the individual might still use force, but his comrades were no longer responsible. The glory to him, if he succeeded, might be all the greater. His control over his captive was absolute. Within the prescribed conditions, "capture" became technical and institutional, and rights grew out of it. The woman had a status which was defined by custom, and was very different from the status of a real captive. Marriage was the institutional relation, in the society and under its sanction, of a woman to a man, where the woman had been obtained in the prescribed way. She was then a "wife." What

her rights and duties were was defined by the mores, as they are today in all civilized society.

Laws. Acts of legislation come out of the mores. In low civilization all societal regulations are customs and taboos, the origin of which is unknown. Positive laws are impossible until the stage of verification, reflection, and criticism is reached. Until that point is reached there is only customary law, or common law. The customary law may be codified and systematized with respect to some philosophical principles, and yet remain customary. The codes of Manu and Justinian are examples. Enactment is not possible until reverence for ancestors has been so much weakened that it is no longer thought wrong to interfere with traditional customs by positive enactment. Even then there is reluctance to make enactments, and there is a stage of transition during which traditional customs are extended by interpretation to cover new cases and to prevent evils. Legislation, however, has to seek standing ground on the existing mores, and it soon becomes apparent that legislation, to be strong, must be consistent with the mores. Things which have been in the mores are put under police regulation and later under positive law. (It is sometimes said that "public opinion" must ratify and approve police regulations, but this statement rests on an imperfect analysis. The regulations must conform to the mores, so that the public will not think them too lax or too strict.) The mores of our urban and rural populations are not the same; consequently legislation about intoxicants which is made by one of these sections of the population does not succeed when applied to the other. The regulation of drinking places, gambling places, and disorderly houses has passed through the above-mentioned stages. It is always a question of expediency whether to leave a subject under the mores, or to make a police regulation for it, or to put it into the criminal law. Betting, horse racing, dangerous sports, electric cars, and vehicles are cases now of things which seem to be passing under positive enactment and out of the unformulated control of the mores. When an enactment is made there is a sacrifice of the elasticity and automatic self-adaptation of custom, but an enactment is specific and is provided with sanctions. Enactments come into use when conscious purposes are formed, and it is believed specific devices can be framed by which to realize such purposes in the society. Then also prohibitions take the place of taboos, and punishments are planned to

be deterrent rather than revengeful. The mores of different societies, or of different ages, are characterized by greater or less readiness and confidence in regard to the use of positive enactments for the realization of societal purposes.

How laws and institutions differ from mores. When folkways have become institutions or laws they have changed their character and are to be distinguished from the mores. (The element of sentiment and faith inheres in the mores. Laws and institutions have a rational and practical character, and are more mechanical and utilitarian.) The great difference is that institutions and laws have a positive character, while mores are unformulated and undefined. There is a philosophy implicit in the folkways; when it is made explicit it becomes technical philosophy. Objectively regarded, the mores are the customs which actually conduce to welfare under existing life conditions. Acts under the laws and institutions are conscious and voluntary; under the folkways they are always unconscious and involuntary, so that they have the character of natural necessity. Educated reflection and skepticism can disturb this spontaneous relation. The laws, being positive prescriptions, supersede the mores so far as they are adopted. It follows that the mores come into operation where laws and tribunals fail. The mores cover the great field of common life where there are no laws or police regulations. They cover an immense and undefined domain, and they break the way in new domains, not yet controlled at all. The mores, therefore, build up new laws and police regulations in time.

Difference between mores and some cognate things. Products of intentional investigation or of rational and conscious reflection projects formally adopted by voluntary associations, rational methods consciously selected, injunctions and prohibitions by authority, and all specific conventional arrangements are not in the mores. They are differentiated by the rational and conscious element in them. We may also make a distinction between usages and mores. Usages are folkways which contain no principle of welfare, but serve convenience so long as all know what they are expected to do. For instance, Orientals, to show respect, cover the head and uncover the feet; Occidentals do the opposite. There is no inherent and necessary connection between respect and either usage, but it is an advantage that there should be a usage and that all should know and observe it. One way is as good as another, if it is understood and established. The folkways

as to public decency belong to the mores, because they have real connection with welfare which determines the only tenor which they can have. The folkways about propriety and modesty are sometimes purely conventional and sometimes inherently real. Fashions, fads, affectations, poses, ideals, manias, popular delusions, follies, and vices must be included in the mores. They have characteral qualities and characteral effect. However frivolous or foolish they may appear to people of another age, they have the form of attempts to live well, to satisfy some interest, or to win some good. The ways of advertisers who exaggerate, use tricks to win attention, and appeal to popular weakness and folly; the ways of journalism; electioneering devices; oratorical and dithyrambic extravagances in politics; current methods of humbug and sensationalism, — are not properly part of the mores but symptoms of them. They are not products of the concurrent and co-operative effort of all members of the society to live well. They are devices made with conscious ingenuity to exert suggestion on the minds of others. The mores are rather the underlying facts in regard to the faiths, notions, tastes, desires, etc., of that society at that time, to which all these modes of action appeal and of whose existence they are evidence.

What is goodness or badness of the mores. It is most important to notice that, for the people of a time and place, their own mores are always good, or rather that for them there can be no question of the goodness or badness of their mores. The reason is because the standards of good and right are in the mores. If the life conditions change, the traditional folkways may produce pain and loss, or fail to produce the same good as formerly. Then the loss of comfort and ease brings doubt into the judgment of welfare (causing doubt of the pleasure of the gods, or of war power, or of health), and thus disturbs the unconscious philosophy of the mores. Then a later time will pass judgment on the mores. ~~Another~~ society may also pass judgment on the mores. In our literary and historical study of the mores we want to get from them their educational value, which consists in the stimulus or warning as to what is, in its effects, societally good or bad. This may lead us to reject or neglect a phenomenon like infanticide, slavery, or witchcraft, as an old "abuse" and "evil," or to pass by the crusades as a folly which cannot recur. Such a course would be a great error. Everything in the mores of a time and place must be regarded as justified with regard to that time and place. "Good"

mores are those which are well adapted to the situation. "Bad" mores are those which are not so adapted. The mores are not so stereotyped and changeless as might appear, because they are forever moving towards more complete adaptation to conditions and interests, and also towards more complete adjustment to each other. People in mass have never made or kept up a custom in order to hurt their own interests. They have made innumerable errors as to what their interests were and how to satisfy them, but they have always aimed to serve their interests as well as they could. This gives the standpoint for the student of the mores. All things in them come before him on the same plane. They all bring instruction and warning. They all have the same relation to power and welfare. The mistakes in them are component parts of them. We do not study them in order to approve some of them and condemn others. They are all equally worthy of attention from the fact that they existed and were used. The chief object of study in them is their adjustment to interests, their relation to welfare, and their co-ordination in a harmonious system of life policy. For the men of the time there are no "bad" mores. What is traditional and current is the standard of what ought to be. The masses never raise any question about such things. If a few raise doubts and questions, this proves that the folkways have already begun to lose firmness and the regulative element in the mores has begun to lose authority. This indicates that the folkways are on their way to a new adjustment. The extreme of folly, wickedness, and absurdity in the mores is witch persecutions, but the best men of the seventeenth century had no doubt that witches existed, and that they ought to be burned. The religion, statecraft, jurisprudence, philosophy, and social system of that age all contributed to maintain that belief. It was rather a culmination than a contradiction of the current faiths and convictions, just as the dogma that all men are equal and that one ought to have as much political power in the state as another was the culmination of the political dogmatism and social philosophy of the nineteenth century. Hence our judgments of the good or evil consequences of folkways are to be kept separate from our study of the historical phenomena of them, and of their strength and the reasons for it. The judgments have their place in plans and doctrines for the future, not in a retrospect.

More exact definition of the mores. We may now formulate a more complete definition of the mores. They are the ways of doing things

which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them. By virtue of the latter element the mores are traits in the specific character (ethos) of a society or a period. They pervade and control the way of thinking in all the exigencies of life, returning from the world of abstractions to the world of action, to give guidance and to win revivification. "The mores (Sitten) are, before any beginning of reflection, the regulators of the political, social, and religious behavior of the individual. Conscious reflection is the worst enemy of the mores, because mores begin unconsciously and pursue unconscious purposes, which are recognized by reflection often only after long and circuitous processes, and because their expediency often depends on the assumption that they will have general acceptance and currency, uninterfered with by reflection." "The mores are usage in any group, in so far as it, on the one hand, is not the expression or fulfillment of an absolute natural necessity (e.g., eating or sleeping), and, on the other hand, is independent of the arbitrary will of the individual and is generally accepted as good and proper, appropriate and worthy."

2. Ceremonial Institutions and Social Control Through the Folkways

The reader who has followed Sumner's analysis will recognize that Herbert Spencer was talking about the same thing under different terminology in his chapters on "Ceremonial Institutions," written many years before. The following is extracted from Spencer's chapter on "Ceremony in General." In accord with his characteristic method of concrete and thorough illustration, the chapter named is followed by a whole series treating in turn of Trophies, Mutilations, Presents, Visits, Obeisances, Forms of Address, Titles, Badges and Costumes, Further Class Distinctions, and Fashion.

If,² disregarding conduct that is entirely private, we consider only that species of conduct which involves direct relations with other persons; and if under the name government we include all control of such conduct, however arising; then we must say that the earliest kind of government, and the government which is ever spontaneously

² *The Principles of Sociology*, by Herbert Spencer; vol. II, pp. 3-5; 11; 14-15; 34-35; 216-217. (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1897. Reprinted by permission.)

recommencing, is the government of ceremonial observance. More may be said. This kind of government, besides preceding other kinds, and besides having in all places and times approached nearer to universality of influence, has ever had, and continues to have, the largest share in regulating men's lives.

Proof that the modifications of conduct called "manners" and "behaviour," arise before those which political and religious restraints cause, is yielded by the fact that, besides preceding social evolution, they precede human evolution: they are traceable among the higher animals. The dog afraid of being beaten, comes crawling up to his master; clearly manifesting the desire to show submission. Nor is it solely to human beings that dogs use such propitiatory actions. They do the like one to another. All have occasionally seen how, on the approach of some formidable Newfoundland or mastiff, a small spaniel, in the extremity of its terror, throws itself on its back with legs in the air. Instead of threatening resistance by growls and showing of teeth, as it might have done had not resistance been hopeless, it spontaneously assumes the attitude that would result from defeat in battle; tacitly saying—"I am conquered, and at your mercy." Clearly then, besides certain modes of behaviour expressing affection, which are established still earlier in creatures lower than man, there are established certain modes of behaviour expressing subjection.

After recognizing this fact, we shall be prepared to recognize the fact that daily intercourse among the lowest savages, whose small loose groups, scarcely to be called social, are without political or religious regulation, is under a considerable amount of ceremonial regulation. No ruling agency beyond that arising from personal superiority, characterizes a horde of Australians; but every such horde has imperative observances. Strangers meeting must remain some time silent; a mile from an encampment approach has to be heralded by loud *cooeys*; a green bough is used as an emblem of peace; and brotherly feeling is indicated by exchange of names. Similarly the Tasmanians, equally devoid of government save that implied by predominance of a leader during war, had settled ways of indicating peace and defiance. The Esquimaux, too, though without social ranks or anything like chieftainship, have understood usages for the treatment of guests. Kindred evidence may be joined with this. Ceremonial control is highly developed in many places where other forms of control are but rudimentary. The wild Comanche "exacts the observance of his

rules of etiquette from strangers," and "is greatly offended" by any breach of them. When Araucanians meet, the inquiries, felicitations, and condolences which custom demands, are so elaborate that "the formality occupies ten or fifteen minutes." Of the ungoverned Bedouins we read that "their manners are sometimes dashed with a strange ceremoniousness"; and the salutations of Arabs are such that the "compliments in a well-bred man never last less than ten minutes." "We were particularly struck," says Livingstone, "with the punctiliousness of manners shown by the Balonda." "The Malagasy have many different forms of salutation, of which they make liberal use. . . . Hence in their general intercourse there is much that is stiff, formal, and precise." A Samoan orator, when speaking in Parliament, "is not contented with a mere word of salutation, such as 'gentlemen,' but he must, with great minuteness, go over the names and titles, and a host of ancestral references, of which they are proud."

That ceremonial restraint, preceding other forms of restraint, continues ever to be the most widely-diffused form of restraint, we are shown by such facts as that in all intercourse between members of each society, the decisively governmental actions are usually prefaced by this government of observances. The embassy may fail, negotiation may be brought to a close by war, coercion of one society by another may set up wider political rule with its peremptory commands; but there is habitually this more general and vague regulation of conduct preceding the more special and definite. So within a community, acts of relatively stringent control coming from ruling agencies, civil and religious, begin with and are qualified by, this ceremonial control; which not only initiates, but, in a sense, envelops all other. Functionaries, ecclesiastical and political, coercive as their proceedings may be, conform them in large measure to the requirements of courtesy. The priest, however arrogant his assumption, makes a civil salute; and the officer of the law performs his duty subject to certain propitiatory words and movements. . . .

If the two kinds of control which eventually grow into civil and religious governments, originally include scarcely anything beyond observance of ceremonies, the precedence of ceremonial control over other controls is a corollary. . . .

On passing to the less general aspects of ceremonial government, we are met by the question — How do there arise those modifications of behaviour which constitute it? Commonly it is assumed that they are

consciously chosen as symbolizing reverence or respect. After their usual manner of speculating about primitive practices, men read back developed ideas into undeveloped minds. The supposition is allied to that which originated the social-contract theory: a kind of conception that has become familiar to the civilized man, is assumed to have been familiar to man in his earliest state. But just as little basis as there is for the belief that savages deliberately made social contracts, is there for the belief that they deliberately adopted symbols. The error is best seen on turning to the most developed kind of symbolization — that of language. An Australian or a Fuegian does not sit down and knowingly coin a word; but the words he finds in use, and the new ones which come into use during his life, grow up unawares by onomatopoeia, or by vocal suggestions of qualities, or by metaphor which some observable likeness suggests. Among civilized peoples, however, who have learnt that words are symbolic, new words are frequently chosen to symbolize new ideas. So, too, is it with written language. The early Egyptian never thought of fixing on a sign to represent a sound, but his records began, as those of North American Indians begin now, with rude pictures of the transaction to be kept in memory; and as the process of recording extended, the pictures, abbreviated and generalized, lost more and more their likenesses to objects and acts, until, under stress of the need for expressing proper names, some of them were used phonetically, and signs of sounds came into existence. But, in our days, there has been reached a stage at which, as shorthand shows us, special marks are consciously selected to signify special sounds. The lesson taught is obvious. As it would be an error to conclude that because we knowingly choose sounds to symbolize ideas, and marks to symbolize sounds, the like was originally done by savages and by barbarians; so it is an error to conclude that because among the civilized certain ceremonies (say those of freemasons) are arbitrarily fixed upon, so ceremonies were arbitrarily fixed upon by the uncivilized. Already, in indicating the primitiveness of ceremonial control, I have named some modes of behaviour expressing subordination which have a natural genesis; and here the inference to be drawn is, that until we have found a natural genesis for a ceremony, we have not discovered its origin. . . .

That control of conduct which we distinguish as ceremony, precedes the civil and ecclesiastical controls. It begins with sub-human types of creatures; it occurs among otherwise ungoverned savages; it often

becomes highly developed where the other kinds of rule are little developed; it is ever being spontaneously generated afresh between individuals in all societies; and it envelops the more definite restraints which State and Church exercise. The primitiveness of ceremonial regulation is further shown by the fact that at first, political and religious regulations are little more than systems of ceremony, directed towards particular persons living and dead: the code of law joined with the one, and the moral code joined with the other, coming later. There is again the evidence derived from the possession of certain elements in common by the three controls, social, political, and religious; for the forms observable in social intercourse occur also in political and religious intercourse as forms of homage and forms of worship. More significant still is the circumstance that ceremonies may mostly be traced back to certain spontaneous acts which manifestly precede legislation, civil and ecclesiastical. Instead of arising by dictation or by agreement, which would imply the pre-established organization required for making and enforcing rules, they arise by modifications of acts performed for personal ends; and so prove themselves to grow out of individual conduct before social arrangements exist to control it. Lastly we note that when there arises a political head, who, demanding subordination, is at first his own master of the ceremonies, and who presently collects round him attendants whose propitiatory acts are made definite and fixed by repetition, there arise ceremonial officials. Though, along with the growth of organizations which enforce civil laws and enunciate moral precepts, there has been such a decay of the ceremonial organization as to render it among ourselves inconspicuous; yet in early stages the body of officials who conduct propitiation of living rulers, supreme and subordinate, homologous with the body of officials who conduct propitiation of dead apotheosized rulers, major and minor, is a considerable element of the social structure; and it dwindles only as fast as the structures, political and ecclesiastical, which exercise controls more definite and detailed, usurp its functions. . . .

We find, then, that rules of behaviour are not results of conventions at one time or other deliberately made, as people tacitly assume. Contrariwise, they are natural products of social life which have gradually evolved. Apart from detailed proofs of this, we find a general proof in their conformity to the laws of Evolution at large.

In primitive headless groups of men, such customs as regulate con-

duct form but a small aggregate. A few naturally prompted actions on meeting strangers; in certain cases bodily mutilations; and in some interdicts on foods monopolized by adult men; constitute a brief code. But with consolidation into compound, doubly compound, and trebly compound societies, there arise great accumulations of ceremonial arrangements regulating all the actions of life — there is increase in the mass of observances.

Originally simple, these observances become progressively complex. From the same root grow up various kinds of obeisances. Primitive descriptive names develop into numerous graduated titles. From aboriginal salutes come, in course of time, complimentary forms of address adjusted to persons and occasions. Weapons taken in war give origin to symbols of authority, assuming, little by little, great diversities in their shapes. While certain trophies, differentiating into badges, dresses and decorations, eventually in each of these divisions present multitudinous varieties, no longer bearing any resemblance to their originals. And besides the increasing heterogeneity which in each society arises among products having a common origin, there is the further heterogeneity which arises between this aggregate of products in one society and the allied aggregates in other societies.

Simultaneously there is progress in definiteness; ending, as in the East, in fixed forms prescribed in all their details, which must not under penalty be departed from. And in sundry places the vast assemblages of complex and definite ceremonies thus elaborated, are consolidated into coherent codes set forth in books.

The advance in integration, in heterogeneity, in definiteness, and in coherence, is thus fully exemplified.

Exercises

1. What are folkways?
2. How do they arise?
3. Are folkways social habits?
4. Why is it impossible to picture the origins of the folkways?
5. Show how folkways can arise through false inference.
6. Give examples of harmful folkways.
7. Show how the folkways are "true" and "right."
8. Are harmful folkways "true" and "right" also?
9. Show how the folkways become mores.
10. Distinguish folkways, mores, and institutions.
11. What is the relation between laws and mores?

12. What is the difference between usages and mores?
13. When and how are the mores recognized as bad?
14. Give an exact definition of the mores.
15. What, according to Spencer, is the earliest kind of government?
How low in the scale of life is it found?
16. What is its relation to control through church and state?
17. What is its relation to personal superiority?
18. Give examples of ceremonious behavior among primitive peoples.
19. Explain: "until we have found a natural genesis for a ceremony, we have not discovered its origin."
20. What changes occur in ceremonial institutions as social evolution progresses?

Additional References

1. Giddings, Franklin H.: *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. Chapter XI. treats "Folkways and Stateways," showing their nature and interactions.
2. Hayes, Edward C.: *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. Pp. 405-409, especially with the diagram in footnote, contain one of the very best brief explanations of the nature of institutions to be found.
3. Ross, Edward A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Chapter XLVI. "Uniformities," and Chapter XLVII. "Standards." These titles are equivalent to Sumner's *Folkways* and *Mores*, respectively.

CHAPTER IV

PERSONAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL VALUES

IT is a difficult problem to determine the relative influence of original and acquired elements in human behavior. Of late the question of *human nature* has received considerable attention, but neither psychology nor sociology has yet succeeded in giving a very definite account of it. Some go so far as to question the existence of *instincts* at all in the case of human beings, as does Professor Faris in his article, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" (in the *Am. Jour. of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII., No. 2, Sept., 1921). Others, while insisting that certain tendencies, or mechanisms, are transmitted through the germ-plasm, are at considerable loss to name and describe them.

In the meantime the idea is being stressed, notably by Professors Park and Burgess in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, that human nature is, to say the least, as much the product of social inheritance as it is the gift of organic heredity. This thought, that one *achieves* for himself his truly human characteristics through participation in group life, runs back to Professor Cooley's doctrine of the *primary groups*, and his early discussion still stands as the most definite and illuminating contribution to the subject of "human nature."

The selections of the present chapter will serve, if read along with the passages cited under "Additional References," to indicate, -first, the original equipment of instincts and tendencies with which, according to psychologists, the human infant is born; next, to show how these are modified through group-life, and elaborated into human attitudes in the more strictly psychological sense; and finally to explain how, through the wider social experience these attitudes are further elaborated into personality and character, determine the reaction of persons toward "social values," to use the phraseology of Professor Thomas, and are in turn modified by these social values, through a continuous process of mutual interaction.

In researches like those of Watson and others one sees the method by which modern experimental psychology is undermining the account given by early psychologists who regarded the human infant as endowed at birth with a complete set of instincts or specific original tendencies. Researches of the kind cited in the "References" seem to show that the new-born human being is endowed with a number of rather general and plastic *tendencies* instead of with a definite set of rigid, "unerring" instincts.

The passages indicated (See References in Warren's *Human Psychology*) discuss human instinctive behavior and classify human attitudes, from the point of view of general psychology;¹ while the selections from Cooley and Thomas, quoted below, explain, from the point of view of *social* psychology, the further elaboration of those elements in the processes of society.

THE FOUR WISHES OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Sociologists and social psychologists have gradually reduced human social behavior to smaller and more definite units. Professor Small anticipated the more recent development in his discussion of the six "interests" (Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty, and Rightness), in *General Sociology* (Chicago, 1905). His definition, however, included under that single term both the subjective and objective aspects, which Professor Thomas has more fully differentiated into "attitudes" and "values," as quoted below. In this connection it is of interest to notice not only that Professor W. G. Sumner made, in his *Folkways*, the best statement thus far produced on "social values," as Professor Thomas recognizes, but also that he came close to formulating the "four wishes" in his four great "motives," namely, Hunger, Love, Vanity, and Fear. It remained, however, for Professor Thomas to push the analysis farthest, and in so doing to give to social theory the two valuable working terms, "attitudes" and "social values," for the two sides of this process. But this was not all, for Professor Thomas went on to show that "attitudes" are themselves capable of being reduced to simpler elements, namely *wishes*. The following selection presents the four fundamental wishes as stated by Thomas, in socio-psychological terms, while the one immediately succeeding it gives a very recent, behavioristic account of the "wishes" from the viewpoint of physiological chemistry.

1. The Four Fundamental Wishes²

Every individual has a vast variety of wishes which can be satisfied only by his incorporation in a society. Among his general patterns

¹ In Warren's *Human Psychology* will be found also a valuable table of the "Higher Human Attitudes," which arise out of the higher mental processes, such as rational thought. Among these are the Interrogative Attitude, the Naïve, the Evaluative, and the Critical, all being aspects of consecutive thinking. The Social and Moral situations are represented by the Conciliatory attitude on the one hand and the Contrary on the other, and by the Altruistic, Irresponsible, and Duty-Bound attitudes; while other secondary attitudes are seen in the Preserving and Vacillating, the Voluble and Reticent, the Idealistic, Sensual, and Artistic. See *ibid.*, Table XXI., p. 370.

² From *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki; Vol. I, pp. 72-73. (Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1918. Reprinted by permission.)

of wishes we may enumerate: (1) the desire for fresh stimulations; (2) the desire for recognition, including, for example, sexual response and general social appreciation, and secured by devices ranging from the display of ornament to the demonstration of worth through scientific attainment; (3) the desire for mastery, or the "will to power," exemplified by ownership, domestic tyranny, political despotism, based on the instinct of hate, but capable of being sublimated to laudable ambition; (4) the desire for security, based on the instinct of fear and exemplified negatively by the wretchedness of the individual in perpetual solitude or under social taboo. Society is, indeed, an agent for the repression of many of the wishes in the individual; it demands that he shall be moral by repressing at least the wishes which are irreconcilable with the welfare of the group, but nevertheless it provides the only medium within which any of his schemes or wishes can be gratified. And it would be superfluous to point out by examples the degree to which society has in the past been able to impose its schemes of attitudes and values on the individual. Professor Sumner's volume, *Folkways*, is practically a collection of such examples, and, far from discouraging us as they discourage Professor Sumner, they should be regarded as proofs of the ability of the individual to conform to any definition, to accept any attitude, provided it is an expression of the public will or represents the appreciation of even a limited group.

NOTE—On the basis of other writings by Professor Thomas and his disciples, the four fundamental wishes may be reduced to those for security, new experience, response, and recognition.

2. The Physical Basis of the Wishes³

It is the distinction of modern psychology that it has established the wish (craving, need, desire, libido) as the moving force in any psychic process. The position of the wish in psychology as the force within and behind the instinct may be compared to that of energy in physics, when it was elevated to a central position in the explanation of physical processes in the nineteenth century. The concept of the *charged* wish has illuminated all the hidden recesses and rendered

³ From *The Glands Regulating Personality: A Study of the Glands of Internal Secretion in Relation to the Types of Human Nature*, by Louis Berman, M.D.; pp. 172-174. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

audible all the subdued murmurings of the mind. The truly novel in the content of the idea is the recognition of the fact that the wish *is* charged. Now it could never be charged in a vacuum. That means that a wish could never be born in the brain alone. For the brain has no power to charge itself with energy — it can only store and transmit. If a wish is potential energy that must be transformed into kinetic, it must have a source. That source is the vegetative system. Without the vegetative system, the great complex of viscera in the abdomen and chest, blood and its vessels, endocrines, muscles and nerves, the brain would remain but an intricate cold storage plant of memories, associations of past experiences. It would need no change and initiate no effort. But when the wish enters upon the scene, it is as if a dead storage battery has been refreshed with new current. Enriched with billions of electrons there is a stir and a movement, dynamic mind. But the dynamo is the more ancient possession of the animal, the vegetative apparatus. In short, what must always be remembered is that a wish is never cerebral, but always sub-cerebral, visceral, in its origins.

The sub-cerebral makes the cerebral. Activities in the nervous system below the brain and especially the vegetative system, force upon it its function of the active verb. It has to be, to do, and to suffer, and then to manipulate the environment to satiate the insatiable viscera, insatiable because the local chemistry is continually raising the tension of one or the other of them. A physics of human behavior becomes possible with the aid of these concepts of endocrine regulation of intra-visceral pressure, and intervisceral equilibrium, an intramuscular pressure and an intermuscular equilibrium, with the brain as the shifting fulcrum of the system.

The sensation of hunger, as we have seen, serves as good an exemplar as any of this mechanism of the wish. Hunger is preceded and accompanied by contractions of the stomach of increasing intensity. Those contractions must be brought about by a substance acting upon the nerve endings in the wall of the stomach. As it closes down upon itself, waves pass up and down. With each wave, the pressure within it rises. The exact amount of the pressure may be accurately measured by means of a small balloon swallowed and then inflated. When the pressure rises above a certain figure, the sensation of hunger breaks into the consciousness of the individual. We infer that certain sensory impulses sent up to the brain attain a strength that finally

forces itself into the conscious field of feeling. The sensation of hunger varies from individual to individual because of variation in the reaction throughout the vegetative system. Most often it is a sense of movement or even an itch in the upper abdomen. Let some cause produce a weakening or cessation of the movements of the stomach — as fear and anger — and the sensation of hunger disappears coincidently with the drop in the pressure within it. As the mathematicians would say, the wish is a function of the pressure, and so of the concentration of substance behind the pressure.

3. Primary Groups the Nursery of Human Nature⁴

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and co-operation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.

It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit. The individual will be ambitious, but the chief object of his ambition will be some desired place in the thought of the others, and he will feel allegiance to common standards of service and fair play. So the boy will dispute with his fellows a place on the team, but above such disputes will place the common glory of his class and school.

The most important spheres of this intimate association and co-operation — though by no means the only ones — are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and

⁴ From Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 23-31. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915. Reprinted by permission.)

all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals. The best comparative studies of the family, such as those of Westermarck or Howard, show it to us as not only a universal institution, but as more alike the world over than the exaggeration of exceptional customs by an earlier school had led us to suppose. Nor can any one doubt the general prevalence of play-groups among children or of informal assemblies of various kinds among their elders. Such association is clearly the nursery of human nature in the world about us, and there is no apparent reason to suppose that the case has anywhere or at any time been essentially different.

As regards play, I might, were it not a matter of common observation, multiply illustrations of the universality and spontaneity of the group discussion and co-operation to which it gives rise. The general fact is that children, especially boys after about their twelfth year, live in fellowships in which their sympathy, ambition and honor are engaged even more, often, than they are in the family. Most of us can recall examples of the endurance by boys of injustice and even cruelty, rather than appeal from their fellows to parents or teachers — as, for instance, in the hazing so prevalent at schools, and so difficult, for this very reason, to repress. And how elaborate the discussion, how cogent the public opinion, how hot the ambitions in these fellowships.

Nor is this facility of juvenile association, as is sometimes supposed, a trait peculiar to English and American boys; since experience among our immigrant population seems to show that the offspring of the more restrictive civilizations of the continent of Europe form self-governing play-groups with almost equal readiness. Thus Miss Jane Addams, after pointing out that the "gang" is almost universal, speaks of the interminable discussion which every detail of the gang's activity receives, remarking that "in these social folk-notes, so to speak, the young citizen learns to act upon his own determination."

Of the neighborhood group it may be said, in general, that from the time men formed permanent settlements upon the land, down, at least, to the rise of modern industrial cities, it has played a main part in the primary, heart-to-heart life of the people. Among our Teutonic forefathers the village community was apparently the chief sphere of sympathy and mutual aid for the commons all through the "dark" and middle ages, and for many purposes it remains so in rural districts at the present day. In some countries we still find it with all its

ancient vitality, notably in Russia, where the mir, or self-governing village group, is the main theatre of life, along with the family, for perhaps fifty millions of peasants.

In our own life the intimacy of the neighborhood has been broken up by the growth of an intricate mesh of wider contacts which leaves us strangers to people who live in the same house. And even in the country the same principle is at work, though less obviously, diminishing our economic and spiritual community with our neighbors. How far this change is a healthy development, and how far a disease, is perhaps still uncertain.

Besides these almost universal kinds of primary association, there are many others whose form depends upon the particular state of civilization; the only essential thing, as I have said, being a certain intimacy and fusion of personalities. In our own society, being little bound by place, people easily form clubs, fraternal societies and the like, based on congeniality, which may give rise to real intimacy. Many such relations are formed at school and college, and among men and women brought together in the first instance by their occupations — as workmen in the same trade, or the like. Where there is a little common interest and activity, kindness grows like weeds by the roadside.

But the fact that the family and neighborhood groups are ascendant in the open and plastic time of childhood makes them even now incomparably more influential than all the rest.

Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as more elaborate relations, but form a comparatively permanent source out of which the latter are ever springing. Of course they are not independent of the larger society, but to some extent reflect its spirit; as the German family and the German school bear somewhat distinctly the print of German militarism. But this, after all, is like the tide setting back into creeks, and does not commonly go very far. Among the German, and still more among the Russian, peasantry are found habits of free co-operation and discussion almost uninfluenced by the character of the state; and it is a familiar and well-supported view that the village commune, self-governing as regards local affairs and habituated to discussion, is a very widespread institution in settled communities, and the continuator of a similar autonomy

previously existing in the clan. "It is man who makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the commune seems to come directly from the hand of God."

In our own cities the crowded tenements and the general economic and social confusion have sorely wounded the family and the neighborhood, but it is remarkable, in view of these conditions, what vitality they show; and there is nothing upon which the conscience of the time is more determined than upon restoring them to health.

These groups, then, are springs of life, not only for the individual but for social institutions. They are only in part moulded by special traditions, and, in larger degree, express a universal nature. The religion or government of other civilizations may seem alien to us, but the children or the family group wear the common life, and with them we can always make ourselves at home.

By human nature, I suppose, we may understand those sentiments and impulses that are human in being superior to those of lower animals, and also in the sense that they belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time. It means, particularly, sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong.

Human nature in this sense is justly regarded as a comparatively permanent element in society. Always and everywhere men seek honor and dread ridicule, defer to public opinion, cherish their goods and their children, and admire courage, generosity, and success. It is always safe to assume that people are and have been human.

It is true, no doubt, that there are differences of race capacity, so great that a large part of mankind are possibly incapable of any high kind of social organization. But these differences, like those among individuals of the same race, are subtle, depending upon some obscure intellectual deficiency, some want of vigor, or slackness of moral fiber, and do not involve unlikeness in the generic impulses of human nature. In these all races are very much alike. The more insight one gets into the life of savages, even those that are reckoned the lowest, the more human, the more like ourselves, they appear. Take for instance the natives of Central Australia, as described by Spencer and Gillen, tribes having no definite government or worship and scarcely able to count to five. They are generous to one another, emulous of virtue as they understand it, kind to their children and

to the aged, and by no means harsh to women. Their faces as shown in the photographs are wholly human and many of them attractive.

And when we come to a comparison between different stages in the development of the same race, between ourselves, for instance, and the Teutonic tribes of the time of Caesar, the difference is neither in human nature nor in capacity, but in organization, in the range and complexity of relations, in the diverse expression of powers and passions essentially much the same.

There is no better proof of this generic likeness of human nature than in the ease and joy with which the modern man makes himself at home in literature depicting the most remote and varied phases of life — in Homer, in the Nibelung tales, in the Hebrew Scriptures, in the legends of the American Indians, in stories of frontier life, of soldiers and sailors, of criminals and tramps, and so on. The more penetratingly any phase of human life is studied the more an essential likeness to ourselves is revealed.

To return to primary groups: the view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us — though that enters into it — and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments of the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.

If this view does not recommend itself to common sense I do not know that elaboration will be of much avail. It simply means the application at this point of the idea that society and individuals are inseparable phases of a common whole, so that wherever we find an individual fact we may look for a social fact to go with it. If there is a universal nature in persons there must be something universal in association to correspond to it.

What else can human nature be than a trait of primary groups? Surely not an attribute of the separate individual — supposing there

were any such thing—since its typical characteristics, such as affection, ambition, vanity, and resentment, are inconceivable apart from society. If it belongs, then, to man in association, what kind or degree of association is required to develop it? Evidently nothing elaborate, because elaborate phases of society are transient and diverse, while human nature is comparatively stable and universal. In short the family and neighborhood life is essential to its genesis and nothing more is.

Here as everywhere in the study of society we must learn to see mankind in psychical wholes, rather than in artificial separation. We must see and feel the communal life of family and local groups as immediate facts, not as combinations of something else. And perhaps we shall do this best by recalling our own experience and extending it through sympathetic observation. What, in our life, is the family and the fellowship; what do we know of the we-feeling? Thought of this kind may help us to get a concrete perception of that primary group-nature of which everything social is the outgrowth.

4. Attitudes and Social Values⁵

Now there are two fundamental practical problems which have constituted the center of attention of reflective social practice in all times. These are (1) the problem of the dependence of the individual upon social organization and culture, and (2) the problem of the dependence of social organization and culture upon the individual. Practically, the first problem is expressed in the question, How shall we produce with the help of the existing social organization and culture the desirable mental and moral characteristics in the individuals constituting the social group? And the second problem means in practice, How shall we produce, with the help of the existing mental and moral characteristics of the individual members of the group, the desirable type of social organization and culture?

If social theory is to become the basis of social technique and to solve these problems really, it is evident that it must include both kinds of data involved in them—namely, the objective cultural elements of social life and the subjective characteristics of the members of the social group—and that the two kinds of data must be taken

⁵ From *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, Vol. I., pp. 20-35; 38-39; 42-46. (Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1918. Reprinted by permission.)

as correlated. For these data we shall use now and in the future the terms "social values" (or simply "values") and "attitudes."

By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity. Thus, a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social values. Each of them has a content that is sensual in the case of the foodstuff, the instrument, the coin; partly sensual, partly imaginary in the piece of poetry, whose content is constituted, not only by the written or spoken words, but also by the images which they evoke, and in the case of the university, whose content is the whole complex of men, buildings, material accessories, and images representing its activity, or, finally, only imaginary in the case of a mythical personality or a scientific theory. The meaning of these values becomes explicit when we take them in connection with human actions. The meaning of the foodstuff is its reference to its eventual consumption; that of an instrument, its reference to the work for which it is designed; that of a coin, the possibilities of buying and selling or the pleasures of spending which it involves; that of the piece of poetry, the sentimental and intellectual reactions which it arouses; that of the university, the social activities which it performs; that of the mythical personality, the cult of which it is the object and the actions of which it is supposed to be the author; that of the scientific theory, the possibilities of control of experience by idea or action that it permits. The social value is thus opposed to the natural thing, which has a content but, as a part of nature, has no meaning for human activity, is treated as "valueless"; when the natural thing assumes a meaning, it becomes thereby a social value. And naturally a social value may have many meanings, for it may refer to many different kinds of activity.

By attitude we understand a process of individual consciousness which determines real or possible activity of the individual in the social world. Thus, hunger that compels the consumption of the foodstuff; the workman's decision to use the tool; the tendency of the spendthrift to spend the coin; the poet's feelings and ideas expressed in the poem and the reader's sympathy and admiration; the needs which the institution tries to satisfy and the response it provokes; the fear and devotion manifested in the cult of the divinity; the interest in creating, understanding, or applying a scientific theory and the

ways of thinking implied in it — all these are attitudes. The attitude is thus the individual counterpart of the social value; activity, in whatever form, is the bond between them. By its reference to activity and thereby to individual consciousness the value is distinguished from the natural thing. By its reference to activity and thereby to the social world the attitude is distinguished from the psychical state. In the examples quoted above we were obliged to use with reference to ideas and volitions words that have become terms of individual psychology by being abstracted from the objective social reality to which they apply, but originally they were designed to express attitudes, not psychological processes. A psychological process is an attitude treated as an object in itself, isolated by a reflective act of attention, and taken first of all in connection with other states of the same individual. An attitude is a psychological process treated as primarily manifested in its reference to the social world and taken first of all in connection with some social value. Individual psychology may later re-establish the connection between the psychological process and the objective reality which has been severed by reflection; it may study psychological processes as conditioned by the facts going on in the objective world. In the same way social theory may later connect various attitudes of an individual and determine his social character. But it is the original (usually unconsciously occupied) standpoints which determine at once the subsequent methods of these two sciences. The psychological process remains always fundamentally a *state of somebody*; the attitude remains always fundamentally an attitude *toward something*.

Now, the chief error of both social practice and social theory has been that they determined, consciously or unconsciously, social facts in a way which excluded in advance the possibility of their subordination to any laws. The implicit or explicit assumption was that a social fact is composed of two elements, a cause which is either a social phenomenon or an individual act, or an effect which is either an individual act or a social phenomenon. Following uncritically the example of the physical sciences, which always tend to find the one determined phenomenon which is the necessary and sufficient condition of another phenomenon, social theory and social practice have forgotten to take into account one essential difference between physical and social reality, which is that, while the effect of a physical phenomenon depends exclusively on the objective nature of this phe-

nomenon and can be calculated on the ground of the latter's empirical content, the effect of a social phenomenon depends in addition on the subjective standpoint taken by the individual or the group toward this phenomenon and can be calculated only if we know, not only the objective content of the assumed cause, but also the meaning which it has at the given moment for the given conscious beings. This simple consideration should have shown to the social theorist or technician that a social cause cannot be simple, like a physical cause, but is compound, and must include both an objective and a subjective element, a value *and* an attitude. Otherwise the effect will appear accidental and incalculable, because we shall have to search in every particular case for the reasons why this particular individual or this particular society reacted to the given phenomenon in this way and not in any other way. . . .

The simple and well-known fact is that the social results of individual activity depend, not only on the action itself, but also on the social conditions in which it is performed; and therefore the cause of a social change must include both individual and social elements. By ignoring this, social theory faces an indefinite task whenever it wants to explain the simplest social change. For the same action in different social conditions produces quite different results. It is true that if social conditions are sufficiently stable the results of certain individual actions are more or less determinable, at least in a sufficient majority of cases to permit an approximate practical calculation. We know that the result of the activity of a factory-workman will be a certain technical product, that the result of the peasant's starting a lawsuit against a member of his family will be a dissolution of family bonds between him and this member, that the result of a judge's activity in a criminal case will be the condemnation and incarceration of the offender if he is convicted. But all this holds true only if social conditions remain stable. In case of a strike in the factory, the workman will not be allowed to finish his product; assuming that the idea of family solidarity has ceased to prevail in a peasant group, the lawsuit will not provoke moral indignation; if the action upon which the judge has to pronounce this verdict ceases to be treated as a crime because of a change of political conditions or of public opinion, the offender, even if convicted, will be set free. A method which permits us to determine only cases of stereotyped activity and leaves us helpless in face of changed conditions is not a scientific method at all,

and becomes even less and less practically useful with the continual increase of fluidity in modern social life.

Moreover, social theory forgets also that the uniformity of results of certain actions is itself a problem and demands explanation exactly as much as do the variations. For the stability of social conditions upon which the uniformity of results of individual activity depends is itself a product of former activities, not an original natural status which might be assumed as granted. Both its character and its degree vary from group to group and from epoch to epoch. A certain action may have indeed determined and calculable effects in a certain society and at a certain period, but will have completely different effects in other societies and at other periods.

And thus social theory is again confronted by a scientifically absurd question. Assuming that individual activity in itself is the cause of social effects, it must then ask: "Why does a certain action produce this particular effect at this particular moment in this particular society?" The answer to this question would demand a complete explanation of the whole status of the given society at the given moment, and thus force us to investigate the entire past of the universe.

The fundamental methodological principle of both social psychology and sociology — the principle without which they can never reach scientific explanation — is therefore the following one:

The cause of a social or individual phenomenon is never another social or individual phenomenon alone, but always a combination of a social and an individual phenomenon.

Or, in more exact terms:

The cause of a value or of an attitude is never an attitude or a value alone, but always a combination of an attitude and a value.

It is only by the application of this principle that we can remove the difficulties with which social theory and social practice have struggled. If we wish to explain the appearance of a new attitude — whether in one individual or in a whole group — we know that this attitude appeared as a consequence of the influence of a social value upon the individual or the group, but we know also that this influence itself would have been impossible unless there had been some pre-existing attitude, some wish, emotional habit, or intellectual tendency, to which this value has in some way appealed, favoring it, contradicting it, giving it a new direction, or stabilizing its hesitating expressions.

Our problem is therefore to find both the value and the pre-existing attitude upon which it has acted and get in their combination the necessary and sufficient cause of the new attitude. We shall not be forced then to ask: "Why did this value provoke in this case such a reaction?" because the answer will be included in the fact — in the pre-existing attitude to which this value appealed. Our fact will bear its explanation in itself, just as the physical fact of the movement of an elastic body B when struck by another elastic body A bears its explanation in itself. We may, if we wish, ask for a more detailed explanation, not only of the appearance of the new attitude, but also for certain specific characters of this attitude, in the same way as we may ask for an explanation, not only of the movement of the body B in general, but also of the rapidity and direction of this movement; but the problem always remains limited, and the explanation is within the fact, in the character of the pre-existing attitude and of the influencing value, or in the masses of the bodies A and B and the rapidity and direction of their movements previous to their meeting. We can indeed pass from the given fact to the new one — ask, for example, "How did it happen that this attitude to which the value appealed was there?" or, "How did it happen that the body A moved toward B until they met?" But this question again will find its limited and definite answer if we search in the same way for the cause of the pre-existing attitude in some other attitude and value, or of the movement in some other movement.

Let us take some examples from the following volumes. Two individuals, under the influence of a tyrannical behavior in their fathers, develop completely different attitudes. One shows submission, the other secret revolt and resentment. If the father's tyranny is supposed to be the cause of these opposite attitudes, we must know the whole character of these individuals and their whole past in order to explain the difference of effect. But if we realize that the tyranny is not the sole cause of both facts, but only a common element which enters into the composition of two different causes, our simple task will be to find the other elements of these causes. We can find them, if our materials are sufficient, in certain persisting attitudes of these individuals as expressed in words or actions. We form hypotheses which acquire more and more certainty as we compare many similar cases. We thus reach the conclusion that the other element of the cause is, in the first case, the attitude of familial solidarity, in the

second case, the individualistic tendency to assert one's own personal desires. We have thus two completely different facts, and we do not need to search farther. The difference of effects is obviously explained by the difference of causes and is necessarily what it is. The cause of the attitude of submission is the attitude of familiar solidarity plus the tyranny of the father; the cause of the attitude of revolt is the tendency of self-assertion plus the tyranny of the father.

Exercises

1. Name and illustrate the four fundamental wishes, as defined by Thomas.
2. What is the mechanism of the wish, according to Berman?
3. Does Berman's assertion that "a wish is never cerebral, but always sub-cerebral" throw any light on what the expression, a "low character," really means?
4. What are the primary groups explained by Cooley?
5. What is *human nature*, as described by Cooley?
6. In what way do these groups produce human nature? What attitudes do they specially foster?
7. How does Thomas define an "attitude"?
8. Give his definition of a "social value."
9. What is the relation between attitudes and values?
10. The earliest American sociologist, Lester F. Ward, held that sociology is the science of institutions. (See above, Ch. III., Reading 1.) Does Thomas sustain this position? Is the thought of the two writers indetical?
11. What does Thomas find to have been the chief error of sociological explanation in the past?
12. State the method of explanation formulated by him, and illustrate the same.
13. Are attitudes essentially individual or social? Would it be correct to say that the adjective "personal" should be used to qualify *attitudes*, and the adjective "social" applied exclusively to values?
14. If the term *social attitudes* is permissible, to what specific attitudes would it apply?

Additional References

1. Watson, John B., and Watson, Rosalie Rayner: "Studies in Infant Psychology," in the *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XIII., No. 6 (Dec. 1921), pp. 493-515. Treats the original equipment of human infants from the standpoint of experimental psychology.
2. Warren, Howard C.: *Human Psychology*. For instinctive behavior see pp. 102-104. For normal human attitudes see pp. 361-373.

3. Wright, William K.: "The Evolution of Values from Instincts," in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIV., No. 2 (1915), pp. 165-183. An account of the evolution of values from the standpoint of functional pragmatism following McDougal's theory of the sentiments.

4. McDougall, William: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Chapter V., especially pp. 121-128. Explains the nature of the sentiments.

5. Wallas, Graham: *The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis*. Chapter IV. "Disposition and Environment." Discusses "balked disposition" from the social point of view.

6. Dewey, John: *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 58-62. Shows the dependence of personal habits upon social customs.

7. Warren, Howard C.: *Human Psychology*, pp. 360-362; 365-367. Classifies attitudes and dispositions from the standpoint of general (individual) psychology.

8. Thomas, William I.: *The Unadjusted Girl, With Cases and Standpoints for Behavior Analysis*. Ch. I. "The Wishes."

CHAPTER V

RACE AND CULTURE

THE first two selections given below are designed to show that most of the earlier assertions about fundamental, inborn racial differences were the product of inadequate investigation and premature generalization. The extracts from Mall and Woodworth do not give an adequate report of their researches, but do indicate the negative drift of recent investigations. This negative character is inevitable because of the fact that so much pseudo-knowledge has accumulated on the subject of race, and must be overthrown before sound and unprejudiced thinking can be advanced. Dr. Mall's experiments were carried on in the Anatomical Laboratory of the Johns Hopkins University.

1. Anatomical Characters of the Human Brain in Black and White Races.¹

A survey of the literature on the peculiarities of brain in men of genius, in women and in the lower races indicates that some anatomists have thought they could determine, almost at a glance, whether or not a given specimen came from a great man, a woman or from a Negro. I refer especially to the older works of Huschke and of Parker and to the more recent ones of Spitzka and of Bean. . . .

I have tabulated as Bean did the area of the genu with that of the splenium in 106 brains and do not find that the symbols for the brains of the two races separate. Most of the Negro brains in my chart are intermixed with the white brains above the line which separates them in Bean's chart. My measurements were all made by tracing the outline of the corpus callosum with the very accurate projecting apparatus made by Hermann of Zurich, while Bean's were made with a less precise instrument borrowed from the Smithsonian Institution. The areas of both Bean's and my own were made with

¹ "On Several Anatomical Characters of the Human Brain Said to Vary according to Race and Sex, with Especial Reference to the Weight of the Frontal Lobe," by Franklin P. Mall, in the *American Journal of Anatomy*, vol. IX, No. 1. Reprinted in *Select Discussions of Race Problems*, Number 20 of *The Atlanta University Publications*, pp. 32; 38-39; 43-46; 47-48; 57. Reprinted by permission.

a Conradi planimeter whose minimum registration is 10 sq. mm. and its probable error was found to be 10 sq. mm. In order to exclude my own personal equation, which is an item of considerable importance in a study like this, all of the tracings as well as the measurements of all of the areas were made without my knowing the race or sex of any of the individuals from which the brains were taken. The brains were identified from the laboratory records just before the results were tabulated.

Tabulation of the brain weight with the area of the cross section of the corpus callosum confirms what Bean found, that is, the area increases with the brain weight. The same is true when the area of the corpus callosum minus that of the splenium is tabulated with the weight of the frontal lobe. However, there are great individual variations, but they seem to be of like extent in both the white and the Negro brains. The female records separate somewhat from the male, but this is due no doubt to the lighter weight of the former.

My figures do not confirm Bean's result that the genu is relatively larger and the splenium relatively smaller in the white than in the Negro brain. The specimens I examined include 18 brains which Bean studied, and I find that the measurements I made of the areas of the genu and splenium in them do not agree altogether with his. Ten of the specimens are white and eight Negro brains. In making the comparison a deviation of 10 sq. mm. is overlooked, for this error is to be expected from the planimeter we employed. The genu is larger in Bean's tables than in mine in 7 white brains and one black brain and smaller in 4 black and 2 white. The splenium is larger in 7 black and 4 white and is not smaller than mine in a single instance in Bean's tables. This discrepancy between our figures is sufficient to account for the racial differences in the corpus callosum found in Bean's tables but not in mine, although the individual deviations in both our charts are very great. I think my chart shows conclusively, as far as possible with the method I employed, that there is no variation in either genu or splenium of the corpus callosum due to either race or sex.

In order to determine the relative weight of the frontal lobe in white and in Negro brains I made numerous tests in separating this lobe from the rest of the cerebrum to develop first an accurate method. . . .

In general I used Broca's method to divide the frontal lobe from the rest of the cerebrum and found as he did that the mean weight of the frontal lobe in both men and women is between 43 and 44 per

cent. The same is true for both the Negro and the white. This bears out what I have found by measuring the area of the genu and splenium and leads to the conclusion that it is incorrect to state that the frontal lobe of the Negro brain is relatively lighter than that of the white.

If in a chart on which the weights of the frontal lobe are plotted the black and the white, and the male and the female are compared it is seen that the distribution is quite even and that on an average the percentage of the frontal lobe is the same in both races and sexes.

In order to give the question another and possibly a better test, I tabulated all the brains in which both halves were weighed, but did not reduce the figures to those of the fresh weight, for in a number of specimens this is not given. Then the combined weight of both sides was divided by two, thus giving the average weight of the frontal lobe of each brain and that of each hemisphere behind the central sulcus. In this chart, Fig. 3, each symbol represents a whole cerebrum divided by two, and in it more of the symbols are shifted to the left, for in general there is more shrinkage of the brains due to the long action of formalin and carbolic acid. The individual deviations are not as great as they are in Fig. 2 (39 per cent to 48 per cent) but the mean is about the same (43.5 per cent). Again there is no separation of the brains due to race or sex.

I must therefore conclude that with the methods at our disposal it is impossible to detect a relative difference in the weight or size of the frontal lobe due to either race or sex, and that probably none exists. My weighings of the frontal lobe were made in three series and each time I did not know the race or sex of the individual whose brain was being tested until it had been broken and weighed. There were 6 white and 6 Negro brains in the first series and the racial difference found in it was very marked,—41 per cent of frontal lobe in Negro brains and 44 per cent in white brains. In the next series of the brains, the white and the Negro brains came closer together and in the third series of about 10 brains this difference was lost altogether. It is evident, as Schwalbe and Pfitzner have pointed out, that a percentage to be of any significance must not change as the records increase in number.

As it is generally believed that the brains of men of genius are of complex configuration, so it is also believed that the brains of lowly races are of a simple and embryonic type. Thus Parker says that

the Sylvian fissure in the Negro is $\frac{5}{8}$ inches (16 mm.) shorter than in the white and the central sulcus is simpler, straighter and less undulated. He also found a Negro brain in which there was a complete connection between the fissures of Sylvius and Rolando. He states that the occipital fissures are ape-like with a well-marked perpendicular fissure. The Negro brain as it presents itself in this country, he says, bears an unmistakably nearer relation to the ape type than does the white, being also more foetal in character.

To any one who is familiar with the Negro brain the statements of Parker appear to be careless and superficial. His observations upon the length and form of the fissures of Sylvius and Rolando can not be taken seriously in the light of recent studies of these fissures, and they strike one rather as an opinion supported by a strong personal prejudice, as are so many of the observations upon the gyri of sulci. Furthermore, other students of the Negro brain found no such difference and state that they are practically like the white (see Tiedemann, Huschke and Marshall). Schwalbe, who reviews the work of Parker, states expressly that racial differences in the Negro brain are in all probability due to similar racial peculiarities of the skull. The same statement is also made by Hrdlicka and has been fully tested by Bean. However, such differences are but slight, for a variation in the shape of the skull influences only the main outlines of the brain and not its gyri. The flattening over the anterior association area, as first observed by Hrdlicka, was fully confirmed by Bean and can be seen in most full-blood Negro brains, certainly in more than one-half. One precaution must always be taken in these cases and that is to compare whites and Negroes of the same type of form of the skull. The majority of Negroes are dolichocephalic and these should be compared only with dolichocephalic whites.

In order to make a preliminary test of this question I attempted to assort a collection of Negro and white brains, calling those with the peculiar narrowing and flattening of the upper surface of the frontal lobe, Negro, and those in which it was more convex, white brains. The brains tested were a mixed lot which happened to be on one shelf in the brain room. After they had been assorted according to the character above mentioned I found that there were 60 Negro and 30 white brains and that their assortment was correct in exactly 75 per cent of the cases. Had all of the brains been dolichocephalic I think the test would have fallen out better, and Dr. Hrdlicka informs me that this is also his opinion.

I then mixed the brains again, added to their number, and assorted them a second time according to the richness of the gyri and sulci, using as a standard the two illustrations given on plate 54 in Retzius' *Menschenhirn*. In case the configuration was complex, of the Gauss type, it was called stenogyrencephalic, and in case it was simple, of foetal type, it was called eurygyrencephalic. Doubtful specimens, and there were many of them, were at first set aside and in case it was impossible to render a decision regarding them by a second effort they were excluded altogether.

The percentage of eurygyrencephaly and stenogyrencephaly is . . . about the same in both races. . . .

The "Affenspalte" first described by Rüdinger has caused anatomists much trouble and its presence in all human brains was often questioned. A few years ago Elliot Smith demonstrated that a marked occipital operculum which is identical with that of the gorilla's brain is often present in the brain of the Egyptian fellah. However, the operculum is not always well marked, but its bounding sulcus, which Smith calls the sulcus lunatus, can be seen in every human brain. Smith's studies are directed rather towards the homology of the Affenspalte which he has fully demonstrated with the aid of the structure of the cortex, *i.e.*, the extent of the stripe of Gennari. At first he showed that the Affenspalte (sulcus lunatus) is present in all Egyptian brains and later he found it present in Negro, Syrian, Turkish and Greek brains and with a study of literature he concluded that it is a normal feature of the adult human brain. It would have been easy for Smith to draw a wrong conclusion regarding this sulcus, for he began his study of it with the Egyptian brain; however, he did not end there.

It may also be noted that Parker states that he found a Negro brain with a gyrus cunei on the surface as is the case in the simian brain. Since Parker gives no illustrations it is difficult to ascertain whether or not he saw only an annectent gyrus partly on the surface, as described and pictured in Quain's Anatomy. This latter condition I have also observed in both Negro and white brains. Until it is thoroughly investigated in a large number of specimens its meaning still remains an open question. Probably it will fall, as do other anatomical peculiarities of the Negro when they are fully investigated.

I wish to add a remark regarding the anatomy of the Negro. One is often led to believe that there are more anatomical anomalies in

the Negro than in the European body. I have now had considerable experience in the dissection of the Negro and have yet to observe that variations are more common in the Negro than in the white. In fact it seems as if excessive development of facial muscles and other variations is more common in the white, but until a large number of statistics are collected no definite statement can be made. However, we have made many thousands of records of nerve variations and find in them no racial peculiarities. The misleading statements are based upon a few dissections of Negroes in which the variations found are given as peculiarities of the race. An equal number of variations will be found in any corresponding series of white cadavers. . . .

In this study of several anatomical characters said to vary according to race and sex, the evidence advanced has been tested and found wanting. It is found, however, that portions of the brain vary greatly in different brains and that a very large number of records must be obtained before the norm will be found. For the present the crudeness of our method will not permit us to determine anatomical characters due to race, sex or genius and which if they exist are completely masked by the large number of marked individual variations. The study has been still further complicated by the personal equation of the investigator. Arguments for difference due to race, sex and genius will henceforward need to be based upon new data, really scientifically treated and not on the older statements.

2. Racial Differences in Mental Traits ²

First, as to the senses. The point of special interest here is as to whether the statements of many travelers, ascribing to the "savage" extraordinary powers of vision, hearing and smell, can be substantiated by exact tests. The common opinion, based on such reports, is, or has been, that savages are gifted with sensory powers quite beyond anything of which the European is capable; though Spencer explains that this is a cause of inferiority rather than the reverse, because the savage is thus led to rely wholly on his keen senses, and to devote his whole attention to sense impressions, to the neglect and atrophy of his intellectual powers. Ranke, however, on testing natives of Brazil, a race notable for its feats of vision, found that their ability

² "Racial Differences in Mental Traits," by R. S. Woodworth, Professor of Psychology in Columbia University. Reprinted in *Atlanta University Publications*, No. 20; pp. 61-65; 67-69. Reprinted by permission.

to discern the position of a letter or similar character at a distance, though good was not remarkable, but fell within the range of European powers. The steppe-dwelling Kalmuks, also renowned for distant vision, being able to detect the dust of a herd of cattle at a greater distance with the naked eye than a European could with a telescope, have also been examined; and their acuity was indeed found to be very high, averaging considerably above that of Europeans; yet only one or two out of the forty individuals tested exceeded the European record, while the great majority fell within the range of good European eyes. Much the same result has been obtained from the Arabs, Egyptians and quite a variety of peoples. Among the most reliable results are those of Rivers on a wholly unselected Papuan population. He found no very exceptional individual among 115 tested, yet the average was somewhat better than that of Europeans. I had myself, through the kindness of Dr. McGee, the opportunity of testing individuals from quite a variety of races at the St. Louis Fair in 1904, and my results agree closely with those already cited, though I did not find any cases of very exceptional powers among about 300 individuals. There were a number who exceeded the best of the 200 whites whom I had also tested under the same conditions, but none who exceeded or equaled the record of a few individuals who have been found in the German army. Indians and Filipinos ranked highest, averaging about 10 per cent better than whites, when all individuals of really defective vision were excluded. The amount of overlapping is indicated by stating that 65-75 per cent of Indians and Filipinos exceeded the average for whites. It did not seem possible, however, to assert anything like a correspondence between eyesight and the degree of primitiveness or backwardness of a people; since, for instance, the Negritos of the Philippine Islands, though much more primitive than the Malayan Filipinos in their mode of life, and, indeed, the most primitive group so far tested, were inferior to the Filipinos, and, in fact, as far as could be judged from the smaller number examined, no whit superior to whites. Nor does it seem possible, from results hitherto reported, to believe in a close correspondence between keen sight and dark skin, though it is true that pigment is important in several ways to the eye, and that therefore, as Rivers has suggested, the amount of pigmentation might be a factor in vision. But it does not seem to be specially the darkest races that show the keenest vision. We may perhaps conclude that

eyesight is a function which varies somewhat in efficiency with difference of race, though with much overlapping. No doubt, however, the results as they stand need some qualification. On the one hand, inclusion of individuals with myopia and similar defects would lower the average of Europeans considerably more than that of most other races; so that the actual condition of eyesight differs more than the results show. On the other hand, it would not be fair to include near-sighted individuals, if what we wish to discover is native differences between peoples; for the different prevalence of myopia is certainly due to the differing uses to which the eye is put. And this matter of use may have considerable influence on the individuals not classed as near-sighted, and so admitted to the comparison. Rivers has made an observation in connection with the test for eyesight, which I am able to confirm, and which is perhaps of much importance. He found that when the letter or character used in his test, the position of which had to be recognized at the possible distance, was removed from him beyond the distance at which he felt that he could judge it, he could still guess it right nearly every time, though without confidence. By such guessing, one's record in this test can be bettered considerably; and careful study enables one to see the slight and blurred indications of position which form the basis of the guessing. Now it may well be that the occupations of civilized life breed a habit of dependence on clear vision, whereas the life of those who must frequently recognize objects at a great distance breeds reliance on slight indications, and so creates a favorable attitude for the test of eyesight. When this possibility is taken in connection with the deterioration of many European eyes from abuse, and in connection with the observed overlapping of all groups tested, the conclusion is not improbable that, after all, the races are essentially equal in keenness of vision. Even if small differences do exist, it is fairly certain that the wonderful feats of distant vision ascribed to savages are due to practice in interpreting slight indications of familiar objects. Both Rivers and Ranke, on testing some of the very individuals whose feats of keen sight seemed almost miraculous, found that, as tested, they had excellent but not extraordinary vision. A little acquaintance with sailors on shipboard is enough to dispel the illusion that such feats are beyond the powers of the white man.

The hearing of savages enjoys a reputation, among travelers, similar to that of their sight; but there can be little doubt that the cause is

the same. In fact, the tests which have so far been made tend to show that the hearing of the whites is superior. Such was the result of Myers on the Papuans, and of Bruner in his extensive series of measurements made at the St. Louis Fair. Only 15 per cent of 137 Filipinos tested did as well as the average of whites; other groups made a somewhat better showing, but all seemed inferior on the average to whites. In spite of the experimental results, there is perhaps reason to doubt that the hearing of whites is essentially and natively much superior to that of other races. Civilized life protects the ear from some forms of injury to which it is exposed in more primitive conditions; and, then, the question of cleanliness must be considered in regard to the meatus. Besides, the ear is known to be highly susceptible of training in the perception of particular sorts of sound—as overtones and difference tones—and it is likely enough that the watch ticks and similar clicks used in the tests are not equally within the repertory of all peoples.

Much the same can be said regarding keenness of smell. On account of the high olfactory powers of dogs and some other lower animals, it has often seemed natural and proper that this sense should be highly developed among savages; and feats of primitive folk have been reported quite analogous to those already referred to under sight and hearing. No doubt here again, special interests and training are responsible, since what few tests have been made tend to show no higher acuity of smell among Negroes and Papuans than among Europeans.

The sense of touch has been little examined. McDougall found among the Papuans a number with extremely fine powers of discrimination by the skin. The difference between two points and one could be told by these individuals even when the two points were brought very close together; on the average, the Papuans tested excelled Europeans considerably in this test. On the other hand, Indians and Filipinos, and a few Africans and Ainu, tested in the same manner, seem not to differ perceptibly from whites.

The pain sense is a matter of some interest, because of the fortitude or stolidity displayed by some races towards physical suffering. It may be, and has been conjectured, that the sense for pain is blunt in these races, as it is known to be in some individuals who have allowed themselves to be burned without flinching, and performed other feats of fortitude. The pain sense is tested by applying gradually increas-

ing pressure to some portion of the skin, and requiring the person tested to indicate when he first begins to feel pain. Now, as a matter of fact, the results of McDougall on the Papuans, and those of Dr. Bruner and myself on Indians, Filipinos, Africans and Ainu, are in close agreement on this point. Greater pressure on the skin is needed to produce pain in each of these races than in whites. This is the average result, but in this test the distribution of the cases is especially important. Though most whites feel pain at or about a certain small pressure, there is quite a respectable minority who give no sign till much higher pressures are reached, their results corresponding very closely to those of the majority of Indians. And similarly, a minority of Indians feel pain at much lower pressures than the bulk of their fellows, falling into the ranks of the white man. In each group, the distribution is bimodal, or aggregated about two points instead of one; but whites are principally aggregated about the lower center, and Indians and other races about the higher center. Introspection comes to our aid in explaining this anomaly, for it shows that there is some difficulty in telling just when the pressure becomes painful. If one is satisfied with slight discomfort, a moderate pressure will be enough; but if a sharp twinge is demanded, the pressure must be considerably increased. Most whites, under the conditions of the test, are satisfied with slight discomfort, while my impression in watching the Indians was that they were waiting to be really hurt. The racial difference would accordingly be one in the conception of pain, or in understanding the test, rather than in the pain sense.

On the whole, the keenness of the senses seems to be about on a par in the various races of mankind. Differences exist among the members of any race, and it is not improbable that differences exist between the averages of certain groups, especially when these are small, isolated and much inbred. Rivers has in fact found such small groups differing considerably from whites in the color sense. One such group showed no cases of our common color blindness or red-green blindness, while another group showed an unusually large percentage of color-blind individuals. In the larger groups, the percentage of the color-blind is, very likely, about constant, though the existing records tend to show a somewhat lower proportion among Mongolians than among whites. Very large numbers of individuals need, however, to be tested in order to determine such a proposition closely; even among Europeans, the proportion can not yet be regarded as finally estab-

lished. One thing is definitely shown by the tests that have been made for color blindness in various races: no race, however primitive, has been discovered in which red-green blindness was the universal or general condition; and this is a fact of some interest in connection with the physiology of color vision, for it seems probable that red-green blindness, since it is not by any means a diseased condition, represents a reversion to a more primitive state of the color sense. If this is so, no race of men remains in the primitive stages of the evolution of the color sense; the development of a color sense substantially to the condition in which we have it, was probably a pre-human achievement.

When we turn from the senses to other functions, the information which the psychologist has to offer becomes even more scanty.

Some interest attaches to tests of the speed of simple mental and motor performances, since, though the mental process is very simple, some indication may be afforded of the speed of brain action. The reaction time test has been measured on representatives of a few races, with the general result that the time consumed is about the same in widely different groups. The familiar "tapping test," which measures the rate at which the brain can at will discharge a series of impulses to the same muscle, was tried at St. Louis on a wide variety of folk, without disclosing marked differences between groups. The differences were somewhat greater when the movement, besides being rapid, had to be accurate in aim. The Eskimos excelled all others in this latter test, while the poorest record was made by the Patagonians and the Coopa Indians—which groups were, however, represented by only a few individuals. The Filipinos, who were very fully represented, seemed undeniably superior to whites in this test, though, of course, with plenty of overlapping.

The degree of right-handedness has been asserted to vary in different races, and the favoring of one hand has been interpreted as conducive to specialization and so to civilization. We were, however, unable to detect any marked difference in the degree of right-handedness in different races, as tested by the comparative strength, quickness or accuracy of the two hands. The Negritos, the lowest race examined, had the same degree of right-handedness as Filipinos, or Indians, or whites.

We are probably justified in inferring from the results cited that the sensory and motor processes, and the elementary brain activities,

though differing in degree from one individual to another, are about the same from one race to another.

Equitable tests of the distinctly intellectual processes are hard to devise, since much depends on the familiarity of the material used. Few tests of this nature have as yet been attempted on different races.

There are a number of illusions and constant errors of judgment which are well known in the psychological laboratory, and which seem to depend, not on peculiarities of the sense organs, but on quirks and twists in the process of judgment. A few of these have been made the matter of comparative tests, with the results that peoples of widely different cultures are subject to the same errors, and in about the same degree. There is an illusion which occurs when an object, which looks heavier than it is, is lifted by the hand; it then feels, not only lighter than it looks, but even lighter than it really is. The contrast between the look and the feel of the thing plays havoc with the judgment. Women are, on the average, more subject to this illusion than men. The amount of this illusion has been measured in several peoples, and found to be, with one or two exceptions, about the same in all. Certain visual illusions, in which the apparent length or direction of a line is greatly altered by the neighborhood of other lines, have similarly been found present in all races tested, and to about the same degree. As far as they go, these results tend to show that simple sorts of judgment, being subject to the same disturbances, proceed in the same manner among various peoples; so that the similarity of the races in mental processes extends at least one step beyond sensation.

The mere fact that members of the inferior races are suitable subjects for psychological tests and experiments is of some value in appraising their mentality. Rivers and his collaborators approached the natives of Torres Straits with some misgivings, fearing that they would not possess the necessary powers of sustained concentration. Elaborate introspections, indeed, they did not secure from these people, but, in any experiment that called for straightforward observation, they found them admirable subjects for the psychologist. Locating the blind spot, and other observations with indirect vision, which are usually accounted a strain on the attention, were successfully performed. If tests are put in such form as to appeal to the interests of the primitive man, he can be relied on for sustained attention. Statements sometimes met with to the effect that such and such a

tribe is deficient in powers of attention, because, when the visitor began to quiz them on matters of linguistics, etc., they complained of headache and ran away, sound a bit naïve. Much the same observations could be reported by college professors, regarding the natives gathered in their class rooms.

A good test for intelligence would be much appreciated by the comparative psychologist, since, in spite of equal standing in such rudimentary matters as the senses and bodily movement, attention and the simpler sorts of judgment, it might still be that great differences in mental efficiency existed between different groups of men. Probably no single test could do justice to so complex a trait as intelligence. Two important features of intelligent action are quickness in seizing the key to a novel situation, and firmness in limiting activity to the right direction, and suppressing acts which are obviously useless for the purpose in hand. A simple test which calls for these qualities is the so-called "form-test." There are a number of blocks of different shapes, and a board with holes to match the blocks. The blocks and board are placed before a person, and he is told to put the blocks in the holes in the shortest possible time. The key to the situation is here the matching of blocks and holes by their shape; and the part of intelligence is to hold firmly to this obvious necessity, wasting no time in trying to force a round block into a square hole. The demand on intelligence certainly seems slight enough; and the test would probably not differentiate between a Newton and you or me; but it does suffice to catch the feeble-minded, the young child, or the chimpanzee, as any of these is likely to fail altogether, or at least to waste much time in random moves and vain efforts. This test was tried on representatives of several races, and considerable differences appeared. As between whites, Indians, Esquimos, Ainus, Filipinos and Singhalese, the average differences were small, and much overlapping occurred. As between these groups, however, and the Igorot and Negrito from the Philippines and a few reputed Pygmies from the Congo, the average differences were great, and the overlapping was small. Another rather similar test for intelligence, which was tried on some of these groups, gave them the same relative rank. The results of the test agreed closely with the general impression left on the minds of the experimenters by considerable association with the people tested. And, finally, the relative size of the cranium, as indicated, roughly, by the product of its three external dimensions, agreed

closely in these groups with their appearance of intelligence, and with their standing in the form test. If the results could be taken at their face value, they would indicate differences of intelligence between races, giving such groups as the Pygmy and Negrito a low station as compared with most of mankind. The fairness of the test is not, however, beyond question; it may have been of a more unfamiliar sort to these wild hunting folk than to more settled groups. This crumb is, at any rate, about all the testing psychologist has yet to offer on the question of racial differences in intelligence.

CULTURE AS REFLECTION OF INNATE RACIAL TEMPERAMENT

The central thought of the following selection—that race and temperament interact and mutually modify each other—seems to have been worked out independently by both Professor McDougall and Professor Park, the latter publishing his formulation of the thesis a year or two the earlier. McDougall's discussion will be found cited in Reference 2, below.

3. Temperament, Tradition, and Nationality³

Every race, like every individual, has the vices of its virtues. The question remains still to what extent so-called racial characteristics are actually racial, *i.e.*, biological, and to what extent they are the effect of environmental conditions. The thesis of this paper, to state it again, is (1) that fundamental temperamental qualities, which are the basis of interest and attention, act as selective agencies and as such determine what elements in the cultural environment each race will select; in what region it will seek and find its vocation in the larger social organization; (2) that, on the other hand, technique, science, machinery, tools, habits, discipline, and all the intellectual and mechanical devices with which the civilized man lives and works remain relatively external to the inner core of significant attitudes and values which constitute what we may call the will of the group. This racial will is, to be sure largely social, that is, modified by social experience, but it rests ultimately upon a complex of inherited characteristics, which are racial.

³ From Robert E. Park, "Education in Its Relation to the Conflict and Fusion of Cultures," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. XIII. (1918); pp. 60-63. Reprinted by permission.

It follows from what has been said that the individual man is the bearer of a double inheritance. As a member of a race, he transmits by interbreeding a biological inheritance. As a member of society or a social group, on the other hand, he transmits by communication a social inheritance. The particular complex of inheritable characters which characterizes the individuals of a racial group constitutes the racial temperament. The particular group of habits, accommodations, sentiments, attitudes, and ideals transmitted by communication and education constitute a social tradition. Between this temperament and this tradition there is, as has been generally recognized, a very intimate relationship. My assumption is that temperament is the basis of the interests; that as such it determines in the long run the general run of attention, and this, eventually, determines the selection in the case of an individual of his vocation, in the case of the racial group of its culture. That is to say, temperament determines what things the individual and the group will be interested in; what elements of the general culture, to which they have access, they will assimilate; what, to state it pedagogically, they will learn.

It will be evident at once that where individuals of the same race and hence the same temperament are associated, the temperamental interests will tend to reinforce one another, and the attention of members of the group will be more completely focused upon the specific objects and values that correspond to the racial temperament. In this way racial qualities become the basis for nationalities, a nationalistic group being merely a cultural and, eventually, a political society founded on the basis of racial inheritances.

On the other hand, when racial segregation is broken up and members of a racial group are dispersed, the opposite effect will take place. This explains the phenomena which have frequently been the subject of comment and observation, that the racial characteristics manifest themselves in an extraordinary way in large homogeneous gatherings. The contrast between a mass meeting of one race and a similar meeting of another is particularly striking. Under such circumstances characteristic racial and temperamental differences appear that would otherwise pass entirely unnoticed.

When the physical unity of a group is perpetuated by the succession of parents and children, the racial temperament, including fundamental attitudes and values which rest in it, is preserved intact. When, however, society grows and is perpetuated by immigration and adapta-

tion, there ensues, as a result of miscegenation, a breaking up of the complex of the biologically inherited qualities which constitute the temperament of the race. This again initiates changes in the mores, traditions, and eventually in the institutions of the community. The changes which proceed from modification in the racial temperament will, however, modify but slightly the external forms of the social traditions, but they will be likely to change profoundly their content and meaning.

Exercises

(The account of Mall's investigations is necessarily somewhat technical, but the result is plain even to the reader unversed in the anatomy of the brain.)

1. List the points of comparison wherein Mall found no racial difference between white and negro brains.
2. Describe the precautions which he used to eliminate personal bias.
3. In what position does his conclusion place the question of racial differences?
4. What evidence has been gathered with respect to keenness of the senses in various races?
5. What has been found out concerning motor performances among different races?
6. What have tests of higher mental processes in different races revealed?
7. Mention some tests of intelligent action, and indicate any racial differences with respect to them.
8. What is the "crumb" Woodworth has to offer from the psychological testing of races?
9. State the thesis of Park's paper.
10. Show how temperament determines individual and racial experience.
11. Explain the relation between race and nationality, according to Park.

Additional References

1. Boas, Franz: *The Mind of Primitive Man*. Chapter I. "Racial Prejudices." A searching analysis of the unproved assumptions of race advocates.
2. McDougall, William: *The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character*, pp. 153-158; 162-163; 164-165.
3. Ross, Edward A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Chapter VI. "The

Race Factor." A brief stimulating discussion, distinguishing race difference from race inequality.

4. Thomas, William I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*. In the part on Mental Life and Education of primitive peoples, the articles by Thomas, Boas, and Dewey on the interpretation of savage mind are invaluable. Their general effect is to reduce the observed differences largely to differences of cultural level, rather than to any innate, racial distinctions.

CHAPTER VI

ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE

THE ultimate factors in social evolution are three in number, namely environment, race, and culture. The first two may be regarded as in a sense original, with culture emerging from the interaction of race and environment somewhat as capital is regarded by economists as the product of land and labor. In both cases the factor thus derived from the two preceding becomes itself an active member of a triumvirate of forces, whose interaction constitutes the process known as economic *production* in the one case, and as *social evolution*, or "civilization," in the other. In view of this fact, that culture becomes the dominant influence among these three factors, the other two will be treated in their relation to culture. In the present chapter culture will be considered in its relation to *environment*, while in the one immediately following its connection with the *racial* factor will be considered.

1. Climate and the Evolution of Civilization ¹

The effect of climate upon material resources and of material resources upon civilization is well illustrated by a comparison of the Indians of California and Utah with their Pueblo neighbors in New Mexico. The pre-Columbian inhabitants of California and Utah were abject savages. They dwelt in flimsy brush huts, and ate rabbits, lizards, grasshoppers, acorns, and other equally poor kinds of food. Because food was so scanty they lived in very small communities, and were forced frequently to move from place to place. Because of their wandering, isolated life they had only the rudiments of social and political organization. All in all, they were well nigh the lowest of the American aborigines. The Pueblo Indians, on the other hand, had risen far beyond mere savagery and were well along in the stage of culture known as barbarism. They had an excellent diet of corn,

¹ *The Evolution of the Earth and Its Inhabitants: A Series of Lectures Delivered before the Yale Chapter of the Sigma Xi during the Academic Year 1916-1917*, by Joseph Barrell and others; Chapter V., *passim*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918. Reprinted by permission.) The essay quoted is by Dr. Ellsworth Huntington.

beans, and squashes, with enough meat to keep them in health. Not being obliged to wander, they lived in compact, well-made adobe houses. Their villages were large enough and near enough to one another so that intercourse was frequent, hence they had a highly organized social and governmental system. They had also developed a series of complex religious ceremonials that did much credit to their mental powers. Among the aboriginal people of America they stood not far from the top.

The contrast between these two neighboring types was apparently not due to racial differences. The Hopis, who were among the most advanced Pueblo people, were apparently of the same race as the Utes, who were among the lowest of the other type. Material resources seem to have been the main cause of the contrast. The Pueblos had behind them the resources of agriculture, while their savage neighbors could not raise crops. This difference was due to climate. At first sight the climates of the two regions appear closely similar. Both are dry. Salt Lake City, in the home of the Utes, for example, has an average rainfall of sixteen inches per year. Los Angeles, where lived some of the lowest California Indians, has the same. Santa Fé, in the center of the Pueblo district, receives a yearly average of nearly fifteen inches. Why, then, was agriculture and hence civilization so different in the two types? The answer is found in the season of rainfall. At Santa Fé the months of June, July, and August have an average of 8.4 inches of rainfall, whereas at Salt Lake City the same months average only 2.2 inches, and at Los Angeles are practically rainless.

Today the greatness of California depends upon its agriculture more than upon anything else; and the farms of Utah are also by no means to be despised. It must be remembered, however, that wheat, barley, beets, grapes, oranges, and other orchard fruits are the staples of agriculture in these regions. They are raised largely by means of elaborate systems of irrigation which utilize the winter snows upon the mountains. Where irrigation is not practiced, cattle are the great agricultural resource. The other foundation of prosperity is mining. All these things are essentially European. The crops which place parts of California and Utah among the world's garden plots did not grow indigenously in America. The cattle and horses which browse on the thousand brown hillsides had no counterpart in the New World. Since iron tools were unknown, the art of mining was impossible. So

far as any one has yet pointed out, the poor Indians had no plants that would serve in place of those with which the early people of the Old World were blessed. The absence of summer rain which is typical of all subtropical climates caused the vegetation to be scanty, and hence wild animals, wild seeds, and fruits were also scarce. Thus the people were condemned to be nomadic hunters and to remain in the lowest stage of civilization.

Turn now to the Pueblo region. A rainfall of six or eight inches in the three summer months seems insignificant. Yet it made all the difference between savagery and barbarism. Its absence caused the Utes and the California Indians to be as much below the Hopis and the other Pueblo tribes as the Pueblos are below modern Europeans. The one great cereal of the New World is Indian corn. The two other staple crops capable of being raised in the dry regions of pre-Columbian America were beans and pumpkins. All of these can grow where there is moisture in summer, but not otherwise. To raise them by irrigation in places like Utah and California is practically impossible for primitive people. On all except the larger streams, whose control is beyond the power of beginners, the floods come to an end long before the time when the crops most need them. Where the Pueblos live, however, the summer rains produce floods just when the corn, beans, and pumpkins are most eager for water. Hence these crops provided the early Americans with the basis for a well-developed system of agriculture, and progress was assured. Even if the Utes and the Indians of California had been more inventive than the Pueblo Indians and had produced men with minds of unusual brilliancy, the lack of material resources adapted to the early stages of development would probably have kept them permanently in savagery.

The material resources thus far mentioned depend upon climate. In this they are like nine-tenths of the world's resources. All kinds of food, all kinds of clothing, and a large part of the materials used for shelter depend absolutely upon climate. Perhaps there is some exception to this statement, but I have searched for it in vain. The fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, and the beasts of the field, even though they may prey upon other animals, are in the last analysis wholly dependent upon the vegetation which feeds either them or their prey. Vegetation is absolutely dependent upon temperature, rainfall, winds, ocean currents, and other climatic conditions. Soil, to be sure, is of much importance, but all soils would be moderately fertile if

they had never been subjected to any except a favorable climate. There would be no great wastes of sand, salt, gravel, or naked rock, for these arise only under extremes of aridity or glaciation.

In spite of the overwhelming preponderance of climate in determining the nature of material resources, certain articles, such as iron and coal, occur without reference to heat or cold, moisture or drought. Their use, however, depends largely upon climatic conditions. Iron was well known in Mediterranean lands at the time of their highest civilization. Nevertheless, its use was strictly limited by the scarcity of fuel in a subtropical climate. Only when iron was smelted in countries like England where the climate fostered dense forests did its use increase rapidly. When the value of coal was at last realized it added wonderfully to man's material resources. Yet even here the limitations of climate are strict. In Alaska today the presence of coal does little to advance civilization. It brings a group of coal miners whose chief desire is to make money enough to enable them to get home again. Because Alaska is so cold and inhospitable the regions with better climate farther south are the ones that profit by its coal. So, too, with the iron mines of Gellivara in northern Sweden. A few small towns have sprung up, but the places chiefly benefited are the cities of southern Sweden where the climate is less severe. Thus it appears that all kinds of resources are strictly limited by climate either in their occurrence or in their use.

2. Classes of Geographic Influences ²

Into almost every anthropo-geographical problem the element of environment enters in different phases, with different modes of operation and varying degrees of importance. Since the causal conception of geography demands a detailed analysis of all the relations between environment and human development, it is advisable to distinguish the various classes of geographic influences.

Four fundamental classes of effects can be distinguished.

I. The first class includes direct physical effects of environment, similar to those exerted on plants and animals by their habitat. Certain geographic conditions, more conspicuously those of climate, apply certain stimuli to which man, like the lower animals, responds

² From *Influences of Geographic Environment, On the Basis of Ratzel's System of Anthro-Geo-Geography*, by Ellen Churchill Semple; Chap. II. (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1911. Reprinted by permission.)

by an adaptation of his organism to his environment. Many physiological peculiarities of man are due to physical effects of environment, which doubtless operated very strongly in the earliest stages of human development, and in those shadowy ages contributed to the differentiation of races. The unity of the human species is as clearly established as the diversity of races and peoples, whose divergences must be interpreted chiefly as modifications in response to various habitats in long periods of time.

Such modifications have probably been numerous in the persistent and unending movements, shiftings, and migrations which have made up the long prehistoric history of man. If the origin of species is found in variability and inheritance, variation is undoubtedly influenced by a change of natural conditions. To quote Darwin, "In one sense the conditions of life may be said, not only to cause variability, either directly or indirectly, but likewise to include natural selection, for the conditions determine whether this or that variety shall survive." The variability of man does not mean that every external influence leaves its mark upon him, but that man as an organism, by the preservation of beneficent variations and the elimination of deleterious ones, is gradually adapted to his environment, so that he can utilize most completely that which it contributes to his needs. This self-maintenance under outward influences is an essential part of the conception of life which Herbert Spencer defines as the correspondence between internal conditions and external circumstances, or August Comte as the harmony between the living being and the surrounding medium or *milieu*.

According to Virchow, the distinction of races rests upon hereditary variations, but heredity itself cannot become active till the characteristic or *Zustand* is produced which is to be handed down. But environment determines what variation shall become stable enough to be passed on by heredity. For instance, we can hardly err in attributing the great lung capacity, massive chests, and abnormally large torsos of the Quichua and Aymara Indians inhabiting the high Andean plateaus to the rarefied air found at an altitude of 10,000 or 15,000 feet above sea level. Whether these have been acquired by centuries of extreme lung expansion, or represent the survival of a chance variation of undoubted advantage, they are a product of the environment. They are a serious handicap when the Aymara

Indian descends to the plains, where he either dies off or leaves descendants with diminishing chests.

Darwin holds that many slight changes in animals and plants, such as size, color, thickness of skin and hair, have been produced through food supply and climate from the external conditions under which the forms lived. Paul Ehrenreich, while regarding the chief race distinctions as permanent forms, not to be explained by external conditions, nevertheless concedes the slight and slow variation of the sub-race under changing conditions of food and climate as beyond doubt. Stature is partly a matter of feeding and hence of geographic condition. In mountain regions, where the food resources are scant, the varieties of wild animals are characterized by smaller size in general than are corresponding species in the lowlands. It is a noticeable fact that dwarfed horses or ponies have originated in islands, in Iceland, the Shetlands, Corsica and Sardinia. This is due either to scanty and unvaried food or to excessive inbreeding, or probably to both. The horses introduced into the Falkland Islands in 1764 have deteriorated so in size and strength in a few generations that they are in a fair way to develop a Falkland variety of pony. On the other hand, Mr. Homer Davenport states that the pure-bred Arabian horses raised on his New Jersey stock farm are in the third generation a hand higher than their grandsires imported from Arabia, and of more angular build. The result is due to more abundant and nutritious food and the elimination of long desert journeys.

The low stature of the natives prevailing in certain "misery spots" of Europe, as in the Auvergne Plateau of southern France, is due in part to race, in part to a disastrous artificial selection by the emigration of the taller and more robust individuals, but in considerable part to the harsh climate and starvation food yield of that sterile soil; for the children of the region, if removed to the more fertile valleys of the Loire and Garonne, grow to average stature. The effect of a scant and uncertain food supply is especially clear in savages, who have erected fewer buffers between themselves and the pressure of environment. The Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert are shorter than their Hottentot kindred who pasture their flocks and herds in the neighboring grasslands. Samoyedes, Lapps, and other hyperborean races of Eurasia are shorter than their more southern neighbors, the physical record of an immemorial struggle against cold and hunger. The stunted forms

and wretched aspect of the Snake Indians inhabiting the Rocky Mountain deserts distinguished these clans from the tall buffalo-hunting tribes of the plains. Any feature of geographic environment tending to affect directly the physical vigor and strength of a people cannot fail to prove a potent factor in their history.

Oftentimes environment modifies the physique of a people indirectly by imposing upon them certain predominant activities, which may develop one part of the body almost to the point of deformity. This is the effect of increased use or disuse which Darwin discusses. He attributes the thin legs and thick arms of the Payaguas living along the Paraguay River to generations of lives spent in canoes, with the lower extremities motionless and the arm and chest muscles in constant exercise. Livingstone found these same characteristics of broad chests and shoulders with ill-developed legs among the Barotse of the upper Zambesi; and they have been observed in pronounced form, coupled with distinctly impaired powers of locomotion, among the Tlingit, Tsimshian, and Haida Indians of the southern Alaskan and British Columbia coast, where the geographic conditions of a mountainous and almost strandless shore interdicted agriculture and necessitated sea-faring activities. An identical environment has produced a like physical effect upon the canoemen of Tierra del Fuego and the Aleutian Islanders, who often sit in their boats twenty hours at a time. These special adaptations are temporary in their nature and tend to disappear with change of occupation, as, for instance, among the Tlingit Indians, who develop improved leg muscles when employed as laborers in the salmon canneries of British Columbia.

Both the direct and indirect physical effects of environment thus far instanced are obvious in themselves and easily explained: Far different is it with the majority of physical effects, especially those of climate, whose mode of operation is much more obscure than was once supposed. The modern geographer does not indulge in the naïve hypothesis of the last century, which assumed a prompt and direct effect of environment upon the form and features of man. Carl Ritter regarded the small, slit eyes and swollen lids of the Turkoman as "an obvious effect of the desert upon the organism." Stanhope Smith ascribed the high shoulders and short neck of the Tartars of Mongolia to their habit of raising their shoulders to protect the neck against the cold; their small, squinting eyes, overhanging brows, broad faces and high cheek bones, to the effect of the bitter, driving

winds and the glare of the snow, till, he says, "every feature by the action of the cold is harsh and distorted." These profound influences of a severe climate upon physiognomy he finds also among the Lapps, northern Mongolians, Samoyedes and Eskimo.

Most of these problems are only secondary grist for the geographer's mill. For instance, when the Aryans descended to the enervating lowlands of tropical India, and in that debilitating climate lost the qualities which first gave them supremacy, the change which they underwent was primarily a physiological one. It can be scientifically described and explained therefore only by physiologists and physico-chemists; and upon their investigations the geographer must wait before he approaches the problem from the standpoint of geographical distribution. Into this sub-class of physical effects come all questions of acclimatization. These are important to the anthropo-geographer, just as they are to colonial governments like England or France, because they affect the power of national or racial expansion, and fix the historical fate of tropical lands. The present populations of the earth represent physical adaptation to their environments. The intense heat and humidity of most tropical lands prevent any permanent occupation by a native-born population of pure whites. The catarrhal zone north of the fortieth parallel in America soon exterminates the Negroes.

The Indians of South America, though all fundamentally of the same ethnic stock, are variously acclimated to the warm, damp, forested plains of the Amazon; to the hot, dry, treeless coasts of Peru; and to the cold, arid heights of the Andes. The habitat that bred them tends to hold them, by restricting the range of climate which they can endure. In the zone of the Andean slope lying between 4,000 and 6,000 feet of altitude, which produces the best flavored coffee and which must be cultivated, the imported Indians from the high plateaus and from the low Amazon plains alike sicken and die after a short time; so that they take employment on these coffee plantations for only three or five months, and then return to their own homes. Labor becomes nomadic on these slopes, and in the intervals these farm lands of intensive agriculture show the anomaly of a sparse population only of resident managers. Similarly in the high, dry Himalayan valley of the upper Indus, over 10,000 feet above sea level, the natives of Ladak are restricted to a habitat that yields them little margin of food for natural growth of population but for-

bids them to emigrate in search of more, — applies at the same time the lash to drive and the leash to hold, for these highlanders soon die when they reach the plains. Here are two antagonistic geographic influences at work from the same environment, one physical and the other social-economic. The Ladaki have reached an interesting resolution of these two forces by the institution of polyandry, which keeps population practically stationary.

The relation of pigmentation to climate has long interested geographers as a question of environment; but their speculations on the subject have been barren, because the preliminary investigations of the physiologist, physicist, and chemist are still incomplete. The general fact of increasing nigrescence from temperate towards equatorial regions is conspicuous enough, despite some irregularity of the shading. This fact points strongly to some direct relation between climate and pigmentation, but does not hint how the pigmental processes are affected. The physiologist finds that in the case of the Negro, the dark skin is associated with a dense cuticle, diminished perspiration, smaller chests and less respiratory power, a lower temperature and more rapid pulse, all of which variations may enter into the problem of the Negro's coloring. The question is therefore by no means simple.

Yet it is generally conceded by scientists that pigment is a protective device of nature. The Negro's skin is comparatively insensitive to a sun heat that blisters a white man. Livingstone found the bodies of albino Negroes in Bechuana Land always blistered on exposure to the sun, and a like effect has been observed among albino Polynesians, and Melanesians of Fiji. Paul Ehrenreich finds that the degree of coloration depends less upon annual temperature than upon the direct effect of the sun's rays; and that therefore a people dwelling in a cool, dry climate, but exposed to the sun may be darker than another in a hot, moist climate but living in a dense forest. The forest-dwelling Botokudos of the upper San Francisco River in Brazil are fairer than the kindred Kayapo tribe, who inhabit the open campos; and the Arawak of the Purus River forests are lighter than their fellows in the central Matto Grosso. Sea-faring coast folk, who are constantly exposed to the sun, especially in the Tropics, show a deeper pigmentation than their kindred of the wooded interior. The coast Moros of western Mindanao are darker than the Subanos, their Malay brethren of the back country, the lightness of whose color can be ex-

plained by their forest life. So the Duallas of the Kamerun coast of Africa are darker than the Bakwiri inhabiting the forested mountains just behind them, though both tribes belong to the Bantu group of people. Here light, in contradistinction to heat, appears the dominant factor in pigmentation. A recent theory, advanced by von Schmaedel in 1895, rests upon the chemical power of light. It holds that the black pigment renders the Negro skin insensitive to the luminous or actinic effects of solar radiation, which are far more destructive to living protoplasm than the merely calorific effects.

Coloration responds to other more obscure influences of environment. A close connection between pigmentation and elevation above sea level has been established: a high altitude operates like a high latitude. Blondness increases appreciably on the higher slopes of the Black Forest, Vosges Mountains, and Swiss Alps, though these isolated highlands are the stronghold of the brunette Alpine race. Livi, in his treatise on military anthropometry, deduced a special action of mountains upon pigmentation on observing a prevailing increase of blondness in Italy above the four-hundred meter line, a phenomenon which came out strongly in Basilicata and Calabria provinces of the south as in Piedmont and Lombardy in the north. The dark Hamitic Berbers of northern Africa have developed an unmistakable blond variant in high valleys of the Atlas range, which in a sub-tropical region rises to the height of 12,000 feet. Here among the Kabyles the population is fair; grey, blue or green eyes are frequent, as is also reddish blond or chestnut hair. Waitz long ago affirmed this tendency of mountaineers to lighter coloring from his study of primitive peoples. The modification cannot be attributed wholly to climatic contrast between mountain and plain. Some other factor, like the economic poverty of the environment and the poor food-supply, as Livi suggests, has had a hand in the result; just what it is or how it has operated cannot yet be defined.

Enough has been said to show that the geographer can formulate no broad generalization as to the relation of pigmentation and climate from the occurrence of the darkest skins in the Tropics; because this fact is weakened by the appearance also of lighter tints in the hottest districts, and of darker ones in arctic and temperate regions. The geographer must investigate the questions when and where deeper shades develop in the skins of fair races; what is the significance of dark skins in the cold zones and of fair ones in hot zones. His answer

must be based largely on the conclusions of physiologists and physicists, and only when these have reached a satisfactory solution of each detail of the problem can the geographer summarize the influence of environment upon pigmentation. The rule can therefore safely be laid down that in all investigation of geographic influences upon the permanent physical characteristics of races, the geographic distribution of these should be left out of consideration till the last, since it so easily misleads. Moreover, owing to the ceaseless movements of mankind, these effects do not remain confined to the region that produced them, but pass on with the wandering throng in whom they have once developed, and in whom they endure or vanish according as they prove beneficial or deleterious in the new habitat.

II. More varied and important are the psychical effects of geographic environment. ✓As direct effects they are doubtless bound up in many physiological modifications; and as influences of climate, they help differentiate peoples and races in point of temperament. They are reflected in man's religion and his literature, in his modes of thought and figures of speech. ✓Blackstone states that "in the Isle of Man, to take away a horse or ox was no felony, but a trespass, because of the difficulty in that little territory to conceal them or to carry them off; but to steal a pig or a fowl, which is easily done, was a capital misdemeanor, and the offender punished with death." The judges or deemsters in this island of fishermen swore to execute the laws as impartially "as the herring's backbone doth lie in the middle of the fish." The whole mythology of the Polynesians is an echo of the encompassing ocean. The cosmography of every primitive people, their first crude effort in the science of the universe, bears the impress of their habitat. The Eskimo's hell is a place of darkness, storm and intense cold; the Jew's is a place of eternal fire. Buddha, born in the steaming Himalayan piedmont, fighting the lassitude induced by heat and humidity, pictured his heaven as Nirvana, the cessation of all activity and individual life.

✓Intellectual effects of environment may appear in the enrichment of a language in one direction to a rare nicety of expression; but this may be combined with a meager vocabulary in all other directions. The greatest cattle-breeders among the native Africans, such as the Hereros of western Damaraland and the Dinkas of the upper White Nile, have an amazing choice of words for all colors describing their animals — brown, dun, red, white, dapple, and so on in every grada-

tion of shade and hue. The Samoyedes of northern Russia have eleven or twelve terms to designate the various grays and browns of their reindeer, despite their otherwise low cultural development. The speech of nomads has an abundance of expressions for cattle in every relation of life. It includes different words for breeding, pregnancy, death, and slaughtering in relation to every different kind of domestic animal. The Magyars, among whom pastoral life still survives on the low plains of the Danube and Theiss, have a generic word for herd, *csorda*, and special terms for herds of cattle, horses, sheep, and swine. While the vocabulary of Malays and Polynesians is especially rich in nautical terms, the Kirghis shepherd tribes who wander over the highlands of western Asia from the Tian Shan to the Hindu Kush have four different terms for four kinds of mountain passes. A *daban* is a difficult, rocky defile; an *art* is very high and dangerous; a *bel* is a low, easy pass, and a *kutal* is a broad opening between low hills.

To such influences man is a passive subject, especially in the earlier stages of his development; but there are more important influences emanating from his environment which affect him as an active agent, challenge his will by furnishing the motives for its exercise, give purpose to his activities, and determine the direction which they shall take. These mold his mind and character through the media of his economic and social life, and produce effects none the less important because they are secondary. About these anthropo-geography can reach surer conclusions than regarding direct psychical effects, because it can trace their mode of operation as well as define the result. Direct psychical effects are more matters of conjecture, whose causation is asserted rather than proved. They seem to float in the air, detached from the solid ground under foot, and are therefore subject matter for the psychologist rather than the geographer.

What of the great man in this geographical interpretation of history? It seems to take no account of him, or to put him into the melting-pot with the masses. Both are to some extent true. As a science, anthropo-geography can deal only with large averages, and these exclude or minimize the exceptional individual. Moreover, geographic conditions which give this or that bent to a nation's purposes and determine its aggregate activities have a similar effect upon the individual; but he may institute a far-seeing policy, to whose wisdom only gradually is the people awakened. The acts of the great man are rarely arbitrary or artificial; he accelerates or retards the normal course of develop-

ment, but cannot turn it counter to the channels of natural conditions. As a rule he is a product of the same forces that made his people. He moves with them and is followed by them under a common impulse. Daniel Boone, that picturesque figure leading the van of the westward movement over the Allegheny Mountains, was born of his frontier environment and found a multitude of his kind in that region of backwoods farms to follow him into the wilderness. Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, in the Louisiana Purchase, carried out the policy of expansion adumbrated in Governor Spottswood's expedition with the Knights of the Golden Horseshoe over the Blue Ridge in 1712. Jefferson's daring consummation of the purchase without government authority showed his community of purpose with the majority of the people. Peter the Great's location of his capital at St. Petersburg, usually stigmatized as the act of a despot, was made in response to natural conditions offering access to the Baltic nations, just as certainly as ten centuries before similar conditions and identical advantages led the early Russian merchants to build up a town at near-by Novgorod, in easy water connection with the Baltic commerce.

III. Geographic conditions influence the economic and social development of a people by the abundance, paucity, or general character of the natural resources, by the local ease or difficulty of securing the necessities of life, and by the possibility of industry and commerce afforded by the environment. From the standpoint of production and exchange, these influences are primarily the subject matter of economic and commercial geography; but since they also permeate national life, determine or modify its social structure, condemn it to the dwarfing effects of national poverty, or open to it the cultural and political possibilities resident in national wealth, they are legitimate material also for anthropo-geography.

They are especially significant because they determine the size of the social group. This must be forever small in areas of limited resources or of limited extent, as in the little islands of the world and the yet smaller oases. The desert of Chinese Turkestan supports, in certain detached spots of river-born fertility, populations like the 60,000 of Kashgar, and from this size groups all the way down to the single families which Younghusband found living by a mere trickle of a stream flowing down the southern slope of the Tian Shan. Small islands, according to their size, fertility, and command of trade, may harbor a sparse and scant population, like the five hundred souls

struggling for an ill-fed existence on the barren Westman Isles of Iceland; or a compact, teeming, yet absolutely small social group, like that crowding Malta or the Bermudas. Whether sparsely or compactly distributed, such groups suffer the limitations inherent in their small size. They are forever excluded from the historical significance attaching to the large, continuously distributed populations of fertile continental lands.

IV. The next class belongs exclusively to the domain of geography, because it embraces the influence of the features of the earth's surface in directing the movements and ultimate distribution of mankind. It includes the effect of natural barriers, like mountains, deserts, swamps, and seas, in obstructing or deflecting the course of migrating people and in giving direction to national expansion; it considers the tendency of river valleys and treeless plains to facilitate such movements, the power of rivers, lakes, bays and oceans either to block the path or open a highway, according as navigation is in a primitive or advanced stage; and finally the influence of all these natural features in determining the territory which a people is likely to occupy, and the boundaries which shall separate them from their neighbors.

The lines of expansion followed by the French and English in the settlement of America and also the extent of territory covered by each were powerfully influenced by geographic conditions. The early French explorers entered the great east-west waterway of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, which carried them around the northern end of the Appalachian barrier into the heart of the continent, planted them on the low, swampy, often navigable watershed of the Mississippi, and started them on another river voyage of nearly two thousand miles to the Gulf of Mexico. Here were the conditions and temptation for almost unlimited expansion; hence French Canada reached to the head of Lake Superior, and French Louisiana to the sources of the Missouri. To the lot of the English fell a series of short rivers with fertile valleys, nearly barred at their not distant sources by a wall of forested mountains, but separated from one another by low watersheds which facilitated lateral expansion over a narrow belt between mountains and sea. Here a region of mild climate and fertile soil suited to agriculture, enclosed by strong natural boundaries, made for compact settlement, in contrast to the wide diffusion of the French. Later, when a growing population pressed against the western barrier, mountain gates opened at Cumberland Gap and the Mohawk

Valley; the Ohio River and the Great Lakes became interior thoroughfares, and the northwestern prairies lines of least resistance to the western settler. Rivers played the same part in directing and expediting this forward movement, as did the Lena and the Amoor in the Russian advance into Siberia, the Humber and the Trent in the progress of the Angles into the heart of Britain, the Rhone and Danube in the march of the Romans into central Europe.

✓The geographical environment of a people may be such as to segregate them from others, and thereby to preserve or even intensify their natural characteristics; or it may expose them to extraneous influences, to an infusion of new blood and new ideas, till their peculiarities are toned down, their distinctive features of dialect or national dress or provincial customs eliminated, and the people as a whole approach to the composite type of civilized humanity. A land shut off by mountains or sea from the rest of the world tends to develop a homogeneous people, since it limits or prevents the intrusion of foreign elements; or when once these are introduced, it encourages their rapid assimilation by the strongly interactive life of a confined locality. Therefore large or remote islands are, as a rule, distinguished by the unity of their inhabitants in point of civilization and race characteristics. Witness Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, Iceland, as also Australia and New Zealand at the time of their discovery. The highlands of the Southern Appalachians, which form the "mountain backyards" of Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina, are peopled by the purest English stock of the United States, descendants of the backwoodsmen of the late eighteenth century. Difficulty of access and lack of arable land have combined to discourage immigration. In consequence, foreign elements, including the elsewhere ubiquitous Negro, are wanting, except along the few railroads which in recent years have penetrated this country. Here survive an eighteenth century English, Christmas celebrated on Twelfth Night, the spinning wheel, and a belief in Joshua's power to arrest the course of the sun.

✓An easily accessible land is geographically hospitable to all newcomers, facilitates the mingling of peoples, the exchange of commodities and ideas. The amalgamation of races in such regions depends upon the similarity or diversity of the ethnic elements and the duration of the common occupation. The broad, open valley of the Danube from the Black Sea to Vienna contains a bizarre mixture of several stocks — Turks, Bulgarians, various families of pure Slavs, Roumanians, Hun-

garians, and Germans. These elements are too diverse and their occupation of the valley too recent for amalgamation to have advanced very far as yet. The maritime plain and open river valleys of northern France show a complete fusion of the native Celts with the Saxons, Franks, and Normans who have successively drifted into the region, just as the Teutonic and scander Slav elements have blended in the Baltic plains from the Elbe to the Vistula.

Here are four different classes of geographic influences, all of which may become active in modifying a people when it changes its habitat. Many of the characteristics acquired in the old home still live on, or at best yield slowly to the new environment. This is especially true of the direct physical and psychical effects. But a country may work a prompt and radical change in the social organization of an immigrant people by the totally new conditions of economic life which it presents. These may be either greater wealth or poverty of natural resources than the race has previously known, new stimulants or deterrents to commerce and intercourse, and new conditions of climate which affect the efficiency of the workman and the general character of production. From these a whole complex mass of secondary effects may follow.

The Aryans and Mongols, leaving their homes in the cool barren highlands of Central Asia where nature dispensed her gifts with a miserly hand, and coming down to the hot, low, fertile plains of the Indian rivers, underwent several fundamental changes in the process of adaptation to their new environment. An enervating climate did its work in slacking their energies; but more radical still was the change wrought by the contrast of poverty and abundance, enforced asceticism and luxury, presented by the old and new home. The restless, tireless shepherds became a sedentary, agricultural people; the abstemious nomads, — spare, sinewy, strangers to indulgence — became a race of rulers, revelling in luxury, lording it over countless subjects; finally, their numbers increased rapidly, no longer kept down by the scant subsistence of arid grasslands and scattered oases.

In a similar way, the Arab of the desert became transformed into the sedentary lord of Spain. In the luxuriance of field and orchard which his skilful methods of irrigation and tillage produced, in the growing predominance of the intellectual over the nomadic military life, of the complex affairs of city and mart over the simple tasks of herdsman or cultivator, he lost the benefit of the early harsh training and therewith his hold upon his Iberian empire. Biblical history gives

us the picture of the Sheik Abraham, accompanied by his nephew Lot, moving up from the rainless plains of Mesopotamia with his flocks and herds into the better watered Palestine. There his descendants in the garden land of Canaan became an agricultural people; and the problem of Moses and the Judges was to prevent their assimilation in religion and custom to the settled Semitic tribes about them, and to make them preserve the ideals born in the starry solitudes of the desert.

The change from the nomadic to the sedentary life represents an economic advance. Sometimes removal to strongly contrasted geographic conditions necessitates a reversion to a lower economic type of existence. The French colonists who came to Lower Canada in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found themselves located in a region of intense cold, where arable soil was inferior in quality and limited in amount, producing no staple like the tobacco of Virginia or the wheat of Maryland or the cotton of South Carolina or the sugar of the West Indies, by which a young colony might secure a place in European trade. But the snow-wrapped forests of Canada yielded an abundance of fur-bearing animals, the fineness and thickness of whose pelts were born of this frozen north. Into their remotest haunts at the head of Lake Superior or of Hudson Bay, long lines of rivers and lakes opened level water roads a thousand miles or more from the crude little colonial capital at Quebec. And over in Europe beaver hats and fur-trimmed garments were all the style! So the plodding farmer from Normandy and the fisherman from Poitou, transferred to Canadian soil, were irresistibly drawn into the adventurous life of the trapper and fur-trader. The fur trade became the accepted basis of colonial life; the *voyageur* and *coureur de bois*, clad in skins, paddling up ice-rimmed streams in their birch-bark canoes, fraternizing with Indians who were their only companions in that bleak interior, and married often to dusky squaws, became assimilated to the savage life about them and reverted to the lower hunter stage of civilization.

Another pronounced instance of rapid retrogression under new unfavorable geographic conditions is afforded by the South African Boer. The transfer from the busy commercial cities of the Rhine mouths to the far-away periphery of the world's trade, from the intensive agriculture of small deltaic gardens and the scientific dairy farming of the moist Netherlands to the semi-arid pastures of the high, treeless *veldt*, where they were barred from contact with the vivifying sea and its ship-borne commerce, has changed the enterprising seventeenth cen-

ture Hollander into the conservative pastoral Boer. Dutch cleanliness has necessarily become a tradition to a people who can scarcely find water for their cattle. The comfort and solid bourgeois elegance of the Dutch home lost its material equipment in the Great Trek, when the long wagon journey reduced household furniture to its lowest terms. Housewifely habits and order vanished in the semi-nomadic life which followed. The gregarious instinct, bred by the closely-packed population of little Holland, was transformed to a love of solitude, which in all lands characterizes the people of a remote and sparsely inhabited frontier. It is a common saying that the Boer cannot bear to see another man's smoke from his *stoep*, just as the early Trans-Allegheny pioneer was always on the move westward, because he could not bear to hear his neighbor's watch-dog bark. Even the Boer language has deteriorated under the effects of isolation and a lower status of civilization. The native *Taal* differs widely from the polished speech of Holland; it preserves some features of the High Dutch of two centuries ago, but has lost inflections and borrowed words for new phenomena from the English, Kaffirs and Hottentots; can express no abstract ideas, only the concrete ideas of a dull, work-a-day world.

The new habitat may eliminate many previously acquired characteristics and hence transform a people, as in the case of the Boers; or it may intensify tribal or national traits, as in the seafaring propensities of the Angles and Saxons when transferred to Britain, and of the seventeenth century English when transplanted to the indented coasts of New England; or it may tolerate mere survival or the slow desuetude of qualities which escape any particular pressure in the new environment, and which neither benefit nor handicap in the modified struggle for existence.

3. Limited Influence of Environment³

[In the following selection Dr. Lowie gives concrete evidence which goes squarely against the theory that environment is an active determiner of cultural and social destiny.]

Professor Kirchhoff, by no means an extreme adherent of the geographical school since he does not reduce man to a mere automaton in the face of his surroundings, nevertheless believes in a far-reaching influence of the environment and cites in particular the resemblances

³ *Culture and Ethnology*, by Robert H. Lowie, pp. 49-51; 55-56; 61-65. (New York, Douglas C. McMurtrie, 1917. Reprinted by permission.)

between inhabitants of arid territories. Unfortunately for his argument we have glaring instances in which desert-like conditions coexist with disparate modes of culture not only in similar but in identical regions of the globe.

Thus, the Hopi and Navajo Indians have both occupied for a long period the same part of northwestern Arizona and on the "environmental theory we should therefore expect among them the same mode of life. In this, however, we are thoroughly disappointed. The Hopi are intensive farmers who succeed in raising crops where white agriculturists fail; the Navajo also plant corn but to a distinctly lesser extent and under Spanish influence have readily developed into a pastoral people, raising sheep for food and wool. Though the same building material is available, the Hopi construct the well-known terraced sandstone houses with a rectangular cell as the architectural unit, while the Navajo dwell in conical earth-covered huts. North American ceramic art attains one of its highwater marks among the Hopi, while the pottery of the Navajo is hopelessly crude in comparison. Cotton was raised by the Hopi, but there is no trace of its use by the neighboring people. What is true of the material aspect of native life applies equally to its less tangible elements. There is at least one marked difference in the sexual division of labor: with the Hopi it is the man's business to spin and weave while this work falls to woman's share among the Navajo. The Hopi were always strict monogamists, while among the Navajo polygamy was permissible. In conjunction with their agricultural pursuits Hopi ceremonialism centered in the magico-religious production of rain; the Navajo applied often the identical ritualistic stock-in-trade to the cure of sickness. A stringent regulation of the Navajo social code forbids all conversation between son-in-law and mother-in-law; but the Hopi merely view the taboo as a Navajo idiosyncrasy. The general cast of Hopi psychology, as fashioned by Hopi society, is that of an eminently peaceable population; the Navajo rather recall in their bearing the war-like and aggressive tribes of the plains. Where resemblances occur, as *e.g.*, in the objective phase of the native cults, we are able to prove that the parallelism is due not to an independent response to environment stimuli, but to contact and borrowing. But quite apart from such cases, the basic differences in Hopi and Navajo civilization show that the environment alone cannot account for cultural phenomena. . . .

The facts of domestication are usually suggestive as regards our general problem for they show in an absolutely convincing manner that even where the same animals have been domesticated by different peoples the use to which they are put may differ widely and give a distinct aspect to this phase of culture. Thus, we find that of Siberian reindeer-breeders the Tungus and Lamut use their animals only for transportation, not for slaughter, and that many bands, unlike other Arctic populations, ride on their reindeer instead of harnessing them to sledges. It is true that a rationalistic motive can be given for the fact that the Chukchee do not ride reindeer-back since their variety seems physically unfit for the saddle. That, however, is not the essential point. We should like to know how the Tungus came to use the saddle with their animals while other tribes with the same variety did not do so, and for this *positive* reaction to their faunal environment geography furnishes no clue. . . .

Indeed, environment is not only unable to create cultural features, ✓ in some instances it is even incapable of perpetuating them. Thus, pottery was once distributed over an extensive region in the New Hebrides but is now restricted to a few isolated localities on a single island. Again, in southeastern New Guinea ancient pottery has been found that vastly surpasses its present representatives in point of craftsmanship. A similar phenomenon has been noted in the Southwest of the United States, where the evolution and deterioration of glazed earthenware may be clearly traced in the same region. Dr. Rivers has pointed out an even more instructive example of cultural degeneration. In the Torres Islands of Melanesia the natives have no canoes for traversing the channels which separate their islands from one another but are obliged to use unseaworthy bamboo rafts inadequate even for fishing purposes. Yet there is evidence that the Torres Islanders once shared the art of canoe-making with their fellow-Oceanians and that it has died out in recent times independently of European influence. It is difficult to conceive of any people less likely *a priori* to lose the art of navigation than a South Sea Island group; yet, their maritime environment proved inadequate to preserve so vital a feature of their daily life.

To sum up: Environment cannot explain culture because the identical environment is consistent with distinct cultures; because cultural traits persist from inertia in an unfavorable environment; because they do not develop where they would be of distinct advantage to a

people; and because they may even disappear where one would least expect it on geographical principles.

Shall we then cavalierly banish geography from cultural considerations? This would be manifestly going beyond the mark. Geographical phenomena can no more be discarded than can psychological phenomena. They represent in the first place a limiting condition. As cultures cannot contravene psychological principles so they cannot, except in limited measure, override geographical factors. To use some drastically clear if somewhat hackneyed examples, the Eskimo do not eat coconuts nor do the Oceanians build snow-houses; where the horse does not occur it cannot be domesticated; in the Hopi country where watercourses are lacking navigation naturally did not develop. As Jochelson points out, the Koryak of northeastern Siberia cannot cultivate cereals because of the low temperature and they cannot succeed as cattle-breeders because of the poor quality of the grasses. This minimum recognition of environment as a purely negative factor, however, does not do full justice to it. Take the bison out of the plains Indian's life and his cultural atmosphere certainly changes. Nevertheless, we have seen that the presence of the bison by no means fully determined the cultural employment possible. Instead of hunting it as the Solutrean Europeans did the wild horse, the Indian might have domesticated it as his namesake by misnomer in Asia domesticated the buffalo. The environment, then, enters into culture, not as a formative but rather as an inert element ready to be selected from and molded. It is, of course, a matter of biological necessity for a people to establish some sort of adaptation to surrounding conditions, but such adaptation is no more spontaneously generated by the environment than are strictly biological adaptations. There are alternatives to adaptation — migration and destruction.

It is true, as Dr. Wissler has forcibly pointed out, that when some kind of adjustment has once been established it will tend to persist in the region of its origin. This, however, illustrates not so much the active influence of environment as rather the tremendous force of cultural inertia which tends to perpetuate an old muddling-along adjustment, however imperfect, provided only it has bare survival value.

Altogether we may illustrate the relations of culture to environment by an analogy used by Dr. Wissler in another connection, which also brings us back to my initial analogy of the environmental theory with

the associationist system in psychology. The environment furnishes the builders of cultural structures with brick and mortar but it does not furnish the architect's plan. As the illustrations cited clearly prove, there is a variety of ways in which the same materials can be put together, nay, there is always a range of choice as regards the materials themselves. The development of a particular architectural style and the selection of a special material from among an indefinite number of possible styles and materials are what characterize a given culture. Since geography permits more than a single adjustment to the same conditions, it cannot give the interpretation sought by the student of culture. Culture can no more be built up of environmental blocks than can consciousness out of isolated ideas; and as the association of ideas already implies the synthetizing faculty of consciousness, so the assemblage and use of environmental factors after a definite plan already implies the selective and synthetic agency of a preëxisting or nascent culture.

Exercises

1. Name three factors in human progress given by Huntington. Compare them with the three factors mentioned in the opening paragraph.

2. Give examples showing the influence of climate upon inherent mental capacity.

3. Show how material resources are affected by climate.

4. How does Huntington account for the difference between the Indians of California, Utah, and New Mexico?

5. What kinds of resources are least affected by climate? Are any of them entirely independent of climate?

6. Name the four fundamental classes of effects produced by geographic influences, according to Semple.

7. What difference do you see between the term "climate," as used by Huntington, and "geography," as used by Semple?

8. What so-called racial differences does Semple attribute to geographical influences?

9. Show how geographical conditions affect the physical type through dominant activities. Should this be credited to environment or to culture?

10. Give some examples of acclimatization in the case of human groups.

11. What is the supposed relation of pigmentation to geography?

12. What portions of Semple's account of psychical effects of geographic environment are least convincing? most convincing?

13. Is it true that the effects mentioned by Semple under class IV. "belong exclusively to the domain of geography?"
14. Which of them suggest racial, and which cultural, factors?
15. Contrast Lowie's explanation of Hopi characteristics with that offered by Huntington.
16. Which of the two authors deals with the smaller area? Should this render his argument more convincing or less so?
17. Discuss the conclusion that environment is merely a passive and limit-setting factor.
18. Show that culture is the dominant factor in the later stages of social development. Is this true of the earlier stages?
19. Under what conditions, if any, is race the active, determining factor?
20. Does environment play this role at any stage?
21. Give illustrations showing (a) the helplessness of environment; (b) its power.
22. Inspect your examples, and see if it appears that geographical environment turns out to be merely a passive and limit-setting factor.

Additional References

1. Chapin, F. Stuart: *An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution*. Chapter V. "The Influences of Physical Environment." Comprehensive and readable.
2. Hayes, Edmund C.: *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. Chapter III. "Geographic Causes Which Affect the Life of Society." A brief, but broad, survey, showing both sides of the question.
3. Myres, J. L.: *The Dawn of History*. Discusses (pp. 13-38) the influence of the geographical setting on early human experience.
4. Todd, Arthur J.: *Theories of Social Progress*. Chapter IX. A critical survey of the "Geographic Determinists."

CHAPTER VII

NATURE AND COURSE OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

1. Social Evolution as Continuity of Achievement¹

✓The discriminating reader of the following passages from Lester F. Ward will perceive that his penetrating mind anticipated much of the best thinking of later years on the nature of culture and the social heritage. A slight difference in terminology need not obscure the essential identity of his thought with that of present-day students of (social heredity.)

It will be noticed that Ward suggests that the handing down of achievement from generation to generation "may be" aptly called *social heredity*; also that "*a few rare minds* have dimly seen that civilization consists in the cumulative light of knowledge." The fact that these ideas are now the familiar language of every student of social science shows how rapidly sociological thinking has moved toward a clear conception of the non-organic character of social evolution.

My thesis is that the subject-matter of sociology is human *achievement*. It is not what men are, but what they do. It is not the structure, but the function. Sociologists are nearly all working in the department of social anatomy, when they should turn their attention to social physiology. Most of them have imbibed the false notion that physiology is dynamic, and is in some way connected with social progress. They scarcely dare inquire what social physiology is, for fear that it may involve them in questions of social reform. But physiology is merely function. It is what structures and organs do, what they were made to do, the only purpose they have. Structures and organs are only means. Function is the end. It is therefore easy to see how much more important physiology is than anatomy. The latter is, of course, a necessary study, since functions cannot be performed without organs; but it is in the nature of preparation, and can be relegated to one or other of the special social sciences, which,

¹ *Pure Sociology*, by Lester F. Ward; pp. 15-17; 20; 22; 25-26; 31; 34-36. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1917. Reprinted by permission.)

as I have shown, supply the data for the study of sociology. The principal sources of such data are history, demography, anthropology, psychology, biology, civics, and economics; but all the sciences contribute to that highest science, social physiology.

To be less technical, but really repeat the same thing, sociology is concerned with social *activities*. It is a study of action, *i.e.*, of *phenomena*. It is not a descriptive science in the naturalist's sense — a science that describes objects looked upon as finished products. It is rather a study of how the various social products have been created. These products once formed become permanent. They are never lost. They may be slowly modified and perfected, but they constitute the basis for new products, and so on indefinitely. Viewed from the evolutionary standpoint, the highest types of men stand on an elevated platform which man and nature working together have erected in the long course of ages. This is not only true of our time, but it has been true of all times. The most advanced of any age stand on the shoulders, as it were, of those of the preceding age; only with each succeeding age the platform is raised a degree higher. The platforms of previous ages become the steps in the great staircase of civilization, and these steps remain unmoved, and are perpetuated by human history.

Or, to change the figure, the human polyp is perpetually building a coral reef, on the upper surface of which the last generation lives and builds. The generations live and die, but they leave behind them the result of all that they accomplished when living. This result is a permanent part of the great ocean bed of human achievement. As time goes on these successive additions, superimposed the one upon the other, form the bed-rock of civilization. They become lithified, as it were, and constitute the strata of the psychozoic age of the world, through which the true historian, like the geologist, cuts his sections and lays bare in profile the successive stages of human culture.

It is this fact of permanent human achievement that makes the broad distinction between animal and human societies. Just as there is a radical difference between cosmic and organic evolution, so there is a radical difference between organic and social evolution. The formula that expresses this distinction the most clearly is that *the environment transforms the animal, while man transforms the environment*. Now it is exactly this transformation of the environment that constitutes achievement. The animal achieves nothing. The organic

world is passive. It is acted upon by the environment and adapted to it. And although it is true that in the structural modifications that constitute such adaptation the efforts and activities of the organism play a prominent part, still even this is only a reflex response to the pressure from without, and really constitutes a part of the environment. Man, on the contrary, as a psychically developed being, and in increasing degrees in proportion to his psychic development, is active and assumes the initiative, molding nature to his own use.

There has been no important organic change in man during the historic period. The trifling physical differences which we attribute to differences of environment acting on man during a century or two, would have no diagnostic value in biology. He is no more fleet of foot, keen of vision, or strong in muscle and tendon than he was when Herodotus wrote. Yet his power of vision has been enormously increased by all the applications of the lens, his power of locomotion has been multiplied by the invention of propelling machines, and his strength has become almost unlimited by calling the forces of nature to his assistance. Tools are vastly more effective than teeth or claws. The telescope and the microscope completely dwarf all natural organs of sight. Railroads are fair substitutes for wings, and steamships for fins. In the electric transmission of thought across continents and seas he has developed an organ of which no animal possesses a rudiment. [Yet all this is less practically useful than the increased means of production that have resulted from a long series of inventions. It is all the result of man's power to transform the environment. The artificial modification of natural phenomena is the great characteristic fact in human activity. It is what constitutes achievement.] No animal is capable of it. Some superficial observers seem to see in the nests of birds, the dams of beavers, the honeycomb of the bees, and the various more or less complicated habitations of certain rodents and other animals, an analogy to the achievements of man. But these all lack the essential element of permanence. They cannot be called artificial, and it is their artificial character that distinguishes the results of human activity. . . .

Civilization may be regarded either as an unconscious or as a conscious process, according to the point of view. The efforts and activities that have raised man from round to round of the ladder may be looked upon as the results of the inherent forces of his nature, and hence unconscious and cosmic. Or, the civilizing acts of men

may be looked upon as the results of will, ideas, and intelligent aspirations for excellence, and hence conscious and personal. The first of these viewpoints has been erected into a science, and is sometimes appropriately called *mesology*. Human history thus becomes a simple extension of natural history. This is regarded as the scientific view *par excellence*. It is, however, mainly true that man has risen by dint of his own efforts and activities. . . .

But it is time to inquire more specially what the products of achievement are. The chief failure to understand them is due to the false and superficial view that they consist in material goods, or wealth. This is the fallacy upon which chiefly rests the notion that human society differs from animal society only in degree. Because welfare is so largely dependent on wealth, it is natural to suppose that wealth is the main condition to progress. There is a sense in which this is true, but to say that wealth is a product of achievement involves an ellipsis. Material goods, as, for example, food, clothing, and shelter, are, it is true, the ends, but the real products of achievement are means. They are the means to these ends, and not the ends themselves. . . .

Achievement does not consist in wealth. Wealth is fleeting and ephemeral. Achievement is permanent and eternal. And now mark the paradox. Wealth, the transient, is material; achievement, the enduring, is immaterial. The products of achievement are not material things at all. As said before, they are not ends but means. They are methods, ways, principles, devices, arts, systems, institutions. In a word, they are *inventions*. Achievement consists in invention in the Tardean sense. It is anything and everything that rises above mere imitation or repetition. Every such increment to civilization is a permanent gain, because it is imitated, repeated, perpetuated, and never lost. It is chiefly mental or psychical, but it may be physical in the sense of skill. The earlier developments of civilizing influences consisted mainly in these, and such accounts as we have consist in descriptions of the physical feats of heroes. But mere muscular strength soon yields to cunning and skill. These do not achieve until they begin to create. Language itself was an achievement of stupendous import, and every one of the steps it has taken—gesture, oral, written, printed forms of language—has marked an epoch in the progress of man. Literature has become one of the great achievements. Art, too, is an achievement upon which we need not dwell.

Philosophy and science must be ranked as achievements, vast and far-reaching in their consequences. The invention of tools, instruments, utensils, missiles, traps, snares, and weapons comes under this head, crowned by the era of machinofacture, artificial locomotion, and electric intercommunication. . . .

[Finally, it may be said in general that all human institutions are achievements.] Even those that we now consider bad, even those that have been abolished, were useful in the wider sense in their day and age. The fact that they were developed and actually came into existence proves to the sociologist that they must have served a purpose. But there is really no such thing as abolishing an institution. Institutions change their character to adapt them to their time, and the successive forms may take different names, and be no longer recognized as the same as the institutions out of which they have developed, but the fundamental principle which underlies them is common to them all, and may usually be traced through the entire series of changes that an institution may have undergone. (The term *institution* is capable of such expansion as to embrace all human achievement, and in this enlarged sense institutions become the chief study of the sociologist.) All achievements are institutions, and there is a decided gain to the mind in seeking to determine the true subject-matter of sociology, to regard human institutions and human achievement as synonymous terms, and as constituting, in the broadest sense of both, the field of research of a great science. / X

These products of achievement that we have been considering have one fundamental condition, without which they would have been impossible. They absolutely require *social continuity*. . . .

It must be clear from all that has been said that the essential characteristic of all achievement is some form of knowledge. But knowledge, unlike capacity, cannot be transmitted through heredity. The germ-plasm can only carry the ancestral strains of parents to their offspring and descendants, and whether "acquired characters" can be thus transmitted or not, it is certain that acquired knowledge is a "character" that does not descend in that way. It has to be acquired anew by every member of society. If it is not thus acquired, it is lost to that member. But as all achievement is knowledge, to be saved it must be transmitted in some way. [The process by which achievement is handed down may be aptly called *social heredity*.] This social heredity is the same thing that I have otherwise denomi-

nated social continuity, and it is the absolute necessity of social continuity that restricts the science of sociology to that great line of social development in which there has been no break in the transmission of achievement. We thus have the continuity of the social germ-plasm, which is as good an analogy as the organicists have discovered. The social germ-plasm is that Promethean fire which has been passed on from age to age, warming the world into life with its glow, and lighting it with its flame through all the long night of the past into the daybreak of the present.

A few rare minds have dimly seen that civilization consists in the cumulative light of knowledge. The most celebrated expression of this truth is that of Pascal in which he says that "the entire series of men during the course of all the ages is to be considered as if it were one and the same man who has always lived and has been constantly learning." Pascal seems to have derived the idea from St. Augustine, of whom he was an admirer and a close student. Bacon has expressed a similar view, and something very close to it occurs frequently in Condorcet's "Esquisse" in connection with his favorite doctrine of the perfectibility of the human race. Herder also entertained similar ideas.

But this conception is only an approach toward the truth. It falls far short of what has actually taken place in the world. It indicates the length but not the breadth of civilization. No one man, however wise, and though immortal, could have accomplished what all men have accomplished. This brings us in full view of one of the most important and at the same time most neglected factors of social evolution, viz., that of individuality in achievement. It is another aspect of the truth we encountered in the last chapter that it is inequality that has broadened and enriched civilization as it has broadened and enriched science. Civilization advances in much the same way that science advances. It is not the work of any one man, but of thousands of men. Each one of these thousands does a somewhat different work from any other. This is due to the natural inequalities of men, chiefly to varied intellectual capacities and attainments which cause them to follow different and almost infinitely varied lines and produce correspondingly varied results. This causes the enormous superiority of all men over any one man. Human achievement may be compared to a great modern city with its buildings of unequal shapes, sizes, and heights, its columns, monuments, domes, towers, and spires differing

in all conceivable ways, and yet denoting a still more endless variety of activities and social operations. If we take up the study of any one particular line, it matters not what, we shall find lesser lights and great lights characterizing the history of its development. Different schools of art represented by great masters, each of which has added something to the work of all the rest. Schools of architecture, of sculpture, of painting, of music; types of poetry and prose literature; systems of philosophy; world views and religious systems; qualitative and quantitative powers of perceiving utilities, resulting in innumerable inventions and arts—all due to natural inequalities in men. It is thus that civilization acquires its volume and that it becomes that infinitely complex and varied field of study which the sociologist finds before him.

2. Ethnical Periods in Social Evolution²

The intensive study of particular culture groups in recent years has undermined and overthrown some of the erroneous notions which formerly passed unchallenged as established facts of social evolution. This has occurred because earlier writers devoted their energies to the construction of stages and sequences which they assumed to be uniformly followed by the developing culture of practically all societies. The justly famous work on *Ancient Society*, by the early American ethnologist, Lewis H. Morgan, affords an excellent example, as quoted below.

It may be remarked finally that the experience of mankind has run in nearly uniform channels; that human necessities in similar conditions have been substantially the same; and that the operations of the mental principle have been uniform in virtue of the specific identity of the brain of all the races of mankind. This, however, is but a part of the explanation of uniformity in results. The germs of the principal institutions and arts of life were developed while man was still a savage. To a very great extent the experience of the subsequent periods of barbarism and of civilization have been expended in the further development of these original conceptions. Wherever a connection can be traced on different continents between a present institution and a common germ, the derivation of the people themselves from a common original stock is implied.

² *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization*, by Lewis H. Morgan; pp. 8-18. (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1878. Reprinted by permission.)

The discussion of these several classes of facts will be facilitated by the establishment of a certain number of Ethnical Periods; each representing a distinct condition of society, and distinguishable by a mode of life peculiar to itself. The terms "Age of *Stone*," "of *Bronze*," and "of *Iron*," introduced by Danish archaeologists, have been extremely useful for certain purposes, and will remain so for the classification of objects of ancient art; but the progress of knowledge has rendered other and different subdivisions necessary. Stone implements were not entirely laid aside with the introduction of tools of iron, nor of those of bronze. The invention of the process of smelting iron ore created an ethnical epoch, yet we could scarcely date another from the production of bronze. Moreover, since the period of stone implements overlaps those of bronze and of iron, and since that of bronze also overlaps that of iron, they are not capable of a circumscription that would leave each independent and distinct.

It is probable that the successive arts of subsistence which arose at long intervals will ultimately, from the great influence they must have exercised upon the condition of mankind, afford the most satisfactory bases for these divisions. But investigation has not been carried far enough in this direction to yield the necessary information. With our present knowledge the main result can be attained by selecting such other inventions or discoveries as will afford sufficient tests of progress to characterize the commencement of successive ethnical periods. Even though accepted as provisional, these periods will be found convenient and useful. Each of those about to be proposed will be found to cover a distinct culture, and to represent a particular mode of life.

The period of savagery, of the early part of which very little is known, may be divided, provisionally, into three sub-periods. These may be named respectively the *Older*, the *Middle*, and the *Later* period of savagery; and the condition of society in each, respectively, may be distinguished as the *Lower*, the *Middle*, and the *Upper Status* of savagery.

In like manner, the period of barbarism divides naturally into three sub-periods, which will be called, respectively, the *Older*, the *Middle*, and the *Later* periods of barbarism; and the condition of society in each, respectively, will be distinguished as the *Lower*, the *Middle*, and the *Upper Status* of barbarism.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to find such tests of progress to

mark the commencement of these several periods as will be found absolute in their application, and without exceptions upon all the continents. Neither is it necessary, for the purpose in hand, that exceptions should not exist. It will be sufficient if the principal tribes of mankind can be classified, according to the degree of their relative progress, into conditions which can be recognized as distinct.

I. Lower Status of Savagery

This period commenced with the infancy of the human race, and may be said to have ended with the acquisition of a fish subsistence and of a knowledge of the use of fire. Mankind were then living in their original restricted habitat, and subsisting upon fruits and nuts. The commencement of articulate speech belongs to this period. No exemplification of tribes of mankind in this condition remained to the historical period.

II. Middle Status of Savagery

It commenced with the acquisition of a fish subsistence and a knowledge of the use of fire, and ended with the invention of the bow and arrow. Mankind, while in this condition, spread from their original habitat over the greater portion of the earth's surface. Among tribes still existing it will leave in the Middle Status of savagery, for example, the Australians and the greater part of the Polynesians when discovered. It will be sufficient to give one or more exemplifications of each status.

III. Upper Status of Savagery

It commenced with the invention of the bow and arrow, and ended with the invention of the art of pottery. It leaves in the Upper Status of Savagery the Athapascan tribes of the Hudson's Bay Territory, the tribes of the valley of the Columbia, and certain coast tribes of North and South America; but with relation to the time of their discovery. This closes the period of Savagery.

IV. Lower Status of Barbarism

The invention or practice of the art of pottery, all things considered, is probably the most effective and conclusive test that can be selected to fix a boundary line, necessarily arbitrary, between

savagery and barbarism. The distinctness of the two conditions has long been recognized, but no criterion of progress out of the former into the latter has hitherto been brought forward. All such tribes, then, as never attained to the art of pottery will be classed as savages, and those possessing this art but who never attained a phonetic alphabet and the use of writing will be classed as barbarians.

The first sub-period of barbarism commenced with the manufacture of pottery, whether by original invention or adoption. In finding its termination, and the commencement of the Middle Status, a difficulty is encountered in the unequal endowments of the two hemispheres, which began to be influential upon human affairs after the period of savagery had passed. It may be met, however, by the adoption of equivalents. In the Eastern hemisphere, the domestication of animals, and in the Western, the cultivation of maize and plants by irrigation, together with the use of adobe-brick and stone in house building have been selected as sufficient evidence of progress to work a transition out of the Lower and into the Middle Status of barbarism. It leaves, for example, in the Lower Status, the Indian tribes of the United States east of the Missouri River, and such tribes of Europe and Asia as practiced the art of pottery, but were without domestic animals.

V. Middle Status of Barbarism

It commenced with the domestication of animals in the Eastern hemisphere, and in the Western with cultivation by irrigation and with the use of adobe-brick and stone in architecture, as shown. Its termination may be fixed with the invention of the process of smelting iron ore. This places in the Middle Status, for example, the Village Indians of New Mexico, Mexico, Central America and Peru, and such tribes in the Eastern hemisphere as possessed domestic animals, but were without a knowledge of iron. The ancient Britons, although familiar with the use of iron, fairly belong in this connection. The vicinity of more advanced continental tribes had advanced the arts of life among them far beyond the state of development of their domestic institutions.

VI. Upper Status of Barbarism

It commenced with the manufacture of iron, and ended with the invention of a phonetic alphabet, and the use of writing in literary

composition. Here civilization begins. This leaves in the Upper Status, for example, the Grecian tribes of the Homeric age, the Italian tribes shortly before the founding of Rome, and the Germanic tribes of the time of Caesar.

VII. Status of Civilization

It commenced, as stated, with the use of a phonetic alphabet and the production of literary records, and divides into *Ancient* and *Modern*. As an equivalent, hieroglyphical writing upon stone may be admitted.

RECAPITULATION

- I. *Lower Status of Savagery. From the Infancy of the Human Race to the commencement of the next Period.*
- II. *Middle Status of Savagery. From the acquisition of a fish subsistence and a knowledge of the use of fire, to etc.*
- III. *Upper Status of Savagery. From the Invention of the Bow and Arrow, to etc.*
- IV. *Lower Status of Barbarism. From the Invention of the Art of Pottery, to etc.*
- V. *Middle Status of Barbarism. From the Domestication of animals on the Eastern hemisphere, and in the Western from the cultivation of maize and plants by irrigation, with the use of adobe-brick and stone, to etc.*
- VI. *Upper Status of Barbarism. From the Invention of the process of Smelting Iron Ore, with the use of iron tools, to etc.*
- VII. *Status of Civilization. From the Invention of a Phonetic Alphabet, with the use of writing to the present time.*

Each of these periods has a distinct culture and exhibits a mode of life more or less special and peculiar to itself. This specialization of ethnical periods renders it possible to treat a particular society according to its condition of relative advancement, and to make it a subject of independent study and discussion. It does not affect the main result that different tribes and nations on the same continent, and even of the same linguistic family, are in different conditions at the same time, since for our purpose the *condition* of each is the material fact, the *time* being immaterial.

Since the use of pottery is less significant than that of domestic animals, of iron, or of a phonetic alphabet, employed to mark the commencement of subsequent ethnical periods, the reasons for its adoption should be stated. The manufacture of pottery presupposes village life, and considerable progress in the simple arts. Flint and stone implements are older than pottery, remains of the former having been found in ancient repositories in numerous instances unaccompanied by the latter. A succession of inventions of greater need and adapted to a lower condition must have occurred before the want of pottery would be felt. The commencement of village life, with some degree of control over subsistence, wooden vessels and utensils, finger weaving with filaments of bark, basket making, and the bow and arrow make their appearance before the art of pottery. The Village Indians who were in the Middle Status of barbarism, such as the Zunians, the Aztecs and the Cholulans, manufactured pottery in large quantities and in many forms of considerable excellence; the partially Village Indians of the United States, who were in the Lower Status of barbarism, such as the Iroquois, the Choctaws and the Cherokees, made it in smaller quantities and in a limited number of forms; but the non-horticultural Indians, who were in the Status of savagery such as the Athapascans, the tribes of California and of the valley of the Columbia, were ignorant of its use. In Lubbock's *Pre-Historic Times*, in Taylor's *Early History of Mankind*, and in Peschel's *Races of Man*, the particulars respecting this art, and the extent of its distribution, have been collected with remarkable breadth of research. It was unknown in Polynesia (with the exception of the Islands of the Tongas and Fijians), in Australia, in California, and in the Hudson's Bay Territory. Mr. Tylor remarks that "the art of weaving was unknown in most of the islands away from Asia," and that "in most of the South Sea Islands there was no knowledge of pottery." The Rev. Lorimer Fison, an English missionary residing in Australia, informed the author in answer to inquiries, that "the Australians had no woven fabrics, no pottery, and were ignorant of the bow and arrow." This last fact was also true in general of the Polynesians. The introduction of the ceramic art produced a new epoch in human progress in the direction of an improved living and increased domestic conveniences. While flint and stone implements — which came in earlier and required long periods of time to develop all their uses — gave the canoe, wooden vessels and utensils, and ultimately timber and plank in house archi-

ture, pottery gave a durable vessel for boiling food, which before that had been rudely accomplished in baskets coated with clay, and in ground cavities lined with skin, the boiling being effected with heated stones.

Whether the pottery of the aborigines was hardened by the fire or cured by the simple process of drying, has been made a question. Professor E. T. Cox, of Indianapolis, has shown by comparing the analyses of ancient pottery and hydraulic cements, "that so far as chemical constituents are concerned it (the pottery) agrees very well with the composition of hydraulic stones." He remarks further, that "all the pottery belonging to the mound-builders' age, which I have seen, is composed of alluvial clay and sand, or a mixture of the former with pulverized fresh-water shells. A paste made of such a mixture possesses in a high degree the properties of hydraulic Puzzuolani and Portland cement, so that vessels formed of it hardened without being burned, as is customary with modern pottery. The fragments of shells served the purpose of gravel or fragments of stone as at present used in connection with hydraulic lime for the manufacture of artificial stone." The composition of Indian pottery in analogy with that of hydraulic cement suggests the difficulties in the way of inventing the art, and tends also to explain the lateness of its introduction in the course of human experience. Notwithstanding the ingenious suggestion of Professor Cox, it is probable that pottery was hardened by artificial heat. In some cases the fact is directly attested. Thus Adair, speaking of the Gulf tribes, remarks that "they make earthen pots of very different sizes, so as to contain from two to ten gallons, large pitchers to carry water, bowls, dishes, platters, basins, and a prodigious number of other vessels of such antiquated forms as would be tedious to describe, and impossible to name. Their method of glazing them is, they place them over a large fire of smoky pitch-pine, which makes them smooth, black and firm."

Another advantage of fixing definite ethnical periods is the direction of special investigation to those tribes and nations which afford the best exemplification of each status, with the view of making each both standard and illustrative. Some tribes and families have been left in geographical isolation to work out the problems of progress by original mental effort; and have, consequently, retained their arts and institutions pure and homogeneous; while those of other tribes and nations have been adulterated through external influence. Thus,

while Africa was and is an ethnical chaos of savagery and barbarism, Australia and Polynesia were in savagery, pure and simple, with the arts and institutions belonging to that condition. In like manner, the Indian family of America, unlike any other existing family, exemplified the condition of mankind in three successive ethnical periods. In the undisturbed possession of a great continent, of common descent, and with homogeneous institutions, they illustrated, when discovered, each of these conditions, and especially those of the Lower and of the Middle Status of barbarism, more elaborately and completely than any other portion of mankind. The far northern Indians and some of the coast tribes of North and South America were in the Upper Status of savagery; the partially Village Indians east of the Mississippi were in the Lower Status of barbarism, and the Village Indians of North and South America were in the Middle Status. Such an opportunity to recover full and minute information of the course of human experience and progress in developing their arts and institutions through these successive conditions has not been offered within the historical period. It must be added that it has been indifferently improved. Our greatest deficiencies relate to the last period named.

Differences in the culture of the same period in the Eastern and Western hemispheres undoubtedly existed in consequence of the unequal endowments of the continents; but the condition of society in the corresponding status must have been, in the main, substantially similar.

The ancestors of the Grecian, Roman and German tribes passed through the stages we have indicated, in the midst of the last of which the light of history fell upon them. Their differentiation from the undistinguishable mass of barbarians did not occur, probably, earlier than the commencement of the Middle Period of barbarism. The experience of these tribes has been lost, with the exception of so much as is represented by the institutions, inventions and discoveries which they brought with them, and possessed when they first came under historical observation. The Grecian and Latin tribes of the Homeric and Romulian periods afford the highest exemplification of the Upper Status of barbarism. Their institutions were likewise pure and homogeneous, and their experience stands directly connected with the final achievement of civilization.

Commencing, then, with the Australians and Polynesians, following

with the American Indian tribes, and concluding with the Roman and Grecian, who afford the highest exemplifications respectively of the six great stages of human progress, the sum of their united experiences may be supposed fairly to represent that of the human family from the Middle Status of savagery to the end of ancient civilization. Consequently, the Aryan nations will find the type of the condition of their remote ancestors, when in savagery, in that of the Australians and Polynesians; when in the Lower Status of barbarism in that of the partially Village Indians of America; and when in the Middle Status in that of the Village Indians, with which their own experience in the Upper Status directly connects. So essentially identical are the arts, institutions and mode of life in the same status upon all the continents, that the archaic form of the principal domestic institutions of the Greeks and Romans must even now be sought in the corresponding institutions of the American aborigines, as will be shown in the course of this volume. This fact forms a part of the accumulating evidence tending to show that the principal institutions of mankind have been developed from a few primary germs of thought; and that the course and manner of their development was predetermined, as well as restricted within narrow limits of divergence, by the natural logic of the human mind and the necessary limitations of its powers. Progress has been found to be substantially the same in kind in tribes and nations inhabiting different and even disconnected continents, while in the same status, with deviations from uniformity in particular instances produced by special causes. The argument when extended tends to establish the unity of origin of mankind.

In studying the condition of tribes and nations in these several ethnical periods we are dealing, substantially, with the ancient history and condition of our own remote ancestors.

3. Culture a Closed System³

In sharpest contrast with the neat formulas of Morgan and his school stand the conclusions of contemporary ethnological scholars, who have abandoned the use of broad *a priori* generalizations and are devoting themselves to the intensive study of specific groups and culture-traits. The result is seen in a refutation of the older theory of a definite series of culture stages through which all tribes and

³ *Culture and Ethnology*, by Robert H. Lowie, pp., 5-7; 66-67; 95-97. (New York, Douglas C. McMurtrie, 1917. Reprinted by permission.)

nations uniformly pass. Even more, it is now increasingly denied that there are any laws of social progress whatsoever. With regard to this startling assertion, one may at least admit that if such laws do exist social science has still largely before it the task of discovering what they are and explaining their operation in convincing terms.

With the beginning of the European war the word 'culture' acquired a sense in popular English usage which had long prevailed in ethnological literature. Culture is, indeed, the sole and exclusive subject-matter of ethnology, as consciousness is the subject-matter of psychology, life of biology, electricity of a branch of physics. Culture shares with these other fundamental concepts the peculiarity that it can be properly understood only by an enlarged familiarity with the facts it summarizes. There is no royal short cut to a comprehension of culture as a whole by definition any more than to a comprehension of consciousness; but as every analysis and explanation of particular conscious states adds to our knowledge of what consciousness is, so every explanation of particular culture phenomena adds to our insight into the nature of culture. We must, however, start with some proximate notion of what we are to discuss, and for this purpose Tylor's definition in the opening sentence of his *Primitive Culture* will do as well as any: "Culture . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."

For purely practical reasons, connected with the minute division of labor that has become imperative with modern specialization, ethnology has in practice concerned itself with the cruder cultures of peoples without a knowledge of writing. But this division is an illogical and artificial one. As the biologist can study life as manifested in the human organism as well as in the amoeba, so the ethnologist might examine and describe the usages of modern America as well as those of the Hopi Indians. In these lectures I shall therefore not hesitate to draw upon illustrations from the higher civilizations where these seem most appropriate.

Indeed, it may be best from pedagogical reasons to commence with an enumeration of instances of cultural activity in our own midst. And since there is a persistent tendency to associate with culture the more impressive phenomena of art, science, and technology, it is well to insist at the outset that these loftier phases are by no means necessary to the concept of culture. The fact that your boy plays "button,

button, who has the button?" is just as much an element of our culture as the fact that a room is lighted by electricity. So is the baseball enthusiasm of our grown-up population, so are moving picture shows, *thés dansants*, Thanksgiving Day masquerades, bar-rooms, Ziegfeld Midnight Follies, evening schools, the Hearst papers, woman suffrage clubs, the single-tax movement, Riker drug stores, touring-sedans, and Tammany Hall. . . .

Psychology, racial differences, geographical environment, have all proved inadequate for the interpretation of cultural phenomena. The inference is obvious. Culture is a thing *sui generis* which can be explained only in terms of itself. This is not mysticism but sound scientific method. The biologist, whatever metaphysical speculations he may indulge in as to the ultimate origin of life, does not depart in his workaday mood from the principle that every cell is derived from some other cell. So the ethnologist will do well to postulate the principle, *Omnis cultura ex cultura*. This means that he will account for a given cultural fact by merging it in a group of cultural facts or by demonstrating some other cultural fact out of which it has developed. The cultural phenomenon to be explained may either have an antecedent within the culture of the tribe where it is found or it may have been imported from without. Both groups of determinants must be considered.

The extraneous determinants of culture summed up under the heading of "diffusion" or "contact of peoples" have been repeatedly referred to in the preceding pages. A somewhat detailed examination seems desirable, for it is difficult to exaggerate their importance.

"Civilization," says Tylor, "is a plant much oftener propagated than developed"; and the latest ethnographic memoir that comes to hand voices the same sentiment: "It is and has always been much easier to borrow an idea from one's neighbors than to originate a new idea; and transmission of cultural elements, which in all ages has taken place in a great many different ways, is and has been one of the greatest promoters of cultural development." . . .

Culture thus appears as a closed system. We may not be able to explain all cultural phenomena or at least not beyond a certain point; but inasmuch as we *can* explain them at all, explanation must remain on the cultural plane.

What are the determinants of culture? We have found that cultural traits may be transmitted from without and in so far forth are deter-

mined by the culture of an alien people. The extraordinary extent to which such diffusion has taken place proves that the actual development of a given culture does not conform to innate laws necessarily leading to definite results, such hypothetical laws being overridden by contact with foreign peoples. But even where a culture is of relatively indigenous growth comparison with other cultures suggests that one step does not necessarily lead to another, that an invention like the wheel or the domestication of an animal occurs in one place and does not occur in another. (To the extent of such diversity we must abandon the quest for general formulae of cultural evolution and recognize as the determinant of a phenomenon the unique course of its past history.) However, there is not merely discontinuity and diversity but also stability and agreement in the sphere of culture. The discrete steps that mark culture history may not determine one another, but each may involve as a necessary or at least probable consequence other phenomena which in many instances are simply new aspects of the same phenomenon, and in so far forth one cultural element as isolated in description is the determinant or correlate of another. As for those phenomena which we are obliged to accept as realities without the possibility of further analysis, we can, at least, classify a great number of them and merge particular instances in a group of similar facts. Finally, there are dominant characteristics of culture, like cultural inertia or the secondary rationalization of habits acquired irrationally by the members of a group, which serve as broad interpretative principles in the history of civilization.

In short, as in other sciences, so in ethnology there are ultimate, irreducible facts, special functional relations, and principles of wider scope that guide us through the chaotic maze of detail. And as the engineer calls on the physicist for a knowledge of mechanical laws, so the social builder of the future who should seek to refashion the culture of his time and add to its cultural values will seek guidance from ethnology, the science of culture, which in Tylor's judgment is "essentially a reformer's science."

|

4. On the Non-Existence of Innate or Uniform Laws of Social Evolution⁴

Primitive society wears a character rather different from that popularized by Morgan's school. Instead of dull uniformity, there is mottled diversity; instead of the single sib pattern multiplied in fulsome profusion we detect a variety of social units, now associated with the sib, now taking its place. . . .

The occurrence of convergent evolution — of like results achieved through different channels — might be cited as evidence of laws consummating predestined ends. But in by far the greater number of instances the likeness dissolves on closer scrutiny into a superficial or only partial resemblance. Thus teknonymy appeared as a possible result of a system of status designations, of feminine inferiority, or of a paucity of kinship terms. Evidently the import of the custom is quite different in these cases; or rather there are three customs which it is sometimes convenient to call by a common name. In the same way we find it convenient to group together as democracies the polities of ancient Athens and of the United States. This sets them apart for certain purposes from certain other constitutions but implies no recognition of either genetic or psychological affinity. But even where genuine likeness has been achieved we find divergence setting in after convergence, as in the case of polyandry.

Thus neither the examples of independent evolution from like causes nor those of convergent evolution from unlike causes establish an innate law of social progress. One fact, however, encountered at every stage and in every phase of society, by itself lays the axe to the root of any theory of historical laws — the extensive occurrence of diffusion. Creating nothing, this factor nevertheless makes all other agencies taper almost into nothingness beside it in its effect on the total growth of human civilization. An explanation of the ultimate origin of the Omaha sib would account for *one* sib organization; transmission accounts for that organization among a dozen tribes or more. Diffusion not merely extends the range of a feature, but in so doing it is able to level the differences of race, geographical environment, and economic status that are popularly assumed as potent instrumentalities in cultural evolution. Through diffusion the Chinese come

⁴ *Primitive Society*, by Robert H. Lowie, pp. 427; 433-441. (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1920. Reprinted by permission.)

to share Western notions of government; through diffusion the Southern Plains Indians come to share with the Iroquois of the Woodlands a type of sib that distinguishes them from their fellow-Siouans living under the same geographical conditions; through diffusion fishermen, reindeer nomads, and tillers of the soil come to entertain the identical conception of feminine disabilities. Any conceivable tendency of human society to pursue a fixed sequence of stages must be completely veiled by the incessant tendency to borrowing and thus becomes an unknowable noumenon that is scientifically worthless. Strangely enough, it was a jurist who clearly recognized this fact at a time when anthropologists were still chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of historical laws; and Maitland's memorable words in *Domesday Book and Beyond* may well be quoted in full: "Even had our anthropologists at their command material that would justify them in prescribing that every independent portion of mankind must, if it is to move at all, move through one fated series of stages which may be designated as Stage A, Stage B, Stage C, and so forth, we still should have to face the fact that the rapidly progressive groups have been just those which have not been independent, which have not worked out their own salvation, but have appropriated alien ideas and have thus been enabled, for anything that we can tell, to leap from Stage A to Stage X without passing through any intermediate stages. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the alphabet or at the Nicene Creed, by traversing a long series of 'stages'; they leapt to the one and to the other." Present ethnographical knowledge warrants us in extending Maitland's argument; we know that the relatively stationary no less than the relatively progressive peoples have evolved their culture through contact with alien ideas, and that accordingly the conditions for the operation of social laws among independent peoples nowhere exist. By all means let us register such sequences as may be found to recur in separated regions, but let us not dignify these strictly limited and sometimes trivial relations, such as that between polyandry and a paucity of women, by the pretentious title of historical laws.

To recognize the complexity and singularity of cultural phenomena, mainly as a consequence of diffusion, is then to abandon that quest of short-hand formulas prescribed by Professor Pearson, and it will be abandoned not from any foolish disdain for a simplification of facts but because we prefer to have the facts unsimplified than a simple

statement that fails to correspond with them. The evolutionary views until recently current among anthropologists are of the category of those "laws" denounced by Sir Henry Maine when in 1861 he wrote as follows: "Theories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unverified, . . . enjoy a universal preference over sober research into the primitive history of society and law." The period has come for eschewing the all-embracing and baseless theories of yore and to settle down to that sober historical research involved in the intensive study of specific regions.

Must we, then, resign all hope of rising from a contemplation of unique series of events to an interpretation? By no means. First of all the renunciation of historical laws does not imply the renunciation of uniformities *independent of the time factor* and veritably inherent in the essence of social existence. The universality of borrowing is itself a generalization of this type, as is the implied aversion from or inability for creative effort, which in turn is correlated with the persistence of cultural features once established. Secondly, it is precisely the singular combination of traits forming the context or past history of a given feature that, in conjunction with such general sociological principles as these, furnishes an interpretation of its meaning, *as nothing else whatsoever can*. An example from Maine, that champion of sane historical methods, will elucidate the point. Maine was confronted with the fact that the later Roman republic dispensed with the death penalty, a fact which had led to explanations based on the supposed psychology of the Romans. But Maine discovered that at the time in question permanent judicial bodies were commissions holding a delegated authority from the legislative assembly, which itself lacked power of inflicting capital punishment, hence could not delegate such authority to one of its creatures. The interpretation completely clarifies the problem, carries immediate conviction, and at once exposes the speciousness of any type of explanation not founded on similar principles. When we desire to understand Masai age-classes or Hidatsa age-societies, we shall do well to follow not Morgan or Schurtz, but Maine; to saturate ourselves with the spirit and history of Masai and Hidatsa culture, respectively, and with that of their neighbors, rather than to fly for aid to a chimerical law of social evolution.

The principles that underlie the growth of social organization do not differ from the principles operative in culture generally. It was once believed that the stages which archaeological research reveals in

western Europe must be stages mankind have everywhere been obliged to traverse. But the case of African technology suffices to disprove the assumption: the Africans did not pass from a Stone Age to an Age of Copper and Bronze and then to an Iron Age; whether through autochthonous advancement or through borrowing from Asiatic sources, they passed directly from the manufacture of stone tools to the manufacture of iron tools. In another phase of material civilization the American natives, except in Peru, completely failed to domesticate animals for economic use, clearly proving that, as in Yucatan and Mexico, a fairly complex cultural structure can be reared without resting on domestication as one of its supports. In the absence of an inherent law of evolution, then, social history merely conforms to the facts of culture history generally.

There is nevertheless an important difference not so much objectively as from the point of view of the appraising observer between the history of material culture and that of social organization. In the former there are periods of retrogression or stagnation alternating with eras of advancement, and the very use of these words implies criteria for judging progress. Nor is it difficult to fathom their foundation. Tools are contrivances for definite practical purposes; if these are accomplished more expeditiously and efficiently by one set of tools, then that set is better. Hence it is a purely objective judgment that metal axes are superior to those of stone. So economic activity has for its object the sustenance of human existence, and when the possibilities for supporting life are enlarged, as by the domestication of an eatable and milkable species, we are justified in speaking of a progressive change. But in the sphere of social life there is no objective criterion for grading cultural phenomena. The foremost philosophers are not agreed as to the ultimate ideals to be sought through social existence. Within a century Western thought and action have swung from one pole to the other, from the extremes of Manchesterian individualism to the extremes of state socialism; and the student's evaluation of, say, the communistic bias of Eskimo society will not be the same if he is a disciple of Herbert Spencer as it would be if he were a disciple of Prince Kropotkin. Democracy has become a slogan of modern times, but it has also roused the impassioned protests of men of genius and of reactionary biologists, some of whom doubtless cast wistful glances in the direction of Micronesia, lamenting the decay of that spirit of loyalty to superior rank so nobly preserved in the Marshall Islands.

Again, the unqualified emancipation of woman may be the only goal consistent with strict individualism, but what if individualistic aspirations are subordinated to others, say, to the perpetuation of traditional family ideals or to eugenic aims? Here, too, judgment of primitive conceptions must depend on one's subjective reaction to moot-problems of modern speculation. Even where the verdict of modern society tends to unanimity, the critical investigator cannot accept it as absolutely valid. It is not obvious that obligatory monogamy is in an absolute sense the most preferable form of marriage, least of all when it is tempered with a system of libertinage producing something not wholly different from the system of the Masai.

In short, the appraisal of sociological features is wholly different from that of technological features of culture. The latter may be rated according to the closeness with which they accomplish known ends; the former have unknown ends or ends whose value is a matter of philosophic doubt, hence they can be graded only on subjective grounds and must scientifically be treated as incommensurable.

Of course it is true that social organizations differ in complexity, but that difference fails to provide a criterion of progress. When the Andamanese evolved or borrowed the notion of segregating bachelors from spinsters, and both from married couples, their social culture gained in complexity, but it is not easy to prove that it experienced either improvement or deterioration. If our enlightened communities coped as successfully with, say, the problem of maintaining order as ruder peoples in a simpler environment, then it might be conceded that our complex administrative machinery represents an intellectual advance. But the condition is contrary to fact, and our cumbersome method of preserving the peace and the more elegant solution of the same problem in simpler circumstances remain incommensurable.

When from definite customs and institutions we turn to the dynamics of social history, the result is again the impossibility of grading cultures, but for a different reason. Institutions are generally different and not comparable; processes are not only comparable but identical in the simpler and higher civilizations. Thus we find the coöperative motive and the need for congenial companionship incarnated in a variety of forms among primitive peoples and at times even simulating the semblance of quite modern institutions, as in the case of the Samoan trade unions. As an invariable component of primitive life we further encounter the eternal striving for prestige, which is thus

clearly a characteristic of all social aggregates. The peacock theory of primitive man does away with that shopworn commonplace that primitive society wholly merges the individual in his group. It is true that at bottom it despises individuality, for it prizes variation only in a direction it has predetermined and conformity to its standards is the price exacted for recognition. But in this respect primitive and civilized society coincide in principle, however they may differ in detail. History records a transfer of power from one mystically sanctified source of authority to another, from a church to a book, from a book to a state, or to an intangible public opinion. But with unflinching tenacity every society from the simplest to the most complex has adhered to the principle that the one unpardonable sin consists in setting up one's private judgment against the recognized social authority, in perpetrating an infraction of tribal taboos. When, therefore, Sir Henry Maine points out the growing importance of contractual instead of status relations in modern society, his argument is of formal rather than of substantial significance for the history of individual freedom. In the disposal of his property an Ewe is not so free as an American, in other regards he is freer; and both are hedged about by a set of conventions whose breach may subject them to indignity, ostracism, and death. Neither morphologically nor dynamically can social life be said to have progressed from a stage of savagery to a stage of enlightenment.

The belief in social progress was a natural accompaniment of the belief in historical laws, especially when tinged with the evolutionary optimism of the 'seventies of the nineteenth century. If inherent necessity urges all societies along a fixed path, metaphysicians may still dispute whether the underlying force be divine or diabolic, but there can at least be no doubt as to which community is retarded and which accelerated in its movement toward the appointed goal. But no such necessity or design appears from the study of cultural history. Cultures develop mainly through the borrowings due to chance contact. Our own civilization is even more largely than the rest a complex of borrowed traits. The singular order of events by which it has come into being provides no schedule for the itinerary of alien cultures. Hence the specious plea that a given people must pass through such or such a stage in *our* history before attaining this or that destination can no longer be sustained. The student who has mastered Maitland's argument will recognize the historical and ethno-

logic absurdity of this solemn nonsense. In prescribing for other peoples a social programme we must always act on subjective grounds; but at least we can act unfettered by the pusillanimous fear of transgressing a mock-law of social evolution.

Nor are the facts of culture history without bearing on the adjustment of our own future. To that planless hodgepodge, that thing of shreds and patches called civilization, its historian can no longer yield superstitious reverence. He will realize better than others the obstacles to infusing design into the amorphous product; but in thought at least he will not grovel before it in fatalistic acquiescence but dream of a rational scheme to supplant the chaotic jumble. ✓

5. Rational Selection of the Maintenance Mores (Industrial Customs) as the Mainspring of Social Evolution⁵

The term *mores* was introduced into social science by William Graham Sumner, in his remarkable book entitled *Folkways*. The *mores* are those folkways (*i.e.*, "customs" in popular speech) that have come, in the thought of a social group, to be deemed *necessary* for social welfare, and binding on the members of the group. His disciple, Albert Galloway Keller, has found in the *mores* connected with getting a living the key to such social evolution as can be detected.

To act with reason, or science, or common sense, that which is most needed is verification. Verification, unmistakable and also repeated, will prove anything. Neither logic nor prejudice can stand before it long; it is after the facts of repeated experience that science comes limping. . . .

Where, then, in the societal system, can verification be found? Where shall the student look to discover and verify the activity of rational selection based upon positive knowledge? Where in the societal field are inadequate adaptations to the environment, as exhibited in unfit *mores*, most irresistibly demonstrated to be inadequate and unfit? It is a fact of observation that dissatisfaction due to the non-realization of human interests may occur in an equal degree anywhere in the societal field. But, whereas in some parts of that field it seems almost impossible to reason out conclusively the causes

⁵ *Societal Evolution*, by Albert Galloway Keller; pp. 128; 129-133; 135-136. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1916. Reprinted by permission.)

of dissatisfaction and then remove them, in the case of others there is a general persuasion that the nexus between effect and cause can be passed and satisfaction attained — and that through rational processes unaided. It is a bold man who believes that through rational means the race can be bred so as to be free of the physically and mentally weak; but everyone expects as a matter of course that fifty years will see the solution of many a present and arising difficulty in the line of material progress. Nobody in 1890 could reasonably expect the abolition of prostitution within any definite period; but there were those who regarded aerial navigation as merely a question of time. Men look to and depend upon rational procedure all the time in some parts of the societal field; they take up the war against smallpox and typhoid with confidence in their ultimate success. They realize that there are probably unknown physical elements, and are not forced to regard that man as a wizard who discloses them; they expect more surprises like the discovery of radium and the development of wireless telegraphy. But they have no hope that their religious mores will be adjusted as the result of some scientific discovery of a positive character; or that sociologists of a certain type may be able to set the relations of the sexes upon a sure basis. They do not hope for inventions in religion and marriage which can be tested with certainty and introduced with general or intelligent approval. Such results will come, they say, in the millennium — that is, when the conditions of life as now lived shall have been altered as the result of an unpredictable or even supernaturally directed development. Examples of this sort crowd to the page. It is not hard to demonstrate to an ignorant person in this country that he should learn to read and write; he can see that by living in this society. Similarly for his interest is it that he shall use the English language. Tests lie all about him, and are immediate and decisive. But try to persuade him by abstract argument to give up the vendetta, to renounce anarchistic leanings, or to change his religion, and you fail. There are no immediate and decisive tests at hand. You cannot demonstrate that interest will be subserved by change; you cannot even secure visualization of evil consequences. Even illness due to filth, where such visualization is becoming more practicable, can be referred unverifiably to too many different causes, as, for instance, the evil eye.

If we seek to generalize from the multitudes of instances on the order of those just given, the only conclusion at which we can arrive

is, that the more nearly custom (the folkways) represents direct reaction on environment in the actual struggle for material aids to existence, the more rational a test does it undergo; and, conversely, the more derived the societal forms the more clearly do they fall under the tests of tradition rather than reason. The nearer the mores come to the struggle for existence, the more nearly they concern self-maintenance, the more vivid is the demonstration of their expediency or in expediency.

But we must turn aside for the moment to get before us some perspective of the activities of a human society that we may observe which of them represent the most direct reactions upon environment. De Greef has made a classification of ~~societal~~ phenomena which is as useful as any for our present purpose. He divides them into the economic, the genesic (of marriage and the family), the artistic, those relative to beliefs, the moral, the juridic, and the political. It is plain enough, without involving ourselves in this author's balancings and cross-classifications, that the first of these categories contains the bulk of societal phenomena that submit to ready and conclusive verification. Sumner classified the activities of society in a less meticulous manner into societal self-maintenance, self-perpetuation, and self-gratification, adding to these the mental and social reactions out of which come the religious and regulative systems. It is plain that the least derived of the mores corresponding to this classification are those which have to do with societal self-maintenance — the struggle for existence against nature and fellow-man, and for a standard of living — the most concrete and material activity of society. If then we were to call the institutions of societal self-maintenance the primary societal forms, those of marriage, the family, religion, etc., might be termed the secondary societal forms. . . .

For, to return to our basic proposition, it is in the field of the mores of societal self-maintenance that testing and verification are most direct and inevitable. It is conceivable that society could live on for a long time under almost any religious form or marriage-system, without seeing it subjected to some visible and conclusive test. But this is not so when we have to do with the institutions crystallized out of the mores of societal self-maintenance. If the mores lead to such ill success in the struggle for existence that the group in question is weakened in numbers or vitality, annihilation or subjugation is at hand. And when man has developed the power of criticism of his own

collective course, there is nothing that will provoke in him distrust of that course more speedily than economic distress. It is upon this criterion that ministries rise and fall and policies are adopted or rejected.

It is in this field that the inadequacy of means to effect ends is most easily perceived, because the relation between means and ends is an immediate, concrete, and striking one. Hence it is here that rational selection of the mores is strongest. It is only on a primitive, irrational stage that the self-maintenance mores are allowed to check advance in the pursuit of a higher standard of living—to insist that the tree shall be felled with a shell axe rather than one of steel. Only under societal isolation, as is shown by the actual cases, could such a taboo persist in the mores. Adherence to the harmful mores becomes, even to the less developed intelligence, inexpedient; for it is plainly contrary to the most concrete and unmistakable of interests. You can persuade a savage of the inadequacy of his stone hatchet long before he can be made to see that his family system is capable of being superseded by one yielding better satisfaction to his interests.

Exercises

1. Did Ward regard sociology as the study of social products or of social processes?
2. What is achievement, according to Ward?
3. What can be said of animals with respect to achievement?
4. Distinguish achievement from its products.
5. Show the relation between achievement, knowledge, and social heredity.
6. Investigate the life of some species of insect or animal, to see if Ward is correct in saying, "The animal achieves nothing."
7. Why does Morgan hold that the evolution of human societies has run in nearly uniform channels?
8. Why did he work out his "Ethnical Periods"?
9. Why did he base them on Inventions?
10. What special reasons are assigned for the selection of pottery as one of these?
11. Does Morgan indicate any single culture that has traversed all these stages in the order given? Can you think of any such example?
12. Are we safe in accepting this evolutionary series as authentic so long as the several stages have to be pieced together from widely separate times and places?

13. If not reliable in detail, what may be said for its value as a rough outline of the general trend of social evolution?
14. Memorize Tylor's definition of culture, as quoted by Lowie.
15. Explain the Latin phrase, "All culture from culture."
16. State Lowie's argument against the notion that any historical laws of social evolution have been discovered.
17. What is meant by "uniformities independent of the time factor and veritably inherent in the essence of social existence." Does this apply to Morgan's ethnical periods?
18. Following Lowie, show how the phenomenon of culture borrowing, or diffusion, invalidates the belief in a general course of social evolution.
19. Distinguish the primary and secondary societal forms, as defined by Keller, and show how and why the former act as the main-spring of social evolution.

Additional References

1. Goldenweiser, A. A.: *Early Civilization*. Presents (pp. 20-27) a striking criticism (with valuable diagram) of the evolutionist method of treating social facts.

PART TWO
SOCIAL ORIGINS

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ORIGINS

THE phrase "social origins" is capable of two interpretations, although they are seldom, if ever, distinguished. One of these is essentially *historical*. It inquires after the *beginnings* of social customs and institutions and tries to state their origins more or less definitely, in terms of time and place. In this it necessarily seeks the aid of archaeology, anthropology, and culture-history, or ethnology. For example, when studying social origins in this sense we try to show how the plow, wheel-carriage, and potter's wheel actually originated and spread over the earth; or we describe the rough stone (Palaeolithic) culture among the Neanderthal race of the late glacial period in Europe, or picture the polished stone (Neolithic) culture of the Swiss lake-dwellers about 10,000 B.C., and so on.

Slightly different in emphasis but essentially the same with respect to its objective, historical character, is the further question of the successive *stages of culture*, in so far as these can be definitely located in time or place, or arranged in any definite order of succession. But as already shown in the selections of Part I, modern ethnologists are inclined to abandon and discountenance the effort to construct schemes of evolutionary steps or stages which human culture in general is supposed to follow, and prefer to study intensively the culture of particular social groups. But whether stated in general or specific terms this way of procedure illustrates social origins in the sense we are here defining. It will be seen applied in those chapters below that deal with the Origins and Dispersion of Races, and the Stages of Culture.

A slight modification of this same viewpoint is seen in those discussions where the social activities of some particular human group are described as actually found, at a given time, without any reference to historical sequence; as in our chapter on Inventions and Discoveries of Primitive Peoples or that on Primitive Economic Institutions.

In its other signification the study of social origins is *psychological*. As such it pays no attention to considerations of time and place, which are essentially historical in nature, but attempts to explain cultural phenomena in terms of the mental and social elements out of which they arise in all ages, and in every place where human beings live together in a common group life. The concern of the student of social origins in this psychological sense is to show *how* social things take place rather than to *tell where* and *when* they ever happened. From this point of view social facts have their origin perpetually in the conditions of group-life wherever it exists. Whereas the investi-

gator in the former case seeks for *beginnings*, the student of social origins in this sense delves for *roots*.

This psychological point of view will be taken in those chapters below that deal with Primitive Social Organization, the Foundations of Government and Law, and the Social Roots of Religion.

As intimated in the opening sentence above, these two meanings of "social origins" are usually present in the term as currently used. They are seldom, if ever, completely separated in practice, and will be found blended in many of the chapters, and individual selections, presented below.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STAGES OF CULTURE

IN Chapter IV it was shown that mankind as a whole does not, as formerly supposed, pass through one and the same evolutionary series in a definitely fixed order. Yet this does not cancel the fact that certain stages can be distinguished, nor even that they represent in a large, rough way successive levels of social evolution. Such series have been worked out for the forms of the family, the systems of religion, and even the types of government, but the culture-complex usually used as the basis lies in the field of technology, and has to do with the kind of material mainly used for weapons and tools, whether stone or metal.

The terminology now generally accepted was proposed in 1865, by Sir John Lubbock, afterward Lord Avebury.

1. Lubbock's Four Epochs¹

From the careful study of the remains which have come down to us, it would appear that Pre-historic Archaeology may be divided into four great epochs.

I. That of the Drift; when man shared the possession of Europe with the Mammoth, the Cave bear, the Woolly-haired rhinoceros, and other extinct animals. This I have proposed to call the "Palaeolithic" period.

II. The later or polished Stone Age; a period characterized by beautiful weapons and instruments made of flint and other kinds of stone; in which, however, we find no trace of the knowledge of any metal, excepting gold, which seems to have been sometimes used for ornaments. For this period I have suggested the term "Neolithic."

III. The Bronze Age, in which bronze was used for arms and cutting instruments of all kinds.

IV. The Iron Age, in which that metal had superseded bronze for arms, axes, knives, etc.; bronze, however, still being in common use

¹ From *Pre-Historic Times. As Illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages*, by The Late Right Honorable Lord Avebury; pp. 2-4. Seventh Edition. (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1913. Reprinted by permission.)

for ornaments, and frequently also for the *handles* of swords and other arms, though never for the blades.

Stone weapons, however, of many kinds were still in use during the Age of Bronze, and lingered on even into that of Iron, so that the mere presence of a few stone implements is not in itself sufficient evidence that any given "find" belongs to the Stone Age. In order to prevent misapprehension, it may also be well to state, at once, that, for the present, I only apply this classification to Europe, though, in all probability, it might be extended also to the neighboring regions of Asia and Africa. The civilization of the south of Europe, moreover, preceded that of northern Europe. As regards other civilized countries, China and Japan for instance, we, as yet, know but little of their pre-historic archaeology, though recent researches have gone far to prove that the use of iron was there also preceded by bronze, and bronze by stone. Some nations, indeed, such as the Fuegians, Andamaners, etc., are even now, or were very lately, in an Age of Stone.

It is probable that gold was the metal which first attracted the attention of man; it is found in many rivers, and by its bright color would certainly strike even the rudest savages, who are known to be very fond of personal decoration. Silver does not appear to have been discovered until long after gold, and was apparently preceded by both copper and tin; for it rarely, if ever, occurs in tumuli of the Bronze Age; but however this may be, copper seems to have been the metal which first became of real importance to Man; no doubt owing to the fact that its ores are abundant in many countries, and can be smelted without difficulty; and that, while iron is hardly ever found except in the form of ore, copper often occurs in a native condition, and can be beaten at once into shape. Thus, for instance, the North American Indians obtained pure copper from the mines near Lake Superior and elsewhere, and hammered it at once into axes, bracelets, and other objects.

Tin also early attracted notice, probably on account of its great heaviness. When metals were very scarce, it would naturally sometimes happen that, in order to make up the necessary quantity, some tin would be added to copper, or *vice versa*. It would then be found that the properties of the alloy were quite different from those of either metal, and a very few experiments would determine the most advantageous proportion, which for axes and other cutting instruments is about nine parts of copper to one of tin. No implements or weapons

of tin have yet been found, and those of copper are extremely rare, in Western Europe, whence it has been inferred that the art of making bronze was known elsewhere before the use of either copper or tin was introduced into Europe. Many of the so-called "copper" axes, etc., contain a small proportion of tin; and the few exceptions indicate probably a mere temporary want, rather than a total ignorance, of this metal.

The ores of iron, though more abundant, are much less striking in appearance than those of copper. Moreover, though they are perhaps more easily reduced, the metal, when obtained, is much less tractable than bronze. This valuable alloy can very easily be cast, and, in fact, all the weapons and implements made of it in olden times were cast in moulds of sand or stone. The art of casting iron, on the other hand, was unknown until a comparatively late period.

The following discussion on the resemblance between the modern Tasmanians and the men of the Old Stone Age, by the distinguished English anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, will serve to emphasize the fact that the so-called "ages" of culture are really *stages*, which exist side by side in various parts of the world. The Tasmanians were the most primitive race found in modern times. They were exterminated by their wars and associations with English settlers, becoming extinct in 1876.

2. On the Tasmanians as Representatives of Palaeolithic Man²

In the accounts of early visits to Tasmania, we have little more than mentions of the chief uses to which the natives put their stone implements. Tasman, on the first discovery in 1642, without seeing any of the people, judged that the notches for climbing the great trees were cut with flints. In 1772, Marion du Fresne saw natives armed with pointed staves, and with stones which appeared to have cutting edges like axe-heads. Furneaux supposed the spears to be sharpened with a shell or stone, and later, Widowson states that they harden one end, which is very sharply pointed, by burning and filing it with a flint prepared for the purpose. These remarks, however, do not show how the native stone implements of Tasmania differed from those of Australia and Polynesia. About 1860 a Tasmanian stone

² By Edward B. Tylor, Esq., D.C.L., F.R.S., in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*; vol. XXIII, pp. 441-152. (A paper read March, 1893. Reprinted by permission.)

implement was brought to England by Mr. Thomas Dawson, who presented it to the Museum of the Somerset Archaeological Society at Taunton. As appears from the cast exhibited it is formed from a flaked-off fragment, dressed by chipping to a rough surface before being struck off the block, and then finished by a series of blows struck round the inner surface so as to remove a succession of small chips from the outer, leaving a cutting edge. The sight of this instrument led me to make inquiry at the International Exhibition of 1862 in London, from Dr. Milligan, Commissioner for Tasmania, the best authority on the language and habits of the natives. From him I learned that the Tasmanian women carried a quoit-like stone, 4 to 6 inches across, chipped about two-thirds round the edge, for notch-climbing trees; women would carry good ones. From these and other particulars obtained at the same time, I wrote as follows in 1865 in *Early History of Mankind*, arguing that comparison of Drift implements with those found elsewhere breaks down any imaginary line of severance between the men of the Drift and the rest of the human species. "The Tasmanians sometimes used for cutting or notching wood a very rude instrument. Eye-witnesses describe how they would pick up a suitable flat stone, knock off chips from one side, partly or all round the edge, and use it without more ado; and there is a specimen corresponding exactly to this description in the Taunton Museum. An implement found in the Drift near Clermont would seem to be much like this." These details are here given at length, as apparently the earliest mentions of a subject materially affecting the history of the Stone Age, namely, the persistence among these modern savages of a state of stone implement making comparable to that of mankind in their remotest acknowledged antiquity. . . .

The conclusion recorded by the Royal Society of Tasmania as to the make of the implements is that no true tomahawks (*i.e.*, stone hatchets with handles) were known to or fabricated by the natives. They merely used sharp-edged stones as knives. These were made sharp, not by grinding or polishing, but by striking off flakes by another stone till the required edge was obtained. . . .

Although some specimens are seen to be trimmed by rather fine chipping, there is no record of the small chips ever being flaked off by pressure, but only by blows with a stone. It is probable that this was the only method used, as when Mr. James Scott mentions seeing natives sitting for an hour at a time, chipping one flint with another,

so as to give them the peculiar cutting sharp edges. Sharp fragments merely struck off the block of stone are common; often these appear to be wasters, but such sharp-edged flakes being suitable for many purposes, were certainly used without further trimming. . . .

There are statements of experienced observers that the implements were grasped in the hand for use, never mounted on handles. The information of Mr. Thomas Scott, Assistant Surveyor-General, who was in the Colony from 1820, is that he never learnt that the aborigines used the flint implements as tomahawks, but invariably held them in their hands with the thumb resting on the flat surface, and turning the stone as found convenient to get the cutting edges where required. Mr. Ronald Gunn, F. R. S., states that "those resembling tomahawks were held in the hand, and under no circumstances, so far as I know or can learn, were they ever fixed in any handle." The present specimens and all others known to me by description agree with these opinions. Care seems to have been taken so to shape them that they might rest conveniently in the hand for use. . . .

Dr. Agnew was told by some correspondents that in addition to the implements described, the natives made use of others after the manner of axes, that is, they fastened to them handles in the shape of withes, bound round with the tendons of some animal. One of these letters is from Mr. James Rollings, who in his youth (1840?) had mixed with the natives and had many opportunities of seeing how they used their stone knives and tomahawks. After describing the ordinary implements grasped in the hand, he continues: "A larger stone, well selected, about four or five pounds in weight, was used for a tomahawk, a handle being fastened to it in the same way as a blacksmith fastens a rod to chisels, etc., for cutting or punching iron, being afterwards well secured by the sinews of some animal. The handles were strong saplings of wattle or curryjong. These were the only stone implements he saw used among the natives, and very expert they were in using them." Dr. Agnew gives the general opinion of those who have examined the subject when he says: "Other observers think our aborigines did not originally use these handles, but learned how to attach them from some New South Wales aborigines who came to this country in the early days of its settlement." To me this seems the most probable explanation. Such intercourse with Australian natives certainly took place, and may have introduced the Australian stone hatchet, but had anything like this been previously in the hands

of the Tasmanians, we should expect to find specimens not merely of chipped stones, suited for hand grasping, but also of hatchet-blades made for fixing in a handle, and even polished after the native Australian manner. None such, however, have as yet appeared. It may be noticed that the statement as to stone hatchet-blades of the great weight of four or five pounds does not agree with the ordinary size of such implements either in Australia or Tasmania.

The question which suggests itself on first inspection of this collection of Tasmanian implements, is how with such poor tools even the rude native crafts could be carried on. It must be noticed, however, that they are for practical purposes somewhat better than they look, being indeed made with great care and skill in getting the edges straight and the grip firm. Fortunately also there are a few passages which show how they were actually used. It seems wonderful that with one of the disc-shaped notching-stones the natives should so quickly have made the notches for climbing the gum-trees, till we notice Mr. Thirkell's remark that they would "chip the bark downwards and make a notch for the big toe," which shows that they did not hack out a piece of the bark, but merely split it in the direction of the fibre, forcing the cut open with the toe till it could rest there. The following remark by Mr. Rollings shows how cutting was done. "The knives when used for skinning kangaroos, etc., were held by the fore-finger and thumb, and the arm, being extended, was drawn rapidly toward the body. The carcass was afterwards cut up, and the knife was held in the same way. In cutting their hair, one stone was held under the hair, another stone being used above, and by this means the hair was cut, or rather, by repeated nickings, came off."

From the foregoing evidence it appears that the Tasmanians, up to the time of the British colonization in the present century, habitually used stone implements shaped and edged by chipping, not ground or polished. These belong, notwithstanding their modern date, to the order of the very ancient "palaeolithic" implements of the Drift and Cave Periods, from which the later implements of the "neolithic" order are distinguished by greater variety of form and skill of finish, and especially by the presence of grinding and polishing. . . .

The apparent ignorance of the Tasmanians of the art of fixing a stone implement in a handle, unless where natives of Australia had introduced among them their own mode of fitting, raises an interesting question as to hafting among the paleolithic men of Europe.

Of the stone implements of the Drift and Caves, many are evidently made from stones chosen to fit the hand, or shaped with a view to grasping, while no certain evidence proves them to have been ever fixed in the wooden handles so certainly familiar in neolithic times. It is apt to be assumed that the Drift flint picks were stuck into clubs, bound in withes, or otherwise hafted, but this opinion seems generally due to an unwillingness to conceive even of most ancient savages as wanting the ingenuity to realize the advantage of an axe-handle. The force of this assumption is, however, lessened by the descriptions of the modern Tasmanians as not conscious of this want, but being content to grasp their rudely chipped cutting stones in their hands. It being indubitable that hand-grasped stone implements were used by these rude modern people for purposes for which, had they known of handles, they could easily and would certainly have had recourse to them, it results that we have no right to assume the wooden haft to have belonged to the earliest Stone Age, but are obliged to allow that it may have been invented at a later period of industrial development.

Of degeneration in culture as accounting for the low state of implement-making in Tasmania, there is at present no evidence, nor is it easy to imagine their rude tools as the successors of higher ancestral forms. Had they had even the hatchet of their Australian neighbors, sharpened by rubbing its edge on a grit-stone, and bound into a withe or cemented to a stick, it is hardly conceivable that they should have abandoned such a tool for a rudely-sharpened cutting stone gripped in the hand; they would have lost more time and pains in the first day than would have sufficed to replace the better implement. Such carelessness would not indeed agree with the careful and patient skill which they, like other savages, gave to finishing their rude implements to the most serviceable point, in which they would spend hours and even days, regardless of trouble. The well-known readiness with which they took to European tools, shows an appreciation of labour-saving which contrasts strongly with the idea that at any time, possessing ground stone hatchets with handles, they abandoned them for chipped stones grasped in the hand. It seems more likely to consider that in their remote corner of the globe they may have gone on little changed from early ages, so as to have remained to our day living representatives of the early Stone Age, left behind in industrial development even by the ancient tribes of the Somme and the Ouse.

Such being the position of the Tasmanians as modern tribes in the lowest Stone Age, the study of their culture in other respects affords valuable though imperfect guidance to formation of opinion as to the earliest distinctly recognizable period of human civilization.

This will appear more clearly from the following brief summary of native Tasmanian life, which presents a picture of man at perhaps the lowest intellectual and industrial level found among tribes leading an independent existence, on their own land and after their own manner. It will be observed that their ideas and habits conform in a general way to the characteristics of normal or healthy savagery elsewhere in the world. Their arts, language, religion, social rules, are on the usual lines of the lowest tribes of man, only at simple and rude stages. The point especially to be noticed is that, just as their stone implements belong to the recognized stone age, though at an especially low level, so it is with the rest of their culture, which is not of an abnormal but only of a low and rude type. They have throughout the characters of mankind in a somewhat more primitive condition than any other tribe among those sufficiently known for detailed comparison, in either ancient or modern times.

Though living mainly by the chase, the Tasmanians knew nothing of the bow and arrow, nor of the spear-thrower characteristic of Australia. Their spear was a stick 16 or 18 feet long, scraped with their stone tools, and usually only pointed by the aid of fire, though there is once a mention of a point of human bone fixed on; though crooked and apparently clumsy, these were bent with the teeth so as to balance truly and were skilfully thrown. They had a wooden club or waddy with a roughened grip, for striking and hurling, and they seem to have used stones, apparently their ordinary choppers, in fight, and a flat wooden shield. They had not the Australian bark canoe, but a canoe-shaped solid float of bundles of bark on which they sat or stood, paddling or punting with a pole. They were string, net, and basket-makers; made fire with the simple fire-drill, and roasted their fish and game; put up such rude shelters of boughs as met the needs of their life of wandering in quest of food. Intellectually they showed no mean power when the inducement sufficed; in hunting and tracking their skill was a wonder to the white men, and in war the patient cunning of their pursuit and ambush made them, in spite of their miserable weapons, a terror. They drew pictures on bark, etc., which seem from descriptions to have shown ordinary savage

skill; one copied by Bonwick might have been done by native Americans. In no respect is the superiority of the European cave-men to them more striking than in their drawing and carving, which the Tasmanians had no pretension to rival.

The following remarks fairly sum up their mental position: "Their intellectual character is low; yet not so inferior as often described. They appeared stupid, when addressed on subjects which had no relation to their mode of life; but they were quick and cunning within their own sphere." Morally, the descriptions of their character present the usual contrasts of savage life; the mother would rush through the fire to save her child, the son would abandon his sick or aged parent under a ledge of rock or in a hollow tree. On the one hand we read of their peaceful and inoffensive kindness, on the other hand of their treachery and relentless cruelty. One colonist never finds it necessary to carry fire-arms to protect himself, while another after carrying his gun for days, lays it down for a moment, and instantly from behind a tree the spear of an unseen black reaches him, one of a party who break out of their hiding places to set fire to the house and kill the women and children. But this contrast of behavior, under different conditions, only illustrates in an extreme form the law which guides ourselves in our different conduct toward friend and enemy. Perhaps no people ever had more rudimentary rules of law and government than these savages, with no property in land, but waging war to the death against the trespasser in pursuit of game; with hardly any government over the wandering clan except the undefined authority of "the bully of the tribe," and yet as soon as war broke out following with absolute obedience the chosen war chief.

Taken as a whole, this may be the rudest picture known of the condition of a savage people leading a healthy normal life, getting their living from nature. It has no small importance in the light it throws on the problem of civilization. A people isolated from interference from without, and in harmony within with their "milieu environment," to use the term of Lamarck, so that circumstances to no great extent compel improvement or bring on decay, may, it seems, remain comparatively unchanged in their level of culture, even from remote prehistoric ages, just as mollusca of species first appearing far back in the earlier formations may continue to live and thrive in modern seas.

Of the Tasmanian language, the details which have come down, incomplete as they are, are sufficient to show an agglutinating language of simple structure, but not extraordinary lowness. . . .

. . . as a whole, the Tasmanian religion was a rude animism, based on the same fundamental principles as the religions of the lower races elsewhere in the world, and even carried out in great measure in similar developments.

In conclusion, the effect of the present evidence may be stated as confirming and extending the argument, familiar on neolithic ground, that the condition of modern savages illustrates the condition of ancient stone age peoples, representatives of a stage of culture at once early in date and low in degree. The Tasmanian specimens and records now place us in full view of the state of a people in the palaeolithic stage, who may have lasted on in their remote and unvisited home from the distant ages when rudely chipped stones grasped in the hand were still the best implements of mankind, to be only in future ages superseded by higher types with their sharp-ground edges and effective helvcs. The life of these savages proves to be of undeveloped type alike in arts and institutions, so much so that the distinction of being the lowest of normal tribes may be claimed for them. Still, though the difference between them and even their Australian neighbors is enough to mark lowness of stage, it by no means amounts to an immeasurable interval. Their palaeolithic state does accompany a corresponding lowness of general condition, as compared with that of modern neolithic savages. But the passage from neolithic to palaeolithic only carries us back a stage. The great initial developments of language, arts, religion, society, still remain in the remote background of human development.

Exercises

1. Distinguish the two meanings of the phrase "social origins."
2. Which sense applies to the study of the stages of culture? to the description of specific cultures now existing (*i.e.*, ethnography)?
3. What importance do modern scholars attach to the idea that all mankind traverse the same series of culture stages?
4. Does this mean that no successive levels appear in social evolution?
5. Characterize the four culture stages first distinguished by Lord Avebury.

6. What does Avebury say with respect to the exactness and application of the term "Stone Age"?
7. Which metal first became important to man? Why?
8. How did bronze originate?
9. How was the Tasmanian flint axe made? How and for what was it used?
10. Do you agree with Tylor's argument that they could not have lost the art of supplying their axes with handles? (See Ref. 2, below.)
11. What weight does Tylor allow to degeneration of culture in this matter? to culture contacts?
12. What is Tylor's conclusion concerning the culture stage attained by the Tasmanians? What light does this throw on prehistoric man?
13. In what respect does he find the Tasmanians similar to all the rest of mankind? In what respect were they different? (See Ref. 4, below.)
14. What is said of the mental power of the Tasmanians?
15. What general conclusion concerning the cultural evolution of man results from this study of Tylor's?

Additional References

1. Bonwick, Rev. James: *The Lost Tasmanian Race*. A vivid and detailed account of the discovery, mode of life, and extermination of the Tasmanian people.
2. Lowie, Robert H.: *Culture and Ethnology*. Chap. III. throws light on the question of lost arts or culture traits.
3. Myres, J. L.: *The Dawn of History*. The Introduction and first two chapters discuss the progress or stagnation of primitive peoples in terms of their adjustment to environment. Bears especially on the last paragraph of Tylor's article.
4. Wissler, Clark: *Man and Culture*. Ch. V., "The Universal Pattern," describes the fundamental culture elements common to all humanity.

CHAPTER IX

THE STAGES OF CULTURE (*Concluded*)

1. Origins of the Copper and Bronze Technique¹

ONE of the most important steps in human progress is marked by the introduction of metal. Apart from the invention of fire-making, which in the childhood of the race helped to raise man above the lower animals, there has been no such advance in our material condition until the development of steam and electricity in quite recent years. The enormous period known as the Stone age, which can only be measured by geological time, left man still ignorant of many essential arts of life. Substantial progress there had certainly been, as the scanty relics of that time demonstrate; but it was in many particulars insignificant in comparison with the results achieved since metal superseded stone some 5,000 or 6,000 years ago. The earliest efforts of the worker in metal, which made such rapid progress possible, are therefore of transcendent importance in the history of civilization.

The period from the beginning of metallurgy down to the dawn of recorded history is commonly divided into two parts, named after the metals which successively occupied the most prominent place in human industry: an earlier or "Bronze Age," and a later age of Iron. These terms are so convenient that they have passed into general use, but it must be remembered that no two prehistoric periods can be separated by a hard and fast line. As stated in the preface to the *Guide to the Antiquities of the Stone Age*, the words do not denote divisions of time, but stages of human culture which gradually supersede each other and are not uniform in all parts of the world. . . .

The very use of the term Bronze age may appear to beg a serious question, for though bronze was undoubtedly the most important metal employed in the early period, it was probably not the first to

¹ From the introduction to *A Guide to the Antiquities of the Bronze Age, in the Department of British and Medieval Antiquities, British Museum*; pp. 1-12; 23-26. Printed by order of the trustees. (Oxford University Press, 1904.)

be fashioned into an implement or a weapon. There are two other metals, copper and iron, in favor of which a claim for priority has been put forward, and of their respective claims a few words must necessarily be said. Metallurgists have pointed out that there is no reason in the nature of things why *iron* should not have first attracted some inventive genius at the close of the neolithic age. Its ores are more abundant and more easily reduced than any others, while in its meteoric form it requires no reduction at all. In this form it has within the memory of man been fashioned into implements by the Eskimo of Greenland, probably without any suggestion or aid from foreign peoples; and it is reasonable to inquire whether it may not have occurred in a similar way and been similarly used in other parts of the world at a very remote epoch. It has been suggested, for example, that the use of iron might have been easily discovered by the accidental reduction of a rich piece of ore on the domestic hearth, and the way thus opened to an experimental repetition of the process. It should further be remembered that iron may have been known in Egypt almost, if not quite, as early as bronze; that is to say, as early as the fourth and sixth dynasties. . . . The word for iron occurs in the Pyramid texts of Unas, and in the paintings of the time of the Ancient Empire weapons and tools are painted blue or black, the hues in which this metal is always represented. Iron plays a prominent part in ancient Egyptian myths, the firmament of heaven being described as a rectangular iron plate; and its Egyptian name is *báa-en-pet*, "metal of heaven," evidently in allusion to the meteoric form in which it may first have been known. The Chinese too are thought to have been acquainted with iron at least as early as 1000 B.C., and probably even earlier, the province of Shan Si having certainly been productive of the metal since very remote times. But reasonable as such arguments in favor of the priority of iron may appear in themselves, there is one thing wanting to their serious consideration: they are not often borne out by archaeological discovery. We know that when men have once become acquainted with the harder metal, they soon cease to make their weapons of the softer; the fact is proved beyond controversy by finds of the transition period at the close of the Bronze age, when the bronze sword or dagger is superseded by that of iron, bronze being retained only for ceremonial or ornamental purposes. It is most unlikely that if iron had been used before any other metal, it should have fallen into disuse in any

place where its ores could readily be obtained; or that men once acquainted with its superior merit should have continued to manufacture weapons of a metal inferior in offensive power. This consideration disposes of the argument that primeval iron weapons may once have existed but have now rusted away; for it is not to be supposed that the long series of bronze weapons which we now possess would ever have been made if all the time iron had lain ready to the hands of their makers. It is equally difficult to believe that iron weapons deposited with the dead should have disappeared so completely as to have left in no single instance even a trace of discoloration upon the surrounding objects. The following remarks of Sir John Evans, which have a direct bearing upon this subject, may fitly be quoted here: "When barrow after barrow is opened, and weapons of bronze and stone only are found accompanying the interments, and not a trace of iron or steel; when hoards of rough metal and broken bronze, together with the moulds of the bronze-founder and some of his stock-in-trade, are disinterred, and there is no trace of an iron tool among them—the presumption is strong that at the time when these men and these hoards were buried, iron was not in use. When, moreover, by a careful examination of the forms of bronze instruments we can trace a certain amount of development which is in keeping with the peculiar properties of bronze, and not with those of iron, and we can thus to some extent fix a kind of chronological succession in these forms, the inference is that this evolution of form, which must have required a considerable amount of time, took place without its course being affected by any introduction of a fresh and qualifying influence in the shape of iron tools and weapons. When, however, in various countries we find interments and even cemeteries in which bronze and iron weapons and instruments are intermingled, and the forms of those in bronze are what we have learned from other sources to regard as the latest, while the forms in iron are not those for which that metal is best adapted, but are almost servile copies of the bronze instruments found with them, the proof of the one having succeeded the other is almost absolutely conclusive."

The same authority points out that at Hallstatt and other places in which graves have been examined belonging to the transitional period, when both iron and bronze were in use together, the weapons and tools of iron, though oxidized, still retain their form and character as completely as those in bronze. This fact affords strong ground for

believing that had iron been present with bronze in other early interments, it would also have been preserved. Arguments like these are incontrovertible in the case of most countries where prehistoric implements have been found, but in such regions as north-eastern Africa there is still perhaps room for doubt. Evidence in favor of the extreme antiquity of iron in Egypt has already been given, and it must not be forgotten that Africa, which as a continent never had a Bronze age, was possessed of abundant ores from which good malleable iron could be extracted by processes far simpler than those required for the manufacture of bronze. The district west of the Upper Nile is very rich in iron, and Professor Gowland has shown that the furnace used in modern times in Kordofan has close analogies with one represented on a tomb bearing the name of Thotmes III (about 1530 B.C.) and with those employed by the Etruscans and other peoples of Southern Europe west of the Apennines. The metallurgy of iron in this part of Africa was evidently both an ancient and a vigorous art, and its origins may be more remote than is usually suspected.

Iron may, however, be fairly eliminated from the general inquiry: there remain copper and bronze, the former a simple metal, the latter an alloy of copper and tin. In Alaska, about the Coppermine River, and on the shores of Lake Superior in North America, and in parts of Central Africa, ores containing copper in the metallic state were made by the natives into knives and spearheads before the advent of the European invader, and some of the American tribes thus passed from the exclusive use of stone to the knowledge of copper simply by the exercise of their own inventive faculty. If the Red Indian was able to make this advance, why, it may be asked, should not prehistoric man have done the same in Europe? But the North American copper ores contained nodules and large masses of copper as metal, and were treated by the Indians as if they had been stone, being hammered into shape without exposure to heat: the Indians were thus merely users of metal and in no sense metallurgists. On the other hand, the prehistoric inhabitants of the Old World melted their copper before they fashioned it; at any rate all the copper implements known to science have certainly been produced by casting, which presupposes a more significant advance in human knowledge, and one much more difficult to explain, involving as it does the introduction of completely new methods and the employment of fire. In some localities where oxidized copper ores (cuprite or malachite) occur in ad-

mixture with tin ore (cassiterite), a true bronze may have been made contemporaneously with, or even earlier than, the pure metal; and the alloy, at first due to accident, may have been almost immediately reproduced of set purpose. For the primitive mind is not unobservant, and if many of the uncivilized tribes of the modern world are capable of the like simple experimental processes, there is no reason why prehistoric man should not have given proof of similar aptitude. But it is probable that in most localities copper was really the first metal of which implements were made, and, being far more widely distributed than tin (the second constituent of bronze), is more likely to have attracted man's notice first, especially in the form of oxides and carbonates, which are surface ores. There are still great numbers of primitive metal implements which have not been chemically analyzed, and the material available for a scientific generalization is very incomplete; but the evidence so far as it goes is against a *universal* stage of culture characterized by the sole use of copper. Such a stage is not proved, for instance, in Britain, though certain indications seem to point in that direction. The fact that the most primitive forms frequently prove to be made of copper, though favorable to the theory of a Copper age, is not in itself conclusive; for, as the opponents of the theory have pointed out, copper can only be successfully cast in flat moulds open to the air, and if it is poured into double or closed moulds it produces unsatisfactory results. Even if all the known implements of primitive form proved to be of copper, this might still only show that tin was for some reason temporarily unobtainable, and that casters who were perfectly well able to produce forms of a more elaborate description, fell back on the forms of primitive appearance because these were alone suited to the metal actually at their disposal. Really effective evidence in favor of a general phase of culture based on the exclusive employment of copper, though it may confirm the argument from form, must be independent of it, and such independence can only be claimed in certain definite regions such as the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. Over this area the occurrence of copper in deposits unquestionably older than the first appearance of bronze, is too frequent to be accounted for on the supposition of a temporary failure of tin; and though the conditions were not quite the same in Europe, the analysis of various specimens has shown that a similar state of affairs may have existed in some parts of our own continent. In many districts of Europe,

indeed, such as North Italy and Hungary, analysis is in favor of a primitive copper culture, while in Ireland the results as yet obtained seem to tell the same tale. The presence of a small percentage of tin — anything from 0.5 to 1 or even 2 per cent. — need not imply an intentional addition, because the impure ores from which the implements were made have been shown to contain the same admixture: the tin was in these cases not added by man with the object of hardening the metal, and consequently the implements are copper, and not a poor quality of bronze. Such natural admixtures are most frequent, and offer the highest percentage of tin, in areas where tin ores also occur; but they are also found in districts where tin ore has never yet been found, for instance at Campos and Parazuelos in south-eastern Spain. The same remarks apply to arsenic and antimony, which are also common impurities of copper ore and have a like hardening effect. Mr. George Coffey, in discussing the composition of primitive Irish celts, has fairly argued that "only when it has been shown that the local ores, from which it may be presumed that the copper was obtained, are free from tin, does it seem allowable to argue that the tin has been added, and even then the possibility that the copper or implements were imported has to be considered." In some cases, for example in Babylonia, the evidence for the priority of copper may be described as stratigraphical, and is in no way dependent upon primitive appearance.

If then we assume that copper preceded bronze in many parts of the world, we may suppose that progress was effected very much on the following lines. In a favored district, or possibly in more than one place about the same time, a simple process of moulding molten copper as a substitute for stone may have been suggested by an accident, such as the partial melting of a piece of surface ore on the hearth. The new material was found convenient for several reasons, notably because it was not brittle, and because a number of implements could be made with rapidity from a single mould. But in many respects it proved inferior to the stone which preceded it, for if the ore was pure it was extremely soft, and its cutting edge was easily dulled; it became necessary therefore to find some means of hardening the metal. Probably by experiment the inhabitants of some region in which not only copper but also tin occurred, discovered that copper could be most effectively hardened by the addition of tin. They would transmit the alloy to their neighbors; and by degrees,

following the great lines of commerce and intercourse, first its use and ultimately its manufacture would become known to almost all the peoples of the ancient world. Those who had already experimented with copper would immediately adopt the superior alloy; those who were still in the neolithic stage would pass without transition to the use of bronze. It cannot be affirmed as a universal rule that the proportion of tin alloy in the early bronzes only reached the ratio of about 10 per cent. by a slow and gradual advance. It is indeed a plausible theory that the most ancient specimens are the poorest in tin, and that as this metal grew more plentiful the alloy became richer by degrees, but there are facts which tell in the opposite direction. In the second city of Hissarlik, for instance, which preceded the Homeric city of Troy by about a thousand years, a bronze very rich in tin makes its appearance suddenly, without having been preceded by poorer alloys. In concluding these remarks upon the order in which metals were used, we may draw attention to some of the literary evidence proving that the ancient traditions as to the sequence of prehistoric ages have often been confirmed by modern archaeology. Hesiod, in his *Works and Days*, speaks of a time when men wrought in bronze, but when "dark iron was unknown." And Lucretius in the fifth book of his poem on the *Nature of the Universe* gives a graphic picture of primitive life, towards the close of which occurs the distinct statement that iron (*ferrum*) was discovered later than *aes* (copper?). Again, Aeschylus in his tragedy of the *Seven against Thebes* alludes to iron as the "stranger from across the sea," "the new-comer from the Scythians," and "the Chalybian stranger," the two last expressions pointing to the eastern shores of the Black Sea as one of the sources from which the Greeks obtained their iron. Here under the shadow of the Caucasus and not far from the Scythian steppes lived the Chalybes, one of the great iron-working peoples of the Old World, whose name has been transmitted through the adjective "chalybeate" to the modern languages of Europe. These allusions of Aeschylus point to a time when iron was still regarded somewhat as an intruder, and illustrate the superstitious feeling of almost all peoples who have passed from one stage of culture into another. Compared with the newer metal, the old has a prestige and sanctity attaching to it, as having been associated from ancient times with the gods and heroes of their race. Allusion has been made to a similar feeling in favor of stone in the *Stone Age Guide*, where instances were

mentioned of stone knives being still used for ceremonial purposes long after the knowledge of bronze had become general. We find the same veneration for the implement of older times in the later period when bronze had in its turn been superseded by iron. In ancient Rome the priest of Jupiter might shave his beard only with a bronze knife, and it was an ancient usage that the site of a new town might only be ploughed round with a ploughshare made of bronze. The same feeling is expressed in the Book of Deuteronomy (XXVII. 5): "And there thou shalt build an altar to the Lord thy God, an altar of stones: thou shalt not lift up any iron upon them." Folklore tells a constant tale of the fear with which iron was everywhere regarded as something new and uncanny by the conservative sentiment of the countryside, a fear engendering a feeling of awe for the smiths and founders who were able to bend the formidable substance to their will. To the smiths mysterious powers were generally assigned, and they were often regarded as abnormal or even supernatural beings. Sir Walter Scott in *Kenilworth* has utilized the legend of Wayland Smith, the northern hero of the forge; while Greek and Roman mythology places a metal-worker, Hephaestus or Vulcan, among the gods. His workshops were held to be in the volcanic districts of Sicily and the neighboring islands; and here, in the caverns beneath Etna, the Cyclops forged the armor which Thetis begged for her son Achilles before he sailed for the siege of Troy. Even the representatives of a despised or vanquished people have reaped the advantage of this sentiment if, as has sometimes happened, the dominant race is less skilled in the working of metals.

It now becomes necessary to touch upon another unsolved problem, the origin of the manufacture of bronze. In what part of the world was the alloy first produced? Any answer given to this question must necessarily take into consideration the distribution of tin; for if traces of tin workings exist within easy reach of the most ancient centers of civilization, a way out of the difficulty might be found. At present the piece of bronze for which the highest antiquity is claimed is the rod found at Mèdûm in Egypt, dating from 3700 B.C. Mesopotamia can show a bronze statuette of Gudea (2500 B.C.), and an almost contemporary bronze vase of Ur Gur; and as their manufacture presupposes a considerable metallurgical skill, the first acquaintance of the Chaldaeans with bronze may go back to an even earlier date than that at which the alloy became known to the

Egyptians. But so far as is known, tin was not found within the borders either of Egypt or Babylonia; and the nearest regions rich in metals, even Armenia and the Caucasus, appear to be devoid of stanniferous ores. Tin is said to exist in Asia Minor, and the Greek historian Strabo declares that it was produced in Drangiana, west of the modern Afghanistan, a district partly coinciding with Khorassan, where its presence has been confirmed. It is also found in other parts of Persia, near Asterabad and Tabriz, and the allusion to it in Numbers XXXI as part of the spoils of Midian, suggests that there may even have been mines in north-west Arabia. From such sources as these the tin used in casting the earliest bronze may have been derived, but it must be confessed that we are here in a region of conjecture where probability has to take the place of evidence. In Eastern Asia, beyond the radius of the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, there would seem to be no region likely to have witnessed the discovery nearer than Southern China; for India, which has copper implements of a very primitive type, is poor in tin, her so-called bronze being often really brass; while the Malay peninsula, an extremely rich stanniferous region, does not appear to have been mined in very ancient times. In Southern China copper and tin are found together in abundance under conditions which would give every opportunity for primitive experiment; but here again we have to rest content with a bare statement of possibility, for proofs are not forthcoming. We know nothing of the state of China in the fifth millennium B.C.; yet unless a theory of independent invention in different parts of the world is adopted, it is to this remote period that the first use of bronze in that country must be assigned. If China originated, Mesopotamia and Egypt must have followed, and yet they have produced bronze nearly as early as 4000 B.C. And the difficulty would hardly be lessened if the date of the Mèdûm rod should prove to be a thousand years later than that usually claimed for it, since our knowledge of the fourth millennium in China is no greater than it is of the fifth. The search for the birthplace of bronze in China is therefore barren of positive results, though there is ample room for future discovery in what is, archaeologically speaking, still an unknown land. The East thus affording no certain clue, the possibilities of the West may be briefly examined. Tin is found in Britain, France, north-west Spain, Italy, Germany, Bohemia, and the Balkan Peninsula, mostly within reach of copper ores. Here, however, we

are once more confronted by the difficulty that proofs of the invention are lacking, and that unless we suppose more than one center of discovery, the acceptance of a European claim to priority would imply a knowledge of bronze in the West as early as 4000 B.C., or, if the Mèdûm rod should prove untrustworthy, a thousand years later. But though in after times Egypt drew her supplies of tin from Europe, it would be bold indeed to suppose that she did so even at the more recent of these two dates, and still bolder to maintain that she learned from northern peoples how to make the alloy called bronze. In the present state of our knowledge we are unable to solve these problems, and if the attribution of the discovery to Babylonia is preferred as offering fewest difficulties, it must be regarded as little more than a temporary hypothesis. It is of course conceivable that there may after all have been more than one center of invention; for if such an independent discovery took place in America, as some authorities hold, it might equally well have done so both in Asia and Europe. But there is much to be said against this view; and if the forms of our dolmens and chambered tombs of the neolithic period are of oriental derivation, while Mediterranean influence crossed the Alps and the Danube at almost as early a time, there is certainly a presumption that the art of casting bronze in Europe was equally dependent on the Nearer East. Wherever bronze may have first been made, its obvious superiority over copper and stone caused it to be adopted by all peoples who could procure either the manufactured alloy or the tin which would enable them to produce it for themselves. Its use spread with comparative rapidity from end to end of the ancient world; and as this vast area provided ample room for the development of local types, it is natural to find a number of archaeological provinces, overlapping each other at certain points, but distinguished by marked individual peculiarities. Thus the style of Western Europe differs from that of Scandinavia and North Germany; the lake-dwellings of Central Europe have a common culture; Italy, the Balkan Peninsula and the Danube valley, are more closely related to the countries of the south-eastern Mediterranean; the Islands of the Aegean have more points of contact with Asia Minor, Egypt, and the early civilization of the Nearer East; while the immense area extending from South Russia across the Ural Mountains and the Altai Range is in touch with the Western frontiers of China. Within these provinces there are various subdivisions affected by spe-

cial geographical and cultural conditions, which will be mentioned below in the short introductions to particular countries. In the present place only a few general considerations can be introduced which may help to explain why the Bronze culture often shows markedly different types in districts not very far removed from each other.

It has been stated in the *Stone Age Guide* (p. xii) that there is no sharp line of demarcation between the great prehistoric periods, and that some regions received and developed new inventions far earlier than others. The important step of discarding bronze in favor of iron was taken by some peoples centuries earlier than others, although the distance between their territories may have been only a few hundred miles. The reason for this inequality of culture is to be sought in geographical conditions. Those countries which were situated upon or near the main lines of commerce and intercourse were naturally the first to take advantage of the latest achievements of human ingenuity, while those which lay in remote inaccessible parts of the world were content to continue for a long series of years the use of a material which had already been superseded among their more progressive neighbors. The loss in aggressive power by the more backward peoples through the continued use of a metal inferior to iron for warlike purposes was not without compensating advantages; for as the time during which they used bronze was indefinitely prolonged, they were able to develop the artistic qualities of the metal in a higher degree, and to produce more varied forms with ornamentation of more elaborate design. On the other hand, the bronze implements and weapons discovered in countries where iron was early introduced are in comparison scantier and less decorative, because there was less time for such a prolonged artistic development. Italy, Southern France, and Upper Austria all offer examples of a Bronze culture cut off before it reached full perfection, the former country having always been open to all the civilizing influences of the Mediterranean, while Southern France and Upper Austria, lying as they did on the great trade-routes for tin and amber, were naturally quick to adopt any useful innovation. In all these countries, therefore, bronze antiquities tend to be simpler and less ornate than in regions where the introduction of iron was delayed. Very different were the conditions in Eastern Hungary and Scandinavia. The first region lay away to the east of the amber route from the head of the Adriatic to the Baltic; while the second was the end of the known world, and

was naturally the latest to be affected by southern civilization. The consequence of this comparative isolation was in an artistic sense a happy one, for in these regions the Bronze age is represented by a series of antiquities which for splendor and wealth of ornament have no parallel among the remains of countries otherwise more favorably situated. Sentimental or religious reasons seem also to have intensified the conservatism natural to remote populations, for there is some reason to believe that the inhabitants of the less progressive countries at first adopted a rather hostile attitude to iron, and in their attachment to the more beautiful metal, to which they had been so long accustomed, were disposed to resist the introduction of an unfamiliar substitute.

The principal questions connected with the first appearance of metals in human industry having been thus briefly indicated, it is now desirable that something should be said about the peoples concerned with the early development of metallurgy. To attempt to deal with the ethnology of the whole ancient world at the period when metal-working first became general would be impossible here. The position and movements of the Eastern peoples will therefore be omitted, and the attention of the reader almost exclusively directed to the groups inhabiting those parts of the world with which the British Islands and the adjoining countries are most intimately connected. . . .

Sir John Evans has provisionally divided our Bronze Age into three parts: (1) the period of the Barrows, characterized by primitive forms hardly found apart from burials; (2) the period of the flanged celt and the tanged spear-head, represented by the Arreton Down find; and (3) the period of the bronze hoards, when swords and socketed celts and spear-heads are most conspicuous. To this last period he would assign four or five centuries, and an approximate date is thus reached for the close of the Barrow period, about 900 B.C. This date must be compared with that reached on other grounds by various archaeologists. Dr. Sophus Müller of Copenhagen is of opinion that cremation was not practiced long before the year 1000 B.C., though it appeared earlier in the south of Europe than in the north, and was characteristic of the Aryan peoples. On both points Professor Ridgeway of Cambridge agrees with him, and an interval of a century or two is thus provided for the interments that show contemporary burials by both cremation and inhumation. The former method is

known to have lasted down to the end of the Late Keltic period and into Roman times, while it helps to explain why burials of the later Bronze period are unproductive of metallic objects. It may have been a change of belief as to the spirit-world or economy of the still precious metal that resulted in the abolition of all furniture from Bronze age graves later than the Barrow period; and the large number of cinerary urns discovered and preserved possibly represent the period during which swords and spear-heads of bronze were manufactured and carried by our population.

The elements of that population have already been indicated, but something must be said as to the immediate source of the Bronze culture in these islands. In the description of the cases, forms will be noticed which appear to belong for the most part to certain definite localities abroad, and though such finds are rare in Britain, they throw some light on our early connections with the Continent. Thus, a remarkable dagger from the Thames was either imported from Italy during the *terramara* period or copied later from such a specimen at some point on the trade-routes between the Channel and Italy. Again, the halberts of Ireland are very like those of Spain, which can be approximately dated, while specimens are also found in Italy and North Germany. On other grounds it seems likely that while Ireland derived its earlier bronze or copper forms from the Mediterranean by way of Spain, Britain in the Bronze period was more closely connected with the north of France, which was in its turn supplied to a certain extent from Italy through the passes of the Alps and by sea to Marseilles. A map prepared by the Hon. John Abercromby shows that the "drinking-cup," the earliest well-defined type of Barrow pottery in this country, occurs uniformly on the east coasts of Scotland and North England, though there are clusters also in Derbyshire and Wilts.; and it may be inferred that these vessels were introduced from Scandinavia or the Netherlands by a people scarcely acquainted with metals. Whether these new-comers can be identified with any race of which we find linguistic traces cannot be affirmed, but that they arrived before the Aryans seems the most probable hypothesis. The Aryans, who are credited with the introduction of cremation into Europe, are now thought to have found the art of metal-working already established in certain parts, and to have actually retarded civilization in the districts they appropriated. Such a view would suit the conditions in our islands very well; and if 1000 B.C. be taken as a

central date for the earliest cremation urns in the Barrows, we may assign the "drinking-cups" and those "food-vessels" found with unburnt burials, and frequently with bronze objects, to the pre-Aryan population in part descended from our remoter neolithic ancestors.

As in the foregoing pages mention has been made of a chronological system in connection with prehistoric objects, it may be well to explain in a few words the method by which it has been possible to establish anything like absolute dates for the antiquities of the Bronze age — a method which is principally associated with the name of Professor Oscar Montelius, of Stockholm.

The attempt to assign absolute dates to objects earlier than any historical records is based upon the previous establishment of a *relative* chronology obtained through a classification by sequence of types. It is found that the bronze antiquities of almost any country can be divided into a number of consecutive series in which the development of types of different objects, especially axe-heads and brooches, can be clearly traced. It is further found that the characteristic types of one series are hardly ever associated with those of another, and that the only objects which overlap are those of the end of one series and the beginning of the next: a type of the earliest series, for example, will never be found in the same tomb or deposit with one of the third, or a type of the second with one of the fourth. From this it may be safely inferred that the period covered by each series must have lasted long enough to completely displace the types of that which preceded it, and its duration is therefore assumed to have been not less than about a century and a half, though it may have been longer.

Sometimes, however, the date of a later series can be exactly determined, because the objects which compose it occur with types also found in Central Europe and Italy, and these in their turn come into relation with the old historical civilization of which the dates are known. For example, a certain form of hammered bronze vessel found in Etruscan tombs at Bologna also occurs in Brandenburg, Saxony, Denmark, and Sweden, in every case with objects belonging to a period to which the dates 700–600 B.C. can reasonably be assigned. Objects of this kind give a date to their group and supply a fixed point from which that of the earlier series can be approximately defined: by such means the beginning of the Bronze age in Northern Europe has been carried back to about 1800 B.C. The weak point

of the method is that though the dates of the later divisions may be regarded as certain, those of the earlier become more and more vague as the remotest period is approached; for the objects which can be brought into relation with the early civilizations diminish in number as the scale is ascended: the higher limit is therefore not a fixed but a wavering line, which may have to be constantly redrawn in the light of increasing knowledge. Some periods, too, must have been longer than others, and it is very hard to say what their average length should be. But in spite of these inevitable drawbacks the system may be relied on within a few centuries even for the higher limit, while it yields exact results for the lower: a greater precision than this we can scarcely expect to achieve. To possess anything in the nature of a date to fall back upon in the study of prehistoric antiquities is a distinct aid to the memory, and even the most provisional of methods may be of great temporary use to the student, provided he never forgets that it is constantly liable to revision. Opportunities for giving an absolute date to prehistoric objects of the Bronze age within the Mediterranean area are more frequent than in the case of those from the north of the Alps, because inscribed Egyptian scarabs belonging to particular dynasties are occasionally found with them, or because they themselves occur in Egyptian tombs of known antiquity. Certain phases of the Aegean Bronze-age culture known as the Mycenaean, and the earlier stage which preceded it, have been dated in this way.

2. The Metal Ages ²

If, as above seen, the study of human origins is largely a geological problem, the investigation of the later developments, during the Metal Ages and prehistoric times, belongs mainly to the field of Archaeology. Hence it is that for the light which has in recent years been thrown upon the obscure interval between the Stone Ages and the strictly historic epoch, that is to say, the period when in his continuous upward development man gradually exchanged stone for the more serviceable metals, we are indebted chiefly to the pioneer labors of such men as Worsaae, Steenstrup, Forchhammer, Schliemann, Sayce, Layard, Lepsius, Mariette, Maspero, Montelius, Brugsch, Petrie,

² From *Man, Past and Present*, by A. H. Keane, Revised, and Largely Rewritten, by A. Hingston Quiggin and A. C. Haddon; pp. 20-29. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1920. Reprinted by permission.)

Peters, Haynes, Sir J. Evans, Sir A. J. Evans and many others, all archaeologists first, and anthropologists only in the second instance.

From the researches of these investigators it is now clear that copper, bronze, and iron were successively in use in Europe in the order named, so that the current expressions, "Copper," "Bronze," and "Iron" Ages remain still justified. But it also appears that overlappings, already beginning in late Neolithic times, were everywhere so frequent that in many localities it is quite impossible to draw any well-marked dividing lines between the successive metal periods.

That iron came last, a fact already known by vague tradition to the ancients, is beyond doubt, and it is no less certain that bronze of various types intervened between copper and iron. But much obscurity still surrounds the question of copper, which occurs in so many graves of Neolithic and Bronze times, that this metal has even been denied an independent position in the sequence.

But we shall not be surprised that confusion should prevail on this point, if we reflect that the metals, unlike stone, came to remain. Once introduced, they were soon found to be indispensable to civilized man, so that in a sense the "Metal Ages" still survive, and must last to the end of time. Hence it was natural that copper should be found in prehistoric graves associated, first with polished stone implements, and then with bronze and iron, just as, since the arrival of the English in Australia, spoons, clay pipes, penknives, pannikins, and the like, are now found mingled with stone objects in the graves of the aborigines.

But that there was a true Copper Age prior to that of Bronze, though possibly of not very long duration, except of course in the New World, has been placed beyond reasonable doubt by recent investigations. Considerable attention was devoted to the subject by J. H. Gladstone, who finds that copper was worked by the Egyptians in the Sinaitic Peninsula, that is, in the famous mines of the Wadi Maghàra, from the fourth to the eighteenth dynasty, perhaps from 3000 to 1580 B.C. During that epoch tools were made of pure copper in Egypt and Syria, and by the Amorites in Palestine, often on the model of their stone prototypes.

Elliot Smith claims that "the full story of the coming of copper, complete in every detail and circumstance, written in a simple and convincing fashion that he who runs may read," has been displayed

in Egypt ever since the year 1894, though the full significance of the evidence is not recognized until Reisner called attention to the record of pre-dynastic graves in Upper Egypt when superintending the excavations at Naga-edder in 1908. These excavations revealed the indigenous civilization of the ancient Egyptians and, according to Elliot Smith, dispose of the idea hitherto held by most archaeologists that Egypt owed her knowledge of metals to Babylonia or some other Asiatic source, where copper, and possibly also bronze, may be traced back to the fourth millennium B.C. There was doubtless intercourse between the civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia, but "Reisner has revealed the complete absence of any evidence to show or even to suggest that the language, the mode of writing, the knowledge of copper . . . were imported." Elliot Smith justly claims that in no other country has a similarly complete history of the discovery and the evolution of the working of copper been revealed, but until equally exhaustive excavations have been undertaken on contemporary or earlier sites in Sumer and Elam, the question cannot be regarded as settled.

The work of J. de Morgan at Susa (1907-8) shows the extreme antiquity of the Copper Age in ancient Elam, even if his estimate of 5000 B.C. is regarded as a millennium too early. At the base of the mound on the natural soil, beneath 24 metres of archaeological layers, were the remains of a town and a necropolis consisting of about 1000 tombs. Those of the men contained copper axes of primitive type; those of the women little vases of paint, together with discs of polished copper to serve as mirrors. At Fara, excavations by Koldewey in 1902, and by Andrae and Nöldeke in 1903 on the site of Shuruppak (the home of the Babylonian Noah) in the valley of the Lower Euphrates, revealed graves attributed to the prehistoric Sumerians, containing copper spear-heads, axes, and drinking vessels.

In Europe, North Italy, Hungary and Ireland may lay claim to a Copper Age, but there is very little evidence of such a stage in Britain. To this period also may be attributed the nest or *cache* of pure copper ingots found at Tourc'h, west of the Aven Valley, Finisterre, described by M. de Villiers du Terrage, and comprising 23 pieces, with a total weight of nearly 50 lbs. These objects, which belong to "the transitional period when copper was used at first concurrently with polished stone, and then disappeared as bronze came into more general use," came probably from Hungary, at that time

apparently the chief source of this metal for most parts of Europe. Of over 200 copper objects described by Mathaeus Much nearly all were of Hungarian or South German *provenance*, five only being accredited to Britain and eight to France.

The study of this subject has been greatly advanced by J. Hampel, who holds on solid grounds that in some regions, especially Hungary, copper played a dominant part for many centuries, and is undoubtedly the characteristic metal of a distinct culture. His conclusions are based on the study of about 500 copper objects found in Hungary and preserved in the Buda Pesth collections. Reviewing all the facts attesting a Copper Age in Central Europe, Egypt, Italy, Cyprus, Troy, Scandinavia, North Asia, and other lands, he concludes that a Copper Age may have sprung up independently wherever the ore was found, as in the Ural and Altai Mountains, Italy, Spain, Britain, Cyprus, Sinai, such culture being generally indigenous, and giving evidence of more or less characteristic local features. It was formerly assumed that such an independent Copper Age was developed not only in the region of the Great Lakes of North America, but also among certain Bantu peoples of Africa, but Elliot Smith and Perry attribute these industries to immigrants already acquainted with metal-working. Copper is not an alloy like bronze, but a soft, easily-worked metal occurring in large quantities and in a tolerably pure state near the surface in many parts of the world. The wonder is, not that it should have been found and worked at a somewhat remote epoch in several different centres, but that its use should have been so soon superseded in so many places by the bronze alloys.

From copper to bronze, however, the passage was slow and progressive, the proper proportion of tin, which was probably preceded in some places by an alloy of antimony, having been apparently arrived at by repeated experiments often carried out with no little skill by those prehistoric metallurgists.

As suggested by Bibra in 1869, the ores of different metals would appear to have been at first smelted together empirically, and the process continued until satisfactory results were obtained. Hence the extraordinary number of metals, of which percentages are found in some of the earlier specimens, such as those of the Elbing Museum, which on analysis yielded tin, lead, silver, iron, antimony, arsenic, sulphur, nickel, cobalt, and zinc in varying quantities.

Some bronzes from the pyramid of Medum analyzed by J. H. Glad-

stone yielded the high percentage of 9.1 of tin, from which we must infer, not only that bronze, but bronze of the finest quality, was already known to the Egyptians of the fourth dynasty, *i.e.*, 2840 B.C. The statuette of Gudea of Lagash (2500 B.C.), claimed as the earliest example of bronze in Babylonia, is now known to be pure copper, and though objects from Tello (Lagash) of earlier date contain a mixture of tin, zinc, arsenic and other alloys, the proportion is insignificant. The question of priority must, however, be left open until the relative chronology of Egypt and Babylonia is finally settled, and this is still a much disputed point. Neither would all the difficulties with regard to the origin of bronze be cleared up should Egypt or Babylonia establish her claim to possess the earliest example of metal, for neither country appears to possess any tin. The nearest deposit known in ancient times would seem to be that of Drangiana, mentioned by Strabo, identified with modern Khorassan.

Strabo and other classical writers also mention the occurrence of tin in the west, in Spain, Portugal and the Cassiterides or tin islands, whose identity has given rise to so much speculation, but "though in after times Egypt drew her tin from Europe, it would be bold indeed to suppose that she did so (in 3000 B.C.) and still bolder to maintain that she learned from northern people how to make the alloy called bronze." Apart from the indigenous Egyptian origin maintained by Elliot Smith (above), the hypothesis offering fewest difficulties is that the earliest bronze is to be traced to the region of Elam, and that the knowledge spread from S. Chaldaea (Elam-Sumer) to S. Egypt in the third millennium B.C.

There seems to be little doubt that the Aegean was the centre for dispersal for the new metals throughout the Mediterranean area, and copper ingots have been found at various points of the Mediterranean, marked with Cretan signs. Bronze was known in Crete before 2000 B.C., for a bronze dagger and spear-head were found at Hagios Onuphrios, near Phaistos, with seals resembling those of the sixth to eleventh dynasties.

From the eastern Mediterranean the knowledge spread during the second millennium along the ordinary trade routes which had long been in use. The mineral ores of Spain were exploited in pre-Mycenean times and probably contributed in no small measure to the industrial development of southern Europe. From tribe to tribe along the Atlantic coasts the traffic in minerals reached the British Isles, where

the rich ores were discovered which, in their turn, supplied the markets of the north, the west and the south.

Even Ireland was not left untouched by Aegean influence, which reached it, according to G. Coffey, by way of the Danube and the Elbe, and thence by way of Scandinavia, though this is a matter on which there is much difference of opinion. Ireland's richness in gold during the Bronze Age made her a "kind of El Dorado of the western world," and the discovery of a gold torc found by Schliemann in the royal treasury in the second city of Troy raises the question as to whether the model of the torc was imported into Ireland from the south, or whether (which J. Dèchelette regards as less probable) there was already an exportation of Irish gold to the eastern Mediterranean in pre-Mycenean times.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

Egypt	Babylonia	Aegean	Greece	Bronze Age in Europe
3300 Dyn. I				
3200				
3100				
3000				
2900	Dynasty of Opis	?Early Minoan I	?Pre-Mycenean	
2800 Dyn. III, IV	Dyn. of Kish			
	Dyn. of Erech			
	Dyn. of Akkad			
2700				
2600 Dyn. V	2d Dyn. of Erech			
2500 Dyn. VI	Gutian Domination	Early Minoan II		Period I. Neolithic (implements of stone, copper and bronze, poor in tin)
2400	Dyn. of Ur			Period II
2300 Dyn. IX				
2200	Dyn. of Isin	Middle Minoan I		
2100 Dyn. XI		Mid. Minoan II		
2000 Dyn. XII	1st Dyn. Babylon		Mycenean I	
1900	2d Dyn.	Mid. Minoan III		
1800				
1700 Dyn. XIII	3rd Dyn.	Late Minoan I		
1600 Dyn. XV				Period III
1500 Dyn. XVIII		Late Minoan II	Mycenean II	
1400		Late Minoan III		
1300 Dyn. XIX				Period IV
1200 Dyn. XX			Homeric Age	
1100	4th Dyn.			
1000 Dyn. XXI	5th to 7th Dyn.		Close of Bronze Age	
900 Dyn. XXII	8th Dyn.			Hallstatt

Of recent years great strides have been made towards the establishment of a definite chronology linking the historic with the prehistoric periods in the Aegean, in Egypt and in Babylonia, and as the estimates of various authorities differ sometimes by a thousand years or

so, the subjoined table will be of use to indicate the chronological schemes most commonly followed; the dates are in all cases merely approximate.

It has often been pointed out that there is no reason why iron should not have been the earliest metal to be used by man. Its ores are more abundant and more easily reduced than any others, and are worked by peoples in a low grade of culture at the present day. Iron may have been known in Egypt almost as early as bronze, for a piece in the British Museum is attributed to the fourth dynasty, and some beads of manufactured iron were found in a pre-dynastic grave at El Gerzeh. But these and other less well authenticated occurrences of iron are rare, and the metal was not common in Egypt before the middle of the second millennium. By the end of the second millennium the knowledge had spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean, and towards 900 at latest iron was in common use in Italy and Central Europe.

The introduction of iron into Italy has often been attributed to the Etruscans, who were thought to have brought the knowledge from Lydia. But the most abundant remains of the Early Iron Age are found not in Tuscany, but along the coasts of the Adriatic, showing that iron followed the well-known route of the amber trade, thus reaching Central Europe and *Hallstatt* (which has given its name to the early Iron Age), where alone in Europe the gradual transition from the use of bronze to that of iron has been clearly traced. W. Ridgeway believes that the use of iron was first discovered in the Hallstatt area and that thence it spread to Switzerland, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, the Aegean area, and Egypt rather than that the culture drift was in the opposite direction. There is no difference of opinion, however, as to the importance of this Central European area which contained the most famous iron mines of antiquity. Hallstatt culture extended from the Iberian peninsula in the west to Hungary in the east, but scarcely reached Scandinavia, North Germany, Armorica or the British Isles, where the Bronze Age may be said to have lasted down to about 500 B.C. Over such a vast domain the culture was not everywhere of a uniform type, and Hoernes recognizes four geographical divisions distinguished mainly by pottery and fibulae, and provisionally classified as Illyrian in the South-West or Adriatic region, in touch with Greece and Italy; Celtic in the Central or Danubian area; with an off-shoot in Western Germany, Northern Switzer-

land and Eastern France; and Germanic in parts of Germany, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Posen.

The Hallstatt period ends, roughly, at 500 B.C., and the Later Iron Age takes its name from the settlement of *La Tène* in a bay of the Lake of Neuchatel in Switzerland. This culture, while owing much to that of Hallstatt, and much also to foreign sources, possesses a distinct individuality, and though soon overpowered on the Continent by Roman influence, attained a remarkable brilliance in the Late Celtic period in the British Isles.

That the peoples of the Metal Ages were physically well developed and in a great part of Europe and Asia already of Aryan speech, there can be no reasonable doubt. A skull of the early Hallstatt period, from a grave near Wildenroth, Upper Bavaria, is described by Virchow as long-headed, with a cranial capacity of no less than 1585 c.c., strongly developed occiput, very high and narrow face and nose, and in every respect a superb specimen of the regular-featured, long-headed North European. But owing to the prevalence of cremation the evidence of race is inadequate. The Hallstatt population was undoubtedly mixed, and at Glasinatz in Bosnia, another site of Hallstatt civilization, about a quarter of the skulls examined were brachycephalic.

3. On the Early Use of Iron³

It is probable that gold was the metal which first attracted the attention of man; it is found in many rivers, and by its bright color would certainly strike even the rudest savages, who are known to be very fond of personal decoration. Silver does not appear to have been discovered until long after gold, and was apparently preceded by both copper and tin; for it rarely, if ever, occurs in tumuli of the Bronze Age; but however this may be, copper seems to have been the metal which first became of real importance to Man; no doubt owing to the fact that its ores are abundant in many countries, and can be smelted without difficulty; and that, while iron is hardly ever found except in the form of ore, copper often occurs in a native condition, and can be beaten at once into shape. Thus, for instance, the North American Indians obtained pure copper from the mines near Lake Superior and

³ From *Pre-Historic Times*, by Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury); pp. 3-6; 8-9; 24-27. (Henry Holt and Company. Reprinted by permission.)

elsewhere, and hammered it at once into axes, bracelets, and other objects.

Tin also early attracted notice, probably on account of its great heaviness. When metals were very scarce, it would naturally sometimes happen that, in order to make up the necessary quantity, some tin would be added to copper, or *vice versa*. It would then be found that the properties of the alloy were quite different from those of either metal, and a very few experiments would determine the most advantageous proportion, which for axes and other cutting instruments is about nine parts of copper to one of tin. No implements or weapons of tin have yet been found, and those of copper are extremely rare, in Western Europe, whence it has been inferred that the art of making bronze was known elsewhere before the use of either copper or tin was introduced into Europe. Many of the so-called "copper" axes, etc., contain a small proportion of tin; and the few exceptions indicate probably a mere temporary want, rather than a total ignorance, of this metal.

The ores of iron, though more abundant, are much less striking in appearance than those of copper. Moreover, though they are perhaps more easily reduced, the metal, when obtained, is much less tractable than bronze. This valuable alloy can very easily be cast, and, in fact, all the weapons and implements made of it in olden times were cast in moulds of sand or stone. The art of casting iron, on the other hand, was unknown until a comparatively late period.

In the writings of the early poets, iron is frequently characterized by the epithet *ηολύκμητος*, and its adjective, *σιδηρεος*, is used metaphorically to imply the greatest stubbornness.

These considerations tend very much to remove the *a priori* improbability that a compound and comparatively expensive material like bronze should have been in general use before such a common metal as iron, and the evidence that it was so seems conclusive.

Hesiod, who is supposed to have written about 900 B.C., and who is the earliest European author whose works have come down to us, appears to have lived during the transition between the Bronze and Iron Ages. He distinctly states that iron was discovered later than copper and tin. Speaking of those who were ancient, even in his day, he says that they used bronze, and not iron. . . .

It is also significant that the word *χαλκεειν*, from *χαλκος*, bronze, means to work in metal. Moreover, the forms of early weapons indi-

cate that those of iron were copied from bronze, not those of bronze from iron. Hesiod's poems, as well as those of Homer, show that nearly three thousand years ago the value of iron was known and appreciated. It is true that, as we read in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, bronze "is represented in the Iliad and Odyssey as the common material of arms, instruments, and vessels of various sorts; the latter (iron) is mentioned much more rarely." While, however, the above statement is strictly correct, we must remember that among the Greeks the word iron (*σίδηρος*) was used, even in the time of Homer, as synonymous with a sword, and that steel also appears to have been known to them under the name of *ἄδαμας*, and perhaps also of *κναιγος*, as early as the time of Hesiod. We may, therefore, consider that the Trojan war took place during the period of transition from the Bronze to the Iron Age.

In the Pentateuch, excluding Deuteronomy, bronze, or, as it is unfortunately translated, brass, is mentioned thirty-eight times, and iron only four times. . . .

The earliest evidence of iron in Assyria is an inscription of Tiglath-Pileser (1120 B.C.), who says: "In the desert of Mitani near Araziki, which is in front of the land of Hatti, I slew four mighty buffaloes with my great bow and iron arrows, and with my lance."

In China copper is said to have been used as far back as the reign of Yu Nai Hwang-ti, 2200 B.C.; and iron in that of Kung Kiu, about 1900 B.C. Copper axes of very simple type have also been discovered in India, but we have no means of determining their date.

The remarkable phase of archaic culture known as Mycenaean — when arms of bronze were beautifully inlaid with gold, when gems were cut, and the potter's art had attained a high degree of perfection — appears to have attained its zenith about 1500 B.C. It must therefore have commenced much earlier.

The date of the introduction of iron into the North of Europe cannot at present be satisfactorily determined; nevertheless it is most likely that the use of this metal spread rapidly. Not only does it seem *a priori* probable that such an important discovery would have done so, but it is evident that the same commercial organization which had already carried the tin of Cornwall all over our continent, would equally facilitate the transmission of iron. However this may be, the soldiers of Brennus were provided with iron swords, and when the armies of Rome brought the civilization of the South into contact

with that of the North, they found iron already well known to, and in general use among, their new enemies. Nor is there any reason to suppose that arms of bronze were also at that time still in use in the North, for, had this been so, they would certainly have been mentioned by the Roman writers; whereas the description given by Tacitus of the Caledonian weapons shows that in his time the swords used in Scotland were made of iron. Moreover there are several cases in which large quantities of arms belonging to the Roman period have been found together, and in which the arms and implements are all of iron. . . .

On the whole, then, the evidence is conclusive that the use of bronze weapons characterizes a particular phase in the history of European civilization, and one which was anterior to the discovery of iron, or, at any rate, to the general use of that metal for cutting purposes.

It is, moreover, I think, clearly established that the use of iron was general throughout Northern Europe long before the invasion of Caesar.

Evidently, however, the transition from the use of bronze weapons to those of iron must have been gradual, and there must have been a time when the two were in use together. M. Ramsauer, for many years director of the salt-mines at Hallstatt, near Salzburg, in Austria, has discovered an extensive cemetery belonging to this transitional period. He has opened no less than 980 graves, evidently of those who even at that early period worked the salt-mines which are still so celebrated. The objects discovered are described, and figured in an album, which has unfortunately never been published, but of which Mr. (now Sir John) Evans and I secured a copy. The foregoing table will sufficiently prove the importance of the discovery.

That the period to which these graves belonged was that of the transition between the Bronze and Iron Ages, is evident; both because we find cutting instruments of iron as well as of bronze, and also because both are of somewhat unusual, and we may almost say of intermediate types. The same remark applies to the ornamentation. Animals are frequently represented, but are very poorly executed, while the geometrical patterns are well drawn. Coins are entirely absent. That the transition was from bronze to iron, and not from iron to bronze, is clear; because here, as elsewhere, while iron instruments with bronze handles are common, there is not a single case of a bronze blade with an iron handle. This shows that, when both

metals were in use, the iron was preferred for blades. Another interesting point in the Hallstatt bronze, as in that of the true Bronze Age, is the absence of silver, lead, and zinc (excepting, of course, as mere impurities in the bronze). This is the more significant, inasmuch as the presence, not only of the tin itself, but also of glass, amber, and ivory, indicates the existence of an extensive commerce.

Exercises

1. Why is the introduction of metal reckoned so important?
2. What reasons can be adduced to show that *iron* might have been the first metal used?
3. What facts are cited to show that bronze was actually the earlier?
4. State arguments for and against the idea that an age of pure copper preceded the bronze age.
5. Where copper is found mixed with other metals what two interpretations are possible?
6. Sketch the lines along which progress was made in the beginnings of the bronze industry.
7. In what sequence did the various metals appear? What is the evidence for your answer?
8. What is the relation between archaic instruments and ceremonial usages?
9. What is the psychological basis of legendary smiths and smithies?
10. Where did the manufacture of bronze, apparently, originate?
11. Show the relation between relative isolation and finer bronze-work.
12. Characterize the three periods of the bronze age.
13. By what line of reasoning are absolute dates assigned to objects in bronze?
14. What does Keane say of the metal ages, and of the age of copper in particular?
15. Where, in Keane's view, did the bronze culture-complex arise? Does this coincide with the conclusion reached by the Guide to the British Museum preceding?
16. What are Keane's views on the origins of iron work? What was the Hallstatt culture? the culture of La Tène?
17. Summarize the argument by which Lubbock (Lord Avebury) shows that a distinct bronze period existed, and that it preceded iron.
18. Do you conclude, from the various authors quoted, that iron was later than bronze because it is more difficult to utilize?

Additional References

1. Elliot, G. F. Scott: *Prehistoric Man and His Story*. Ch. XIV., on "The Occupation of the World," portrays the trade and warfare of the prehistoric world, with special reference to the effects of bronze weapons. See also Ch. XXV., on "The Age of Metals."
2. Ripley, William Z.: *The Races of Europe*. Ch. XVIII. treats authoritatively the racial basis of European peoples, and, incidentally, the Hallstatt iron culture.
3. Tyler, John M.: *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*. Ch. IV. gives a good description of life in the Swiss lake-dwellings during the transition from stone to copper and bronze culture.

CHAPTER X

ORIGINS AND DISPERSION OF RACES

THE origins of human races are wrapped in mystery, and the early wanderings of peoples are not much more definitely known. Nevertheless the subject is as fascinating as it is difficult, and many are those who, from human interest or sheer intellectual curiosity, have sought to push aside the curtains of ignorance that shut from our view the comings and goings of men in the most ancient world.

In the following selections we have tried to present some of the most authoritative speculations on this baffling problem. In so doing we begin with the more general considerations, leaving more restricted questions for the chapter following.

In the first selection, from the eminent anatomist, physiologist, and anthropologist, Sir Arthur Keith, is presented an authoritative discussion of some of the most recent speculations concerning the physical basis of existing race differences. While this subject is of considerable interest, the reader should bear in mind that it merely reduces the older explanations to more minute and definite terms. It has always been obvious, even to the untutored eye, that human races differ in color, stature, and feature, and it has been likewise understood that these characters were transmitted by heredity in the biological sense. For these reasons it was equally clear that their ground was physical and physiological. These recent discussions show us more definitely just *how* this is true.

The objective racial situation remains unchanged except in one respect, and that is the question, highly speculative at present, whether a racial type could be modified not only by selective breeding, as long maintained, but also by the modification of glandular activity through the manipulation of environmental factors, particularly the character of food and drinking water.

The last selection in this chapter, which deals with the general question of the distribution of the great world-races, according to Keane, rests in part upon his own theory that mankind originated in a primeval and now vanished continent, southeast of Africa, as described in the first selection of the next chapter.

1. The Differentiation of Mankind into Racial Types¹

For a brief half-hour I am to try and engage your attention on a matter which has excited the interest of thoughtful minds from

¹ Presidential address of Professor A. Keith, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.S., before the Anthropology Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sept., 1919. See *Report* of the 89th Meeting; pp. 275-281.

ancient times — the problem of how mankind has been demarcated into types so diverse as the Negro, the Mongol, and the Caucasian or European. . . . We are all familiar with the features of that racial human type which clusters round the heart of Africa; we recognize the Negro at a glance by his black, shining, hairless skin, his crisp hair, his flattened nose, his widely opened dark eyes, his heavily moulded lips, his gleaming teeth and strong jaws. He has a carriage and proportion of body of his own; he has his peculiar quality of voice and action of brain. He is, even to the unpractised eye, clearly different to the Mongolian native of North-Eastern Asia; the skin, the hair, the eyes, the quality of brain and voice, the carriage of body and proportion of limb to body pick out the Mongol as a sharply differentiated human type. Different to either of these is the native of Central Europe — the Aryan or Caucasian type of man; we know him by the paleness of his skin and by his facial features — particularly his narrow, prominent nose and thin lips. We are so accustomed to the prominence of the Caucasian nose that only a Mongol or Negro can appreciate its singularity in our aryanized world. When we ask how these three types — the European, Chinaman, and Negro — came by their distinctive features, we find that our evolutionary machine is defective; the processes of natural and of sexual selection will preserve and exaggerate traits of body and of mind, but they cannot produce that complex of features which marks off one racial type from another. Nature has at her command some secret mechanism by which she works out her new patterns in the bodies of man and beast — a mechanism of which we were almost ignorant in Darwin's day, but which we are now beginning to perceive and dimly understand. It is the bearing of this creative or morphogenetic mechanism on the evolution of the modern races of mankind which I propose to make the subject of my address.

Hid away in various parts of the human frame is a series of more or less obscure bodies or glands, five in number, which, in recent times, we have come to recognize as parts of the machinery which regulate the growth of the body. They form merely a fraction of the body — not more than 1-180th part of it; a man might pack the entire series in his watch-pocket. The modern medical student is familiar with each one of them — the pituitary body, about the size of a ripe cherry, attached to the base of the brain and cradled in the floor of the skull; the pineal gland, also situated in the brain, and

in point of size but little larger than a wheat-grain; the thyroid in the neck, set astride the windpipe, forms a more bulky mass; the two suprarenal bodies situated in the belly, capping the kidneys, and the interstitial glands embedded within the substance of the testicle and ovary, complete the list. The modern physician is also familiar with the fact that the growth of the body may be retarded, accelerated, or completely altered if one or more of these glands becomes the seat of injury or of a functional disorder. It is thirty-three years now since first one woman and then another came to Dr. Pierre Marie in Paris seeking relief from a persistent headache, and mentioning incidentally that their faces, bodies, hands, and feet had altered so much in recent years that their best-known friends failed to recognize them. That incident marked the commencement of our knowledge of the pituitary gland as an intrinsic part of the machinery which regulates the shaping of our bodies and features. Dr. Marie named the condition acromegaly. Since then hundreds of men and women showing symptoms similar to those of Dr. Marie's patients have been seen and diagnosed, and in every instance where the acromegalic changes were typical and marked there has been found a definite enlargement or tumor of the pituitary body. The practised eye recognizes the full-blown condition of acromegaly at a glance, so characteristic are the features of the sufferers. Nay, as we walk along the streets we can note slight degrees of it—degrees which fall far short of the border-line of disease; we note that it may give characteristic traits to a whole family—a family marked by what may be named an acromegalic taint. The pituitary gland is also concerned in another disturbance of growth—giantism. In every case where a young lad has shot up, during his late "teens," into a lanky man of seven feet or more—has become a giant—it has been found that his pituitary gland was the site of a disordered enlargement. The pituitary is part of the mechanism which regulates our stature, and stature is a racial characteristic. The giant is usually acromegalic as well as tall, but the two conditions need not be combined; a young lad may undergo the bodily changes which characterize acromegaly and yet not become abnormally tall, or he may become—although this is rarely the case—a giant in stature and yet may not assume acromegalic features. There is a third condition of disordered growth in which the pituitary is concerned—one in which the length of the limbs is disproportionably increased—in

which the sexual system and all the secondary sexual characters of body and mind either fail to develop or disappear — where fat tends to be deposited on the body, particularly over the buttocks and thighs — where, in brief, a eunuchoid condition of body develops. In all of these three conditions we seem to be dealing with a disordered and exaggerated action of the pituitary gland; there must be conditions of an opposite kind where the functions of the pituitary are disordered and reduced. A number of cases of dwarfism have been recorded where boys or girls retained their boyhood or girlhood throughout life, apparently because their pituitary gland had been invaded and partly destroyed by tumors. We shall see that dwarfism may result also from a failure of the thyroid gland. On the evidence at our disposal, evidence which is being rapidly augmented, we are justified in regarding the pituitary gland as one of the principal pinions in the machinery which regulates the growth of the human body and is directly concerned in determining stature, cast of features, texture of skin, and character of hair — all of them marks of race. When we compare the three chief racial types of humanity — the Negro, the Mongol, and the Caucasian or European — we can recognize in the last named a greater predominance of the pituitary than in the other two. The sharp and pronounced nasalization of the face, the tendency to strong eyebrow ridges, the prominent chin, the tendency to bulk of body and height of stature in the majority of Europeans, is best explained, so far as the present state of our knowledge goes, in terms of pituitary function.

There is no question that our interest in the mechanism of growth has been quickened in recent years by observations and discoveries made by physicians on men and women who suffered from pituitary disorders, but that a small part of the body could influence and regulate the growth and characterization of the whole was known in ancient times. For many centuries it has been common knowledge that the removal of the genital glands alters the external form and internal nature of man and beast. The sooner the operation is performed after birth the more certain are its effects. Were a naturalist from a unisexual world to visit this earth of ours it would be difficult to convince him that a brother and a sister were of the same species, or that the wrinkled, sallow-visaged eunuch with his beardless face, his long tapering limbs, his hesitating carriage, his carping outlook and corpulent body, was brother to the thickset, robust, pugilistic

man with the bearded face. The discovery that the testicle and ovary contain, scattered throughout their substance, a small glandular element which has nothing to do with their main function—the production of genital cells—was made seventy years ago, but the evidence which leads us to believe that this scattered element—the interstitial gland—is directly concerned in the mechanism of growth is of quite recent date. All those changes which we may observe in the girl or boy at puberty—the phase of growth which brings into full prominence their racial characteristics—depend on the action of the interstitial glands. If they are removed or remain in abeyance the maturation of the body is both prolonged and altered. In seeking for the mechanism which shapes mankind into races we must take the interstitial gland into our reckoning. I am of opinion that the sexual differentiation—the robust manifestations of the male characters—is more emphatic in the Caucasian than in either the Mongol or Negro racial types. In both Mongol and Negro, in their most representative form, we find a beardless face and almost hairless body, and in certain Negro types, especially in Nilotic tribes, with their long, stork-like legs, we seem to have a manifestation of abeyance in the action of the interstitial glands. At the close of sexual life we often see the features of a woman assume a coarser and more masculine appearance.

Associated with the interstitial glands, at least in point of development, are the suprarenal bodies or glands. Our knowledge that these two comparatively small structures, no larger than the segments into which a moderately sized orange can be separated, are connected with pigmentation of the skin dates back to 1894, when Dr. Thomas Addison, a physician to Guy's Hospital, London, observed that gradual destruction of these bodies by disease led to a darkening or pigmentation of the patient's skin, besides giving rise to other more severe changes and symptoms. Now it is 150 years since John Hunter came to the conclusion, on the evidence then at his disposal, that the original color of man's skin was black, and all the knowledge that we have gathered since his time supports the inference he drew. From the fact that pigment begins to collect in and thus darken the skin when the suprarenal bodies become the seat of a destructive disease we infer that they have to do with the clearing away of pigment, and that we Europeans owe the fairness of our skins to some particular virtue resident in the suprarenal bodies. That their function is com-

plex and multiple, the researches of Sharpey-Schafer, of T. R. Elliott, and of W. B. Cannon have made very evident. Fifteen years ago Bullock and Sequeira established the fact that when a suprarenal body becomes the site of a peculiar form of malignant overgrowth in childhood, the body of the boy or girl undergoes certain extraordinary growth changes. The sexual organs become rapidly mature, and through the framework of childhood burst all the features of sexual maturity—the full chest, muscularity of limbs, bass voice, bearded face and hairy body—a miniature Hercules—a miracle of transformation in body and brain. Corresponding changes occur in young girls—almost infants in years—with a tendency to assume features which characterize the male. Professor Glynn has recently collected such cases and systematized our knowledge of these strange derangements of growth. There can be no doubt that the suprarenal bodies constitute an important part of the mechanism which regulates the development and growth of the human body and helps in determining the racial characters of mankind. We know that certain races come more quickly to sexual maturity than others, and that races vary in development of hair and of pigment, and it is therefore reasonable to expect a satisfactory explanation of these characters when we have come by a more complete knowledge of the suprarenal mechanism.

During the last few years the totally unexpected discovery has been sprung upon us that disease of the minute pineal gland of the brain may give rise to a train of symptoms very similar to those which follow tumor formation of the cortex of the suprarenal bodies. In some instances the sudden sexual prematurity which occurs in childhood is apparently the immediate result of a tumor-like affection of the pineal gland. We have hitherto regarded the pineal gland, little bigger than a wheat-grain and buried deeply in the brain, as a mere useless vestige of a median or parietal eye, derived from some distant human ancestor in whom that eye was functional, but on the clinical and experimental evidence now rapidly accumulating we must assign to it a place in the machinery which controls the growth of the body.

We come now to deal with the thyroid gland, which, from an anthropological point of view, must be regarded as the most important of all the organs or glands of internal secretion. Here, too, in connection with the thyroid gland, which is situated in the front of the neck, where it is so apt to become enlarged and prominent in women—I must call attention to a generalization which I slurred over, when

speaking of the pituitary and suprarenal glands. Each of these glands throws into the circulating blood two sets of substances — one set to act immediately in tuning the parts of the body which are not under the influence of the will, to the work they have to do when the body is at rest and when it is making an effort; another set of substances — which Professor Gley has named morphogenetic — has not an immediate but a remote effect; they regulate the development and co-ordinate the growth of the various parts of the body. Now, so far as the immediate function of the thyroid is concerned, our present knowledge points to the gland as the manufactory of a substance which, when circulating in the body, regulates the rate of combustion of the tissues; when we make a muscular effort, or when our bodies are exposed to cold, or when we become the subjects of infection, the thyroid is called upon to assist in mobilizing all available tissue-fuel. If we consider only its immediate function it is clear that the thyroid is connected with the selection and survival of human races. When, however, we consider its remote or morphogenetic effects on growth its importance as a factor in shaping the characteristics of human races becomes even more evident. In districts where the thyroid is liable to that form of disease known as goitre it has been known for many a year that children who were affected became cretins — dwarf idiots with a very characteristic appearance of face and body. Disease of the thyroid stunts and alters the growth of the body so that the subjects of this disorder might well be classed as a separate species of humanity. If the thyroid becomes diseased and defective after growth of the body is completed then certain changes, first observed by Sir William Gull in 1873, are set up and give rise to the disordered state of the body known as myxoedema. “In this state,” says Sir Malcolm Morriss, “the skin is cold, dry and rough, seldom or never perspires, and may take on a *yellowish* tint; there is a bright red flush in the malar region. The skin as a whole looks transparent; the hair of the scalp becomes scanty; the pubic and axillary hair, with the eyelashes and eyebrows, often falls out; in many cases the teeth are brittle and carious. All these appearances disappear under the administration of thyroid extract.” We have here conclusive evidence that the thyroid acts directly on the skin and hair, just the structures we employ in the classification of human races. The influence of the thyroid on the development of the other systems of the body, particularly on the growth of the skull and skeleton, is

equally profound. This is particularly the case as regards the base of the skull and the nose. The arrest of growth falls mainly on the basal part of the skull, with the result that the root of the nose appears to be flattened and drawn backwards between the eyes, the upper forehead appears projecting or bulging, the face appears flattened, and the bony scaffolding of the nose, particularly when compared to the prominence of the jaws, is greatly reduced. Now, these facial features which I have enumerated give the Mongolian face its characteristic aspect, and, to a lesser degree, they are also to be traced in the features of the Negro. Indeed, in one aberrant branch of the Negro race—the Bushman of South Africa—the thyroid facies is even more emphatically brought out than in the most typical Mongol. You will observe that, in my opinion, the thyroid—or a reduction or alteration in the activity of the thyroid—has been a factor in determining some of the racial characteristics of the Mongol and the Negro races. I know of a telling piece of evidence which supports this thesis. Some years ago there died in the East End of London a Chinese giant—the subject, we must suppose, of an excessive action of the pituitary gland—the gland which I regard as playing a predominant part in shaping the face and bodily form of the European. The skeleton of this giant was prepared and placed in the Museum of the London Hospital Medical College by Col. T. H. Openshaw, and any one inspecting that skeleton can see that, although certain Chinese features are still recognizable, the nasal region and the supraorbital ridges of the face have assumed the more prominent European type.

There are two peculiar and very definite forms of dwarfism with which most people are familiar, both of which must be regarded as due to a defect in the growth-regulating mechanism of the thyroid. Now, one of these forms of dwarfism is known to medical men as Achondroplasia, because the growth of cartilage is particularly affected, but in familiar language we may speak of the sufferers from this disorder of growth as being of the “bulldog breed” or of the “dachshund breed.” In the dachshund the limbs are greatly shortened and gnarled, but the nose or snout suffers no reduction, while in the bulldog the nose and nasal part of the face are greatly reduced and withdrawn, showing an exaggerated degree of Mongolism. Among achondroplastic human dwarfs both breeds occur, but the “bulldog” form is much more common than the “dachshund”

type. The shortening of limbs with retraction of the nasal region of the face — pug-face or prosopia we may call the condition — has a very direct interest for anthropologists, seeing that short limbs and a long trunk are well-recognized racial characteristics of the Mongol. In the second kind of dwarfism, which we have reason to regard as due to a functional defect of the thyroid, the Mongolian traits are so apparent that the sufferers from this disorder are known to medical men as “Mongolian idiots” — for not only is their growth stunted, but their brains also act in a peculiar and aberrant manner. Dr. Langdon Down, who gave the subjects of this peculiar disorder the name “Mongolian idiots” fifty-five years ago, knew nothing of the modern doctrine of internal secretions, but that doctrine has been applied in recent years by Dr. F. G. Crookshank to explain the features and condition of Mongoloid imbecile children. Some years ago I brought forward evidence to show that we could best explain the various forms of anthropoid apes by applying the modern doctrine of a growth-controlling glandular mechanism. In the gorilla we see the effects of a predominance of the pituitary elements; in the orang, of the thyroid. The late Professor Klaatsch tried to account for the superficial resemblances between the Malay and the orang by postulating a genetic relationship between them; for a similar reason he derived the Negro type from a gorilline ancestry. Occasionally we see a man or woman of supposedly pure European ancestry displaying definite Mongoloid traits in their features. We have been in the habit of accounting for such manifestations by the theory at one time very popular, that a Mongoloid race had at one time spread over Europe, and that Mongoloid traits were atavistic recurrences. An examination of the human remains of ancient Europe yields no evidence in support of a Turanian or Mongol invasion of Europe.

All of these manifestations to which I have been calling your attention — the sporadic manifestation of Mongoloid characters in diseased children and in healthy adult Europeans, the generic characters which separate one kind of ape from another, the bodily and mental features which mark the various races of mankind — are best explained by the theory I am supporting — namely, that the conformation of man and ape and of every vertebrate animal is determined by a common growth-controlling mechanism which is resident in a system of small but complex glandular organs. We must now look somewhat more closely into the manner in which this growth-

regulating mechanism actually works. That we can do best by taking a glimpse of a research carried out by Bayliss and Starling in the opening years of the present century. They were seeking to explain why it was that the pancreas poured out its digestive juice as soon as the contents of the stomach commenced to pass into the first part of the duodenum. It was then known that if acid was applied to the lining epithelial membrane of the duodenum, the pancreas commenced to work; it was known also that the message which set the pancreas into operation was not conveyed from the duodenum to the pancreas by nerves, for when they were cut the mechanism was still effective. Bayliss and Starling solved the puzzle by making an emulsion from the acid-soaked lining epithelium of the duodenum and injecting the extract of that emulsion into the circulating blood. The result was that the pancreas was immediately thrown into activity. The particular substance which was thus set circulating in the blood and acted on the pancreas and on the pancreas alone, and which thus served as a messenger or hormone, they named secretin. They not only cleared up the mechanism of pancreatic secretion, but at the same time made a discovery of much greater importance. They had discovered a new method whereby one part of the human body could communicate with and control another. Up to that time we had been like an outlandish visitor to a strange city, who believed that the visible telegraph or telephone wires were the only means of communication between its inhabitants. We believed that it was only by nerve fibres that intercommunication was established in the animal body. Bayliss and Starling showed that there was a postal system. Missives posted in the general circulation were duly delivered at their destinations. The manner in which they reached the right address is of particular importance for us; we must suppose that the missive or hormone circulating in the blood and the recipient for which they are intended have a special attraction or affinity for each other — one due to their physical constitution — and hence they and only they come together as the blood circulates round the body. Secretin is a hormone which effects its errand rapidly and immediately, whereas the growth or morphogenetic hormones, thrown into the circulation by the pituitary, pineal, thyroid, suprarenal, and genital glands, act slowly and remotely. But both are alike in this: the result depends not only on the nature of the hormone or missive, but also on the state of the local recipient. The local recipient may be

especially greedy, as it were, and seize more than a fair share of the manna in circulation, or it may have "sticky fingers" and seize what is not really intended for local consumption. We can see that local growth—the development of a particular trait or feature—is dependent not only on the hormones supplied to that part, but also on the condition of the receptive mechanism of the part. Hence we can understand a local derangement of growth—an acromegaly or giantism confined to a finger or to the eyebrow ridges, to the nose, to one side of the face, and such local manifestations are not uncommon. It is by a variation in the sensitiveness of the local recipient that we have an explanation of the endless variety to be found in the relative development of racial and individual features.

Some ten years after Starling had formulated the theory of hormones, Professor W. B. Cannon, of Harvard University, piecing together the results of researches by Dr. T. R. Eliott and by himself, on the action of the suprarenal glands, brought to light a very wonderful hormone mechanism—one which helps us in interpreting the action of the growth-regulating hormones. When we are about to make a severe bodily effort it is necessary to flood our muscles with blood, so that they may have at their disposal the materials necessary for work—oxygen and blood-sugar, the fuel of muscular engines. At the beginning of a muscular effort the suprarenal glands are set going by messages passing to them from the central nervous system; they throw a hormone—adrenalin—into the circulating blood, which has a double effect; adrenalin acts on the flood-gates of the circulation, so that the major supply of blood passes to the muscles; at the same time it so acts on the liver that the blood circulating through that great organ becomes laden with blood-sugar. We here obtain a glimpse of the neat and effective manner in which hormones are utilized in the economy of the living body. From that glimpse we seem to obtain a clue to that remarkable disorder of growth in the human body known as acromegaly. It is a pathological manifestation of an adaptational mechanism with which we are all familiar. Nothing is better known to us than that our bodies respond to the burden they are made to bear. Our muscles increase in size and strength the more we use them; increase in the size of our muscles would be useless unless our bones also were strengthened to a corresponding degree. A greater blood supply is required to feed them, and hence the power of the heart has to be augmented; more oxygen is needed for their consump-

tion, and hence the lung capacity has to be increased; more fuel is required — hence the whole digestive and assimilative systems have to undergo a hypertrophy, including the apparatus of mastication. Such a power of co-ordinated response on the part of all of the organs of the body to meet the needs of athletic training presupposes a co-ordinating mechanism. We have always regarded such a power of response as an inherent property of the living body, but in the light of our growing knowledge it is clear that we are here dealing with a hormonal mechanism, one in which the pituitary gland is primarily concerned. When we study the structural changes which take place in the first phase of acromegaly, we find that not only are the bones enlarged and overgrown in a peculiar way, but so are the muscles, the heart, the lungs, the organs of digestion, particularly the jaws; hence the marked changes in the face, for the form of the face is determined by the development of the upper and lower jaws. The rational interpretation of acromegaly is that it is a pathological disorder of the mechanism of adaptional response; in the healthy body the pituitary is throwing into the circulation just a sufficiency of a growth-regulating substance to sensitize muscles, bones, and other structures to give a normal response to the burden thrown on the body. But in acromegaly the body is so flooded with this substance that its tissues become hypersensitive and respond by over-growth to efforts and movements of the slightest degree. It is not too much to expect, when we see how the body and features become transformed at the onset of acromegaly, that a fuller knowledge of these growth mechanisms will give us a clue to the principles of race differentiation.

There must be many other mechanisms regulated by hormones with which we are as yet totally unacquainted. I will cite only one instance — that concerned in regulating the temperature of the body. We know that the thyroid and also the suprarenal glands are concerned in this mechanism; they have also to do with the deposition and absorption of pigment in the skin, which must be part of the heat-regulating mechanism. It is along such a path of inquiry that we expect to discover a clue to the question of race color.

This is not the first occasion on which the doctrine of hormones has been applied to biological problems at the British Association. In his Presidential address to the Zoölogical Section at Sheffield in 1910 Professor G. C. Bourne applied the theory to the problems of evolution: its bearing was examined in more detail in an address to the

same section by Professor Arthur Dendy during the meeting at Portsmouth in 1911. At the meeting of the Association at Newcastle in 1916 Professor MacBride devoted part of his address to the morphogenetic bearings of hormones. Very soon after Starling formulated the hormone theory, Dr. J. T. Cunningham applied it to explain the phenomena of heredity. Nay, rightly conceived, Darwin's theory of Pangenesis is very much of the same character as the modern theory of hormones.

2. Factors in the Movements of Peoples²

The movements of peoples are determined by two main factors, which may be briefly described as the driving force and the control; or, in other words, the cause of a migration is due to one set of circumstances and its direction to another.

When reduced to its simplest terms a migration is caused by an expulsion and an attraction, the former nearly always resulting from dearth of food or from over-population, which practically comes to the same thing. Sooner or later, a time comes when the increase of the population of a country exceeds its normal food-supply. Among hunting communities the game may be so reduced by over-hunting or by disease that it cannot support even a stationary or decreasing population. The chief danger to be feared by pastoral peoples is lack of water; a succession of small droughts can make pasturing unprofitable, but when a whole country definitely becomes more arid, migrations on a large scale are inevitable. Evidence has now accumulated which proves that various regions of the earth have undergone slow climatic changes, and that a given area at one period of time may be more or less wooded, while at another, owing to a drier climate, steppes arise, or even desert conditions may supervene. Changes of this nature occurred in parts of Europe during the ages when Palaeolithic men hunted reindeer and chased bison and wild horses; and the desiccation of central Asia has had a profound effect upon human history in Europe as well as in Asia. Agriculturists are affected in the same way; but to a certain extent, by means of irrigation in some cases, and by more intensive cultivation in others, the

² From *The Wanderings of Peoples*, by A. C. Haddon, Sc.D., F.R.S., University Reader in Ethnology, Cambridge; pp. 1-11; 15-18. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1911. Reprinted by permission.)

soil may be made to support an increased population; nevertheless, a limit is soon reached, unless the resources are supplemented by trade.

It is probable that a migration induced by an attraction is rare as compared with that produced by an expulsion, for as a rule people are loth to leave their fatherland, and it usually requires the double set of circumstances to uproot them.

The simplest cases of migration by attraction are those of a people living on poor steppes or plateaus adjoining cultivated land or rich valleys. Agricultural peoples are, as a rule, averse to and ill-prepared for war, and the more prosperous their circumstances, the more they are likely to be enervated by their very civilization. They are thus liable at all times to be attacked by neighboring brigands, who in some cases retire to their barren homes with their booty, but in others remain among the conquered people, and, assimilating with them, in due course become more civilized, and in their turn are subject to invasions from their barbarian kinsmen of the borders. Thus is set up an automatic social mechanism which at the same time civilizes the barbarians and energizes those who have become softened by easy circumstances. To take but two examples: the walled towns of Ancient Greece in the centre of valleys opening out to the sea point to a danger from the brigands of the mountains, and possibly also from pirates from the sea; and the inhabitants of the rich plains of Assam from time immemorial have been subject to raids and settlements by the hill tribes. When people become agglomerated in towns, especially where they have gained notoriety for their riches, the temptation for looting becomes very strong, but as a rule such enterprises do not lead to a permanent migration.

Hunger and loot are not the only impulses towards migration. The restless disposition of the "winners of the west" of North America was not due to an inability to maintain an existence in the Eastern States, nor to an expectation of speedy riches. A craving for land — for more and more land — is only a partial explanation; sentiment, and a reaction against even the slightest of social restraints, had a great deal to do with it. Gold rushes are different, as wealth may thus be speedily gained by rapid exploitation.

Freedom from social, political or religious bondage has resulted in migrations of various kinds, like the exodus of the Hebrew bondmen from Egypt, the voyage of the Mayflower, or the trekking of the Boers. Religious enthusiasm may stimulate race expansion and lead

to shiftings of population, as is seen in the histories of Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. The partnerships of the crescent and the sword, of the cross and the gold of El Dorado, have been based upon a double enthusiasm.

The movements of peoples which are sufficiently dramatic for the ordinary historian to record, are often of less importance than the quiet, steady drift of a population from one area into another, as, for example, in the emigration from Europe to America in modern times. Movements of this kind may result in a noticeable or even a fatal depletion of a country, and the parent country may long remain desolate, or may be filled up in course of time by an alien people, as in the case of eastern Germany and the Slavs. Although immigrant peoples may bring a culture and language permanently affecting the conquered peoples, yet the aboriginal population, if allowed to survive in sufficient numbers, will eventually impair the racial purity of the new comers, and there is a tendency for the indigenous racial type to reassert itself and become predominant once more.

The control of a migration is due mainly to geographical conditions. Movements of men, like those of fluids, take the line of least resistance, flowing, as it were, in channels or open areas bounded by barriers. The latter are of variable resistance; thus, if an open area or a valley is densely populated it may offer a greater resistance than a geographical barrier, and the tide of migration would then flow over or along the barrier. Barriers are thus relative, and only in rare cases are they insurmountable.

An open country is most liable to early occupation, as the labor of felling trees with stone implements is very great; even with iron axes there is considerable difficulty in clearing a forest, a difficulty which becomes enormously increased in tropical jungles. For the same reason an open country is subject to frequent invasions. River valleys, for various reasons, early supported relatively large populations, but the rivers themselves, as a rule, afforded an easy means for ingress to seafaring invaders. Steppes present great difficulties to agriculturists, unless they are supplied with mechanical means for breaking up the soil and reaping the harvest; on the other hand, steppes form the natural home for pastoral peoples, who by their mobility are usually able to keep off intruders. When a hunting population occupies an open country or a steppe, it is ultimately replaced by a pastoral people, especially if the invaders be also tillers

of the soil, for the more they are prone to agriculture the more complete is their usurpation of the land. A pastoral or semi-pastoral people, however, can only migrate along a country which affords sufficient pasturage and watering for their flocks; mountains, forests, deserts, swamps, and the sea form obstacles which are practically insuperable for such peoples. In Africa, at all events, a further barrier towards migration may be found in the tsetse fly, ticks, and other insect pests, which afford intermediate hosts for the parasites of various kinds of cattle diseases.

Mountain chains are obvious barriers which deflect all movements on a large scale, but usually they can be pierced across the passes by the strenuous efforts of armed bands. Even the Romans did not attack the Germans till they had secured their position in Gaul and could find an easy entrance into central Europe. On the other hand the slopes or plateaus of a mountain chain may serve as a bridge when the surrounding country is difficult to traverse.

The movements of peoples may not result entirely from causes which appear to be immediate, but are traceable in some instances to a remote event having at first sight no connection with them. Even an artificial barrier, as Ujfalvy suggests, may have far-reaching effects: "The building of the great wall of China was an event fraught with the greatest consequences, and one may say without exaggeration, that it contributed powerfully to the premature downfall of the Roman Empire."

Another type of artificial barrier is produced by the dominance of neighbouring countries by a powerful empire, which prevents the encroachment of barbarian peoples into countries thus protected. Examples of this are seen in the great empires of the East, the Egyptian dominance of Syria, and the Roman Empire. When the central government became weak, the way was again open for invasion.

Not only is it necessary fully to comprehend existing climatic conditions and geographical features in order to understand human migrations, but it is equally necessary to reconstruct the conditions of different periods since the appearance of man. This is essentially the work of geologists, geographers, and meteorologists. The data are very scanty, and until more have been accumulated and the conditions reconstructed, ethnologists will be unable to elucidate the early history of man.

Our knowledge of the movements of peoples in various parts of the world during the historic period, that is since the time when man

learnt to write his records, is meagre, even in regard to the culture areas; elsewhere, and for prehistoric periods, recourse must be had to tradition and archaeological evidence. Both these sources of information have to be utilized with extreme caution, but where they agree a fair degree of probability if not of certainty can be attained.

The evidences for migrations are to be sought mainly in the physical characters of peoples, their artifacts, customs, folk-tales, and language.

The physical characters of an isolated people are usually fairly obvious, though their accurate description is difficult, and becomes still more so when racial mixture has taken place. The effects of hybridization are as yet very imperfectly understood, as are the effects of change of environment; the disentanglement of racial elements in a mixed people, therefore, requires the greatest care.

Artifacts, that is objects made by man, are often brought forward as evidence of racial movements, but their occurrence may be due merely to borrowing. Archaeology bears the same relation to ethnology that palaeontology does to zoology, and the objects with which it deals are fossils in the true sense of the term. The evidence must be treated in a similar manner. For example, ethnologists learn how to recognize the artifacts of a given people and the differences between them and similar objects made by other peoples; frequently characteristics of material, form, technique, or decoration, are so marked that many objects can be definitely assigned to a particular group of people or to a limited area. In process of time, form, technique, and decoration may become modified, and then it is necessary to determine whether this indicates that definite evolution has taken place *in situ*, or whether influences have come in from elsewhere. If the latter can be proved, the question arises whether the change is due to the immigration of another people into the district, that is a "racial drift"; or whether the innovations are the result of the imitation of objects that have arrived by means of loot or trade, that is a "cultural drift," for there can be little doubt that import trade if considerable and protracted will exert a marked influence on native manufactures. The introduction and methods of utilization of domestic animals and plants may be considered as analogous to the foregoing. For instance, the introduction of the horse into America was due to a racial drift, but its employment by the Plains Indians was a cultural drift.

The same argument applies to a certain extent to custom, and religious ideas and ceremonies. In the latter cases there is probably always some personal influence, but the results may be disproportionate to the numbers; in these instances the racial drift may be inappreciable, or may not affect the local population in the least, while the cultural drift may be quite noticeable.

There has been great discussion concerning the evidential value of folk-tales with regard to cultural drift and racial drift. There is no doubt that they can be passed on from one people to another, but owing to the essential uniformity of human thought the same simple motives can originate independently. When complex tales occur, however, in different countries, then there is a *prima facie* case for borrowing. Further, folk-tales, especially those dealing with mythology, often reflect earlier conditions in a different geographical environment.

It is astonishing with what ease a people can adopt a foreign language, which, however, almost invariably undergoes structural and phonetic modification in the process. For example, the great groups of Indo-Germanic languages mainly result from subject peoples having adopted the alien conquerors' speech. The earlier language of a country, which in some cases underwent sound-shiftings, for instance, the Germanic languages, often survives in place-names. Language is a criterion for racial-contact but not necessarily for migration. On the other hand, language has proved of great assistance in determining the affinities and the movements of peoples in the New World. . . .

There can be little doubt that man evolved somewhere in southern Asia, possibly during Pliocene or Miocene times, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the early groups were not unlike one another, but possessed a tendency to variability which would be directed to some extent by geographical conditions and fixed by isolation. As Palaeolithic man was certainly inter-glacial in Europe we may assume that man was pre-glacial in Asia. The incoming of the Glacial period would start movements, which would be alternately relaxed and accentuated during the inter-glacial mild periods and those of increased cold; during the former the movements would probably be those of simple expansion, but during the latter of propulsion. Assuming the relative, but not the absolute, heights of the Asiatic plateaus in late or post-Pliocene times to have been similar to what they are at present, it may be suggested that a narrow-headed human variety

occupied the lower lands to the north of the plateaus, eventually spreading to America. As there was more than one race of man in Europe in Palaeolithic times, there were probably several narrow-headed (dolichocephalic) varieties in Asia, which may have differentiated by Neolithic times into distinct races; some of these may have become mixed with broad-headed (brachycephalic) peoples and thus formed several of those obscure west Asiatic peoples whose affinities it is so difficult to unravel. The tall, fair, blue-eyed dolichocephals of north Europe are generally believed to be a variety of the Mediterranean race, but these may equally well be two varieties of a common stock, the former probably having their area of characterization in the steppes north of the plateaus of Eur-Asia, and migrating eastwards and westwards as the country dried after the last glacial phase. It will be convenient to speak of them as Proto-Nordics. The prehistoric dolichocephals (Chudes) of southern Trans-Baikalia, the builders of the tumuli (kurgans) of southern Siberia, and the dolichocephalic kurgan-builders of south Russia, probably belonged to this stock which later appears to be represented by the blond, blue-eyed Usuns or Wu-suns (who lived on the northern slopes of the Tian-shan in Chinese Turkestan, and gave so much trouble to the Chinese two hundred years B.C.), and also by the Sacae (and their modern descendants the Balti), the western Scythians, and the Nordics of north Europe. These were mobile peoples who preferred a pastoral to an agricultural life and therefore were a source of unrest to their neighbors. While Mongoloid peoples may have existed around the central plateaus, the true Mongol type appears to have differentiated on those tablelands, whence in times of stress they poured forth on the neighboring lowlands. The western plateaus were the area of characterization of another brachycephalic race, which includes short and tall varieties, but is not at all "Mongolian." This Alpine race extends from the Hindu Kush to Brittany; here and there descents have been made into the lowlands, but it remains an essentially upland people. Western Asia is the home of two main brachycephalic peoples, the Turki and Ugrians, who were doubtless of more or less common origin; usually they are stated to be a very early cross between Proto-Nordics and Alpines, with, in places, occasional Mongol mixture. On the other hand they may be descendants of an intermediate variety between the two former types. South of the plateaus brunet dolichocephals wandered west and east; traces of this

stock are found scattered in south-east Asia, for example the Man-tse of south China, and it is the essential element in the Indonesians and possibly also in the Dravidians of India. Some of the last are mixed with a much lower race, the Pre-Dravidians, survivors of whom may be found among certain jungle tribes, *e.g.*, the Veddas of Ceylon and the Sakai of Malacca. The last remnants of a Negroid stock are the pygmy Andamanese and the Semang of Malacca.

3. Distribution of the Principal Human Divisions³

Two divisions: African and Oceanic. Negro Family Tree. In our Family Tree the "Generalized Negro" appears to be first detached from the parent stem. But strictly speaking it was not detached at all. The Negro group is to be conceived rather as remaining in the primeval home, left behind, so to say, while the others passed on to their several centers of evolution. As seen in the last chapter, this primeval home is assumed to be the Indo-Austral region now flooded by the Indian Ocean. But before, or simultaneously with, the subsidence of the land, its human inhabitants gradually withdrew westwards to Africa, northeastwards to India and Malaysia, eastwards to South Australia and Tasmania and later to New Zealand. . . . Perhaps the strongest argument for the original unity of all these groups, now separated by a great marine basin, is afforded by the fact that the two main sections, the African and Oceanic, comprise two distinct types, the tall Negro and the dwarfish Negrito. As the Negrito appears to represent the primitive stock, from which the Negro diverged later, such a parallelism cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence. . . .

Asia, home of the Mongol race, accessible to the Pliocene precursor. It is admitted by all ethnologists that Asia is the original home of the Mongolic division, a fact which harmonizes well with the view that the vanished Indo-African Continent was the cradle of mankind. From that region the Pliocene precursor had easy access through India itself to the Central Asian plains and plateaus. At present the peninsula appears cut off on all sides by lofty ranges from the mainland, although recent military surveys have revealed a considerable number of relatively easy passes, giving access through the Soleimán Mountains

³ From *Ethnology*, by A. H. Keane; pp. 242-243; 295-299; 334-336; 374-379. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1909. Reprinted by permission.)

to the Iranian tableland. But in the Pliocene epoch all these ranges stood at a much lower level than they now do. Both the Arakan-Yoma, now blocking the way to Indo-China, and the Siválik foothills, date only from the latter part of the Tertiary era, when the Western Himalayas themselves were probably not more than 20,000 feet high, or nearly 10,000 less than at present. Even the Tibetan plateau, now the highest on the globe, was a marine bed in the Cretaceous age, since when it has been slowly raised to its present level. In general "the extra-peninsular ranges, the great Indo-Gangetic plain, the northern margin of the peninsula, and the western coast owe their origin to another great series of earth-movements which took place during the Tertiary era." Consequently the way was open from India to the very heart of the continent, that is, to the shores of the then flooded Central Asian depression, at the very time when Pliocene man began to spread northwards from the Indo-Austral regions.

Transition from the generalized human type to the Mongol variety. Such a precursor, migrating northwards to a new environment on the Central Asian plateau, as at that time constituted, might pass by easy transitions to a form approximately like that of the ideal Homo Mongolicus described in Chap. X. Neither color of the skin, texture of the hair, nor stature could present any difficulty, for in all these respects the Mongol type stands actually nearer than does the Negro to that of the precursor as conceived by de Quatrefages. Hence the unsatisfactory nature of all attempts made to derive the yellow and white varieties from the black, which is generally but wrongly assumed to be in all particulars the best representative of primitive man. It is mainly in the form of the skull, its extreme prognathism and dolichocephaly, as well as in the disproportionate length of the arms and slight muscular development of the calves, that the Negro stands nearest to the anthropoids. Perhaps in most other respects the Mongol takes this position, although Topinard has noticed that in the texture of the hair the white comes nearest to the apes, the black differing most, while the yellow is intermediate. Such results should be expected on the theory here assumed of independent ascent from the prototype, whereas they would be inexplicable on the opposite assumption of successive transitions from one human variety to another. (See Exercise No. 26, below, for a more recent comparison of human races.)

Chief Mongol physical characters. Taken as a whole, the typical

Mongol differs from the other divisions mainly in the general yellowish color of the skin, the broad flat features, with very prominent anteriorly projecting cheek bones, small mesorrhine nose, mesognathous jaws, brachycephalous head, slightly developed superciliary ridges and glabella, somewhat sunken eyes with narrow almond-shaped aperture between the lids, a vertical fold of skin over the inner canthus and outer angle slightly elevated. This oblique eye with its "third lid" is a highly characteristic trait, constant in the more typical groups, and exclusively found in the Mongol division. The black, lank and coarse hair, almost if not quite circular in transverse section, is also a constant but not an exclusive character, being equally common to the American division, and forming the most marked physical link between *Homo Mongolicus* and *Homo Americanus*. It seems to justify the assumption of an original generalized Mongolo-American type, from which the American branched off at an early date prior to later differentiations, as represented in the Family Tree of the Hominidae.

Difusion of the Mongol race. Early Mongolo-Caucasic interminglings. Mongol Family Tree. After the separation the parent stem continued to spread over a great part of the continent, reaching its extreme eastern limits probably in the Palaeolithic age, passing later southwards into Malaysia, and penetrating in Neolithic times into Europe, but apparently not into Africa. This early expansion of the Mongol race, of which there is monumental evidence in Mesopotamia, and abundant ethnical proof in Indo-China and the Amur basin, brought about fresh groupings and interminglings, not only with kindred tribes, but also with Caucasian peoples, who had already in remote times spread from their primeval homes in North Africa and Europe eastwards to Japan, south-eastwards to India and Indo-China, and thence to Malaysia, Australasia and Polynesia. Thus arose, not only on the confines but in the very heart of the Mongol domain, those Mongoloid and Caucasoid aberrant groups, such as the Malaysian Indonesians, the Mesopotamian Akkads, the Dravidians of the Indian peninsula, the Ugrian Finns, and the Túrki peoples, wrongly called Tatars, all of whom are found fully constituted long before the dawn of history, but whose ethnical affinities have remained an unsolved problem. But, speaking broadly, it may be confidently said that the explanation of these ethnical puzzles will be found in the frank recognition of Mongolic and Caucasian elements interpenetrating each other at various points of their respective territories from the

earliest times. In the presence of distinctly fair types and regular "European" features in Manchuria, Korea, Yezo, Turkestan, parts of Siberia, and Malaysia, the assumption must be abandoned that these regions have always been the exclusive appanage of the yellow race. . . .

America peopled from the Eastern Hemisphere during the Stone Ages. Elsewhere general reasons were given for detaching the American aborigines from the Mongolic connection, and treating them independently, as one of the four main divisions of the Hominidae. It was also shown that while a Neolithic age is universally accepted for the New World, there are also good grounds for accepting a Palaeolithic age for at least the southernmost parts (Patagonia, Fuegia) of that region. On the other hand there are no records of any migrations between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres in pre-Columbian or pre-Norse times throughout the historic period, which at all events for Egypt and Babylonia goes back some 8000 or 10,000 years from the present time. Outside those earliest centres of civilization primitive man was at that remote period everywhere at a low plane of culture, from which it follows that, if America was peopled from the Old World, the occupation took place and was practically completed during the two stone ages.

The bronze age of Chimú (Peru), no proof of later intercourse between the Old and New Worlds. The general absence of bronze as well as of iron excludes those metal periods, while the copper age was in the east too short and of too ill-defined a character to be here taken into account. Iron was unknown except in meteoric form. But bronze implements in great number and variety have been collected amid the vast ruins of Chimú, a Peruvian city, capital of an empire overthrown by the Incas (Squier, *Peru, passim*). The occurrence of *chumpe*, as the alloy is locally called, in this district, and nowhere else in the New World, is almost equally inexplicable, whether we suppose the metal itself to have been prepared on the spot, or only introduced and wrought into diverse objects by the local workers in bronze. The few bronze objects, little bells and other trinkets, found in the Isthmus of Panama and in Mexico, appear to have been imported, perhaps from Peru. But for Chimú a real bronze age may be claimed. The people were skilled in other arts and their earthenware was so beautiful in form and finish that they may be called the "Etruscans of the New World." Deposits of tin occur both in

Mexico and in Bolivia, and some of the mines appear to have been worked in pre-Columbian times, so that the Chimu people may have been expert metallurgists as well as artificers. In any case this solitary instance scarcely warrants the assumption of direct trading relations between the two hemispheres in the bronze age, that is, long before the dawn of Chimu culture. On any later contact history is silent.

Hence the aborigines are the descendants of Palaeolithic and Neolithic man, and their culture is a local development. It may thus be inferred that, before the discovery, America received no ethnical contributions of any importance from any quarter after the Stone Ages, and consequently that the aborigines are mainly the direct descendants of Palaeolithic and Neolithic man. If this inference can be established, the further inference will follow of itself, that all their arts and institutions, everything comprised under the general expression "culture," are indigenous, those only being excepted which may be traced to the pre-metal ages. These inferences may thus be briefly formulated: *Homo Americanus* branched off from *Homo Mongolicus* in the Stone Ages, and since then has pursued an independent local evolution, arrested by the arrival of *Homo Caucasicus* in late historic times. . . .

North Africa probable cradle of the Caucasian race. For the history of primitive man in the northern hemisphere the chief geological factor is the condition of the Mediterranean basin in Miocene and later epochs. Reference has already been made to the distribution of land and water after the slow disappearance of the Miocene continent, and it will suffice here to add that Professor E. Hull has lately placed beyond reasonable doubt the existence of barriers, by which the Mediterranean area was separated into a chain of basins in post-Miocene times. Continuous land, or at least land connecting North Africa, Europe and West Asia at several points during the Pliocene and post-Pliocene epochs, is thus established, and at once explains the constant migrations of the large African fauna north and south of the Mediterranean basin. That these migrations were accompanied by primitive human groups is sufficiently attested by the overwhelming proofs of their presence on both sides of this area during the Stone Ages. The long sojourn of Palaeolithic man in Mauritania, using the term in its wider sense, has been revealed by the researches of Dr. Collignon and of Dr. Couillault in the Gafsa district, Tunisia,

and it was also seen that the same region was one of the earliest, and in every respect one of the most important centers of Neolithic culture. Human progress, arrested or at least partly interrupted in the north by the phenomena of glaciation, subsidence, and upheaval, was exposed to none of these disturbing influences in the south, where the Sahara itself formed a well-watered and habitable region, and not, as commonly supposed, a marine bed. Here therefore Pliocene man, migrating from his original seat in the Indo-African Continent, found a new home where by slow adaptation to the changed and improved climatic conditions the highest human type, conventionally known as the Caucasian, may well have been evolved. The white man and the Negro, says a great biologist, have been differentiated "through the long-continued action of selection and environment."


Which spread thence east to Asia and north to Europe. The Crô-Magnon and other early European races affiliated to the fair Berbers of Mauritania. From this centre of evolution and dispersion the higher groups passed by easy transitions, eastwards into the Nile valley and West Asia, northwards to Iberia, and thence to West and Central Europe. But these migrations, like those of the African fauna itself, were successive and spread over a vast period of time, during which the process of upward physical and mental development was in continuous progress. Thus is explained the appearance of low human types (Neanderthal, Spy, Castenedolo) in various parts of Europe during late Pliocene and early Pleistocene times. They represent the first waves of migration from North Africa soon after the arrival of Pliocene man in that region. But they were followed later by higher types, such as that of Crô-Magnon, which radiating from the Vezere district, gradually spread over a great part of Europe, and is by some ethnologists already regarded as the substratum of the present populations of West Europe. De Quatrefages does not hesitate to connect all the fossil remains found in Europe with "the white type," and if these remains be regarded as so many transitional forms in the evolution of *Homo Caucasicus*, there can be no objection to that view. He also agrees with M. Verneau in identifying the Crô-Magnon race with those groups of tall, dolichocephalic Kabyles (Berbers) of fair complexion and often characterized by blue eyes, who still survive in various parts of Mauritania, and were even represented amongst the Guanches of the Canary Islands.

But in consequence of his hypothesis of a northern origin of *Homo*

Sapiens, De Quatrefages is obliged to introduce the Crô-Magnon race apparently from Siberia, "arriving in Europe simultaneously with the great mammals which were driven by the cold from Siberia, and no doubt following their route" (*ib.*). Thus their later migrations are described as following a southerly course, from Belgium, France, Iberia and Italy to North Africa and the Canaries. But the movements of the great mammals were not from north to south, but to and fro, over the Eurafrian Continent, for this fauna was essentially southern, and advanced and retreated synchronously with the advance and retreat of the ice sheet. Hence it is that this exceedingly diversified fauna is scarcely represented in Siberia except by the rhinoceros and mammoth, whereas the early and later species of elephant, lion, bear, hyena, and hippopotamus abound in Britain, France, Italy and Greece.

West Europe occupied by several varieties of Homo Caucasicus in the Stone Ages. The Ibero-Berber problem. Basques and Picts. Thus all the conditions point to North Africa as the true centre of dispersion for the Pliocene and Pleistocene mammals, which invaded Europe in successive waves of migration during those epochs, and which were admittedly accompanied by primitive man in ever-increasing numbers. So thickly inhabited have some more favored districts become in later, but still remote times, that the human remains brought to light by M. de Baye in the Neolithic caves of the Marne basin already show an intermingling of no less than "six races, representing at least three quite distinct types, with an aggregate of characters and a physiognomy which closely recall what may be seen in the most modern craniological collections." As these remains are all connected with the "white type," it follows that several varieties of *Homo Caucasicus* were already developed in Neolithic times in West Europe. It was suggested that none of these pre-historic peoples were of Aryan speech, from which a fresh argument may be drawn in favor of their arrival from North Africa, where no Aryan language was ever current before the Greek occupation of Cyrenaica (7th century B.C.). In this connection the importance of the survival of a non-Aryan form of speech, still spoken by the Basques on both sides of the Western Pyrenees, can scarcely be overrated. The significance of this fact is greatly increased since modern research tends more and more to connect both the Basque people and their primitive language with the indigenous Hamitic (Berber) race and language of Mauri-

tania. We have seen that the late G. von der Gabelentz claims to have established a connection between the Basque and Berber linguistic groups. A similar connection between the Basque and Berber physical types has long been proclaimed by French and Spanish anthropologists, and although a distinct Basque type has lately been denied, it has nevertheless been, so to say, reconstituted by the recent measurements of Basque conscripts taken on the French slope of the Pyrenees. These measurements fully confirm the views of Dr. F. M. Tubino regarding the identity of the Basques with the ancient Iberians, and their relationship to the fair Berbers of Mauritania, as well as to the fair Libans (Libyans) depicted on the Egyptian monuments of the 14th and 15th centuries B.C. It is also to be noticed that the megalithic monuments of Iberia, which abound especially in western Andalusia, in Portugal, Galicia and generally along the north coast, recall "rather the megalithic monuments of Northern Africa than those of Brittany and of the British Isles." But despite local differences, which characterize all widespread cultures, it has already been pointed out that all these Neolithic monuments were erected by the same race, by whatever name they be called — Berbers and Libyans in Africa, Iberians and Turdetani in Spain, "Kelts," "Gauls," Picts in Gaul and Britain. This view is confirmed by the researches of Professor John Rhys, Mr. J. Gray and others, who are now disposed to give a wide expansion northwards to the Iberian race, identifying them with the Picts, that is, the Pictones of Poitou, and the indigenous Pictish inhabitants of the British Isles. Professor Rhys certainly draws a distinction between Picts and Basques; but he supposes them to be "as nearly related to one another as Latins, Teutons and Kelts are held to be related within their own Aryan family. . . . I believe Picts and Iberians to have belonged to one and the same family, which I have ventured to call *Ibero-Pictish*. How nearly related Picts and Iberians may prove to be is a matter for future research." But Mr. Gray seems needlessly to separate the Basques from the Iberians, and to connect the former positively with the Picti of North Britain and the Pictones or Pictavi of South [West] Gaul. "The language of the Picts was Basque. The name Pict is derived from a Basque word, *pikatu*, to cut. . . . The pre-Pictish inhabitants were probably Iberians, and prevailed mostly in Ireland, South Wales, Cumberland and South Scotland." It is right to add that these conclusions are far from being accepted by some of the



FAMILY TREE OF THE HOMINIDÆ

(After Keane)

NOTE:—The Pleistocene (Ice Age) Precursors indicated in Keane's chart have not been identified for any part of the world except Europe. For that continent prehistoric anthropology has established the presence of the Cro-Magnon race in the Post-Glacial period, and the Neanderthal in the Fourth Glacial, or earlier. These are distinctly human races. While the so-called "Pitdown Woman" and "Heidelberg Man" are assigned to the Third and Second Inter-Glacial periods, respectively, they are hypothetical forms based upon a minimum of fact and a maximum of conjecture. (See References at end of following chapter.)

C. M. C.

leading Keltic scholars, such as Mr. Whitley Stokes and Professor Windisch, both of whom still hold that the Picts were Kelts, "but more nearly allied to the Cymry [Welsh] than to the Gael [Irish]."

Family Tree of Homo Caucasicus. But these discordant views on points of detail do not affect the main argument, that *Homo Caucasicus* had his origin in North Africa, and spread thence in Palaeo- and Neolithic times over the whole of Europe, the Nile Valley and a great part of Asia. In the accompanying Family Tree are seen the chief branches, which have ramified from the parent stem during pre-historic and historic times.

Exercises

1. Are racial differences usually exaggerated or slighted in the popular mind?
2. Compare earlier and more recent explanations for the existence of human races.
3. Locate the various ductless glands.
4. Describe some effects of the pituitary gland, and compare them with Caucasian racial features.
5. What racial characteristics suggest the influence of the interstitial glands?
6. Indicate some effects of the supra-renal glands and show how this bears upon racial differences.
7. Describe three bodily effects of the thyroid gland.
8. Describe two abnormal types produced by its activity.
9. Indicate the bearing of the above cited facts on racial differences.
10. Explain the theory of hormones.
11. Show their bearing on the differentiation of races.
12. What two factors determine the movements of peoples?
13. Discuss the propulsive effects of desiccation.
14. Give some examples of migration by attraction.
15. How does an open country affect the movements of peoples?
16. How complete is our knowledge of early migrations and upon what kind of evidence is it based?
17. Distinguish "racial drift" from "cultural drift," particularly as exemplified in the introduction of the horse into America. (See also Reference No. 1, below.)
18. What weight should be given to folk-lore and language in tracing migrations?
19. Where, according to Haddon, did the great human types arise?
20. Characterize the divisions of the Negro races according to Keane.
21. State Keane's theory of the origin of the Mongol race, and give its physical characters.
22. How does Keane account for the red Indian?

23. What are his views with reference to the origin of the new world culture?

24. Where does he find the birthplace of the Caucasian race?

25. On this theory, how is the peopling of Europe accounted for? Note — The African origin of the white race is supported by other writers, notably in the remarkable work by Professor G. Sergi on *The Mediterranean Race*. New York, 1914. (Scribners.) The problem is further presented in our next chapter.

26. Report on Kroeber's discussion of the question of simian resemblances in various races as given in his *Anthropology*. (See Ref. 3, below.)

Additional References

1. Dixon, Roland M.: *The Racial History of Man*. Classifies the world's peoples into eight principal types, on the basis of cranial and nasal indexes. A highly authoritative work treating the subject of racial dispersion in a radically new way. See especially the first and last chapters.

2. Giddings, Franklin H.: *Principles of Sociology*. See pp. 230-238 for some very suggestive "conjectural conclusions" concerning the origin and dispersion of races.

3. Kroeber, A. L.: *Anthropology*. Pp. 62-64 riddle the popular pseudo-scientific notions about ape-like features in certain races.

4. Sittig, Otto: "Compulsory Migrations in the Pacific Ocean," in *Reports of the Smithsonian Institution*. 1895; pp. 519-535. Gives concrete evidence showing the involuntary wanderings of primitive peoples in Oceania.

5. Wissler, Clark A.: *Man and Culture*. Ch. VII., "The Spread of Culture," presents an extraordinarily fine picture of the spread of the horse culture-complex from Central Asia to the New World; with a similar account of the reverse movement in the case of the maize culture-complex.

6. Boas, Franz: "The Question of Racial Purity," in *The American Mercury*, Vol. III., No. 10 (Oct., 1924), pp. 164-169.

CHAPTER XI

ORIGINS AND DISPERSION OF RACES. (*Concluded.*)

IN the chapter just preceding some of the more general aspects of the differentiation of mankind into the varieties called "races" were presented. In this chapter attention is directed to two more specific racial problems. One is the necessarily speculative question concerning the *geographical* origins of the primitive human stock, and the other deals with the probable migrations of certain sub-divisions of the white and black races. In this field of study, where imagination, hypothesis, and inference must be the main dependence, since the facts cannot be collected or observed, there are many interesting theories concerning as many different races and peoples. We present only two or three, selected almost at random. The student will find equally interesting material with reference to the early races of Europe, the American Red Race, the brown people of the Pacific Ocean, or any other division of humanity, in the books referred to in these chapters, and in other ethnological works.

1. Theory of Dispersion from a Vanished Southern Continent¹

Four primary groups. We have seen that recent systematists show a tendency to return to the broad groupings of Linné and Blumenbach, and to recognize with them not more than three or four main divisions of the human family. Flower and Lydekker in a careful survey of the whole field reduce the Hominidae to three primary groups, the *Ethiopic*, *Mongolic* and *Caucasic*, leaving the position of the American aborigines an open question. Although "inclined to include them as aberrant members of the Mongolian type," they add: "it is, however, quite open to anyone adopting the Negro, Mongolian and Caucasian groups as primary divisions to place the Americans apart as a fourth." But they really go farther than this, remarking that "now that the high antiquity of man in America—perhaps as high as that which he has in Europe—has been discovered, the puzzling problem, from which part of the Old World the people of America have sprung, has lost its significance. It is indeed quite as likely that the people of Asia may have been derived from

¹ From *Ethnology*, by A. H. Keane; pp. 221-223; 229-232; 236; 238-241. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1909. Reprinted by permission.)

America as the reverse." And as the pre-Columbians were practically isolated from the rest of the world, "it is difficult to look upon the anomalous and special characters of the American people as the effects of crossing—a consideration which gives more weight to the view of treating them as a distinct primary division." It would therefore seem that on physical grounds alone these anthropologists are prepared to admit the claim of the Americans to be regarded as an independent branch of the human family. This view is greatly strengthened by a consideration of the mental characters as revealed in the independent cultures of the New World. Hence without denying a common origin of both groups, it may still be argued that the American offshoot has diverged sufficiently to be regarded as a distinct variety in the same sense that the Mongol is itself taken as a distinct variety. In other words, the pre-Columbians differ perhaps as much from the Asiatic Mongols as these do from the Caucasian Europeans; consequently all stand in any scheme on much the same level, constituting three branches more nearly akin to each other than any of them is to the Negro or Ethiopic branch.

Homo Aethiopicus, Mongolicus, Americanus, Caucasicus. Linné's original fourfold division must therefore be upheld; nothing would be gained either in clearness or accuracy by attempting on minor considerations to increase or reduce the number of the great systematist's primary groups. These groups, as explained, are to be regarded as so many main varieties of a single species, and not as so many distinct species of genus *Homo*. . . .

Reserving each of these four types for special treatment, it will be convenient here to consider such general questions as equally concern them all. Such are mainly their probable primeval homes, and the direction of their first migratory movements, in other words, their several centres of evolution and dispersion.

Centres of Evolution. Former distribution of land and water. The Indo-African and Austral Continents. From the foregoing remarks there follows a first important corollary, that although man had but one origin, one Pliocene precursor, men had several separate places of origin, several Pleistocene precursors. In our Family Tree four such precursors are assumed, and the question at once arises, in what inhabitable regions of the globe were they evolved? Here the inquiry assumes a somewhat speculative turn, as is obvious from the consideration that, despite the views put forward by Wallace and others

regarding the stability of the Continents, the inhabitable regions of the globe have certainly undergone considerable modifications since the appearance of the Hominidae in their several geographical areas. Doubtless Wallace is right in rejecting Sclater's "Lemuria," as unnecessary to account for the range of the Lemurs. But he cannot reject the "Indo-African Continent," which replaces Lemuria in the Indian Ocean, and which is established on a solid foundation by the naturalists associated with the *Indian Geological Survey*. Thus the hippopotamus, now confined to Africa, is found in a fossil state both in Madagascar and in the Sivalik Hills (Himalayan foothills), while the plants of the Indian and South African coal measures are absolutely identical, and the remarkable *Dicynodon* and other allied forms of fossil reptiles are equally characteristic of both regions. Hence, although belonging mainly to secondary times, considerable sections of the Indo-African Continent, such as are still represented by Madagascar, the Chagos, Seychelles, Mascarenhas and other smaller groups, must have persisted far into the Tertiary epoch.

During this epoch Australia was far larger than at present, not only comprising New Guinea, Tasmania, and perhaps New Caledonia in the Pacific, but also stretching westwards probably as far as the islets of St. Paul and Amsterdam, that is, to within a relatively short distance of the Mascarenhas in the Indian Ocean. "The islands of St. Paul and Amsterdam may indicate where an intervening land once formed a stepping-stone for the intermigration of the plants of Australia and South Africa." In fact an Austral Continent dating from late Secondary or early Tertiary times, surviving in fragments down to the Quaternary epoch, and extending from the Cape through Madagascar and Australia towards New Zealand, seems to be postulated by the huge cursors and other birds such as the *aepyornis* of Madagascar, the dodo of Mauritius, the Australian dromornis and the moa of New Zealand, surviving till quite recently in those regions. . . .

Pliocene and Pleistocene migrations. Order of development of the primary groups. Thus all the conditions point to these Indo-African and Austral lands as the most probable center of the Pliocene precursor, who may have easily migrated thence in small family groups to every part of the eastern hemisphere — northwards through India to Central Asia, eastwards and westwards to Australasia and Central Africa, and from Africa to Europe. From the already described distribution of land and water at that time, it is evident that all the

continents were directly accessible by "overland routes" to the migratory groups, which in their new homes became independently specialized by the natural process of readjustment to the different environments. And thus arose in the new centers of evolution the several Pleistocene groups, whence are derived without any violent transitions the present primary divisions of the human family. Treating of the relative antiquity of these divisions de Quatrefages concludes that "The human races have appeared in the following order: The Yellow, or at least a section of them, would appear to be the elder branch of the present human family; other Yellow men, the Blacks and the Allophylian Whites followed apparently very soon after them, and it would be difficult to say which came first; then may have come the Semites and at last the Aryans." This successive evolution of Blacks, Allophylian and other Whites from different sections of a Mongol prototype, involves transformations, which are both improbable in themselves and unwarranted by the known facts. It seems far more natural to assume an independent and simultaneous evolution of the several Pleistocene groups from a generalized pliocene precursor in different surroundings, where the specialized forms were each determined by their special environment, and afterwards diversely modified by fresh migrations and interminglings. . . .

Flower and Lydekker on the spread of the Hominidae over the globe. Such would also seem to be the assumption of Flower and Lydekker, who, in discussing the primeval dispersion, remark that the first Hominidae were probably all alike (our Pliocene groups); but as they spread over the globe, they became modified by climate, food, the struggle for existence with themselves and with other animals, by selection acting on slight variations, and so forth, the differences showing themselves externally in the color of the skin, and the color and texture of the hair, form of head and face, proportions of limbs and stature. These anthropologists also point out that the geographical position must have been a main factor in determining the formation and permanence of races. Groups isolated in islands or secluded uplands would in due course develop new types in the physical and moral orders. But on large open spaces, continental plains or plateaus, unobstructed by great ranges or other natural barriers, free intercourse would make for uniformity. Smaller or feebler groups would be absorbed or wiped out, conquerors and conquered disappearing or merging

together. "Thus for untold ages the history of man has presented a shifting kaleidoscopic scene," a ceaseless "destruction and reconstruction," a constant tendency towards differentiation and towards fresh combinations in a common uniformity, the two tendencies acting against and modifying each other in diverse ways. At the same time the history of the evolution of the present divisions has been mainly obliterated, and the absence of paleontological evidence, that is, of physical facts drawn from the remote ages when the different races were being slowly fashioned, makes their reconstruction largely conjectural. In other words, the geological record is necessarily imperfect, and many chapters being absent, the gaps between transitional forms cannot all be bridged over. The starting-point itself in the inquiry is unknown, and may never be discovered, as it may lie buried in the bed of the Indian Ocean, or of some other marine or lacustrine basin.

2. Theory of Dispersion from Central Asia²

The next point to consider is the distribution of mankind over the earth. In the synthetic treatment of such a large problem, we need the greatest possible array of corrective data. While such data cannot entirely mitigate the weakness of all interpretations based upon incomplete series of observations, they, at least, serve as friendly guide-posts. If, instead of focusing our attention upon man alone, we take in the whole gamut of mammalian dispersion, we greatly increase the number of these corrective aids. Thus, a brief perusal of general books on mammalian life suggests at once the existence of a veritable swarming center in the heart of Asia. It is not, of course, contended that all mammals arose there, but that a surprisingly large number of the most distinctive families can be successfully localized within the general limits of that continent. This is supported by specific data when we restrict our view to the primates alone, respecting whose Asiatic origin there is no dissenting voice among those competent to speak. The most convenient presentation of the subject is in Matthew's paper on "Climate and Evolution." . . . From this we

² From *The American Indian: An Introduction to the Anthropology of the New World*, by Clark Wissler, Curator of Anthropology in the American Museum of Natural History, New York City; pp. 344-350. (New York and London, Oxford University Press, American Branch. Second Edition, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

see, in a general way, how the many diverse forms of primates have swarmed out of the Old World, one after the other. We have, therefore, no alternative but to conclude that the same factors controlling the dispersion of the whole division of primates apply also to man, and that his dispersion will, in the main, follow the same beaten tracks. With this as a point of departure, it is not very difficult to form a satisfactory statement of the order and direction of dispersion of the known species and varieties of Hominidae.

When we consider the map . . . it appears that the New World is geographically more remote than either Africa, Europe, or the insular area, and has but one point of contact, but that point is in direct line with the assumed center of dispersion. On mere geographical grounds, we should locate the extremes of expansion in Patagonia, Greenland, Cape Colony, Ceylon, and Tasmania. To this list may also be added the extreme western parts of Europe, as the Canaries and British Isles. These are veritable blind alleys in which primitive man was ultimately brought up short and where some of his descendants are still marking time. It so happens, however, that the fluctuating polar ice cap hovers over the single narrow bridge to the New World and the part it has played in the story of the primates is truly wonderful. The reader familiar with the recent literature on Paleolithic man need not be told that the pulsation of this ice-cap is proving the only reliable time clock for human culture. At four intervals, at least, this ice field crept down into North America and into the Old World, each time greatly modifying the distribution of mammalian life.

Though we now have a fairly complete outline of man's relation to these events in Europe, we are quite in the dark as to what happened in Asia and America. The United States school of anthropologists, led by the veteran Holmes, has successfully combated all claims to an interglacial man in America, but this negative result is difficult to harmonize with the cultural career of the aborigines we have just sketched. No doubt it was the consciousness of this that led Boas to formulate the dissenting view: *viz.*, that man reached the New World during an interglacial period. Many investigators agree that ten to twenty thousand years is all that can be allotted for the lapse of time since the last retreat of the ice in the New World. This, of itself, might give time enough to account for the growth of American culture, but the ice receded gradually, in fact, still hangs about

the connecting bridge, so that a much more recent date must be set for the last opening of communication. Reference to our chapter on chronology will show that this leaves a very narrow margin for the development of aboriginal culture. Yet, exactly the same difficulty confronts us in the Old World, for it is clear that the earlier phases of Egyptian development also leave us a narrow margin, if we assume that all the higher cultures we know were developed since the dawn of the Neolithic in Europe. The important difference, however, lies in that whereas we know that man was even at that time a very old inhabitant of the vicinity, his corresponding presence in the New World is denied. Thus, if we accept the theory that man first reached America after the opening of the ice in Alaska, we are under the necessity of assuming a sudden unprecedented growth of culture, unless it turns out that the lapse of time has been greatly underestimated. It seems far more consistent with the facts to assume that the peopling of the New World was contemporaneous with that of Western Europe, and that the subsequent return of the ice practically isolated the two hemispheres, leaving each to develop as it might.

If we leave out of account everything below the Tropic of Cancer, a certain parallelism appears between western Europe and eastern North America, though far more strongly accentuated in the former. The Crô-Magnon man, who appears rather abruptly in western Europe, has in his disharmonic face, one of the most prominent New World characters, and it is not at all improbable that future research in Asia will give grounds for assuming the Crô-Magnon and contemporaneous New World peoples to be collateral branches from a central Asiatic type. More than once, attention has been called to certain vague similarities between certain Paleolithic races and the Eskimo, and in the New World certain older skulls from the remoter parts of South America are not far removed from this same Eskimo type. Incidentally, we may note that the Chancelade skeleton in western Europe belonging to Magdalenian time, is quite similar to the modern Eskimo. The earlier races appearing in Europe tend to be long-headed, and we have noted a less marked, but still noticeable tendency for the long heads in the New World to cluster on the extreme margins. That this is rather fundamental appears when we regard mammals as a whole, for we read that "when the parallel series in Europe and North America are sufficiently complete, they are seen to be not parallel phyla of independent local evolution, but periodically re-

cruited by more progressive new stages, apparently from a common center of dispersal. The relations are like those of one side and the other of a branching tree whose trunk region is unknown to us. The human phenomena we have been considering appear, therefore, as but an integral part of mammalian expansion, and, for that reason, become more evident."

In conclusion, then, we seem to have a large mass of *hominidae* occupying the greater part of Asia and America, the tendency of which was toward round-headedness and straight hair; hanging on the outskirts of these were many variants. This interpretation is not antagonistic to those who regard the modern Indo-European as distinct from the Asiatic-American branch, for the suggestive parallels between earlier types of western Europe and America arise in a much earlier period of man's history. That the New World native is a direct descendant of the Asiatic Mongolian is not to be inferred, for the differentiation is evidently remote; what is implied, is that somewhere in the distant past the Asiatic wing of the generalized type diverged into strains, one of which we now know as Mongolian, and another as American.

3. Probable Origins of Caucasian Peoples³

Evidence of the presence in early times of tall blond peoples in Africa, side by side with a short dark population, and of brachycephals together with dolichocephals, proves that even in the Stone Age ethnic mixtures had already taken place, and racial purity—if indeed it ever existed—must be sought for in still remoter periods.

With Sergi's view which traces the neolithic inhabitants of the northern shores of the Mediterranean (Iberians, Ligurians, Messapians, Siculi and other Itali, Pelasgians), to North Africa, most anthropologists agree. Also that all or most of these were primarily of a dark (brown), short, dolicho type, which still persists both in South Europe and North Africa, and in fact is the race which Ripley properly calls "Mediterranean," although in the west they almost certainly ranged into Brittany and the British Isles. But there are some who hold that the migration was in the opposite direction, and derive the North African branch from Europe, rather than the European branches from Africa. "Anthropologists who have specially studied

³ From *Man, Past and Present*, by A. H. Keane. Revised edition, pp. 452-453. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1920. Reprinted by permission.)

the question of the Berbers or Kabyles have concluded that they are descendants of prehistoric European invaders who occupied the tracts that suited them best." In France the Neolithic "Mediterranean type" has been regarded as lineally descended from Palaeolithic predecessors *in situ*. Some would even go further still, and claim Europe as the place of origin not only of the Mediterranean but also of the Alpine and Northern branches. "The so-called three races of Europe are in the main the result of variation from a common European stock, a variation due to isolation and natural selection."

Summary of Orthodox View. Without making any claim to finality the following perhaps best represents orthodox opinion at the present time. It may be assumed that man evolved somewhere in Southern Asia in pliocene times, and that the early groups possessed a tendency to variability which was directed to some extent by geographical conditions and became fixed by isolation. The tall fair blue-eyed dolichocephals (Northern Race) and the short dark dolichocephals (Mediterranean Race) may be regarded as two varieties of a common stock, the former having their area of characterization in the steppes north of the plateaus of Eur-Asia, and migrating eastwards and westwards as the country dried after the last glacial phase. The southern branch, entering East Africa from Southern Asia, spread all over North Africa; those in the east were the archaic Egyptians; to the west were the Libyans whose descendants are the Berbers; those who crossed the Mediterranean formed the European branches of the Mediterranean race. With regard to the third type, while the central plateaus of Asia were the center of dispersal for the true Mongols the western plateaus were the area of characterization of a non-Mongolian brachycephalic race, which includes short and tall varieties. This is the Alpine race, which extends from the Hindu Kush to Brittany, and formerly spread further westwards into the British Isles.

4. Supposed Origin of the Bushmen⁴

It seems almost as certain that even the aboriginal Bushmen migrated to the south as that they, at one time, were the sole pos-

⁴ From *The Native Races of South Africa, A History of the Intrusion of the Hottentots and Bantu into the Hunting Grounds of the Bushmen, the Aborigines of the Country*, by George W. Stow, F.G.S., F.R.G.S.; pp. 6-8; 11-14. (London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Company, Ltd., and New York, the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.)

sessors of the country. It seems somewhat surprising that so many writers have continued to class these people with the Negroes and other dark-skinned, woolly-haired species of men; whereas if we are to judge from their physical appearance, with the solitary exception of the hair, no two sections of the human race could be more divergent. Their closest affinities in this respect are certainly more frequently to be found among those now inhabiting the Northern Hemisphere than in any other portion of the world. It is possible that the character of the hair may point to the fact that they hold a kind of intermediate station, a kind of connecting link, but still one more nearly related to the men of the north than the splay-footed, swarthy races of Central Africa.

Even the bones of the Bushmen show a marked difference from those of a large number of the Negro type. The writer in his long and frequent wanderings has had many opportunities of examining the striking characteristics which they present. This is particularly noticeable in the almost perfectly cylindrical shape of the bones of the extremities, and the extreme smallness of their hands and feet. Every observant traveler who has come in contact with any of these people has been struck with their remarkably diminutive proportions. "The stature of both sexes," writes Harris, "is invariably below five feet." "Their complexion is sallow-brown." "The women, who were much less shy, are of small and delicate proportions, with hands and feet of truly Lilliputian dimensions. Their footprints reminded us of Gulliver's adventures, and are not bigger than those of a child. Whilst young they have a very pleasing expression of countenance." One of these Bush-people was seen by this enthusiastic traveler, whose foot measured barely four inches in length. It is, therefore, undeniable that their diminutive size of limb gives their bones a delicacy of shape entirely foreign to those of the larger and more robust races alluded to, in some of which the projecting and uncouth-looking *os calcis* becomes a wonderful development. . . .

As there are few in the present day who would hazard the opinion that the Bushmen were "a special creation," adapted peculiarly to South Africa, and as they are now cut off from the more northern birthplace whence they probably sprung, by a zone of nations more ferocious than themselves, we are led to suppose that the impetus which caused these old primitive hunters to migrate farther and farther to the southward was a period of such remote antiquity that

it must have been previous to the occupation of the country by the savage black races which now form, and must have ever formed since they have taken possession of the intervening area, an impenetrable cordon of barbarism, which the weaker hunter tribes, with their puny shafts, could never have forced their way through. The original habitat of the Negro is clearly involved in this but that is a subject which must be left for future discussion. It is, however, almost self-evident, if we consider but for a moment the condition of Central Africa, even at the present day, as described by the most recent travelers, that these stronger nations must have presented the impregnable barrier we have alluded to, through which such a race as the Bushmen never could have broken.

What Stanley and other enterprising travelers describe the black tribes to be *now* has doubtless been, with such unprogressive nations, their condition for unknown centuries. Had the remote ancestors of the Bushmen commenced their southern migration *after* the occupation of the central lands by these hordes of savage men, the smaller and weaker hunter race, as is evident from their subsequent history, could never, as we have before stated, have broken through such a cordon of fierce barbarity. All the evidence we have been able to collect tends strongly to prove that the Bushman race alone, in their southward migrations, moved through a perfectly unoccupied and uninhabited country. The other and stronger races closed in upon their southern retreat and followed their footsteps at a later period.

It would seem from the present researches into the construction of the Bushman language that its northern origin will be fully established. The labors of the late lamented Dr. Bleek threw much new light upon this important subject; and it may be looked upon as one of the most primitive forms of language which has survived to the present day. And the striking manner in which it has preserved what may be termed its purity and individuality is evidently owing to the long continued isolation of the race to which it belonged. Unhappily, by the untimely death of the eminent philologist, inquiry was suspended just at the crisis when the origin of grammatical forms of gender and number, the etymology of pronouns, and kindred questions seemed likely to be solved. One of the great objects was to examine the lower or more primitive forms of speech, so as to exhibit thoroughly and fundamentally the relations in which the Hottentot language stands to some of the northern languages, such as the Egyptian, the

Semitic, and those of the Indo-European family; in fact, to establish that kinship which had been indicated by the Rev. Dr. Adamson, long resident at the Cape.

This question of the Bushman language, its nearer affinity to those of the northern hemisphere than to those of Central Africa, and its freedom from any foreign intermixture, are points of the greatest importance in support of the position which we, upon other grounds, have taken up. . . .

Mr. Moffat considered that the Bushmen have descended from the Hottentots, and gives what he supposes to be a parallel case, in the Balala, a tribe to be noticed in the sequel; but so much evidence has since been obtained which proves this hypothesis to be untenable, that we should only be led into error should we adopt it in pursuing our inquiry. The Korana traditions appear conclusive on the point of the prior existence of the Bushmen in the country, at the time their forefathers migrated from tropical Central Africa to the western coast, and thence to the cape.

That both Hottentots and Bushmen may have descended from the same original stock seems more likely. In that case, however, such a length of time elapsed between the migration of the two offshoots that the language had completely changed, and when they again came in contact they were not able to understand one another. With regard to the language of the Hottentot race, Mr. Moffat remarks that "genuine Hottentots, Koranas, and Namaquas meeting for the first time from their respective and distant tribes could converse with scarcely any difficulty," while the Bushmen "speak a variety of languages" (dialects) "even when nothing but a range of hills or a river intervenes between the tribes, and none of these dialects is understood by the Hottentots." Again, this writer considers the present condition of the Malala will explain the difference. It may explain the difference of the variety of dialects among the Bushmen themselves, but not the wide gap between the language of the Hottentots and that spoken by the Bushmen.

We have also another proof of the length of time which must necessarily have elapsed between the two migrations. Not only had the language completely changed, but the tribes of the later migration had advanced from the purely hunter to the nomadic pastoral stage of existence, while a noticeable alteration had taken place in their physical development. They were no longer tribes of diminutive

dwarfs, but they had become a taller race of men, although still inferior to the more robust and manly Kaffir. A period, however, of no ordinary duration must have intervened to have effected changes of so marked a character.

From the foregoing one cannot doubt but that we are authorized in drawing the following deductions, *viz.*:

1. That the Bushman is not a development of the south, but that he must have had his origin somewhere in the distant *unknown* north.
2. That his language, his artistic talents, and even his physical characteristics, have closer affinities to some of the northern races than to that of the Negro type.
3. That he migrated from the north to the south at a remote period.
4. That that period was so remote that the stronger black races could not then have occupied Central Africa.
5. That therefore the Bushman was the true aborigine of the country.

We can advance still a step further. The Bushman tribes, with regard to their artistic talents, were divided into painters and sculptors. This difference marks two distinct divisions of the Bushman race, and judging from the relics which they have left of their former ownership, they entered the widespread territories of Southern Africa by two different lines of migration. The sculptors moved to the southward through the more central portions of the country, crossing the Zambesi and traversing the country by the Lake Ngami, the Mariqua, and the upper Limpopo, thence to the Malarene and the 'Gij Gariep or Vaal. In the valleys of these two rivers and in that of the Gumaap or Great Riet river they appear to have established their headquarters. Some of them spread to the westward and occupied the mountains of Griqualand West, others extended to the east, and left the records of their occupation upon the rocks of the Wittebergen, a branch of the Maluti range projecting into the Free State. Others again pushed farther to the south, and sculptured over the rocks and boulders as far into the Cape Colony as the present division of Beaufort West, whence some of them migrated as far as the Sneeuwberg.

The painters, on the other hand, appear to have advanced through Damaraland along the western coast. On arriving at the great mountain ranges in the south, they turned to the eastward, in which direction they can be traced as far as the mountains opposite Delagoa Bay. The main body of them, however, settled in the country now

occupied by the Divisions of George, Uitenhage, Albany, Beaufort; Victoria East, Somerset, Cradock, Graaff Reinet, Queenstown, and the Transkeian Territory, thence to the Stormberg and the 'Nu Gariep or Upper Orange river, occupying the whole of the Colesberg and Aliwal districts, and crossing the river, filled every rock shelter to the east and northeast with their cave paintings.

They do not appear to have penetrated as far to the north as the Vaal river: that valley was already thickly peopled by clans of the other division of the family. They also came into contact with the sculptors of the north along the line of the Sneeuwbergen, where some of the clans appear to have amalgamated, as their artists combined both styles of art for the ornamentation of their rock shelters. A small clan of these painters appears to have penetrated as far as to the hills to the north of Griquatown, where a few isolated caves were filled with paintings, while chippings or sculptures alone are found in the country around. This was probably a fugitive clan, that had fled so far to the north whilst their countrymen were being ruthlessly hunted like wild beasts in the southern portions of the country.

Besides these there were numerous clans who lived in the center of the great plains, thus filling up the intervening spaces with inhabitants, and who were neither painters nor sculptors. The painters were the true cave-dwellers, and delighted in ornamenting the walls of their rock shelters; the sculptors lived in large communities, but they preferred the stony hills covered with projecting rocks and boulders, which they sculptured over with their carvings. Their great places were permanent residences, from which they started on their hunting expeditions; their huts were small spherical structures, opening to the east. The occupants of the plains lived in fragile portable shelters, constructed of withes and small rush mats, which they rolled up and moved as fancy and the game might lead them.

5. Traditional Wanderings of the Hottentots⁵

The next section of the human species that claims the attention of a student of South African history is the people known to us as Hottentots. Long considered and termed aborigines by many writers, the not very remote ancestors of these people are now known to have

⁵ From *The Yellow and Dark-Skinned People of Africa South of the Zambesi, etc.*, by George McCall Theal; pp. 58-66. (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1910. Reprinted by permission.)

been colonists in the same sense that the Dutch and English are, that is they came from another country and settled in those parts where they were found by the first European visitors, which localities had previously been occupied by earlier inhabitants. That this circumstance long remained unknown is a matter easy of explanation. Neither the Portuguese, nor the Dutch, nor the early English settlers took any trouble to make the necessary investigations; they were wholly occupied with other affairs, they found the Hottentots in the country, and that seemed sufficient for them to know.

Then, long before any real research was commenced, the Hottentots in those parts occupied by Europeans lost their own language and customs, and the blood of most of them became mixed with that of other races. Their traditions were forgotten, and no information of any value was to be obtained from them. At length the eminent philologist Dr. Bleek, by comparing the language of those who lived in secluded localities and retained their ancestral tongue, with the speech of sections of the inhabitants of Northern Africa, pronounced them to have close affinities. Already, in 1851, the Reverend Dr. James Adamson had reported to the Syro-Egyptian Society a discovery he had made, that "the signs of gender were almost identical in the Namaqua and the Egyptian, and the feminine affix might be considered the same in the Namaqua, Galla, and old Egyptian." This was not known to Dr. Bleek, however, before he made the same discovery.

The question then arose how could the Hottentots, who differ as much from the present black inhabitants of Central Africa as they do from Europeans, have found their way to the south? Various answers were suggested, but as every one who attempted to solve this question regarded the black race as having occupied the whole of Central Africa from the most remote times, none were conclusive or satisfactory. The mystery remained unsolved, like that which veils from our knowledge the cause and the manner of the early migrations of our own race.

A satisfactory answer, however, has now been given, at least to part of what is implied in the question. Mr. George W. Stow, who spent many years in research among the Korana clans, the purest Hottentots now existing — if some small sections of the Namaqua be excepted, — and who was aided in his investigations by missionaries and other inquirers, learned from the traditions of those clans that

their ancestors had indeed moved down from the north, and that too at no very remote time. These traditions, collected in different localities and from individuals who could have had no intercourse with each other, carried back the history of the Hottentots to a period when they were residing in a well-watered region somewhere in the center of the continent, from which they were driven by more powerful people, of a black color, who came down from the north or north-east. They do not go beyond that point, but there is strong reason to believe that the race had its origin in the country now termed Somaliland, and was formed there by the intercourse of men of a light-colored Hamitic stock with women of Bushman blood.

Herodotus mentions that a large band of Egyptian soldiers, said by him to be two hundred and forty thousand in number, deserted and marched into Ethiopia at a date corresponding to about 650 before Christ, and were settled by the Ethiopian king as far beyond Meroë as Meroë was beyond Elephantine. These people he termed the Automoli or Deserters, but by succeeding writers they are called the Sembritae or Sebritae. The locality assigned to them was in about 13° to 14° north latitude, Meroë being not far above the junction of the Atbara with the Nile, or in latitude 17° north. This may not be correct, and certainly, if there was any foundation for the statement, the number of the deserters must be enormously exaggerated, but it shows that such migrations were not deemed impossible at that time.

It is therefore not unlikely that at a much earlier date a small body of men, perhaps soldiers, did make their way from Egypt to Somaliland, and took to themselves there women of the Bushman race, there being no other females for them to associate with. All the difficulties of the problem are solved by this supposition, and to support it there are the following facts:

1. The Egyptian picture of the queen of Punt is seen to be a correct portrait.
2. The Hottentot language, in its structure North African, and yet containing the four Bushman clicks most easily pronounced, is at once accounted for.
3. The possession by the Hottentots of horned cattle and Syrian sheep covered with hair and having very large tails is immediately explained.
4. The peculiarly shaped drilled stones found recently in considerable numbers by Germans in Somaliland, and now to be seen in the

museum at Berlin, which are exactly similar to those used by Hottentots in South Africa and to one in the British museum found in Central Africa, also support this view.

The original Hottentots were therefore mixed breeds, but judging by analogy, there must have been a second intrusion of males, who took consorts from the first cross and so obtained a preponderance of blood, or the newly formed race would not long have remained fertile. They must have been like the Griquas of modern times, who were originally half Hottentots, and who die out speedily if they intermarry only among themselves, but who have often large families if they take consorts of either of the races from which they have sprung.

How long these mixed breeds remained in Somaliland, and what caused them at length to leave that locality cannot be stated, but in all probability they were driven out by the arrival there of people more powerful than themselves. The date of their removal must have been earlier than the occupation of Central Africa by Bantu tribes, for they could not have passed through a region inhabited by any other people than Bushmen, especially as they had horned cattle and sheep with them. Their route was south-westward to the region of the great lakes, but whether they tarried at any place or places on the way, there are no means of ascertaining. Nor can it be even conjectured how long they remained at this new home, though probably it was a period of many centuries.

While they were there the Bantu tribes were increasing in the north and pushing their way down the continent, until they too reached the lake region, and then the Hottentots were compelled to move again. They were acquainted with the use of copper and iron, and were better armed than the Bushmen in advance of them, but they were too few in number to hold their own against the stalwart black men who had now come in contact with them. They had not the energy and alertness of the Bushmen either, for their mode of existence as herdsmen did not need the exercise of those qualities. Thus it is not likely that their resistance was protracted, if indeed they made any resistance at all. Before them the country was open, that is it had no other inhabitants than the pygmy aborigines, so they set out in quest of a place where they could live in safety. It is this point of their history that tradition reaches back to.

They turned their faces to the south-west. Eastward they could not go, because in that direction the Bantu were pressing down the coast,

and probably were already far beyond the latitude they were in. Northward their way was blocked by the enemy they were endeavoring to escape from. Their choice of a route was thus limited, and even in the country apparently open to them, it was only to the southwest that they could proceed in safety. In migrations such as this, the line of least resistance is of course followed, but in the present instance that had to be determined by more than the usual considerations. It was not only the absence of enemies more powerful than themselves, and the physical features of the country to be traversed, its mountains and rivers, that the Hottentot fugitives had to take into account. The question was complicated to them by the existence of the tsetse fly in a broad belt of land to the south, which barred their retreat with cattle in that direction. That insect alone, whose sting is fatal to domestic animals, would have prevented them from crossing the Zambesi until they had travelled very far to the westward. The Bushmen could not oppose them with any chance of success, or they could not have journeyed with their women and children, much less have driven their flocks and herds, through the country, for no right is recognized by savages and barbarians but the right of the strong, even as men observe it to be among the lower animals.

Naturally, all details of the long journey have been lost, the only circumstance preserved by tradition being the point from which it commenced. That it must have been very slow after the danger of immediate pursuit was over, seems certain, however. Cows and sheep cannot be transferred hastily from one kind of pasture to another without heavy loss, and there could have been no motive for hurrying on when only Bushmen were in the neighborhood. Probably many years were spent at each favorable halting place, though the design of a continued advance, once initiated, was never entirely lost sight of.

At length the shore of the Atlantic was reached, and then the wave of migration turned to the south. In some parts of this course, after the twentieth parallel of latitude is passed, the pasture is better at a distance inland than on the margin of the sea. The rainfall along the coast, owing to the prevailing winds being offshore, is trifling compared with that of the thunderstorms in the interior, and the sandy soil does not long retain moisture. It is an arid, sterile belt of land, destitute of running streams and fountains, where in places the sand hills blown about by the wind are constantly changing their form.

It is traversed with difficulty even by those who are acquainted with the localities where scanty pasture and a little water are to be found. Here therefore the migrating horde, which must have been broken up into small parties, moving on slowly at long intervals, turned inland for a short distance and then kept on towards the south, but as soon as possible it moved westward again and pursued its course along the terrace nearest the ocean. Did the wanderers expect that the shore would somewhere turn and lead them to a fairer land, where they could rest at last? No one can tell. Perhaps they themselves did not know of an object in view, but were merely impelled onward by a ruling desire for change. They were not now driven forward by enemies stronger than themselves, but still they advanced. Leaving a section behind in the territory now termed Great Namaqualand, they crossed the Orange river and entered the present Cape Colony.

During their march they must have had constant conflicts with the Bushmen, the only earlier inhabitants of the land, who could not look on unmoved while the country was thus invaded. These puny savages were capable of causing much mischief, though they could not prevent the strangers from either advancing or taking possession of the choicest pastures along the shore. The Hottentots did not regard them as human beings having rights, but simply as noxious animals to be got rid of as quickly as possible. In one respect, however, this was not the case. Young girls of Bushman blood, when captured, were detained and incorporated as inferior members of the families of those who slew their kindred without the slightest feeling of remorse. In this manner, probably from the first contact of the two peoples, a mixture of blood took place, which, though slight in the beginning of the journey from the center of the continent, was considerable by the time the intruding horde reached the Cape promontory. On the other hand, there was no intercourse between Bushmen and Hottentot women, either before or after this period. Their arrival at the southern shore of Africa must have preceded that of the first Portuguese explorers by only a very few centuries, certainly not more than two or three at most, and probably even less.

At different stages between the mouth of the Orange river and Table Bay sections of the horde were left behind, each of which took a tribal name, and thereafter carried on war with its nearest neighbors on its own account. As the majority of the Bushmen who had lived at these localities were either exterminated or forced to retreat farther

inland, the incorporation of girls necessarily almost ceased, so that each tribe of Hottentots from north to south was of purer blood than the next in advance. Nearly all of the former dwellers on the coast, the people who raised the great shell heaps that cannot now be distinguished from natural mounds unless the materials of which they are composed are discovered by accident, must have been cut off at this time. A few only may have survived in situations favorable for concealment, and at a distance from localities where the invaders settled. All the others disappeared, and then dust and sand accumulated on the mounds, and plants began to grow upon them, and when centuries went by all traces of them were lost to view.

When the southern point of the continent was reached, the migratory movement did not end, but, turning eastward, a portion of the horde continued its march, still keeping close to the shore of the sea. At no point except the one mentioned on the long journey, which may have occupied several centuries, was any attempt made to penetrate the interior country. Yet these people did not possess the skill to make even a rough canoe, and only when they were without cattle resorted to catching fish for food. It was therefore not from any attachment to the ocean or from any benefit derived directly from it that they continued their course along its margin, but from the pastures, owing to the greater rainfall, being more luxuriant in its neighborhood than farther inland.

The character of the country had now entirely changed. The south-east wind sweeping over the Indian ocean reached the land laden with moisture, which was deposited in abundance on the lowest terrace, in decreasing quantities on each succeeding plateau, and least of all on the vast plain in the interior. The farther to the north-east one proceeds the more is this perceptible, until the rich vegetation of the shore forms a striking contrast to the desert belt in the same latitudes on the Atlantic side.

As band after band was thrown off along the southern and south-eastern coast, and Bush girls were continually incorporated, the most advanced party at length probably contained more Bushman than pure Hottentot blood. It was so gradually absorbed, however, that it was assimilated, for these little tribes preserved the Hottentot customs and mode of living, and carried on hostilities with the Bushmen just as if they were wholly unconnected with those savages. Along this coast the Hottentots were never so numerous as along the shore

of the Atlantic south of the Orange river. There were wide gaps between the various tribes or distinct bands, which were occupied solely by the aboriginal hunters. At the beginning of the sixteenth century of our era the Hottentots extended thus in a thin line, or rather a series of dots at varying distances from each other, from Walfish Bay on the western coast round to the mouth of the Umtamvuna river on the south-eastern, beyond which there is no indication that they ever advanced.

The cause of their being so thinly scattered along this line was their depending almost entirely upon milk for subsistence. They needed a large number of cows and ewes, and consequently a great extent of pasture for each separate community, as the cattle belonging to all the families composing it were herded together for reasons of safety, and were driven from place to place according to the state of the grass. As soon as a community became so large that this was impossible or even inconvenient, a swarm was of necessity thrown off, and moved to a distance in order to acquire a new pasture of sufficient extent for its use. The offshoot, might for a time consider itself a dependency of the parent band, or a clan of the tribe, but the tendency would soon be towards perfect independence. There was no other way of extension, for a party moving needed to be strong enough to protect itself and its cattle from Bushmen and ravenous animals. For a single family, or even two or three families together, to settle separately on the pasture of a tribe and to keep up connection with the main body was not possible. Each Hottentot community was thus compact, but limited in number to a few hundred or at most to a couple of thousand souls. It occupied a single village, or kraal as now generally termed.

From the neighborhood of the kraal the Bushmen were cleared off as far as possible, but in many instances they still occupied the mountains and seized every opportunity to plunder cattle from the intruders and to put any stray individual of either sex to death. The feeling between the two peoples was in general one of intense animosity, though there were occasional instances of a compact between a Hottentot tribe and the Bushmen in its neighborhood, under which the former provided food in times of great stress, and the latter acted as scouts and gave warning of any approaching danger. This was only the case, however, when the Bushmen were so reduced in number as to be incapable of carrying on war.

The great interior of the country was undisturbed by the intruders, but it did not always offer an asylum to the dispossessed people. Each little band of Bushmen had there its own hunting grounds, and resented intrusion upon them as much by individuals of kindred blood as by strangers. Then they were strongly attached to the localities in which they had lived from childhood, and in many instances preferred to die rather than abandon them. Still there were some who, under exceptional circumstances, made their way to localities far distant from the tracts they had lost, and established themselves anew on a wild mountain or an arid plain, dispossessing previous occupants as they had themselves been dispossessed of their former abode.

Such was the manner of the occupation of the South African coast by the Hottentots, and such were the effects of the invasion upon the earlier inhabitants.

Exercises

1. State the theory of an "Indo-African Continent," and indicate the evidence on which it rests.
2. Discuss in a similar way the theory of a "Eurafrican Continent."
3. How did the geographical conditions above indicated affect the "Pliocene precursor" of man?
4. By what avenues was America accessible from Europe and Asia?
5. By what reasoning does Keane locate earliest man near Australia?
6. Does Keane argue that mankind originated in a single center or in several?
7. How did the racial differences arise, according to Keane's account?
8. Why must all such reasoning be largely conjectural?
9. In Wissler's argument for an Asiatic origin, what part is played by zoölogical evidence? by geological? by anthropological?
10. What, in his view, is the relation between the Mongolian and American races?
11. How far back, according to Keane, did race mixture begin?
12. In Reading No. 3, which represents Haddon and Quiggin's recent revision of Keane's earlier work: (a) Note which European races are derived from Africa; (b) What present-day orthodox opinion holds with respect to the Asiatic origin of each of the three European races, *viz.*, the Northern, the Mediterranean, and the Alpine. *Note* — For a detailed description of these three races consult Ripley, as cited in Ch. IX., Ref. 2.

13. Describe the physical characteristics of the Bushman race, and contrast them with the Negro type.
14. Upon what grounds does Stow hold that the Bushmen were the original inhabitants of S. Africa?
15. What is said of the language of the Bushmen?
16. What is held to be the relation between the Bushmen and the Hottentots?
17. How did the sculptor division of the Bushman race reach their present habitat?
18. What route was followed by the Bushman painters?
19. Contrast Stow's theory of Bushman origins and wanderings with that of Keane, in his *Ethnology*.
20. In Theal's account, how and where did the Hottentot race originate?
21. What facts support the theory?
22. What part did the negro (Bantu) peoples play in Hottentot history?
23. What route was followed by the Hottentots, and for what reasons?
24. What light does Hottentot experience throw on the mode of advance of a pastoral people?
25. What relations have the Hottentots had with the Bushmen?

Additional References

1. Elliot, G. F. Scott: *Prehistoric Man and His Story*. Ch. XV. treats of the earliest occupation of Africa, showing the great highways of migration. Ch. XI., "Pygmies," sheds much light on these most primitive inhabitants of the earth.
2. Keane, A. H.: *Man, Past and Present*. Revised Edition. See page 39, for a most serviceable classification of races, based principally upon hair texture.
3. Kroeber, A. L.: *Anthropology*. Ch. III., on "Living Races," is exceptionally discriminating. See also pp. 347-352, for earliest American migrations.
4. Osborn, Henry F.: *Men of the Old Stone Age*. This entire volume, profusely illustrated, is invaluable for the whole subject of prehistoric races and cultures, but its discussions are too complex and extended to be quoted effectively. The passage on "The Birth of Art," pp. 315-330, is valuable for comparative study of Palaeolithic and modern Bushman art. The resemblance between these two widely separated cultures is striking, and the student desiring to follow it out should make extensive use of the volumes cited here from Osborn and Stow.
5. Wilder, Harris H.: *Man's Prehistoric Past*. Chapter VI. "Known Types of Prehistoric Man." A brief, but comprehensive survey.

CHAPTER XII

LANGUAGE AND GROUP-LIFE

Vocal Intercommunication the Basis of Cultural Development.

THE essentially *human* equipment seems to be a large brain and articulate vocal organs, and of the two it would be hard to choose the more important. The following dynamic series — large fore-brain, expressive vocal organs, articulate language, community of experience, group-learning, accumulation of culture, tradition, civilization — with all its members closely related as cause and effect, tells the story of *human* life, as something distinct from that of animals, even those of highest physical and social type. And it all rests upon the superlative *vocal* equipment of *Homo sapiens*. Man has literally *talked* his way upward from lowest savagery to his present comparatively high estate.

1. The Festal Origin of Human Speech¹

In view of the importance of vocal communication in the development of group-life, it is astonishing how little has ever been written on the phenomenon in its socio-psychological aspects. An examination of the files of the leading scientific journals devoted to anthropology, sociology, psychology, philology, and folk-lore will discover scarcely a single monograph on the subject. The following paper by Donovan, the significance of which was recognized years ago by Giddings in his *Principles of Sociology* (p. 224), still stands almost alone.

The facts of history and ethnology which may be given a new aspect when regarded in the light of the analysis of music cover a very wide field of the early manifestations of human thought and emotion, beginning with the first and rudest vestiges of communal sympathy and tribal glorification, and extending up to the national song or epic. In order to work down to the root of these facts quickly, it must be observed that, while communal interest itself is not peculiar to man, it is peculiar to man, to give expression to this interest in a way which has nothing to do with life-caring instincts. Now what is the rudest and most primitive manner in which man

¹ "The Festal Origin of Human Speech," by J. Donovan, in *Mind*, Vol. XVI, No. 64 (Oct. 1891), p. 500 ff.

is found giving expression to a communal interest apart from practical co-operation for the care of life, hunting and fighting, &c.? The most ancient traditions of the races now civilized and the ethnology of still uncivilized races give the same answer. The communal spirit of man finds its first and rudest expression in the bodily play-excitement which is found in all grades of development from that of the lowest Australian or American aborigines up to the choral dance out of which the first glorifying songs of the race and its heroes are found growing. Certainly we cannot catch sight of this play-excitement in its first spontaneous outlet; at the lowest grade in which the manners of its outlet are found, they had already become manners of racial tradition, and had become involved in the peculiar racial habit of festal celebration. But (1) bodily play-movements in imitation of actions, (2) rhythmic beating, (3) some approach to song, and (4) some degree of communal interest, display themselves as the most constant elements of all festal celebrations. The degree in which the play-excitement is infused with a spirit of communal interest seems to vary considerably in different tribes, but if we start from the generally-accepted explanation of play-movements in animals, and grasp the ultimate reason why play-excitement became infused with the communal spirit, there will be no difficulty in tracing evidences of this spirit even where they are most hidden by accompanying habits. When the strain of action resulted in the satisfaction of the chief animal desires and the play-movements of the pleasant nervous reaction drifted into the manner of the actions that brought about the satisfaction, it was impossible that some of the communal interest which lived amid the actions should not be resuscitated in the play. Few will deny that this is how play-excitement drew communal interest up from its lower animal grounds of life-caring instincts to the distinguishing human habit of expressing this interest apart from actual life-caring co-operation, even if they deny that the event was important in its consequences. And, if it is kept in view while the most familiar phenomena of aboriginal festal celebrations are recalled, it will be perceived that fact verifies this simple interpretation of the connexion between play-excitement and communal interest. In the chief ethnological works, festal celebrations are often placed under the heading of "amusements" even when they display not only a communal interest, but also a pronounced religious spirit. In thus classifying these habits the ethnologists are

obviously influenced by the large element of seemingly aimless play which enters into them, by the rhythmic beating, hilarious cries and songs, &c. They would not attempt to deny that, whether the dance was to celebrate a victory in war, the capture of an animal in the chase, the stranding of a whale, the coming of the salmon, or the finishing of harvest or vintage, the play-excitement would be fused with a more or less solemn spirit of communal interest. Although bodily play-excitement and communal interest are constant elements of festal celebrations, neither of them may be the moving spirit of the celebrations that travellers observe in any particular instance. Having become traditional habits of the tribe, the celebrations had clinging to them interests which were superior to their originating impulse, interests of patriotic and religious memories, which could only have developed along with the mental development which resulted in the origin of the human characters of mind. When the ethnologist regards the celebrations, such interests as these are their vivifying spirit.

My conclusion, plainly, can be nothing else but that the psychologist will advance upon the philologist's negative definition of the ultimate roots of human speech. The philologist says that roots are elements of words which analysis can reduce no further. The psychologist may say that the root is not ultimate for him. He can trace it back to the musical tones which became reproductive agents of the vague presentative elements of actions as they had been repeatedly held together in consciousness by the psychological machinery of nascent musical pleasure. He can trace the root back to the rhythmic sounds that savages produce when they beat sonorous bodies amid the play-excitement which was originated through communal elation of the success of communal action, and which had become, at the earliest glimpse we obtain of it, involved, like the oldest and most sacred of words it gave birth to, in the race's traditional custom of festal celebration.

2. Human Vocal Powers as the Key to Cultural Evolution

Very recently the group-making, community-fostering rôle of language has begun to be remarked upon, although usually in a casual and passing way. In the following article, Professor Ellwood² sets

² "Theories of Cultural Evolution," by Charles A. Ellwood, in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (May, 1918); pp. 790-794. Reprinted by permission.

forth clearly the view herein held to be most plausible with respect to cultural evolution. The extraordinary significance of vocal communication is well explained in his discussion.

We must evidently formulate our theory of cultural evolution in terms of *distinctively* human traits. As soon as we do this, we shall find all the other factors falling into their proper places. It would be foolish to deny the existence and the influence of these other factors, such as geographic conditions, instincts, habits, and even "psychic accidents." But they give us no clear insight into the origin and development of human culture because they fail to include the *differential* factors which produced this new evolutionary series. Now, as we have seen, anthropologists are generally agreed that the distinctive mark of man is his larger and more highly organized brain. And this larger and more highly organized brain of man is characterized by certain areas and organs which are quite entirely lacking in the brains of other animals. These are the higher intellectual centers of the brain, which have to do with conceptual processes, or abstract thinking. We have seen, too, that the larger and better-developed brain of man is correlated with vocal organs which make it possible for him to symbolize his conceptual processes in articulate sounds. Thus along with man's brain has gone the power of relatively definite intercommunication between man and man. Not only a more highly organized brain, with new and more highly organized intellectual centers, characterizes man, but also a more definite mechanism of interstimulation and response, which establishes new and better means of intercommunication. To use the old and more familiar terms, it is language and the power of abstract thought, or of forming concepts, which is the foundation of man's cultural life, and so of his peculiar social evolution. These are the mutations, the new and qualitatively distinct factors, which enabled man to enter upon a new and distinct evolution.

To quote from Wissler, "the forms and varieties of cultural remains seem to necessitate from the first the existence of the rationalizing power at its present level." Again,

We fail to discover any essential differences in the tools of early man and those now made in a rationalistic manner; hence we can do no more than assume that from the first they were mere inventions. There may be, however, very great differences in the intensity of

rationalization between our ancestors and ourselves, but it is difficult to see how even the earlier cultures we know could have taken form without the same qualitative rationalizing power.

Again,

No mechanical movement complexes for tool-making are innate, but there is in man's original nature a (rationalizing) mechanism that lays hold of things and thus supplies the basis for self-rationalization and for the acquisition of the great store of accumulated rationalizations of the race, or culture.

Inasmuch as this argument applies not simply to tool-making but to all other cultural products, such as language, science, art, morality, and religion, Wissler rightly concludes: "We see that culture production, as the devising of tools, etc., is a product of the rationalizing capacity of man, which, in turn, is a part of his original nature."

The full evidence for the conclusion just given cannot be presented within the space of this article, but the case of language will furnish an illustration, and, at the same time, suggest a needed modification in the conclusion presented. Apparently language is coeval with man, and highly organized languages, if we may judge from the lowest existing savages, were developed long before much material culture was achieved. Thus the Bushmen of South Africa have a highly organized language, with a rich vocabulary, capable of expressing complex ideas, but their material culture remains, in all essentials, at the level of paleolithic man. This, of course, should not be the case if the habit-environment theory of culture were adequate and the norm of adjustment were technological or economic conditions. Very evidently a superior method of intercommunication, namely, articulate speech, was necessary for the development of culture. It was necessary because language is the vehicle of tradition, and the development of culture is essentially the development of tradition, or the growth of what sociologists are wont to call the "social mind."

It is not simply, then, as Professor Thomas has phrased it, that "man has a peculiar power of mental calculation which the animals do not possess," but that he has a peculiar mechanism of intercommunication. Culture, to be sure, to use Professor Thomas' language again, is "more fundamentally connected with the operations of the human mind than with the aspects of nature," but it would be wholly impossible without superior means of intercommunication. In

other words, culture in human society has been produced, not only by man's higher intellectual development, but by his more intense social life. To be sure, these two facts are intimately correlated. The higher development of man's brain is probably due to the fact that his precursors used the brain, not simply as an organ of adaptation to the physical environment, but even more as an organ of coadaptation with their fellows. It was the use of the brain as an organ of coadaptation, indeed, which fixed the mutation in the direction of centers for higher intellectual processes — processes, in other words, connected with the use of language. Sociologists have long emphasized that the development of the brain, or the mind of man, as a biological character, has been due to his social life, and recently anthropologists have come to the same view. For example, such development of the brain, since the most primitive times, as we can trace in the fossil remains of man, seems to have been due to the fact that races, or groups, of inferior brain organization have been eliminated in the competition or struggle with groups of higher brain organization. The selection, in other words, fell upon groups, and not upon individuals as such. Everywhere, from the most primitive times, so far as anthropology can gather the evidence, man was a social creature living in small groups, probably of families and hordes.

The mind of man, and so the brain of man, as distinctive from that of other animals, was developed, then, largely as an organ of intercommunication. Its function is more that of a connecting link between individuals, so to speak — that of an organ of coadaptation — rather than that of an organ of adaptation to physical nature. All of this, of course, presupposes an intense, though perhaps narrow, group life upon the part of primitive man and his immediate precursors. To meet the needs of this group life the rationalizing centers in the brain and superior means of intercommunication were developed. If there ever existed a brain that had the power of forming concepts without superior means of intercommunication it could make no use of such a power. It would remain a mere latent capacity. Intercommunication in the form of articulate speech develops this power in each individual after birth. Hence it is clear that the higher intellectual development of man and the development of superior means of intercommunication have gone hand in hand; and it is also clear that these two developments are the foundation of culture. Of course, back of them was the development of the ap-

propriate structure in the brain and in the vocal cords, and these we have already emphasized as the two fundamental organic mutations upon which the evolution of human life, as we know it, has depended.

The theory which we have just set forth may, perhaps, for want of a better name, be called the "socio-psychic theory of culture." It emphasizes, on the one hand, that culture is a social matter, that is, a product of group-life; and on the other, that it is a matter of ideas and of the intercommunication of ideas. The rationalizing capacity of man is without doubt a part of his original nature, but this capacity has received its development in, and functions for, the social life. It is not alone the formation of abstract ideas, but even more their communication which is of significance for the development of culture. This latter point is often overlooked, but careful examination of the material of cultural anthropology, as well as of recorded human history, will show beyond a doubt that *the development of civilization has kept pace with the development of intercommunication*. The apparatus of intercommunication, from the spoken word to "wireless," is of more significance for the evolution of civilization than the apparatus for the production and distribution of material goods.

Ethnologists have made note of the fact that in various primitive tribes the men and women have secret languages unknown to the members of the opposite sex. In the selection following we have an example of the use of an artificial, secret language, or jargon, used to conserve the peculiar traditions and special interests of a very limited and humble class, namely, the tinkers and masons of Ireland, and their comrades in other lands.

3. The Secret Language of Masons and Tinkers ³

Many years ago, when I was looking up gipsies on the roads, I occasionally ran across Irish tinkers. Some of these travel about in their wagons, and camp out, and often several families together. Many people think they are gipsies, and so call them. Indeed, I have seen magazine articles describing them as such. In and near cities the tinker is usually seen alone, ready to mend tin-ware and umbrellas, and do other odd jobs of repairing. Some peddle laces and dry goods, and are prosperous, and one well-known Boston prize-

³ From an article under the above title, by A. T. Sinclair, in *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXII, No. LXXXVI (Oct.-Dec., 1909), 353 ff. Reprinted by permission.

fighter was a tinker. As I had heard they had a jargon, I was interested to know whether it was gipsy, and learned considerable of it from them. They generally know a few gipsy words; but their talk, I discovered, was not at all like Romany. What it was, puzzled me. During a summer spent at Scituate, Massachusetts, I learned to speak Irish from the quaint, picturesque Irish colony of some six hundred "mossers" there. They gather the Irish moss on the rocky sea-bottom when the tide is low. As early as three o'clock in the morning the women wade into the water nearly to their necks, in order to obtain it; while their husbands row off in their dories long distances for the same work. They gather it, dry and cure it, just as they did on the rocky islands and shores of their old home in the west of Ireland. Irish is the language they talk among themselves, and many speak no other tongue. It is an interesting settlement transplanted to America, and full of the tales of fairyland, chivalry, and the music and folk-lore of Erin. The tinker's jargon, I saw at once, was not Irish, but sounded like some Gaelic dialect.

Since then I have noticed in some publications statements that this tinker's talk, called "Shelta," was the language of the old Irish bards, but I was very sceptical about their truth.

Within two years two important articles were called to my attention, — one by Professor Kuno Meyer, the distinguished Irish scholar ("Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society," January, 1891, vol. 2, No. 5, p. 257); the other, by Mr. John Sampson (*ibid.*, October, 1890, No. 4, p. 204). The latter has collected from tinkers a large number of Shelta words, and shown that they are either Old-Irish or a corruption of it. Professor Meyer has conclusively proved that this Shelta is an artificial language, formed by the old bards from very old Irish, which has been handed down, and is now spoken by tinkers. On p. 265 Professor Meyer states as follows: "There is, or was, spoken within the memory of men now living, a Gaelic idiom in Ireland, called 'béarla lagair,' or 'béarla lagair na saor,' an artificial or technical cant, jargon, or gibberish used 'by masons and pedlers, etc.'" — "Judging from the few words of this idiom given, etc., this speech seems by no means a mere artificial cant, or jargon like Shelta." — "It would be of great interest and might be of considerable value if this idiom, supposing it still to be in existence, were written down by some Irish scholar before it wholly disappears."

On mentioning the subject to some old Irish masons here in Allston,

I was surprised to find they could speak this language, which they called "Bearla lagair na saor"; and what interested me, perhaps even more, was the fact that they had a mass of folk-tales and traditions connected with their craft and with Goban Saor, the bard mason, who they say, founded this talk. At first I was very incredulous, for I was well aware of the exuberance of the imaginations of many of the Celtic race; but I found that over a dozen of these masons, unacquainted with each other and questioned independently, all told exactly the same stories and full details. In addition to this, a large number of other old Irishmen knew there was such a mason's talk called "Bearla lagair," and many of these same traditions and folk-tales. It is clear that such was common knowledge among large numbers in Ireland.

This mason's talk is a secret language spoken only by stone-masons, they all claim. Apprentices obtained from a master-mason first papers, second papers, and finally a third paper, called an "indenture," and an increase of wages with each paper. No apprentice was entitled to his indenture until he could speak the "Bearla lagair." They were forbidden to teach it to any one not a mason, even to a member of their own family. No stone-mason would work on any job except with members of the order. This language identified them. They also had secret signs, methods of handling their trowels, squares, and other tools, ways of pointing, and laying and smoothing mortar, which indicated a member, without a word being spoken. Meetings were held, from which strangers were excluded by posted sentinels. Any member who had broken a rule of the craft could be tried and punished. Some of these rules were designed to protect the health; and the tradition is, that in olden times masons had the right to, and did, punish occasionally with the death penalty. They were a powerful order, and at that time contained a large class of the most intelligent men of the time. The mason's trade was perhaps the most important craft.

When the ancient monasteries and churches were building, these stone-masons assembled from far and wide, and with their families camped out near the work.

Sometimes they remained many years on one job. They paid no rent or taxes, and governed themselves. Their temporary habitations were not huts, but tents made of bent saplings covered with oiled cloth.

The architects then were themselves masons, who, by their talent, skill, and ability, rose to be designers of the artistic and elegant edifices now seen in ruins all over Ireland. It was then, and has been ever since, an inherited trade handed down, with its secrets, from father to son. The father of Goban Saor was himself a famous mason and architect. The poet-mason surpassed even the father in skill and renown, and was also a famous bard. The traditions as to the time when he lived vary from before Christ to the seventh century. He is said to have travelled extensively in Ireland, England, and on the Continent, designing splendid edifices, and at times working as a common mason. . . .

The Goban Saor is one of the famous mythical Irish heroes. Sometimes he is styled the Vulcan of Irish mythology in books; but the masons claim him as *their* hero, and he is so spoken of and considered by the Irish peasantry. The shrewdness of the mother seems to have been inherited by his daughter. To her, tradition ascribes the invention of the use of a line to build a wall straight. Before, they were laid by the eye. Her father was one day teaching a son how to do this, and correcting him. She was knitting, and, passing him a long strand of yarn, said, "Give him the line, father." Such little incidents related by masons, although not particularly interesting perhaps in themselves, illustrate the regard and reputation in which the great bard-mason, the founder of Bearla lagair, is still held.

It is said by them that at one time during the Middle Ages the Irish masons were the most skilful artisans in Europe, and in large numbers went to England and the Continent, where their services were eagerly accepted. They were welcomed everywhere by other masons, as the whole craft were bound to assist one another. Common signs and secrets enabled all to recognize one another. They also say that the early Irish monks who Christianized Germany, etc., took with them Irish architects and masons to erect monasteries and churches. Some assert that the masons in England, Scotland, and parts of the Continent understood some of this secret language. It is a fact that some stone-masons in Germany thirty years ago had a secret trade-talk, and in Belgium a tinker class have a jargon which some have supposed may be Shelta. Professor Ernst Windisch of the University of Leipzig, in the *Gaelic Journal*, vol. I. p. 165, tells us that Irish missionaries "swarmed" into Gaul, the Low Countries, Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy, from the sixth to the tenth centuries.

It must be borne in mind that I am simply giving traditions as told me by a large number of men independently, some of whom could not read or write; and all agreeing. I am not vouching for the real facts. It is noticeable, however, that many of these traditions are confirmed by historical records, as that masons camped out with their families, and assembled from long distances in some large work, etc. We also see now in existence ruins of the old round towers and other buildings, in which the mortar is still so hard that it cannot be picked. The secret is now lost; but the tradition is, the mortar was left in clay pits for a year or more, and was mixed with blood. . . .

The men here who speak this mason's talk best are old men. A few of the middle age know some of it. But all are stone-masons who learned their trade in Ireland. Irish stone-masons who learned the craft in America, never speak it, and many never heard there is such a talk. Many people do not notice such things. Within a year I have been told of several small gangs who talked the Bearla lagair every day among themselves on large jobs,—one in Bangor, Maine, also others in Belmont, Auburndale, Providence, etc.

The masons are an intelligent class of men, agreeable to meet when not busy; but the itinerant tinker is generally a different character. In Ireland they bear a hard reputation, as quarrelsome, hard drinkers, and given to every kind of deception and low trick. A woman with a sick baby appears at some respectable farmhouse and begs to be taken in for the night. As soon as all are asleep, she gets up and opens the door, and the house is filled with the whole ragged and perhaps drunken band. Sometimes even the poor farmer and family are practically driven out for the night. The first tinker I met refused to tell me one word of Shelta until a light luncheon in a saloon loosed his tongue. Even then he would not talk until he had asked the saloon-keeper if it was safe to talk with me. Some of the better class, however, who sell laces and dry goods, are prosperous and more agreeable.

All over Ireland they wander about with their wives and children, camping out. They mend tin, iron, copper ware, and crockery with wires and cement, and cast copper, iron, and brass articles, such as flatirons, iron pots and kettles, socks, and sole plates for ploughs, more durable than others, little brass ornaments, etc. Secrets of trade have been handed down. They use a black substance, perhaps bone charcoal, which makes a very hot fire, and fuse a new leg on

a cast-iron pot. Tools such as mason's chisels they sharpen by sprinkling on them a kind of sand, which makes a very durable cutting-edge. Masons have told me this secret was by tradition the same as that used in olden times to sharpen bronze swords, etc., and that these tinkers are the descendants of the old Irish metal-workers, who made the elegant old Irish objects of various metals.

Another of their trades is dealing in horses; and they understand all the arts of fixing horses up to show spirit, and pass off worthless animals as good on the unwary. Sometimes several hundred assemble at fairs, and the inevitable drunkenness and fighting ensue. . . .

As before stated, Professor Meyer and Mr. Sampson have abundantly shown that Shelta, the tinker's jargon, is mostly an artificial language formed from very old Irish. Some of it is back slang; also syllables are prefixed, added, inserted in a word, and various other artifices are resorted to. The Bearla lagair, or mason's talk, is plainly founded on the same Old-Irish, but has a very large number of its words not disguised. The number of words for one thing is often very large. My conclusion is that both *talks* are the same, except that the masons use a very much larger proportion of undisguised Old-Irish words in their ordinary conversation. In this view I am confirmed by a nice, well-educated, old Irish gentleman, Mr. Jeremiah Shaw of Allston, who all his life has been deeply interested in Irish studies. He reads, writes, and speaks New-Irish perfectly, and knows Old-Irish well. From his boyhood he has collected, from hearing it, Irish folk-lore of all kinds and has collected and copied manuscripts. He understands the Bearla lagair thoroughly. He studied it four years in Cork from two itinerant knife-grinders, Driscoll and Kearney; from a mason, Crowley; and later in Killarney during a year with a horse-trainer, O'Shea, who spoke it well. All these spoke it exactly alike. Driscoll called the language "Shelta." Everywhere he traveled in Ireland, and this was much, he often had the opportunity of speaking the Bearla lagair, and improved it. He confirms the above traditions given me by the masons. I prepared a list of over three hundred words found in the articles of Professor Meyer and Mr. Sampson, and went over this list with those masons who know the talk best.

They know more than nine tenths of these words, and said they had often heard them used by masons. They pronounced many of them slightly different from the way I read them, but perhaps no

more so than would be expected, considering that I could not be quite sure of Mr. Sampson's manner of speaking them, and the inevitable uncertainties in taking down any such tongue. They always insisted on their own pronunciation, and would not vary it to suit my list, but they very frequently gave me several other words for the same things. The various disguises of the words they spoke of themselves, and said masons did the same even with New-Irish words to conceal them. All these artifices were well known to them; but they asserted that the masons do not use so many perverted words, but rather archaic words handed down, which have dropped out of New-Irish. Mr. Shaw confirmed all these statements, and generally volunteered the same without any hints from myself. Great care was always taken not to suggest anything, or lead any of these informants. Mr. Shaw's view is that some of these words are older than the oldest known Irish; and he states which these are, and his reasons. Some words are made up of several Old-Irish roots put together.

Exercises

1. Name some distinctive aspects of *human* life, and show the significance of vocal expression for the whole series.
2. What is distinctive about man's communal interest?
3. What is the earliest expression of man's communal interest?
4. Name the constant elements of all festal celebrations. Do they apply to modern civilized groups?
5. Are ethnologists correct in calling primitive festal celebrations "amusements"?
6. How, according to Donovan, does the psychologist answer the philologist's assertion that word roots are the ultimate and un-analyzable elements of human speech?
7. What does Ellwood name as the *distinctively human* traits?
8. Are tool-making and culture-building a part of man's original nature? (See especially Ref. 2, below.)
9. Is this equivalent to the saying of earlier writers, that man is a "rational" being?
10. In Professor Ellwood's discussion, what is the relation between man's social life, higher brain development, and language?
11. What is the connection between intercommunication and culture?
12. Explain: "Its function (*i.e.*, the brain) is . . . more that of an organ of coadaptation . . . than that of an organ of adaptation to physical nature."
13. State the "socio-psychic" theory of cultural evolution.
14. Discuss "intercommunication" as the basis of human progress.

15. Make a list of the distinctive equipment of man as contrasted with the lower animals. Consult Ellwood (above), Wissler, and Keith (Ref. 2 and 3 below).

16. What groups besides savage women and tinkers make use of secret languages or codes?

17. What do such facts teach us concerning the relation between language and group-life?

18. What groups use the "Shelta" speech? the "Bearla lagair?"

Additional References

1. Goldenweiser, A. A.: *Early Civilization*. Pp. 360-380 present an illuminating account and evaluation of Emile Durkheim's theory that crowd excitement in primitive groups is the source of ruling social ideas, or "collective representations." Elaborates a point of view similar to that of Donovan's article.

2. Keith, Sir Arthur: *Man: A History of the Human Body*. Ch. III., "Man's Place Amongst Animals." Ch. V., "The Erect Posture." Evolutionist viewpoint and anatomical method.

3. Sapir, Edward: *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech*. Ch. I. clearly shows the essentially social nature of language. Ch. X. shows its relation to race and culture.

4. Wissler, Clark: *Man and Culture*. In this extremely valuable book, Dr. Wissler has elaborated the thought of the earlier passages quoted by Professor Ellwood in Reading 2, above. See especially Ch. XII., "Culture As Human Behavior."

CHAPTER XIII

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL HEREDITY

IT is the purpose of this chapter to show that education, so-called, is simply a special phase of the transmission of culture through social heredity. Those aspects of the group culture which are felt to be most important, or least likely to be passed on without special attention or practice, are impressed upon the mind of youth in one way or another. This conscious process of inculcation is *education*. When it comes to be carried on in a particular place, at a specified time, and by specialized agents, education has become identified with *schooling*. Thus social inheritance, education, and schooling are phases of one and the same process. / Schools may come and schools may go, but the stream of education within any human group can never cease to flow so long as the life of the group endures.

1. The Nature of Civilization and Its Relation to Education ¹

Our attitudes, beliefs and ideas, our judgments and values; our institutions, political and legal, religious and economic; our ethical code and our code of etiquette; our books and machines, our sciences, philosophies and philosophers—all of these and many other things and beings, both in themselves and in their multiform inter-relations, constitute our civilization. In many of these things it differs from the civilizations of antiquity and from those other remoter ones of pre-history.

It is characteristic of civilization that it persists; a large part of it, in fact, is passed on from generation to generation. But also, it changes: at no two points in time is it quite the same, and the differences in the civilization of two succeeding generations are often perceptible and at times striking.

It takes but little thought to realize that the changes in civilization are each and all due to the emergence of new things, inventions, ideas, which, in the last analysis, are always emanations of the minds of

¹ From *Early Civilization: An Introduction to Anthropology*, by Alexander A. Goldenweiser, pp. 15-18. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

individuals. Whether the change is in a mechanical device, or a detail of social organization; in a new scientific idea or ethical value; in a method of simplifying or improving economic production or distribution; in a new play, or a novel form of stage art; in an article of use, comfort or luxury, a new word, a witticism, a proverb — all of these things originate in individual minds and there is no other place where they can originate. Nor is this generalization in the least affected by whatever view one may hold as to the relative importance of the individual and society in the production of civilization. Even though the individual were wholly determined by the social setting, all of the civilizational changes just referred to, including those in material things, would remain psychological in their derivation and, as such, they could only originate in individual minds, for there are no other minds but those of individuals. Thus the whole of civilization, if followed backward step by step, would ultimately be found resolvable, without residue, into bits of ideas in the minds of individuals.

But civilization also persists and accumulates. Some elements carry over from generation to generation through the sheer objective continuity of material existence. Most of the paraphernalia of our complicated mechanical equipment, the roads, vehicles and houses, the books in our libraries, the specimens in the museums, persist in as crass and material a way as does man's physical environment. The institutions, those crystallized depositories of attitudes, ideas and actions, persist in a less objectified form, for they are only in part represented by material or mechanical arrangements, such as fixed organizations, recorded codes and archives, in whose prolonged existence the change of generations appears as but an incident. But there is still another and more important mechanism through which civilization is passed on from fathers to sons. This mechanism, more dynamic and plastic than the others, is education. Through education, in the home, at school, in society, the past molds the present and sets a pattern for the future.

Here it is important to remember that civilization, psychological and individual though it may be when resolved into a chronological series, is not at all the outgrowth of the minds of individuals or of any particular generation. On the contrary. It comes to them from without, it molds them, it forces itself upon them through the material persistence of its objective elements, through its codes and institutions,

and through the deep cutting tools of education. A large part of the educational process strikes the mind of the individual during the years of highest receptivity and plasticity. Without accepting the extreme verdict of psychonalysis on this matter, it suffices to realize that what is deposited in the mind during the early years of childhood, persists throughout later life with often but slight modification.

Not only is man at the mercy of civilization, but he generally remains either partly or wholly unaware of what he is thus forced to accept.

While we regard the language in which we think and express our ideas as very particularly our own, the grammatical structure of that language rests in the unconscious. The complicated system of classifications, categories and nuances, which make up grammar, are used by the individual without the least realization of their presence. In primitive communities, where writing is unknown, individuals are totally unaware of the very existence of a grammar underlying the language they daily use. The situation is not so very different today, for the fact that grammar is taught does not prevent us from absorbing the structure of our mother tongue without the least reference to whatever conscious knowledge we may acquire of its grammatical principles. Only at the cost of a deliberate and persistent effort can the mind be brought to deal analytically with the elements of the grammar it constantly employs in thinking.

The same is almost equally true of art, particularly of music. The theoretical structure of our musical system is known to but few. Many of those who appreciate music or even produce it by singing or playing an instrument, may remain almost wholly unconscious of the basic principles with which they operate. And, again, in primitive society or among the peasant populations of Europe or among the singing and banjo-playing masses of our cities, the theoretical foundations of the music they enjoy, use and abuse, remain altogether unknown. What applies so drastically to language and art is only to a slighter degree true of other elements of civilization. Rules of etiquette, religious dogma, political convictions, and to a great extent the specialized outlook of a social or professional class, become fixed in the mind of the individual before he is quite aware of what is taking place.

Then, when self-consciousness comes — and to many of us it never comes — we discover ourselves fitted out with all the paraphernalia of

a world view, with a code of morality, behavior and belief. Then we may indulge in a deliberate effort to change these ideas and attitudes or, more commonly, to provide for them an exculpating background of explanations and justifications. Many of our theories of education, of criminology or of etiquette, for example, consist of nothing but such accumulated afterthoughts, invented with greater or less ingenuity to render our unconsciously acquired habits, attitudes and convictions, more congenial to ourselves and better prepared to hold their own in the face of criticism or attack.

The importance of that larger education which is obtained outside of schools, and the relation of the schools to it, are explained with extraordinary lucidity in the following selection, which appeared under the title, "The Unprintable Text Book."

2. Education Outside of Schools²

Human beings cannot let the world alone. Our world, whether physical or social, has been greatly modified by means of inventions. Some of these inventions are distinctly social. "Man is an institution-building animal," said Aristotle. That is to say, man is a social innovator—when he needs to be. Frequently, however, our inventions turn upon us and control us. In the estimation of some, our institutions have become our masters: institutions are everything, the individual and the community are nothing!

However that may be, the boundaries between the various social institutions have never been clearly defined, and the competitions among them for the allegiances of men, women and children have been keen, even bitter and deadly. The church, the state, the home, the shop: all these compete for the loyalty and the energy of us all. In recent centuries, the school has entered into this arena of competition, especially with respect to the time and energy of children.

Schoolish men and women are greatly disturbed by the fact that the boundaries between the school and the other social institutions are not definite. "If," say they, "we could just get the community to agree as to what the work of the school is, we could proceed to organize that work in such specific ways as would advance education immeasurably. But now the home interferes, now the state, the

² By Joseph K. Hart, in *The Survey*, Vol. XLIX., No. 1 (Oct. 1922), pp 33-35. (Copyright, 1922, by Survey Associates, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)

church objects and industry interrupts. Nothing definite can be done about it! Education could organize the world; but the other institutions won't permit it! "

This desire that education should belong to the school and that the school should have a domain of its own, safe from all these interferences of the community, is perfectly natural. In a stationary social order, such a school and such an education might be permitted. But in a democratic and scientific age, no such contention can be accepted. The schoolhouse is not the center of education; the school-man is not the arbiter of what education should be. The whole problem is infinitely more complex. But whatever its complications, democracy must face the issue. That issue is defined, not by the schoolhouse but by the community of which it is a part.

Consider the educational processes and results found in a primitive community before schools came into existence. The school is the youngest of our social institutions, an invention of comparatively recent times. Education is as old as the race, at least; the school is not.

In that little primitive community group of, let us say, some five hundred members, education was just the sum total of all the experiences of the common life. That community had its industries, its religious ceremonials and rituals, its organized social controls, its family life—with all the current traditions, customs and habits that had grown up about these common relationships and activities. Children were born into this group life; they grew up in the midst of its activities and influences; they took on its habits, its skills, its customs and traditions; they graduated from its apprenticeships into adult membership, fully educated for the life they were to live. That education was thorough, practical, moral. For the needs of that group life it was all that could be desired. It assured, within limits, the survival of the group.

But consider further what happened in those later days when populations increased and that community of five hundred members found itself becoming an aggregation of ten thousand, a hundred thousand. In that small community everyone worked; everyone shared in the structure of the social order; everyone was a member of the family life; everyone was of the religious life; all belonged, and each became what everyone else became, subject to unalterable differences in the individual natures.

But as that community grew into what we came to call the city, those common experiences necessarily failed. Children could no longer share completely the old common life. Various interests became institutionalized and segregated. The city developed its "residence district"; its "industrial quarter"; religion was sequestered in a church building; and the social order grew into a "state," with its "city-hall" and its jail. No child could longer find all the primitive interests in its immediate world.

Moreover, the people themselves became specialized: labor was "divided." Some became workers, *per se*; some became politicians; some became "churchmen." Each type tended to monopolize the activities and the prestige of its particular interest, and to neglect or decry the other newly competing interests and activities. No child could longer find all its needs represented in the interests of its own immediate group. And few there were, indeed, who rose above these specializations of personality and of social interest and became true members of the ideal community still imaginatively existent above these fragmentations of interests: that is to say, few individuals could become citizens, in the psychological sense.

Yet, then and now, as of old, education is not complete without some sense of the whole environment within which one's life is to be lived. There are some of course who can function in a fragment of existence, shuttling back and forth in a slot, while the great currents of life pass by unknown and unconsidered. But most people have to get *on the outside* of their environment, at least in some measure. Even though the city grows beyond immediate comprehension, they must do something that will bring them at least a little *understanding*. Education is not *experiences* alone: it is *experience*!

How did this primitive community meet the conditions of break-up in its old, immediately perceptible world? The answer is illuminating. Between that older community without organized schools and our own modern society with its massively organized education we catch glimpses of a little period in which a very peculiar institution existed—an institution whose only trace remaining to us is a word that seems at best whimsical. I refer to the pedagogue. How greatly changed is the meaning of that elderly word and institution!

Yet in those transitional days in Athens, when the primitive life had broken down and the "academic" days had not yet come, the pedagogue was the chief educational factor. He was first of all a

citizen — an individual who still knew his way through the city's life and therefore could help bewildered children find their ways through and into the life of their city. The pedagogue was never a school-man. He was a city-man, a city-zen. He led his charge, or his charges, through the city's streets. He stopped to talk with them about the novel things they saw. He helped them understand what this too-large environment meant. He helped them integrate their experiences into a meaningful experience, "with power on their own lives and on the world."

Ben Franklin tells, in his autobiography, of the days when his father led him through the streets of Boston town, showing him shops and stores, offices and all the other indications of vocational differentiation. When this investigation had been thoroughly finished, the father said to the boy: "Of all the vocations we have examined into, Ben, which would you choose?" That was the work of the pedagogue!

But the city grew. Time passed. The pedagogue grew old and came upon the days of his departure. He knew a great deal about the city, historical and contemporaneous. The city might never see his like again. He wrote a book of his remembrances, the full story of his city as he knew and loved it. And so he died!

There was none like him to take his place in the same complete way. Some knew certain aspects of the city — for their own purposes. But no one knew the city in that complete and understanding way which was the pedagogue's; none could reveal its hidden activities to the children as he had done. What should now become of the education of the children? The answer to this question is illuminating also.

Though no one knew the city as the pedagogue had known it, there were those who had read his book. One such could be found who was practically letter-perfect (say $92\frac{3}{4}$ per cent) in it. As a substitute, this one might do. But with many children on his hands and with a book to teach, he could find no time to wander about the city. Accordingly, they built a house for him — a house with windows so high from the floor that the children could not be distracted by outward sights. Here he met the children and assigned them lessons in the book. And this was the first school!

And here we find the first school-teacher in the academic sense: one who has taken upon himself the bookish learning of other people

and who devotes himself to passing on this second-hand learning to third parties, particularly little children who have no way of defending themselves from the process. Such a school-teacher does not know the materials he is putting over. He finds them in a book. He teaches the book. He does not dare permit himself to be too closely quizzed about the materials. He can but insist that the children learn what is in the book. They ask him for the city and he gives them bookish irrelevancies. They ask him for bread and he gives them a stone!

So education gets into a compartment of its own: it leaves the market-place and the city streets, where Socrates walked and talked with his pupils; it retreats, with Plato, into the shady groves of Academus, in the suburbs, and becomes "academic"! The teacher and the schoolhouse get into the tradition. The book becomes supreme. A book about a city obviates the necessity of investigating the city. A book is something inescapable: "It is written!" Which by translation into the Greek becomes: "It is scripture!" From the which there is no escape! Education ceases to be something that goes on in the life of the community and in the growing life of the child. It is something stored up in books, treasured in schoolhouses, guarded by school-teachers, to be taken on in organized fashion by children, willy-nilly.

All this would not be so undesirable were it not for the fact that the cult of the school developed by this process assumes to monopolize the word education. It holds that education is something that goes on in schoolhouses, under the supervision of school-teachers. Nothing else, or at least little else, can be accepted by the schools — "for credit." All else, all the rich and varied experiences of life and the world may be valuable — "for some things" — but not for credit in the schools. The schools in this fashion achieve a world of their own, with its own standards and rules, the academic world, not the real world. Education is discussed by teachers of this sort, not from the standpoint of its bearings on life and active experience, but from the standpoint of its conformity to some phase or aspect of the tradition. The schools are troubled by the fact that a "real world" lies all about them. Teachers are disturbed by the possibility that some pupil will come alive in the midst of a recitation and ask some "funny" question.

For this reason, in most schools children are never found: only

"pupils"! The pupil is that part of a child which consents to accept and abide by the rules and folkways of the school-room. The connection between the school-room pupil and the living child that waits at the door for the end of the hour is usually very tenuous, sometimes exceedingly remote. Always this barring-out of a part of the child's personality results in some degree of division of attention; not infrequently it results in a divided personality, with all the pathological after-effects that we know. But for most children it means their quick elimination from the schools.

Meanwhile all sorts of constructive and destructive educations are going on elsewhere, in all the activities and experiences of the child's life. An hour spent in the school-room has no superlative virtue. Experience is experience, wherever achieved. To be sure, some experiences are more important than others. But labeling an experience "educational" does not guarantee that superiority. Whatever helps the individual to grasp his world, to tear that world to pieces for purposes of understanding, to put it back together again for purposes of control: such experiences, wherever secured, are the significant experiences for that kind of education which seems to be needed in a democratic and scientific age.

The school might help children of all ages, today, to develop such growing experiences — such a growing experience. But other factors in the community help in these ways, also, and always will help. Industry was once the chief means of educating boys and girls in the primitive community, as we have seen; in the pioneer country district, as many will remember. No matter how important, or how intelligent the school becomes, education will always inhere, in some degree, in the vocations, in the social situation, in community interests and ideals, in every experience of the plastic years.

Moreover, these experiences outside of schools are the primary experiences of life. Just as they existed for children before the school came into being, so they exist for children now, before they ever start to school; they surround the children in all their hours outside of school; they will still condition adult activity in the years after schools are left behind. Schools may be escaped altogether. In any case, they will soon be left behind. But experience cannot be escaped by any sentient being: in spite of schools, education goes on from birth (or even from before birth) until the nervous system becomes so set, or sot, that nothing longer makes impression upon it.

It seems clear, therefore, that in any discussion of education, the argument must begin with the "education outside of schools," the education contributed by the community. This method of discussion leaves the school in a peculiar position. The argument resolutely denies that, in a democratic society, the school has a right to its own traditions, its own standards, its own materials, its own private compartment. As an academic institution, the school will claim such "rights." But securing them will rather quickly subject it to the criticisms of the community. Some of those criticisms will be unfair; some will be 'ridiculous. Enough of them will be obviously irrelevant, and hardened school-men will be able to make it appear that all criticisms of the schools are motivated by ignorance or jealousy or some biased bent of mind.

None the less, the school as an academic institution is an unintelligent substitute for the immediate experience-world of the primitive community and for the illuminating guidance of the old pedagogue. As compared with either of its precursors, its work is faulty in the extreme. The pedagogue might have become institutionalized, in time. He too might have become bookish, pedantic, and remote from reality. It may even be that the school of today is just the institutionalized pedagogue. The survival of that word and its present meaning tend to support that possibility.

But the pedagogue was once the most intelligent member of the community, and at the same time the most understanding and sympathetic member. He knew his community. He knew the needs of the children. He illuminated the life of the community for the bewildered minds of the children, and thereby illuminated those minds. He did not substitute his own experience for theirs. He made his own experience a means and a guide in helping them to develop experiences and experience of their own. He had one function *in his own right*: He did, as pedagogue, those things that needed to be done to help bewildered children find their ways through and into the larger, inclusive life of their city, their world.

The school, if it is to do the work of democracy and support the efforts of science, must return from its academic aloofness, with Plato, and find its place once more in the midst of the actual experiences of life and the world, with Socrates, the pedagogue — must draw them in, must go out to them. What goes on inside of schools must be seen to be the approach to what goes on outside of schools.

The initiation ceremonies of the Australian aborigines have been vividly portrayed by Howitt, and by Spencer and Gillen, in their well-known studies of the tribes of that continent, and their accounts will be found extensively quoted in the *Source Book for Social Origins*, by W. I. Thomas. (See under "Additional References" at end of this chapter.) In the selections printed by Thomas, the description is devoted entirely to the initiation of *boys*. The following selection is offered as an example of similar ceremonies, devised by another primitive people, for *girls*. In this account the educational purpose is clearly evident.

3. A Puberty Ceremony of the Mission Indians ³

I

In 1889 the author attended a puberty ceremony of the Mission Indians at Campo near the Mexican line in southern California. Word had been sent out that the ceremony would be held near this place. Friendly tribes were invited. Among others twenty-five Yumas came across the desert by a trail which leads by the new settlement of Imperial. The writer saw them crossing a mountain ridge mounted on ponies, in Indian file, gaily attired, presenting a most picturesque sight.

An Indian fiesta is usually much the same, though it may be assembled for various purposes. It consists of a general gathering of entire families, and eating, drinking, horse-racing, gambling, and all kinds of merrymaking are indulged in night and day continuously for about a week, or until food is exhausted and the sharpest gamblers have secured all the money and the valuables at hand.

The present ceremony has been observed by the different tribes of Mission Indians of southern California from time immemorial. It has been described under various names, such as the "roasting of girls." It was learned from careful inquiry among the old women that the object of the ceremony is to prepare the girls for matrimony. As they arrive at the age of puberty they are informed of the object of the ceremony and told that they have been selected for it. They look forward to the event with pleasure rather than dread, for contrary to what has been represented there is nothing in it that is repulsive. The object of the present account of this ceremony as it was witnessed is particularly to show its relation to a certain sacred

³ From Horatio N. Rust, in *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1906), with a supplementary note by A. L. Kroeber; p. 28 ff. Reprinted by permission.

curved stone which was then new to the author, and to point out its possible relation to the sacrificial yoke or "Maya stone" of Mexico.

In the open space between the booths prepared for the guests a space was cleared for the dancers. Near this a pit was dug about three feet deep and five feet in diameter. In this pit a fire had been built which had warmed the damp earth and caused steam to arise through the green herbs with which the pit was nearly filled. The girls appeared wrapped in blankets. They lay down upon the green herbs and were covered with blankets. Finding themselves comfortable, they appeared very happy, peering out through their covers, laughing, and chattering. They remained here four days and nights continuously, except that occasionally they were wrapped in a blanket to go away for food. Sometimes acorn meal porridge was brought them to drink. During these four days the old women, who appeared very much in earnest, danced and sang around the pit, waving branches of sagebrush to drive away the spirits. These women intended to keep up their dance constantly, but worn out with old age and continuous effort they sometimes dropped on the ground and fell asleep. Having rested they would then return to the dance. Occasionally the visitors would join in a wild boisterous dance, shouting, singing, and beating time with rattles. These efforts would encourage the tired old women upon whom the responsibility of continuous dancing seemed to rest.

Once during the dancing an old woman appeared and scattered a handful of silver coins over the crowd. Anyone was permitted to secure the coins, and the act caused much merriment. It was explained that this was done to teach the girls to be generous. After this many yards of calico and gingham and ten sacks of wheat were brought and given away to the old and needy, in order to teach the girls by example to be kind to the old and the poor. After this quantities of wild seeds used for food were brought and sowed broadcast on the girls. This was done to cause them to be prolific. During the ceremony grain was also often showered over the crowd by old women.

As the end of the ceremony drew near, the chief ordered all strangers away. The girls, with blankets wrapped about them, arose and received garlands of leaves prepared by friends and placed upon their heads. They were then led away to a hillside where they were shown the sacred stone, which it was said was to protect them. This

stone is about 13 by 15 inches in size, shaped like a yoke, and thirty-five pounds in weight . . . Then friends of the girls hung their garlands on rocks and bushes about, and the sacred stone was buried again. Grain was scattered over all and the ceremony was complete.

It is believed, and taught the girls, that the sweating in the pit and the remaining ceremonies banish bad spirits from the girls; also that the sacred stone entertains and controls these spirits and that they will not return to the girls as long as these do right. . . .

II

NOTES BY A. L. KROEBER

. . . The following information as to the girls' puberty ceremony was obtained on inquiry in 1903 among the Luiseño Indians of Pauma and Rincon in northern San Diego county. These Indians are of Shoshonean stock, while those at Campo described by Mr. Rust belong to the Yuman family.

A fire was made in a hole in the ground. In this ^{bush} tule was placed. The girls lay on this on their backs. The two flat stones were heated and laid on their abdomens. Several girls, generally relatives, were usually put through the ceremony at once. They were called *ās*, and the ceremony *weghenish*. The ceremony lasted four or five days. A head-dress of a plant called *engwish* was worn by the girls for several months after the ceremony. During this period they could eat neither meat nor fish. The duration of this restriction does not seem to have been altogether fixed. The longer it was observed the better it was thought to be for the girls. In some cases it is said to have lasted a year. The ceremony was performed in order to make good women of the girls. They were talked to by their relatives and advised to be good and to give water and food to people.

The conclusion of the girls' period of restrictions at puberty was marked by paintings made by them on the smooth surfaces of large granite boulders. These paintings, some of which can still be seen, especially near the old village sites, consist of geometrical arrangements of red lines, usually in patterns forming vertical stripes several feet high. After making her painting, a girl was again free to eat meat and salt. The paintings were called *yunish*.

At one period, apparently at the beginning of the ceremony, the girls ate tobacco. Several small balls of this, it is said without

admixture of any other substance, were swallowed by them, after which they drank hot water. If they retained the tobacco they were said to be good; but if they vomited it, they were regarded as bad.

Exercises

1. Distinguish education and schooling.
2. What is "civilization"?
3. Name two characteristics of civilization.
4. In what sense is civilization *psychological* and *individual*?
5. In what sense is it *material* and *super-individual*?
6. Discuss the *cumulative* nature of civilization in relation to *education*.
7. Illustrate the *unconscious* aspect of civilization by reference to grammar and music.
8. How does the competition among institutions affect "schoolish" men and women, as described by Hart?
9. How was the educational process carried on in the small primitive community pictured by him?
10. Show how social differentiation of this group affected citizenship and education.
11. What was the social function of the "pedagogue," as painted by Hart?
12. Look up the etymology and definition of "pedagogue" in Webster's Dictionary or any dictionary or history of education.
13. In what respect did Benjamin Franklin's father resemble the ancient pedagogues?
14. Describe the process by which the pedagogue gave way to the academic school.
15. Is bookish schooling really education?
16. Is the process of degeneration described by Dr. Hart merely allegorical or actually historical?
17. What difference does he find between a child and a "pupil"?
18. Discuss earlier industry and vocations as the real teachers. Note also how, under modern factory conditions, they may prevent real education.
19. How can the schools of today be made more truly educative?
20. In what way or sense are initiation ceremonies like those described by Rust and others really educational?
21. Along what general line, or for what social purposes, do they endeavor to educate the youths?
22. Is this social purpose in any way different from that of modern education in theory? in practice?

Additional References

1. Dow, Grove Samuel: *Society and Its Problems: An Introduction to the Principles of Sociology*. Ch. XV., "Education," presents a very comprehensive and instructive survey of education from earliest times to the present.
2. Spencer, Frank Clarence: *The Education of the Pueblo Child: A Study in Arrested Development*. Shows how the simple social organization of a primitive group serves as the channel for transmitting the attitudes, aptitudes, and information valued by the community.
3. Thomas, William I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*. Pp. 213-258 present extensive quotations from Howitt, and from Spencer and Gillen, describing the initiation ceremonies of the Australian boy.
4. Wallas, Graham: *Our Social Heritage*. Pp. 16-25 present a lucid account of the nature and method of the *social* heritage.

CHAPTER XIV

INVENTIONS AND INDUSTRIES OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

THE occupations of primitive peoples are often characterized by ingenuity and, in many cases, by a striking fitness for the circumstances. Yet at the same time there is a vast deal of clumsiness, waste, and reliance upon magical performances in connection with their industrial affairs. In this chapter are presented a few examples from a great wealth of materials, those given having been chosen for their intrinsic interest and representative character. Thus the account of the building of the Eskimo *kaiak* illustrates the extraordinary ingenuity and skill of this people not only in the working of skins, as would be expected, but also in wood-carpentry, a trait one would not expect to find in the treeless wastes of the Arctic. In the construction of the canoe these two techniques are beautifully combined.

The passage referring to the iron industry among the African tribes is given because the Negro stands pre-eminent among primitive peoples in the practice of that industry. The evidence of pre-historic anthropology suggests that Africa gave the iron culture to the world. But while the industry is very ancient and widely spread in Africa, it has not attained a very high development among the Negro races. On this point Frobenius remarks:

"Africa is the classic land of the iron industry amongst primitive peoples. The reason of this is very simple. If the ancient Mexicans had no iron, it was because this metal had not been pressed upon them by nature. If the Africans are, of all rude peoples, the best workers in iron, it is because the broad plains of this continent are nothing less than a vast region of easily worked iron areas. Inner Africa is a great 'laterite basin.' Its very rivers are coloured brown and red by its brown hematites and bog-iron ores. Thus it is not difficult to procure the ores. In a blast-furnace with a tall clay chimney, which is provided with outlets at the base, layers of wood and bog-iron ores are piled up in successive strata. From below the whole mass is set on fire, and then it burns slowly out. Through the outlets at the base the molten metal escapes. Then comes the turn of the blacksmith. By means of a bellows . . . the iron is brought to a glow in the fire, and is then worked up with a simple iron wedge as hammer and a large stone for anvil. A length of rattan or cane simply bent round serves for the most part as tongs." (*The Childhood of Man*, pp. 446-447.)

1. Invention and Discovery Among Primitive Peoples¹

The material progress of mankind rests upon an ever-deepening and widening study of natural phenomena, from which results a corresponding increase in the wealth of means at a man's disposal for his own emancipation, and for the improvement and embellishment of his life. The discovery how to make fire by friction was an act of the intellect which in its own degree demanded as much thinking power as the invention of the steam-engine. The inventor of the bow or the harpoon must have been a genius, whether his contemporaries thought him one or not. And then as now, whatever intellectual gains were due to natural suggestions must have grown up in the individual intellect, in order, when circumstances were favorable, to make its way to the minds of several or many persons. Only suggestions of a lower, less developed kind, such as we may call quite generally tones of mind, appear like epidemics in many simultaneously, and are capable as it were of giving their tone to the mental physiognomy of a race. Intellectual gains are individual achievements, and the history of even the simplest discovery is a fragment of the intellectual history of mankind.

When primitive man was brought naked into the world, Nature came to meet him in two ways. She gave him the materials of food, clothing, weapons, and so forth, and offered him suggestions as to the most suitable methods of turning them to account. It is with these suggestions that we have now to concern ourselves. In invention, as in all that is spiritual in man, the external world, mirrored in his soul, plays a part. We cannot doubt that much has been taken from it. The agreement between type and copy seems very close when we find the tail of a gnu or eland used by the Bushmen of South Africa, just as it was by its first owner, to keep off the flies of that fly-abounding region; or when Peter Kolb relates how the Hot-tentots look only for such roots and tubers as are eaten by the baboons and other animals. When we come to consider the evolution of agriculture, we shall discover many other cases of similar suggestions; justifying us in the reflection that in the lower stages of culture man is nearer to the beast, learns from it more easily, and, similarly,

¹ From *The History of Mankind*, by Friedrich Ratzel (translation of A. J. Butler), Vol. I, pp. 76-81; 87. (London and New York. Copyrighted by the Macmillan Company, 1896. Reprinted by permission.)

has a larger share of brute-instinct. Other discoveries go back to the earliest observations of the sequence of cause and effect; and with the course of discovery the beginnings of science also reach back to the earliest ages of mankind. Some natural occurrence strikes a man; he wishes to see it repeated, and is thus compelled to put his own hand to it. Thus he is led to inquire into the particulars of the occurrence and its causes.

But it is the individual alone who, in the first instance, makes the discovery and profits by it. More is required if it is to become an addition to the store of culture such as the history of culture can take into account. For the mode in which the acquisitions of the intellect are amassed is twofold. First, we have the concentrated creative force of the individual genius, which brings one possession after another into the treasury of mankind; and secondly, the diffusion of these among the masses, which is a preliminary condition of their preservation. The discovery which the individual keeps to himself dies with him; it can survive only if handed down. The degree of vitality possessed by discoveries depends, therefore, upon the force of tradition; and this again upon the internal organic interdependence of the generations. Since this is strongest in those classes who either have leisure or are led by their calling to attend to intellectual matters, even in their most primitive form, the force which tends to preserve what the intellect has won is also dependent on the social organization. And lastly, since a store of intellectual possession has a stimulating effect upon creative minds, which would otherwise be condemned to be always beginning anew, everything which strengthens the force of tradition in a race will have a favorable effect upon the further development of its store of ideas, discoveries, inventions. Those natural conditions, therefore, may be regarded as indirectly most especially favorable to intellectual development, which affect the density of the whole population, the productive activity of individuals, and therewith the enrichment of the community. But the wide extension of a race and abundant possibilities of commerce are also operative in this direction. If we consider, not finding only, but the preservation of what has been found—by diffusion through a wide sphere and incorporation with the permanent stock of culture,—is essential to invention, we shall comprehend that this element of invention, so important for progress, will not attain an equally effective character in all stages of civilization. Everything tends to limit its effective-

ness in the lower stages, for the lower we go in civilization, the less is the interdependence of men kept up; and for this reason the progress of culture in the other direction acquires an accelerated pace.

How many inventions of men may have been lost in the long ages before great communities were formed! Even today how many do we see fallen with their inventors into oblivion, or, in the most favorable case, laboriously dug up again and so preserved? And who can measure the inertia of the stubborn opposition which stands in the way of the birth of new ideas? We may remember Cook's description of the New Zealanders in the report of his second voyage: "The New Zealanders seem perfectly content with the scraps of knowledge which they possess, without showing the least impulse to improve upon them. Nor do they show any particular curiosity either in their questions or their remarks. Novelties do not surprise them as much as one would expect; nay, they do not hold their attention for an instant." We know now that on the remote Easter Island, writing, the most important of inventions, was generally known. It seems to have died out there without leaving any offspring.

What a vista of eternally futile starts opens when we think of this mental immobility and this lack of quickening interdependence! We get a feeling that all the sweat which the struggle after new improvements has cost our age of inventions is but a drop in the ocean of labors wherein the inventors of primitive times were submerged. The germ of civilization will not grow in every soil. The bulk of civilized methods which a race is capable of assimilating is in direct proportion to its average of civilization. Anything that is offered to it beyond this is only received externally, and remains of no importance to the life of the race, passing as time goes on into oblivion or rigidity. To this must be referred the ethnographical poverty found in the lower strata of ethnographically richer races.

If we draw conclusions from certain acquisitions of culture which may be found among a people, such as garden plants, domestic animals, implements, and the like, to its contact with some other people, we may easily forget this simple but important circumstance. Many institutions among the inhabitants of our mountains fail to betray the fact that they have lived for ages in the neighborhood of a high civilization; the Bushmen have appropriated astonishingly little of the more copious store of weapons, implements, dexterity, possessed by the Bechuanas. On the one side the stock of culture progresses,

on the other it retrogrades or stands still, a condition into which a movement, evidently in its nature not strong, easily passes. This is an instructive phenomenon, and a comparison of various degrees of this stationariness is specially attractive. Any one who starts with the view that pottery is a very primitive invention, less remote than almost any other from the natural man, will note with astonishment, not in Australia only but in Polynesia, how a talented race, in the face of needs by no means inconsiderable, manages to get along without that art. And when he finds it in existence only in Tonga and the small Easter Island at the extreme eastern limit of Polynesia, he will be apt to think how much more the intercourse between lands and islands has contributed to the enrichment of man's stock of culture than has independent invention. But that even here again intercourse is very capricious, we learn from the absence of this art among the Assiniboines of North America, next door to the Mandans, who excel in it. Here we learn that inventions do not spread like a prairie-fire, but that human will takes a hand in the game which, not without caprice, indolently declines some things and all the more readily accepts others. (The tendency to stand still at a stage that has been once reached is greater in proportion as the average of civilization is lower.) You do just what is enough and no more. Just because the Polynesians were able to heat water by putting red-hot stones into it, they would never have proceeded to pottery without foreign aid. We must beware of thinking even simple inventions necessary. It seems far more correct to credit the intellect of "natural" races with great sterility in all that does not touch the most immediate objects of life. Migrations may also have given occasion for sundry losses, since the raw material often occurs only in limited quantity, and every great migration causes a rift in tradition. *Tapa* plays an important part among the Polynesians, but the Maoris lost the art of its manufacture. In these lower stages of civilization the whole social life is much more dependent upon the rise than upon the loss of some simple invention than is the case in the higher. (The nearer life stands to Nature, the thinner the layer of culture in which it is rooted, the shorter the fibres which it strikes down to the natural soil, the more comprehensive, the further-reaching every change in that soil naturally is. The invention of the way to manufacture clothing, whether in the form of woven stuffs or of beaten bark, is surely natural and yet rich in results. The entire refinement of existence

among the natural races of Polynesia, resting upon cleanliness and modesty, and sufficient by itself to give them a high place, is inconceivable without the inconspicuous material known as *tapa*. Bark is converted into a stuff for clothing, which provides not only a plentiful covering for the body but also a certain luxury in the frequent change it allows, a certain taste in wearing and in the selection of colors and patterns, and, lastly, a means of amassing capital by preserving stores of this material which are always convertible. Think, on the other hand, of an Eskimo's skin coat or a Negress's leather apron, which are worn through successive generations and laden with the dirt of them. *Tapa*, a material which can be provided in quantities without much trouble, naturally represses the weaver's art, which can only have proceeded by a long and toilsome road from plaiting. In the lake-dwellings there are products which, with equal justice, are referred to both one and the other form of work. This suggests the relations between basket-weaving and pottery; large earthen-ware vessels were made by covering baskets with clay. There is no need on this account, with William H. Holmes, to call the whole art of pottery, as contrasted with plaiting, a "servile art," but this outgrowth is instructive.

The fact that the most necessary kinds of knowledge and dexterity are spread throughout mankind, so that the total impression of the stock of culture possessed by the "natural" races is one of a fundamental uniformity, gives rise to a further feeling that this scanty stock is only the remains of a larger total of possessions from which all that was not absolutely necessary has gradually dropped out. Or can we suppose that the art of producing fire by friction made its way all alone through the world, or the art of making bows and arrows? To discuss these questions is important, not only in order to estimate the measure of the inventive talent possessed by natural races, but also to obtain the right perspective for the history of primitive humanity, for it must be possible to read in the stock of culture, if anywhere, from what elements and by what ways mankind of today has become what it is. Now if we pass in review what is possessed by the natural races in artifices, implements, weapons, and so on, and deduct what is and has been imported, in some cases already to a large extent, by means of trade with modern civilized races, we are inclined to form a high conception of their inventive talent. But what guarantee have we of the independent discovery of all these

things? Undoubtedly before there were any relations with Europeans, relations existed with other races which reached down to these lower strata, and thus many a crumb must have fallen here from the richly spread tables of the old civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, and Japan, and has continued here in a mutilated shape perhaps quite alien to the original uses served by it. The ethnographer knows cases enough of such borrowings; every single race shows examples of them. Nor is the examination of their nature and significance anything new. We may specially recall an original remark of Livingstone's which, though made with another intention, is fairly applicable here: "The existence of various implements which are in use among the Africans and other partially civilized races, points to the communication of an instruction which must have proceeded at some time or another from a superhuman being." Think as we may about the conclusion of this remark, its main point is fully justified as a contradiction of the widespread assumption that everything which natural races have to show of their own came into existence in the place where it is now seen, and was invented by those races themselves. When we find all races in Africa, from Moors to Hottentots, producing and working iron after one and the same method, it is far more probable that this art reached them all from a common source than that it was independently discovered in all parts alike. At one time people pointed triumphantly to the turkey as an animal which had been independently domesticated by barbarous races, until Spencer Baird discovered in Mexico the ancestor of this ill-tempered sovereign of the poultry-yard. In the matter of utensils, borrowing from civilization is naturally more difficult to prove, since these do not, like plants and animals, bear about them, however obliterated, the marks of their origin. But may not the Indian, who got his maize from Mexico, have learnt from the same quarter the art of his delicate stonework? Such introduction, together with its consequence of the widest possible propagation, must seem to us more natural than the independent invention of one and the same utensil, or one and the same touch of art in a dozen different places. Attention has been quite recently called to the fact that the Solomon Islanders have bows and arrows, while the inhabitants of New Ireland and others in the neighborhood have not, and people were quite ready to credit the former with the invention of this ingenious weapon. As has been already pointed out, people are, in this matter, wonderfully incon-

sistent. On the one hand the natural races are put down to the level of the brute, on the other hand inventions are ascribed to them which are, at least, not of an easy kind. One is always too apt to think of invention as easy, considering only the difficulties of finding out, which for a brain of genius are small; but it is otherwise with the retaining of what has been found out. In some cases it has been possible to penetrate down to the more remote origin of apparently quite spontaneous productions of "natural" races. Bastian has compiled a list of cases in which certain elements of European civilization have been formally imitated; a good instance being the characteristic Fijian form of club copied from a musket of the last century. The savages thought they would have the dreaded weapon at least in wood, and produced a club remarkably ill-adapted to its proper purpose. A head-dress used in the New Hebrides is a colossal exaggeration of an admiral's cocked-hat. The remarkable cross-bow used by the Fans is more to the purpose. It reached the Fans of the interior from the Portuguese discoverers on the west coast, and they retained the pattern, while on the coast fire-arms came into use, as in Europe. Now, after four hundred years, the cross-bow turns up again; but as the Fans have neither the patience nor the tools to fashion a lock, they slit the stock, and use the cross-bow to shoot little poisoned arrows which might just as well be shot from a light long-bow. . . .

It is quite wrong to believe that we do not meet with division of labor before reaching a somewhat advanced stage of economic development: Central Africa has its villages of blacksmiths, nay, of smiths who only make throwing-knives; New Guinea its potter villages; North America its finishers of arrowheads. Hence arise those remarkable social and political groups which from guilds become castes, and from castes privileged classes in a race. Hunting-races, who stand towards the agriculturist in a mutual relation of traffic in products, are scattered with special frequency about Africa. Besides these specialized activities there are others distributed among those people who practice their art only occasionally as need requires. The form and fashion of their work therefore often appears in the shape of a busy idleness. A man who has just then nothing better to do polishes a great *trochus* for an arm band, or files some other kind of shell for a finger ring, or prefers to do the engraved work on a club to which he has for years past devoted his leisure. This habit of working with the most liberal expenditure of time, and quite at ease,

goes far to explain the perfection of the things produced. No doubt they are for the most part articles for immediate use and not for traffic, and trade profits little by this limited though persevering labor; whereas an active trade is closely connected with the industries mentioned above.

2. On Inventive Genius Among Primitive Peoples²

It is difficult to imagine the motives which actuate ethnologists in rendering their applause so grudgingly to this genius of invention. Mr. Wake says: "The ingenuity displayed by the Australians in overcoming the many difficulties they have to contend against in dealing with the hard conditions of nature is often, no doubt, very great. Great ingenuity is undoubtedly shown in the native weapons, one of which, the boomerang, would appear to be unknown, in principle at least, by any other race. It must be noted, however, that we do not know the progressive stages through which the boomerang has arrived at its present perfection, and that it may have been an accidental recognition of an operation of nature." Now, is that not too bad? The boomerang arriving at its present perfection! Accidental recognition of an operation of Nature! Was it not just such a history, of a humbler sort, as that of the rifle, the locomotive, the alphabet, the electric light? Recognition of the operations of Nature constitutes the genius of invention. The Australian or humble people just like him commenced this wonderful process. Those cunning little creatures, as Emerson called them, invented the boomerang. And there is not a patent office in the world that would refuse to grant them letters for the exclusive use thereof for seventeen years.

The civilized man passes his whole life in the midst of wheels and cranks and engines of iron. His eyes are on them every day. Now and then a new thought occurs to him in their motion. An improvement which would facilitate their action and lessen his pains or expense. That is called invention, for which he seeks a patent. The savage man passes his life away from wheels. He never saw a wheel until the new-comer showed it to him. But there are around him all sorts of suggestive things that take the place of wheels. He

² From *The Origins of Invention: A Study of Industry Among Primitive Peoples*, by Otis T. Mason; pp. 21-23; 25-26. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913. Reprinted by permission.)

sees how he could improve them so as to facilitate their action, and so as to lessen his labor and multiply his gains. He makes the change. Is not that an invention also?

It surely ought not to fill this magnificent age with envy to admit that intimations at least of our times were heard long ago. The monorganic form of a tool from which a machine is a polyorganic evolution or elaboration ought, according to the nature of things, as they are now understood, to have come first. Furthermore, these old forms ought to have survived and do survive here and there, just as preglacial genera of butterflies may be seen even now, flitting about Mount Washington, in New Hampshire. In the crude art of the French caves is found the prophecy of a people who in this last day should set the fashions of the Western world.

According to Le Bon, "The higher races have never been influenced by a foreign civilisation more rapidly than the lower races, and if they have sometimes adopted creeds, institutions, languages, and arts, different from those of their ancestors, it was not till they had slowly and profoundly transformed them and brought them into relation with their mental constitution." Compare this with oft-repeated assertions that no race or people has ever raised itself to any higher culture. The race or people that did not lay at least one dressed stone on this stately edifice can not possibly have survived.

Schweinfurth says: "A people, as long as they are on the lowest steps of their development, are far better characterised by their industrial products than they are either by their habits or by their own representations, which are often incorrectly interpreted by others." This is entirely in accord with what the present writer has said about the double history of the race, that written in words and that written in things and actions. The former is circumscribed in time and place and intelligibility; the latter is universal, like the objects upon which it is based.

Again: "It is among the most secluded inhabitants, indeed among the rudest tribes, who are partly still addicted to cannibalism, aye, in the very heart of Africa, whither not even the use of cotton stuffs and hardly that of glass beads has penetrated, where we find the indigenous mechanical instinct, the delight in the production of works of art for the embellishment and convenience of life, the delight in self-acquired property best preserved."

Captain Spicer, a whaler, who mingled with the Eskimo, told the writer, that they often make invention a part of their sport. They go out to certain difficult places, and, having imagined themselves in certain straits, they compare notes as to what each one would do. They actually make experiments, setting one another problems in invention. . . .

A great deal that has been written about primitive industries and inventions is wide of the mark, because the writer has failed to take into account what may be called the knack of the age, or the tribe, or the particular method. He has described it as clumsy, and said that he could not for the life of him imagine how people could get along with such appliances. But they did. You will see a professional ethnologist sweating for hours to get a spark of fire with two sticks. The savage will do it for him in as many seconds. By and by the former acquires the knack, and then his trouble vanishes. Lafitau says the polishing of a stone axe requires generations to complete. Mr. Joseph D. McGuire fabricates a grooved jade axe from an entirely rough spall in less than a hundred hours. Every one who reads this will recall examples of this deftness; not only among jugglers and turners, but in the shop, on the farm, about the household there is always some one who has the knack of doing the thing.

“The dean was famous in his time,
And had a kind of *knack* of rhyme,”

says Swift, and there is no doubt that this is the quality which in the higher pursuits of life we call genius. Now this quick perception and dexterity of execution are not traits of higher civilization alone; the savage and the barbarian possess them as well. Indeed, it is sometimes said that the substitution of unerring machinery has taken away the cunning from the human hand. The case is not nearly so bad as that, however. No change of apparatus can deprive the human race of geniuses, for the man of knack will be found excelling in the handling of the new machines. Now I have dwelt on this word in order to account for the earliest differentiation of trades. Doubtless in pristine civilization every man had a multiple of functions, and every woman was mistress of all trades. But travelers tell us that, among the Eskimo, the Plains Indians, the fishing tribes, the Polynesian navigators, the Australian bushrangers, the man of knack takes the lead, is sent ahead freed from all burdens to spy

out and slay the musk ox or other game, while the rest of the gang, men and women, come lumbering along with the conservative luggage. The bow-makers, the arrow-makers, the skin-dressers, the basket-weavers, the potters of the tribe, exalting their occupation and exalted by it in turn, find in the social differentiation the greatest opportunity and encouragement.

3. Hunting and Butchering Game: Omaha Tribe³

The following customs were observed in cutting up the carcasses of the deer, antelope, elk, and buffalo:

After a chase any one could help in butchering the game. The first person to arrive had to set to work at once in order to secure the rights of the first helper. Every animal was cut up into certain portions. These were graded and assigned by custom to the helpers in the order of their beginning work on the carcass. The man who shot the animal might find, on reaching it, men already engaged in cutting it up. In that case he would go to work on some other man's game. He did not, however, lose his rights in the animal he had shot. As every man's arrows bore the owner's peculiar mark, there could be no dispute as to who fired the fatal shot and so owned the killer's share.

All animals were made ready for butchering by being rolled on the back with the head pulled around backward by the beard until the face lay on the ground; next, the head was pushed under the edge of the side to serve as a support to the body as it lay on its back with feet upward. First, the skin was removed in this way: An incision was made at the lower end of the dewlap and the knife run up to the middle of the underlip; the knife was then again inserted at the starting point and a straight cut was made down to the vent; again the knife was inserted at the starting point and a straight cut made down the inside of each fore leg to the ankle. A straight cut was made down the inner side of each hind leg to the ankle. A cut was then made around the mouth and up the line of the nose to the base of the horns and around the horns, leaving the hide, when taken from the deer, antelope, elk, or buffalo, in one piece. The hide was called *ha*; this belonged to the man who killed the animal. The summer hide of the buffalo was called *teskna'ha*, meaning "hide without

³ Adapted from Fletcher and La Flesche; "The Omaha Tribe," in *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, p. 271 ff.

hair." From the *teshna'ha* clothing, moccasins, and tent covers were made, as these hides were easily tanned on both sides. The hides taken in winter were called *meha*; these were used for robes and bedding and were tanned on one side only. The hide of an old bull was preferred for bedding. In flaying the animal for this purpose the usual incisions were made on the breast; after this was flayed it was turned thereon, the hind legs were stretched out backward, the fore legs doubled under the body, and a straight cut was made down the back; then the skin was drawn off on each side. Skill was required to make straight cuts and was the result of much practice. One of the most difficult cuts to make was to follow the dewlap. A true outline was the pride of the hunter and added to the value of the skin, as well as to its beauty, particularly when it was to be used as a robe.

After flaying a buffalo, one of the hind legs was disjoined at the hip and cut off. The flesh of the leg was cut lengthwise, following the natural folds of the muscle, and the bone extracted; this portion was called *tezhe'ga*. The next act was to open the body sufficiently to remove the intestines. The large intestine, the stomach and the bladder were removed and laid to one side. The fore leg was then unjointed and cut off at the shoulder and the bone extracted; this portion was called *tea'*. The breast was next cut; this portion was called *temoⁿ'ge*. The meat between the ends of ribs and the breast was called *tezhu'*. There were two portions of this cut, which were considered very choice. These were the pieces that were offered at the ceremony of Anointing the Sacred Pole and were tabu to the Waxthe'xetoⁿ subgens of the Hoⁿ'ga,* who had charge of these rites. Next, the ribs were severed from the backbone; the ribs from both sides made one portion, which was called *tethi'ti*. The tongue was last to be taken out; this was secured by making an incision in the middle of the underjaw, pulling the tongue through the slit and then cutting it off at the roots. If it was late in the day, or the hunters were in haste, the tongue was left untouched. When one of the writers commented on the loss of so dainty a part, she was answered:

* Note—The "superior n" (as in Hoⁿga) indicates that the vowel preceding it is to be nasalized. The character ɔ is a medial *sh*, a sonant-surd. Ç is pronounced as *th* in *thin*. This sign, t', indicates an exploded *t*. For the complete Souian alphabet, see *3rd. Ann. Rep., Bur. Am. Ethnology*, p. 206.—C. M. C.

"Men do not pay attention to these little delicacies, but when their children ask for them, the men remember."

The following are the portions of the buffalo and their graded values:

1. Tezhu' — side meat; 2 portions.
2. Tezhe'ga — hind quarters; 2 portions.
3. Tethi'ti — ribs; 2 portions.
4. U'gaxetha — includes the stomach, beef tallow, and intestines; 1 portion.
5. Tenoⁿ'xahi — baik; includes muscles and sinew; 1 portion.
6. Temoⁿge — the breast; 1 portion.
7. Tea' — forequarters; 2 portions.

To the man who killed the animal belonged the hide and one portion of *tezhu'* and the brains. Whether he had more or not depended on the number of men who were helping. If there were only three helpers, their portions were as follows: To the first helper to arrive, one of the *tezhu'* and a hind-quarter; to the second comer, the *u'gaxetha*; to the third, the ribs. The various portions were adjusted by the owner of the animal. Each helper received something for his services. It sometimes happened that eight or ten men helped, in which case all the cuts were required. If two or more men butchered an animal in the absence of the hunter, when they finished the work each man took his proper portions and left those belonging to the man who had killed the game. When, therefore, the hunter returned to the animal he had shot, he might find it flayed and cut up and his portions lying on the hide awaiting him. Prominent men did not do the butchering. This work was performed by the poor or by young men, who thus secured food or choice bits. Should a chief or the son of a chief appear on the scene when butchering was in progress, he would be allowed the choice of any portion of the animal.

The large intestine was disentangled by the men, stripped between the fingers, and its contents were thrown away. Then it was handed over to the women to be prepared for cooking. They turned it inside out, washed it, and turned it back, being careful not to disturb the fat that adhered to the outside. A narrow strip of tender meat from the side of the backbone was then cut; one end of the intestine bearing fat on it was turned in and the strip of meat was inserted at this end. As the meat was pushed along, the intestine became reversed — the fatty outside became the inside. After the meat was in,

both ends of the intestine were securely tied; it was then boiled, or roasted on coals. This was called *ta'he* and was esteemed a great delicacy. The meat thus cooked was very tender and all the juice was preserved within its close covering. The stomach was turned inside out, carefully washed, and the inner coating removed and thrown away; the remainder was used for food. The heart and lungs were usually left in the carcass. The small intestines of the sucking calf were braided and roasted over coals; these were regarded as a delicacy. Meat was generally boiled, the water, or soup, being taken after the meat had been eaten.

The bones, used for their marrow after roasting, were: *wazhi'be*, "leg bones"; *tenoⁿ'xahi*, "backbone." The *waba'çnoⁿ*, "shoulder blades," were valuable as implements, particularly those of the elk, used as hoes. The other bones were called: *te'pa*, "skull"; *he*, "horns"; *u'gaxoⁿ*, "hip bone"; *wazhi'beutoⁿ'ga*, "upper leg bone"; *zhi'beuçni*, "lower leg bone"; *te sha'ge*, "hoofs."

The buffalo meat was brought into camp on ponies. Boys drove these animals out to the hunting field for the purpose of packing the meat on them. The running horses used in hunting were not permitted to carry burdens. Sometimes women went out to help in butchering, particularly widows or childless women, or they drove the pack ponies. It was the woman's part to cut the meat into thin sheets and hang it on the racks for drying. The rib meat was cut into strips, braided, and dried.

The rules for butchering an elk and dividing the meat among the helpers were the same as for the buffalo.

After being flayed a deer was cut in half, one side being cut close to the backbone; this half was called the *tathié*. This cut became the property of the first man to reach the deer and to begin to butcher the game. The other half of the deer, that to which the backbone and the neck adhered, was divided through the ribs, making two portions. The hind part of this cut belonged to the second person who arrived on the scene and took part in the butchering. To the man who shot the deer belonged the skin and the portion to which the neck was attached. Sometimes a man was alone when he killed a deer. In that case, after he had flayed the animal he cut all the meat from the bones and left the skeleton. If after he had finished a person should come up, the hunter would say, *Bthé uthi shnude* (*bthe*, "all"; *uthisnude*, "stripped"), that is "the meat is stripped

from the bones," making but one piece without divisions. Under such circumstances no portion would be given to the newcomer nor would any be demanded. This manner of taking home the deer saved labor to the women, as the meat was nearly ready to hang on the *wá moⁿ* shiha, or "rack," for jerking.

The rules for butchering and dividing the flesh of the antelope and bear were the same as observed with the deer.

4. The Building of the Eskimo Kaiak ⁴

Kaiaks and paddles.—Like all the rest of the Eskimo race, the natives of Point Barrow use the kaiak, or narrow, light, skin-covered canoe, completely decked over except at the middle, where there is a hole or cockpit in which the man sits. Although nearly every male above the age of boyhood owns and can manage one of these canoes, they are much less generally employed than by any other Eskimo whose habits have been described, except the "Arctic highlanders," who have no boats, and perhaps those of Siberia and their Chuckche companions. The kaiak is used only during the season of open water, and then but little in the sea in the neighborhood of the villages. Those who remain near the villages in the summer use the kaiak chiefly for making the short excursions to the lakes and streams inland, already described, after reindeer, and for making short trips from camp to camp along the coast. At Pernyû they are used in setting the stake-nets and also for retrieving fowl which have fallen in the water when shot.

According to Dr. Simpson the men of the parties which go east in the summer travel in their kaiaks after reaching the open water "to make room in the large boat for the oil-skins." We obtained no information regarding this. It is at this time, probably, that the kaiak comes specially in play for spearing molting fowl and "flappers," and for catching seals with the *kúkiga*. They manage the kaiak with great skill and confidence, but we never knew them to go out in rough weather, nor did we ever see the practice, so frequently described elsewhere, of tying the skirts of the waterproof jacket round the coaming of the cockpit so as to exclude the water.

It should, however, be borne in mind that from the reasons above stated our opportunities for observing the use of the kaiak were very

⁴ From "Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow Expedition," by John Murdoch, in *Ninth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology* (1887-'88); pp. 328-335. Reprinted by permission.

limited. At all events it is certain that the people depend mainly on the umiak, not only for travelling, but for hunting and fishing as well, which places them in strong contrast with the Greenlanders, who are essentially a race of kaiakers and have consequently developed the boat and its appendages to a high state of perfection.

We brought home one complete full-sized kaiak, with its paddle, which is a very fair representative of the canoes used at Point Barrow. This is 19 feet long and 18 inches wide amidships. The gunwales are straight, except for a very slight sheer at the bow, and the cockpit is 21 inches long and $18\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. It has a frame of wood, which appears to be all of spruce, held together by treenails and whalebone lashings, and is covered with white-tanned sealskins with the grain side out. The stoutest part of the frame is the two gunwales, each $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches broad and $\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick, flat, and rounded off on the upper edge inside, running the whole length of the boat and meeting at the stem and stern, gradually tapered up on the lower edge at each end. The ribs, of which there are at least forty-three, are bent into nearly a half-circle, thus making a U-shaped midship section, and are $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch wide by $\frac{1}{3}$ -inch thick, flat on the outer side and round on the inner. Their ends are mortised into the lower edge of the gunwale and fastened with wooden treenails. They are set in about 3 inches apart and decrease gradually in size fore and aft. Outside of these are seven equidistant streaks running fore and aft, $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch to 1 inch wide and $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch thick, of which the upper on each side reaches neither stem nor stern. These are lashed to the ribs with a strip of whalebone, which makes a round turn about one rib, above the streak, going under the rib first, and a similar turn round the next rib below the streak.

There is a stout keelson, hemi-elliptical in section, under the cockpit only. This is $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet long, about 2 inches deep, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide, and is fastened in the middle and about 1 foot from each end by a strip of whalebone, which passes through a transverse hole in the keelson, round the rib on one side, back through the keelson, and round the rib on the other side twice. The end is wrapped spirally round the turns on one side and tucked into the hole in the keelson. The deck beams are not quite so stout as the ribs and are mortised into the upper edge of the gunwales a little below the level of the deck. The ends are secured by lashings or stitches of some material which are concealed by the skin cover. They are about as far apart

as the ribs, but neither exactly correspond nor break joints with the latter.

At the after end of the cockpit is an extra stout beam or thwart to support the back, $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches wide and three-quarters inch thick, with rounded edges, the ends of which are apparently lashed with thong. The first beam forward of the cockpit is rounded, and appears to be a natural crook forming a U-shaped arch, and is followed by seven V-shaped knees, thickest in the middle and enlarged a little at the ends, successively decreasing in height to the seventh, which is almost straight. This makes the rise in the deck forward of the cockpit.

Every alternate deck beam is braced to the gunwale at each end by an oblique lashing of whalebone, running from a transverse hole in the beam about 1 inch from the gunwale to a corresponding hole in the gunwale, three-quarters inch from the lower edge. The lashing makes three or four turns through these holes and around the lower edge of the gunwale, and the end is wrapped spirally round these turns for their whole length. Above these beams a narrow batten runs fore and aft amidships from cockpit to stem and stern, mortised into the two beams at the cockpit, and lashed to the others with whalebone. The coaming of the cockpit is made of a single flat piece of wood, $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches broad and one-quarter inch thick, bent into a hoop with the ends lapping about 6 inches and "sewed" together with stitches of whalebone. Round the upper edge of this, on the outside, is fitted a "half-round" hoop, which appears to be made of willow, three-quarters by one-third inch, with its ends lapped about 4 inches, this lap coming over the joint of the larger hoop. It is fastened on by short stitches of whalebone about 5 or 6 inches apart, leaving room enough between the two hoops to allow a lacing of fine whalebone to pass through. The coaming is put on over the edge of the skin cover, which is drawn up tight inside of the coaming and over its upper edge and fastened by a lacing of whalebone, which runs spirally round the outer hoop and through holes about one-half inch apart in the edge of the cover.

The coaming fits over the crown of the arch of the forward deck beam and rests on the middle of the thwart aft, and is secured by lashings of whalebone, which pass through holes in the coaming and over its upper edge. The forward lashing makes three turns, which pass round the beam with the end wrapped spirally round the parts between beam and coaming; the after lashing, four similar turns,

which pass through a hole in the thwart and around its forward edge. On each side is a stout vertical brace of wood $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches long, 1 inch wide, and one-half inch thick, with rounded edges and corners. The ends are cut out parallel to the breadth, so that one end fits on to the upper edge of the gunwale, while the other receives the lower edge of the coaming, protruding on the outside through a hole in the cover.

The cover is of six sealskins, put together heads to tails, so that there is only one longitudinal seam, which runs irregularly along the deck. The transverse seams, which run obliquely across the bottom, are double and sewed with a blind stitch, like the seams already described on the waterproof boots, from the inside. These seams are nearly 2 inches wide. The longitudinal seam is sewed in the same way from the outside, but not so broadly lapped, with the edge turned over into a roll. There are two pieces of stout thong stretched across the deck, one forward of the cockpit and the other aft, which serve to fasten articles to the deck. The thong passes out through a hole in the gunwale, one-half inch from the upper edge and 6 inches from the cockpit, on the starboard side forward and on the port side aft, and is secured by a knot in the end inboard. The other end passes in through a corresponding hole in the other gunwale and is loosely knotted to the deck beams, so that the line can be slackened off or tautened up at pleasure. Three feet from the bow is a becket for holding spears, etc., fastened into two little holes bored diagonally outward through the edge of the gunwales. It is of two parts of seal thong, one part twisted round the other, but is broken in the middle, so that only one-half of it is left. The weight of this kaiak in its present dry condition is 32 pounds.

This is about the ordinary pattern of kaiak used at Point Barrow, and is a medium-sized one. These boats are made to fit the size of the owner, a youth or small man using a much smaller and lighter kaiak than a heavy adult. They are never made to carry more than one person, and I have never heard of their being used by the women. In carrying the kaiak across the land from lake to lake, it is held horizontally against the side with the bow pointing forward, by thrusting the forearm into the cockpit. We never saw them carried on the head, in the manner practiced at Fury and Hecla Straits.

In entering the canoe the man takes great care to wipe his feet clean of sand and gravel, which would work down under the timbers

and chafe the skin. The canoe is launched in shoal water, preferably alongside of a little bank, and the man steadies it by sticking down his paddle on the outer side and holding it with his left hand, while he balances himself on his right foot, and with his free hand carefully wipes his left foot. He then steps with his left foot into the kaiak, and still balancing himself with the help of the paddle, lifts and wipes his right foot before he steps in with that. He then pushes his feet and legs forward under the raised deck, settles himself in a proper position for trimming the boat, and shoves off. As elsewhere, the kaiak is always propelled with a paddle.

. . . [The paddle] is 7 feet long. The shaft joining the blades is elliptical in section, with its greatest width at right angles to the plane of the blades so to present the greatest resistance to the strain of paddling. The shape of the blade, with rounded tip and thin rounded edges is admirably adapted to give the blade a clean entry into the water. The whole is very neatly and smoothly made, and the blades are painted with red ocher. This is a much more effective paddle than those used by the Greenlanders and other eastern Eskimo, the blades of which, probably from the scarcity of wood, are very narrow, not exceeding 4 inches in width. In Greenland and Labrador, also, the blades are square at the ends like those of ordinary oars, and are usually edged with bone to prevent them from splitting. The absence of this bone edging on the paddles from Point Barrow perhaps indicates that they are meant for summer use only and not for working among the ice. In accordance with the general custom in northwestern America, the double-bladed paddle (*pautiñ*) is used only when great speed is desired, as in chasing game. It is handled in the usual way, being grasped with both hands near the middle, and dipped alternately on opposite sides. For ordinary travelling they use a single-bladed paddle (*añun*), of the same shape as those used in the umiak but usually somewhat smaller, of which we neglected to procure a specimen. With this they make a few strokes on one side, till the boat begins to sheer, then shift it over and make a few strokes on the other side. They do this with very great skill, getting considerable speed, and making a remarkably straight wake. The use of this single paddle appears to be universal along the coast of Alaska, from Point Barrow southward, and it is also used at the Mackenzie and Anderson rivers, as shown by the models collected by MacFarlane in that region. It is, however, unknown among the eastern Eskimo

about whom we have any definite information on the subject, namely, the Greenlanders, the people of Baffin Land, Hudson Strait, and Labrador.

Curiously enough the Greenlanders had a superstition of a sort of malevolent spirits called kajariak, who were "kayakmen of an extraordinary size, who always seem to be met with at a distance from land beyond the usual hunting grounds. They were skilled in the arts of sorcery, particularly in the way of raising storms and bringing bad weather. Like the umiarissat (other fabulous beings), *they use one-bladed paddles*, like those of the Indians." This tradition either refers back to a time when the ancestors of the Greenlanders used the single paddle or to occasional and perhaps hostile meetings between eastern and western Eskimo.

Though the kaiak is essentially the same wherever used, it differs considerably in size and external appearance in different localities. The kaiak of the Greenlanders is perhaps the best-known model, as it has been figured and described by many authors. It is quite as light and sharp as the Point Barrow model, but has a flat floor, the bilge being angular instead of rounded, and it has considerably more sheer to the deck, the stem and stern being prolonged into long curved points, which project above the water, and are often shod with bone or ivory. The coaming of the cockpit also is level, or only slightly raised forward. The kaiaks used in Baffin Land, Hudson Straits, and Labrador are of a very similar model, but larger and heavier, having the projecting points at the bow and stern rather shorter and less sharp, and the coaming of the cockpit somewhat more raised forward. Both of these forms are represented by specimens and numerous models in the museum collections. I have seen one flat-floored kaiak at Point Barrow. It belonged to a youth and was very narrow and light.

The kaiak in use at Fury and Hecla Straits, as described by Captain Lyon and Captain Parry, is of a somewhat different model, approaching that used at the Anderson River. It is a large kaiak 25 feet long, with the bow and stern sharp and considerably more bent up than in the Greenland kaiaks, but round-bottomed, like the western kaiaks. The deck is flat, with the cockpit coaming somewhat raised forward.

In the kaiaks used at the Anderson and Mackenzie rivers, as shown by the models in the National Museum, the bending up of the stem

and stern posts is carried to an extreme, so that they make an angle of about 130° with the level of the deck. The bottom is round and the cockpit nearly level, but sufficient room for the knees and feet is obtained by arching not only the deck beams just forward of the cockpit, but all of them from stem to stern, so that the deck slopes away to each side like the roof of a house. At Point Barrow, as already described, the deck beams are arched only just forward of the cockpit, and the stem and stern are not prolonged. This appears to be the prevailing form of canoe at least as far south as Kotzebue Sound and is sometimes used by the Malemiut of Norton Sound. At Port Clarence the heavy, large kaiak, so common from Norton Sound southward, appears to be in use from Nordenskiöld's description, as he speaks of the kaiaks holding two persons, sitting back to back in the cockpit. The kaiaks of the southwestern Eskimo are, as far as I have been able to learn, large and heavy, with level coamings, with the deck quite steeply arched fore and aft, and with bow and stern usually of some peculiar shape, as shown by models in the Museum. . . .

While the kaiak, however, differs so much in external appearance in different localities, it is probable that in structure it is everywhere essentially the same. Only two writers have given a detailed description of the frame of a kaiak, and these are from widely distant localities, Iglulik and western Greenland, both still more widely distant from Point Barrow, and yet both give essentially the same component parts as are to be found at Point Barrow, namely, two comparatively stout gunwales running from stem to stern, braced with transverse deckbeams, seven streaks running fore and aft along the bottom, knees, or ribs in the form of hoops, and a hoop for the coaming, bound together with whalebone or sinew.

The double-bladed paddle is almost exclusively an Eskimo contrivance. The only other hyperborean race, besides the Aleuts, who use it, are the Yukagirs, who employ it in their narrow dugout canoes on the River Kolyma in Siberia. Double-bladed paddles have also been observed in the Malay Archipelago.

Exercises

1. What does Ratzel say of the intellectual character of primitive inventions?
2. What part does Nature play in such things?
3. Why are inventions less fruitful among more primitive societies?

4. Discuss the relative parts played by individual genius, nature's models, and social organization, in rendering inventions productive.

5. What part is played by the apathy and immobility of the average mind?

6. Discuss this mental indolence in relation to the borrowing, as well as originating, of new culture acquisitions.

7. Describe the social aspects of *tapa* among the Polynesians.

8. Does Ratzel's discussion warrant the conclusion that useful inventions may be lost by a group?

9. What importance does he attach to borrowing of culture elements? Illustrate the difficulty of retaining intact what is borrowed.

10. Illustrate division of labor among primitive peoples.

11. Explain and illustrate the following: "Recognition of the operations of Nature constitutes the genius of invention."

12. Discuss Eskimo inventiveness.

13. How important is deftness and "knack" among primitive peoples?

14. What part is played by custom and ceremony in primitive industry?

15. Describe the rules for cutting up game among the Omahas.

16. What were the best portions and to whom did they fall?

17. Describe the use made of the different parts.

18. Should you call this system individualistic or communistic?

19. Show whether it is fitted to the environment and mode of life.

20. Describe the uses to which the Eskimo kaiak is put; the umiak.

21. Indicate some of the most remarkable features of Eskimo boat-building.

22. How is the kaiak handled when in use?

Additional References

1. Boas, Franz: "Making Leather and Preparing Skins Among the Eskimo"; in *Sixth Annual Report, Bureau American Ethnology* (1884-'85), 516-523.

2. Dutcher, B. H.: "Piñon Gathering Among the Panamint Indians"; in *The American Anthropologist*, N. S. Vol. VI., No. 4 (Oct., 1893). Pp. 377-380.

3. Ratzel, Friedrich: *The History of Mankind*. Vol. II., pp. 387-390 treat the Negro and the iron industry.

4. Smith, G. Elliot: *Migrations of Early Culture*. This intensive study of the spread of mummification and other elements in the "heliolithic" (sun-stone) culture of ancient Egypt throughout southern Asia, Oceania, and, possibly, South America, mentions many instances of that borrowing of savages from higher cultures which is referred to by Ratzel.

CHAPTER XV

PRIMITIVE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

WHILE the preceding chapter dealt with the ingenuity, skill, and organization of primitive industry, the present one must touch upon some of the economic concepts, or general ideas, which underlie their industrial activities. Among these, two of the most important ideas will be illustrated. Of these two, their dependence upon magical and religious practices for economic success is perhaps the more widely known. It is expounded in the passages from Jenks, and illustrated in the account of the Omaha Maize Ritual and Buffalo Hunt. The other set of ideas deals with primitive property arrangements, and the selections given will serve to show that both communal and private property, in forms essentially identical with such intangible goods as the civilized *copyright*, are developed to a surprising degree and in novel ways by primitive peoples. Dr. Lowie's chapter on this subject is epoch-making in its significance, overturning, as it does, the long-standing notion that primitive society is communistic and without a sense of private property. The fact seems to be that it is neither communistic nor individualistic, but communal. It thus falls between the two extremes, with sufficient flexibility to vary in either direction in different groups.

1. Faith As a Factor in the Economic Life of the Amerind ¹

Economists have scanned and brushed aside the various cost-of-production theories, the demand-and-supply theories, and the utility theories until the foremost theorists seem now to hover over and to nestle as their own and as the final theory, the marginal-utility theory of value. Although marginal utility may prove to be the final theory of value, yet back in the formative days — where few theorists have searched — there were numerous mythic influences, some of which assisted while others hindered the present-day accepted economic laws. These forces are beliefs; they are parts of the philosophy of primitive man. Some of these beliefs are found in his cosmology, others in his theology, others in his religion, and still others in his social and political philosophy.

¹ By Albert Ernest Jenks, in *The American Anthropologist*, N. S. Vol. 2. (1900), pp. 676-677; 683-685; 689. Reprinted by permission.

Such beliefs occur constantly in Amerindian mythology, and, from the point of view of economics, they defy scientific or logical classification, or rational explanation. Yet there they are, real, potent forces affecting the economic life of the primitive American; and because they are facts they must be taken into consideration. . . .

SOME BELIEFS AFFECTING PRODUCTION

The Menomini tribe in Wisconsin has a belief which has kept it from sowing fields of nutritious, productive cereal *ma-no'min*, or wild rice (*Zizania aquatica* L.). One of their religious myths, treating of the origin of the tribe, explains how they first obtained this cereal, which is so important a staple with them that the tribal name is derived from it. While the young tribe lived on Menominee river, the boundary between the upper peninsula of Michigan and Wisconsin, Mä'näbüsh, a half-man, half-god mythic creation of the tribe, gave to them the extensive fields of wild rice along Menominee river and told them that they should always have the grain. The tribe has moved twice during historic time — first to the vicinity of Lake Winnebago, Wisconsin, and then to their present reservation north of that lake. They claim never to have sown the grain, because, they say, if Mä'näbüsh wanted them to have it, he would provide it. In the year 1852, when about to take residence on their present reservation, the agent held repeated councils with the Menomini for the purpose of inducing them to gather the grain to be resown in their new home; but his efforts were futile, and the tribe points with pride today to the large fields of the plant now growing in their vicinity which Mä'näbüsh has provided them since they took reservation.

According to Niópet, chief of the tribe, it was about ten years after the Menomini removed to their present reservation before Lake Shawano (where the annual crop has since been gathered) produced the grain in sufficient quantities to be harvested. Yet during those years they claim not to have sown a single kernel. Of recent years the land around the lake has been owned by whites who quite generally refuse the tribe access to the shore, so that their harvest is often a failure; nevertheless, they steadfastly refuse to sow the seed in any of the many suitable and available places. The restricting influence of this belief is more noticable when it is known that the Ojibwa of Wisconsin (brothers of the Menomini) sow wild rice.

They also claim that all of the wild-rice beds in the state which they now harvest were originally sown by their tribesmen from seeds obtained as far west as the Red River of the North.

The tutelar god, the "my god" of the family, clan, and tribe, is often a plant or animal concerning which there is some religious belief which forbids the particular human group (especially the clan which calls its tutelar god its "totem") from killing or possessing the animal or plant. And strange as this may seem, the belief is operative in districts where the thing tabooed is often not only a food, but frequently a staple which furnishes shelter and clothing as well to the clans of the same tribe.

Among the reasons for such beliefs are these: Certain animals (as the grizzly bear) are the abiding-places of men's spirits; certain animals (as the owls) are the ghosts of men; and certain animals, like the bear and the bison, had common bear and bison ancestors with the clan or tribe. This is the reason that the Menomini today "begs the pardon" of the bear which he has killed, calling it "elder brother," and telling the bear either that the killing was accidental or else that he must forgive him this one offense for his poor family is starving.

"The Crow Indians will neither trap nor hunt a bear. They believe it is bad luck to kill a bear, and will not touch the food. . . . The Crows say the bear has a spirit in him, and to kill it offends the great Wa-con Ton-ka. If a Crow meets a bear, when out hunting, he will go around with him, and if the bear attacks him he will run away. . . ."

SOME BELIEFS AFFECTING CONSUMPTION

Beliefs affecting consumption are numerous and varied. One of the chief reasons for taboo against eating foods arises from religious belief regarding the clan totem. Of the elk gens of the Omaha tribe it is said: "The members of this gens are afraid to touch any part of the male elk, or to eat its flesh; and they cannot eat the flesh of the male deer. Should they accidentally violate this custom they say that they are sure to break out in boils and white spots on different parts of the body." The Wa'igije gens (a subgens of the Iñkě-sabe, Black-shoulder, gens) of the Omaha tribe may not eat the tongues of the bison, and they are not allowed to touch a bison's head, for the members of that gens were originally bison, and dwelt beneath the surface of the water before they came on the earth. Another

subgens of the tribe does not eat red maize for fear of breaking out with running sores about the mouth. The Omaha *Hañga* gens (meaning "ancestral" or "foremost") is also a buffalo or bison gens. This gens has four subgentes, two of which may not eat buffalo sides, geese, swans, or cranes. The other two subgentes may not eat buffalo sides. The *atada* gens of the same tribe has four subgentes which have the following consumption taboos:

1. *Wasabe-hit' ajĩ* (meaning "Those who do not touch the skin of the black bear") are not allowed either to eat the flesh or to touch the skin of a black bear.
2. *Wajiñga-Ƨataji** (meaning "They do not eat small birds") is not allowed to eat prairie-chicken when sick.
3. The Eagle subgens is not allowed to touch a buffalo head.
4. The Turtle subgens is forbidden to touch or to carry turtles, but its people may eat turtles.

Members of the Buffalo-tail gens of the same tribe may not eat a calf (bison or domestic) while it is red, but they may eat it when it becomes black. Like members of the *WaƧigije* gens they are not allowed to touch a bison's head. The Omaha tribe also has a Deer-head gens the members of which may not touch the skin of any animal of the deer family; they are not allowed to use deerskin moccasins; they may not use deer-fat for hairoil as all the other Omaha may; however, they are not forbidden to eat deer meat. Members of the Omaha *IñgƧe-jide* gens do not eat buffalo calves.

None of the Omaha gentes eat dried fish, dried fish-spawn, slugs, dried crickets, grasshoppers, or other insects; nor do they use as a drink any fish or animal oil.

Schoolcraft wrote of a California tribe in the vicinity of San Diego that they do not eat the flesh of large animals; and this taboo is based on the belief that the souls of certain human generations long ago entered such animals. The Mission people of this tribe removed the taboo on beef because they subsisted largely on that meat. Schoolcraft says that a half-blood once cooked bear meat and gave it to the Mission people to eat for beef, and that as soon as they learned of the deception they were taken with sudden retching which ceased only when the cause was removed. He further relates that the reproachful epithet, "They eat venison," used by the tamer tribes for the wilder ones, is based on such taboo. The same author says that

* For pronunciation see footnote after Reading No. 3, in Chapter 14, above — C. M. C.

the Navaho never eat the flesh of the gray-squirrel. It is claimed that the Apache of Arizona refused to eat bear meat even when so cooked by the whites as to be indistinguishable from beef. . . .

The foregoing facts, selected from a great body of similar evidence, reveal that faith or belief, — sometimes social, sometimes incipiently political, but at most times superstitious — is the great stumbling-block which everywhere lay in the pathway of the primitive American leading toward economic manhood; and they also show that, no matter what may be the final or present-day measure of value, there was a time when superstitious faiths or beliefs raised and lowered values at the beck and nod of mere whim and fancy.

2. The Ritual of the Maize: Omaha Tribe²

The various environments in which the Omaha people lingered as they moved westward left their impress on the ceremonials of the tribe. Some of these, as has been shown, were lost and the relation of others to the welfare of the people suffered change. Among the latter were the ceremonies connected with the maize.

The facts that the tabu of the subgens of the I^hké çabe, which had charge of the two Sacred Tribal Pipes, was the red ear of corn and that it was the duty of this subgens to provide the sacred corn for distribution at the time of planting, indicate that the rites of the maize and those of the Pipes were once closely connected. In the political development of the tribe the Pipes, through their significance, kept an important place; while, owing to the environment of the people, the maize, as the sustainer of life, became subordinated to the buffalo, which yielded not only food but also raiment. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the maize did not wholly lose prestige but continued to be treated ceremonially.

The ancient Sacred Legend already cited, besides speaking of the discovery of maize, adds later on, evidently referring to the ceremony and ritual observed when distributing the grain for planting:

"The maize being one of the greatest of means to give us life, in honor of it we sing. We sing even of the growth of its roots, of its clinging to the earth, of its shooting forth from the ground, of its springing from joint to joint, of its sending forth the ear, of its

² Adapted from "The Omaha Tribe," by Alice C. Fletcher and Francis La Flesche (a member of the Omaha tribe), in *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, 1905-1906; p. 261 ff. Reprinted by permission.

putting a covering on its head, of its ornamenting its head with a feather, of its invitation to men to come and feel of it, to open and see its fruit, of its invitation to man to taste of the fruit.

"When maize was discovered the grain was distributed among the people that they might plant and eat of the fruit of their labor, and from that time on it has been the custom to sing the song of the maize and to repeat the distribution of the corn every year at the time of planting.

"The songs (stanzas) are many. They begin with the gathering of the kernels. The people talk of where they shall plant. Then the men select the land and wherever each man selects he thrusts a pole in the ground to show that now the corn shall be planted."

The stanzas last referred to have been lost, as well as the ceremony of selecting the planting plot and the thrusting of the pole into the ground. It is also impossible to give an accurate account of the ceremonies attending the distribution of the sacred corn for planting. The rites have long been disused, their abandonment being largely due to the influence of the Government. It is said that formerly when spring came the Hoⁿga subgens, whose duty it was to keep the sacred ears of red corn, met with the subgens of the Iⁿke çabe, whose right it was to provide them, and after the prescribed rites had been performed and the ritual sung, the Iⁿke çabe men acted as servers to the Hoⁿga and distributed four kernels to each family. The women received the sacred corn and mixed it with their seed corn, which they preserved from year to year. It was believed that the sacred corn was able to vivify the seed and cause it to fructify and yield a good harvest. Only the red corn was used for this sacred purpose. Its color was indicative of its office.

Even after the discontinuance of these rites of distributing the maize its ritual was still sung just before the ritual of the White Buffalo Hide was given in connection with the hunting ceremonies. . . .

Free translation

I.

O hasten!
Behold,
With four roots I stand.
Behold me!

2.

O hasten!
Behold,
With one leaf I stand.
Behold me!

3.

O hasten!
Behold,
With two leaves I stand.
Behold me!

4.

O hasten!
Behold,
With three leaves I stand.
Behold me!

5.

O hasten!
Behold,
With four leaves I stand.
Behold me!

6.

O hasten!
Behold,
With five leaves I stand.
Behold me!

7.

O hasten!
Behold,
With six leaves I stand.
Behold me!

8.

O hasten!
Behold,
With seven leaves I stand.
Behold me!

9.

O hasten!
Behold,
With one joint I stand.
Behold me!

10.

O hasten!
Behold,
With two joints I stand.
Behold me!

11.

O hasten!
Behold,
With three joints I stand.
Behold me!

12.

O hasten!
Behold,
With four joints I stand.
Behold me!

13.

O hasten!
Behold,
With five joints I stand.
Behold me!

14.

O hasten!
Behold,
With six joints I stand.
Behold me!

15.

O hasten!
Behold,
With seven joints I stand.
Behold me!

16.

O hasten!
Behold,
With clothing I stand.
Behold me!

17.

O hasten!
Behold,
With light, glossy hair I stand.
Behold me!

18.

O hasten!
Behold,
With yellow hair I stand.
Behold me!

19.

O hasten!
Behold,
With dark hair I stand.
Behold me!

20.

O hasten!
Behold,
With light, glossy tassel I stand.
Behold me!

21.

O hasten!
Behold,
With pale tassel I stand.
Behold me!

22.

O hasten!
Behold,
With yellow tassel I stand.
Behold me!

23.

O hasten!
Behold,
With fruit possessed I stand.
Behold me!

24.

O hasten!
Grasp ye,
My fruit as I stand.
Pluck me!

25.

O hasten!
Roast by a fire
My fruit as I stand.
Even roast me!

26.

O hasten!
Rip from its cob
My fruit as I stand.
And eat me!

In this ritual the maize is anthropomorphized and is conscious of its mission. The poetic feeling of the ritual lies in the call of the maize to man to behold its up-springing life, its increasing growth, and its fruitage. Its final abnegation is also hidden under the rather matter-of-fact directions of the last stanzas. Still, it is there.

CULTIVATION OF MAIZE

Garden patches were located on the borders of streams. Occupancy constituted ownership and as long as a tract was cultivated by a family no one molested the crops or intruded on the ground; but if a garden patch was abandoned for a season, then the ground was considered free for anyone to utilize. Men and women worked together on the garden plots, which ranged from half an acre to two or three acres in extent. Occasionally a good worker had even a larger tract under cultivation. These gardens were mounded in a peculiar manner: The earth was heaped into oblong mounds, their tops flat, about 18 by 24 inches, and so arranged as to slant toward the south. The height on the north side was about 18 inches; on the south the plot was level with the surface of the ground. These mounds were 2 or 3 feet apart on all sides. In one mound seven kernels of corn were scattered; in the next mound squash seeds were placed, and so on alternately. If the family had under cultivation a large garden tract the beans were put into mounds by themselves and willow poles were provided for the vines to climb upon; but if the ground space was limited the beans were planted with the corn, the stalks serving the same purpose as poles. Squash and corn were not planted together, nor were corn, beans, and squash grown in the same mound. After the planting the ground was kept free of weeds and when the corn was well sprouted it was hoed with an implement made from the shoulder blade of the elk. The second hoeing took place when the corn was a foot or more high. Up to this time the mounds were carefully weeded by hand and the earth was kept free and loose. After the second hoeing the corn was left to grow and ripen without further cultivation. The mounds containing the squash and those in which the melons were planted were weeded and cared for until the second hoeing of the corn, when they, too, were left, as about this time the tribe started out on the annual buffalo hunt.

NAMES OF PARTS AND OF PREPARATIONS OF MAIZE

The following names refer to the maize or corn and the preparations made of it:

Watoⁿ'zi: corn growing in the field; also shelled corn.

Watoⁿ'zihi: corn stalk or stalks.

Waha'ba: an ear of corn.

Waha'bahi: a corn cob or cobs.

Wa'xaⁿha: corn husk.

Hatu: the green husk.

Wathi'ⁿge: braided corn. The husks were braided, leaving the ear hanging.

Wami'de: seed corn. This word is applied to any seed used for reproduction. Other seed, such as apple seeds, are called *çi*.

Washon'ge: pounded corn. A stick, noⁿxpe, was thrust into the cob and the corn roasted before a fire; then it was shelled and the chaff blown off; finally it was pounded in a mortar (*uhe*) with a pestle (*wehe*).

Wa'çke: pounded corn mixed with honey and buffalo marrow.

Wani'de: mush or gruel — pounded corn mixed with water.

Um'bagthe: corn boiled with beans set over night to cool and harden, then served cut in slices. Considered a delicacy.

Wana'xe: parched corn — used by travellers, and carried in skin bags.

Wabi'shnude: corn boiled with ashes and hulled — a sort of coarse hominy.

Wabthu'ga: *wabi'shnude* boiled with meat.

Watoⁿ'zickithe: sweet corn roasted in milk, cut off the cob, and dried

3. Property-Right in Wild Eagles Among the Hopi³

Of all the feathers used by the Hopi in their ceremonies, those of the eagle are valued next to those of the turkey. The eagles of Tusayan are not kept in cages as at Zuñi; nevertheless, the true ownership of these birds is recognized by all. A Hopi speaks of his eaglets and eagle-nests as he does of his sheep or horses, regarding them as clan property. He takes no care of them; but when he

³ From J. Walter Fewkes, in *The American Anthropologist*, N. S. Vol. 2, p. 690 ff. Reprinted by permission.

wishes their feathers, he plucks them from birds which he owns and from no others. This recognition that certain birds belong to one clan, and others to another, has not, so far as I am aware, been specially commented on by writers on zoöculture among the Indians. We can call this retention of birds for religious purposes a stage of domestication, although it is only a little higher than promiscuous hunting of wild animals. When, as at Zuñi, eagles are brought to the pueblo and kept alive from year to year, there exists an advancement beyond the Hopi custom of merely capturing the feral birds from the nests of their owners. Anyone in Tusayan who kills an eagle, not his own, within about fifty miles of Walpi, trespasses on the property-rights of others. In other words, the eagle, although wild, is regarded from the point of view of ownership, in the same way as is the horse, cow, or sheep, — eagles are property over which the Hopi have rights which all their number respect. Unfortunately, however, this right is often violated by white men or by the Navaho, who see no reason why wild birds should belong to a person living perhaps forty or fifty miles away. There are no other wild creatures which the Hopi now regard in the same light of ownership that they do the eagle.

As already suggested, proprietary rights with reference to the eagle inhere in the clan rather than in the individual; nests, eaglets, and adult eagles are owned by the whole clan, not by any one member, although the male head or chief of that clan represents its rights; he speaks of them as his property, and has inherited the right to do so through his mother. This is an ancient form of ownership which prevails likewise in the case of land, springs, peach-trees, houses, and other possessions. Some clans are poor, and own no eagles; but among the "wealthy," two members of the same clan may have nests in different localities. As a rule, however, the nests of eagles near village ruins are owned by the descendants of clans which once lived in their neighborhood.

OWNERSHIP OF EAGLE-NESTS EFFECTED BY CLAN MIGRATIONS

As has been previously shown, the present population of Walpi is composed of descendants of clans which from time to time drifted together from different directions for mutual protection. Some of

these clans came from as far north as Rio Colorado, while others came from the Gila basin and still others from Rio Grande valley. In their early migrations from distant pueblos to their ultimate homes, each clan halted at intervals, where towns were built but were afterward deserted. The sites of these abandoned villages are indicated by ruins which are very numerous in Arizona and also in parts of New Mexico. Thus it resulted that men of certain clans claim rights in springs near ruins in which their forefathers lived, and at times of ceremony they revisit these ancestral springs to obtain water which is considered particularly efficacious in the performance of ancient rites; thus, also, certain tracts of land are regarded as the property of this or that clan. The present ownership of eagle-nests in the vicinity is a survival of a similar claim. A consideration, therefore, of the situation of eagle-nests claimed by clans is directly related to former migrations of the clan. . . .

The clans of the Tewa pueblo of Hano have no eagle-nest property near their pueblo. This can readily be explained by the fact that they were late arrivals in Tusayan, consequently all available nests had been preëmpted by existing Hopi clans.

It thus appears that the present claims to ownership of eagle-nests are based mainly on the situation near former places of residence. This fact can hardly be regarded as a mere coincidence, nor do the Hopi consider it as such; indeed, they regard this proprietorship as a proof that the country in which eagle-nests are situated is theirs, and have repeatedly urged me to so inform those engaged in surveying the boundaries of their reservation. The legendary claim by the Hopi that their ancestors came to Walpi from different directions is supported by the situation of the eagle-nests still owned by various clans. . . .

When "discovered" by the whites, the Hopi were in an early stage of the development of Zoöculture, the nature of which may be seen in the relations between the people and their eagles. With regard to animals as an aid in the food-quest, the Hopi were but little above the hunter stage; they considered certain tracts of land as the range of their respective clans, over which the members alone had a right to hunt, but had not yet domesticated individual animals or their young for food. Adult eagles were ceremonially captured. A knowledge that the eagles were not nomadic in their habits, and that eaglets consequently grew to maturity and died near or on the

same crags as their parents, led the Hopi later to claim individual birds and to capture their young as he would gather his corn or peaches.

Birds were among the first animals to which property-right attached among the Hopi, and of these the more important were the eagle, the turkey, and the parrot. These birds were used for religious purposes rather than as food, and the parrot and the turkey were probably kept in the pueblos. The eagle, however, was allowed to remain at large in its feral condition and captured only as needed. Unlike other wild animals, eagles and eaglets, with their nests, were the property of the clans. Ownership of eagles descended through the clan in the maternal line, and the present geographical distribution of eagle-nests is directly connected with clan migration. The treatment of the eagle after capture—its killing and ceremonial burial—is a survival of an ancient custom, probably paralleled in the case of the parrot and the turkey.

The ancient Hopi had a domestic dog which was a pet rather than a beast of burden. The good qualities of this pet were recognized and recounted in their legends. The Hopi domesticated no animal for food or raiment before the advent of the Spaniards, nor did the territory occupied by them furnish any mammal capable of domestication. Unaided they might have advanced in culture, but not through a pastoral stage.

Among most people the food-quest has come to be an incentive for the domestication of animals; but when the Pueblos were discovered their meager zoöculture was not for food, nor even for clothing, but for religious purposes—the adornment of ceremonial objects with feathers or the decoration of dance paraphernalia. Is it not possible that before man domesticated animals for the purpose of augmenting his food supply, he kept certain of them in confinement for religious purposes, and that some of these were found to be valuable in material ways—so docile that they could be employed as beasts of burden, possessed of a pelage that could be utilized as raiment, or of udders for yielding milk, etc.? When these benefits were recognized, the domestication of animals became a feature of the food-quest which the Hopi never attained until after the advent of the white man.

4. Private Property in Intangible Goods Among Primitive Peoples⁴

INCORPOREAL PROPERTY

Contrary to what might be supposed, the notion of patents or copyrights is well developed in the lower reaches of civilization, and its prominence among certain peoples reduces the dogma of a universal primitive communism to a manifest absurdity. That this fact has not been adequately grasped by earlier writers is in part due to that rationalistic prejudice which is the bane of all historical inquiry. To minds steeped in the spirit of an industrial era it is difficult to conceive that privileges without obvious utilitarian benefits may be highly prized and sometimes distinctly rank as wealth.

Even in so humble an environment as that of the Andaman Islands "choses in action," to use our legal phraseology, are not wanting. This is all the more remarkable because with reference to utensils, such as cooking-vessels, the aborigines display a large-mindedness actually approaching communism: "the rights of private property are only so far recognized that no one would without permission appropriate or remove to a distance anything belonging to a friend or neighbor." But no such latitude holds with regard to the songs composed for the occasion of a tribal gathering. A song that has been received with applause may be repeated by request at lesser gatherings, but irrespective of its popularity no one dare sing it except the composer himself.

The Koryak believe that the course of events may be shaped by magic formulas, which serve to banish disease, lure game, consecrate charms, and exorcise evil spirits. All incantations originated from the Creator. They are now held by elderly women, who treasure them as trade secrets; indeed, there is a belief that to divulge the formula is to destroy its efficacy. For chanting a formula the owner receives from her client cakes of pressed tea, or several packages of tobacco, or a reindeer. "When a woman sells an incantation, she must promise that she gives it up entirely, and that the buyer will become the only possessor of its mysterious power."

On one of the Eastern Torres Straits Islands Professor Haddon

⁴ From *Primitive Society*, by Robert H. Lowie; pp. 235-243. (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1920. Reprinted by permission.)

discovered distinct ideas of proprietorship in local legends, for an informant never liked to tell a story connected with another locality. This type of experience has been shared by many investigators of the North American Indians. Additional examples of copyright are furnished by the Kai. Among them, as in the Andamans, a poet is the absolute owner of his composition. No one else may sing it without his consent, and usually he exacts a fee for granting it. Similarly, there is ownership of magical formulas, the instructor being entitled to compensation. Certain carvings, too, must not be copied without special leave. Even personal names are in a sense a form of patented property, so that a young man adopting a name already held presents his elder namesake with a gift by way of conciliation.

Among the natives of British Columbia the Nootka are conspicuous for the number and variety of their intangible goods. From data kindly supplied by Dr. Sapir it appears that the patent rights of these people are divisible into two categories, those called *topati* which are necessarily transmitted from father to eldest son and those which a father normally surrenders to his son but is not obliged to transmit. That is, such a privilege as the knowledge of the family legend could not be withheld from the eldest son since it is his birthright. On the other hand, a father may exercise some discretion in regard to such a secret as the ritual for spearing fish; if he consider his son unworthy, he will refuse to give him the requisite instructions. The *topati* are exceedingly numerous. They include names,—not only those designating the owner himself, but also those he has an exclusive right to apply to his slaves, his houses, canoes or harpoons; the right to certain carvings on grave posts or totem poles; the prerogative of singing certain songs, including even lullabies, and of executing certain dances; and many other privileges. Some of these are of an amazingly special character. For example, in the Wolf ritual the particular coloring and decoration of certain performers are the inherited patents of the man who arranges the festival; the right to set a trap to capture the wolf-impersonators is associated with a particular lineage; one actor who limps and howls in a peculiar way does so by virtue of inherited prerogative. The same applies to solemn chants sung at particular junctures, to the lassoing of novices, the loud and rapid beating of a drum at one point of the drama, the wearing of bear skins at another, the blackening of all the spectators' faces. Other ceremonies are marked by corresponding exhibitions of *topati*; thus,

in the girls' puberty festival the right to receive a ceremonial torch was a jealously guarded hereditary privilege.

While the Nootka stress the hereditary character of their immaterial forms of property, which is tantamount to making the privileges the joint property of a group, the individualistic character of incorporeal property is on the whole strongly marked among the Indians of the Plains. In order to understand the phenomena found in this region we are obliged to transcend for a moment the sphere of purely sociological data and enter the domain of religious belief. The center of Plains Indian religion is occupied by the conceptions and practices connected with visionary experiences. These sometimes came unsought to the fortunate man favored by supernatural beings but was far more commonly stimulated by a several days' fast on a lonely hilltop. The tenor of the revelation would often determine the course of the successful visionary's future career. If he saw a buffalo recommending the use of a certain mixture of roots for the treatment of wounds, he would set up as a practitioner and success would gain for him fame and riches. If he was instructed to organize a new dancing society with a definite set of songs and regalia, he would forthwith become the founder of such an organization with a probable rise of prestige and possibly other benefits. If he saw a horseman carrying a peculiarly ornamented shield and escaping unscathed from a hostile onslaught, he would henceforth feel secure in any encounter and establish a reputation for reckless bravery.

But the visionary experience might extend its beneficent influences to other individuals who had never ventured in quest of a revelation or had tried and failed to obtain supernatural favors; and they might come to share the benefits not merely in a subsidiary fashion, as patients cured by a visionary or as participants in the dance he founded, but in the fullest sense, as though they themselves had enjoyed the spiritual blessing. This was rendered possible by the notion that privileges conferred by a spirit are transferable; and this conception became a source of gain to the visionary through the additional conception that they were alienable only through sale. Why certain rights should have come to be prized by the people of this or that tribe is not always obvious any more than in the case of the Nootka; the important fact is that they are highly esteemed and thus add to the social standing of the possessor; that no one ventures to infringe his patent; and that any one desirous of sharing it or

buying it outright will sacrifice property to what we should consider an absurd amount. Transfer by gift is excluded even where the relationship of the negotiating parties is as close as possible: I know of a Crow who bought the right of using a special kind of ceremonial paint from his own mother, and the Hidatsa medicine bundles, uniformly derived from ancestral visions and hereditary in certain families, must nevertheless be bought by sons from their own fathers. In many instances, as in the one last mentioned, tangible commodities too may be transferred, but the principal thing is not the corporeal object—the pipe or feather or rattle—but invariably the immaterial privilege with instructions about correlated songs and methods of handling the sacred object or warnings as to taboos indissolubly bound up with the visionary prerogative. Because of the comparative insignificance of the visible object a replica may readily be substituted for the visionary's own emblem, nay, may be supplied by the purchaser himself. It does not matter whether he takes the seller's rabbit foot, ermine skin and eagle feather or secures them by his own efforts: what he is buying is the right to use this particular combination of objects together with the right to the associated songs and activities, but also with any coëxistent duties and restrictions on conduct.

The rules as to different ceremonial privileges naturally vary somewhat. Sometimes the seller does not alienate his ownership completely but merely permits the buyer to share in its benefits in return; but sometimes there is the qualification that the owner may not dispose of his rights more than four times, the fourth partial sale terminating his own proprietary rights. In other cases the buyer purchases the privileges in question outright, a single transfer completely divesting the seller of ownership.

These general principles are best driven home by concrete illustrations. I will select two examples, the right to plant the sacred Tobacco of the Crow and the purchase of membership in the military organizations of the Hidatsa.

In order to secure the right to join in the planting of the sacred Tobacco, it is necessary to be initiated by a member of the Tobacco society, to be adopted as his "son." This feature emphasizes the individual character of the proceeding. No man can be taken in by the society as a whole; he is fathered by his individual sponsor as he in turn was fathered by the person who introduced *him*, and as the

founder of the society was fathered by the supernatural being that bade him plant Tobacco for his own and the tribal welfare. The fact that the planting privilege is shared by a group is from the Crow point of view incidental: it has merely happened that in the case of the Tobacco those purchasing the same medicine have shown greater solidarity than those buying, say, the same war medicine, and that consequently they have come to form a society instead of a mere series of unassociated individuals with similar privileges. In addition to the generic right to plant Tobacco, each novice acquires specific medicines, which he is allowed to choose from those unfolded before him by the adopting section of the society. Further, there is a multiplicity of specific privileges recalling those of the Nootka but differing in their non-hereditary character. For each medicine object and each privilege separate payment must be made. Thus, a woman named Cuts-the-picketed-mule paid a horse for a Tobacco bag, another horse with otterskins for a breast ornament, a horse for the privilege of sitting next to the door. These payments were over and above the initiation fee given to the "father" and were yielded to such members of his section as held the prerogatives. Since the novice is aided by friends and relatives and because the main privilege he seeks is held jointly, an appearance of collective purchase is produced that is quite foreign to the essence of the transaction. Inasmuch as it is a matter of pride to do things handsomely at an initiation, the candidate is more or less liberally aided by his kin, his friends, and his club. On the other hand, the "father" who receives, say, fifty horses would incur the reproach of avarice if he retained the fee without making adequate deductions on behalf of fellow-members of his section. These are, however, merely personal or ethical motives intruding on a strictly legal procedure, by which an individual A yields a share in his planting privilege to an individual B, who is obliged to furnish compensation.

A remarkable blending of the collective and the individualistic element appears in the Hidatsa military clubs. Other features of these organizations will be noticed in a later chapter; here it is the conception of membership as property that alone requires attention. According to Hidatsa theory, these societies with their songs, regalia and functions were revealed to visionaries who subsequently founded them in obedience to supernatural instructors; when an Hidatsa does not know the legendary vision on which a society is based, he at once

suspects its alien origin. In other words, we meet again the notion of an individual revelation, bestowing on the beneficiary transferable prerogatives. Since the visionary was instructed to found a society, the collective feature is inevitable under normal conditions. Yet in principle we are merely dealing with a proprietary right that may be shared by a group but may also be held by a single person. This is proved by the fact that at one time when all the owners of a certain society with a solitary exception had been carried off by disease, this survivor actually was sole proprietor and sold his membership to a group of young men eager to acquire it. As compared with the Tobacco-planting privilege, the membership in a military club differs in that it is sold outright, so that the "father" wholly abdicates his place in favor of the "son."

Normally the collective feature appeared in that a group of buyers jointly purchased membership from a group of sellers. A reason for the collective procedure will be suggested later. What concerns us here is that the transfer of property was essentially individual. There was an initial accumulation of goods by the "sons" in a body, and through this property they sought to induce the owners to consider selling their membership rights. But with the commencement of the sale itself each buyer selected a seller belonging to his own father's sib as his individual "father," and henceforth the affair was an individual transfer. In purchasing certain of the societies it was customary to surrender one's wife; but there was never a wholesale surrender of wives by the buyers to the sellers as a group; each man took his wife to his individual "father." Again, if the "father" held some special office and regalia in the society, then they were automatically transferred to his "son." The entire transaction was at bottom not the transfer of proprietary rights from one corporation to another but resolves itself into a multiple simultaneous transfer of individual ownership rights.

Thus the individual character of proprietary rights founded on visionary experiences asserts itself even where the rights are shared by a company of individuals. *A fortiori*, it will have to be accepted as unquestioned where, as in the case of many war medicines and medicine bundles, there is a negotiation between only two individuals, the buyer and the seller. Certain incorporeal forms of property thus support beyond cavil the possibility of personal ownership at a rude stage of civilization. This is certainly quite unequivocal where a

father cannot transmit a mode of painting the face nor even an hereditary set of rituals to his own son without receipt of compensation. Of course we must not forget that incorporeal property, as among the Nootka, may also descend automatically and in that sense be joint property. The point is that among the Andaman Islanders, the Kai, the Koryak and the Plains Indians, regardless of any laws relating to material possessions, there are also patents and reserved rights which are held personally and upon which no one not duly qualified dare encroach.

Incorporeal property, however, should not be considered merely from this angle. Its very existence among the simpler peoples is of the highest interest; and not less remarkable are the Protean forms it assumes under favorable conditions.

Exercises

1. Name two fundamental ideas affecting primitive industrial life.
2. Is primitive society communistic?
3. Show the part played by faith in the rice culture of the Menominee Indians.
4. Mention some other food taboos, with the reasons assigned for them.
5. Distinguish production taboos from consumption taboos.
6. What, according to Jenks, is the effect of beliefs on economic progress?
7. Describe the Omaha maize ritual.
8. How has its importance been affected by the history of the tribe?
9. Show how a taboo often carries with it a special duty.
10. It is known that American white men borrowed practically all their knowledge of handling corn from the Indian. Test this assertion by analyzing the methods of cultivation described by Fletcher and La Flesche.
11. What is to be learned from the names of maize parts and preparations?
12. Do the Hopi domesticate eagles? Do they own them?
13. Compare our own legal arrangements with respect to wild animals. (See Reference 1, below.)
14. Show the relation between clan migrations and ownership of nests.
15. What does this passage suggest concerning the beginnings of domestication?
16. Do primitive peoples own patents and copyrights?

17. Name some of the most remarkable forms of incorporeal property among various primitive peoples.

18. Does Lowie show that ownership of these things is collective or individual in character?

19. Do the primitive peoples described have the same sense of private property that we possess? Does it apply to the same things and in the same proportion?

20. Is such property inherited?

Additional References

1. Ely, Richard T. — *Property and Contract, in Their Relation to the Distribution of Wealth*. See Vol. I, pp. 98, 102, 110, 112, 146-148, for discussion of the legal property status of wild animals in English and American law.

2. Fletcher and La Flesche; *Ibid.* — "The Annual Buffalo Hunt: Omaha Tribe"; p. 275 ff.

3. *Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*, Vol. 19, pp. 1013-1137. "The Wild Rice Gatherers of the Upper Lakes."

4. *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 167-178. "Navaho Silversmiths."

5. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 371-391. "Navaho Weavers."

6. Wheeler, Gerald C. — *The Tribe and Inter-Tribal Relations in Australia*; pp. 35-36. Describes property rights among the Australian Aborigines.

CHAPTER XVI

PRIMITIVE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

THE social organization of primitive peoples, as the reader is aware, centers around the fact of kinship. The primitive family or horde is the earliest form of society. Early government consists simply in family discipline, and is differentiated into its *political* aspect, in the narrow, legalistic sense, only in the later stages of societal evolution. Therefore in the following chapter, which is devoted to social organization in its primitive aspects, materials are presented to show the nature of the idea of kinship itself; the structure of some of the most rudimentary human groups known to social science; and the exact meaning of the familiar but rather indefinite term, "tribe." Mr. Wheeler's study of the Tribe was made under the direction of the distinguished ethnologist, Professor Edward Westermarck, and bears his weighty endorsement.

In the reference to *The Aryan Household* will be found a description showing the great importance of the family as the basis of social organization among Aryan peoples of higher cultural advancement than those depicted in the passages quoted below.

1. Theoretical Analysis of the Concept of Kinship¹

It is undoubtedly one of the most valuable discoveries arrived at by modern sociological science that each institution varies in accordance with the social environment in which it is found. A given institution or social form (like the family, the state, the nation, the church) appears under various forms in different societies, and among peoples with a very low culture only rudiments thereof may be expected. This point of view, applied to marriage and the family, has led some writers to the assumption of forms as much opposed to those usual in our societies, as promiscuity and group marriage is opposed to individual marriage and the family. Nevertheless, although the variability and multiplicity of forms of marriage and family were acknowledged, the concepts applied to them were still the old ones,

¹ From *The Family Among the Australian Aborigines: A Sociological Study*, by B. Malinowski; pp. 168-178. (London, University of London Press, 1913. Reprinted by permission.)

directly borrowed from our own society and formed upon the facts found amongst ourselves. In particular the sociologically untrained ethnographers comprehended the phenomena of kinship only under our own social concepts, judged them according to our own moral standard, and described them with words the meaning of which ought to have been defined when applied to a new case; nevertheless these terms have been nearly always used by ethnographers in the same sense in which we use them amongst ourselves, *i.e.*, as expressing ideas of community of blood through procreation. That this is quite erroneous will be shown below. How far the idea of kinship changes from society to society, what are its essential invariable features, and what are the variable elements—these are the problems that must be set forth.

The inadequacy of our ideas of kinship as applied to lower societies has been often felt by those ethnographers who wished to enter deeper into the problems of kinship among a given people. They have found the greatest difficulty in conveying to a European reader the meaning of different terms of relationship. While warning the reader to put aside our (the modern European) ideas of kinship, they have hardly succeeded in giving any definite and clear concept instead. The reasons for this failure are simple: our ideas of kinship are defined by certain facts which are not to be found in the given primitive society. In order to define kinship so as to fit the latter, the author ought to bring forward a series of facts, playing a part analogous in the given society to that played by the essential defining elements amongst us. But it is by no means easy to know among which facts to look for such analogous, defining elements. And here again arises the necessity of a general definition of kinship, one which would afford indications in what direction to search for social facts giving a right idea of kinship in any given society. Such a general definition would be like an algebraic formula, having its constant and its variable terms; if for the latter special data be inserted (in this instance the special conditions proper to the given society), the special value for any given case is obtained (namely the special concept of kinship proper to the given society). And it should also be indicated within what range the variables should be taken; in other words, in what facts the elements which specifically determine kinship in the given society must be looked for. The practical value of such a general definition of kinship is obvious. On the one hand it indicates the

constant elements in kinship common to all societies; on the other hand it indicates the general character of the variable elements, and the way in which they must be looked for and worked into the general formula.

By the word kinship, roughly speaking, is denoted a series of family relationships (those of parents to children, brothers to sisters, etc.), all of which consist of a set of extremely complex phenomena. They are made up of the most heterogeneous elements: physiological (birth, procreation, suckling, etc.), social (community of living, of interests, social norms, etc.), and psychological (different ways in which these relations are conceived, different moral ideas, and different types of feelings). Special care must be taken to select in all these elements the essential ones, as an omission would be just as fatal for the investigations as an overburdening with secondary elements. Moreover, it would be specially valuable to look at all these heterogeneous determining elements from the same point of view, and view them all under one and the same aspect. Leaving on one side the purely physiological problem of kinship² it appears necessary to give a sociological view of kinship, *i.e.*, to show the social bearing of physiological facts as well as of psychological elements. But it appears also necessary to view the whole of the phenomena of kinship from the psychological point of view; that is, to show how the sociological and physiological facts of kinship are reflected in the "collective mind" of the given society.

Besides for other reasons (adduced below) this appears necessary, because one of the most important scientific uses that has been made of the different human systems of kinship is one that presupposes a certain definite meaning, as given to the terms of kinship in very low societies. In Morgan's deductions a very important part is played by the assumption that kinship is always understood in terms of consanguinity; in particular that it was understood thus by primitive man; that in all (even the lowest) societies all ideas of kinship were essentially based upon the community of blood, established in the case of the mother by her share in bearing, in that of the father by his part

² This would be the place to point out the biological meaning of the social aspects of kinship and family; whether, *e.g.*, the different social regulations of sexual intercourse, which in higher societies afford the basis to kinship, the different forms of family and kinship are the expression of biological laws. How far such would be possible could only be decided on the basis of a biological knowledge which the present writer does not possess.

in procreation. Only by assuming that these facts were known to the lowest, prehistoric savages, could Morgan draw inferences from systems of kinship terms about the forms of sexual intercourse. If, on the other hand, the relation between sexual intercourse and birth escaped the knowledge of primitive men, they could not have based their idea of kinship upon community of blood between father and offspring; hence there could be no connection between forms of sexual intercourse and forms of kinship as conceived by primitive man. Whether there could be connection between marriage, defined sociologically, and kinship is another and more complicated problem. In any case Morgan uses throughout his book the word consanguinity, and he defines it as the tie of common blood arising from the sexual act. In other words he sets forth the problem in a simplified and incorrect form. The question how kinship may be conceived in a given society, especially in a low one, naturally presents itself as a very important point of investigation.

As in the following pages there will be question more or less exclusively of the individual relation between parents and children, the present discussion may be fittingly restricted to the individual parental kinship in Australia. In the second part of this chapter facts giving some insight into the aboriginal collective ideas of kinship are set forth; and in the following chapter other different facts will be brought forward in order to complete the definition of *individual parental kinship*. But in accordance with what has been just said, it is needful to have some guiding principle in collecting this material, and this will now be looked for. This discussion, being only concerned with the Australian facts, does not pretend to be complete, but perhaps if the results are worked out so as to suit our modern European concept of kinship as well as the Australian one, it might, should it be correct, be applicable also to other societies.³ Let us now proceed to give the general definition of kinship and in the first place to indicate which are its constant, uniform factors found in all societies.

Amongst the heterogeneous factors which together make up parental kinship, the physiological facts appear to be the most constant, for the natural process of procreation is in all human societies the same. But the social consequences of this process vary very widely according to other variable elements, as will appear clearly below in our discussion of consanguinity. Part of them only, together with some social

³ Of course by result is meant a general formula for kinship.

elements, may be taken as the uniform, constant basis of kinship, such as must serve for the first point of departure in an attempt to discuss more in detail the kinship in any society. It appears probable that this basis is given by the existence of a group formed by a woman, her husband, and the children whom she has borne, suckled and reared. The existence of such a group will be considered as the necessary and sufficient condition for *individual parental kinship*. Where such a group exists we are justified in affirming that individual parental kinship exists, although it is not yet completely defined thereby; further facts must be adduced in order to complete the definition. Those further facts are precisely the variable terms in the general formula of kinship; it remains still to indicate their general character. But a few words must be first said about the constant factors of kinship just mentioned.

They consist in the existence of the individual family group as determined by individual marriage and by individual motherhood. Individual motherhood means that the same woman who gave birth to a child stands to it in a special close relation in its later life also: she suckles it and rears it, and she is bound to him or her by the manifold ties resulting from the community of life and community of interests. This woman is bound on the other hand to a man by individual marriage; and thereby her children are bound to him also; and the mother, her husband, and her children form the social unit called the individual family. The existence of such a unit is to be established by showing its different social functions, and the different ways in which its solidarity and individuality are marked in a given society. It is clear that the position of the father is in this way first established socially only, as the husband of the children's mother. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that thus his relation to the children is clearly marked; and that this is only a preliminary, so to say formal, determination of fatherhood, which in all societies appears to be much more materially defined by other factors, discussed hereafter.

The existence of the individual family as a social unit, based upon the physiological facts of maternity, the social factor of marriage and other social factors, are thus chosen as the basis upon which we may proceed to analyze more in detail the individual parental relation. Whether this basis exists in all human societies and forms what was called above the constant, invariable elements of parental kinship, may remain an open question. This could only be answered correctly

a posteriori, on the basis of a series of special researches in many societies. The existence of individual motherhood, as this word is defined here, seems to obtain in the majority of human societies (or even in all of them). Nevertheless, as pointed out above, even this point cannot be treated as self-evident. This applies in still higher degree to individual marriage, which has been often denied as regards many societies.⁴ In this place we have mainly to keep before our eyes the Australian society and our own society, the latter of which affords, so to say, the heuristic principle, the clue to the understanding of the former. As far as those two societies are concerned, our choice appears to be the right one, and the social-physiological basis mentioned above contains the essential common elements of kinship in both societies.

The existence of individual marriage and its legal, sexual and psychological aspects have been discussed and established in the preceding chapters, as far as Australia is concerned. A discussion on individual motherhood will be given below. The existence of the individual family group in Australia, based upon individual marriage and upon individual motherhood, is the subject of the remaining chapters of this study. So that the existence of this physiological and social basis of kinship may be taken as granted.

Bearing now in mind that what will be said hereafter applies in the first place to Australia, it may be said that in the physiological and social basis of kinship adopted above, the minimum of conditions necessary for the application of the idea of individual kinship was enumerated. But this minimum is not sufficient to determine this idea completely in any given society. By studying only the social facts which determine the individuality of family life within the society, we should not exhaust all the features and essential aspects of parental kinship in any society. The existence of the individual family merely indicates unambiguously that individual parental kinship exists in the given society. For this social unit having a deep analogy with our own individual family, the relation between the

⁴ In some cases, when the position of the father is very subordinate in the family and his relation to the mother and her children is a very loose one—it seems doubtful whether the existence of the individual family (in the sense here defined) can be accepted (compare, for examples of such peoples, Dr. Westermarck, *H. H. M.*, p. 109, and Sir Laurence Gomme, *loc. cit.*, pp. 231, 232). In these cases the necessary condition for individual *paternal* kinship according to our theory would be lacking.

members of both these social units must also have some deep resemblance. But to exaggerate this resemblance would be as erroneous as to deny it. Besides the features common both to our parental kinship and to that of the Australian, there are also those which differentiate these two relationships. They must be sought for in the differences in the *social conditions*, which may even modify the physiological basis of kinship, as for instance when physical fatherhood is in one society established beyond doubt by exclusive sexual appropriation, while in the other there can be no question of it, owing to sexual communism. The variations in the general social conditions obviously also affect the purely sociological side of kinship. To point this out clearly, it is enough to mention that each relation is subject to the normative influences of the society in the midst of which it exists, and these norms and their sanction vary with the general social structure.

The variable elements in parental kinship must be also looked for in the different elements of the *collective mind*, connected with the parental relationship; in other words, in the different *collective ideas* and *feelings* which have parental kinship for their centre. Moreover, as mentioned above, there are reasons why the knowledge of the collective idea of kinship is sociologically important. It may be emphasized here that we should cripple and curtail our knowledge if we arbitrarily abstained from inquiring what influence the collective knowledge as to procreation, consanguinity, affinity, etc., may have upon the social aspect of the relation in question.

The same thing may be said of another domain of collective mentality: that is, of the feelings involved in parental kinship. The type of feelings underlying this relationship may vary with the society, in the same way as these feelings vary with each individual case in any given society. And as these feelings essentially determine the character of parental kinship in any given society, it appears that the discussion of this point cannot be omitted. Thus into the general formula of kinship there must enter also the psychological elements: collective ideas, expressing in a given society what is kinship, what are its legal, moral and customary aspects; and the collective feelings prevailing in a given society. From the interaction of these psychological elements with different variable social elements arise the more special, peculiar factors which define kinship in any given society. In other words, the variable elements in the general formula of kinship are seen to arise chiefly from the collective psychological inter-

pretation and valuation of some of the physiological and social facts underlying parental kinship.

To sum up, it may be said that parental kinship is the personal tie obtaining between members of the *parental group* or *individual family*, and like all other personalities it must be further determined in each society by the characteristic *collective feelings* and *collective ideas* which in the given society give it its specific meaning.⁵ This is that general formula of kinship which will yield us what we have demanded of it—that is, an indication of the facts for which to look in any given society. As the facts referred to in the first part of the above definition (the establishment of the existence of the family unit) are dealt with in the remaining chapters, it is necessary to discuss only the second part of the definition.

The influence upon kinship of the beliefs and ideas as to procreation appears quite plainly upon an analysis of the concept of consanguinity, and to this we may devote a few words.

Parental kinship is in our society conceived invariably and exclusively in terms of *consanguinity*, or, speaking more explicitly, parental kinship is conceived as established by the tie of common blood, resulting from birth (maternal kinship) or procreation (paternal kinship). Of course the mere physiological fact does not establish kinship in its full extent, with all its personal, emotional, social and legal aspects. It is only when the physiological facts of procreation or birth are sanctioned by society, in other words when they are consummated in legal marriage, that the children are full kinsmen of both their parents. Society takes all facts which are of vital importance for itself under its own supervision; and consequently the important facts of propagation are subject to the control of society, which regulates them by a series of religious, legal, customary and conventional norms, all of which are also necessary conditions and essential features of full parental kinship. But this sanction once granted, the tie of common blood is conceived as the main source of all mutual duties and moral and legal obligations; and from this also outflow the feelings of

⁵ This definition may appear a commonplace and a truism, a mere formulation of what is obvious to every one at first sight. But it is liable to this objection only when taken formally, *i.e.*, when only its *form* is considered, because it contains in the words *parental group* (individual family) the substance of all that has been said in the preceding pages about this social unit; and the other terms of the definition (*collective ideas* and *collective feelings*) will be determined more in detail in the following discussion.

love, attachment, reverence, and so forth, which are in our society the essential features of parental kinship. Once a man knows that a child, which he considered his own, is in reality not begotten by him, undoubtedly all his feelings for this child are affected, and, under certain conditions, its legal position may be modified. The two conditions for full parental kinship in our society are (1) that the child be the real physiological offspring of both presumed parents; (2) that it be legally begotten or its birth legalized.

In our society the line of distinction between physiological consanguinity and social consanguinity is quite clear; the one is a mere physiological fact, the other the social acknowledgment of this fact and all its consequences, subject to certain norms, laid down by society.

There are two separate sets of circumstances in which we may speak of consanguinity: (1) the existence of social institutions, which allow us to trace the physiological blood ties (*e.g.*, monogamy or harem institutions), in which case we can speak of the existence of physiological consanguinity as obtaining between the members of the individual family. (2) The existence of a social acknowledgment of the facts of procreation as creating ties of individual personal kinship, in which case we may speak of social consanguinity. If neither of these conditions are fulfilled, then it would be quite meaningless to speak of consanguinity.⁶

2. Rudimentary Human Groups ⁷

In the organization of human society the earliest form to develop seems to have been the power and control of the man as provider and ruler of dependent wife and children — if at least we may judge by

⁶ Keeping to the definition of this word as given above. It is a question of mere convention whether we call the general relationship not necessarily based upon ideas of community of blood *kinship*, as is done here, or whether we call it *social* in opposition to *physical kinship*, as does M. A. van Gennep. What is essential is to point out that our peculiarly European idea of kinship, which necessarily involves consanguinity, cannot be applied to other societies without discussion, but that it is only a special case of a more general concept of kinship which may be made up of quite different elements. It would seem convenient to reserve the word consanguinity for relationship based upon community of blood, and to use the word kinship to denote the parental relationship in general.

⁷ From *Primitive Society: The Beginnings of the Family and the Reckoning of Descent*, by Edwin Sidney Hartland, Ch. III. (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, no date. Reprinted by permission.)

the lowest groups now found, such as the Yahgans and the Onas of Tierra del Fuego and the Bushmen of South Africa. Very little is known of these tiny communities, especially of the Fuegians, who are perhaps the lowest and most miserable of all. If they at all represent the primitive condition of humanity, the race was dispersed in groups consisting of hardly more than those of the solitary apes. This, however, is doubtful. They inhabit only inhospitable localities. The Fuegians seem to have been driven to the extremity of South America by the continual pressure of other tribes. The Bushmen once roamed over the vast expanses of South Africa, where doubtless they obtained sufficient, if precarious, supplies of food in the shape of game. What were their condition and organization in those circumstances we can only conjecture: they have long been exterminated from the most habitable parts by the invasions of Hottentots and Bantu; and their degradation has been completed by the destruction of the larger game by the White Man's rifle. It is not likely that they were at any time more than few in numbers wandering over veld and mountain; and they are now reduced to a mere despised and miserable remnant, roving in small companies of twos and threes the desert and the steppe, where few other people care to dwell. Their organization was probably never more than rudimentary, but what shape it took, or on what it was founded, we are hardly informed.

Nor is our knowledge of the Fuegians less fragmentary. The Yahgans travelling about in canoes form very small parties, often consisting only of a man, his wife and children. In such a party the man would be supreme. Occasionally as many as five such families may be found living in one rude wigwam; more generally two families. They are said to live in "clans"; but what is the organization of a clan we are not told. Probably the statement has no better foundation than a natural preference felt by relatives for living near together. The utmost we learn is that they "consider the maternal tie much more important than the paternal, and the duties connected with it of a mutual help, defence and vengeance are held very sacred." Superficially, that statement seems to favor matrilineal kinship in spite of the dominance of husband and father; but it cannot be taken as conclusive evidence in the absence of definite information. It has, however, some confirmation in a tradition which alleges that in earlier days men were under female domination, but they rebelled, adopted initiation rites from the women and invented masked spirits, to keep the women in subjection.

In more favored lands the natives formed larger hordes. Those of Tasmania were unfortunately exterminated before any real effort had been made to obtain a knowledge of their organization. We are only told that they had neither government nor laws, and "the place of command was yielded up to the bully of the tribe." The relations of the colonists and the aborigines were almost uniformly hostile. There was therefore no attempt made to ascertain facts that would be of scientific value; and the opportunity is lost forever. From what little is known about them they are believed to have belonged to an early stratum of the population of the adjacent mainland of Australia. Accordingly we can only surmise that their customs and organization had a general similarity to those of the Australian Black-fellows, which we shall discuss at a later stage.

Thanks to Mr. Man, Mr. M. V. Portman, and Sir R. C. Temple we are a little better informed about another of these lowly races, the inhabitants of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. A Negrito, dwarfish people, their civilization is still in a rudimentary stage; for while they are well acquainted with the use of fire, they do not know how to produce it. Our knowledge of their organization is still vague. We are told that "an Andamanese individual, as the people themselves recognize, belongs to a family, which belongs to a sept, which belongs to a tribe, which belongs to a group of tribes or division of the race." But what is the exact definition of a family or a sept we are not informed. "There is," says Sir R. C. Temple, "no idea of government, but to each tribe and to each sept of it there is a recognized head, who has attained that position by tacit agreement on account of some admitted superiority, mental or physical, and commands a limited respect and such obedience as the self-interest of the other individual men of the tribe or sept dictates. There is a tendency to hereditary right in the natural selection of chiefs, but there is no social status that is not personally acquired." I am informed that more recent investigations by Mr. A. R. Brown, the results of which have not yet been published, lead to the belief that all this is somewhat too definitely stated. A tribe is a loose aggregate, held together by a common dialect and vague feeling of kinship. It consists of local groups, in no sense clans or septs, and these in turn of households, each of a husband and wife with dependent immature children. An organized family beyond this does not exist; and the "chiefs" are only the more influential men, without real authority. Undeveloped as their culture is, they appear to understand the origin

of children. Parents use different words in referring to their offspring. The father calls his son by a word signifying Him that has been begotten by me, the mother by a word meaning Him whom I have borne. And we are not surprised to learn that "relationships are traced in both lines." It naturally follows, as is the fact, that polygamy and divorce are alike unknown, and that while the unmarried of both sexes are universally unchaste, when once marriage has been entered into conjugal fidelity is probably the rule. A state of things, so far as we have material for understanding it, so exceptional does not enable us to bring Andamanese society within any category at present known. Until further researches lay bare something of its history and more precise information regarding its organization we must be content to leave it aside, merely noting its peculiarities.

The Andamanese have occupied their little chain of forest-clad islands in a stormy sea for unknown ages in isolation from the rest of mankind. To this fact they probably owe much of the particular development taken by their institutions. At the extremity of the habitable earth, on the inhospitable shores of the Arctic Ocean the Eskimo long enjoyed a similar, if not quite so complete, separation from foreign influences. There, though in an utterly different environment, they have evolved an organization distinguished also by the recognition of kinship on both paternal and maternal sides. Unlike the Andamanese, however, they indulge in polygamy (probably favored by the dangerous occupations of the men, which often result in loss of life and consequently many widows), divorce, sexual hospitality, and the ceremonial, temporary or permanent exchange of wives. The wife goes to live with her husband—a custom which has perhaps grown out of the more primitive possession by a man of his wife and children. Indeed the Eskimo, like the Yahgans, never seem to have passed entirely beyond that stage. The unit of society appears to be a family of husband with his wife or wives and growing children, to whom adopted children or a dependent mother may be added. Larger communities than this consist of housemates, where more than one family resides in the same house, and placefellows or inhabitants of the same little settlement. There are no chiefs, and no *gentes*, or clans: the people are not bound together by any wide-reaching bond or sentiment of common blood. What Steensby says of the Polar Eskimo is true in greater or less degree of all: "Naturally the life of the Polar Eskimo is not wanting in social features, but everything

has contributed to retard the formation of the society, so that the tendency to work and live together, which the Polar Eskimo are certainly also in possession of, has never had the chance to develop. Practically the only sort of coöperation or subordinate kind of sociological formation we can talk of in the case of the Polar Eskimos is the settlement; but as this is constantly on the move, sometimes scattering, sometimes concentrating more or less, this unit is not very constant either. The basis for this periodic meeting together at a settlement is in part relationship, in part the comradeship of the hunt. On the other hand, there is no such thing as true alliances, or grouping according to age, probably on account of the small numbers and scattered nature of the tribe; nor are any ceremonies or forms known on the attainment of maturity."

Climatic and economic reasons account for the preservation at both extremities of the American continent of so archaic and rudimentary a form of social order. At all events the severity of the climate for the greater part of the year, the consequent difficulty of finding subsistence, and the perils which ever environ the Eskimo man have raised his value as the sole protector and provider of the means of life for his dependants. When he returns from his fishing voyages on the stormy seas his catch is often not more than sufficient for his immediate circle. If it be larger than usual he is compelled to divide it not only among these but among his neighbors without distinction, especially in the oft-recurring times of necessity. In a more genial climate, even where as in Australia civilization is at its lowest and the population lives from hand to mouth, the mother, by her search for roots and berries and her skill in capturing insects and other small animals, contributes as much to the resources of the family as her husband by the greater but more uncertain booty of the hunt for larger game. But in the Arctic regions the man alone by his daily adventures on the water is able to obtain the necessary food and clothing; and to him the children habitually look for these things. It is, therefore, not extraordinary that, where larger communities are impossible and an extended consciousness of propinquity and protection cannot exist, the father has an authority and an influence in his family which have preserved his position and created the feeling of kinship. On the other hand, the ties with the mother, originating in birth, continued care and personal affection, are felt by the children, as is shown by the rule that in case of separation of the parents the

son always follows the mother. Sometimes too a husband goes to reside with his wife's parents. In this case he helps to maintain them and is to some extent under their control, as we shall find among matrilineal peoples. It would seem, therefore, that the rudimentary institutions both of the Fuegian and of the Eskimo might easily evolve with favoring circumstances into a matrilineal society.

3. The Meaning of the Tribe ⁸

The aim of this study is to examine into the customs which regulate the relations between certain groups belonging to the social organizations of primitive races, which groups are to be considered as the earliest forms of the more developed political groups.

The term "tribe" is generally used, with, however, little meaning, to indicate certain social groups at the lower stages of culture. We shall, therefore, begin by giving a sketch of the organization of the tribe in Australia.

This is the more necessary in this case owing to the fact that here the tribes have no permanent villages or dwellings, while their government is not very definite in form. These tribes represent almost the loosest known form of organization. "Every aboriginal inhabitant . . . is a member of a tribe"—that is, of a set of persons closely related in kinship, occupying practically in common and exclusively a tract of country, and bound together by the strictest alliance. "Were a man to persist in disregarding the customs of his tribe, he would be killed by its members, unless he expatriated himself . . . and were a man (or family) to dwell alone, he would inevitably fall a victim to the enemies of his tribe. Hence, as a rule, there is no alternative between compliance with tribal customs and death." It may be laid down that no person can exist, save as one of a tribal group.

Howitt gives the following definition of a tribe: "I use the word 'tribe' as meaning a number of people who occupy a definite tract of country, who recognize a common relationship and have a common speech, or dialects of the same. The tribes-people recognize some common bond which distinguishes them from other tribes, usually a tribal name, which may be their word for 'man,'—that is, an aboriginal of Australia." He goes on to observe that there are also groups

⁸ From *The Tribe, and Intertribal Relations in Australia*, by Gerald C. Wheeler; pp. 15-23. (London, John Murray, 1910. Reprinted by permission.)

made up of tribes very similar to one another. Such groups he calls "nations." We shall return to this point further on.

Howitt also states: "A distinction is drawn by tribes between themselves and aliens by some term applied to the latter, either of contempt or fear. Thus, while the Kurnai speak of themselves as 'men,' they give the name of Brajerak, from *bra* = men, and *jerak* = rage, or anger, to their neighbors, the Theddora . . . the Ngarigo . . . and Murring. . . . Those living in the Western Port district of Victoria they called Thurung, or 'tiger-snakes,' because, as I have heard them say, 'they came sneaking about to kill us.'"

It is, however, sometimes difficult to determine the true name of a tribe, for a member of a clan within the tribe will probably use the name of his clan, "and only on closer inquiry will give the name of the tribe of which that clan is a part."

Spencer and Gillen, writing of the North Central Australian tribes, say: "The names used are those by which the members of the tribes respectively call themselves, and which outsiders also apply to them. Thus, for example, the Arunta call themselves by this name, and it is used by the Kaitish in speaking of them. So, again, the latter call themselves Kaitish, and are called this by their neighbors, the Arunta, Warramunga, etc."

We may conclude that the tribal group, is in the first place, marked off by a special name.

A second way in which a tribe is generally marked off is by the use of a peculiar dialect.

The Australian aborigines all speak what is fundamentally one language, but this is broken up into a huge number of dialects, which in the more extreme cases may appear, even to a European, as different languages. In general, the natives of one tribe do not understand the dialects of any but their nearest neighbors among the other tribes; each tribe has its own dialect, though the variations in these dialects are of different degrees.

A tribe will also in general be differentiated from others by some peculiarities of Organization and Custom. While there is, as in the case of speech, a general similarity in these respects throughout Australia, there are also considerable variations; these may be very great in the case of tribes lying far apart, the direction of greatest variation, perhaps, being north and south. But this kind of differentiation is not very important in the case of neighboring tribes.

The fourth way in which a tribe is differentiated from others is through the exclusive possession and enjoyment by the tribal group of a defined territory. To this important point we shall return below, merely referring to it here as a distinguishing mark of the tribe, and probably the most definite one.

But the determination of a "tribe" is to a great extent conventional and schematic. We have indicated four marks or attributes by which one tribal group is distinguished from others, but it must not be supposed that the tribe is always so clearly constituted and differentiated as the above statements might lead us to expect. It is true that in most cases careful observation and comparison enable the observer to determine definitely constituted groups to which the name "tribe" is applicable, but the matter is not always so simple.

There are two kinds of complication. The first is the existence of "nations" — that is, aggregates of similar tribes. It is not always easy to tell whether we have here to deal with one large tribe, with its local divisions, or whether we are to consider the lesser groups as true independent "tribes." The case is further complicated in that such "nations" have often each its name, while the dialects spoken by the component tribes may not vary more than is often the case with the smaller divisions within what is held to be one tribe. In such circumstances we must often be content to leave a margin of uncertainty to be eliminated, maybe, by more accurate observation.

The second complication is of the same kind as the first, only in an opposite direction. As we shall see below, each tribal group is subdivided on a local basis into many smaller groups, each with its own share of territory, while within a tribe there may be considerable variations in the dialect. Thus, cases arise where it is hard to say whether we are dealing with a tribe, or merely with sub-tribes, or even small groups of families. Here again we have often to leave a margin of uncertainty.

We conclude, therefore, that it is not always possible to give an accurate determination of the group which we are to consider as the tribe, and sometimes the fixation of the tribal group may have to be revised.

These two complications, together with the frequently loose statements of observers, make it often difficult to gather whether we are dealing with inter-tribal or with intra-tribal relations. . . .

We may summarize the facts by saying that a tribe is a mere ag-

gregation of certain local groups, distinguished from other local groups only by certain common, more or less distinctive, peculiarities, which hardly, if at all, condition the inter-group relations within the tribe. . . . There would seem to be, however, certain tribal rights over the smaller subdivisions of the tribal territory, but the loose use of the term "tribe" by most authorities must here be borne in mind. . . .

The loose structure and the wandering habits of the Australian tribes, together with the absence of permanent settlements, lead most of the early observers to deny the existence of any form of government. But more careful observation has shown that though the forms are not very precise, there undoubtedly exist the rudiments of a regular government over and above the mere authority belonging to the head of each family.

It is clear that the individual Australian is under the authority of well-understood customs or laws throughout his life, by which his relations with his fellows and with his physical environment are effectively controlled. Many of these customs are obeyed under supernatural sanctions, such as those dealing with food restrictions, and sometimes the keeping secrecy as to ceremonials, and so on. But the sanctions for many rules of conduct come from the local group, and are not supernatural. . . . This system of regulated justice points to some form of authority to enforce it.

Howitt sums up the evidence from the southeastern area by declaring that we are justified in assuming the existence of headmen in the Australian tribes generally, though the extent of their authority may vary.

These headmen belong to the local groups within the tribe; sometimes one among them may be slightly raised, owing to certain personal qualities or accidents, above the rest, and take the lead at their joint deliberations, but there is no further approach to any headman of the tribe as a whole. . . .

Coming now to the central tribes north of Lake Eyre, we may take the Arunta as type. Each of the local totemic groups has its headman or "alatunja." Within his own group this personage takes the lead, but outside it no headman has necessarily any special power; this he would only win through more than ordinary capacity, or through being the head of a numerically important group; old age, as such, does not bring distinction. There is no chief of the whole tribe. The alatunja's authority is vague, and he has no definite

powers over the members of his group; he is simply one of the elders' council, and his authority depends on his personal qualities. Within certain limitations as to capacity the office is hereditary, descending in the male line. . . .

It is to be concluded that there were the rudiments of government in the Australian tribes. The degree of development of this institution varied probably in different cases. Each local group of a certain extent had its headman or headmen and elders' assembly, and was autonomous, or nearly so. The tribal unity is very slight.

4. Totem, Taboo, and Magic.⁹

One of the most interesting institutions of primitive people is "Totemism." Frazer defined a totem as, "a class of material objects which a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that there exists between him and every member of the class an intimate and altogether special relation." Because totemism is often closely connected with the social and religious institutions of primitive people it is one of the most illuminating subjects of study for the anthropologist. There are several features which various authorities have believed to be symptomatic of totemism. Dr. Goldenweiser has summarized them as follows:

- (1) An exogamous clan.
- (2) A clan name derived from the totem.
- (3) A religious attitude towards the totem; as a "friend," "brother," "protector," etc.
- (4) Taboos, or restrictions against killing, eating (sometimes touching and seeing), the totem.
- (5) A belief in the descent from the totem.

Since totemism among the Australian tribes and among the Indians of British Columbia presents certain characteristic features mentioned above, we will study these primitive groups and their relation to totemism. It is necessary to recognize that the totem is of three general kinds; the clan totem, common to all members of the clan, and hereditary; the sex totem, one common to all males, another common to all females, of a tribe; and the individual totem, belonging to a single individual, and not hereditary. Moreover, totemism is to

⁹ From *An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution*, by F. Stuart Chapin; pp. 245-247; 255-256; 258-262. (New York, The Century Company, 1913. Reprinted by permission.)

be distinguished from fetishism. A totem is a class of objects. If the eagle is the totem of a clan, all eagles are held in sacred veneration by all members of the clan. A fetish is an individual object, not a class of objects.

We first noted that totemism is related to exogamy. In British Columbia the local clan or family is the important social unit among the Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, and Kwakiutl. The Tlingit people comprise fourteen divisions each consisting of several towns. At the present time there are two strictly exogamous phratries, with descent through the mother. These phratries are subdivided into clans which generally derive their names from the locality they originally occupied,—“Of the Island of Teqo,” “Of the House in the Middle of the Valley,” etc. Among the Haida we find two exogamous metronymic clans. The members of one clan are regarded as closely related, and marriage between persons of the same clan is viewed by them with almost the same abhorrence as incest is looked upon by us. The Tsimshian clans are also exogamous and metronymic. The northern Kwakiutl are organized like the Tsimshian, with the exception of descent, which is both maternal and paternal. The system of descent among the southern Kwakiutl presents an interesting example of what is probably a transition from male to female descent. Through marriage, a man acquires the position and privileges of his father-in-law which he cannot use for himself but transmits to his son. These are unmistakable indications of a former descent through the father. But the clans are not exogamous. Indeed, a woman is advised to marry in her clan. The custom of marrying a member of the same clan and of never making matrimonial alliance with outsiders, is called endogamy. The two phratries of the Tlingit are Raven and Wolf. The exogamy of the British Columbian Indians does not seem to be indissolubly bound up with their system of totemism, so that we cannot always expect totemism to appear in connection with exogamy. Although many of the clans and family names of these peoples are animal names, the clans of the Tlingit and the families of the Haida bear names derived from localities. Thus the institution of totemism may exist without there being derivation of the clan name from the totem. . . .

In Australia, the taboo plays an important part in connection with the totemic system. A member of the Arábana must not eat the totem animal, but can kill it and hand it over to the members of other

totem groups to be eaten by them. A kangaroo man must not kill a kangaroo with any show of brutality. He is only permitted to hif it on the neck. Then he can eat its head, feet, and liver; the rest he must leave to his friends. The mosquito man may neither kill nor eat insects. The rain man must use water moderately, and when it rains must stand in the open with no protection over his head other than his shield. . . .

The ceremonial life of primitive peoples is bound up with a belief in magic. This belief is supplemented in the minds of peoples that have made some advance beyond the lowest savagery by a belief in personal spirits or ghosts. The basis of magic is the "mana," already mentioned.

Frazer reduces the fundamental principles of magic to two: first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and second, that things which have once been in contact, but have ceased to be so, continue to act on each other as if the contact still persisted. The savage infers from the first of these principles that he can produce any desired effect by merely imitating it; from the second principle he concludes that he can influence at pleasure and at any distance, any person of whom, or any thing of which he possesses a particle. Magic of the first sort Frazer has called "imitative magic," and magic of the second kind he has called "sympathetic magic." But inasmuch as the efficacy of the imitative magic depends upon a certain physical influence or sympathy, both kinds of magic may be conveniently called sympathetic magic.

The most familiar application of imitative magic based upon the principle that like produces like, is the attempt to injure or destroy an enemy by mutilating or destroying an image of him, in the belief that, just as the image is hurt, so does the man suffer and die when the image perishes. The Ojebway Indian desiring to work evil to his enemy, makes a little wooden image of him and runs a needle into its head or heart, or he shoots an arrow into it, for he believes that by so doing his foe will at the same instant be seized with a sharp pain in the corresponding part of his body. A Malay charm which enables one to injure another person is to take the parings of nails, hair, eyebrows, and spittle of the victim, enough to represent every part of his person, and then make them up into his likeness with wax from a deserted bee's comb. The figure must be scorched slowly over a lamp every night for seven nights, with the following words:

"It is not wax that I am scorching,

It is the liver, heart, and spleen of So-and-so that I scorch."
After the seventh time the figure must be burned, and the victim will die.

Exercises

1. What can be said of *political* phenomena among primitive groups?

2. What error, according to Malinowski, has crept into modern studies of primitive marriage and family?

3. State Malinowski's general definition of "kinship," and give his reasons for formulating such a definition.

4. What is the "individual family," according to Malinowski?

5. Show how ideas of kinship are affected by social conditions; by collective ideas and feelings.

6. State his conception of parental kinship, and indicate what part consanguinity plays in it.

7. What, according to Hartland, is the earliest form of human organization?

8. Describe the scattered groups which furnish the evidence for this conclusion. Is the evidence sufficient in Hartland's opinion? in your own?

9. Discuss the evidence for the existence, among the Eskimos, of the family; the clan; the settlement.

10. What environmental conditions favor the authority of the *father* among the Eskimos and lessen it among the Australians?

11. Show that these environmental factors become effective only indirectly, through social factors.

12. What four marks, according to Wheeler, distinguish a tribal group?

13. What two facts complicate the problem of distinguishing the tribal divisions?

14. State Wheeler's final definition of the *tribe*, and compare it with that of Howitt.

15. Describe government among the Australian tribes. (For further evidence consult the References below; also Hutton Webster: *Primitive Secret Societies*.)

16. Explain *totemism*, and show its bearing upon primitive social organization.

17. How does *taboo* function for social control?

18. Define "imitative" magic; "sympathetic" magic. Is magic used more frequently for individual aggression or for social control? Compare it with *religion* in this respect. (See Reading 2, under Ch. XVIII., above).

Additional References

1. Gettell, Raymond B.: *Introduction to Political Science*, Ch. V. "Origin of the State."
2. Goldenweiser, Alexander A.: *Early Civilization*. Ch. XII., and XIII., "Society."
3. Hearn, William E.: *The Aryan Household. Its Structure and Its Development*, Ch. III.
4. Kroeber, A. L., and Waterman, T. T.: *Source Book in Anthropology*. Extracts 31-37 deal with various aspects of primitive social organization, by outstanding authorities.
5. Leacock, Stephen: *Elements of Political Science*. Ch. III. "The True Origin of The State."
6. Lowie, Robert H.: *Primitive Society*. Ch. V., "Kinship Usages"; Ch. VI., "The Sib." Highly authoritative
7. Thomas, William I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*. Part VII., especially "The Iroquois Confederacy," by L. H. Morgan.
8. Wissler, Clark, and others: "Societies of the Plains Indians," in *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*; Vol. XI. Treats exhaustively the "societies and analogous organizations" of the Indians of the Plains.

CHAPTER XVII

FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW

THE origins of government and law in the most general sense have already been touched upon in the preceding chapter. Their beginnings are plainly to be discerned in the primitive family, the clan or gens, and the tribal organization. In their more narrow and specific sense they are identified with the civic and territorial State, with courts of justice and judicial procedure. Space will not permit of a discussion of the origins of the State in this political sense. Most writers trace it to conquest in some form or other, as will be found expressed in the additional references given below. In this chapter two extracts are presented. One attempts to trace the historical development of criminal justice in some of its objective phases, while the other treats the social psychology underlying all punitive procedure.

1. The Beginnings of Punitive Law ¹

Let us pass on to examine the beginnings of punitive law. After all, even under the sway of custom, casual outbreaks are liable to occur. Some one's passions will prove too much for him, and there will be an accident. What happens then in the primitive society? Let us first consider one of the very unorganized communities at the bottom of the evolutionary scale; as, for example, the little Negritos of the Andaman Islands. Their justice, explains Mr. Man, in his excellent account of these people, is administered by the simple method of allowing the aggrieved party to take the law into his own hands. This he usually does by flinging a burning faggot at the offender, or by discharging an arrow at him, though more frequently near him. Meanwhile all others who may be present are apt to beat a speedy retreat, carrying off as much of their property as their haste will allow, and remaining hid in the jungle until sufficient time has elapsed for the quarrel to have blown over. Some-

¹ From *Anthropology*, by R. R. Marett, Reader in Social Anthropology in the University of Oxford; pp. 188-194. (New York and London, Henry Holt and Company. No date. Reprinted by permission.)

times, however, friends interpose, and seek to deprive the disputants of their weapons. Should, however, one of them kill the other, nothing is necessarily said or done to him by the rest. Yet conscience makes cowards of us all; so that the murderer, from prudential motives, will not uncommonly absent himself until he judges that the indignation of the victim's friends has sufficiently abated.

Now here we seem to find want of social structure and want of law going together as cause and effect. The "friends" of whom we hear need to be organized into a police force. If we now turn to totemic society, with its elaborate clan-system, it is quite another story. Blood-revenge ranks amongst the foremost of the clansman's social obligations. Over the whole world it stands out by itself as the type of all that law means for the savage. Within the clan, indeed, the maxim of blood for blood does not hold; though there may be another kind of punitive law put into force by the totemites against an erring brother, as, for instance, if they slay one of their number for disregarding the exogamic rule and consorting with a woman who is all-one-flesh with him. But, between clans of the same tribe, the system of blood-revenge requires strict reprisals, according to the principle that some one on the other side, though not necessarily the actual murderer, must die the death. This is known as the principle of collective responsibility; and one of the most interesting problems relating to the evolution of early law is to work out how individual responsibility gradually develops out of collective, until at length, even as each man does, so likewise he suffers.

The collective method of settling one's grievances is natural enough, when men are united into groups bound together by the closest of sentimental ties, and on the other hand there is no central and impartial authority to arbitrate between the parties. One of our crew has been killed by one of your crew. So a stand-up fight takes place. Of course we should like to get at the right man if we could; but, failing that, we are out to kill some one in return, just to teach your crew a lesson. Comparatively early in the day, however, it strikes the savage mind that there are degrees of responsibility. For instance, some one has to call the avenging party together, and to lead it. He will tend to be a real blood-relation, son, father, or brother. Thus he stands out as champion, whilst the rest are in the position of mere seconds. Correspondingly, the other side will tend to thrust forward the actual offender into the office of counter-champion.

There is direct evidence to show that, amongst Australians, Eskimo, and so on, whole groups at one time met in battle, but later on were represented by chosen individuals, in the persons of those who were principals in the affair. Thus we arrive at the duel. The transition is seen in such a custom as that of the Port Lincoln black-fellows. The brother of the murdered man must engage the murderer; but any one on either side who might care to join in the fray was at liberty to do so. Hence it is but a step to the formal duel, as found for instance, among the Apaches of North America.

Now the legal duel is an advance on the collective bear-fight, if only because it brings home to the individual perpetrator of the crime that he will have to answer for it. Cranz, the great authority on the Eskimo of Greenland, naïvely remarks that a Greenlander dare not murder or otherwise wrong another, since it might possibly cost him the life of his best friend. Did the Greenlander know that it would probably cost him his own life, his sense of responsibility, we may surmise, might be somewhat quickened. On the other hand, duelling is not a satisfactory way of redressing the balance, since it merely gives the powerful bully an opportunity of adding a second murder to the first. Hence the ordeal marks an advance in legal evolution. A good many Australian peoples, for example, have reached the stage of requiring the murderer to submit to a shower of spears or boomerangs at the hands of the aggrieved group, on the mutual understanding that the blood revenge ends here.

Luckily, however, for the murderer, it often takes time to bring him to book; and angry passions are apt in the meanwhile to subside. The ruder savages are not so bloodthirsty as we are apt to imagine. War has evolved like everything else; and with it has evolved the man who likes fighting for its own sake. So, in place of a life for a life, compensation—"pacation," as it is technically termed—comes to be recognized as a reasonable *quid pro quo*. Constantly we find custom at the half-way stage. If the murderer is caught soon, he is killed; but if he can stave off the day of justice, he escapes with a fine. When private property has developed, the system of bloodfines becomes most elaborate. Amongst the Iroquois the manslayer must redeem himself from death by means of no less than sixty presents to the injured kin; one to draw the axe out of the wound, a second to wipe the blood away, a third to restore peace to the land, and so forth. According to the collective principle, the

clansmen on the one side share the price of atonement, and on the other side must tax themselves in order to make it up. Shares are on a scale proportionate to degrees of relationship. Or, again, further nice calculations are required, if it is sought to adjust the gross amount of the payment to the degree of guilt. Hence it is not surprising that, when a more or less barbarous people, such as the Anglo-Saxons, came to require a written law, it should be almost entirely taken up by regulations about blood-fines, that had become too complicated for the people any longer to keep in their heads.

So far we have been considering the law of blood-revenge as purely an affair between the clans concerned; the rest of the tribal public keeping aloof, very much in the style of the Andamanese bystanders who retire into the jungle when there is a prospect of a row. But with the development of a central authority, whether in the shape of the rule of many or of one, the public control of the blood-feud begins to assert itself; for the good reason that endless vendetta is a dissolving force, which the larger and more stable type of society cannot afford to tolerate if it is to survive. The following are a few instances illustrative of the transition from private to public jurisdiction. In North America, Africa, and elsewhere, we find the chief or chiefs pronouncing sentence, but the clan or family left to carry it out as best they can. Again, the kin may be entrusted with the function of punishment, but obliged to carry it out in the way prescribed by the authorities; as, for instance, in Abyssinia, where the nearest relation executes the manslayer in the presence of the king, using exactly the same kind of weapon as that with which the murder was committed. Or the right of the kin to punish dwindles to a mere form. Thus in Afghanistan the elders make a show of handing over the criminal to his accusers, who must, however, comply strictly with the wishes of the assembly; whilst in Samoa the offender was bound and deposited before the family "as if to signify that he lay at their mercy," and the chief saw to the rest. Finally, the state, in the person of its executive officers, both convicts and executes.

When the state is represented by a single ruler, crime tends to become an offence against "the king's peace" — or, in the language of Roman law, against his "majesty." Henceforward, the easy-going system of getting off with a fine is at an end, and murder is punished with the utmost sternness. In such a state as Dahomey, in the old days of its independence, there may have been a good deal of

barbarity displayed in the administration of justice, but at any rate human life was no less effectively protected by the law than it was, say, in mediaeval Europe.

2. The Psychology of Punitive Justice²

The following pages discuss the hostile attitude as it appears especially in punitive justice.

In the criminal court it is the purpose of the proceeding to prove that the defendant did or did not commit a certain act, that in case the defendant did commit the act this act falls under such and such a category of crime or misdemeanor as defined by the statute, and that, as a consequence, he is subject to such and such punishment. It is the assumption of this procedure that conviction and punishment are the accomplishment of justice and also that it is for the good of society, that is, that it is both just and expedient, though it is not assumed that in any particular case the meting out to a criminal of the legal recompense of his crime will accomplish an immediate social good which will outweigh the immediate social evil that may result to him, his family, and society itself from his conviction and imprisonment. Galsworthy's play *Justice* turns upon the wide discrepancy between legal justice and social good in a particular case. On the other side lies the belief that without this legal justice with all its miscarriages and distintegrating results society itself would be impossible. In the back of the public mind lie both these standards of criminal justice, that of retribution and that of prevention. It is just that a criminal should suffer in proportion to the evil that he has done. On the other hand it is just that the criminal should suffer so much and in such a manner that his penalty will serve to deter him and others from committing the like offense in the future. There has been a manifest shift in the emphasis upon these two standards. During the Middle Ages, when courts of justice were the antechambers to chambers of torture, the emphasis lay upon the nice proportioning of the suffering to the offense. In the grand epic manner Dante projected this torture chamber, as the accomplishment of justice, against the sphere of the heavens, and produced those magnificent distortions and magnifications of human primitive vengeance that the medieval heart and imagination accepted as divine.

² By George H. Mead, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 5 (Mar. 1918); pp. 581-594. Reprinted by permission.

There existed, however, even then no commensurability between retributory sufferings and the evil for which the criminal was held responsible. In the last analysis he suffered until satisfaction had been given to the outraged sentiments of the injured person, or of his kith and kin, or of the community, or of an angry God. To satisfy the latter an eternity might be too short, while a merciful death ultimately carried away from the most exacting community the victim who was paying for his sin in the coin of his own agony. Commensurability does not exist between sin and suffering but does exist roughly between the sin and the amount and kind of suffering that will satisfy those who feel themselves aggrieved, and yet it has become the judgment of our common moral consciousness that satisfaction in the suffering of the criminal has no legitimate place in assessing his punishment. Even in its sublimated form, as a part of righteous indignation, we recognize its legitimacy only in resenting and condemning injury, not in rendering justice for the evil done. It was therefore natural that in measuring the punishment the emphasis should shift from retribution to prevention, for there is a rough quantitative relation between the severity of the penalty and the fear which it inspires. This shift to the standard of expediency in determining the severity of the penalty does not mean that retribution is no longer the justification for punishment either in the popular mind or in the legal theory, for however expedient it may be to visit crimes with condign punishments in the interest of the welfare of society, the justification for inflicting the suffering at all is found in the assumption that the criminal owes retributive suffering to the community; a debt which the community may collect in the form and amount which is most expedient to itself.

This curious combination of the concepts of retributive suffering which is the justification for punishment but may not be the standard for the amount and degree of the punishment, and of a social expediency which may not be the justification for the punishment itself but is the standard of the amount and kind of punishment inflicted, is evidently not the whole story. If retribution were the only justification for punishment it is hard to believe that punishment would not itself have disappeared when society came to recognize that a possible theory of punishment could not be worked out or maintained on the basis of retribution; especially when we recognize that a system of punishments assessed with reference to their deterrent

powers not only works very inadequately in repressing crime but also preserves a criminal class. This other part of the story, which neither retribution nor social expediency tells, reveals itself in the assumed solemnity of criminal court procedure, in the majesty of the law, in the supposedly impartial and impersonal character of justice. These characters are not involved in the concept of retribution nor in that of deterrence. Lynch law is the very essence of retribution and is inspired with the grim assurance that such summary justice must strike terror into the heart of the prospective criminal, and lynch law lacks solemnity, and majesty, and is anything but impersonal or impartial. These characters inhere, not in the primitive impulses out of which punitive justice has arisen nor in the cautious prudence with which society devises protection for its goods, but in the judicial institution which theoretically acts on the rule and not upon impulse and whose justice is to be done though the heavens fall. What, then, are these values evidenced in and maintained by the laws of punitive justice? The most patent value is the theoretically impartial enforcement of the common will. It is a procedure which undertakes to recognize and protect the individual in the interest of the common good and by the common will. In his acceptance of the law and dependence upon it the individual is at one with the community, while this very attitude carries with it the recognition of his responsibility to obey and support the law in its enforcement. So conceived the common law is an affirmation of citizenship. It is, however, a grave mistake to assume that the law itself and men's attitudes toward it can exist *in abstracto*. It is a grave mistake, for too often the respect for law as law is what we demand of members of the community, while we are able to regard with comparative indifference defects both in the concrete laws and in their administration. It is not only a mistake, it is also a fundamental error, for all emotional attitudes—and even respect for law and a sense of responsibility are emotional attitudes—arise in response to concrete impulses. We do not respect law in the abstract but the values which the laws of the community conserve. We have no sense of responsibility as such but an emotional recognition of duties which our position in the community entails. Nor are these impulses and emotional reactions less concrete because they are so organized into complex habits that some slight but appropriate stimulus sets a whole complex of impulses into operation. A man who defends an apparently

unimportant right on principle is defending the whole body of analogous rights which a vast complex of social habits tends to preserve. His emotional attitude, which is seemingly out of proportion to the immediate issue, answers to all of those social goods toward which the different impulses in the organized body of habits are directed. Nor may we assume that because our emotions answer to concrete impulses they are therefore necessarily egoistic or self-regarding. No small portion of the impulses which make up the human individual are immediately concerned with the good of others. The escape from selfishness is not by the Kantian road of an emotional response to the abstract universal, but by the recognition of the genuinely social character of human nature. An important instance of this illusory respect for abstract law appears in our attitude of dependence upon the law and its enforcement for the defense of our goods and those of others with whom we identify our interests.

A threatened attack upon these values places us in an attitude of defense, and as this defense is largely intrusted to the operation of the laws of the land we gain a respect for the laws which is in proportion to the goods which they defend. There is, however, another attitude more easily aroused under these conditions which is, I think, largely responsible for our respect for law as law. I refer to the attitude of hostility to the lawbreaker as an enemy to the society to which we belong. In this attitude we are defending the social structure against an enemy with all the animus which the threat of our own interests calls out. It is not the detailed operation of the law in defining the invasion of rights and their proper preservation that is the center of our interest but the capture and punishment of the personal enemy, who is also the public enemy. The law is the bulwark of our interest, and the hostile procedure against the enemy arouses a feeling of attachment due to the means put at our disposal for satisfying the hostile impulse. The law has become the weapon for overwhelming the thief of our purses, our good names, or even our lives. We feel toward it as we feel toward the police officer who rescues us from a murderous assault. The respect for the law is the obverse side of our hatred for the criminal aggressor. Furthermore the court procedure, after the man accused of the crime is put under arrest and has been brought to trial, emphasizes this emotional attitude. The state's attorney seeks a conviction. The accused must defend himself against this attack. The

aggrieved person and the community find in this officer of the government their champion. A legal battle takes the place of the former physical struggle which led up to the arrest. The emotions called out are the emotions of battle. The impartiality of the court who sits as the adjudicator is the impartiality of the umpire between the contending parties. The assumption that contending parties will each do his utmost to win, places upon each, even upon the state's attorney, the obligation to get a verdict for his own side rather than to bring about a result which will be for the best interests of all concerned. The doctrine that the strict enforcement of the law in this fashion is for the best interest of all concerned has no bearing upon the point which I am trying to emphasize. This point is that the emotional attitude of the injured individual and of the other party to the proceedings — the community — toward the law is that engendered by a hostile enterprise in which the law has become the ponderous weapon of defense and attack.

There is another emotional content involved in this attitude of respect for law as law, which is perhaps of like importance with the other. I refer to that accompanying stigma placed upon the criminal. The revulsions against criminality reveal themselves in a sense of solidarity with the group, a sense of being a citizen which on the one hand excludes those who have transgressed the laws of the group and on the other inhibits tendencies to criminal acts in the citizen himself. It is this emotional reaction against conduct which excludes from society that gives to the moral taboos of the group such impressiveness. The majesty of the law is that of the angel with the fiery sword at the gate who can cut one off from the world to which he belongs. The majesty of the law is the dominance of the group over the individual, and the paraphernalia of the criminal law serves not only to exile the rebellious individual from the group, but also to awaken in law-abiding members of society the inhibitions which make rebellion impossible to them. The formulation of these inhibitions is the basis of criminal law. The emotional content that accompanies them is a large part of the respect for law as law. In both these elements of our respect for law as law, in the respect for the common instrument of defense from and attack upon the enemy of ourselves and of society, and in the respect for that body of formulated custom which at once identifies us with the whole community and excludes those who break its commandments, we rec-

ognize concrete impulses—those of attack upon the enemy of ourselves and at the same time of the community, and those of inhibition and restraint through which we feel the common will, in the identity of prohibition and of exclusion. They are concrete impulses which at once identify us with the predominant whole and at the same time place us on the level of every other member of the group, and thus set up that theoretical impartiality and even-handedness of punitive justice which calls out in no small degree our sense of loyalty and respect. And it is out of the universality that belongs to the sense of common action springing out of these impulses that the institutions of law and of regulative and repressive justice arise. While these impulses are concrete in respect of their immediate object, *i.e.*, the criminal, the values which this hostile attitude toward the criminal protects either in society or in ourselves are negatively and abstractly conceived. Instinctively we estimate the worth of goods protected by the procedure against the criminal and in terms of this hostile procedure. These goods are not simply the physical articles but include the more precious values of self-respect, in not allowing one's self to be overridden, in downing the enemy of the group, in affirming the maxims of the group and its institutions against invasions. Now in all these we have our backs toward that which we protect and our faces toward the actual or potential enemy. These goods are regarded as valuable because we are willing to fight and even die for them in certain exigencies, but their intrinsic value is neither affirmed nor considered in the legal proceeding. The values thus obtained are not their values in use but sacrifice values. To many a man his country has become infinitely valuable because he finds himself willing to fight and die for it when the common impulse of attack upon the common enemy has been aroused, and yet he may have been, in his daily life, a traitor to the social values he is dying to protect because there was no emotional situation within which these values appeared in his consciousness. It is difficult to bring into commensurable relationship to each other a man's willingness to cheat his country out of its legitimate taxes and his willingness to fight and die for the same country. The reactions spring from different sets of impulses and lead to evaluations which seem to have nothing in common with each other. The type of valuation of social goods that arises out of the hostile attitude toward the criminal is negative, but because it does not present the positive social func-

tion of the goods that the hostile procedure protects. From the standpoint of protection one thing behind the wall has the same import as anything else that lies behind the same defense. The respect for law as law thus is found to be a respect for a social organization of defense against the enemy of the group and a legal and judicial procedure that are oriented with reference to the criminal. The attempt to utilize these social attitudes and procedures to remove the causes of crime, to assess the kind and amount of punishment which the criminal should suffer in the interest of society, or to reinstate the criminal as a law-abiding citizen has failed utterly. For while the institutions which inspire our respect are concrete institutions with a definite function, they are responsible for a quite abstract and inadequate evaluation of society and its goods. These legal and political institutions organized with reference to the enemy or at least the outsider give a statement of social goods which is based upon defense and not upon function. The aim of the criminal proceeding is to determine whether the accused is innocent, *i.e.*, still belongs to the group or whether he is guilty, *i.e.*, is put under the ban which criminal punishment carries with it. The technical statement of this is found in the loss of the privileges of a citizen, in sentences of any severity, but the more serious ban is found in the fixed attitude of hostility on the part of the community toward a jailbird. One effect of this is to define the goods and privileges of the members of the community as theirs in virtue of their being law-abiding, and their responsibilities as exhausted by the statutes which determine the nature of criminal conduct. This effect is not due alone to the logical tendency to maintain the same definition of the institution of property over against the conduct of the thief and that of the law-abiding citizen. It is due in far greater degree to the feeling that we all stand together in the protection of property. In the positive definition of property, that is in terms of its social uses and functions, we are met by wide diversity of opinion, especially where the theoretically wide freedom of control over private property, asserted over against the thief, is restrained in the interest of problematic public goods. Out of this attitude toward the goods which the criminal law protects arises that fundamental difficulty in social reform which is due, not to mere difference in opinion nor to conscious selfishness, but to the fact that what we term opinions are profound social attitudes which, once assumed, fuse all conflicting

tendencies over against the enemy of the people. The respect for law as law in its positive use in defense of social goods becomes unwittingly a respect for the conceptions of these goods which the attitude of defense has fashioned. Property becomes sacred not because of its social uses but because all the community is as one in its defense, and this conception of property, taken over into the social struggle to make property serve its functions in the community, becomes the bulwark of these in possession, *beati possidentes*.

Beside property other institutions have arisen, that of the person with its rights, that of the family with its rights, and that of the government with its rights. Wherever rights exist, invasion of those rights may be punished, and a definition of these institutions is formulated in protecting the right against trespass. The definition is again the voice of the community as a whole proclaiming and penalizing the one whose conduct has placed him under the ban. There is the same unfortunate circumstance that the law speaking against the criminal gives the sanction of the sovereign authority of the community to the negative definition of the right. It is defined in terms of its contemplated invasion. The individual who is defending his own rights against the trespasser is led to state even his family and more general social interests in abstract individualistic terms. Abstract individualism and a negative conception of liberty in terms of the freedom from restraints become the working ideas in the community. They have the prestige of battle cries in the fight for freedom against privilege. They are still the countersigns of the descendants of those who cast off the bonds of political and social restraint in their defense and assertion of the rights their forefathers won. Wherever criminal justice, the modern elaborate development of the taboo, the ban, and their consequences in a primitive society, organizes and formulates public sentiment in defense of social goods and institutions against actual or prospective enemies, there we find that the definition of the enemies, in other words the criminals, carries with it the definition of the goods and institutions. It is the revenge of the criminal upon the society which crushes him. The concentration of public sentiment upon the criminal which mobilizes the institution of justice, paralyzes the undertaking to conceive our common goods in terms of their uses. The majesty of the law is that of the sword drawn against a common enemy. The even-handedness of justice is that of universal conscription against a common enemy,

and that of the abstract definition of rights which places the ban upon anyone who falls outside of its rigid terms.

Thus we see society almost helpless in the grip of the hostile attitude it has taken toward those who break its laws and contravene its institutions. Hostility toward the lawbreaker inevitably brings with it the attitudes of retribution, repression, and exclusion. These provide no principles for the eradication of crime, for returning the delinquent to normal social relations, nor for stating the transgressed rights and institutions in terms of their positive social functions.

On the other side of the ledger stands the fact that the attitude of hostility toward the lawbreaker has the unique advantage of uniting all members of the community in the emotional solidarity of aggression. While the most admirable of humanitarian efforts are sure to run counter to the individual interests of very many in the community, or fail to touch the interest and imagination of the multitude and to leave the community divided or indifferent, the cry of thief or murder is attuned to profound complexes, lying below the surface of competing individual effort, and citizens who have separated by divergent interests stand together against the common enemy. Furthermore, the attitude reveals common, universal values which underlie like a bedrock the divergent structures of individual ends that are mutually closed and hostile to each other. Seemingly without the criminal the cohesiveness of society would disappear and the universal goods of the community would crumble into mutually repellent individual particles. The criminal does not seriously endanger the structure of society by his destructive activities, and on the other hand he is responsible for a sense of solidarity, aroused among those whose attention would be otherwise centered upon interests quite divergent from those of each other. Thus courts of criminal justice may be essential to the preservation of society even when we take account of the impotence of the criminal over against society, and the clumsy failure of criminal law in the repression and suppression of crime. I am willing to admit that this statement is distorted, not however in its analysis of the efficacy of the procedure against the criminal, but in its failure to recognize the growing consciousness of the many common interests which is slowly changing our institutional conception of society, and its consequent exaggerated estimate upon the import of the criminal. But it is important that we should realize what the implications of this attitude of hos-

tility are within our society. We should especially recognize the inevitable limitations which the attitude carries with it. Social organization which arises out of hostility at once emphasizes the character which is the basis of the opposition and tends to suppress all other characters in the members of the group. The cry of "stop thief" unites us all as property owners against the robber. We all stand shoulder to shoulder as Americans against a possible invader. Just in proportion as we organize by hostility do we suppress individuality. In a political campaign that is fought on party lines the members of the party surrender themselves to the party. They become simply members of the party whose conscious aim is to defeat the rival organization. For this purpose the party member becomes merely a republican or a democrat. The party symbol expresses everything. Where simple social aggression or defense with the purpose of eliminating or encysting an enemy is the purpose of the community, organization through the common attitude of hostility is normal and effective. But as long as the social organization is dominated by the attitude of hostility the individuals or groups who are the objectives of this organization will remain enemies. It is quite impossible psychologically to hate the sin and love the sinner. We are very much given to cheating ourselves in this regard. We assume that we can detect, pursue, indict, prosecute, and punish the criminal and still retain toward him the attitude of reinstating him in the community as soon as he indicates a change in social attitude himself, that we can at the same time watch for the definite transgression of the statute to catch and overwhelm the offender, and comprehend the situation out of which the offense grows. But the two attitudes, that of control of crime by the hostile procedure of the law and that of control through comprehension of social and psychological conditions, cannot be combined. To understand is to forgive and the social procedure seems to deny the very responsibility which the law affirms, and on the other hand the pursuit by criminal justice inevitably awakens the hostile attitude in the offender and renders the attitude of mutual comprehension practically impossible. The social worker in the court is the sentimentalist, and the legalist in the social settlement in spite of his learned doctrine is the ignoramus.

While then the attitude of hostility, either against the transgressor of the laws or against the external enemy, gives to the group a sense of solidarity which most readily arouses like a

burning flame and which consumes the differences of individual interests, the price paid for this solidarity of feeling is great and at times disastrous. Though human attitudes are far older than any human institutions and seem to retain identities of structure that make us at home in the heart of every man whose story has come down to us from the written and unwritten past, yet these attitudes take on new forms as they gather new social contents. The hostilities which flamed up between man and man, between family and family, and fixed the forms of old societies have changed as men came to realize the common whole within which these deadly struggles were fought out. Through rivalries, competitions, and co-operations men achieved the conception of a social state in which they asserted themselves while they at the same time affirmed the status of the others, on the basis not only of common rights and privileges but also on the basis of differences of interest and function, in an organization of more varied individuals. In the modern economic world a man is able to assert himself much more effectively against others through his acknowledgment of common property rights underlying their whole economic activity; while he demands acknowledgment for his individual competitive effort by recognizing and utilizing the varied activities and economic functions of others in the whole business complex.

This evolution reaches a still richer content when the self-assertion appears in the consciousness of social contribution that obtains the esteem of the others whose activities it complements and renders possible. In the world of scientific research rivalries do not preclude the warm recognition of the service which the work of one scientist renders to the whole co-operative undertaking of the *monde savante*. It is evident that such a social organization is not obtainable at will, but is dependent upon the slow growth of very varied and intricate social mechanisms. While no clearly definable set of conditions can be presented as responsible for this growth, it will I think be admitted that a very necessary condition, perhaps the most important one, is that of overcoming the temporal and spatial separations of men so that they are brought into closer interrelation with each other. Means of intercommunications have been the great civilizing agents. The multiple social stimulation of an indefinite number of varied contacts of a vast number of individuals with each other is the fertile field out of which spring social organizations, for these make

possible the larger social life that can absorb the hostilities of different groups. When this condition has been supplied there seems to be an inherent tendency in social groups to advance from the hostile attitudes of individuals and groups toward each other through rivalries, competitions, and co-operations toward a functional self-assertion which recognizes and utilizes other selves and groups of selves in the activities in which social human nature expresses itself. And yet the attitude of hostility of a community toward those who have transgressed its laws or customs, i.e., its criminals, and toward the outer enemies has remained as a great solidifying power. The passionate appreciation of our religious, political, property, and family institutions has arisen in the attack upon those who individually or collectively have assailed or violated them, and hostility toward the actual or prospective enemies of our country has been the never-failing source of patriotism.

Exercises

1. Explain the difference between the origins of government and law in the broader and narrower sense of the terms.
2. Describe the "justice" of the Andaman Islanders, as sketched by Marett.
3. Contrast with this the blood-revenge of the clans in a more highly organized, totemic society.
4. Show how this "collective responsibility" merges into the legal duel.
5. Why does the duel tend to give place to the ordeal?
6. Show how the system of fines ("pacation") arises, and the elaborate forms into which it develops.
7. Describe four stages in the substitution of public punishment for private vengeance.
8. In Mead's discussion, what two standards of criminal justice are found to underlie court procedure in the public mind?
9. What is the third aspect of criminal justice, emphasized in Mead's paper?
10. Explain: "We do not respect law in the abstract but the values which the laws of the community conserve."
11. Does the average citizen really have any sense of responsibility in general or reverence for law in the abstract?
12. What are the concrete motives that impel men to support the enforcement of law?
13. Explain: "The respect for law is the obverse side of our hatred for the criminal aggressor."

14. What light does this throw on "a man's willingness to cheat his country out of its legitimate taxes and his willingness to fight and die for the same country"?

15. Show how the emotional attitude of animosity toward the aggressor permeates all dealings with criminals inside and outside of court and prison.

16. Show how these attitudes are unable to produce a sound social conception of property and its uses or a humane treatment of criminals.

17. What light does this analysis throw on the fact that men of great wealth, even though acquired by questionable practices, are almost always great advocates of "law and order" and the "sacredness of property"?

18. How does it also explain the fact that they are sustained in this position by the average poor citizen?

19. Show that a distorted view of social goods and institutions is "the revenge of the criminal upon the society which crushes him."

20. Explain: "Thus we see society almost helpless in the grip of the hostile attitude it has taken toward those who break its laws and contravene its institutions."

21. Fully explain and illustrate this statement: "While then the attitude of hostility, either against the transgressor of the laws or against the external enemy, gives to the group a sense of solidarity which most readily arouses like a burning flame and which consumes the differences of individual interests, the price paid for this solidarity of feeling is great and at times disastrous."

Additional References

1. See the "Dooms" (laws) of Alfred the Great, or the codes of other Germanic peoples, in Kendall's *Source-Book of English History* (pp. 17-20); Thorpe's *Ancient Laws and Institutions of England*, or similar works.

2. Ely, Richard T.: *Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth*. For a sound social view of property, in marked contrast to the narrow negative view pointed out in Professor Mead's paper, see Vol. I., Ch. VI.

3. Faris, Ellsworth: "The Origin of Punishment," in *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 25, pp. 54-67. (1914-'15.)

A clear and concise exposition of the idea that punishment "owes none of its origin to private vengeance or the rule of force within the group," but solely to "the clashing of groups." Very important.

4. Ford, Henry Jones: *The Natural History of the State, An Introduction to Political Science*. For a larger view of the State, see pp. 146-158.

5. Oppenheimer, Franz: *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically*. Translated edition. A very vigorous and

readable exposition of the State as the organization of plunder. See especially pp. 24-45; 51-56.

6. Webster, Hutton: *Primitive Secret Societies*. See Ch. VII., for a vivid picture of semi-public administration of "justice" at the hands of secret societies.

7. Wheeler, Gerald C.: *The Tribe and Intertribal Relations in Australia*. See pp. 46-52, for a picture of the State in its earlier stages as simply social order in the general sense.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOCIAL ROOTS OF RELIGION

THE selections of this chapter are not presented as a complete statement with respect to the origin, nature, and value of religion, although they do throw much light upon it, from the stand-points of psychology, anthropology, and sociology. It will be borne in mind that in these chapters we are concerned primarily with *social origins*, and it is from this point of view that religion is treated. Taking for the specific object of attention the religion of primitive peoples, we notice especially how deep and powerful are its *social* roots. The two selections represent the same general interpretation, with a slight difference of emphasis. The account by Dr. King shows how religious attitudes and values arise out of the social life, through the psychological experiences connected with efforts, particularly those attended with perplexity and delay, to solve the problems of environmental adjustment. Professor Marett's discussion proceeds from the same general point of view but stresses particularly the *social function* of religion as a source of confidence in dealing with the crises of life and the ever present mystery of the universe.

If one were treating of religion in general, rather than of its origins, it would doubtless appear that in the higher religions one encounters such distinguishing elements as philosophical speculation; great historical personalities, events and writings; and a shifting of attention from the *group* character of crisis to its *individual* or personal aspects.

The origin of the higher moral teachings of the great world-religions has never been more clearly shown than by Professor Ross in his vivid chapters on "The Genesis of Ethical Elements," (*Social Control*, Ch. XXV, XXVI. New York, 1901.)

It hardly needs to be said that the sociological point of view, reflected in all these selections and references, is that religion, no matter where existing, or in what crude form, represents an attempt to organize and preserve the highest values of life, as conceived by its adherents, and as such is an actual going concern of utmost social value, and greatest significance to the thoughtful student of human life.

1. Social Genesis of the Religious Attitude¹

The Genesis of the Religious Attitude. The religious consciousness, as has been said, is a special development of valuational attitudes.

¹ From *The Development of Religion: A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology*, by Irving King; Chapters IV and V, *passim*. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1910. Reprinted by permission.)

The problem now before us is that of determining how this specialization has been accomplished. It is the problem of the origin of religion, as far as psychological science is concerned.

We may start with the hypothesis that the social body has been at least an important factor in this process. There are certainly many things which will readily come to mind as favorable to such a preliminary conception. Many of our highest valuations are distinctly dependent upon a social context for even their present significance. The sentiments of love and duty, the notion of sin and of right, have no meaning except in terms of either an (actual or an ideal social order.) We may well inquire, then, whether these higher valuations of conduct, and even the so-called highest religious conceptions, those of God, freedom, and immortality, do not owe their existence to the influence of the social group upon the simpler values, the origin of which has been sketched in the preceding chapter.

It should be scarcely necessary to remind the reader at this point that the inquiry here proposed does not in the least impugn the significance of the religious attitude. We are merely seeking to determine the natural history of certain facts. If our highest values have developed in a social atmosphere, it means that these values are an organic part of the universe of which human society is also a constituent. If the intercourse of man with man has, under favoring conditions, been instrumental in creating within him lofty conceptions and noble purposes, we can only feel a deeper confidence in the nature of things, *whatever* that nature may be. It is the purpose of this study to seek for relationship where disconnection has often, hitherto, been assumed.

It is, indeed, well recognized, but in a general way, that the atmosphere of the social group is an important stimulus to the development of almost every human characteristic. It is difficult to conceive of the development of language and of art, or of the accumulation and organization of knowledge outside of a social environment. It is to the same source that we should doubtless look for the development of the finer emotional attitudes. What do we not owe to one another in the development of our sense of beauty, of loveliness, and of moral greatness? While we may experience the emotions of fear or of anger toward the forms of life beneath ourselves and even toward the inanimate world, it is significant to note that primitive man,—if we may judge from the natural races of today,—when he experienced these

emotions, often conceived of them as directed toward conscious beings like himself. The sense of value itself is so thoroughly bound up with social activities that it may almost be called a social category.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze this somewhat vague conception of the importance of social intercourse in the formation of human nature in the hope of formulating it more definitely. It will be recalled that in an earlier chapter we pointed to the fact that mental attitudes develop in intimate connection with overt processes, that the psychical state is as much the *result* of physical activity as it is the *cause* of further action. As was previously stated, the mental process stands for a crisis of some kind which has arisen in the overt chain of events. Whenever it is considered in itself, it must be thought of as an abstraction from this objective sequence. Now if the activities most likely to give rise to a valuational attitude are those in which many may share, if the crises are crises of the group rather than of the individual, the resulting mental attitudes would certainly be social. Tufts has advanced the theory that the aesthetic consciousness is in this way a social product, arising out of such group activities as the dance, the festival, and other social performances which were originally the expression of practical attitudes called forth by the necessities of the life-process. In other words, that we have in these activities the causes and not the results of certain states of consciousness. More than this, it is seen that the acts are of a definitely social character, so that the aesthetic development of the value-consciousness is the product of social intercourse. On reflection it seems quite evident that such is the case. It is certainly true that the attitude of appreciation follows rather than precedes the act to which it refers, and if the act is one performed by a social group, if it is, in fact, possible only through social coöperation, as in the case of dance or festival, the aesthetic consciousness is clearly conditioned by the pre-existing social body. That the context of activity out of which all the more permanent and far-reaching values have arisen is essentially social, and therefore that religion, as an aspect of the value-consciousness, is a product of social intercourse, we shall now try to show.

The general notion of worth, as has been pointed out, appears, first of all, when the appropriate response to a stimulus is not immediately forthcoming, and the individual is sidetracked into a lot of intermediate, or preliminary, activities. The presence of an evaluating attitude means, primarily, that in some way the direct

outgo of activity has been checked. In the case of primitive man, the most acutely felt inhibitions were certainly those which affected the group as a whole. The occasions of strain which were permanent enough to become fixed in mind were doubtless those of food and defence, and in these the entire group would be concerned. The crises felt by the individual only would be, in most cases, subsidiary to these primary necessities in which all were interested. They would therefore be more transient and less able to afford a basis for the building up of a definite sense of worth. The desires of the individual vary; from purely physical causes his attitudes toward many things are easily subject to even hourly changes. If, however, of the values of which he is conscious at a given time, some are shared with others, to these values he is very likely to come back, even though his appreciation of them may lapse from time to time. Their presence in the minds of others is a constant reminder to him of their existence and a constant stimulus to him to recover them for himself. More than this, whatever has had more than a passing interest for him has almost always turned out to be of concern to others as well as to himself. . . .

The point, thus far, is that the primitive man's greatest values, his highest conceptions of worth, are apparently distinctly social matters, and hence must be the product of social activities, particularly those which cluster about the problems and crises which affect the group as a whole. . . .

That the social organization is practically the universe, the *ne plus ultra* of the primitive man's life, is a most important point for the development of religious values out of those of less degree. As we shall try to show, the social body not only is an agent in enhancing and rendering permanent the simple values brought to consciousness by the growth of intermediate activities, it also raises them to the highest power. Psychologically, the values of the group are not only higher than those of the individual, they are genuinely ultimate and universal. This is our argument in a nutshell, and we can do no more in the pages which follow than illustrate it a little further. . . .

That which has been in some measure illustrated, and in a degree proved, it is hoped, may be restated thus: A compact group, such as may be found among the Central Australians, the Dyaks, or the primitive Semites, furnishes a basis on which the notion of far-reaching values can take footing. The relatively stable social background is

absolutely essential to the extended development of value-attitudes. This seems to be certain, because where the social organization is of low grade and hence somewhat fluent, the values mediated are found to be correspondingly indefinite, uncertain, private, and more or less transitory. The social group may be said to furnish the matrix from which are differentiated all permanent notions of values, and these are primarily conscious attitudes aroused in connection with activities which mediate problems more or less important for the perpetuation of the social body. These values may be of any kind, but especially aesthetic and religious, which are representative of such values in their most definite form. Whether the attitude turns out to be religious, or whether aesthetic, depends upon the nature of the context which gives rise to it. In general it may be said that the difference between them is one of relationships rather than of intrinsic content. Thus, the peculiarity of aesthetic values is that they are detached or isolated from the problems of life, while values of the religious type are expressions of these problems in their most ultimate form. But in any case there can be no question as to the close connection of the two attitudes, and in all probability they are always intermingled. A valuational attitude in which the emphasis is upon the detached enjoyment of the moment would, of course, be aesthetic, while it would be religious if the emphasis were upon the consciousness of the relationship of the act to the welfare of the group. In some types of the modern religious consciousness the connection is not with the group but with some conception of the ultimate welfare of the individual. In primitive religion such a conception is impossible. The individual can think of his own continued welfare only in connection with the continued prosperity of the group.

Many illustrations may be found of the interrelation of the aesthetic and the religious in social activities. Thus, the performance of the Mountain Chant, a nine-day religious festival of the Navaho, affords not only opportunity for religious expression but also for a jolly social time. The merrymaking attendant upon the religious rites of primitive Semitic peoples is evidence of the large aesthetic element involved in them. The intricate details of the Australian ceremonials are undoubtedly productive of aesthetic reactions in the performers and onlookers, just as with ourselves in watching the evolutions of a body of soldiers, or any other complicated activity.

Thus far our main object has been to point out the way in which

the social body mediates the development of value-attitudes. Of necessity, many religious acts have been used as illustrative of the process. A few words yet remain to be said to connect it more definitely with the religious consciousness *per se*. The religious sense of the modern man represents an indefinite extension of the notion of value. From the point of view here suggested, the religious attitude may be said to be the consciousness of the value of action in terms of its ultimate organization. In a highly figurative and symbolic form of statement this attitude may be described by some people as "living in the power of an endless life." This statement would apply to the primitive as well as to the modern conception of religious value, for the activity organized with reference to the welfare of the tribe as a whole is equivalent, psychologically, to behavior viewed by the individual as significant eternally with reference to his own destiny. To the primitive man, the group to which he belongs is his universe; whatever else appeals to him in any way is taken, as a matter of course, to be related to the group. Thus, in several parts of the world, the natural races have conceived the whites as the embodied spirits of their own departed tribesmen. The extent to which the conception referred to above is generalized, or develops, depends upon the character of the organization of the group. If, as we have pointed out, the group is definite and compact, there will be many activities in which it, as a whole, takes part, and there is therefore more opportunity afforded for the development of conceptions of ultimate value, that is, conceptions which are, as a matter of course, expressed in terms of the entire group. Such values are ultimate values because the primitive man's horizon is bounded by his tribe. They cannot even be a degree less than ultimate, because, from the first, they have come to consciousness as concerning the whole group. . . .

The Origin of Religious Practices and Ceremonials. In the preceding chapter the attempt was made to show that the social atmosphere furnishes the *sine qua non* of that peculiar type of consciousness known as the religious. It is this atmosphere which has produced the religious quality as well as conditioned the development of the very sense of value itself.

We wish now to go a step farther. *The religious acts and ideas are themselves an organic part of the activities of the social body.* They are, in fact, social acts. Under certain circumstances, customs become religious, or acquire religious values. It may be said that religious

practices are social habits specialized in a certain direction. (That a nation's gods are direct reflections of its social and political ideals, and that the deities cannot represent a higher ethical plane than that of the worshippers, is well recognized by students of religion). Barton gives clear expression to these facts when he says, "It is a law which may be regarded as practically universal, that the religious conceptions of a people are expressed in forms which are modelled, in large degree, on those political and social institutions which the economical conditions of their situation have produced." Thus, a god could not be conceived as a father where marriage was so unstable that fatherhood was no recognized feature of the social structure, nor as a king among a people into whose experience the institution of kingship had never entered."

But we may go even farther than this and maintain that religious beliefs and practices are not merely modelled upon the analogy of a people's economic and social life. The religious life is this social life in one of its phases. It is an organic part of the activity of the social body, not merely something built upon it. In other words, as before suggested, we may hold that the religious aspects of a people's life are special differentiations of the social order which appear under certain favoring conditions. . . .

It may be regarded as a generally accepted fact that religion, morality, and law form an undifferentiated whole in primitive societies. This is true even in societies of a high degree of culture, the continuity of whose evolution has not been too much interrupted by external influences. Such facts as these have the greatest significance when taken in connection with the hypothesis that the religious activities of a group of people are fundamentally their practical, social, and "control" activities, which have, according to well-recognized psychological laws, undergone a special development. The religious consciousness, as a body of psychic attitudes, dispositions, concepts, and beliefs, represents the net outcome of the overt evolution. . . .

Our preliminary thesis, namely, that a low-grade social structure lies back of chaotic religious ideas, receives further confirmation from certain facts regarding the primitive religions of North America. Dr. Boas says that the continuity of mythological material, "and therefore its aesthetic quality, is least in the Arctic and in the Northwest." In the East, Southeast, and Southwest, where political and social organization has attained a higher perfection, and where the ceremonial life

of the people is strongly developed, the origin story is also more fully developed . . . (into it is woven the history of the origin of those phenomena, around which centres the interest of the Indians.") Here it is evident that the ceremonial life and the social and political life are closely connected. In fact, we should say that they are but different aspects of the same thing. That the beliefs must, on their own part, be closely connected with, if not the direct outgrowth of, the same social organization is equally manifest.

From these general considerations we now turn to seek specific illustrations of our theory of the origin of religious practices, especially of rites and ceremonies, and their relation to the more ordinary activities of the social group. Stated in its most general form, the question before us is: Why do the simpler activities arising directly out of the life-process give rise to secondary activities, of which religious ceremonies are types? This question has already been answered in a general way in a preceding chapter in the discussion of 'intermediate activities.' It was pointed out there that many of man's complex activities are necessary developments from practical adjustments, due to the recurrent need of meeting new or more complicated difficulties; that others are due to chance variations in the original activity, and preserved by imitation until they become customs. It was also pointed out that many accessory acts arise through association with an end which is insistently held in attention, when direct adjustments for attaining the end are for the time being impossible. These acts are closely akin to play, and are apt to be strongly emotional, just because the practical outgo is, at the moment, either purposely or necessarily held in check. Primitive customs may, then, for our purposes, be conveniently classed as either practical or as accessory.

Some ceremonials and religious practices seem to be the outgrowth of adjustments which to the savage are decidedly practical. Others seem to be more related to play, to sports of various kinds; and still others seem to be the outgrowth of feasts of rejoicing before or after the harvest or hunt, or of feasts and dances preceding the departure of a war party, or after its return. All these types of activity are relatively simple, and it is easy to explain them on psychological grounds. Hence, whatever practices can be shown to be outgrowths of these elementary activities may be regarded as at least in a measure related and clarified. Mere 'practical' adjustments certainly do not need explanation here, whether or not we hold to the instrumental

view of consciousness. The other types are in a measure either derivatives of the 'practical,' or are due to the overflow of energy after or during times of repression or times of emotional tension. Because these accessory activities are relatively high in emotional values, they probably furnish the basis for the largest number of religious ceremonies. Purely practical acts, in environments which make heavy demands upon the attention of a people, are apt to change frequently as the necessity of new adjustments arises, so that they do not form a good basis for the development of valuational attitudes. When, however, such acts become relatively fixed, because of the lack of change in the stimulating environment, they may become objects of attention in themselves, and important media of social intercourse, or at least of social expression. Under these conditions they frequently acquire religious value. . . .

The transformation of practical acts into religious ones through the medium of habit has no more striking illustration than that furnished by the Todas with their dairy religion. What the original Toda religion was we cannot determine with certainty. They have now somewhat vague beliefs regarding certain deities, beliefs which were quite possibly at some time in the past much more definite. This condition probably existed before they came to their present country in the Nilgiri Hills of southern India. The significance of the changes which have probably taken place in Toda religion we shall take up in connection with the general problem of the evolution of religion. It is sufficient here to note that most of the attention of the Todas has in some way been diverted from their older belief, and has come to be centered upon the care of their buffaloes. It is not strange that this is the case, since their subsistence is almost entirely gained from these animals. They have, it is true, an annual ceremony for increasing the supply of honey and fruit, indicating that at some period they must have been considerably dependent upon these things. Since, however, these are not any longer important articles of food to the Todas, very little interest is taken in the ceremony.

Whether their religion is rudimentary, as some hold, or rather degenerate, as Rivers thinks, there is no question that at present they are absorbingly interested in their buffaloes. The buffalo is a sacred animal, though not worshipped. The most sacred places are certain of their dairies; their most sacred objects are the utensils of the sacred dairies, and particularly the bells worn by the buffaloes. The dairy

building is the nearest approach to a temple, and the dairyman is practically a priest. He can enter upon his duties only after certain ordination ceremonies, varying with the sanctity of the dairy in which he is to minister. During the period of his service he must observe as strict rules to maintain his ceremonial cleanliness as does many a real priest of a higher cult. In fact, they have few religious acts entirely divorced from their practical interest in the care of the buffalo and the securing of milk, *i.e.*, they have no idols, images, no sacred objects apart from the dairy, no dreaded supernatural beings to be appeased, and no sacrifices beyond eating a little buffalo meat at stated intervals, or drinking fresh milk on certain occasions. Although they owe no duties to a deity, "yet," as Marshall says, "they hold to certain practices and habits in daily life, which are to them in the place of religion, being performed with all the strictness and certainty which should be bestowed on sacred observances." These practices are intimately allied with the care and distribution of that divine fluid, milk. As Rivers says, "In the Toda rites and ceremonies is little else than the arrangements which a pastoral and communistic people have made for the provision and care of an article of food."

√In general, then, it seems that we have in the Todas a unique illustration of how the habits of a group of people, habits which have originated in some practical interest, may become of such great importance that they are true religious ceremonies. Moreover, if our principles of interpretation are true, these very habits have served to enhance the value, the sanctity, of the object about which they have gathered, if they have not actually produced it. We believe the Todas illustrate these points, even though there are some of their buffaloes which are not sacred, or rather some of the dairies are not sacred (for the sanctity of the buffalo seems to depend at present upon its being connected with a sacred dairy), and even though there are all degrees of sanctity in these various things. The initial causes of these valuations we may never be able to determine, but at least we do know that sanctity, as far as it is recognized by them at all, is definitely related to their dominant economic pursuit.

If we were to analyze the development of the present religious ideas of the Todas and the relation of these ideas to their everyday life, we believe that the following hypotheses would be fully in accord with the facts as at present observed. In the first place, it is evident

that their current religious system is not their original one, for they have vague beliefs in a body of deities which have probably come down to them from a time when their life was quite different from what it now is. These gods seem to be becoming less and less important; they are stranded, as it were, in a new social order. The only deity who has retained any considerable importance is Teik zi, — the one to whom they trace most of their dairy ceremonials. Some of the other deities are supposed to have lived upon the earth and to have been dairymen. That is, the Todas' most definite ideas regarding their gods are those concerning their relationship to the social order under which the people now live. In so far as they have been able to throw the old gods into relation with their new conditions of life, they have kept them fairly definite, but even thus, they seem to be little more than intellectual concepts, or postulates, certainly not objects of worship. The real object of the Todas' valuational consciousness is the milk and the dairy. It is uncertain whether the milk or the buffalo was the original object of their sacred regard, but that is not here a matter of great importance, since we wish simply to show how *one* of their objects of reverential regard assumed its present importance. If the buffalo were first regarded as sacred, it is natural that the fluid given by the buffalo would acquire by association a like value. But its sacredness would be greatly enhanced if it came to be the *chief* source of their livelihood. This would make it an object of solicitous attention, and every act connected with the procuring and care of it would likewise become an object of interest. If, for any other reason, the killing of the female buffalo had been tabooed, their hesitation at doing such a thing would now be much increased by the fact of their dependence upon the buffalo's milk. Granted, then, that the milk becomes a matter of great moment to them because of its economic importance, it is easy to see how its value could be indefinitely increased by the habits arising in the care of it. Only let the idea arise that a certain thing has great worth, and secondary processes will be set up which will make the value greater than ever. That is, when the worth of an object is once established by its relation to a group's practical and social life, it thereby gains enough internal momentum to go on increasing, in relative independence of practical and social interests. This is certainly true regarding milk among the Todas. When this article of food acquires considerable value, both because of its prac-

tical importance and because of the primary adjustments necessitated in caring for it, situations repeatedly arise which necessitate secondary adjustments in order that due regard may be shown to this pre-existing sanctity, or in order that it may be preserved intact in the new relations, or that no injury may come to its possessors when its sanctity is in a way violated, as, for instance, when it is removed from its accustomed environment. These secondary processes, designed to preserve the value, not only accomplish that end, but even greatly enhance it.

Thus, much of the dairy ritual has grown up as a means of counteracting the danger involved in giving the sacred substance, milk, to peoples whom they regard as inferior beings. "Similarly, the migration ceremonies have the general underlying idea of counteracting any possible evil influence which may accompany the passage of the buffaloes through the profane world from one sacred place to another. During the migration, certain utensils may be seen by the multitude which, under ordinary circumstances, are strictly screened from the general gaze, and objects may be touched, or be in danger of being touched, by people who ordinarily may not even see them. Again, the ceremonies connected with entrance upon any dairy office are intended to purify the candidate and make him fit to see and touch and use the sacred objects." These are all the crude attempts of a primitive people to effect what is, for them, a very practical end, and the 'secondary processes,' as we have called them, aroused by the social interest in the object, serve to increase that interest, and hence to enhance the value of the object itself.

The Todas have other ceremonies which are directly connected with seasons of stress or of emotional tension. They are distinctly social in character, and they may thus be supposed to be the outcome of these psychological conditions rather than to have been caused by any original religious motive. Among these may be mentioned the *Irpavusthi* ceremony, which occurs about the fifteenth day after the birth of a calf. It strongly resembles a sacrificial or thanksgiving feast; the dairyman performs elaborate ceremonies in connection with the calf and its mother; the people assemble in large numbers and partake of the fresh milk of the buffalo, a thing not done on any other occasion. From this time the calf is allowed to run with the others, and the buffalo is milked with the rest of the herd. This festival, in which the people partake of the milk of a sacred animal,

bears an interesting analogy to sacrificial feasts of some other peoples, in which the sacred animal itself is consumed.

The giving of salt to the buffaloes occurs at stated intervals, and is accompanied with a definite ceremonial. Rivers thinks it points to a time when salt was difficult to obtain. If this were the case, the giving of salt would naturally have been an event of some importance, and would easily serve as a centre about which habits would cluster. Certain of the Toda sacrifices can be rather clearly traced back to some sort of purely practical custom. In certain Toda clans the offering of a buffalo as an atonement for some sin is made from one division of the clan to another. "It seems that we have in these offerings a good example of something which is midway between a social regulation of the nature of punishment and a definite religious rite of propitiation of higher powers." This seems the more likely in view of the fact that there are some other types of offerings, closely related to the foregoing, and, in fact, designated by the same name, in which the religious and sacrificial character is quite clear. That is, the buffalo, instead of being given to another division of the clan, is given to a *ti*, the most sacred type of Toda dairy. The animal is not killed, but on entering the sacred herd it is devoted to the service of the gods. If the clan divisions are primary, Rivers thinks that the offering made to the *ti* dairies may be an example of what was originally a mere social regulation transformed into a religious rite. That is, "religious sanction has been added to the system of social punishment, which seems to be all which clearly exists in the offerings, when these are kept within the clan."

It is very significant that most of the Toda offering ceremonies are closed by feasts, and also that they all involve prescribed activities on the part of the whole clan. The offerings are distinctly clan affairs; that is, they are *social ceremonies*.

It is impossible to separate the purely 'practical' from the 'accessory' in any examination of the origin of religious activities. So great is the exuberance of human impulse, that accessory activities constantly and inevitably cluster about our practical adjustments, often resulting in a union so intimate that it is impossible, even in ourselves, to separate them. So, in all the activities of primitive peoples, we find, intermingled with the direct responses to the demands of the life-process, multitudes of play activities, festivities of various kinds, all bearing witness to the fact that the *life-process* is a

social process, and that after its most insistent demands are in a measure satisfied, the activities it calls forth are functionally valuable not merely as means for preserving life, but in greater and greater degree as a means of social intercourse. . . .

It is perhaps unnecessary to give further illustrations. Whether those which have been offered lend genuine support to the thesis of the chapter, the reader will have to judge for himself. If they do not, the multiplication of instances will not be any more convincing. Our attempt has been rather to *illustrate* a point of view than to adduce *all* the evidence in support of it which seems to be pertinent. It is needless to say that this evidence might be extended almost indefinitely.

Our conclusion is that the accumulation of habits in various directions is one of the first steps in the evolution of religion. The world for most of us consists primarily of a number of foci of interests. What we apprehend is always related to ourselves more or less directly. This sense of relationship, as we have tried to show, depends quite definitely upon the fact that we are *active* creatures. The first objects of attention come to consciousness because we have been doing something in various instinctive or impulsive ways. These objects develop, their values become more pronounced, as still further adjustments, or modes of behavior, are organized and elaborated about them.

In connection with this development of behavior as influencing the unfolding of interests and values, it will be necessary, however, to take account of another factor, a 'concept,' we may call it, for want of a better term, which has probably played a large part in the unfolding of human thought, and has consequently reacted in important ways upon behavior and custom. It is difficult to relate it exactly to what has thus far been said of the development of the value-consciousness, and yet it has had a part in that development which we trust will not seem to be altogether adventitious, even though we shall stand firmly upon the theory as thus far outlined. This 'concept,' if we may call it such, is not in itself a religious one, although it has been operative, along with other things, in the development of the religious attitude. The notion to which we refer is that there is in the universe, as the primitive man knows it, an undefined and hence more or less impersonal force, a force extremely potent in nature and in the affairs of human life, and with which man may, in various ways, come into *rappport*. . . .

2. Religion as the Solution of Group Crises²

Now, frankly, I am one of those who take the more sympathetic view of historical religion; and I say so at once, in case my interpretation of the facts turn out to be colored by this sanguine assumption.

Moreover, I think that we may easily exaggerate the differences in culture and, more especially, in religious insight and understanding that exist between the ruder peoples and ourselves. In view of our common hope, and our common want of knowledge, I would rather identify religion with a general striving of humanity than with the exclusive pretension of any one people or sect. Who knows, for instance, the final truth about what happens to the soul at death? I am quite ready to admit, indeed, that some of us can see a little farther into a brick wall than, say, Neanderthal man. Yet when I find facts that appear to prove that Neanderthal man buried his dead with ceremony, and to the best of his means equipped them for a future life, I openly confess that I would rather stretch out a hand across the ages and greet him as my brother and fellow-pilgrim than throw in my lot with the self-righteous folk who seem to imagine this world and the next to have been created for their exclusive benefit.

Now the trouble with anthropologists is to find a working definition of religion on which they can agree. Christianity is religion, all would have to admit. Again, Mahomedanism is religion, for all anthropological purposes. But, when a naked savage "dances" his god — when the spoken part of the rite simply consists, as amongst the south-eastern Australians, in shouting "Daramulun! Darumulun!" (the god's name), so that we cannot be sure whether the dancers are indulging in a prayer or in an incantation — is that religion? Or, worse still, suppose that no sort of personal god can be discovered at the back of the performance — which consists, let us say, as amongst the central Australians, in solemnly rubbing a bull-roarer on the stomach, so that its mystic virtues may cause the man to become "good" and "glad" and "strong" (for that is his own way of describing the spiritual effects) — is that religion, in any sense that can link it historically with, say, the Christian type of religion?

No, say some, these low-class dealings with the unseen are magic, not religion. The rude folk in question do not go the right way about

² From *Anthropology*, by R. R. Marett, pp. 206-213; 233-234. (New York and London, Henry Holt and Company. No date. Reprinted by permission.)


putting themselves into touch with the unseen. They try to put pressure on the unseen, to control it. They ought to conciliate it, by bowing to its will. Their methods may be earnest, but they are not propitiatory. There is too much "My will be done" about it all.

Unfortunately, two can play at this game of *ex-parte* definition. The more unsympathetic type of historian, relentlessly pursuing the clue afforded by this distinction between control and conciliation, professes himself able to discover plenty of magic even in the higher forms of religion. The rite as such—say, churchgoing as such—appears to be reckoned by some of the devout as not without a certain intrinsic efficacy. "Very well," says this school, "then a good deal of average Christianity is magic."

My own view, then, is that this distinction will only lead us into trouble. And, to my mind, it adds to the confusion if it be further laid down, as some would do, that this sort of dealing with the unseen which, on the face of it, and according to our notions, seems rather mechanical (being, as it were, an effort to get a hold on some hidden force) is so far from being akin to religion that its true affinity is with natural science. The natural science of today, I quite admit, has in part evolved out of experiments with the occult; just as law, fine art, and almost every other one of our higher interests have likewise done. But just so long and so far as it was occult science, I would maintain, it was not natural science at all, but, as it were, rather supernatural science. Besides, much of our natural science has grown up out of straightforward attempts to carry out mechanical work on industrial lines—to smelt iron, let us say; but since then, as now, there were numerous trade-secrets, an atmosphere of mystery was apt to surround the undertaking, which helped to give it the air of a trafficking with the uncanny. But because science then, as even now sometimes, was thought by the ignorant to be somehow closely associated with all the powers of evil, it does not follow that then or now the true affinity of science must be with the devil.

Magic and religion, according to the view I would support, belong to the same department of human experience—one of the two great departments, the two worlds, one might almost call them, into which human experience, throughout its whole history, has been divided. Together they belong to the supernormal world, the *x*-region of experience, the region of mental twilight.

Magic I take to include all bad ways, and religion all good ways,



of dealing with the supernormal — bad and good, of course, not as we may happen to judge them, but as the society concerned judges them. Sometimes, indeed, the people themselves hardly know where to draw the line between the two; and, in that case, the anthropologist cannot well do it for them. But every primitive society thinks witchcraft bad. Witchcraft consists in leaguering oneself with supernormal powers of evil in order to effect selfish and anti-social ends. Witchcraft, then, is genuine magic — black magic, of the devil's color. On the other hand, every primitive society also distinguishes certain salutary ways of dealing with supernormal powers. All these ways taken together constitute religion. For the rest, there will always be a mass of more or less evaporated beliefs, going with practices that have more or less lost their hold on the community. These belong to the folklore which every people has. Under this or some closely related head must also be set down the mass of mere wonder-tales, due to the play of fancy, and without direct bearing on serious pursuits of life.

The world to which neither magic nor religion belongs, but to which physical science, the knowledge of how to deal mechanically with material things, does belong wholly, is the workaday world, the region of normal, commonplace, calculable happenings. With our telescopes and microscopes we see farther and deeper into things than does the savage. Yet the savage has excellent eyes. What he sees he sees. Consequently, we must duly allow for the fact that there is for him, as well as for us, a "natural," that is to say, normal and workaday world; even though it be far narrower in extent than ours. The savage is not perpetually spook-haunted. On the contrary, when he is engaged on the daily round, and all is going well, he is as careless and happy as a child.

But savage life has few safeguards. Crisis is a frequent, if intermittent, element in it. Hunger, sickness and war are examples of crisis. Birth and death are crises. Marriage is usually regarded by humanity as a crisis. So is initiation — the turning-point in one's career, when one steps out into the world of men. Now what, in terms of mind, does crisis mean? It means that one is at one's wits' end; that the ordinary and expected has been replaced by the extraordinary and unexpected; that we are projected into the world of the unknown. And in that world of the unknown, we must miserably abide until, somehow, confidence is restored.

Psychologically regarded, then, the function of religion is to restore men's confidence when it is shaken by crisis. Men do not seek crisis; they would always run away from it, if they could. Crisis seeks them; and, whereas the feebler folk are ready to succumb, the bolder spirits face it. Religion is the facing of the unknown. It is the courage in it that brings comfort.

We must go on, however, to consider religion sociologically. A religion is the effort to face crisis, so far as that effort is organized by society in some particular way. A religion is congregational—that is to say, serves the ends of a number of persons simultaneously. It is traditional—that is to say, has served the ends of successive generations of persons. Therefore inevitably it has standardized a method. It involves a routine, a ritual. Also it involves some sort of conventional doctrine, which is, as it were, the inner side of the ritual—its lining.

Now in what follows I shall insist, in the first instance, on this sociological side of religion. For anthropological purposes it is the sounder plan. We must altogether eschew that "Robinson Crusoe method" which consists in reconstructing the creed of a solitary savage, who is supposed to evolve his religion out of his inner consciousness: "The mountain frowns, therefore it is alive"; "I move about in my dreams whilst my body lies still, therefore I have a soul," and so on. No doubt somebody had to think these things, for they are thoughts. But he did not think them, at any rate did not think them out, alone. Men thought them out together; nay, whole ages of living and thinking together have gone to make them what they are. So a social method is needed to explain them. . . .

Now the function of religion, it has been assumed, is to restore confidence, when man is mazed, and out of his depth, fearful of the mysteries that obtrude on his life, yet compelled, if not exactly wishful, to face them and wrest from them whatever help is in them. This function religion fulfils by what may be described in one word as "suggestion." How the suggestion works psychologically—how, for instance, association of ideas, the so-called "sympathetic magic," predominates at the lower levels of religious experience—is a difficult and technical question which cannot be discussed here. Religion stands by when there is something to be done, and suggests that it can be done well and successfully; nay, that it is being so done. And, when the religion is of the effective sort, the believers

respond to the suggestion, and put the thing through. As the Latin poet says, "they can because they think they can."

What, from the anthropological point of view, is the effective sort of religion, the sort that survives because, on the whole, those whom it helps survive? It is dangerous to make sweeping generalizations, but there is at any rate a good deal to be said for classing the world's religions either as mechanical and ineffective, or as spiritual and effective. The mechanical kind offers its consolations in the shape of a set of implements. The "virtue" resides in certain rites and formularies. These, as we have seen, are especially liable to harden into mere mechanisms when they are of the negative and precautionary type. The spiritual kind of religion, on the other hand, which is especially associated with the positive and active functions of life, tends to read will and personality into the wonder-working powers that it summons to man's aid. The will and personality in the worshippers are in need not so much of implements as of more will and personality. They get this from a spiritual kind of religion; which in one way or another always suggests a society, a communion, as at once the means and the end of vital betterment.

Exercises

1. In what respect is the viewpoint of the two selections identical? In what respect do they diverge?
2. What additional elements will be found in more modern and higher religions?
3. State the sociological point of view with respect to religion.
4. What part does the social body play in forming valuational attitudes?
5. Does the recognition of the social aspect of religion impugn its significance?
6. How extensive is this influence of the social group?
7. How does the general notion of worth arise?
8. What, according to King, is the kernel of his argument?
9. Show the close relation which he finds between the aesthetic and religious evaluations?
10. In what sense, sociologically speaking, are religious values ultimate?
11. In primitive religion, are all religious activities social? Are all social activities religious?
12. Is either of the above alternatives true of modern, present-day religions?

13. Explain: "The religious life *is* this social life in one of its phases."

14. Distinguish "practical" and "accessory" activities, and show their bearing upon primitive religion.

15. Show in detail how practical acts have been transformed into religious ones among the Todas.

16. What life problem underlies the Toda dairy religion? What values are at stake? What idea underlies the dairy ritual? What are some of the more important ceremonies connected with it?

17. What is Marett's attitude toward primitive religions?

18. What, in his view, is the difference between magic, religion, and science?

19. What is the relation between religion and crisis? (See also Reference 3, below.)

20. Contrast the "Robinson Crusoe method" of interpreting religion with the sociological method.

21. What, from the anthropological point of view as stated by Marett, is the effective sort of religion?

Additional References

1. Ames, Edward Scribner: *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. Pp. 43-44 treat the social role of the sexes in primitive religion.

2. Goldenweiser, A. A.: "Spirit, Mana, and the Religious Thrill," in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*; Vol. XII, No. 23 (Nov. 1915), pp. 632-640. Anthropological and psychological analysis of magic and religion.

3. Thomas, William I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*. The standard work in the field of social origins. See "Introductory," pp. 3-26, for the socio-psychological meaning of "crisis." See also pp. 651-669, for Frazer's explanation of "sympathetic" and "imitative" magic.

CHAPTER XIX

PRIMITIVE ART

THE art of primitive peoples has always been of great interest, if only for its appeal to a liking for the novel and the picturesque, not to say the grotesque. But of late years the advance of psychological and social science has made possible a deeper insight into the art activities of the nature peoples, along with a more sympathetic appreciation of their life in general.

The earlier ethnologists assumed that conventional, symbolic art represents a later form, derived by unconscious evolutionary processes, from the earlier art of the same people, which they took for granted to have been of a realistic character. This easy assumption is now challenged by modern ethnologists, as reflected in the article quoted from Boas, and in the equally instructive chapter by Goldenweiser, mentioned under the additional references below.

Hirn's chapter, while representing the work of a thinker of the older, evolutionary school, is quoted for its clear analysis of the psychological aspects of primitive art, revealing the personal and social attitudes out of which it springs.

In the consideration of primitive art the whole question of the meaning and interrelations of realistic, symbolic, and conventional art becomes a major problem. In the selections quoted and referred to in this chapter the reader will find these terms defined and discussed.

There are among professional artists some (for instance Professor H. E. Cumming, Head of the department of fine arts, State University of Iowa, and Director of the Cumming School of Art, Des Moines) who hold that genuinely realistic art is the achievement of the White race alone. Thus Professor Cumming (in unpublished lectures and manuscripts) maintains that the power to make clear "statement of vision" in realistic terms is not a characteristic of primitive art in any case. All art among non-civilized, and even non-white civilized races, is, he maintains, essentially symbolic, expressing itself in abstract and symbolic forms which never convey a clear and accurate statement of natural objects as they present themselves to the eye. The ability to make such a realistic statement of vision is held by thinkers of that persuasion to be the unique gift or attainment of the white race, and its product is styled by them "the white man's art."

In these brief paragraphs we cannot either expound or criticize this truly challenging theory in any adequate way. It will be helpful, however, simply to bear it in mind while studying primitive art, especially that of the Cro-Magnon race of the Aurignacian and Magdalenian periods of the old Stone Age, and that of the present day Bushmen of South Africa, both of which races seem to come nearest, among primitive peoples, to an absolute statement of vision. Along with them should be mentioned the native American races, who, under the instruction of artists of the white race as must be admitted, have in recent years shown a surprising ability for realistic depiction. This has been very impressively shown in the illustrated lectures of Dr. Edgar L. Hewett, of the American Institute of Archaeology and the San Diego Museum, and in the article by Dr. Diamond Jenness, referred to below.

1. The Original Sources of Art¹

... The further the psychological biographer pushes his indiscreet researches into the private life of individual artists, the more often will he find that some form of interest—personal, political, ethical, religious—enters into the so-called disinterested aesthetic activity. Such instances must induce undogmatic authors to relax to some extent the strict application of this criterion. And even those philosophers who, in spite of the historical evidence, insist upon applying it will be compelled to admit that they have taken for works of genuine art productions which, from their philosophic standpoint, have no claim to the title.

The danger of such mistakes is all the greater when one has to deal with the lower stages of artistic development. In point of fact recent ethnological researches have conclusively proved that it is not only difficult, but quite impossible, to apply the criterion of aesthetic independence to the productions of savage and barbarous tribes. It is true that the large province of primitive art has not as yet in its entirety been made the subject of systematic study. But, on the other hand, the results which have been arrived at with regard to decoration, its most typical form, amply bear out our view. In almost every case where the ornaments of a tribe have been closely examined, it has appeared that what to us seems a mere embellishment is for the natives in question full of practical, non-aesthetic significance. Carvings on

¹ From *The Origins of Art. A Psychological and Sociological Inquiry*, by Yrjö Hirn, pp. 9-12; 301-306. (London. Copyrighted by the Macmillan Company, Ltd., 1900. Reprinted by permission.)

weapons and implements, tattooings, woven and plaited patterns, all of which the uncritical observer is apt to take for purely artistic compositions, are now explained as religious symbols, owners' marks, or ideograms. There is still room for discussion as to whether in certain individual interpretations the tendency to look for concealed meanings has not been carried too far. But there can be no doubt that the general principles which to many students seemed so fantastic when first formulated by Stolpe, Read, and others, have derived additional support from every fresh inquiry into primitive systems of decoration.

The isolated researches which have been carried on within the department of primitive literature and drama all point in the same direction. Wherever ethnologists have the opportunity of gaining some insight into the inner life of a savage tribe, they are surprised at the religious or magical significance which lies concealed behind the most apparently trivial amusements. And it is to be remarked that they have learned to appreciate this esoteric meaning, not by a closer study of the manifestations themselves, but through information acquired by intercourse with the natives. There is often not a single feature in a savage dance which would give the uninitiated any reason to suspect the non-aesthetic purpose. When North American Indians, Kaffirs, or Negroes perform a dance in which all the movements of the animals they hunt are imitated, we unavoidably see in their antics an instance of primitive but still purely artistic drama. It is only from the descriptions of Catlin, Lichtenstein, and Reade that we learn that these pantomimes have in quality quite as practical a purpose as those imitations and representations of animals by which hunters all over the world try to entice their game within shooting distance. According to the doctrine of sympathetic magic, it is simply an axiomatic truth that the copy of a thing may at any distance influence the thing itself, and that thus a buffalo dance, even when it is performed in the camp, may compel the buffaloes to come within range of the hunters. But the deceptive appearance of disinterestedness, which in these cases might have led one to mistake a mere piece of hunting magic for a specimen of pure dramatic art, is apt to make us cautious about accepting as independently aesthetic any performance of primitive man.

In the songs and dances by which savages exhort themselves to work and regulate their exertions we find an aspect of utilitarian

advantage which is real and not imaginary. Evidently also this advantage, and not any independent aesthetic pleasure, is — intentionally or unintentionally — aimed at in the war-pantomimes, the boating songs, dances, etc. And it is no doubt for this reason that music and dance have attained so surprising a development in the lower stages of culture. In trying, therefore, to explain the historical development of art, we are compelled to take into account that foreign purpose which is repudiated in art-theory.

If every work of art were really an end in itself — *Selbstzweck* — standing quite isolated from all the practical utilities of life, it would be nothing less than a miracle that art should be met with in tribes which have not yet learnt to satisfy, nor even to feel, the most elementary necessities of life. In such a case it is not music only which would, as Wallace thinks, have to be explained by supernatural causes: primitive art in all its departments would baffle our attempts at rational interpretation. By studying, however, the artistic activities of savage and barbarous man in their connection with his non-aesthetic life, writers on evolutionary aesthetic have succeeded in solving his great crux of art-history. The dances, poems, and even the formative arts of the lower tribes possess indeed, as every ethnologist will admit, unquestionable aesthetic value. But this art is seldom free and disinterested; it has generally a usefulness — real or supposed — and is often even a necessity of life. . . .

The attentive reader will probably have remarked that those very aspects of art with which we have been engaged in the latter part of this work broadly correspond to some of the most important interpretations of the art-impulse offered by aesthetic theories. To give information — that is, to widen our knowledge of nature and life; to propitiate — that is, to flatter our senses by the display of beauty; to stimulate — that is, to heighten our vital energy, and thus make life easier to live and life's work easier to perform; to work magic — that is, to produce an illusion of reality capable of leading to a confusion between the subjective and objective world; — these are all purposes which have been represented as essential to art. From our summary investigation of primitive art it has, we hope, appeared how fully we admit the close connection of these purposes with the historical development of art. And it might be shown, if our investigation were pursued into the later stages of development, that art on its highest plane still bears the same relation to concrete utilities as it does on

the lowest. Art never ceases to inform, never ceases to please, never ceases to stimulate, never loses something of a magical efficacy. But while acknowledging the importance of all these purposes, we have, on the other hand, to maintain the view which was set out in the psychological chapters of the opening — that it is only by assuming an independent art-impulse that we can explain the essential character of art. To make plain the distinction between these two points of view it is advisable to summarize in brief the arguments of either part of our investigation.

In the first chapters the writer attempted to show that the art-impulse in its broadest sense must be taken as an outcome of the natural tendency of every feeling-state to manifest itself externally, the effect of such a manifestation being to heighten the pleasure and to relieve the pain. We found in this fact the primary source of art as an individual impulse. But art is essentially social; and this also we explain on psychological grounds. The secondary effect of the exteriorization of a feeling-state is to awaken similar feelings in other human beings who perceive the manifestation; and their sympathetic feeling acts upon the author of the original manifestation, heightening in him the feeling-state which gave rise to it.

Now, all works of art have a common element notwithstanding their diversity. They express, each in their own medium, a mood or moods of the artist; they arise, that is, out of the impulse, which is as primitive as feeling itself. Every man seeks automatically to heighten his feelings of pleasure and to relieve his feelings of pain. The artist is the man who finds that he can gain such enhancement or relief, not only by the direct action of giving expression to his feeling, but also by arousing a kindred feeling in others. Hence originates in him that desire to transmit his moods to an external audience which must be regarded as the simplest and most primordial inducement to artistic production. And also as a further means of realizing the same purpose there arises the endeavor to give the artistic product — that is to say, the externalized expression of his mood — a form which may facilitate the revival of the original state in an ever wider circle of sympathizers. Thus from the reflex outlet for a strong emotional pressure we are led to a deliberate creation, in which the intellectual and volitional elements preponderate increasingly over the automatic, emotional impulse. But from this gain in consciousness there does not result any change in the essential character of the artistic activity.

However great the difference between the highest forms of art, such as, for instance, a drama or a sculpture, and the primitive dance-pantomime, the underlying impulse is still the same in both cases. Perpetuation—that is, expression which is addressed to a fictitious audience—can only be explained by reference to the enhancing and relieving effects which man has experienced as results of emotional transmission. And all the intentional activities, the artistic composition, the artistic technique, and so on, by which perpetuation is secured can thus be regarded as subservient to the emotionalistic purpose. Moreover, these same activities, however unemotional they may be in themselves, will enable the artist to extort an increased emotional value from his “motives”; for instance, the greater a man’s skill in suggesting the peculiar thrill of color, the greater will be his pleasure in color itself. Technical excellency, which to the outsider is a cold and neutral thing, may thus to the artist and to the intelligent critic be full of expressional significance. From whichever point of view we may look at art, we shall have to interpret its central and essential characteristics in terms of feeling. In this way we can account for it as a self-sufficing, or as we have said, autotelic activity. And in this way only can we explain the strength of that compelling force which urges an artist to an exertion from which he derives no external utility.

But it cannot be contended that primitive human nature furnishes not only the impulse to expression but also the medium. The artist in man had the feeling; he had to discover a way to exteriorize it. Nearest perhaps to primitive art lie the immediate manifestations by regulated gesture and regulated sounds of the voice, which are also in their highest development the most potent means for transmitting an emotion. Yet the different utilities of life offered also other means—as it were, words of a language—in which the feeling could express itself and transmit itself from mind to mind. The man who used drawing as a means of communicating thoughts could express in a drawing the terror which a beast inspired or the delight he had derived from watching its movements. And just as the purpose of imparting information—whether by word or image—afforded a natural medium through which the art-impulse could work to its own ends, so also the purpose of propitiation afforded in dance or decoration something which might be diverted from its original object and be used with the single intention of expressing, for instance, the

dancer's mood. Similarly each of the other purposes that have been discussed or alluded to afforded, as it were, a concrete material for art—a shape in which the primitive impulse to gesture could embody and develop itself. And beyond the fact that art has been obliged to avail itself of media which have originally been called into existence by utilitarian, non-aesthetic needs, there lies another fact. To these external “origins” we can also trace some of the most important qualities which we appreciate in a work of art. In this way it is open to us to explain how several of the virtues of art, as we know it, may be derived from the primitive needs which it subserved; how, for instance, the lucidity of art may find its explanation in art's use for conveying information; how the sensuous and attractive qualities of all art may be traced to the need for propitiating favor; how the power that resides in art to brace and stimulate the mind may be transmitted from the days when the artist was appointed to nerve his fellows for work or war. And, lastly, it might be argued that a most characteristic quality of art, the imagination, which is in a sense faith in the reality of the unreal (whether native to the human mind or not), may have been immensely heightened by the use of art for purposes of magic, which fuses the visible and the invisible.

There is thus suggested a further point. We were able to derive those qualities of artistic composition, which in all aesthetic systems have been insisted on as the most primordial, from the distinctive qualities of the self-sufficing art-impulse, by showing how the unity, the concentration, and the subordination of parts to a whole correspond to the unity of a feeling-state which it is the object of the art-impulse to convey and to perpetuate in its entirety. On the other hand, we are forced to acknowledge that by the side of these primordial qualities there exist certain secondary qualities which have been of great importance in facilitating and securing the transmission and perpetuation of the original feeling-state; and we have shown how these qualities arise out of the vassalage by which art in its historical development has been bound to the necessities and utilities of practical life. For those who crave a theoretical basis for the estimation of art there is offered a field of research in the comparison and relative valuation of these two orders of qualities. By studying the alternate influences which the primary and the derived factors have exercised on the character of works of art, it may even be possible to lay down a kind of scale by which to rank general qualities as well

as individual manifestations. But all this train of thought, though cognate to our inquiry, is not a part of it. This book has aimed simply to give an answer to the question, How did art originate? To those minds which see no value in an aesthetic inquiry that neither purposes to offer guidance for the artist in producing works of art, nor for the student in appreciating them, the whole discussion may probably appear futile. The author on his part has thought that such investigation into an important and typical human energy must be of interest at least, if not of value. But upon the practical question it is his personal opinion that the loss would be greater than the gain if theories and judgments based upon philosophical considerations were allowed to influence either the production or the enjoyment of art.

2. Motives in the Conventionalization of Primitive Art²

We have . . . at the present time three distinct theories regarding the development of decorative design: First, the theory of the realistic origin of conventional motives; second, that of the technical origin of conventional motives; and, third, the theory that the explanations of conventional motives are essentially secondary in character, and due to a later association of the existing decorative forms with realistic forms.

I shall discuss in the following pages the decorative designs of Alaskan needlecases, largely from the region between the mouth of the Yukon River and the western part of Norton Sound, which seem to throw considerable light upon the history of decorative design, and illustrate the applicability of these various theories.

Among the carvings of Alaskan Eskimo we find a very large number of needlecases of peculiar form. They are of the characteristic tubular type of the Eskimo needlecase, in which the needle is inserted in a strip of skin pulled into a tube, which protects the needle against breakage. The peculiar type to which I here refer has, on the whole, a tube slightly bulging in the middle, and expanding into two wings or flanges at the upper end. It is characteristic of almost all these specimens that at a short distance below the flanges there are two small knobs on opposite sides of the tube. In some cases these are

² From "Decorative Designs of Alaskan Needlecases: A Study in the History of Conventional Designs, Based on Materials in the U. S. National Museum," by Franz Boas, in *Proceedings U. S. National Museum*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1616, p. 321 ff. Reprinted by permission.

well marked, while in other cases they are so diminutive that they cannot be seen at all, although they can be felt when moving the finger gently over the surface of the tube. They must be considered as one of the characteristic features of this type, which is so well defined, and whose distribution is so restricted that there cannot be the slightest doubt as to the unity of its origin. . . .

The features here enumerated comprise those of the most generalized type of these needlecases. They may be briefly summed up as (1) a tube slightly bulging in the middle, (2) flanges at the upper end, (3) small knobs under the flanges, (4) a long concave face at the upper end of the tube, (5) long parallel lines with small forks at their lower ends setting off the concave face, (6) border designs consisting of lines at the upper and lower ends of the flanges and on the concave face, and (7) an alternate-spur band at the lower end of the tube.

In order to understand the significance of this peculiar type of needlecase, we must bear in mind that the two design elements which are most characteristic of this specimen—namely, the line design with short branches and the alternate-spur design—are characteristic Eskimo motives over the greater part of the Arctic coast. The alternate-spur band design has been found by me on a number of very old specimens from Southampton Island and Lyons Inlet, collected by Captain G. Comer, which are reproduced here in fig. 2, a and c. In the same region the forked-line design is found on bone engravings (fig. 2, b) and it may be observed in a few of the specimens found by Parry in Fury and Hecla Strait in 1820. Besides this, this design is commonly found in tattooings, the form of which is almost everywhere very stable. It occurs in the tattooings from the west coast of Hudson Bay, as well as in those from Baffin Land (fig. 3). Unfortunately I have not had opportunity to examine extensive collections from Greenland, in order to ascertain the occurrence of these designs. In view of their wide distribution over the whole Eskimo area, it seems justifiable to consider them as a very old possession of the Eskimo, and to assume that originally they bore no relation to the needlecases on which they are found with such great regularity. Incidentally it may be remarked that the explanations of these forms as bushes and whales' tails, which are given by the Alaskan Eskimo, appear so one-sided that they can not be accepted as a general interpretation. . . .

The conclusion which I draw from a comparison of the types of

needlecases here represented is that the flanged needlecase represents an old conventional style, which is ever present in the mind of the Eskimo artist who sets about to carve a needlecase. The various parts of the flanged needlecase excite the imagination of the artist, and a geometrical element here or there is developed by him, in accordance with the general tendencies of Eskimo art, into the representation of whole animals or of parts of animals. In this manner small knobs or the flanges are developed into heads or animals. After this modification has once set in, the animal figures may be repeated in other parts of the implement. Besides this, associations between animal forms and the form of the whole needlecase seem to have taken place, which have to a certain extent modified the manner of representing animals which were adapted to use as needlecases; so that the old form and style of the needlecase determined the treatment of the animal form.

If we were to apply to the present series the theory of the origin of conventional form from realistic motives, it would be exceedingly difficult to account for the general uniformity of fundamental type. It seems to me that, on the basis of this theory, we could not account for the diversity of realistic forms and the uniformity of general type. Neither does it seem possible to account for the series of types by assumption of any influence of technic; and my impression is that the only satisfactory explanation lies in the assumption that the multifarious forms are due to the play of the imagination with a fixed old conventional form, the origin of which remains entirely obscure. This I freely acknowledge. If, however, we are to form an acceptable theory of the origin of decorative designs, it seems a safer method to form our judgment based on examples the history of which can be traced with a fair degree of certainty, rather than on speculations in regard to the origin of remote forms for the development of which no data are available.

I believe a considerable amount of other evidence can be brought forward sustaining the point of view that I have tried to develop, namely, that decorative forms may be largely explained as results of the play of the imagination under the restricting influence of a fixed conventional style. Looking at this matter from a purely theoretical point of view, it is quite obvious that in any series in which we have at one end a realistic figure and at the other end a conventional figure, the arrangement is due entirely to our judgment re-

garding similarities. If, without further proof, we interpret such a series as a genetic series, we simply substitute for the classificatory principle which has guided us in the arrangement of the series a new principle which has nothing to do with the principle of our classification. No proof whatever can be given that the series selected according to similarities really represents an historical sequence. It is just as conceivable that the same series may begin at the conventional end and that realistic forms may have been read into it, and we might interpret the series, therefore, as an historical series beginning at the opposite end. Since both of these tendencies are active in the human mind at the present time, it seems much more likely that both processes have been at work constantly, and that neither the one nor the other theory really represents the historical development of decorative design.

The assumption of a development from realistic design to conventional design also omits the consideration of one exceedingly important element, namely, the style of convention that prevails in the types of art of different areas. If geometrical designs developed from realistic motives the world over, it still would remain to be proved why a certain style of conventionalism belongs to one art and another style to another art; and in order to explain in a satisfactory way the different styles of art, we should have to accept these as given at a very early stage during the process of conventionalization of realistic designs.

The attempt to explain the processes of conventionalization by the theory of the influence of technical motives does not seem to offer an entirely adequate solution of this problem. It is true that certain very simple designs seem to be due almost entirely to the influence of technic upon simple decorative tendencies. This influence, however, does not reach so far as to determine in detail the character of design in the same kind of material or in the same technic. As an example of such differences may be mentioned, for instance, the designs in woven checkered mattings from West Africa, where peculiar realistic figures alternate with geometrical band designs; the designs of cedar-bark mattings of the Ojibwa and of those of the North Pacific coast, and of designs made in the same technic by the South American Indians. In all these cases the technical conditions are practically the same, but the styles differ vastly. It seems necessary, therefore, to assume in the development of design the existence of tendencies which are due to causes different from the technic, and un-

related to the realistic motives which may be current or may have been current.

I have no theory to offer in regard to the origin of these types of convention, which presumably was connected with a whole series of activities determining the perception and reproduction of forms; but it seems desirable to point out by a number of instances the fixity of these conventional forms and the deep influence that they have had even in apparently realistic forms. I have pointed out in the discussion of the designs of the blankets of the Chilkat Indians that a great many of the older forms can be reduced to two fundamental types, and that no matter what animal may be represented in the art of the weaver, it is almost always reduced to one of these two forms. In the same place I have shown that the treatment of the animal figure on carved boxes of the Tlingit has other fixed conventional forms, which, although closely related to the blanket design, are quite permanent and applied only in the manufacture of boxes.

In a quite different region, among the Tungus tribes of the Amur River, Dr. Berthold Laufer has shown that one of the essential types determining the whole arrangement of decorative designs, which consist of realistic figures as well as of curved lines, is based on the type of "cocks combatant."

It is also important to note that figures conforming to such fundamental types may be interpreted in a great variety of ways by the people who use them. I have pointed out such a similarity of type and fundamental difference of interpretation in explanations given by the Huichol Indians. Here we find practically the same figure once interpreted as the fresh-water crab, and then as oak leaves and stems. Other more extended series of such ambiguous interpretations may be found in the art of the Plains Indians as well as in those of other parts of the world.

I have suggested before that in many cases these forms seem to compel us to assume that the interpretations of many simple forms are entirely secondary; that often the forms have been borrowed; and that later on, according to their use in the life of the people, they have been given a fitting interpretation.

I think evidence can be brought forward also to show that the tendency to play, and the play of the imagination with existing forms, have deeply influenced the decorative art of primitive tribes as we find it at the present time.

The first of these traits appears with particular clearness in the tendency to use rhythmic repetitions of varying forms. Bead necklaces are one of the most striking examples of the pleasure that man receives through the use of rhythmic repetition of colors and forms. It is very important to notice that among primitive tribes the rhythmic and symmetrical order of such arrangements are often exceedingly complex,—so complex, in fact, that they can be recognized by us only by a close study of the arrangement. A case of this kind occurs in the fringe on a pair of leggings collected among the Thompson Indians, which I have described. In this specimen we have a fringe which hangs down in a very disorderly fashion, so that the constituent elements can not be seen distinctly. Nevertheless a most painstaking arrangement of the component elements is adhered to, the rhythmic unit consisting of five elements,—one string having one glass bead and two bone beads in alternating order, one undecorated string, one having alternating glass beads, one undecorated, and one having one glass bead and two bone beads in alternating order. I have found still more complex rhythmic repetitions and symmetrical arrangements on the embroidered borders of coats of the Koryak. These contained sometimes ten and more elements in one group. Still another case of similar kind, from Peru, has been described by Mr. Mead. Here a rhythmic repetition of six units seems to be very common.

I consider it particularly important to observe that in the first of these specimens the rhythmic repetition can not be seen when the leggings are in use, because this suggests strongly that the reason for the application of the rhythmic repetition is not the aesthetic pleasure in the effect which it produces, but the pleasure felt by the maker. If this is true, then we do not need to assume that in the other cases a much more highly developed appreciation of complex rhythm is found among primitive people than the one we possess. Corroborative evidence in regard to this point is offered by the basketry of the Thompson and Lillooet Indians. I have noticed that here, where in a fine imbricated technique color bands are produced, the basket weavers tend to use with great regularity certain groupings of the number of stitches belonging to each color, although, owing to the irregularity of the size of the stitches, these modifications can hardly be observed. If these facts have a wider application, it would seem that on the whole the pleasure given by much of the decorative work of primitive people must not be looked for in the beauty of the

finished product, but rather in the enjoyment which the maker feels at his own cleverness in playing with the technical elements that he is using. In other words, one of the most important sources in the development of primitive decorative art is analogous to the pleasure that is given by the achievements of the virtuoso.

Examples may also be given illustrating the effect of the play of imagination upon the development of design. One of the best examples of this kind is offered by the decorated bag of the Thompson Indians illustrated by Professor Farrand. The analogy of this soft rectangular bag, which is decorated with rows of large diamonds, to other similar bags shows quite clearly that the rows of diamonds have the same origin as the rows of diamonds which are painted on parfleches of the Plains Indians. In this case the diamonds suggested the idea of ponds; and, in order to emphasize this idea, which came to the mind of the woman who used the bag, she added a number of birds flying toward these ponds. Other examples of this kind have been mentioned by Doctor Koch in his observations on the drawings of South American Indians. The development of the triangles in the designs of the Plains Indians to tent designs or cloud designs brings out similar points.

Thus it would seem that the development of decorative designs can not be simply interpreted by the assumption of a general tendency toward conventionalism or by the theory of an evolution of technical motives into realistic motives by a process of reading in, but that a considerable number of other psychic processes must be taken into consideration if we desire to obtain a clear insight into the history of art.

3. The Realistic and the Conventional in Primitive Art³

One aspect of primitive decorative art that has aroused a great deal of discussion is the fact that it may be realistic and geometric, or conventionalized. Quite apart from the rare instances of realistic representations of extraordinary excellence, the design patterns on baskets, pots, rugs, walls of houses, sides of canoes and other objects, often suggest with varying degrees of realism, the forms of mammals, birds,

³ From *Early Civilization: An Introduction to Anthropology*, by Alexander A. Goldenweiser; pp. 169-173. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

snakes, crocodiles, occasionally plants, and less frequently, objects of human manufacture. On the other hand, numerous paintings, etchings and carvings are wholly devoid of any realistic suggestion, but must be described as purely geometrical, consisting of lines, straight or curved, and angular or curvilinear figures. Usually either the angular and straight-lined patterns or the curvilinear ones predominate, but the two tendencies may also appear in combination. In connection with the geometrical designs, it has often been noted that they are interpreted by their makers as representations of animals, birds or objects, the forms of which, however, they may resemble but remotely or not at all. In view of these facts and under the general suggestion of the evolutionary conception, there arose a theory of artistic development, in which the attempt was made to combine into a historical and logical sequence, these discrepant features of primitive art.

The theory, for example, which lies at the root of A. C. Haddon's "Evolution of Art," is this: the earliest form of art was realistic, but as generation succeeded generation, the influence of technique and other causes produced a tendency in the direction of more geometrical forms, so that in the course of time the designs altogether lost their one-time realistic outlines and became wholly geometrical. The symbolic meanings of geometrical designs, then, represent survivals in interpretation of the former realistic character of these designs. As a proof of this theory, such collections of data were presented as that adduced by Haddon, which comprises a considerable number of specimens of spear and arrow shafts with crocodile carvings. The carvings on some are unmistakably realistic, on others, one or more parts of the animal appear in conventionalized geometrical form, while on still others a purely geometrical carving is found which is merely classed as a crocodile by the natives, while in some instances even this classification is omitted. Haddon conceived of this set of decorated objects as a chronological scale, his idea being that the realistic carvings were the original ones and that from this stage there was a steady progress through steps of increasing conventionalization to those carvings in which no trace of realism was left.

This attractive theory, while holding the field for a certain time, could not withstand the adverse criticism born of a more penetrating study of the material. It was pointed out that the very arrangement of a series such as Haddon's in a chronological sequence, was wholly

arbitrary, no proof being forthcoming that the realistic specimens were really the earlier ones, nor that the specimens with varying degrees of conventionalization actually represented historically successive stages.

Other evidence indicated that the geometrical designs were in some instances later than the realistic meanings attached to them. The patterns in bead embroidery which abound among the Plains Indians, for example, are highly characteristic of this area and appear with only minor variations throughout a large number of tribes. The symbolic meanings of these patterns, on the other hand, vary greatly from locality to locality. Many of these meanings are realistic. Now it would be unreasonable to assume that identical or highly similar geometrical patterns developed among the different tribes from pre-existing and different realistic originals. The alternative hypothesis must therefore be accepted, namely, that the geometrical patterns are the older element and that discrepant realistic meanings were later read into them by the different tribes.

To this argument it was added that purely technical conditions such as those present in basketry work, would naturally lead to the development of geometrical patterns. The appeal, moreover, of purely geometrical combinations, of straight or curved lines, of angular or rounded figures, is universal, in primitive as well as modern times. This appeal must answer to a common-human aesthetic demand, and if this is so, there is no reason to doubt that decorated designs of a purely geometrical pattern have numerous times originated independently of any realistic antecedents.

In brief, the situation must be conceived somewhat as follows: realistic and geometrical designs have often originated independently and from different sources and technical conditions. The primary common cause of both types of decoration is the aesthetic appeal of realistic as well as geometrical forms in nature and the pleasure derived from realistic reproductions and geometric designs. The very same psychological cause, namely, the aesthetic value of the realistic as well as of the geometrical, is responsible for the further transformations. Realistic representations suggest geometrical relations and thus may become either partly or wholly conventionalized, with or without sufficient technical determinants. Geometrical designs, on the other hand, tend either to suggest or to become symbolically associated with realistic meanings, and as a result, realistic excrescences may come to

be attached to such geometrical patterns, leading to partly geometrical, partly realistic designs. The process, finally, assumed by evolutionary theory, namely, the survival of an originally realistic representation in the form of a symbolic meaning attached to a geometrical transformation of the realistic design, also represents a plausible development, which must claim its place in the theoretical interpretation of decorative design, if only due allowance is made for the other processes here indicated.

4. Motifs in Prehistoric Peruvian Design ⁴

THE FISH

PLATE I

The Peruvians of the coast region worshiped the sea as one of their gods, and the fish being the natural emblem of the sea, undoubtedly accounts for the frequency with which it appears in all their arts. We find it woven, embroidered, and painted on cloth; molded, incised, and painted on pottery; and represented in various ways on their works in metal, wood, stone, and bone. I shall show some of the conventionalized figures that plainly represent fish; others that I have found, during my long experience with art students, where the fish motive is very rarely suspected, and some intermediate figures that I believe will enable the student to recognize this motive in the higher forms of Peruvian art. The first three figures on this Plate plainly represent fish, although degeneration has made considerable progress. They are shown as if seen from above, a common way of representing fish with many primitive peoples.

Fig. 1 is painted on a large piece of cloth which formed the outer wrapping of a mummy bundle from Surco. It is painted in black except the curved line representing the gill openings and the fins. The six small squares show the dorsal fin.

Fig. 2 is a very common form, in fact the typical Peruvian fish. If we study carefully all the forms on Plates I and II we shall find that the greater part of them are but modifications of this figure. We shall find the number of points projecting from the sides more

⁴ *Peruvian Art as Shown on Textiles and Pottery*, by Charles W. Mead. Guide Leaflet No. 46, pp. 7-13. The American Museum of Natural History. Reprinted by permission.

PLATE I




1



2




3



5




6



4

7



THE FISH

(Used by the Courtesy of Charles W. Mead and the American Museum of Natural History.)

or less, or two fish derived from this form interlocked, as shown in Fig. 7.

Fig. 3 is from the wrappings of a mummy bundle found in the vicinity of Lima. The lines representing gill openings are straight in this case. The characteristic projecting points from the sides are present.

Fig. 4 is a design not uncommon in tapestry from the coast region in the vicinity of Lima. It consists of four fish heads, in colors, surrounding a fret. During the many years that design students have worked from these Peruvian collections, I do not remember a single case in which the fish motive was suspected in this figure until I had made it clear by drawing the forms shown in Figs. 5 and 6. The character of such a design when it is woven in the cloth, in a variety of colors, is by no means as easily recognized as when drawn on paper in black and white.

Figs. 5-6. Fig. 5 is a tracing of the upper fish head in Fig. 4. Fig. 6 was made from the same tracing, but in inking it, straight lines down from the mouth were substituted for the step-form ones of Fig. 5, and this gives us exactly the same head as seen in the fish form at Fig. 2. These step-form lines, caused by the technique of weaving, often disguise a form that would be obvious if the lines were straight.

Fig. 7 shows the interlocked fish design, a form of decoration very common over most of the coast region, where it is found on borders of ponchos, belts, etc. In the poncho border from which this figure was taken the decoration is in diagonal bands, each band having two colors. The black fish shown is interlocked with one in red. The bands on either side are in different colors. A repetition of the same figure, but in different colors, arranged either in rows or, as in this illustration, in diagonal bands, is a prominent characteristic of Peruvian art. If we examine any one of these fish we find that such parts of it as can be seen when another is interlocked with it are like the typical one shown in Fig. 2.

PLATE II

Fig. 1 gives us another form of the interlocked fish design. We see here attached to the tail of each fish a form bounded on one side by a straight line and on the other by a zigzag forming four chevrons or points. This added figure plays quite a part in Peruvian art, as we shall see when we come to discuss their bird forms.

Fig. 2 was traced from the black fish above. If two forms like this are cut from paper, and one of them colored black, they will, on being put together, give the design shown. This form is often found and sometimes a bird head takes the place of the half of a fish head shown here. On turning back to Plate I and looking at the typical fish in Fig. 2 we find that one is but a skeleton or part of the other.

Fig. 3 is also a part of the design above, and is frequently used in decoration just as it is shown here.

Fig. 4 is an example of their work in pyrography. This design was burned into the side of a gourd bowl. The figure spoken of before: one bounded on one side by a straight line and on the other by a zigzag, forms all but the head of this highly conventionalized fish. It varies but little from those shown in Figs. 3 and 6, and has the triangular head of Fig. 10. Triangular heads are very common in cloth and on pottery fish forms.

Fig. 5 is another variation in the interlocked fish pattern. As the heads, tails, and crude outlines of the bodies of fish, as the Peruvians represented them, are shown, there has never been any trouble about identifying the true motive.

Figs. 6 and 7 are in relief on pottery vessels. They show again the fondness of the Peruvians for the interlocked design. In Fig. 6 each fish is the same as Fig. 3, which has an extra projecting point. The number of points in the body of a fish or bird was governed entirely by the space to be filled up by the decoration. In Fig. 7 degeneration has not progressed as far as in most of the other figures and the motive is apparent.


Figs. 8-10 are forms common on pottery vessels, sometimes painted, but oftener incised or in relief.

Fig. 11 shows the designs on a tapestry belt. It is very common on the small bags that may have been used as charms. This fish head varies but slightly from that shown in Plate I, Fig. 4, and the means shown there of identification apply equally to this form and its many variants.

Fig. 12 has been identified as the horse mackerel and is a fairly realistic representation of that fish. It is painted in several colors on a pottery vessel from Nazca.

Fig. 13 is cut from a thin sheet of silver. Twenty of these fish are fastened on a cord in the form of a necklace. It comes from Ica, but such fish strung together or with beads were common in many places in the coast region.

PLATE II



THE FISH

(Used by the Courtesy of Charles W. Mead and the American Museum of Natural History.)

The forms shown in Figs. 14-16 represent the shark and are found both on cloth and on pottery vessels.

Fig. 17 is in relief on a pottery vessel from Surco. It is a very common fish form over all the coast region. The original of this sketch is 9 cm. long, and it is often seen very much larger both on cloth and pottery.

Figs. 18-19 are from Nazca pottery. Both show a parallel line of white which in the first case completely separates the body into two unequal parts. Whether this represents the median line or was only a fancy of the artist must be left to guesswork.

In Fig. 18 there is an idea for the design student. In the original the two parts are in different colors, with the line of white between them. This will suggest to the design student the breaking up of any of the other figures and using the parts so obtained in his work.

THE BIRD

PLATE III

Figs. 1-8 and 11 are from the coast region in the vicinity of Lima. Figs. 1-2 show the typical bird of Peruvian cloth. The heads and necks are fairly realistic. The body consists of the form mentioned in the remarks on the interlocked fish design, Plate II, Fig. 1. As was said, this consists of a figure bounded on one side by a straight line, and on the other by a zigzag which forms chevrons or points. The number of points, or length of the body, depends entirely on the space to be decorated.

Fig 3. The head is more realistic than in the two preceding figures, but the body is represented in the same way. In the original the space between the head and the body is nearly filled by the head of a second bird, turned in the opposite direction, the two forming an interlocked bird design.

Fig. 4 is from the border of a tapestry poncho, where the decoration consists of a long line of these birds. Each figure is woven in several colors, and they are so placed that two with the same color scheme do not come together. Note the exaggerated topknot projecting over the bird's head. This device makes the whole figure nearly rectangular, and in a row of such designs little space will be left undecorated.

Fig. 5 is painted on white cloth. The heavy outline is black, the body brown, and the eye and space between the mandibles were left white.

PLATE III



THE BIRD

(Used by the Courtesy of Charles W. Mead and the American Museum of Natural History.)

Fig. 6. Here again the artist resorted to the same device as is shown in Fig. 4. He has used an exaggerated topknot to balance his designs and cover space.

Fig. 7. In this case the wings have been carried over the head and made to serve as quite a part of the design.

Fig. 8 shows a common bird form in textiles. It will be seen that this is very closely related to the form in Fig. 2. If we substitute the legs in this for one of the points in the body of that one, we shall have practically the same design.

Fig. 9 represents a humming bird. A row of these birds is painted around a pottery vessel from Nazca. They are all sucking honey from a six-pointed flower on the upper surface of the vessel. Only a part of this flower is shown in the sketch.

Fig. 10 shows another bird on Nazca pottery. This, like the last described, is beautifully painted in colors.

Fig. 11 is a pelican that has just caught a fish. This design is a part of the woven fabric. Similar figures are also found in relief on cloth. This is done by sewing on narrow pieces of braid. The fish in the bird's mandibles is a conventionalized form, often seen both on cloth and pottery, especially where space only admits of a small figure.

Fig. 12 shows birds from three Nazca pottery vessels. They are painted white on variously colored darker backgrounds.

Fig. 13 shows the decorations on a piece of vicuña cloth, as it is commonly called, from Pachacamac. The warp threads are cotton, crossed by a weft of vicuña wool, which completely covers them. The ground color is a deep reddish-brown with the decoration in yellow. The effect produced is extremely pleasant and artistic and has made this textile one of the favorites of art students who have many times copied it in colors. It also affords a good example of the influence of basket work on the arts of these people. The lines bounded by zigzags are plainly copied from the work of the basket maker. The birds' necks rise and depend from these basket designs.

Fig. 14 is from a large shawl-like garment from Lachay, near Chancay. The color of this textile is indigo blue with the designs woven in white, in broad stripes. It is the interlocked bird design: the upper bird faces to the right, and the lower one to the left. If we study one of these birds we find in its neck and body the same form as is shown in Fig. 3.

Exercises

1. What is the New Viewpoint with respect to primitive Art?
2. Name some major problems in connection with this subject.
3. What is the theory of the "white man's art"? What primitive races seem to offer most difficulty for the theory?
4. What motives besides the pure aesthetic interest (love of the beautiful) are discernible in primitive art?
5. Why have so many observers of primitive art missed these non-aesthetic motives?
6. How important is the recognition of this utilitarian element in the interpretation of art-history?
7. What is its relation to sympathetic magic?
8. Considered as an independent impulse apart from these practical motives, what are the psychological and social sources of art?
9. Is the artist one who feels more intensely or one who has a stronger impulse and capacity to share his feeling socially?
10. In seeking a *medium* for expressing his feeling, what social situations stimulate the primitive artist?
11. State three theories regarding the development of decorative design, and show which one Boas applies to Alaskan needlecases.
12. What arguments are brought by Boas against the notion that primitive art moves from realistic to the conventional?
13. Describe certain examples of primitive art that go to show that many designs are simply the expression of the artist's pleasure in expressing his own skill.
14. State Goldenweiser's argument against Haddon's theory.
15. What motives and conditions might lead to geometrical designs?
16. From the various writers do you infer that the meanings assigned by savages for certain designs or patterns are necessarily correct?
17. Interpret each figure on Plates I, II, and III.

Additional References

1. Atwood, Stella M.: "The Case for the Indian," in *Survey*, Vol. XLIX., No. 1. Graphic Number (Oct., 1922). With illustrations of Pueblo Art by Mabel Sterne.
2. Collier, John: "The Red Atlantis," *Ibid.* Showing modern pueblo life.
3. Elliot, G. F. Scott: *Prehistoric Man and His Story*. Ch. XVIII. — "Prehistoric Art." and Ch. XIX. — "The Developments of Art."
4. Goldenweiser, A. A.: *Early Civilization*. Ch. IX — "Art," deals with the artistic aspects of primitive industry. Finely illustrated.
5. Jenness, Diamond: *Eskimo Art*. 18 drawings. In *The Geographical Review*, Vol. XII., No. 2.

6. Osborn, Henry F.: *Men of the Old Stone Age*. Pp. 315-330, describe "the birth of art" during the glacial period in Europe. The entire volume is invaluable for the subject of this chapter.

7. Stow, George W.: *The Native Races of South Africa*. Contains valuable color plates illustrating the art of the modern Bushmen, who are nearest akin to the prehistoric Aurignacian painters in artistic ability.

8. Thomas, William I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*. Part V., on "Art, Ornament, and Decoration," is extremely valuable, notably the illustrated selection from W. H. Holmes, on "Form and Ornament in Ceramic Art."

PART THREE
SOCIAL PROCESSES

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

A SOCIAL "process" is simply any characteristic social change. The term signifies any kind of a "going on" in society, provided it be of a type that repeats itself over and over, and is thus not unique and isolated. The latter would be a *historical* process, and historical processes, despite a common saying to the contrary, do not repeat themselves. If they did, history would lose its most distinctive characteristic, which is its uniqueness. For it will be recalled that anything is unique when it is the only one of its kind, and this is peculiar to historical, including biographical processes. They happen just that particular way only once.

Social processes, on the other hand, may be illustrated by comparison with the physiological processes, such as digestion, respiration, circulation and growth. These changes are characteristic of all organisms. All of them begin with the first movement of life, repeat themselves throughout infancy and youth, and all, except growth, continue to the end of life.

Most of the social processes illustrated in the chapters below are of similar character, inasmuch as they occur in the very youngest and smallest groups as well as in the largest and oldest societies or nations, and they persist until the dissolution of the group. Some social processes, however, are more similar to the *growth* process in the physical organism. Among these may be mentioned those chapters on the Rise of Caste and Class, the Growth of Democracy, and Group Expansion. All these processes begin, increase and continue for a period, decline, and disappear.

There are, all in all, numberless minor social processes, which in their totality may be conceived as one all-inclusive single social process, as by Professor Small, when he says: "The social process is the incessant evolution of persons through the evolution of institutions, which evolve completer persons, who evoke completer institutions, and so on beyond any limit that we can fix." (*General Sociology*, by Albion W. Small; p. 552. Chicago, 1905.)

When, on the other hand, sociologists essay to enumerate and classify the separate social processes that make up this great all-inclusive process, the results vary so enormously with different writers that the question intrudes itself whether a solid basis of distinction has yet been found. It is doubtless true, as shown by Park and Burgess in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* Chapter V. that *social interaction*, in the sense of mutual modification, is the fundamental

social process. But it is also the fundamental process of the whole universe, as expressed in the universal attraction of masses, and in countless specific ways, such as chemical affinities, etc. Therefore it is not specifically treated as a social process in this book, being regarded as a philosophical process to be simply assumed as the basis of all social becoming as well as of all becoming whatsoever. As the same writers show, social *contact* is the first phase of social interaction. This process, along with *isolation*, which is simply the *absence* of contact, and always more or less relative to it, is here treated in connection with various concrete, objective processes, especially those dealing with the Socialization of the Individual, and Diffusion of Cultures.

Perhaps the reader has observed that *social processes*, as defined above, are practically identical with *social origins* in the psychological sense explained at the opening of Part II. Indeed we may say that, speaking in terms of social psychology, social phenomena have their origins perpetually in social processes.

But on the other hand, as explained in the same place, social phenomena have also their historical and more or less unique origins in the particular circumstances of time and place. This aspect of social change will be found more or less prominent in various selections quoted in the following chapters, many of which treat of social processes in a quite objective and depictive way. This applies especially to the discussions on Diffusion of Cultures, Social Stratification, and Equalization of Opportunity.

Professor Small is foremost among those who have striven to elucidate the nature of *the social process* in general, as the fundamental concept of the social sciences. In his *General Sociology* (p. 513) he says: "The use of the word is immaterial. The possession of the idea, the perception of the relation between portions of experience, is essential. We do not represent human experience to ourselves as it is, unless we think every portion of it as a factor in a process composed of all human experience.

"In the absence of any canonical formula of the concept 'process' the following is proposed: *A process is a collection of occurrences, each of which has a meaning for every other, the whole of which constitutes some sort of becoming.* . . . Human association is such a process."

While Professors Small, Giddings, and others have endeavored to explain *the social process* in general, Professor Ross has the pre-eminence among those who have singled out and illustrated the many important particular social processes into which it divides itself upon close analysis. His method is concrete and objective, and his studies in this field are so comprehensive that many of the titles in Part III. of this volume draw upon terminology made familiar among sociologists by his many brilliant contributions.

CHAPTER XX

SUB-SOCIAL PROCESSES

UNDERLYING the strictly social processes as defined in the preceding section, one should notice a class of changes which directly affect the character of social life in numerous ways, although they, themselves, take place not on the social level, but upon that of the biological and economic forces. No one has treated these phenomena more suggestively, from the viewpoint of sociology, than has Professor Ross, from whom the title of this chapter and the two selections which make up its contents are borrowed.

Professor Ross styles them "extra-social" or "sub-social" *factors of social change*. From the point of view of the present writer they are not only factors, but also forms, of social change. But a form of social change is what is usually meant by the much-used term "social process." They are therefore sub-social *processes*, — processes because of the fact that they are characteristic social changes, and *sub-social* because they take place more or less automatically and only partly within the realm of the psychic interactions of men in society. They represent physical processes partly affecting, and partly affected by, the social relations in the more specific sense.

1. The Growth of Population ¹

The Growth of Population. — This phenomenon presents two cases. In the one case the rate of increase is practically the same for all parts of the population; in the other case the various classes and sections multiply at diverse rates. The former case will be considered first.

A uniform increase of numbers throughout society, while it does not directly disturb the relations of the parts, changes the relation of population to land, and thus intensifies the exertions needed to procure subsistence. This stress incites to new ways of exploiting the environment, which in turn bring individuals into new relations to one another and so cause modification of the social structure. The

¹ From *Foundations of Sociology*, by Edward Alsworth Ross; pp. 209-217. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1912. Fifth edition. Reprinted by permission.)

advance from the hunting to the pastoral stage did not follow promptly the domestication of animals, but often awaited the pressure of population. Man seems first to have tamed animals for amusement. In Africa we find the Ovambo "very rich in cattle and fond of animal diet, yet their beasts would seem to be kept for show rather than for food." Says Bücher: "Generally speaking, the possession of cattle is for the Negro peoples merely 'a representation of wealth and the object of an almost extravagant veneration'—merely a matter of fancy." An Indian village in the interior of Brazil "resembles a great menagerie . . . ; but none of the many animals are raised because of the meat or for other economic purpose." "On the whole, then, no importance can be attached to cattle raising in the production of the food supplies of primitive peoples." The motor, then, that urges a primitive people on into the pastoral state is either the growing scarcity of game (a "cumulative effect"), or the increase of numbers.

The same driving force causes man to pass from herdsmanhip to tillage. Of the Navajos we read: "Indian corn . . . was known to them apparently from the earliest times, but while they remained a mere hunting tribe, they detested the labor of planting. But as their numbers increased, the game, more regularly hunted, became scarce, and to maintain themselves in food, necessity forced them to a more general cultivation of corn, and the regular practice of planting became established among them." Says Baden-Powell: "Necessity has forced Rajputs and others to take to agriculture." Wallace writes: "The prospect of starvation is, in fact, the cause of the transition (to agriculture) probably in all cases, and certainly in the case of the Bashkirs." Von Middendorf says: "Only the poorest Kirghises, driven by want, engage in tillage." An ancient chronicle, alluding to the passage from pasturage to agriculture in seventh-century Ireland, says: "Because of the abundance of the households, in their period, therefore it is that they (the sons of Æd Slane) introduced boundaries in Ireland." Jenks tells us that the earliest cultivators of the soil were "strangers attached to the tribe upon whom the rough work of the community fell, and who would be the first to suffer from scarcity of food." Elsewhere we are told: "When hemmed in by impassible barriers or invincible enemies, pastoral tribes under the pressure of increasing population slowly became agricultural." To the same force is due the change from extensive and shifting cultivation, where after a crop or two the cultivator makes a fresh clear-

ing, to intensive agriculture, where by an alternation of crops and fallow the same land is used in perpetuity.

Now, by causing these economic changes the movement of population becomes a primary cause of the changes in social organization to which they give rise. The adoption of pastoral pursuits converts the savage pack into the tribe, institutes property, establishes male kinship, develops patriarchal authority, favors polygyny and wife-purchase, makes woman a chattel, causes captives to be enslaved instead of eaten, and substitutes the *wergeld* for the blood-feud. The adoption of agriculture changes the nature of the social bond. Says Maine: "From the moment a tribal community settles down finally upon a definite space of land, the land begins to be the basis of society in place of kinship." It breaks up the tribe into clans which become village communities. The back-breaking toil induces a resort to systematic slavery and the slave trade. Where settlement has already occurred, the passage from simple collection to tillage causes a passage from the large patriarchal household to the simple family, and from family property in land to individual property with the right of bequest.

After agriculture is adopted, the increase of population does not cease to be a dynamic factor. The land is progressively occupied, until at last the laborer has no longer a direct access to natural resources, but must offer his services for wages. When this point is reached, slavery and serfdom begin to disappear, for coercion is no longer necessary to secure a sufficient supply of laborers. The expansion of population compels a resort to inferior soils. This, by enhancing the value of the better tracts and increasing the landowner's share of the produce, engenders an agricultural aristocracy, which, in proportion as it withdraws itself from labor and centers its attention on war and politics, becomes master of the community.

Again, the enlargement of demand in consequence of the increase of numbers enables an exchange economy to take the place of domestic husbandry, perhaps causes a foreign trade to spring up. The growth of political exchange, in consequence of the greater local surpluses to be disposed of and the greater local deficits to be supplied from outside sources, makes it worth while to create avenues of communication, and these, in turn, promote the territorial division of labor. The growth of numbers in a region cannot but strain its natural resources in certain respects, and compel the local population to supply

their lack of certain commodities from the larger resources of some other locality, sending out in return those products of their own region which are to be had in the greatest abundance. Besides thus calling into being merchants, markets, and movements of goods, the expansion of population causes local groups of craftsmen to spring up for the supplying of articles formerly demanded in quantities too small to set up currents of trade. In place of the transitory assemblages at fairs, there now appear town populations regularly exchanging their wares with the country.

The growing prominence of exchange brings men into unwonted relations, which presently call forth an expansion of law on the commercial side. The appearance of routes traversing many jurisdictions, and the need of a more perfect security for goods *en route* or in a market, create a demand for royal protection and cement that alliance of the nascent merchant-artisan groups with the king which is so potent in humbling the feudal lords. In his struggle with the barons the monarch, finding his surest support in the burgher population, picks from them his agents and servants, and the choicest of these, ennobled by royal patent, take their places alongside the old territorial aristocracy.

The towns which arose in the Middle Ages to meet the economic needs of an expanding population became the starting-point of social and political developments quite tangential to the institutions of the time. The feudal manor was a type of constrained association; the town, a form of free association. "City air makes free." Outside the town the industrial classes were servile, and a stigma attached to labor; inside, labor was honored, and the workman felt joy and pride in his work. Outside, fighting and working were distinct professions; inside, the burgher labored or fought as occasion required. Outside was rigid hereditary caste; inside, men came into numerous and fluid relationships. The town, in fact, contained the germ of a distinct social growth. How pregnant is the overflow of population into towns appears from the fact that town life develops a mentality of its own, more impressionable and plastic than that of the country. Here outworn traditions and narrow local sentiments and obstinate prejudices meet and cancel one another. Races fuse and intermarry. There appear new combinations of hereditary factors. Variation is more common. The shutters of the intellect are taken down. The mind

becomes alert and supple. Freed from the hampering net of kin and class ties, the *individual* appears. The town is, therefore, a hotbed, where seed-ideas quickly germinate. Its progressive population soon places itself at the head of the social procession and sets the pace for the slower country-dwellers.

The city, less traditional than the country, values men according to some present fact — their efficiency or their wealth, rather than their family. It is democratic or plutocratic in temper, whereas the country is the natural support of aristocracy. In the city people consume, as it were, in one another's presence, and hence their expenditure conforms more to the canon of Conspicuous Waste than does that of countrymen. The multiplication of merely conventional wants arouses energy, intensifies competition, whets egoism, and restricts the size of the family.

The increase of social mass has various effects upon regulative institutions. A lateral extension of society, by causing distinctions to arise between local chiefs and the head chief, between local priests and the high priest, favors the formation of hierarchies. The growth of the aggregate causes a differentiation between sacred and secular functionaries, between military and civil heads, and between judicial, legislative, and executive offices. The heavier burden of business compels the ruler to surround himself with helpers, who in turn require other helpers, until government structure becomes complex. Power is deputed and re-deputed. Control comes into the hands of the leisured or the trained. The exclusion of the poorer classes from the government of the Roman republic in its later period was due to its expansion. "Now that Rome had ceased to be a purely Italian state, and had adopted Hellenic culture, it was no longer possible to take a small farmer from the plow and set him at the head of the community." Eventually, owing to the overflow of population into the great burgess-colonies, and the diffusion of the Romans throughout the peninsula, the absolute centralization in the one focus of Rome was given up, and a municipal system was instituted for Italy which permitted the formation of smaller civic communities within the Roman community. "Under Chlodovech and his immediate successors," we read, "the People, assembled in arms, had a real participation in the resolutions of the king. But with the increasing size of the kingdom, the meeting of the entire people became impossible."

In New England, after the local community reaches a certain size, the annual town-meeting is replaced by the government of mayor and council.

There is, furthermore, reason to believe that the formation of large, dense, complex bodies of population is favorable to the growth of a belief in the rights of man as man and to the spread of ideas of human equality, *i.e.*, of the habits of thought that underlie individualism and democracy.

So far, the growth of population has been assumed to proceed at an equal rate throughout society. If, now, it be assumed that the rate of increase is sensibly unequal, a new set of consequences appears. The resulting inequality of pressure — providing the distribution of life-opportunities remains the same — will cause people to pass from class to class and from place to place. City dwellers never keep abreast of country dwellers in reproduction, and hence the city has constantly to be fed with the overflow from the farms. One consequence is that the city never becomes traditional and static, as it might well do if it grew from its own loins. Another result is the gradual depletion of the eugenic capital of the rural population — *e.g.*, the increasing brachycephaly of France within historic times — owing to the continual drain of its best elements to the cities. As the towns draw from the fields, so the fertile valleys, sterilized by their very prosperity, draw from the barren uplands streams of migrants representing the peoples beaten in ancient conquests.

It may happen that the distinct types in the population — the martial and the industrial, the imaginative and the calculating, the “ideo-motor” and the “critical-intellectual” — come under diverse influences which make their rates of reproduction unequal, and so change their numerical proportions. Every such shifting of the predominant type is marked by important vicissitudes in society.

The unequal increase of population on the opposite sides of a frontier finally sets up a current of migration which replaces one race, language, or civilization by another, thereby entailing changes in society. If the frontier is a political one, the movement is likely to take the form of an armed invasion, and the society must sustain the shock of war. It is now understood that the assaults of the Germans upon the Roman Empire were prompted by over-population, and the eventual failure to withstand them was due to the fact that infecundity had reduced the Empire to a hollow shell.

2. The Accumulation of Wealth ²

The progress of wealth, and the expansion of income which attends the control of a growing mass of capital, have a transforming effect on society. Even a general movement of prosperity shared in by all is a dynamic factor. The enlarged production shows itself, not along the entire line of commodities, but chiefly in the higher grades of goods, and in comforts and luxuries. These qualitative changes in production cannot but result in the transfer of labor and capital from certain occupations to others, from extractive to elaborative industries, from the production of goods to the supplying of services, from certain centers and regions to other centers and regions. Manufactures and foreign trade will be stimulated. Redistributions of population will take place between country and city, between districts producing necessities and districts that produce luxuries. The preponderating importance of capital enhances the sacredness of property in law and in morals, strengthens government as a property-protecting agency, and exalts the virtues of frugality and thrift.

At the same time, the enlarged consumption of goods tends to bring about social changes. Crime becomes less serious than vice, so that moral injunctions aim less to restrain men from aggression than to fortify them against the temptations to over-indulgence. Human depravity is doubted, and belief in future retribution dies out. The God of Fear yields to the God of Love. In worship, praise gains at the expense of prayer. To guide men, amid the greater variety of consumables, toward certain harmonious groupings of goods, numerous standards of consumption are erected.

It is hardly to be expected, however, that in the accumulation of capital all portions of society will participate to the same degree. Some will distance others, and those who thus become differentiated from the rest in respect to possessions will eventually segregate into a distinct social class. For capital is not merely economic power; *it is latent social power*. Those of superabundant wealth in time convert portions of it into political power, legal privileges, and invidious social preferences and exemptions, all serving to mark them off from the rest of the community. In other words, an aristocracy may originate, quite apart from conquest, quite apart from royal grace, in

² *Ibid.*, p. 217 ff.

the mere fact of superior riches. "The Heroes of the Homeric poems," says Maine, "are not only valiant, but wealthy; the warriors of the *Nibelungen Lied* are not only noble, but rich. In the later Greek literature we find pride of birth identified with pride in seven wealthy ancestors." Among the ancient Irish the nobles are in seven grades, distinguished chiefly by wealth. At the bottom of the scale is the Aire-desa and "the Brehon law provides that when the Bo-Aire has acquired twice the wealth of an Aire-desa and has held it for a certain number of generations, he becomes an Aire-desa himself." The possession of resources sufficient to enable one to fight on horse-back rather than on foot has become the germ of knighthood the world over. Out of it grew the Greek *hippeis*, the Roman Equestrian Order, the Gaulish *equites*, and the mediaeval knighthoods.

The appearance of a body of wealthy persons overthrows that primitive political equality of citizens based upon their like capacity to bear arms in defense of the commonwealth. Clients and retainers multiply, and these natural partisans of the rich undermine the burgess class. Not only is the possession of great wealth generally felt to afford a presumption of superiority, but the position of the poorer citizens is weakened by their economic dependence. "It is by taking stock that the free Irish tribesman becomes the Ceile or Kyle, the vassal or man of his chief, owing him not only rent, but service and homage." Meanwhile, the proprietors, freed from labor, devote themselves to war and politics, and, since they are well accoutred and expert in weapons, they finally prove themselves more than a match for the *plebs*.

Besides political inequality, the differentiation by possessions entails various other secondary forms of differentiation. Service in the Roman cavalry, originally obligatory upon all who could furnish two horses, became after a time a badge of superiority. Men of standing remained in the cavalry after they had become incapacitated by age. "Young men of rank more and more withdrew from serving in the infantry, and the legionary cavalry became a close aristocratic corps." By the time of Sulla the dying out of the sturdy farmer class and the formation of an urban rabble had converted the Roman army "from a burgess force into a set of mercenaries who showed no fidelity to the state at all, and proved faithful to the officer only when he had the skill personally to gain their attachment." Finally the rich come to feel that wealth ought to buy its possessor clear of every onerous

duty. In Caesar's time "in the soldiery not a trace of the better classes could any longer be discovered. In law the general obligation to bear arms still subsisted; but the levy took place in the most irregular and unfair manner. Numerous persons liable to serve were wholly passed over. . . . The Roman burgess cavalry now merely vegetated as a sort of mounted noble guard, whose perfumed cavaliers and exquisite high-bred horses only played a part in the festivals of the capital; the so-called burgess infantry was a troop of mercenaries, swept together from the lowest ranks of the burgess population."

Other differentiations are connected with certain ideas which naturally strike root in a society marked by great pecuniary inequality. One is the notion that *it is disgraceful to take money for work*. The effect of this is to raise a wall of partition between the laborer or artisan and the respectable landlord or manufacturer, between the private and the officer, between the clerk and the magistrate. Akin to this is the idea that *labor is not respectable*. Springing up among the wealthy after they have withdrawn from all public duties and become a leisure class pure and simple, this notion, descending through society by deferential imitation, aggravates the discontent and envy of the poor, and causes work to be shunned as much on account of its stigma as on account of its irksomeness. Finally comes the notion that *human worth is measured, not by achievements or personal qualities, but by the scale of consumption*. This exalts pecuniary emulation above all other forms of rivalry, and engenders a host of purely factitious wants which call into being an insensate luxury at the top of society; then, percolating down through the social strata, these wants divert a serious proportion of income from the service of real human needs. The joint operation of these principles eventually raises the craving for wealth to an extravagant pitch and depresses the worth of everything else. These effects appeared most nakedly in the Rome of the last age of the republic, where the slave economy had completely wiped out the middle class. Says Mommsen: "To be poor was not merely the sorest disgrace and the worst crime, but the only disgrace and the only crime; for money the statesman sold the state and the burgess sold his freedom; the post of the officer and the vote of the jurymen were to be had for money; for money the lady of quality surrendered her person as well as the common courtesan; the falsifying of documents and perjuries had become so common that in a popular poet of this age an oath is called "the

plaster for debts.' Men had forgotten what honesty was; a person who refused a bribe was regarded, not as an upright man, but as a personal foe." There was "nothing to bridge over or soften the fatal contrast between the world of the beggars and the world of the rich." "The wider the chasm by which the two worlds were externally divided, the more completely they coincided in the like annihilation of family life . . . in the like laziness and luxury, the like unsubstantial economy, the like unmanly dependence, the like corruption differing only in its scale, the like criminal demoralization, the like longing to begin the war with property."

The misery of the multitude was such that free men not infrequently sold themselves to the contractors for board and wages as gladiatorial slaves. The obsequious deference of legal canons to economic realities appears from the fact that the juris-consults of the period pronounced lawful and actionable the contract of such a gladiatorial slave "to let himself be chained, scourged, burned, or killed, without opposition, if the laws of the institution should so require."

Changes in taste, the growth and redistribution of population, the shifting of trade routes, mechanical inventions, discovery of natural deposits, or increase in local security, cause wealth to well up at new spots or to come into new hands. If it is true that capital is a kind of crude power which may be refined, transmuted and differentiated into nearly all forms of the Desirable, then New Wealth will be pregnant with social change. Such, indeed, is the fact. The first full-fledged aristocracy is based on agricultural profits, for among the sources of early revenue land alone possesses that stability which is necessary in order that the merely rich may ripen into a true nobility. If, however, by the side of the blue-blooded territorial aristocracy there forms a considerable body of plebeian rich, the social structure is at once subject to a strain which sooner or later will modify it. It matters not whether the source of these fortunes be piracy, commerce, manufacture, colonial exploitation, tax-farming, or finance; money is power and ultimately contrives to register itself in super-economic forms. The fall of the Greek aristocracies was due to the fortunes made in commerce, navigation and manufacture. The Eupatrids, absorbed in war and politics and content to leave the working of their land to serfs, were confronted by new men who, by clearing and inclosure, sometimes by marriage, had become owners of

landed estates. The assault of these upstarts on the political monopoly of the old territorial nobility began the movement which ended at last in democracy. Thucydides declares that the increase in the number of people of means brought about an irresistible demand for a large participation in government, and that this triumph of property over birth occurred usually in states where property was most diffused, and where maritime commerce, industry, and financial speculation were most developed. Caius Graccus carried his reforms and broke down the governing aristocracy of Rome by turning over to the rich speculator and merchant class, that had grown up outside the old senatorial nobility, the farming of all the Asiatic provinces and the control of the jury courts.

In the Middle Ages flourishing commercial or mining towns bought of their lords the grant of special rights and immunities, and thus virtually ransomed themselves out of the feudal system. In France the first extra-feudal fortunes originated in the farming of taxes. Later, commerce and manufacturing created a wealthy class upon which the monarch constantly leaned when extending his authority at the expense of the feudal *seigneurs*. About the beginning of the seventeenth century the proud Duke of Sully laments that "at this day . . . when everything is rated by the money which it brings, this generous body of nobility is brought into comparison with the managers of the revenue, the officers of justice, and the drudges of business." Finally, can anyone doubt that the strong tendency in the new extra-European societies toward popular government and the democratic spirit finds at least one of its ultimate roots in the diffusion of opportunities to accumulate property brought about by the presence of free land?

Exercises

1. Define a social process.
2. Give examples of physiological and social processes.
3. How does the *growth* process differ from others?
4. State two cases of growth in population. Which is more common?
5. Where population increases uniformly, in what fundamental fact does its dynamic influence reside?
6. Show the effect of such increase on domestication of animals and tillage.
7. What changes in social organization grow out of these primary changes?

8. Describe the changes in social attitudes and institutions entailed by the increase of population in towns.
9. Mention some examples of *unequal* growth of population and indicate the resulting social changes.
10. Show how an increase of wealth, even if uniform and general, affects the kind of goods and services produced; the location of capital and labor; the social attitudes and values.
11. What social changes take place at the same time?
12. When wealth increases *unequally* what changes occur in war and politics?
13. What new social attitudes appear with this same inequality of property?
14. Mention some democratic tendencies and changes growing out of the increase of wealth.
15. What is meant by a *sub-social* change or process?
16. Can you think of any other processes that could be rightly called sub-social?
17. In the various changes mentioned in this chapter distinguish the sub-social from the social processes that grow out of them.

Additional References

1. Rivers, W. H. R. (Editor): *The Depopulation of Melanesia*. Extremely valuable reports by missionaries, British government officials, and ethnologists on the present decline in the native population in Melanesia.
2. Schoolcraft, Henry R.: *Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States, etc.* Vol. I. (called "Part I"), pp. 257-258, contains an early account (1851) of the small-pox scourge among the Western Indians in 1837. Partly quoted in Thomas: *Source Book, etc.*, p. 466.

CHAPTER XXI

SOCIALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

THE readings of this chapter are selected with the purpose of illustrating the stages in the process by which the individual passes from personal isolation at the one extreme to a condition in which he is so completely identified with his social group, at the other extreme, as to become *like* the approved social type — in other words he is *assimilated*. The word "assimilated" is here used in its original meaning, which signifies to be made to resemble or be like others.

Of course it is not implied, in presenting this series of readings, that every individual is first isolated and anti-social, as was the lad described by Dr. Healy; or that he next possesses only *acquaintances* and later wins *friends*. The fact is evident that he possesses both acquaintances and friends at the same time, and also has more remote dealings, *i.e.*, secondary contacts, simultaneously with strangers. He is thus at any given time in various stages of intimacy with a large number of individuals, the number and character of these contacts as a whole determining the degree, not only of his *assimilation* to his fellows, but also his *socialization*, which means his active identification of his own interests with the interests of his group.

In the case described by Healy the individual was isolated and unsocial in an abnormal sense. But every infant is normally in a state of isolation even greater, and only by the development of *communication* can he enter into the life of his fellow-beings and his group. While the pathological case described below had possession of the mechanisms of communication, his unfortunate experiences had estranged him upon the emotional or dispositional side. The normal infant possesses the appropriate dispositions in part, but has to develop by appropriate responses, as shown by Bogardus, a still greater similarity of nature with his associates; and he must also master the technique of communication itself.

In the profound analysis of acquaintance and friendship, quoted from Simmel, one sees the processes revealed by which one recognizes, traverses, or maintains the social distances that separate or unite his personality with those of others.

The selection from Michelson is offered for its picturesque interest, and also because it shows concretely the methods of training used by a simple Indian society for the purpose of placing upon its younger

members the type of character and conduct approved by the group. It has the weakness of being largely negative, a matter of inhibitions or "don'ts." It is thus in sharp contrast with our most recent and most advanced notions of child training, but is probably much nearer to the methods actually practiced by all the generations of the past and by the masses of parents and teachers today.

For a most illuminating discussion of primary and secondary contacts, the reader should consult the passages from Park and Burgess cited in the References below.

For a graphic account of the whole process of socialization, the chapter on "Association" by Ross (cited below) has seldom, if ever, been equalled.

1. Personal Isolation¹

The following abridged account, from the case histories of Dr. William Healy, describes an instance where the personality became extremely *isolated* and anti-social because of a repression which itself arose from *contacts*,—but contacts of an evil and disintegrating character suffered in early childhood.

Some three years ago I was asked to study a case by the judge of one of the smaller juvenile courts, a case which had proved remarkably recalcitrant, and baffling to understand. Coming and going through their city I had ample opportunity to see this boy of 12 years many times and to get well acquainted with his unusually pleasant mother, who regarded her boy as a desperate problem. That the case so far has been a failure has its lesson for us, equally with those in which there has been more success. As an example of extensive grudge formation and development of anti-social feeling at an early age, the study of this case is most illuminating. We have studied the same phenomena in older individuals, but nowhere have we found such direct proof of the peculiar and largely preventable beginnings which there may be in the background.

We saw at once that the opinion of the judge was correct—here was a most peculiar lad, so far as his attitude towards the world was concerned. According to his notion, nobody was his friend, and the very kindest advances were repulsed by him. This judge is a man who can reach a boy if anybody can, and his court admits of much personal touch with offenders, but he acknowledged himself an utter

¹ From *The Individual Delinquent*, by William Healy, M.D.; pp. 376–384. (Boston. Copyrighted by Little, Brown, and Company, 1917. Reprinted by permission.)

failure. We, too, had the same opinion of our efforts even after several interviews, and no real understanding of the case was had, in spite of voluminous records of facts, until several months afterwards when we visited him in a certain reformatory institution, and we were able for the first time to get at the foundations of his attitude.

This boy was born in Germany and we found him to be a typical blond Teuton. Complete examination showed only the following peculiarities. Poorly developed for his age. Weight 75 lbs. Height 4 ft. 7 in. One tonsil much enlarged. No sensory defect. . . . Well-shaped head. Teeth crowded, with little room for those yet to be erupted. Eyes bright. Moderate biting of finger nails. Strength fair and good expansion of chest. His expression was remarkable; not exactly stubborn and defiant, with the attitude of the bad boy of the street, but rather *blasé*, and altogether firm. With his small features, pug nose, and firmly compressed straight mouth, he made a marked picture. Our study of the character of this boy has continued at intervals over a long period. At the time when first asked to give an opinion we had not succeeded in getting him to do the tests — his being the only case in which they have not invoked interest. He assumed a listless attitude, indifferently worked at this or that, and finally said he could not do it. When later he was asked why he failed, he said he had not tried hard enough. This attitude was characteristic. He had only advanced to the 4th grade, and yet the feeling of his teachers was that this was due to perversity rather than lack of ability.

From his mother and teachers we heard accounts of his school life which, as his mother suggested, made one very sorry for his teachers. He had been unwilling to make effort to learn, and had interfered much with the teaching of others. He had even struck some of his teachers. There had been much changing about from school to school. A teacher experienced in the treatment of offenders, who had him in charge when we first saw him, gave me an enlightening account of his attitude. She gave him a simple problem in arithmetic and he said he could not do it. She told him to try. He did it wrong and she told him so, and then he went over it some four times, showing it to her each time. On each occasion he purposely copied it wrong, so as never to do correctly her original example. At the same time when I asked him his age he said he was 13, then later said he was born in 1900. When I called his attention to the discrepancy, he shrugged

his shoulders and showed sullenness. When I again kindly inquired he said, "I'm 12. I'm 11. I'm 6." It was at this time that two other experienced observers of boys informed me that they felt very certain the boy was not right in his mind. They gave as reasons his persistent anti-social attitude, his lying, bad behavior, and particularly the amount of trouble he got himself into as the result of his assumed point of view.

The woman officer of the court, a most kindly personage, told us this was the only case in which she, as well as the judge, had utterly failed, and that the boy's whole attitude and behavior were the most remarkable thing she had ever heard of. My impression from the start was that his frame of mind with its stubborn recalcitrancy, instead of boyish defiance, was a very similar attitude to what one has frequently observed in adult confirmed offenders. Although the general opinion was that the boy was insane, we could not find any typical symptoms of psychosis.

In the endeavor to break through his marked attitude in the several interviews which we had in this first period, we noted it was almost impossible to get him to drop for even a few minutes his pose of perversity. The teacher at our request talked to him about his very sweet little mother, and how she felt he was almost sending her crazy by his actions. He merely tossed his head with indifference. Never were we able to get out of him the slightest show of sorrow. He grew neither angry nor sad. Let alone in the school-room directly after a demonstration of bad behavior he took to reading a book and became thoroughly absorbed, and later in industrial work he made a very pretty cardboard house.

Before we stopped our first efforts we had ascertained from him that he conceived the whole world to be doing him an injustice. He was being railroaded through court, his mother did not treat him right, the judge was a good enough man, but nevertheless the court simply sent boys away without caring for them in the least. It was true he had stolen on numerous occasions and run away and so on, but he had good reason to — he was so badly treated. His mother wants to put him away for his life-time. He wants to live with his grandmother. We knew that he had previously told a lot of lies to the authorities, some of which had given considerable trouble, particularly when he said he had just come from relatives where they had scarlet fever, and that he himself felt sick with sore throat and so on. He insisted

on the truth of this to me, although it had been found to be absolutely untrue. He said there was no use talking to him, because the court had made up its mind to put him away, and had done so from the start—the only thing anybody could do for him was to let him go free, that's all he wanted. He willingly acknowledged he had stolen from these very relatives to whom he said he wanted to go. He seemed to think no one should have any idea of disciplining or chiding him for anything he had ever done.

At this time and later he wrote elaborate letters, telling of many delinquencies which were not known to the authorities, although most of them his mother said were true enough, and endeavoring evidently to make himself out as bad a boy as he really was. Sometimes in his letters he said he hoped to go home and have a chance to be a better boy, but in general there was very slight indication of any intention or promise to change in any way his career.

The story of the very intelligent mother was told at great length at this time. She had conjectured all sorts of possibilities in explanation of his remarkable behavior, which had grieved her so terribly. . . .

They never had much trouble with Victor until he was about 10 years old, about the time his father died. Since then he is like a wild and reckless animal. Previously he had made one grade a year. The family have shown the utmost patience with him, but his misdeeds have been a terrible list. He has stolen the prized belongings of his dead father and sold them. He has been a great truant in spite of much effort to prevent this. He goes away some distance on the street cars, and sometimes is gone as many as three nights at a time. Many times he has gotten money in small amounts by misrepresentation. He has gone to the neighbors and borrowed money to get medicine for an alleged sick baby.

He does not seem, whether at home or in the school-room, at all like other children. All he seems to care for is a place to eat and sleep. He never plays a game at home, although there are many. He never touches any of the family books. Never looks at pictures. When other boys and girls sing he never joins in with them. Does not even read the funny pictures in the newspapers. No one ever succeeded in making a friend or confidant of him. They have a very kindly family physician who has taken the boy on rides, given him money, and tried to win him, but when his back is turned Victor scornfully laughs at the overtures. In one of his letters he boasted

of having kicked a teacher in the stomach and made her faint. He never wants to go to a matinee or a picnic when invited with other children. Has rejected many offers for normal fun. . . .

When we saw him at the institution he was willing for the first time to give us some account of his own feelings towards the world and how he happened to have them. He told of his own bad behavior and demerits in the institution. He spoke in a very low voice, but showed willing and pleasant responsiveness. Was biting his finger nails a great deal. Asked about the beginnings of his stealing, he gave us a story about neighbor boys whom he used to know when he was seven or eight years old. They told him much about thieving, and got him definitely into the way of stealing. I said to him that although he had proved such a difficult problem people really were interested in him and in evidence of this I had come a long distance to see him. He at once plunged into the sex question. He said the boys who first taught him stealing were the ones who told him the other things that had been coming up in his mind ever since. He gave a very vivid account of how by night and day their teachings had been with him, and how he had never given way to doing the worst things they had taught him, but had been engaged in sex habits by himself. He insists his sex troubles bothered him every night before he went to sleep or when he waked up. . . . Finally got around to telling us he had really been indulging in sex practices frequently for a long time and doing it sometimes quite excessively. His mother never said anything to him about it. He seemed to think very definitely that this is the entire trouble with him, and when seen at a second interview, he again reiterated the whole point.

It is interesting to note the boy's appearance did not particularly suggest his habits, and that no one had suspected them heretofore. The boy gave some account of how secretive he had been in the matter. As seen at the institution for the first time tears came to his eyes and as I left he gave me a good clasp of the hand, the first bit of friendly feeling I had ever heard of his exhibiting toward any one. At this time it seemed the boy really wanted to change, and felt he had expressed the real nature of his trouble. It seemed without any question to be a case of mental conflict in which the temptation to the worst type of delinquency . . . had been steadily resisted, and that lesser misdeeds learned at the same time . . . had been freely indulged in. He emphasized the point of how the boys had

tried to lead him into sex perversion, but he always fought them off. We have every reason to believe this is true because his record at the institution, both at this time and later, does not contain the slightest evidence of any tendency in this direction.

There is little more that needs to be said in this case. As elsewhere stated, reconstructive measures in such an instance are necessary. The mother has never taken hold of the matter in spite of our request for her to do so — she has never been willing to take the trip to find out in detail what is necessary for understanding and treatment of such a case. In the interval since we first saw him the boy has been in and out of institutions. Since then he has had an admirable record in them. He is well liked by others and works up to positions of responsibility. But when tried at home the effect of old associations has been altogether too much for him, especially since no parental aid to self-restraint has been given. At each trial he has resumed stealing and other delinquencies, then has been sent back to institutional life, and at present is in an industrial school for boys.

2. Communication ²

Communication makes intersocial stimulation possible. Without it organic forms of life would not be able to contact and stimulate one another; the world would remain like a forest, with individual forms but no mental activity. Change would not occur except by the operation of physical forces. There would be no mental growth, and isolation would rule everywhere. . . .

In the next place, a similarity of original nature is to be emphasized as essential. The dying cry of the chicken in the cat's jaw produces no disturbing activity on the part of the nearby mother-Newfoundland; and a babe's cries of hunger arouse no response from the nesting swallow under the eaves. The mother who responds quickly, without thinking, to the crying child possesses a native constitution similar to that of the child. Her quick protection of an injured animal also discloses an original nature similar to that of the animal. The fact that she does not respond to cries of trap-ensnared rodents or other destructive animals seems best explained by the fact that she has developed a psychical background of dislike for destructive animals

² From *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, by Emory S. Bogardus; Ch. X., *passim*. (New York, The Century Company, 1924. Reprinted by permission.)

and that this dislike overcomes the tendency to sympathetic response arising out of similarity of structure and functions. Communication therefore implies similarity of original nature.

Communication arises out of common needs such as those for food, protection, and continuance of the species. In meeting these needs, individuals tend to develop like responses to like stimuli together with a uniformity of structure and function which is the essence of original human nature and of communication.

Communication involves gestures or symbols of various types. Sometimes these are pantomimic, that is, made by the hands and shoulders; sometimes they are facial; and again, they are vocal, involving an elaborate development of the vocal apparatus and of a system of sound-signs, together with alphabets, words, languages, and literatures. . . .

As new social institutions arise, new symbols of expression are needed. Sometimes communication is the shortest cut between two ideas, namely, by a new slang phrase. That is to say, language is always in process of creation. As a rule new communicative gestures have been created fortuitously and thoughtlessly. An increased degree of conscious control of the processes of inventing language would tend to prevent the formation of illogical language monstrosities and ill-cultured "slanguage"; it would result in a perfected means of vocal and written communication.

In every case of pantomimic, facial, or vocal gesture, the gesture represents the beginning of a whole act. As soon as the second party recognizes the act for which the given gesture is the beginning, communication is taking place. The response will consist of another gesture, which in turn is the beginning of another act — and communication by interchange of pantomimic, facial, and vocal attitudes and suitable responses takes place. Hence communication is a social process, consisting in an interchange of gestures and appropriate responses between individuals possessing a common group background and a common original nature; and language is seen in the nature of a conversation of attitudes and responses. Social life is basic to and develops out of interchanges of symbols and their meanings between individuals.

An investigator of mountain social life reports the following occurrence:

"Where one of West Virginia's creeks begins a woman of our party

made friends with a girl of 14, who, after the ice was broken, said simply, 'I like you.' And when this new found friend, 'the stranger,' went away, the little girl climbed up to a ledge of rock overlooking the trail, and the woman, looking back till the trail turned in the forest, saw limned against the skyline the lone figure of a lonely girl in calico. The woman waved but received no response. The explanation of this omission, perhaps, is to be found in another instance, when the visitor waved back to a little group of mother and children standing before the cabin door and overheard the question of the oldest of the girls, 'Ma, wha'd she do that fer?'" (R. G. Fuller, in *Rural Child Welfare*.)

In these cases the gestures were apparently without meaning. The ideas which the pantomimic gestures represented were not comprehended. Communication was incomplete — the gesture was given, but the meaning was not manifest in the recipient. The symbols of language, thus, are associated with some element or group of elements of experience before they have even "rudimentary linguistic significance." It is in this "element" of experience that the "meaning" of language symbols is found. Moreover, "the symbols that ticket off experience" are associated with groups of experiences, not with a single, isolated experience. Language symbols give form to culture. "They are invisible garments that drape themselves about our spirit and give a predetermined form to all its symbolic expression." . . .

. . . In the cry of fear, of hunger, of excitement, human beings have a common and universal means of communication. From these elemental symbols arising out of common neural mechanisms, themselves preceded by common organic needs, the symbols of communication have evolved until circumstances such as the invention of the radio and its commercialization may hasten the coming of a universal language for mankind. But symbols are after all only the expression of meanings, the evolution of which is at the heart of social evolution. . . .

Communication is close to the heart of a community or a common life. It indicates the presence of common factors in the original nature of all human beings. Its development makes possible the expansion and enrichment of this common nature. With a very simple or even a very elaborate set of communicative machinery, intersocial stimulation occurs; and by it human personalities as well as civilization are developed.

3. Acquaintance³

That purely general objective knowledge of a person, beyond which everything that is strictly individual in his personality may remain a secret to his associates, must be considerably reinforced in the knowledge of the latter, whenever the organization for a specific purpose to which they belong possesses an essential significance for the total existence of its members. The merchant who sells grain or oil to another needs to know only whether the latter is good for the price. The moment, however, that he associates another with himself as a partner, he must not merely know his standing as to financial assets, and certain quite general qualities of his make-up, but he must see through him very thoroughly as a personality; he must know his moral standards, his degree of companionability, his daring or prudent temperament; and upon reciprocal knowledge of that sort must depend not merely the formation of the relationship, but its entire continuance, the daily associated actions, the division of functions between the partners, etc. The secret of personality is in such a case sociologically more restricted. On account of the extent to which the common interest is dependent upon the personal quality of the associates, no extensive self-existence is in these circumstances permitted to the personality of the individual.

Beyond the organizations for distinct purposes, but in like manner beyond the relationships rooted in the total personality, stands the relationship, highly significant sociologically, which is called, in the higher strata of culture, "acquaintance." That persons are "acquainted" with each other signifies in this sense by no means that they know each other reciprocally; that is, that they have insight into that which is peculiarly personal in the individuality. It means only that each has, so to speak, taken notice of the existence of the other. As a rule, the notion of acquaintanceship in this sense is associated only with mere mentioning of the name, the "presentation." Knowledge of the *that*, not of the *what*, of the personality distinguishes the "acquaintanceship." In the very assertion that one is acquainted with a given person, or even well acquainted with him, one indicates very distinctly the absence of really intimate relationships. In such case

³ By Georg Simmel, in "The Sociology of Secrecy," translated by Albion W. Small, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI (1905-06), pp. 451-456. Reprinted by permission.

one knows of the other only his external characteristics. These may be only those that are on exhibit in social functions, or they may be merely those that the other chooses to exhibit to us. The grade of acquaintanceship denoted by the phrase "well acquainted with another" refers at the same time not to the essential characteristics of the other, not to that which is most important in his inmost nature, but only to that which is characteristic in the aspect presented to the world. On that account, acquaintanceship in this polite sense is the peculiar seat of "discretion." This attitude consists by no means merely in respect for the secret of the other — that is, for his direct volition to conceal from us this or that. It consists rather in restraining ourselves from acquaintance with all of those facts in the conditions of another which he does not positively reveal. In this instance the particulars in question are not in principle distinctly defined as forbidden territory. The reference is rather to that quite general reserve due to the total personality of another, and to a special form of the typical antithesis of the imperatives; viz.: what is not forbidden is permitted, and, what is not permitted is forbidden. Accordingly, the relationships of men are differentiated by the question of knowledge with reference to each other: what is not concealed may be known, and what is not revealed may yet not be known. The last determination corresponds to the otherwise effective consciousness that an ideal sphere surrounds every human being, different in various directions and toward different persons; a sphere varying in extent, into which one may not venture to penetrate without disturbing the personal value of the individual. Honor locates such an area. Language indicates very nicely an invasion of this sort by such phrases as "coming too near" (*zu nahe treten*). The radius of that sphere, so to speak, marks the distance which a stranger may not cross without infringing upon another's honor. Another sphere of like form corresponds to that which we designate as the "significance" (*Bedeutung*) of another personality. Towards the "significant" man there exists an inner compulsion to keep one's distance. Even in somewhat intimate relationships with him this constraint does not disappear without some special occasion; and it is absent only in the case of those who are unable to appreciate the "significance." Accordingly, that zone of separation does not exist for the valet, because for him there is no "hero." This, however, is the fault, not of the hero, but of the valet. Furthermore, all intrusiveness is bound

up with evident lack of sensitiveness for the scale of significance among people. Whoever is intrusive toward a significant personality does not, as it might superficially appear, rate that person high or too high; but on the contrary, he gives evidence of lacking capacity for appropriate respect. As the painter often emphasizes the significance of one figure in a picture that includes many persons, by grouping the rest at a considerable distance from the important figure, so there is a sociological parallel in the significance of distance, which holds another outside of a definite sphere filled by the personality with its power, its will, and its greatness. A similar circuit, although quite different in value, surrounds the man in the setting of his affairs and his qualities. To penetrate this circuit by curiosity is a violation of his personality. As material property is at the same time an extension of the ego—property is precisely that which obeys the will of the possessor, as, in merely graduated difference, the body is our first “property” (*Besitz*)—and as on that account every invasion of this possession is resented as a violation of the personality; so there is a spiritual private property, to invade which signifies violation of the ego at its center. Discretion is nothing other than the sense of justice with respect to the sphere of the intimate contents of life. Of course, this sense is various in its extension in connection with different personalities, just as the sense of honor and of personal property has a quite different radius with reference to the persons in one’s immediate circle from that which it has toward strangers and indifferent persons. In the case of the above-mentioned social relationships in the narrower sense, as most simply expressed in the term “acquaintanceship,” we have to do immediately with a quite typical boundary, beyond which perhaps no guarded secrets lie; with reference to which, however, the outside party, in the observance of conventional discretion, does not obtrude by questions or otherwise.

The question where this boundary lies is, even in principle, by no means easy to answer. It leads rather into the finest meshes of social forms. The right of that spiritual private property just referred to can no more be affirmed in the absolute sense than that of material property. We know that in higher societies the latter, with reference to the three essential sides, creation, security, and productiveness, never rests merely upon the personal agency of the individual. It depends also upon the conditions and powers of the social environment; and consequently its limitations, whether through the prohibitions that

affect the mode of acquiring property, or through taxation, are from the beginning the right of the whole. This right, however, has a still deeper basis than the principle of service and counter-service between society and the individual. That basis is the much more elementary one, that the part must subject itself to so much limitation of its self-sufficiency as is demanded by the existence and purposes of the whole. The same principle applies to the subjective sphere of personality. In the interest of association, and of social coherence, each must know certain things with reference to the other; and this other has not the right to resist this knowledge from the moral standpoint, and to demand the discretion of the other; that is, the undisturbed possession of his being and consciousness, in cases in which discretion would prejudice social interests. The business man who enters into a contractual obligation with another, covering a long future; the master who engages a servant; and, on the other hand, this latter, before he agrees to the servile relationship; the superintendent who is responsible for the promotion of a subordinate; the head of a household who admits a new personality into her social circle—all these must have the right to trace out or to combine everything with reference to the past or the present of the other parties in question, with reference to their temperament, and their moral make-up, that would have any relation to the conclusion or the rejection of the proposed relationship. These are quite rough cases in which the beauty of discretion—that is, of refraining from knowledge of everything which the other party does not voluntarily reveal to us—must yield to the demands of practical necessity. But in finer and less simple form, in fragmentary passages of association and in unuttered revelations, all commerce of men with each other rests upon the condition that each knows something more of the other than the latter voluntarily reveals to him; and in many respects this is of a sort the knowledge of which, if possible, would have been prevented by the party so revealed. While this, judged as an individual affair, may count as indiscretion, although in the social sense it is necessary as a condition for the existing closeness and vitality of the interchange, yet the legal boundary of this invasion upon the spiritual private property of another is extremely difficult to draw. In general, men credit themselves with the right to know everything which, without application of external illegal means, through purely psychological observation and reflection, it is possible to ascertain.

In point of fact, however, indiscretion exercised in this way may be quite as violent, and morally quite as unjustifiable, as listening at keyholes and prying into the letters of strangers. To anyone with fine psychological perceptions, men betray themselves and their inmost thoughts and characteristics in countless fashions, not only in spite of efforts not to do so, but often for the very reason that they anxiously attempt to guard themselves. The greedy spying upon every unguarded word; the boring persistence of inquiry as to the meaning of every slight action, or tone of voice; what may be inferred from such and such expressions; what the blush at the mention of a given name may betray—all this does not overstep the boundary of external discretion; it is entirely the labor of one's own mind, and therefore apparently within the unquestionable rights of the agent. This is all the more the case, since such misuse of psychological superiority often occurs as a purely involuntary procedure. Very often it is impossible for us to restrain our interpretation of another, our theory of his subjective characteristics and intentions. However positively an honorable person may forbid himself to practice such cogitation with reference to the unrevealed traits of another, and such exploiting of his lack of foresight and defenselessness, a knowing process often goes on with reference to another so automatically, its result often presents itself so suddenly and unavoidably, that the best intention can do nothing to prevent it. Where the unquestionably forbidden may thus be so unavoidable, the division line between the permitted and the non-permitted is the more indefinite. To what extent discretion must restrain itself from mental handling "of all that which is its own," to what extent the interests of intercourse, the reciprocal interdependence of the members of the same group, limits this duty of discretion—this is a question for the answer to which neither moral tact, nor survey of the objective relationships and their demands, can alone be sufficient, since both factors must rather always work together. The nicety and complexity of this question throw it back in a much higher degree upon the responsibility of the individual for decision, without final recourse to any authoritative general norm, than is the case in connection with a question of private property in the material sense.

4. Friendship

In contrast with this preliminary form, or this attachment of secrecy, in which not the attitude of the person keeping the secret, but that of a third party, is in question, in which, in view of the mixture of reciprocal knowledge or lack of knowledge, the emphasis is on the amount of the former rather than on that of the latter — in contrast with this, we come to an entirely new variation; that is, in those relationships which do not, like those already referred to, center around definitely circumscribed interests; but in relationships which, at least in their essential idea, rest upon the whole extension of the personalities concerned. The principal types in this category are friendship and marriage. The ideal of friendship that has come down from antique tradition, and singularly enough has been developed directly in the romantic sense, aims at absolute spiritual confidence, with the attachment that material possession also shall be a resource common to the friends. This entrance of the entire undivided ego into the relationship may be the more plausible in friendship than in love, for the reason that, in the case of friendship, the one-sided concentration upon a single element is lacking, which is present in the other case on account of the sensuous factor in love. To be sure, through the circumstance that in the totality of possible grounds of attachment one assumes the headship, a certain organization of the relationship occurs, as is the case in a group with recognized leadership. A single strong factor of coherence often blazes out the path along which the others, otherwise likely to have remained latent, follow; and undeniably in the case of most men, sexual love opens the doors of the total personality widest; indeed, in the case of not a few, sexuality is the sole form in which they can give their whole ego; just as, in the case of the artist, the form of his art, whatever it may be, furnishes the only possibility of presenting his entire nature. This is to be observed with special frequency among women — to be sure, the same thing is to be asserted in the case of the quite different "Christian love" — namely, that they not only, because they love, devote their life and fortune without reserve; but that this at the same time is chemically dissolved in love, and only and entirely in its coloring, form, and temperature flows over upon the other. On

⁴ From Georg Simmel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 456-459.

the other hand, however, where the feeling of love is not expansive enough, where the other contents of the soul are not flexible enough, it may take place, as I indicated, that the predominance of the erotic nexus may suppress not only the practically moral, but also the spiritual, contacts that are outside of the erotic group. Consequently friendship, in which this intensity, but also this inequality of devotion, is lacking, may more easily attach the whole person to the whole person, may more easily break up the reserves of the soul, not indeed by so impulsive a process, but throughout a wider area and during a longer succession. This complete intimacy of confidence probably becomes, with the changing differentiation of men, more and more difficult. Perhaps the modern man has too much to conceal to make a friendship in the ancient sense possible; perhaps personalities also, except in very early years, are too peculiarly individualized for the complete reciprocity of understanding, to which always so much divination and productive phantasy are essential. It appears that, for this reason, the modern type of feeling inclines more to differentiated friendships; that is, to those which have their territory only upon one side of the personality at a time, and in which the rest of the personality plays no part. Thus a quite special type of friendship emerges. For our problem, namely, the degree of intrusion or of reserve within the friendly relationship, this type is of the highest significance. These differentiated friendships, which bind us to one man from the side of sympathy, to another from the side of intellectual community, to a third on account of religious impulses, to a fourth because of common experiences, present, in connection with the problem of discretion, or self-revelation and self-concealment, a quite peculiar synthesis. They demand that the friends reciprocally refrain from obtruding themselves into the range of interests and feelings not included in the special relationship in each case. Failure to observe this condition would seriously disturb reciprocal understanding. But the relationship thus bounded and circumscribed by discretion nevertheless has its sources at the center of the whole personality, in spite of the fact that it expresses itself only in a single segment of its periphery. It leads ideally toward the same depths of sentiment, and to the same capacity to sacrifice, which undifferentiated epochs and persons associate only with a community of the total circumference of life, with no question about reserves and discretions.

5. Assimilation: How Meskwaki Children Should be Brought Up ⁵

When a boy becomes old enough to be intelligent, his parents begin to teach him how to take care of himself and act righteously. They usually tell him not to do a good many things. Children are taught not to be naughty. They are told that if they are naughty, people will have nothing to do with them. They are told that if they are naughty, people will talk about them. And children are told not to steal anything from their neighbors. Moreover, children are taught not to talk to people. If they see anyone going by their place, they should hold their tongues, nor should they laugh.

And they also tell children not to visit other people too often. "Every time they see you going anywhere they would say that you are looking for something good to eat, if you go visiting too often," is what children are told. So children do not often visit too much.

They likewise tell children not to gamble. They tell them that they might be lucky and win, but that it would not benefit them. And they tell them that it is just as bad to lose. They caution them in this way: "If you win, people will see your winnings and will try to get you to gamble. And if you do, you will surely lose all that you have won. And yet it is not right to be over-quiet. If you are quiet and well off, that is not quite right either. If you have a lot of horses, people will be jealous of you. Some one might want some of your property, and you would not give it to him. That is how it will be.

"The best way is to be kindly to every one, to speak kind words, to treat your friends nicely, to keep your heart clean, and not to talk meanly. If you do this, you will have a number of friends. And when you are a young boy, do not fight with other boys. If any one speaks badly to you, do not answer him. Let it go. This is one of the best things you can do. And if you see some one doing something, you must hold your peace; do not be the one to start the news. Do not tell what you saw him or her do. If you spread the report they will hate you. They will become your enemies."

⁵ By Truman Michelson, Ethnologist, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, from the dictation of Harry Lincoln, a Meskwaki Indian; in *American Indian Life, By Several of Its Students*, edited by Elsie Clews Parsons. (New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

And there is another thing which boys are told. Boys are told not to tattle to any one. They are told not to be too intimate with girls. It is not a right thing for a boy to do. They are warned: "If you do that, people will be jealous of you."

And there is another thing they are warned. "When there are many people, when something is going on, don't go over there, and try to show off. That will not benefit you. You may go to the crowd and see what is going on, but behave yourself. And if anyone asks you a question, you are to tell the person that you know nothing about it. That is the best way to keep out of trouble."

And there is another thing which young men are told, which is: "If some one asks you to do a favor, you must always do it for him. Some time in the near future they will come around again and ask another favor of you. If you refuse, you straightway will begin to have trouble. But you should always do a favor for any one, so as to please them. . . ."

And girls are taught a little differently from boys. Of course they tell girls, in the beginning, the same thing, that is, how to take care of themselves. They teach girls that if they obey the rules they will have an easier life as they grow older. After they are old enough they teach them how to do things. And they also make them fast. They are asked to fast so that adversity shall not strike them when they grow up. They make girls fast for four days. They make them fast all winter, especially when they are beginning to be young ladies. The reason why they make them fast is that they are supposed to dream of something that will take them through their life. That is why they do not take regular meals like others, to prepare for a long life.

And they teach them to do something for themselves, especially when they grow up. They teach them work, suitable for women. They teach them to learn to make mattings and how to make sacks. They also teach them how to make moccasins and bead-work. Girls are told that they can get along nicely if they learn these things before they are married. They are told, "You will be benefited by doing this for your husband. Your relatives will be benefited by you. . . ."

And after they are married, girls are especially told not to say anything about other persons, and not to feel unfriendly towards them. And they are told not to have any quarrels with other people,

for that is not a right thing to do. They are told to be kind towards the people and not to have quarrels with any one. "This is the best way, to be friendly with every one. By so doing, the people will feel kindly towards you. They will always say a good word for you. People do not think anything of a mean person. If you are mean, some day some one will turn against you. Some persons are dangerous. They have secret ways to kill people." This is why girls are told not to be mean, or say mean things to other persons. And some girls hate their parents for telling them this. But it is a rule that children should be taught. The reason parents tell girls this, is because they love them so well. They are teaching them so they can attain an old age. Girls who were not taught, do anything they please. They do not care what they do. They spoil themselves.

Girls are supposed to be taught till they are married. After a girl is married, she has full control of herself, and may do whatever she thinks best. But it is best to follow the rules forever, to be kind to one's husband and the people. It is pretty hard to lead a righteous life. . . .

And all girls are taught the same things. And in this way, they lead themselves the right way.

Exercises

1. What was abnormal about the boy described by Healy?
2. In what ways, and to what extent, was he isolated?
3. Was he *anti-social*, or simply *non-social*? (Cf. Giddings, Ref. 1.)
4. Show, from the record given, that his lack of communication was not intellectual or technical.
5. What seems to have caused his isolation?
6. Comment on the following from Bogardus: "Without communication . . . isolation would rule everywhere."
7. What connection does he find between likeness of nature and communication?
8. What aspect of communication is illustrated by the query of the West Virginia mountain girl?
9. Out of what elemental factors have our radio systems and other complex mechanisms developed?
10. Name some "organizations for specific purposes" which require greater knowledge of others than is implied in "purely general objective knowledge" of the person.
11. What is involved in the relation known as "acquaintance"?

12. What is the relation between acquaintance and discretion?
13. Explain: "Discretion is nothing other than the sense of justice with respect to the sphere of the intimate contacts of life."
14. What difficult question of boundary arises under the acquaintance relation?
15. In what way does "friendship" differ from acquaintance?
16. Compare the degree to which the whole personality is involved in sex-love, friendship, and Christian love.
17. Why are friendships of the Damon and Pythias types, or that of David and Jonathan, comparatively rare in the modern world?
18. What does Simmel mean by "differentiated friendships"?
19. Do they involve the whole personality?
20. In the account of the training of Meskwaki children, list the positive and negative admonitions.
21. What motives are appealed to in this instruction? Are they *social* in character?
22. Comment on the social significance of this sentence: "And all girls are taught the same things."
23. What is the weakness of this training? What is its strength?
24. In what way do white civilized parents do better or worse?

Additional References

1. Giddings, F. H.: *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 261-264.
2. Park, R. E., and Burgess, E. W.: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 280-287.
3. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Ch. X.
4. Tennyson, Alfred (Lord): *The Palace of Art*. Shows in poetic form the contrast between selfish existence and socialized living.

CHAPTER XXII

DIFFUSION OF CULTURES

THIS chapter traces for the group a process which has its counterpart in the socialization of the individual as described in the preceding chapter. There the individual was pictured in various stages ranging from personal isolation through more and more intimate personal contacts to a quite complete assimilation or resemblance to his group-associates. In this case now before us we have the group itself, in greater or lesser isolation from other groups, coming to share, by means of *social* contacts, the culture of other groups, and thus becoming assimilated to them.

This diffusion of cultures, sometimes called "acculturation" for brevity, is one of the most fundamental processes connected with the collective life of man. An adequate understanding of it lies at the basis of all the social sciences, every one of which is concerned with the explanation of culture in some of its aspects.

Reading 1 portrays an instance of extreme geographical isolation, namely that of the Pitcairn islanders. This is presented partly for its picturesque interest and historical value, as well as for its sociological significance. Another, and a very instructive example, cited in the References, is that of the Lower St. Lawrence district of Canada. In Reading 2 the isolation of the Jewish community is shown to be fundamentally social although incidentally regional. It rests upon extreme cultural differences existing within a given national population.

In Reading 3 Colonel Rivers, speaking with the authority of a great ethnologist, proposes a theory which formulates the social psychology underlying the spread of culture from one people to another. Space forbids the presentation of his application of the principle to concrete cases, for which the reader is referred to the original paper in the work cited. In the next Reading, by Dr. Wissler, is shown more definitely the exact method of operation by which the contact of peoples leads to the transference of their culture. If, as Rivers shows, the psychological situation is one of prestige on the part of the culture-bearers, the mechanism itself is that of the culture-pattern, which may be simple or relatively complex in any particular instance. But cultures bear a fundamental resemblance on the whole among all peoples. It is the particular culture complex or culture trait that is borrowed in every instance, and never culture in its entirety.

The exact operation of this process is shown with striking definiteness by Professor Kroeber, in Reading 5. Diffusion, rather than independent origin, accounts for most of the cultural possessions of every people on earth. The whole world has enjoyed a partnership, mostly unconscious, in culture ever since the Old Stone Age, and perhaps longer.

The diffusion and mingling of cultures forces upon the peoples involved a mutual social adjustment which is known among sociologists as "accommodation." The term means the same thing in the social realm that "adaptation" does in the biological. In Reading 6, Professor Weatherly describes contemporary conditions in the West Indies with a sociological insight that sheds much light on the processes of accommodation now under way in that region of extreme racial and cultural intermingling.

The organizing thought of this chapter may be stated as follows: The various peoples, and minor groups within their borders, are more or less isolated either geographically or socially. By means of culture-contacts, affected by the degree of prestige and admiration involved, the culture patterns (either simple culture traits or more elaborate culture-complexes) are spread from group to group by the process of diffusion, or culture borrowing, in the vast majority of cases. The resulting differences and antipathies are softened by the sub-process of accommodation. The result is a tendency toward assimilation between peoples and cultures, and a filling in of identical elements upon the background of a universal culture-pattern.

1. Pitcairn Island: A Case of Geographical Isolation¹

Lieutenant Bligh went to the Pacific in 1788, in command of H.M.S. *Bounty*, with orders to obtain plants of the bread fruit, and introduce it into the English possessions in the West Indies.

He spent six months at Tahiti collecting the fruit, and there the crew fell victims to the charms of its lotus-eating life, its sunshine, its flowers, and its women. Soon after the ship sailed the majority of the men mutinied, being led by Christian, the Master's mate. They set Bligh and eighteen others adrift in an open boat, and returned in the ship to Tahiti. Subsequently, fearing that retribution might follow, Christian and eight fellow mutineers left Tahiti on the *Bounty*, taking with them nine native women, and also some native men to act as servants. For years their fate remained a mystery.

The refuge found by the party was the lonely island of Pitcairn.

¹ From *The Mystery of Easter Island: The Story of an Expedition*, by Mrs. Scoresby Routledge; Chapter XX., pp. 305-314. (London, Sifton, Praed & Company, Ltd., 1919. Reprinted by permission.)

They took out of the ship everything that they required, and then sank the vessel, fearing that her presence might betray them. The new habitation proved anything but an amicable Eden. The native servants were ill-treated by their masters, and in 1793 rose against them, murdering Christian and four other white men; but were finally themselves all killed by the Europeans. The women also were discontented with their lot, and in the following year they made a raft in order to quit the island, an attempt which was of course foredoomed to failure.

Of the four mutineers left, one, McCoy, committed suicide through an intoxicating drink made from the ti plant. Another, Quintal, having threatened the lives of his two comrades, Adams and Young, was killed by them with an axe, in self defense. A woman who witnessed the scene as a child, survived till 1883, and we were told by her grandchildren that her clearest recollection was the blood-spattered walls and the screaming women and children. Young, who had been a midshipman on the *Bounty*, died shortly after, and in 1800 John Adams (*alias* Alexander Smith) was left the sole man on the island, with the native women and twenty-five children.

Later ensued not the least strange part of the story. Adams was converted by a dream, and awoke to his responsibility towards the younger generation. He taught them to read from a Bible and Prayer-book saved from the *Bounty*, and the offspring of the mutineers became a civilized and God-fearing community.

The small colony were first found by an American ship, the *Topaz*, in 1808, but little seems to have been heard of the discovery, and six years later H.M. ships *Briton* and *Tagus*, sailing near the island, were much astonished at being hailed by a boat-load of men who spoke English.

By 1856 the population of Pitcairn numbered about one hundred and ninety, and they were removed, by their own request, to the larger Norfolk Island. Six homesick families, however, against the strong advice of Bishop Selwyn, subsequently returned to Pitcairn. . . .

. . . We arrived at Pitcairn on August 27th. The island, as seen from the sea, rises as a solitary mass from the water. It is apparently the remaining half of an old crater, and is some two miles in width. An amphitheatre of luxuriant verdure faces northward; its lowest portion, or arena, is perhaps 400 feet above sea level, and rests on the top of a wall of grey rock. The other three sides of the amphitheatre

are encircled by high precipitous cliffs. The green gem, in its rocky setting, was a refreshing change after treeless Easter Island.

Mana was welcomed by a boat-load of sturdy men, who were definitely European in appearance and manner; they were mostly of a sallow white complexion, though a few had a darker tinge. They spoke English, though with an intonation different from that of the Dominions, America, or the Homeland. A local *patois* is sometimes used on the island which is a mixture of English and Tahitian, but pure Tahitian is not understood.

... Service used to be held at Pitcairn after the manner of the Church of England, but in 1886 the island was visited by one of the American sect calling themselves "Seventh day Adventists." The Society is Christian, but the members regard as binding many of the Old Testament rules. Saturday is observed as the divinely appointed day of rest, pork is considered unclean, and a tenth part of goods is set aside for religious purposes. Special attention is paid to Biblical prophecy, and the end of the world is thought to be near. It was not difficult to convert the reverent little community on Pitcairn to views for which it was claimed that they were the plain teaching of the Bible, and various persons were shortly baptised in the sea.

The group who awaited us were headed by our most kind hosts, the missionary and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Adams, who were of Australian birth. Sunday school was just over and service about to begin. It was held in an airy building filled with a large congregation. The sermon was on prophecy as found in the books of Daniel and Revelation, and fulfilled in the division of the Empire of Alexander the Great. It was depressing to be told that the late war is only the beginning of trouble.

We went back with Mr. and Mrs. Adams to luncheon, which was served at 2:30, and composed principally of oranges and bananas. It was a very dainty if, to some of us who had breakfasted at 7 o'clock, a rather unsubstantial repast. Our hosts were vegetarians and had only two meals a day, but subsequently kind allowance was made for our less moderate appetites. I was glad of a rest in the afternoon, but S., who attended a second service, said it had been the most interesting part of the Sunday observances; it was a less formal gathering, when personal religious testimonies were given by both young and old. Later we were shown a little settlement of huts in the

higher part of the island, where once a year the community retire for ten days and have a series of camp meetings.

The teachings of the new religion are practically observed. The tithe barn, at the time of our visit, held £100 worth of dedicated produce which was awaiting shipment. It was the prettiest sight to see the fruits of the earth, being brought into it, in the form of loads of various tropical produce. The whole colony abstains from alcohol and, nominally at any rate, from tobacco, though one old gentleman was not above making an arrangement for a private supply from the yacht. Tea and coffee are thought to be undesirable stimulants, and even the export of coffee was beginning to be discouraged. The place suffers admittedly from the 'social laxity characteristic of Polynesia; but the evil is being combated by its spiritual leaders, and is cognizable by law. The whole atmosphere is extraordinary; the visitor feels as if suddenly transported, amid the surroundings of a Pacific Island, to Puritan England, or bygone Scotland. It is a Puritanism which is nevertheless light-hearted and sunny, without hypocrisy or intolerance.

The general influence of the missionaries seemed very helpful to the little community, and they also conducted a school for its younger members. Most of the inhabitants can read, but the subject matter of books is too far away for them to be of much interest, and the only application, it was noticed, which was made to the yacht for literature, was for picture papers of the war. We gave by request an hour's talk on the travels of the *Mana*, and it was listened to with apparent understanding, or at any rate with politeness; the chief interest shown was in the manner of life of the Easter Islanders, about which many questions were asked.

The houses are substantially built of wood with good furniture. A well-made chest of drawers was a birthday present to the missionary's wife from the young men of the island. There is a separate bedroom or cubicle for nearly every inhabitant, and some houses have a room set apart for meals. Hospitality was shown without stint, and we were entertained during our stay to a series of attractive repasts in various homes; our hosts bore such names as Christian, Young, and McCoy. Meat is limited to goat or chicken, but there is a profusion of tropical produce, and oranges are too numerous to gather. The cocoanut trees are unfortunately dying. Each household has a share of the ground rising behind the village, and the

hillside is traversed by shady avenues of palms and bananas, which afford at every turn glimpses of outstanding cliffs and the brilliant blue of the ocean. The standard of life compares very favorably with that of an English village, and is immeasurably superior to that achieved on Easter Island under similar circumstances.

Pitcairn has the dignity of being a democratic self-governing community, with a Magistrate and two houses of legislature. The present Constitution was suggested by the Captain of H.M.S. *Champion* in 1892, and superseded an earlier one. . . .

The island is in the jurisdiction of the British Consul at Tahiti, and the Magistrate explained sadly that it was then two years since it had been possible for his superior to send any instructions. In very serious matters, such as murder or divorce, reference is necessary to the High Commissioner at Fiji, and five years may elapse before an answer is received.

It is indeed comparatively simple to communicate from Pitcairn with the outside world, particularly now that it lies near the route from Panama to New Zealand. Warning of the approach of a vessel is given by the church bell, and all hands rush forthwith to launch the boat and pull out to the ship. It is reported that once the bell sounded whilst a marriage was being celebrated, the crowded church emptied at once, and the bride, bridegroom, and officiator were left alone. Sooner or later a letter can thus be handed on board, but to obtain a reply is another matter; no steamer will undertake to deliver passengers, goods, or mails to the islands. It does not pay to spend time over so small a matter, the liner may pass in the night, or the weather at the time may render communication with the shore impossible. During our visit notice was given that a ship was approaching; the men, who were at that time engaged in digging for the Expedition, threw down their tools and the boat started for the vessel, only to founder among the breakers of Bounty Bay. The place is too remote to be visited by the trading vessels which visit the Gambier Islands, and as there is no anchorage, it is by no means easy for the Islanders to keep any form of ship on their own account. In normal times a British warship calls every alternate year, but its visits were suspended during the war. Of the two islands, Easter, which has at least definite bonds with a firm on the mainland, is on the whole the easier of access.

The economic problem of Pitcairn lies in the difficulty of making

it self-supporting. Food and housing materials abound, but clothes, tools, and similar articles must be obtained from elsewhere; while to secure in return a market for its small exports is almost impossible. It is sometimes said that as the result, the inhabitants have grown so accustomed to be objects of interest and charity, that they have become pauperized and expect everything to be given them freely by passing ships. This was certainly not our experience. They made us a large number of generous gifts, such as bundles of dried bananas and specimens of their handiwork — hats, baskets, and dried leaves, cleverly embroidered and painted. On the other hand they took with gratitude any articles which were given by us, either as presents or in return for the things we purchased. One request has been received since we left the island; it was made with many apologies by the Chief Magistrate, and was for a Bible of the Oxford Teacher's Edition.

The position, however, is unsatisfactory, and it seems very desirable that if possible more frequent communication should be established. In any case it is to be hoped that now peace reigns, a warship may visit the place at least once a year.

It is frequently suggested that the Pitcairners must have deteriorated in physique by intermarriage; as far, however, as we are able to observe, such is not the case. It has been remarked, indeed, that a large number have lost their front teeth, but in this they are not unique. Dr. Keith observes, in the report previously alluded to, that many Pacific Islanders are extremely liable to disease and loss of teeth. The effect of such disease is, he states, to be seen in every one of the skulls from Easter regarded as belonging to a person of over twenty-five years; "tooth trouble is even more prevalent in Easter Island than in the slums of our great towns."

We were asked to collect pedigrees on Pitcairn and make observations from the point of view of the Mendelian theory; this would, however, have been a very long and troublesome business, and we did not feel assured that the results would be sufficiently exact to justify it. While there has probably been no fresh infusion of South Sea Blood, the Islanders have constantly been in contact with white men. Between 1808 and 1856, three hundred and fifty vessels touched at Pitcairn, and on various occasions shipwrecked mariners and others have taken up their abode on the island, and intermixed with the population.

The Pitcairn Islanders have been described as the "Beggars of the

Pacific," and, on the contrary, have also been depicted as saints in a modern Eden. Needless to say they are neither the one nor the other, but inheritors of some of the weaknesses and a surprising amount of the strength of their mixed ancestry.

2. The Jewish Community and Social Isolation ²

The corporate life of the Jewish people for nearly two thousand years has been founded upon a communal basis. Exiled from the land in which they had developed their national life and which they had rendered sacred for all time, and dispersed in the process of ages unto the four corners of the earth, they have succeeded in preserving most of the distinctive characteristics of a separate people. The survival of these racial and national traits through endless wanderings from land to land, and through a long continued cycle of persecutions, massacres, and expulsions, is one of those strange historic phenomena that never cease to evoke the wonder and challenge the analytic power of the scientific historian. So singular and unaccountable does it seem that a people, without a territorial centre, after being buffeted about by all the tyrants known to history and broken up into countless fragments, should still conserve so many vital elements of nationality, that the phenomenon is generally attributed to the immediate favor of Providence. But there is no need to seek in the realm of the supernatural the solution of a problem which can be explained by forces and factors of a human order. These forces were twofold, internal and external. The internal force was the attachment to a religion whose innumerable prescriptions controlled and colored the life of every day and necessitated close congregation; the external force was the oppression which compelled the Jews to live in isolation in the various lands of their dispersion. In some countries the isolation was only social, due to the prevalence of religious prejudice and the feudal system; in other countries it assumed the concrete form of a special Jews' quarter, or Ghetto, bounded by tall gloomy walls and barred by an iron gate. The force of persecution intensified the fervor of the religious consciousness: it prevented the Jews from seeking an outlet for their activity in the general world, it deepened the foundations and strengthened the fabric of their own particular world. Within the communities in which they thus dwelt,

² By Israel Cohen, in *The Sociological Review*, Vol. III (1910), pp. 216-218; 224-225. Reprinted by permission.

especially in Central Europe, they enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy and consolidated their social organization. They conserved their religious rites and customs, they developed particular institutions, and kept alive the traditional culture, the racial consciousness, and the national genius of their people. But if instead of dwelling together in a close compact body, they had lived, or been allowed to live, singly and separately, scattered promiscuously among their neighbors, the Jews in Europe would have lost most of their distinguishing traits and would have been largely absorbed among the nations.

As they have lived throughout the centuries of their dispersion, so, for the most part, they live at the present day—in communities. These communities are, with very few exceptions, of an urban character; those of a rural character hardly comprise more than a quarter of a million Jews all together. They exist in every inhabited part of the globe, forming an integral factor in the social life of different countries, imbedded—as it were—in the fabric of cities, and sometimes, in Eastern Europe, occupying the greater part of a town and giving it its dominant character. In these settlements, which vary in external structure and internal character as one land differs from another, and vary at the most as the East from the West, the specific life of Jewry is nourished and sustained and proves its vitality by unceasing activity. In some the pulse of Jewish life beats more vigorously than in others. In some we find all the functions of social life in full operation, all phases of social development in working activity; in others the same phases may be manifest but in a less active form; and in others again there are fewer phases, and these may present but feeble signs of animation. Where Jewish life is most intense there the people lead a life distinct from that of the surrounding nation not merely in religious observance but in every other sphere of human endeavor and aspiration. They confine their social intercourse for the most part to themselves, they organize their own education, develop their own industries, support their own charities, pursue their own intellectual ideals, and combine occasionally for self-defence in the political arena, though into the midst of all this collective activity echoes and elements of the national life around them penetrate slowly and subtly. The fewer the phases of collective activity the weaker is the spirit of communal life, but even where Jewish life is at its lowest ebb there will be found a synagogue which

provides a visible bond of union among those who still wish to remain within the fold. Where there is no synagogue nor any attempt to provide a substitute there may, indeed, be Jews, but there is no Jewish life; the Jews become so many indistinguishable atoms in the general social mass. The main variations between communities thus consist in the relative number of social functions that they manifest, and in the intensity with which these are discharged, and the incidence of these phenomena is itself dependent upon other factors.

The two principal factors determining the constitution and character of a Jewish community are the nature of the environment and the density of the Jewish population. A hostile environment inevitably tends to engender a robust communal spirit; and if there also be a dense population the ideal conditions are present for a vigorous communal life in its countless ramifications. These ideal conditions are found throughout the lands of the East, in Asia and North Africa, as well as in Eastern Europe, which is still largely under the spell of the spirit of the East. The political despotism and religious fervor or fanaticism that characterize these regions make them a favorable soil for separatist settlements, and the centripetal force which these exercise inevitably produces a concentrated population. But in the lands of the West, whether in Europe, America, or the British Colonies, where the Jews enjoy civil and political freedom in varying degree and are not excluded by legal barriers from social intercourse with their neighbors, a certain compactness of population alone can give substance and strength to communal life. Thus, in the East the maintenance of separate communities is mostly compulsory, in the West it is entirely voluntary. . . .

The modern Ghetto is found in most of the large cities of Western Europe, America, and South Africa. Its widespread ramifications are a comparatively recent development, immediately due to the chronic persecution that has existed in Russia and Roumania for the last thirty years. In Paris and London, in Manchester and New York, in Chicago and Toronto, and in countless other cities of political and commercial importance, a Ghetto has arisen as a distinct, sometimes as a dominating, factor of the local community. In dimensions it is generally equal to, and occasionally greater than, its Eastern prototype, the Ghetto of New York being the largest in the world. There is more of the color and intensity of Jewish life in the Ghetto than in the rest of the community. There is less of it than in an Eastern

Ghetto, but there is quite enough to afford a vivid conception of the conditions prevailing there. Innumerable blocks of poor houses, covering a wide area, are wholly inhabited by immigrant Jews, who swarm into the streets, talking their strange guttural tongue, and sometimes still clad in the peculiar dress of their native country. The streets are lined with shops and restaurants bearing foreign names and Hebrew signs; the walls are covered with multi-colored posters in Yiddish; the gutters are occupied by rows of stalls and barrows, laden with exotic wares — loaves of brown bread, kegs of cucumbers and olives, fried fish of various kinds and sizes, alternating with commodities for religious use, such as Hebrew prayer-books, praying-shawls, phylacteries, and eight-branched candlesticks for the Feast of Dedication in December. In the larger centres there are special market-places which present a scene of tremendous bustle on the eve of Sabbaths and festivals, when every Jewish housewife lays in a store of fish and fowl to celebrate the sacred day with fitting honors. Wherever you turn there is life pulsating vigorously, ceaselessly, tumultuously. Newsboys rush through the motley crowd, crying the names of Yiddish papers; a stringed band at a street corner discourses some haunting Hebrew melody that attracts the passers-by, who stop and listen, whilst their minds wander away to the little prayer-house in Poland where they first heard its pathetic strains; a poor woman, with a child at her breast, sings a Yiddish song of sadness; a blind man at the street-corner offers for sale the little four-cornered fringed garments prescribed in Deuteronomy; a peripatetic bookseller, with a basket of literature on his arm, proffers mediaeval commentaries on the Pentateuch, religious code-books, and sensational romances; a labor leader harangues a small crowd of workmen and exhorts them to continue the fight against their petty tyrants; an unctuous missionary quotes the New Testament in Yiddish and seeks to lure his former co-religionists to apostasy; a Zionist orator waxes eloquent over the glories of a rejuvenated Judaea. The atmosphere is charged with the Jewish spirit; the environment is studded with Jewish institutions. Synagogues great and small, houses of prayer and houses of Talmudic study, big religious seminaries that resound with boyish voices chanting the Torah, and little private schools tucked away in fifth-floor back-rooms, religious "courts of judgment," and libraries, baths, hospitals, and dispensaries, theatres, concert-rooms, and dancing halls, clubs for working-men, for boys,

for girls, asylums for newly-arrived immigrants, for the poor and the aged — these and countless other institutions make up the compact variegated fabric of the modern Ghetto.

Socially, the Ghetto in the West is necessitated by the immigration of hosts of Jews into countries whose language, conditions, and modes of life are utterly strange to them. But its inhabitants are never permanent inmates: they use it at most as a half-way house, as a transitional stage between East and West. The influences from without penetrate slowly, subtly, inevitably, luring the Jew into the outer world. By dint of industry, sobriety, and thrift he reaches a position that makes him discontented with his abode in the Ghetto, and he leaves it for a more spacious quarter, where he will find more quiet and comfort. By that time he will have mastered the language both in speech and writing, and become pretty familiar with the principal conditions of his adopted fatherland. He possesses a gift for adaptability due in large measure to the hereditary effects of his people's migrations, whilst the process of assimilation is favored and stimulated by his native co-religionists, who make "Anglicization" or "Americanization," or whatever else the local term may be, a cardinal principle in their communal policy. Thus the Western Ghetto is but the preparatory school in which the orthodox Jew of the East, with all his ingrained ideas, traditions, prejudices, is gradually developed into the modern Jew of the West.

3. The Contact of Peoples³

One consequence of the preoccupation of ethnologists with the idea of the independent origin of custom and belief has been the neglect of the study of the principles underlying the contact of peoples and the interaction of their cultures. In recent years we have had studies, as in the work of Huntington, of the causes of migration, of the factors which have set peoples in motion and thus acted as the starting point of the blending of cultures. We have also had accounts, as in a recent book by Haddon, of the migrations of which we have evidence in history, tradition or culture. I do not know, however, of any work which deals with the conditions which determine the results of these movements.

³ By W. H. R. Rivers, in *Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeway on His Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by E. C. Quiggin; pp. 474-479. (Cambridge, England, The Cambridge University Press, 1913. Reprinted by permission.)

If we are to adopt as the main working hypothesis of ethnology that the examples of human culture now found about the earth are the complex results of the blending of peoples, and if its primary task be the analysis of this complexity, it becomes a matter of urgent necessity to understand the nature of the process of blending. We have to study how far the compound which emerges from the process is determined by the physical conditions of the country in which the blending takes place; and how far the character of the process is determined by the relative numbers, degree of culture and other conditions of the people who come into contact with one another.

It would be hopeless to attempt here to deal comprehensively with so vast and complex a subject and I propose to devote this small token of my admiration and regard for Professor Ridgeway to the formulation of one principle and then to inquire whether this principle can help towards the solution of two of the outstanding ethnological problems of to-day.

The contact of peoples is not a process which is limited to the past but one which is still going on before our eyes. Let us inquire whether this process of the present may suggest a principle which will guide us to a better understanding of the past. During the last two centuries there has been going on, and is still continuing, a movement of our own people to all parts of the world. A rough survey is sufficient to show that the effects of this movement have depended largely on the nature of the culture of those whom it has reached. The more developed and highly organized the culture of a country, the less is the effect upon it of our own people. In such a country as China the effect of European influence has been slow and in amount is still very slight. On social structure and language, the effect is infinitesimally small; on religion it has been little greater, and even on material culture it has been so slight that, if all Europeans were to leave China to-morrow and the country were again to be closed, it would probably be difficult for the future archaeologist to discover even the material traces of their presence except on the sites of some coastal settlements and of a few large towns.

In India again it is doubtful whether, except in material culture, our influence has really been much greater. We have had little effect on social structure, on the caste system, on language or on religion, and it is noteworthy that the greatest effect has been in those parts of India where the indigenous culture has remained at a relatively low

level. It is only in the south that the English language and the Christian religion have obtained any hold on the people.

If now we compare this influence on China and India with that which has been exerted on such lower cultures as those of America, Africa and Oceania the difference is very great. The English language and the Christian religion are readily adopted; even social structure does not escape, while the effect on material culture is so great that the difficulty of the archaeologist of the future will not be to discover the nature of the introduced influence; his difficulty will be to find even the traces of the indigenous cultures on which this influence has been exerted.

It may have occurred to you that there is one country which may seem to form an exception to the generalization I am trying to establish. The influence of European civilization upon Japan would seem at first sight to form a striking exception to the rule that the higher is the culture of a people, the less is it susceptible to external influence. It must be pointed out, however, how little has been the effect of this external influence upon the more stable elements of Japanese culture, on social structure, on language and on religion, and, further, such effect as there has been is due, not to the influence of immigrants, but to a process of a quite special kind, a process which perhaps will stand out in the future as the striking historical fact of our own times, a process in which a people of high culture have recognized their inferiority in certain of the more material arts of life and have deliberately chosen from the culture of others just those elements which they have believed to be useful. Japan is one of those exceptions which, when we study them more closely, are found to prove the rule.

A brief survey of the effect of modern European culture throughout the world thus suggests the working of a principle that the condition which emerges from the contact of peoples depends upon the distance which separates them in the scale of culture. With the exception I have already considered, there is no reason to suppose that this modern movement differs in any essential respect from the many which have preceded it. The difference is one of degree rather than of kind. With our improved means of transport we do now in years what once took centuries, but it is unlikely that the principle I have sought to establish for the present is a new feature in the history of mankind. I propose, therefore, to use as a guide to the past the principle

that the extent of the effect of a migrating people upon those among whom they settle is proportional to the degree of superiority of the immigrant culture, and from this it will follow that the greater be the superiority of an introduced culture, the smaller need be the number of its introducers. The special theme of this paper is that few immigrants are able to exert a deep and far-reaching influence if their culture be greatly superior to that of the people among whom they settle.

We have first to inquire what is the criterion of the superiority which allows the few to exert an influence out of proportion to their number. It is clear that we have not to do with any absolute standard of higher or lower. The influence of an introduced culture is not determined by any absolute superiority but by its effects on those to whom it is presented. It is the fact that an introduced culture seems to those who adopt it to be higher than their own which determines the extent of its influence. We have, then, to inquire what aspects of culture thus impress on the minds of rude peoples this notion of superiority, and here again I believe that the study of the spread of modern European influence gives us the answer. An examination of our own times makes it clear that in this direction it is material culture which counts, and counts almost alone.

High organization of social structure, a refined and exalted religion, high aesthetic ideals finding their accomplishment in works of art, a language capable of expressing the finest shades of meaning, all these are important when we have to do with settlements among those already civilized. To the uncivilized they are of small importance beside the purely material aspects of culture. It is the knife and the match, the steamship, the house and its furniture, but above all and beyond all the firearms of the European, which impress the man of rude culture and lead him to regard their possessors as beings of a higher order than himself. It is the recognition of the superiority of the material objects and arts which precedes and makes possible the acceptance of other elements of an introduced culture.

An example may be given to illustrate the effect produced on a rude people by superiority of material culture. About the year 1804 twenty-seven convicts escaped from New South Wales and found their way to the Fijian Islands. The settlement of these few men had a far-reaching influence on Fiji. The supremacy of the people of Mbau and Rewa and the manifold consequences of this supremacy

were due to the help which they gave to the chiefs of those districts. This influence was due predominantly, if not entirely, to the firearms of the visitors. Owing to the effect of their weapons they were regarded as more than human, their every wish was gratified and, if they had been more worthy representatives of their race, they might have had an even greater influence. The nature of the reception of these visitors enables us to understand how great might be the influence of a body of men, no larger, but more fit to follow up the impression made by their material arts.

Further, the example shows how great an effect on culture may be produced by a body of immigrants so small as to have no appreciable effect on the physical characters of the people. Though one of the twenty-seven settlers in Fiji had no less than forty-eight children, the physical anthropologist who visits Fiji today would find nothing which would lead him to suspect the former presence of a body of immigrants who not long ago exerted a profound influence on the fortunes of the country.

I have now put forward as a working principle that superiority of material culture will enable a few immigrants to exert a great influence on those among whom they settle. It remains to inquire whether this principle is capable of helping towards the solution of any of the problems by which the ethnologist of today is confronted. For this purpose I choose two: (i) the nature of Australian culture, whether it is simple or complex, and (ii) the origin of megalithic monuments, whether they belong to a single culture or have come into existence independently in different parts of the world.

4. The Culture Pattern ⁴

Since the accidental is seen to play a rôle in the appearance of a trait and since our studies in distribution show that the traits constituting a type of culture tend to arise in a single center, it is necessary to account for these repetitions. If chance alone ruled we should expect a more even distribution within the area. So for this concentric distribution there can be but one explanation, the causes lie in factors peculiar to the group in question. Among individuals we expect that the man who makes one important invention will follow

⁴ From *Man and Culture*, by Clark Wissler; pp. 186-191. (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923. Reprinted by permission.)

it with another, so in a tribe or a mere assemblage of individuals, we may expect an analogous condition. However, the analysis of such a manifestation of group superiority cannot be undertaken here, since the problem presented involves psychology, heredity, physiology, and human ecology. But one aspect of the case is strictly historical; it is conceivable that the foundations for many culture areas were laid by the first immigrants. When this group found itself in a new environment, among new foods, etc., it was stimulated to invention and so began to work out an order of life more in keeping with this new setting. Thus, the initial tribe in the area enjoys priority; it is ahead, and as we shall see later its culture is in a position to set the type. While here again we are short of good data, what we see in the distributions of known cultures suggests that one of the conditioning factors in a culture area is the initial adjustment to the environment by the prior group. It is this initial solution that counts, and not necessarily the best solution.

Turning once again to the more objective aspects of culture and taking inventories of the trait content, it is apparent that even the initial invention within the tribal culture predisposes to that culture. In historic cultures this is usually spoken of as specialization, seen at its best in art and other equally immaterial complexes; not that the principle does not hold in material things, but because the environment often obscures the nature of the processes involved. Thus, if a group specialize in navigation of a specific type it is difficult properly to evaluate the part played by the external environment. On the other hand, when we find two culture groups, one of which has developed a high form of geometric decorative art, in contrast to another with an equally rich realistic art, the environment does not greatly trouble us. So far as geography is concerned, each group was free to turn to one or the other. Now, while we must speculate as to just how it came about that one was bent toward geometric art, it is fair to conclude that the nature of culture being what it is, the initial drift of art originality was so headed and that this was so because there was but one good idea at the bottom of it; perhaps the thought of a single individual. All the successive workers in the group but elaborated on the same model.

Our own culture is in no wise different in this respect. It is common to explain this phenomenon as due to the rarity of originality, but what is meant is that superior originality is rare, for originality in

general is universal. Thus in reference to scientific men, it is said that he is great who chooses his problems the most wisely. Nor are they by any means the most difficult problems. Often in fact they are amazingly simple, but they are the problems whose solutions are of the most moment to culture. Yet when they are announced they hold the attention of all and there follows a flood of elaborating and supplementing inventions in which there may be a wealth of originality, unacknowledged by the group, it is true. But the significant thing is that inventions in other directions are inhibited. It has been well said that in science we advance only by the discovery of new leads. Thus the discovery of radio-activity was a great event in the history of Euro-American culture, but we shall go on feverishly elaborating this trait-complex until it stagnates or breaks down by its own weight. Yet ere this, no doubt, some genius will come forward with a new lead and thus save the day for our culture. In brief then, every culture group, however primitive, tends to channel its own culture building, or to elaborate and reduplicate in building up its trait-complexes.

Anthropologists have come to regard this channelizing as *pattern phenomena*. It is readily seen in the ceremonial complexes of many aboriginal American cultures, in which we observe a bewildering array of rituals, but which, when closely scrutinized, prove to be very much alike. For example, the Pawnee Indians have a large number of lengthy rituals, all of which are built around a fixed series of concepts symbolized by sacred objects: one can know in advance that the songs and procedures will be about the earth, vegetation, waters, seeds, fog, dew, rain, wind, and so on. Now, this can have but one meaning, viz., that at some point in the past history of the Pawnee tribe the initial ritual was invented, became a trait, and functioned as a new lead. Then, immediately other rituals were devised after the same pattern and successively elaborated. Another especially fine example of pattern phenomenon has been observed among the Blackfoot Indians where all ceremonies are fashioned according to a type of ritual based upon a concept of the transfer of supernatural power to human beings. Here again it is safe to offer a similar explanation. The phenomenon in general we see to be universal, since it occurs in higher cultures as well as in lower, and is not so much a lack of true originality as has been naïvely assumed, but is due to the nature of the processes in culture. If it were otherwise, culture would not be what it is.

So far in this chapter we have dealt only with the culture materials produced within the group, whereas we have seen that inter-tribal borrowing is the prevailing process by which the content of culture is enriched. In addition to the new ideas, or potential traits, offered by its own constituents, the tribe has at hand the cultures of its neighbors. It is here, by seeing what a tribe does with what it borrows, that we get the clearest insight into the workings of the pattern. Returning again to the case of rituals, while there is no reason to believe that the Blackfoot borrowed from the Pawnee, they not being neighbors, it is clear that they did so indirectly or perhaps from the same source. Anyway, in each tribe we find similar ceremonial complexes worked over to conform to the respective tribal patterns. The histories of the horse and maize complexes, which we have chosen as types, also show this phenomenon in high relief; as when the Indian unhitched his dog and hooked up his horse, and the European farmer sowed his maize, instead of planting it in hills. In each case the tribe took from another culture what it found possible to recast. And so do we, day in and day out, meet all about us examples of borrowed traits refashioned according to our traditional patterns. Hence, this universal principle of culture building is one of the primary factors conditioning its development, and shows how secure may be the tribal culture whose priority of emigration, or merely of invention, enables it to set a pattern on new lines.

Yet the tribe at the center of the area need not depend upon its own originality exclusively, for due to its most favorable location, the new ideas of other tribes are at its command; these it needs but to lay hold of and adjust to one of its initial traits, thereby elaborating its own complexes and so passing out again a new increment of culture. Here we see the culture area in a new light, a restricted province in which, because of uniform environment, the fundamental problem is much the same for each tribe and to whose solution all make suggestions, from which the tribe in the most favored position draws and perfects the ideas that are to form the basic trait-complexes. The paths of diffusion once blazed are the lines of least resistance and this coupled with the prestige of priority insures the leadership of the tribes at the centers of cultures; but they are not the sole producers.

In general then, there is one specific aspect of pattern phenomenon that deserves attention here; the existence of a trait-complex pattern will exercise a kind of selective function in the face of diffusion. As

we have stated elsewhere the new trait that is offered must find something to fit into, otherwise it may be repulsed. Thus, legal procedure in Euro-American culture is based upon Roman law, which seems to have been built up on a specific conception of the family, whereas Greek law was based upon the fraternity of the ruling class, or a gentleman's club. Here were two different trait-complex patterns, and though later on, Rome borrowed legal ideas and technique from Greece, she took only what she could recast to fit her own pattern. The sequence to this is seen when in the United States missionaries and teachers labored with the Indian problem; being not the least conscious of culture processes, they were chagrined at the indifference of the Indian to the ownership and conservation of property and particularly to the idea of inheritance from father to son. In most cases the poor Indian could not see the point at all. The facts are that these well-intentioned missionaries, the advance agents to the diffusion of Euro-American culture, were not aware that they were seeking to spread a borrowed form of Roman law, slightly warped to fit the needs of their own once barbarous forefathers and that the Indian had quite a different form of jurisprudence into which this would in no wise fit. To introduce it, would be like throwing the proverbial monkey wrench into the legal machinery of the tribe.

Many other examples could be cited, particularly in the failure of Spanish culture traits to find a true setting in the Indian culture underlying many Latin American tribal groups. Hence, this type of inhibition can be formulated by stating that each of the more fundamental trait-complex patterns in a culture will exercise a selective influence upon diffusion, for unless the new trait can be easily fitted into these existing patterns, it will be rejected. Remembering that in most cases no part of the procedure is understood by the people concerned, this working of the trait-pattern seems to be a part of a culture process as subtle and deep as the force of gravity itself.

5. Diffusion and Parallelism ⁵

THE MAGIC FLIGHT

There is one folk-lore plot with a distribution that leaves little doubt as to its diffusion from a single source. This is the incident

⁵ From *Anthropology*, by A. L. Kroeber; pp. 198-200; 202-203; 229-232. (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1923.)

know as the Magic Flight or Obstacle Pursuit. It recounts how the hero, when pursued, throws behind him successively a whetstone, a comb, and a vessel of oil or other liquid. The stone turns into a mountain or precipice; the comb into a forest or thicket; the liquid into a lake or river. Each of these obstacles impedes the pursuer and contributes to the hero's final escape. This incident has been found in stories told by the inhabitants of every continent except South America. Its distribution and possible spread are shown in the accompanying figure.



THE MAGIC FLIGHT TALE

An example of inter-continental and inter-hemispheric diffusion.

After Stucken, with additions.

While no two of the tales or myths containing the episode of the Magic Flight are identical, there can be no serious doubt as to a common source of the incident because of the co-existence of the three separate items that make it up. If a people in Asia and one in America each know a story of a person who to impede a pursuer spilt water on the ground which magically grew into a vast lake, it would be dogmatic to insist on this as proof of a historical connection between the two far separated stories. Belief in the virtue of magic is world-wide, and it is entirely conceivable that from this common soil of magical beliefs the same episode might repeatedly have sprouted quite independently. The same reasoning would apply to the incident of the transformation of the stone and of the comb, as

long as they occurred separately. The linking of the three items, however, enormously decreases the possibility of any two peoples having hit upon them separately. It would be stretching coincidence pretty far to believe that each people independently invented the triple complex. It is also significant that the number of impeding obstacles is almost always three. In the region of western Asia and Europe where the tale presumably originated, three is the number most frequently employed in magic, ritual, and folk-lore. Among the American Indians, however, three is scarcely ever thus used, either four or five replacing it according to the custom pattern of the particular tribe. Nevertheless, several American tribes depart from their usual pattern and mention only three obstacles in telling this story.

This instance introduces a consideration that is of growing importance in culture history determinations. If a trait is composed of several elements which stand in no necessary relation to each other, and these several elements recur among distinct or remote peoples in the same combination, whereas on the basis of mere accident it would be expected that the several elements would at times combine and at other times crop out separately, one can be reasonably sure of the real identity and common origin of the complex trait. When a trait is simple, it is more difficult to be positive that the apparent resemblance amounts to identity. Such doubt applies for instance to isolated magical practices. A custom found among separate nations, such as sprinkling water to produce rain, may be the result of an importation of the idea from one people to another. Or again it may represent nothing more than a specific application of the assumed principle that an act similar to a desired effect will produce that effect. This magical belief is so broad, and so ramifying in its exemplifications, as to become almost impossible to use as a criterion. The essential basis of magic may conceivably have been developed at a single culture center in the far distant past and have been disseminated thence over the whole world. Or again, for all that it is possible to prove, magic beliefs may really be rooted instinctively in the human mind and grow thence over and over again with inevitability. There seems no present way of determining which interpretation is correct. . . .

THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE


An unexpected story of wandering attaches to the figure or symbol of the double-headed eagle. Like other elements of civilization, this goes back to an Egyptian beginning. One of the great gods of Egypt was the sun. The hawk and vulture were also divine animals. A combination was made showing the disk of the sun with a long narrow wing on each side. Or the bird itself was depicted with outstretched wings but its body consisting of the sun disk. These were striking figures of considerable aesthetic and imaginative appeal. From Egypt the design was carried in the second millennium B.C. to the Assyrians of Mesopotamia and to the Hittites of Asia Minor. A second head was added, perhaps to complete the symmetry of the figure. Just as a wing and a foot went out from each side of the body or disk, so now there was a head facing each way. This double-headed bird symbol was carved on cliffs in Asia Minor. Here the pictures remained, no doubt wondered at but uncopied, for two thousand years. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries after Christ, the Turkish princes, feeling the symbol to be a fit emblem of sovereignty, began stamping it on their coins. The later Crusaders brought these coins, or the idea of the pattern, back with them to Europe, where the mediaeval art of heraldry was flourishing. The double-headed eagle was a welcome addition to the lions and griffins with which artists were emblazoning the coats of arms of the feudal nobility. The meaning of sovereignty remaining attached to the figure, the device before long became indicative of the imperial idea. This is the origin of its use as a symbol in the late empires of Austro-Hungary and Russia.

Four hundred years ago Charles V was king of Spain and Austria and Holy Roman emperor of Germany. It was in his reign that Cortez and Pizarro conquered Mexico and Peru. Thus the symbol of the double-headed eagle was carried into the New World and the Indians became conversant with it. Even some of the wilder tribes learned the figure, although they were perhaps more impressed with it as a decorative motive than as an emblem. At any rate, they introduced it into their textiles and embroideries. The Huichol in the remote mountains of Mexico, who use the design thus, seem to believe that their ancestors had always been conversant with the figure. But such a belief of course proves no more than did the ignorance of

European heraldists of the fact that their double-headed eagle came to them from Asia Minor and ultimately from Egypt. No pre-Columbian representation of the two-headed eagle is known from Mexico. The conclusion can therefore hardly be escaped that this apparently indigenous textile pattern of the modern Huichol is also to be derived from its far source in ancient Egypt of whose existence they have never heard. . . .

ZERO

One of the milestones of civilization is the number symbol zero. This renders possible the unambiguous designation of numbers of any size with a small stock of figures. It is the zero that enables the symbol 1 to have the varying values of one, ten, hundred, or thousand. In our arithmetical notation, the symbol itself and its position both count: 1,234 and 4,321 have different values although they contain the identical symbols. Such a system is impossible without a sign for nothingness: 123 and 1,023 would be indistinguishable. Our zero, along with the other nine digits, appears to be an invention of the Hindus approximately twelve or fifteen hundred years ago. We call the notation "Arabic" because it was transmitted from India to Europe by the Arabs.



MAYA SYMBOLS FOR ZERO

a monumental; *b*, *c*, cursive. (From Bowditch.)

Without a zero sign and position values, two methods are open for the representation of higher numerical values. More and more signs can be added for the high values. This was done by the Greeks and

Romans. MV means 1,005, and only that. This is simple enough; but 1,888 requires so cumbersome a denotation as MDCCCLXXXVIII — thirteen figures of six different kinds. A simple system of multiplying numbers expressed like this one is impossible. The unwieldiness is due to the fact that the Romans, not having hit upon the device of representing nothingness, employed the separate signs I, X, C, M, for the quantities which we represent by the single symbol 1 with from no to three zeroes added.

The other method is that followed by the Chinese. Besides signs corresponding to our digits from 1 to 9, they developed symbols corresponding to "ten times," "hundred times," and so on. This was much as if we should use the asterisk, *, to denote tens, the dagger, †, for hundreds, the paragraph, ¶, for thousands. We could then represent 1,888 by 1¶8†8*8, and 1,005 by 1¶¶5, without any risk of being misunderstood. But the writing of the numbers would in most cases require more figures, and mathematical operations would be more awkward.

The only nation besides the Hindus to invent a zero sign and the representation of number values by position of the basic symbols, were the Mayas of Yucatan. Some forms of their zero are shown in Figure 28. This Maya development constitutes an indubitable parallel with the Hindu one. So far as the involved logical principle is concerned, the two inventions are identical. But again the concrete expressions of the principle are dissimilar. The Maya zero does not in the least have the form of our or the Hindus' zero. Also, the Maya notation was vigesimal where ours is decimal. They worked with twenty fundamental digits instead of ten. Their "100" therefore stood for 400, their "1,000" for 8,000. Accordingly, when they wrote, in their corresponding digits, 1,234, the value was not 1,234 but 8,864. Obviously there can be no question of a common origin for such a system and ours. They share an idea or a method, nothing more. As a matter of fact, these two notational systems, like all others, were preceded by numeral word-counts. Our decimal word-count is based on operations with the fingers, that of the Maya on operations with the fingers and toes. Twenty became their first higher unit because twenty finished a person.

It is interesting that of the two inventions of zero, the Maya one was the earlier. The arithmetical and calendrical system of which it formed part was developed and in use by the time of the birth

of Christ. It may be older; it certainly required time to develop. The Hindus may have possessed the prototypes of our numerals as early as the second century after Christ, but as yet without the zero, which was added during the sixth or according to some authorities not until the ninth century. This priority of the Maya must weaken the arguments sometimes advanced that the ancient Americans derived their religion, zodiac, art, or writing from Asia. If the zero was their own product, why not the remainder of their progress also? The only recourse left the naïve migrationist would be to turn the table and explain Egyptian and Babylonian civilization as due to a Maya invasion from Yucatan.

6. Accommodation ⁶

The process of *social adaptation*, called "accommodation" by some sociologists, is admirably described in the following pen-picture of the West Indies, by a very recent observer.

Between English and French there was little to choose as regards the motives which brought them into the islands. Both undertook colonization to secure economic advantage for the nation or for individuals, and both adopted purely exploitive methods. England had the advantage of military success and superior industrial and commercial development. But her very superiority on the economic side interfered with her cultural success in dealing with a primitive, non-industrial people like the Africans. The French were by temperament and experience less industrial, and therefore more congenial to the simpler nature of the African. They had less of race prejudice; they crossed more willingly with the blacks; and the color line was less rigid than in English colonies. They also had more gaiety, a keener artistic and dramatic sense, and less rigorous moral attitudes. Once in full contact with French national culture, the Negro was likely to readily absorb its type and long retain its influence.

What was the amount of cultural equipment which the Negroes brought from Africa is still a matter of keen controversy. Coming as slaves, sternly coerced into the white man's ways, dispersed so that local or kinship groups should not form dangerous centers of revolt, there was no fair chance for culture survival, had such survival been

⁶ From "The West Indies As a Sociological Laboratory," by U. G. Weatherly, in *The American Journal of Sociology*; Vol. XXIX., No. 3. (Nov. 1923), pp. 296-302. Reprinted by permission.

likely. This was particularly true in the wide, heterogeneous areas of South America and the United States. In the small, isolated West Indian islands the possibility of survival and propagation of cultural characters was greater, though still limited. In the English colonies emancipation, occurring nearly a generation earlier than in the United States, fell within a period when many African-born persons were still alive. Here then ought to be found a particularly favorable field for the study of African survivals, although to have produced the best results such a study should have begun two generations ago.

For, after emancipation had removed the coercive pressure of white control, the European population rapidly declined, and the population mass became predominantly African. Despite this, however, so far as institutions and outstanding social characters are concerned, there are few traces of actual survival. Further, in the process of developing cultural traits the whole present tendency seems to lie in the direction of rather exaggerated conformity to European models. It is difficult to discover a distinctively African social character which has been consciously and deliberately fostered, so strong is the prestige of white fashions. Not even the educated race-consciousness of present Negro leaders has been able to arouse a consistent interest in anything African. Governmental hostility to African movements indeed exists, but it is hardly necessary. Whether a far-sighted colonial administration might not with advantage foster some measure of Negro cultural survivals, is an open question. It is at least logical to assume that the race might prosper best, even in an alien environment, under a social order which selected some elements from the system to which it had become adapted in the long process of anterior development.

If there is such a thing as an African type of mind it cannot have been totally obliterated within the two or three centuries of contact with Europeans, even though that contact was of a character least calculated to produce an independent social attitude. Supposing the Negro to have originally possessed little objective cultural equipment, his mind was not a *tabula rasa*. He at least had interests and capacities, and these have found small outlet in his new home. Repression of these interests and capacities has thrown him back on those primitive interests which are more or less furtive and which function on the instinctive rather than the rational level. Most of such survivals as can be traced are therefore in the field of emotional expression and

superstitious practice. Certain elements of African dances are still traceable in some of the islands, but they are rapidly becoming so conventionalized as to be little more than suggestions. Chants in the original tongues have now become meaningless lingo. African folk-songs have largely disappeared, although their forms are possibly preserved in some of the current folksongs. Religion has modeled itself almost completely on the churches and practices of the whites.

It is in the belief and practice of *obeah*, well-nigh universal among Africans in the New World as in the Old, that the most patent African survival is found. In the British West Indies a scientific study of this phenomenon is possible because, since the practice is legally prohibited, reliable evidence presented in court cases is readily and abundantly available. The exact information thus at hand permits an examination of departures from the original African types and of the variants which have arisen in each island as a result of local conditions or of special contacts.

These contacts have produced some notable results. With religion, *obeah* has assimilated to the extent of fusing folk-magic with ecclesiastical ritual and equipment. It likewise merges with different kinds of medicine. One of the clearest possible examples of the fusion of cultures is found in the blending of magical elements with folk-medicine — "bush medicine" is the local name. Collections of *obeah* objects seized by the police contain indiscriminately primitive fetishes, herbs and bones, modern chemicals, and patent medicines in the original packages. Distorted fragments from the great magic books of the Middle Ages have also passed into use among *obeah* men, and the dim ghost of Albertus Magnus flits in and out among purely African magical objects.

Although the open practice of *obeah* is not now so prevalent as it was a generation ago, owing to general education and to legal repression, it is still nearly universal in its appeal. In fact it is exactly this process of disintegration and fusion which makes the West Indian situation so interesting. It would be difficult to find a better example of a belief which is intellectually doubted while instinctively accepted. In his outward relations with the dominant civilization, the negro often affects a skepticism which only partly hides his real obsession. *Obeah* is occasionally resorted to with the hope of influencing the actions of white people, but the popular belief is that it is a purely African matter which the white man can neither work nor understand.

It is supposed that the white man's civilization, powerful as it is within its own sphere, does not act on those intimate, mystic forces which bulk so large in the Negro's imagination. As more and more of this obscure realm of forces is brought under scientific control, *obeah* survives by assimilating itself to science and by practicing on the lurking superstition that education has as yet been unable to eradicate.

Wherever whites and blacks have crossed, the social status of the mixed breeds is a serious problem. In the United States they are all classed with the blacks whatever the amount of African blood; but in the West Indies the "colored" are recognized as a separate class, and their position is distinctly superior to that of the pure blacks. Within the color line there is a complicated system of castes, with prestige and stratification fixed by the degree of white blood. The lighter types not only aspire to "breed up" through the choice of lighter mates, but show a decided aversion to purely African movements and interests. Here is certainly one explanation of the failure of African social institutions to survive, for the ambition to assimilate to the white man's type finds expression in conformity to European customs which, since they can be acquired and practiced at will, are more flexible than physical type.

The colored constitute a real middle class, just as the blacks constitute the lower class. Unmixed blacks are not openly excluded from responsible activities, but in practice it is usually the colored who fill official and commercial positions which lie between menial labor and higher administrative control. What is the real explanation of this stratification? The whites deny any intention of excluding blacks as such from responsible positions, and claim that, with rare exceptions, it is only the colored who have sufficient mental capacity for them. Some observers believe that the reason lies in the prestige of lighter color, since in trade it is a business asset, while in administration it carries greater dignity and authority. Sir Sidney Ollivier, who has had much experience in West Indian administration, holds that, whatever the fact as to capacity, mixed bloods in a tropical environment make a useful buffer between white and black by easing the shock between two types otherwise too alien for successful co-operation. What appears to be certain is that the existence of a colored group at least tends to fracture race solidarity among those who have African blood.

With minor exceptions, the East Indians are restricted to Demerara and Trinidad. Immediately after slavery was abolished futile attempts were made to secure a satisfactory labor supply by bringing in Portuguese and Chinese. The importation of laborers from India under a government-controlled indenture system was then inaugurated, and was so successful that it was continued until the agreement was cancelled by the Indian government during the world-war. Large numbers of coolies elected to remain after their indenture had expired, and at present about a third of the population of each colony is of Indian birth or descent. Like the Negro, the Indian is well fitted to live and work in a tropical environment, but the personal and social qualities of the two are otherwise markedly different. In temperament the Indian is tense and introspective; he is by nature extremely acquisitive and thrifty; and he has brought with him a deeply fixed ancestral social order. Living and working together, the two races remain definitely segregated, each antipathetic to the other without any marked outward hostility. Were the Negro less easy-going and easy-living he must either have migrated or died out under the stress of this unequal competition. As it is, there has arisen no serious problem of race relationship. The Indian, by almost incredible industry and thrift, has pushed himself into economic and social prominence while the Negro has persisted unchanged, little affected either by emulation or economic stress.

This transplanting of considerable masses of Orientals in the New World has perhaps affected the Indians themselves more than the local communities. Anything but socially pliable, the Indian is nevertheless quietly passing through a period of disorganization and readaptation. The caste system was one of the first elements to crumble under the pressure of migration and settlement. Language, in an environment dominated by English, has been gradually changed, particularly since general education has flourished. Familiar institutions have been generally modified. Women, at first scarce, are now nearly equal to the men in numbers, and the break-up of the old order is strikingly illustrated in the increasing education of girls. Dress and mode of living show strange mixtures, with a pronounced tendency toward ultimate conformity to European fashions. In religion the Hindus tend gradually to lose connection with their old beliefs, or definitely go over to Christianity; while the Mohammedan portion of the population holds more strictly to the ancestral faith. In some

communities there is evidence of massing and group economy, but in general economic pressure appears to be too strong to permit effective resistance to the process of cultural transformation.

With a civilization so deeply fixed as the Indian, and with psychic qualities so decisive, it would be expected that rapid transformation would be accompanied by violent aberrations. The typical Indian, however, despite his tenseness and his dogmatic equipment, is of gentler nature than the average Occidental. Up to the present, there has been little trace of gross moral or social maladjustment. Some portions of the population become derelicts through lack of adaptive capacity, and there is some tendency among the young toward moral dislocation during the period of breaking away from old sanctions before acquiring new controls. But this tendency is perhaps less marked here than among the new immigrant elements in the United States. As the migration was originally motivated by purely economic aspirations, so the process of community building is still mainly dominated by economic interest. Whether the rich cultural capacities of the Indian will ultimately flower in the new environment remains to be seen. That they should do so is a matter of deep moment for the two colonies where the Indians are now congregated, and probably also for the whole district of the lower West Indies, for it is likely that a considerable portion of the Windward Islands may ultimately be occupied by their descendants.

Exercises

1. Sketch the history of the Pitcairn Islanders.
2. Comment on the different causes and effects of their isolation.
3. Is the Jew's isolation geographical or social?
4. Name the two factors that account for the distinctive and persistent Jewish traits.
5. Comment on the two factors governing the nature of the Jewish community.
6. Give a concrete picture of the Ghetto.
7. What social function does the Ghetto perform in Western countries?
8. State the main working hypothesis of ethnology according to Rivers.
9. What principle does he find at work in his survey of present-day contacts between peoples?
10. State and illustrate the special theme of his paper. (If accessible, the rest of the article may very profitably be read.)

11. What does Wissler say of originality in relation to culture?
12. What is the effect of "channelizing" upon an indigenous or independent culture?
13. What is the relation of the above to the culture *pattern*?
14. Show how the culture pattern works in cases where culture borrowing takes place.
15. Illustrate the selective influences of the culture pattern.
16. Distinguish diffusion and parallelism in the development of a culture.
17. Upon what grounds does Kroeber hold that the story of the Magic Flight has unquestionably spread by diffusion?
18. State the principle of culture-history interpretation which he deduces from it.
19. Discuss the wanderings of the Double-Headed Eagle symbol as an example of diffusion.
20. Discuss the zero symbol as a case of independent origin.
21. What traits in the French and English, as seen by Weatherly, affected the rate of accommodation between them and the natives of the West Indies?
22. Comment on the following especially in the light of the principle formulated by Rivers. "Not even the educated race-consciousness of present Negro leaders has been able to arouse a consistent interest in anything African."
23. Discuss *obeah* from the viewpoint of accommodation and culture survival.
24. Show how accommodation has taken the form of social stratification in the West Indies.
25. Show how the problems of contact and accommodation differ in the case of the East Indian as compared with the Negro.

Additional References

1. Bryce, James: *The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind*. Romanes Lecture, 1902. Discusses racial contacts of the modern world.
2. Jenness, Diamond: "The Eskimos of Northern Alaska: A Study in the Effect of Civilization." *Geographical Review*, Vol. V., No. 2 (Feb. 1918). A very fine study of culture contacts in a concrete modern case.
3. Lowie, Robert H.: *Culture and Ethnology*, pp. 67-80. Treats the phenomena of acculturation.
4. Peattie, Roderick: "Isolation of the Lower St. Lawrence Valley," in the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 5 (Jan.-June, 1918). A remarkably instructive picture of a community isolated geographically.
5. Schreiner, Olive: "The African Boer," in the *Cosmopolitan*, Vol. XXIX., No. 6 (Oct. 1, 1900), pp. 601-602. A vivid picture of

the social isolation of the Boer. Quoted by Ross in *Social Psychology*, pp. 151-153.

6. Wissler, Clark: "The Influence of the Horse in the Development of Plains Culture," in *The American Anthropologist*, N. S. Vol. XVI., No. 7, pp. 1-25. See also *Man and Culture*, by the same author, pp. 111 ff. ("Horse Culture") and p. 121 ff. ("The Maize Complex").

CHAPTER XXIII

CREATION OF SOCIAL VALUES

IT is the purpose of this chapter to show that one of the most important social processes, constantly going on in every human group, consists in the creation of social values, or, in the language of ethnology, the accumulation of culture. This same process of ceaseless creation holds true for social attitudes as well. Both these terms have been fully defined in the selections of Chapter IV., and it is the sole aim of the present chapter to illustrate the process of their mutual relation and interaction. This is first shown in Reading 1, where the two concepts are again defined and their reciprocal action especially emphasized. In Reading 2, the thing we call "community" is seen to be itself a *process*, and, as here interpreted, one that consists essentially in the continual creation, decline, and re-creation of social attitudes and social values. In this selection, and also in the discussion of Reading 3, both written with a slightly different emphasis from that of the present chapter, the reader should attempt to note how, under different terminology, the authors quoted are really treating the creation and interaction of attitudes and values.

In Reading 3, while the attention of its author is fixed upon the illustrating of social isolation, the examples chosen portray equally well that condition which Professor Ross has called *estrangement* in society, and which he explains with striking clearness in his *Principles of Sociology*. (See Reference.)

Social estrangement, under which different classes and groups within a society become so alienated from one another that they attach different meanings to common words and symbols, is rooted fundamentally in the fact that different life situations, resting usually on economic inequality at bottom, create different attitudes and values. When this state of affairs comes to pass one of the divergent classes will respond with devotion or enthusiasm while the other has only indifference or contempt for common symbols, such as "the Constitution," "law and order," "the sacredness of property," "the closed shop," "free labor," "the general strike," "Darwinism," or "freedom of speech."

1. Interaction of Attitudes and Social Values¹

An attitude is a tendency to act, and a social attitude is a tendency to act with reference to some phase of associative life. Social atti-

¹ From *Introduction to Sociology*, by Emory S. Bogardus; pp. 94-98. (Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

tudes are expressed by individuals with reference to values or phases of the social environment toward which individuals are attracted.

The social attitudes arise from original human nature and also in social heritage and in group stimulation. Drives and mechanisms represent the technique by which social attitudes are expressed. Emotional reactions and sentiments, dispositions and temperaments must also be understood if one would penetrate the psychic backgrounds of social attitudes. The human desires, wishes, and beliefs are also generic to social attitudes. Wishes may originate chiefly in psychological needs, but beliefs are noticeably social in their development. A reference to beliefs leads directly to the field of social heritage and group stimulation.

A child's attitudes are determined generally by the customary beliefs of parents, teachers, clergy, and other representatives of group thinking. In the social heritage are found many ideas which become objects of value, and hence generate social attitudes. In the religious heritage are ideas of immortality, brotherhood of man, service, and personal contact with God — all of which are values that create attitudes. In the political heritage are ideas of national achievement and greatness which fascinate the human mind and stimulate specific attitudes.

Public opinion creates values, which in turn arouse attitudes. Favorable opinion gives prestige; that which opinion favors is reputable. Opinion attracts attention to specific principles, procedures, and persons; to the extent that it approves, whole floods of values inundate the minds of individuals. Only here and there a person is critical enough to view with his full reason the values that the group establishes through its unscientific assumptions. Only occasionally does a person discover that the scornful estimate of group opinion may be expressed irrationally. In the long run, however, public opinion frees itself from blind emotional reflexes and roughly represents a common sense judgment. In a later chapter public opinion will be considered in more detail as an agent of control in determining values and hence social attitudes.

Law may be cited here as another agency which acts as a judge of values and hence as a creator of attitudes; it also will be considered in another chapter in more detail as a factor in group control. Law represents a crystallization of public opinion, and thus is less emotional but more rigid. When it settles upon given social procedures it is

not easily changed. Law establishes values, permanence, and conservatism. By forceful, objective means it brings group standards and necessities before the individual's attention. By compelling the individual to live according to rule and regulation it may indirectly force him to develop habits of action and thinking built upon group needs; and hence ultimately lead him to the acceptance of new attitudes. The process is often painful and costly to both the individual and the group, but nevertheless cannot always be avoided. A weakness in modern penal systems is the fact that they fail lamentably oftentimes in controlling punishment so that the attitudes of the anti-social member may be made more socially welcome.

In times of group crisis, such as war, values and attitudes undergo rapid modification. When the United States entered the World War there was a widespread lethargy regarding the necessity of sending millions of soldiers to Europe. Pulpits, newspapers, the cinema, government representatives, four minute speakers, and others joined in whirlwind campaigns throughout the country, starting widespread currents of feeling and opinion concerning the necessity of making the world safe for democracy and of fighting to end war. The results were almost miraculous. Millions of men left their accustomed pursuits, their homes and loved ones; they entered upon training for war; they embarked dauntlessly on ships sailing over submarine-infested seas. They gave up temporarily, or if need be permanently, the values of constructive peace for the values of destructive war. Their social attitudes shifted from earning money, following personal desires, and enjoying the comforts of home to serving the nation at the cost of life itself.

The primary social value is the group. At the crucial tests human beings give up their loved ones and their own lives for the sake of the group. Under the flags of the nations millions marched to death in the World War. Multitudes, some freely, and others more hesitantly, place themselves upon the altar of the group. Group opinion is almost all-powerful. Favorable group opinion expands personality; unfavorable group judgments constitute the severest form of punishment.

The welfare of loved ones is another leading social value. Ordinarily it is primary. For the sake of members of the family group and closest friends, an individual will face all manner of risks, even death. For their sake the laborer struggles on day by day in earning money

for the necessities of life, and the man of wealth furnishes them with the finest comforts of life, the ablest physicians in case of sickness, and all the advantages of travel if these will please.

The cause of truth, creative effort, and achievement constitutes a set of highly rated values. In these directions, the best years of life are spent ungrudgingly. To the extent that these factors are given fundamental interpretations they rank high among social values. In short, the social values are differentiated in many ways, too numerous to present here, depending upon the level of civilization which is being examined.

Group manufacture of values and individual development of social attitudes represent the main elements in the social process, which will now be examined. The social process contains in itself all group and interacting personal phenomena; it is the central theme of sociological study.

2. Community As a Creative Process ²

In the following selection, we see the word "community," often used to designate the purely geographical and static aspects of groups, used in a distinctly dynamic sense, to denote a *process*, which creates social *attitudes* and *values*.

Community is a process. The importance of this as the fundamental principle of sociology it is impossible to over-estimate. Physical science based on the study of function is today a study of process. The Freudian psychology, based on the study of the "wish," is pre-eminently a study of process and points towards new definitions of personality, purpose, will, freedom. If we study community as a process, we reach these new definitions.

For community is a *creative* process. It is creative because it is a process of integrating. The Freudian psychology, as interpreted and expanded by Holt, gives a clear exposition of the process of integrating in the individual. It shows us that personality is produced through the integrating of "wishes," that is, courses of action which the organism sets itself to carry out. The essence of the Freudian psychology is that two courses of action are not mutually exclusive, that one does not "suppress" the other. It shows plainly that to integrate is not to absorb, melt, fuse, or to reconcile in the so-called Hegelian sense.

¹ From "Community is a Process," by Mary Parker Follett, in the *Philosophical Review*, XXVIII: 168 (Nov. 1919); pp. 576-588. Reprinted by permission.

The creative power of the individual appears not when one "wish" dominates others, but when all "wishes" unite in a working whole.

We see this same process in studying the group. It is the essential life process. The most familiar example of integrating as the social process is when two or three people meet to decide on some course of action, and separate with a purpose, a will, which was not possessed by anyone when he came to the meeting but is the result of the interweaving of all. In this true social process there takes place neither absorption nor compromise. Many of the political pluralists believe that we cannot have unity without absorption. Naturally averse to absorption, they therefore abandon the idea of unity and hit upon compromise and balance as the law of association. But whoever thinks compromise and balance the secret of coöperation fails, insofar, to understand the social process, as he has failed to gather the fruits of recent psychological research. Our study of both individual and group psychology shows us the evolving individual. But when you advocate compromise, it means that you still see the individual as a *ding-an-sich*. If the self with its purpose and its will is even for the moment a finished product, then of course the only way to get a common will is through compromise. But the truth is that the self is always in flux weaving itself out of its relations.

Moreover, the Freudian psychology shows us that compromise is a form of suppression. And as the Freudians show us that a "suppressed" impulse will be our undoing later, so we see again and again that what has been "suppressed" in the compromises of politics or of labor disputes crops up anew to bring more disastrous results. I should like to apply the Freudian definition of the sane man to social groups. After having shown us that dissociation of the neural complex means dissociation of personality, it defines the sane man as one in whom personality is not split, as one who has no thwarted wishes, "suppressions," incorporated in him. Likewise the sane industrial group would be one in which there was no "suppression," in which neither workman nor employer had compromised. The sane nation would be one based on log-rolling. The sane League of Nations would be one in which no nation had made "sacrifice" of sovereignty, but where each gains by the fullest joining of sovereignty. Suppression, the evil of the Freudian psychology, is the evil of our present constitution of society — politically, industrially and internationally.

What then is the law of community? From biology, from psy-

chology, from our observation of social groups, we see that community is that intermingling which evokes creative power. What is created? Personality, purpose, will, loyalty. In order to understand this we must study actual groups. For instance, it is often discussed whether community may be a person. A recent book on ethics gives the arguments for and against. There is only one way to find out. My idea of ethics is to lock three people into a room and listen at the keyhole. If that group can evolve a common will, then that group is a "real" person. Let us stop talking about personality in ethics and sovereignty in political science and begin to study the group. Wherever you have a genuine common will, you have a 'real' person; and wherever you have a common will and "real" personality, you have power, authority, sovereignty.

As the process of community creates personality and will, freedom appears. According to Holt the individual is free as far as he integrates impulses, "wishes." His activity will be constantly frustrated by that part of him which is "dissociated." An individual misses of freedom by exactly as much as he misses of unity.

The same process must take place with a group of two, say of two people who live together. They have to stand before the world with joint decisions. The process of making these decisions by the interpenetrating of thought, desire, etc., transfers the centre of consciousness from the single I to the group I. The resulting decision is that of the two-self. It is the same with a three-self, a several-self, perhaps a village-self. Our conception of liberty depends upon where we put the centre of consciousness.

Freedom, however, is supposed by many to be the last stronghold in the individual which has not yielded to contacts, that impregnable stronghold which *will* not yield to contacts. These people are in grave danger of some day entering their Holy of Holies and finding it empty. I must each moment find my freedom anew by making a whole whose dictates, because they are integrations to which I am contributing, represent my individuality at that moment. The law of modern psychology is, in a word, achieving. We are achieving our soul, our freedom.

When we see community as process, at that moment we recognize that freedom and law must appear together. I integrate opposing tendencies in my own nature and the result of freedom, power, law. To express the personality I am creating, to live the authority I am

creating, is to be free. From biology, social psychology, all along the line, we learn one lesson: that man is rising into consciousness of self as freedom in the forms of law. Law is the entelechy of freedom. The forms of government, of industry, must express this psychological truth.

I have said that community creates, that it creates personality, power and freedom. It also creates purpose, continuously creates purpose. No more fatally disastrous conception has ever dominated us than the conception of static ends. . . .

The practical importance of an understanding of the nature of community can only be indicated, but its influence on our attitude towards present political and industrial problems is very great. We come to see that the vital matter is not methods of representation, as the menders and patchers fondly hope, nor even the division of power, as many of the pluralists tend to think, but *modes of association*. When the political pluralists propose a more decentralized form of government, I am entirely in sympathy with them; but what they propose will surely fail unless we are considering at the same time the modes of association through which we are to act within these different pluralities. The political pluralists are very much concerned with the question whether we need one authority or many. I think our hardest job is not to change the seat of power but to get hold of some actual power. And when we are told that the trade-union should be directly represented in the state, we must remember that we have at present little reason to think that a man will be more able to contribute his will to the trade-union will than he has been able to contribute it to the national or civic will. Whoever has watched for the last few years the struggle of the younger men to break the Gompers machine will not think that party politics vary greatly in labor organizations and political organizations. It is only through an understanding of the nature of community that we shall see clearly the fallacies involved in the "consent of the governed": a preëxisting purpose (very insidious today in both industry and politics), collective will as the will of the like-minded, and the denial of *participation*. One is sometimes a little struck by the Rip Van Winkleism of the pluralists: consent and balance, believed in a hundred or two years ago, we have now outgrown.

That labor problems should be studied in the light of our conception of community as process is of the utmost importance. We hear much at present of the application of instinct psychology to industry, but this

I am sure is full of pitfalls unless we join to it a study of group psychology. Again, if the industrial manager is to get the fruits of scientific management, he must understand the intricate workings of a group. If he is to have good reasons for his opinion as to whether a shop-committee should be composed of workmen alone or of workmen and management, he must study group psychology. It is impossible to work out sound schemes of compulsory compensation or compulsory insurance without understanding the group relations and group responsibility upon which these are based. And so on and so on. The study of community as process is absolutely necessary for the sound development of industry. And if we should have industrial democracy—but democracy is just this, productive interrelatings.

It seems to me that jurisprudence has gone ahead of ethics or political science or economics in an understanding of community, as for instance in the notion of reciprocal relation. It is significant that the fact that the master has a relation to servant as well as servant to master has now general recognition. Moreover, the philosophical jurists see that it is the same process which produces the corporate personality and the social individual who is fast becoming the unit of law. Our progressive judges seek always the law of the situation, which means in the language of this paper the discovery and formulation of modes of unifying. Upon this point turns all progress for jurisprudence. Less bound by the crowd illusion than the rest of us, and therefore better understanding community as process, jurists are showing us law as endlessly self-creating. I hope they will soon show us explicitly some of the errors involved in a teleological jurisprudence. It would be interesting to examine the decisions of judges to see how often in the case before them they accept a fossil purpose developed in bygone times, and how often, on the other hand, they see the purpose a-growing within the very situation. . . .

To conclude: I wish to urge in this paper actual group association—the *practice* of community. I am thus in close sympathy with the pluralists because I too believe in the “nearest” group; but while most of the pluralists believe in the “nearest” group because they think the personal element gets thinner and thinner the further away you get from it, I believe in it just because I do *not* think this, because I think it is the path to a fuller and richer personality. This idea of the pluralists I believe infinitely prejudicial to our national life. For the practical harm such a conception can accomplish, witness many of the lectures last winter on the League of

Nations. I know of a talk based on this idea given to an audience of working men with the consequence that that particular audience was left with very little interest in the League of Nations. The lecturer with this mistaken sociology and mistaken ethics was trying to urge his audience to rise above personal interests to impersonal considerations. We shouldn't, we don't, we can't. The larger interest must be made personal before it can be made real. That audience ought to have been told, and shown, how a League of Nations would change their own lives in every particular.

We build the real state, the vital and the moral state, by reinforcing actual power with actual power. No state can, forever, *assume* power. The present state has tried to do so and the pluralists have been the irrepressible child to cry out, "The King has on no clothes." But if the pluralists have seen the King, as in the fairy story, clad by the weavers who worked at empty looms, shivering in nakedness while all acclaimed the beauty of the robes of state, many of us do not intend to accept this situation, but believe in the possibility of ourselves weaving, from out our own daily experience, the garments of a genuine state.

Idealism and realism meet in the actual. Some of us care only for the workshop of life, the place where things are *made*. James says that critical philosophy is sterile in practical results. As far as this is true it is because critical philosophy remains in the concepts it involves, instead of grasping the activity which produced them and setting it at concrete tasks. We must grip life and control its processes. Conscious achieving is leaping into view as the possibility of all. We are capable of creating a collective will, and at the same time developing an individual spontaneity and freedom hardly conceived of yet, lost as we have been in the herd dream, the imitation lie, and that most fatal of fallacies — the fallacy of ends.

This is the reality for man: the unifying of differings. But the pluralists balk at the unifying. They refuse to sweat and suffer to make a whole. They refuse the supreme effort of life — and the supreme reward. Yet the pluralists lead our thought today because they begin with the nearest group, with the actual. If they will add to this insight the understanding that the job of their actual groups is to carry on that activity by which alone these groups themselves have come into existence — they will have recognized community as process.

Note — For "pluralists" see Exercise 20, below.

3. Social Estrangement Through Divergent Values³

The results of isolation are lamentable. Ignorance, profound prejudice, disgust, suspicion, misinterpretation of motives, perversion of purposes, incredible blindness to facts—these are the unavoidable effects of the high walls which separate class from class, set from set, group from group, school from school, in modern society.

A great British statesman once said, in connection with parliamentary measures dealing with social problems, that the upper classes of the United Kingdom know as little about the lives, conditions, and sentiments of the lower classes of their own country as the average Englishman knows of the life or mental habits of any foreigner in a far-off land. Since that observation was made a voluminous literature has been laboriously piled up on the subject, "How the Other Half Lives." Not many have studied this literature, it must be confessed, and, moreover, it is largely out of date. Each period has its own mood, its own spirit, its own point of view. The facts gathered by the conscientious students of economic and social conditions of fifty or even twenty-five years ago have lost not a little of their relevance or significance for the thoughtful student and analyst of our own day. We can no more live socially on the data of another generation than we can sustain ourselves physically by the food which another generation consumed.

Let me illustrate at this point the strange, deplorable, and mischievous effects of individual and group isolation. When the writer was a very young man he entertained vague and slight relations with certain leaders of what was then known as Anarchist Communism. Though no avowed disciple, he was trusted by those leaders. He was present at some secret and important meetings at which "the Revolution" was discussed, as well as the means of furthering and accelerating it. At one of these meetings a man, then internationally famous, calmly recommended arson, with deliberate fraud at the expense of the insurance companies, as a promising source of revenue for propaganda. A considerable group of impressionable youths listened to this advice without the faintest surprise. Why not arson in America if Red Terror was, not only permissible, but sacred in

³ From "Isolation and Social Conflicts," by Victor S. Yarros, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII., No. 2, (Sept. 1921) pp. 213-218. Reprinted by permission.

Russia? A state of war existed between modern society and the revolutionary radicals, and in war everything is fair. Why shrink from robbing capitalistic insurance companies, or from endangering life? What is the value of a few lives as against the duty of contribution to the overthrow of a hateful and iniquitous social order?

Discretion and expediency, not regard for human life or for property, prevented the adoption of the arson scheme. But the fact that intelligent young men consider it at all, and that a man of distinction and intellectual power proposed it in all seriousness, can be explained only by the demoralizing effects of group isolation. Even grim revolutionists cannot long resist the insidious influence of contact with persons of less extreme views, and sooner or later they begin to perceive that bourgeois morality and common sense are not without some claim to consideration from advanced thinkers and architects of a perfect social system!

Now, many of the destructive radicals whose names were household words twenty years ago have acquired a certain amount of understanding. Experience and contact with men of other views and other temperaments have consciously and unconsciously opened their minds. But younger radicals are no doubt cherishing identical or similar delusions and fallacies in this day of ours. Time may work a like cure, but why not apply the corrective, or remedy, of contact and intercourse at once and hasten recovery?

It is a well-known fact that militant radicals who do not see eye-to-eye with one another are apt to hate and despise one another even more deeply than they hate and despise the common foe, the non-radical. The bitter conflicts between orthodox Socialists and Anarchists, or between Communist-Anarchists and Individualist Anarchists, are often wondered at by the simple-minded conservative who imagines that all radicals aim at the same objective and favor the same methods. But the intelligent observer and student of revolutionary literature makes no such mistake. He knows that one radical group may be as isolated from other radical groups as from conservative groups. Always to meet the same co-disciples, always to hear the same arguments, always to apply the same viewpoint, and never to have to meet searching criticism, doubt, contradiction, is to sink gradually into the most intolerant and insane dogmatism and absurdity. That criticism is helpful, because it leads to reconsideration of one's position and to revision of one's creed, is of course a truism. The corollary,

that isolation is an intellectual and moral curse, has not been sufficiently emphasized, at least in the discussion of disquieting social movements.

Nor is it necessary to go far afield or to explore dark subterranean holes, in order to discover instances of injustice and error due to isolation. A little reflection on the incidents of national everyday existence will satisfy any thoughtful person that most of the fallacies and crude, shallow generalizations indulged in by men and women who regard themselves as moderates or reasonable liberals, or even firm conservatives, are attributable to ignorance, misapprehension, and isolation. Where the isolation is temporary, the mischief is temporary and perhaps soon forgotten. Where the isolation is permanent the mischief is permanent.

Take a very familiar notion constantly expressed in so-called liberal circles—namely, the notion that “the people” are just, square, altruistic, reasonable, while “the rulers,” or the politicians and the diplomats, are almost invariably tricky, selfish, predatory, arrogant. How often have honest and well-intentioned audiences applauded this notion! Yet it is difficult to find any basis of fact for it in history and contemporary experience. The rulers and ruled are often in profound agreement when the former seem most unfair and aggressive to outsiders. In democratic countries rulers have no dynastic traditions to bind them, and when elected they are fresh from contact with the plain citizens. How soon, alas, do these democratic statesmen diplomats display the traits and propensities which our doctrinaire liberals associate with autocrats, kings, aristocratic “governing cliques,” and the like! How can representatives of the virtuous people so soon lose the virtues they are supposed to bring with them into public office because they are sons of the soil, typical representatives of the average body of citizens?

The common-sense answer is, of course, that the rulers never really had the virtues they are supposed to have lost; that the “plain people” are neither better nor worse than their representatives in office; that office and power present temptations or opportunities to which the average human nature succumbs, and that “the people,” in similar circumstances, under like temptations, would behave and actually do behave precisely as the statesmen and diplomats do. There is moral danger in the possession of power, and in this important fact certain schools of radicalism find an argument against

all "strong" governments and the sovereign pretensions of states. Power is almost invariably abused. Bureaucratic arrogance and superciliousness are proverbial. But these truths are wholly irrelevant to the sweeping and arbitrary distinction between rulers and ruled. The assumption that the common people are always right, just, sympathetic, and generous is naïve to the point of childishness.

Take one recent instance. President Wilson, after consultation with experts, expressed the opinion that Fiume ought to be awarded to the Jugo-Slav state, not to Italy. He made an elaborate argument on the question, and appealed to the Italian people over the heads of their diplomatic representatives, who were generally accused of chauvinism and perverse obscurantism. What was the response of the Italian people? What was the reaction of the Italian citizens and residents of America? Why, with negligible exceptions, the Italians appealed to angrily condemned President Wilson—and this without meeting his arguments. The man they had idolized a few short months before suddenly fell in their estimation and none was disposed to make any allowances for him. He was to be "punished" for his presumption. Now, even if we take the position that Mr. Wilson was wrong on the Fiume question, the Italian people knew that there was nothing selfish and deliberately unfriendly to them in his decision. He sought to do justice, and there was no occasion for wrath and violence on the part of honest and justice-loving men. The explosion of an irrational nationalism and a shabby jingoism in connection with the Fiume affair should have given the superficial Liberals pause.

A very popular fallacy not unrelated to the "ruled-versus-rulers" fallacy is that current among those opponents of the capitalistic system who are more bitter than intelligent. Of course, a thoughtful evolutionist will admit, at least on cross-examination, that this system was "inevitable"—as a stage in industrial development. Marx himself fully recognizes this fact. His contention was that capitalism was outliving its usefulness, rapidly becoming impossible and "digging its own grave." He felt sure that at a certain stage the working masses would rise and abolish it—not by destroying it, but by taking over factories, mills, mines, transportation facilities, banks, etc., and placing them on a new co-operative, democratic basis. Yet Marx, evolutionist though he was, set the worst kind of example to his disciples by thundering against and vehemently assailing the

capitalists—as if they had maliciously and wickedly *invented* and established the present system, and as if, in maintaining and defending it today, they were all guilty of moral turpitude! Of course, every sane person who knows “capitalists” and supporters of capitalism is aware that they believe in it sincerely and do not admit that any better system is available to put in place of capitalism. Such men may be mistaken, but how can an evolutionist denounce them as enemies of humanity? Individually and personally they are as liberal, as humane, as tolerant, as generous as the members of any other class of modern society. It is possible to work for the supersession of capitalism by co-operation without hating or abusing the average capitalist or the average honest champion of that system.

Yet how often one hears in radical or semi-radical circles the phrases, “capitalistic conspiracy,” “brotherhood of thieves,” “ruthless exploiters,” and the like. The notion that a great system, economic, political, or religious, can rest on a “conspiracy” is too absurd to be treated seriously, yet how many are misled and poisoned by taking it seriously! On the other hand, in capitalistic and business circles one hears much rabid denunciation of “labor agitators,” union chiefs, organizers of strikes, and insistent advocates of collective bargaining. To many employers and managers the whole labor movement is simply a “conspiracy” against business and property—a conspiracy led by crooks, grafters, indolent men who will not work at their trades and prefer to live by their wits!

Such fallacies as have been mentioned are so puerile that, to account for them, some observers jump to the equally absurd fallacy that the world is full of conscious knaves and hypocrites, and that few really entertain the beliefs they profess to entertain and to act upon in their ordinary relations.

The true explanation of the extraordinary fallacies under discussion, and others of like nature, is that individual or group isolation is fatal to the human mind and the human moral sense, and that men otherwise sane can become virtually insane in respect to questions affecting their class, caste, group, which questions they never have to consider from the point of view of other classes, castes, and groups. Exhortations in behalf of open-mindedness and tolerance are usually vain unless we are forced by contacts, by circumstances, to clear our minds of cant and prejudice.

Under normal circumstances prejudice and misunderstanding seri-

ously retard progress by compromise and mutual concession. In revolutionary times the same causes produce savage physical conflicts and bloodshed. Assassinations, reprisals, executions, mob vengeance—these are the terrible effects of hate and prejudice begotten by ignorance and isolation.

It may be pointed out, by way of objecting to the foregoing argument, that there are doctrinaires and fanatics whose eyes do not see and whose ears do not hear—whom facts do not impress, and who, indeed, misinterpret every fact to suit the theory they have espoused. Yes, there are such doctrinaires. But it is doubtful whether many of them are hopelessly incurable. If facts make no impression upon them, the remedy is more facts and still more facts. The fanatic is generally a person whose natural peculiarities are accentuated by complete isolation.

Exercises

1. What is an attitude according to Bogardus? a social attitude?
2. State the relation of social attitudes to social values, original human nature, the social heritage.
3. Explain social attitudes in terms of drives and mechanisms.
4. Illustrate the formation of a child's attitudes by contacts within his social group.
5. Show the relation of public opinion to the creation of values and attitudes.
6. Discuss law from the same point of view.
7. Describe the effects of war upon values and attitudes.
8. Discuss: "The primary social value is the group."
9. Give illustrations from your own observations of the interaction of attitudes and values.
10. In what sense, according to Follett, is community a process?
11. Give a familiar example of integrating as the social process.
12. State the fundamental social law of community, according to Follett. Among its creations as named, which are attitudes? values?
13. Show the relations between integration, community, and freedom.
14. Describe the social process leading to a decision of the two-self, or any other grade of collective self.
15. Discuss the relation between freedom and law in the light of community.
16. State Follett's criticism of the political pluralists.
17. What light does this view of community as a process throw upon labor problems?
18. To what extent does Follett agree with the pluralists?

19. In what respect does she deplore their influence on national and international life?

20. What is meant by "the possibility of ourselves weaving, from out our own daily experience, the garments of a genuine state?" (For a more complete understanding of the doctrine known as "political pluralism" the reader should consult the writings of Harold J. Laski.)

21. Show, following Yarros, how social isolation produced divergent values in the case of anarchist communism.

22. Show how and why the values held by different radical groups may be divergent one from the other, and at the same time entirely incomprehensible to moderate or liberal groups.

23. Name some epithets which indicate that their divergent values and attitudes have rendered capitalists and laborites mutually incomprehensible.

24. Restate the next to the last paragraph in the reading from Yarros so as to express the same thought in terms of attitudes and values.

Additional References

1. Cooley, Chas. H.: *Social Organization*, Ch. XIII. "What the Masses Contribute."

2. Ross, Edward A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chs. XXXVIII., XXXIX., XLV. "Re-Shaping."

3. Small, Albion W.: *General Sociology*, Ch. L. Presents a detailed conspectus of social values ("Social Achievement") at present existing in the United States.

4. Wallas, Graham: *The Great Society*, Ch. XIII. "The Organization of Happiness."

5. Wright, Wm. K.: "The Evolution of Values from Instincts," in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIV., No. 2. (1915) pp. 165-183. Standpoint of functional pragmatism, and McDougall's theory of the *sentiments*.

CHAPTER XXIV

SOCIAL OPPOSITION

FROM a philosophical point of view the most fundamental of all social processes is that of *interaction*, which involves mutual *modification*. But as thus defined interaction is not merely a social process, but is truly cosmic in its scope. The familiar law of physics, that every particle of matter attracts every other particle in proportion to mass and distance, represents the most universal and abstract formulation of the process of mutual modification. Since it is so universal and of interest mainly for the cosmic philosopher, interaction, in the view of the present writer, requires no separate chapter here, but may be assumed as a datum from the sciences and philosophical disciplines antecedent to the social sciences. Perhaps all that need be said here on the specific subject is that in social groups interaction becomes essentially a process of mental inter-stimulation, as Professor Bogardus has phrased it. (*Fundamentals of Social Psychology*.)

Social interaction itself divides into two processes which are the most fundamental and all inclusive of those going on in human groups, although not limited to the human level but operative also among social insects and gregarious animals. They are *social opposition* and *social coöperation*. Park and Burgess have elucidated these concepts in a most profound way, and have clearly shown the nature especially of competition and conflict. (*Introduction to the Science of Sociology*.) In the light of their analysis, conflict seems to be competition in its more personal, conscious, and intermittent forms. If we correctly interpret their logic, competition thus figures as the more fundamental of the two processes, being logically inclusive of the narrower category called conflict.

But Professor Ross has treated these processes with equal brilliancy, and has included both competition and conflict, in all their various forms, under the one single and more general category of "opposition." (*Principles of Sociology*; also *Outlines of Sociology*.) His example is followed in the present work, because there seems to be needed a more fundamental category capable of including both competition and conflict, and at the same time setting them, with all their sub-species, in contrast with that other fundamental process called social co-operation. This terminology explicitly recognizes the fact that the wishes, attitudes, purposes, and interests of the members of a group

either move toward similar and common ends, and thus work together, i.e., *coöperate*, or they move toward dissimilar and disparate ends, and thus *oppose* one another. But it should not be overlooked that antagonistic forces often supplement each other in such a way that while producing an immediate and superficial opposition they really rest at bottom upon a more fundamental and remote coöperation. This is the so-called "synergy" of Ward and the "antagonistic co-operation" of Sumner, a process which will be referred to again in a later place. (See Introduction to Ch. XXVII.)

In the present chapter competition is presented in Reading I as the impersonal, unconscious, and unremitting struggle for existence characteristic of all living things; then, in Reading 2, it is shown as the more conscious competition of social and industrial life, in which it takes on the nature and forms of *conflict*. In Reading 3 the nature of class conflict is analyzed, while in Reading 4 a concrete example is presented showing *exploitation*, a final stage in the development of social opposition.

1. Competition and the Struggle for Life¹

We will now discuss in a little more detail the struggle for existence. In my future work this subject will be treated, as it well deserves, at greater length. The elder De Candolle and Lyell have largely and philosophically shown that all organic beings are exposed to severe competition. In regard to plants, no one has treated this subject with more spirit and ability than W. Herbert, Dean of Manchester, evidently the result of his great horticultural knowledge. Nothing is easier than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult — at least I have found it so — than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it be thoroughly ingrained in the mind, the whole economy of Nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood. We behold the face of Nature bright with gladness; we often see superabundance of food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of prey; we do not always bear in mind, that, though food may be now superabundant, it is not so at all seasons of each recurring year.

¹ From *The Origin of Species*, by Charles Darwin; pp. 70-72. Fifth Edition. (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1871. Reprinted by permission.)

THE TERM, STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE, USED IN
A LARGE SENSE

I should premise that I use this term in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. Two canine animals, in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be dependent on the moisture. A plant which annually produces a thousand seeds, of which on an average only one comes to maturity, may be more truly said to struggle with the plants of the same and other kinds which already clothe the ground. The mistletoe is dependent on the apple and a few other trees, but can only in a far-fetched sense be said to struggle with these trees, for, if too many of these parasites grow on the same tree, it will languish and die. But several seedling mistletoes, growing close together on the same branch, may more truly be said to struggle with each other. As the mistletoe is disseminated by birds, its existence depends on birds; and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in order to tempt birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds rather than those of other plants. In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for convenience' sake the general term of struggle for existence.

GEOMETRICAL RATIO OF INCREASE

A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase. Every being which during its natural lifetime produces several eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold

force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint for marriage. Although some species may be now increasing, more or less rapidly, in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would not hold them.

There is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate, that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair. Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and at this rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing-room for his progeny. Linnaeus has calculated that if an annual plant produced only two seeds — and there is no plant nearly so unproductive as this — and their seedlings next year produced two, and so on, then in twenty years there would be a million plants. The elephant is reckoned the slowest breeder of all known animals, and I have taken some pains to estimate its probable minimum rate of natural increase: it will be safest to assume that it begins breeding when thirty years old, and goes on breeding until ninety years old, bringing forth six young in the interval, and surviving till one hundred years old; if this be so, after a period of from seven hundred and forty to seven hundred and fifty years, there would be alive nearly nineteen million elephants descended from the first pair.

2. Economic Competition²

Of all forms of human conflict, economic competition is the highest. In no other form of conflict does success depend so much upon production or service and so little upon destruction or deception. There are three forms of economic competition: competitive production, competitive bargaining, and competitive consumption. Competitive production always works well; competitive bargaining sometimes works well and sometimes badly; competitive consumption always works badly. Of these three forms of economic competition, therefore, the highest is competitive production, the lowest is competitive consumption, while competitive bargaining occupies a middle position.

Most of the opponents of economic competition propose to substitute for this form of conflict another form, namely, political com-

² From *Essays in Social Justice*, by Thomas Nixon Carver; pp. 93-97. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1915. Reprinted by permission.)

petition. The more the state absorbs the enterprises now carried on by private initiative, the more will political competition displace economic competition. Political competition is a lower form. Before pursuing this topic further, let us examine the fundamental factors involved in all human conflict.

That the chief purpose of all living beings is to keep on living is too obvious to need discussion. The universal struggle for existence has occupied the attention of all students of the problems of life, both human and sub-human, for many generations. Some of the most revolutionary and far-reaching scientific generalizations of modern times have grown out of this study. It is clearly perceived by every student that economic competition is, in some way, a part of this universal struggle. It is not always understood just how it relates itself to that struggle as it is carried on in the sub-human world. There is abroad a very uncritical and indiscriminating opinion to the effect that there is no essential difference between economic competition and the brutal struggle for existence as studied by the zoologist.

In assuming the universality of the struggle for existence, however, it is not necessary to exclude such facts as love, friendship, play, and mutual aid, either among men or animals. These are facts which cannot be denied, and they must have a place in any philosophy of life that is worth a moment's consideration. In the effort of living beings to keep on living these benign agencies have a place as well as the sterner facts of war and slaughter. In a preliminary and superficial way it may be suggested that the key to the problem of harmonizing such unlike things as love and war, friendship and strife, mutual aid and mutual slaughter, is found in the observation that human interests are sometimes harmonious and sometimes antagonistic. Where they are harmonious, love, friendship, and mutual aid promote the effort to keep on living. Where they are antagonistic, some form of struggle is inevitable. It may take any one of a multitude of forms. [The rivals may, in an unthinking way, absorb the limited supply of nutriment, moisture, or light, leaving the less successful competitors to perish of starvation; it may take the form of a conscious and deliberate extermination of rivals by the method of slaughter, or it may take on the idyllic, but none the less deadly form of gracious social intercourse which accompanies courtship, and leaves the less fortunate competitors to go unmated and eventually to perish without

reproducing themselves. From this point of view, love and friendship are only specialized forms of battle and slaughter.


But economic competition relates to those rivalries which grow out of the desire to possess those things which are generally classed under the name of wealth. Just what is to be included under this term varies from time to time and from place to place. When wives were regarded as property, were evaluated commercially, and bought and sold, they were wealth, and the rivalry for their possession took the form of economic competition. Where they are no longer regarded as property, nor evaluated commercially, nor bought and sold, they are not included under wealth; but they are regarded as something very much better. Under these conditions there is frequently a rivalry among men for their possession, and, where this rivalry is not restrained by law or custom, it is even more deadly than economic competition; but it is not economic competition.

The very nature of wealth involves a conflict of interests and consequent rivalry. Nothing is ever regarded as wealth, commercially evaluated, or bought and sold, unless it be scarce. A thing is scarce only when there is less of it available, in a given time and place, than is wanted. Where there is less of it than is wanted, if some one gets all he wants, some one else must necessarily get less than he wants. Instantly there is rivalry for the possession of the scarce article.

In an unrestrained and brutal state of existence, there are no limits to the form which this rivalry may take. The rivals may strive with tooth and claw, or with manufactured implements of destruction, or they may strive to win the desired article by useful and meritorious service; but strive they will in one form or another. Not every form of struggle for wealth is economic competition. The only forms to which that name can accurately be applied are those wherein some form of service, real or imagined, is a condition of success. These alone are economical forms of rivalry, all others are uneconomical. They consist in contributing to social production as much as is acquired by the competitor. Rivalry in acquisition becomes rivalry in production; all other forms of rivalry in acquisition being more and more suppressed by enlightened governments.

A glance at the diagram will reveal, in a general way, the difference between economic competition and the unrestrained, brutal struggle for existence. In the absence of some kind of social control or legal

restraint, any or all the methods there outlined are followed. Wherever there is any kind of social control or legal restraint, an effort is made to distinguish between the economic and the uneconomic, and to suppress the uneconomic methods, particularly the destructive methods, of acquiring wealth. In fact, the enlightenment and efficiency of a system of government or social control may be tested by



the accuracy with which it makes that discrimination, and the success of its efforts to suppress the uneconomical methods.

By an economical method of acquiring wealth is meant a method by which an individual succeeds in proportion as he contributes to the wealth of the community. By an uneconomical method is meant a method by which the individual impoverishes others in proportion as he succeeds himself. The more people there are in a community acquiring wealth by uneconomical methods, and the more successful they are, the poorer they tend to make the community; but the more they are acquiring wealth by economical methods, and the more successful they are, the richer they make the rest of the community.

The fact that we can make such a distinction as this between the economical and the uneconomical ways of making a living show how far we have progressed beyond the brutal struggle for existence. Neither brutes nor unrestrained human beings make any such distinction. All the grosser and less refined of the destructive ways of acquiring the means of subsistence are practiced by brutes. The only reason they do not practice the more refined methods is that they do not know how. But unrestrained and uncontrolled human beings have not even the limitations of ignorance.

3. Conflict³

In every state and in every period, class contrasts, class struggles, and class domination depend, (1) upon the degree of unity or of diversity in the citizen body; these citizens are formed into groups by race, occupation, distribution of income and property, intellectual and religious culture, etc.; (2) upon the type of distinction and of organization peculiar to the classes; (3) upon the strength and organization of the civic government, which stands for the unity and the peace of society. Every great society exhibits historically a picture of a social differentiating process. A counterbalancing process also goes on by virtue of the force of common heredity, common language, common morality, common religion; in short, the *aggregate* of cultural factors, and finally the unity of law, of institutions, of the civic power. Every actual situation is a diagonal of these two opposing series of factors.

The smaller, more primitive, more rude the social bodies are, the minuter the class contrasts. Great, ancient, civilized peoples always have important class contrasts. They grow, in the first place, with the great economic advance. The increase of money and *entrepreneur* economy had done most to intensify these contrasts and to lead to class conflicts. The decisive factor in this latter development has always been that along with the growing economic contrasts there was the dissolution of the older psychomoral and religious unity of the folk. In these periods the upper and progressing classes on the whole increased more in intellect and in technico-economic ability

³ From "Class Conflicts in General," by Gustav Schmoller, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XX., No. 4, (Jan. 1915) pp. 504-508. Translation of Albion W. Small. Reprinted by permission.

than in social and political virtues. The lower classes easily lagged behind in development of the intellect and of economico-technical qualities. They lost a part of their old virtues (fidelity, obedience, temperance) and they did not at once gain as a compensation increase of other higher qualities. The recovery of unifying supreme ideals of morality and of the societary constitution has been difficult in such times of the dissolution of the old societary constitution and of religious conceptions. Indeed it was often wholly impossible, often possible only after long struggles and mistaken endeavors.

Accordingly the *degree* of class contrasts, of class conflicts, of class domination, varies greatly in different peoples. We must now get at, first, an understanding of the nature of class conflicts; second, of the nature of class dominance; third of the opposing legal and constitutional development, as well as of the *adjustment* of the class conflicts:

(a) Wherever there are different classes, they have on the one hand various, distinct, even contradictory interests; but on the other hand they also have common interests. The former or divergent interests are predominantly of an external, practical, and economic sort; they aim at immediate ends. The latter, or common interests, are of a more ideal and spiritual sort. They refer to the total purposes of society and state and to the future. To a considerable degree the former are unorganized, or only loosely organized. At any rate they have a compact organization only under particular circumstances. The latter, or common interests have also a loose organization of customs and morality; but in state and church, in law and institutions, they have always a certain firmly jointed organization of force, which, to be sure, possesses at different times very different degrees of power. The more strongly the common feelings and the great national purposes emerge, the firmer the civic organization of power eventually becomes, the more will the particularized class interests in time be forced to subordinate, co-ordinate, and adjust themselves to one another. In the larger states, with pronounced class structure, however, these special interests in turn will always occasionally assert themselves, and rightfully, for progress results only from certain frictions and trials of strength. From these the victory of the better is at last gained. The whole interior development thus rests upon the relations of tension, upon the struggles and peace treaties of the social classes, upon the craft and the circumspection of the government, upon the skill and power of its leading minds in arranging

their peace agreements and in winning the victory for the total interest over the separate class interests.

Accordingly the history of folk-economy, of society, and of the state falls into epochs of social peace and others of social disturbance. Even in the former, class antitheses are not lacking. They are, however, either latent, wholly controlled by common feelings, interests, and organizations, or after certain struggles they have withdrawn from prominence, because certain legal principles and institutions have furnished the basis for suppression or conciliation; that is for arriving at a tolerable point of equilibrium. Especially in times of long industrial and technical stability will such a peaceful condition occur. The feelings and relationships of classes will have adjusted themselves to a given distribution of power, of callings and of possessions, and to a certain civic and legal order. The social frictions are reduced to a small total. So far as there is a class dominance at all, it is more or less recognized as rightful by all.

Contrasted with these periods are those of social conflict. They always occur if the division of economic or other labor is modified, if new upper classes are formed in the course of technical, intellectual, or other progress, if existing or new lower or middle classes are threatened with destruction or with a change for the worse in their condition. Then there must take place a struggle of classes, not merely of individuals. It is an incident of the universal striving for power and control. It is precipitated by the new conditions of life. It may last a longer or a shorter time. It may lead to reforms or revolutions. It may start the destruction of the states and the peoples concerned. Or it may end with some sort of equilibrium, with a pacified social condition.

The struggles will always have reference to three points: (1) to the constitutional law, to the filling of civic offices, to the appointment or choice of officials, choice of general or local officers, to the rights of organization, of assembly or of the press, to organization of the army and of the courts, to the position of church and school, to the removal of administrative abuses; (2) to class and family law in the strict sense, to class privilege and their abolition, and (3) to the distribution of income as affected on the one hand by the play of free forces in the market, and on the other by legal molding of economic life. Both of these factors are affected by the existing distribution of power, in connection with the contemporary morality and customs.

Chiefly, however, it is the law and the great institutions which favor or embarrass the position of the particular classes in their struggle for economic advantage, and which aid or retard their access to profit and property. The entire legal boundary between common and private property, between common and private thrift, is decisive for the favoring of the upper or the lower classes. The higher economic classes have always understood more or less how to develop customs and laws in their favor, how thereby to increase their incomes and their property, how to give themselves an advantage in commercial intercourse. The middle classes have to a certain extent attempted the same thing, as opposed to the upper classes. Their success has been variable. The lower classes have always been most unfavorably situated for that sort of influence, but custom and law have sought to protect them, and every intelligent state government has had the same purpose. Wherever the self-consciousness of these classes awoke, wherever their culture and working efficiency grew, wherever they could form organizations, under such circumstances, like the middle class, they have striven for lightening of their burdens, for better means of getting a living, for easier labor conditions, for higher wages, or even for equal distribution of property and income. What in a more remote time everyone held to be proper and tolerable in all these respects appeared to a more refined sense of justice hard and intolerable. Accordingly, it was in part this actual unequal distribution of goods, in part the growing opinion about the same, that ever again, after temporary rest, summoned the social classes into the lists for struggle over change and improvement. In earlier times the issue was joined directly. The upper classes retained the lion's share of conquered lands, of captured cattle, of slaves or serfs, without stopping for justification. On the other hand, the lower classes, when temporarily successful, carried out large confiscations of the property of the rich, new apportionments of the soil, restrictions upon quantities of land and cattle to be owned by the well-to-do, release from debt or reductions, gifts of farms in the colonies, or even free entrance to the theater or to the representative assembly, distribution of bread, and similar measures. The more complex a folk-economy is, and the more it is necessary to deal with very diverse classes, with an old division of labor and class structure, the less is it to be expected that such direct attacks, such bungling attempts at reformation and redistribution, will succeed. To be sure, some of these radical attempts have oc-

curred in recent times. Legal emancipation of the slaves and serfs, from 1500 to 1860, the abolition of burdens upon the peasantry, the creation of a free peasant class and free landed property, were extraordinarily radical measures. The introduction of craft freedom, indispensable for the new molding of folk-economy, was a deep slash into the existing legal order of industrial life. It immediately raised the higher class of *entrepreneurs*, just as it depressed the artisans and the laboring class. The struggle over taxes and other civic burdens has been at the forefront in all social conflicts, and every profound change (such, for example, as a new rapidly progressive income and inheritance tax) may greatly encourage one class while it severely embarrasses another. On the whole, however, even radicalism, the right wing of the social democracy, has today become relatively reasonable. Its standpoint is that no fairly earned property rights should be impaired, that means of production should be changed into collective property only with proper compensation. At the same time the more moderate of the radicals no more demand equality of all wages and incomes than they demand abolition of all private property. Gradual reconstruction, working toward more equitable future adjustment of the social organism, are becoming more and more the passwords, even among the radicals. The violent revolutionary movement is of course not satisfied with this program. The question is whether a more violent program can be restrained.

4. Exploitation ⁴

Most travelers in South America have no eye for the fundamentals which make society there so different from our own. One may read a bushel of the books visitors have written on these countries without ever learning the momentous basic fact that *from the Rio Grande down the West Coast to Cape Horn, free agricultural labor as we know it does not exist*. In general, the laborers on the estates are at various stages of mitigation of the once universal slavery into which the native populations were crushed by the iron heel of the conquistador.

To account for this servile stamp one must appreciate the profound contrast between English America and Spanish America in the relation of the colonizing whites to the natives. The North American

⁴ From *South of Panama*, by Edward Alsworth Ross; pp. 144-157. (New York, The Century Company, 1915. Reprinted by permission.)

Indians, inasmuch as they had not emerged from the hunting stage, could not be enslaved; they were too "wild." So the English colonist slew them, drove them away or bought them off, and put his own back into the labors of the field. The Spaniard, on the other hand, came upon peoples who had made marked advancement in agriculture and the industrial arts. Such were the Chibchas of Colombia, the Nescas, Chimus, and Kechuas of Ecuador and Peru, the Aymaras of Bolivia, to some extent even the Mapuches of Chile. The masterful invaders had only to beat these native peoples to their knees, seat themselves firmly on their backs, and remain there while the Indians washed gold for them, or tended herds, or grew food. Thus the colonial Spanish never had to set foot upon the ground and their descendants even to-day will go any lengths rather than humble themselves to the physical labor necessary to existence.

Spain never really colonized her possessions; she exploited them. The number of white men who subdued the New World was trifling. Cortez invaded the plateau of Mexico, populated by several millions, with a band of 553 men and finished his conquest with the aid of the 880 soldiers of de Narvaez together with a few squads of adventurers. Pizarro brought to ground the empire of the Incas, containing perhaps ten million inhabitants, with 310 soldiers, to which were added six months later the 150 men enlisted at Panama by his lieutenant, Almagro. Valdivia tackled Chili, inhabited by perhaps half a million natives at about the culture level of the Iroquois, with 150 Europeans, later reinforced by 70 troopers from Peru. All these bands were aided by thousands of native auxiliaries who were made to bear the brunt of the fighting in order that the precious handful of white horsemen might be held in reserve.

The English colonies in America were peopled from Holland, France, Germany and Sweden as well as from the British Isles. Spain, on the other hand, allowed none but her own subjects to settle in her possessions. The English colonies attracted great numbers — Puritans, Quakers, Huguenots, Presbyterians and Roman Catholics — who preferred the hardships of the wilderness to suffering religious and political oppression. The Spanish colonies offered no asylum to liberty-lovers, while their mineral riches attracted the avaricious and ruthless rather than the industrious and frugal.

Broadly speaking, light and freedom wax as you go south from Panama. Ecuador is less medieval than Colombia, Peru than Ecuador,

Chili than Peru. Hence, the status of the agricultural laborer, which is at its nadir in Colombia, rises gradually until, in Argentina, the last traces of his former servile condition have disappeared.

In the rich region about Pasto in southern Colombia the land is all held in large estates. There is no chance whatever for the agricultural laborer to become an owner of land. Four days in each week — how like the “boon-days” the feudal tenant owed his lord! — he is bound to work at a wage of from five to ten cents a day, in return for the use of a plot for his house and truck patch. Of course, such pitiful earnings do not suffice for the needs of his family, so he is obliged to run into debt to his *amo* or master for money or supplies. Since he can never work off this debt and the law does not permit him to leave the estate until it is liquidated, the peon becomes virtually a serf bound to work all his life for a nominal wage. He can change employers only in case some one pays his debt and this binds him to a new master.

An Englishman of twenty-five years’ residence in Colombia thus describes the labor system:

“The peon gets ten cents a day if he works, but is charged twenty cents for each boon day he fails to work. For what he buys through his patron he pays double. If he is in the way of getting out of debt, a timely present of a couple of bottles of *aguardiente* will make him drunk, and in this expansive mood he may be induced to take enough goods to plunge him again up to his neck in the quagmire of debt. In a court of law the master’s book account always outweighs the word of the peon. It is the game of the masters and of their allies the priests to keep the peons ignorant savages the more easily to exploit them. As regards the free peons, the masters are too shrewd to bid against one another for their services. This would violate class ethics, just as with you it is ‘wrong’ for one lady to ‘steal’ the domestic of another by offering her more wages.”

In Ecuador the peon has the free use of an acre or two on which he raises food for his family. Four days in the week he must put in eight hours of labor for his master, for which he receives about forty cents in the lowlands — where there is chronic scarcity of laborers — and twenty cents in the uplands. As there are no stores within reach, he takes his pay in supplies, furnished by the master always at a good profit, and often at an exorbitant price, seeing that the peon is too ignorant to know when he is being fleeced. Most of them are in debt

and their condition, as an Ecuadorian statesman put it to me, is "virtual slavery." It is certainly worse than the villeinage of the Middle Ages, for the debt may be sold and with it the debtor. Flogging is practiced on some plantations and the police will bring back the peon who has run away from his debt. The chief differences between this *concertaje*, as it is called, and chattel slavery are that the family is left intact, the *concierto* may not be obliged to work more than four days in the week, and he has no claim on his master in sickness or old age.

Since 1895 the Liberals have been in the saddle in Ecuador and they have made some effort to safeguard the interests of the peon. For example, the master's account against the peon does not become a legal debt until it is acknowledged by the peon himself in the presence of a public official. Once a year this formality takes place. Formerly the day's labor of an indebted peon wiped out only five cents of his debt. Now the law gives it a value which appears to be about three quarters of what the free laborer receives for the same work.

The business men of Guayaquil admit that *concertaje* is a medieval institution but defend it on the ground that if you cut the lariat of debt slavery by which the planter holds the peon, the fellow is likely to decamp, squat on the wild land of which there is an abundance in coastal Ecuador, and go to raising food on his own account. This would leave the cacao and sugar plantations without an adequate labor force and might "ruin" the planter. The ghastly alternative of paying the peons what their labor is really worth the planters cannot bring themselves to contemplate. A heavy European immigration, indeed, by providing the planters with plenty of white labor, would free the peon's neck from the noose of debt; but so long as the huge sign confronts the railway: "*Se necesita continuamente peones*" (laborers in constant demand), the planters will want a legal hold on the laborer.

One planter wiped out all debts due him from peons, with the result that his peons worked for him six days a week instead of four and, having cash to look forward to, they worked the better. He advocates limiting by law the amount of debt for which the peon may be obliged to labor, but still he would not abolish the system entirely. He points out that in bad seasons the peon would starve without help from his master and his master will not advance him supplies without some form of security. Others say, however, "Slash off this manhood-

destroying concertaje and let the peon start to learn the necessity of living on his cash earnings instead of relying on advances from his master. The sooner he starts the sooner he will learn."

For all its stucco front of modernism and liberalism, Peru is feudal to the core.

The mining companies of Peru recruit most of their underground labor through agents who go about and "hook" (*enganchar*) the guileless native. The "hooker" turns up in a village some weeks before the annual *fiesta* in honor of its patron saint. On such an occasion the Indian is wont to "blow" himself because his entire emotional, recreative, and social life centers about this *fiesta*. What with presents of vestments or jewels to the effigy of the saint, fees to the priest for masses, and a feast for his numerous relatives and friends, he is in a mood to embark on reckless spending. Comes now the wheedling "hooker" and offers him from \$30 to \$50 cash, provided only the Indian will sign a bond to repay the debt by labor. The Indian signs and, after sobering up from the *fiesta*, he reports to the "hooker" and is sent up to the mines to dig ore at perhaps 14,000 feet above sea-level. The Cerro de Pasco Mining Co. alone has 4000 natives in its employ under the *enganche* system. The miner gets, say, seventy-five cents a day, of which a third keeps him while the rest is applied on his debt. On the average four months of labor is necessary to make him a free man again. The estates of the *montaña* region east of the Andes, as well as those of the Coast, snare the natives of the highlands by this method.

Often the Indian signs the contract when drunk and usually he fails to realize where he is to work and how. He thinks he is to work for the "hooker," whereas he may be sent a hundred miles away to toil in a freezing mine gallery or a hot cane field. Buried far from home in a coast sugar hacienda or a *montaña* coffee estate, the poor fellow finds himself a slave without a shred of legal protection and quite at the mercy of his employer.

Repeatedly I was assured that the laws of Peru do not compel the debtor to work off his debt, but, to quote the words of a foreign diplomat, "Lima has no rule outside the cities." Peonage is fixed in usage, the victim does not know his legal rights and, moreover, the gobernador or subprefect, who stands in with the capitalist or the "hooker," threatens imprisonment if the debt is not repaid. The manager of the Cerro de Pasco Company reports a loss of \$12,500

a year by advances on enganche contracts and complains of the increasing difficulty in inducing the "hooked" to "come up to the scratch" because the *Liga pro Indigena* or Native-Rights Association, a Lima society standing up for the rights of the Indians, has told him he is not obliged to work off his debt. One wonders why the company cannot go after labor with a cash offer as we do at home. The manager replies that cash wages will attract Indians for surface work but that only the "hook" will provide him with enough underground workers. The *Liga pro Indigena* stigmatizes enganche as a device for evading the payment of a just wage that would make up to the Indian for the hard and health-destroying labor in the mines. The operators, however, insist that the Indian lacks initiative and that no offer of cash wages would supply the mines with labor from a distance.

Exercises

1. What is the most fundamental of all social processes?
2. Distinguish competition and conflict.
3. How large a place in nature was assigned by Darwin to the struggle for existence?
4. Illustrate the large, metaphorical sense in which he used the term.
5. Show how the struggle for existence is related to the rate of increase among organic beings.
6. Characterize the forms of economic competition distinguished by Carver.
7. What relation does he recognize between the struggle for existence described by Darwin and economic competition?
8. In what ways, according to Carver, is the struggle for existence softened?
9. What is the essential nature of economic competition?
10. Comment on the diagram by Carver. Which of the items represent "conflict" in the stricter sense? (Consult Park and Burgess or Ross.)
11. When is competition economic and when uneconomic?
12. What does the distinction show about the struggle for existence among human beings?
13. Upon what, according to Schmoller, does the opposition of classes depend?
14. What does he hold with respect to class contrasts in small primitive groups as compared with great civilized peoples? Mention an example of each.
15. Where different classes exist, what influences tend to separate them? to draw them closer?

16. Contrast an epoch of social peace with one of social conflict, with respect to the mental and social factors at work.

17. Of the three points involved in class struggle, which is most vital for the outcome, and why?

18. How does the method of attack between classes differ as between simple and complex societies?

19. Why is the laborer exploited so completely down the West Coast of South America, as reported by Ross?

20. Give specific examples of the exploitation of agricultural laborers in that region; of industrial laborers.

21. Explain the following and show whether it is, or is not, a typical illustration of the attitude of all exploiters: "The ghastly alternative of paying the peons what their labor is really worth the planters cannot bring themselves to contemplate."

Additional References

1. Dealey, James Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*. Pp. 390-397 contain the most comprehensive brief discussion of exploitation available.

2. Geddes, Patrick, and Thomson, J. Arthur: *Evolution*. See pp. 106-111 for remarks on parasitism and progress.

3. Hobhouse, L. T.: *The Elements of Social Justice*. Ch. IX. "Social and Personal Factors in Wealth."

4. Leacock, Stephen: *Elements of Political Science*. Pp. 357-369 present the theory of *individualism* in relation to government.

5. Marshall, Alfred: *Principles of Economics*, pp. 5-10 (Fifth Edit.). Treats competition in relation to industrial advantage.

6. Massart, Jean, and Vandervelde, Emile: *Parasitism, Organic and Social*. Pp. 1-3, 18-22, show exploitation in these two realms of phenomena.

7. Park, R. E., and Burgess, E. W.: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Ch. VIII. and IX. Extremely important for the social psychology of conflict.

8. Ross, Edward A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Ch. XI-XIX. The most thorough concrete discussion of social opposition in all its phases

CHAPTER XXV

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

AS social opposition passes into exploitation class domination flourishes and social stratification results. This means the formation of classes and castes, and it is a process always advancing or receding in societies sufficiently developed industrially to render private property, in the form of capital and its attendant institutions, the principal source of privilege and authority. While most primitive society is *communal* (not communistic, necessarily), private property is more fully developed there than is commonly supposed (See Chapter XV., Readings 3 and 4), and occasionally there is found a primitive group manifesting a high degree of social stratification and social racing based on wealth. In this respect the Northwest Tribes of the American Indians are most striking. One sees among these nature people invidious distinctions, conspicuous consumption, and other aspects of Veblen's famous "theory of the leisure class" in full bloom, and expressing themselves in most astonishing forms, notably in the wealth-displaying feast known as the "potlatch." Among these otherwise simple children of the forest social stratification mounts through all its layers from downright chattel slavery to a hereditary nobility based on inheritance of lands.

What is thus found to be true in all culture stages is also true of all times and places. Prof. Ross has shown most clearly and fully the history and mode of operation of this social process; while the outlook for its growth in American life has been treated with fine balance by Prof. Cooley. (See References below.)

In the present chapter, Readings 1 and 2 discuss the origin and nature of the caste system of India, commonly recognized as the most flagrant example of social stratification in the world. Resting originally upon race differences and conquest, it has come to be reinforced and multiplied by occupational and religious influences until the result is a nation as elaborate in its heaped-up storeys as one of its own pagodas — and vastly more intricate.

Readings 3 and 4 are from Professor Small — the first translating Prof. Schmoller's careful definition of class domination (included here because it is the active factor in social stratification); the other Reading from his own *General Sociology*, showing the exact nature of stratification considered as a social process.

1. Caste and Class in India¹

The chief distinguishing feature of Indian society at the present day is the caste-system, the origin and growth of which may be traced from an early period. It now divides the great majority of the inhabitants of Northern and Southern India into hundreds of self-contained social groups, *i.e.*, castes and sub-castes. A man is obliged to marry (outside his family) but within the caste, and usually within the sub-caste, to which his family belongs. A family consists of persons "reputed to be descended from a common ancestor, and between whom marriage is prohibited." It is the exogamous social unit. A collection of such units constitutes a sub-caste or caste.

"A caste may, therefore, be defined as an endogamous group or collection of such groups bearing a common name and having the same traditional occupation, who are so linked together by these and other ties, such as the tradition of a common origin and the possession of the same tutelary deity, and the same social status, ceremonial observances and family priests, that they regard themselves, and are regarded by others, as forming a single homogeneous community. (Census Report, 1911, I. p. 367.)"

The institution is essentially Brāhmanical, and it has spread with the spread of Brāhmanism. It either does not exist, or exists only in an imperfect state of development, in countries where Buddhism has triumphed, such as Burma and Ceylon. It would indeed appear to rest ultimately on two doctrines which are distinctively Brāhmanical — the doctrine of the religious unity of the family, which is symbolized by the offerings made to deceased ancestors, and the doctrine of *sva-karma*, which lays on every man the obligation to do his duty in that state of life in which he has been born.

The orthodox Hindu holds that the caste-system is of divine appointment and that it has existed for all time. But the sacred books themselves, when they are studied historically, supply evidence both of its origin and of its growth. The poets of the Rigveda know nothing of caste in the later and stricter sense of the word; but they recognize that there are divers orders of men — the priests (Brāhma or Brāhmana), the nobles (Rājanya or Kshatrya), the tillers of the soil (Viç or

¹ From *The Cambridge History of India*, by E. J. Rapson (Editor); Vol. I., pp. 53-57. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

Vaiçya), and the servile classes (Çūdra). Between the first and the fourth there is a great gulf fixed. The former are conquering Aryans: the latter are subject Dasyus. The difference between them is one of color (*varṇa*): the Aryans are collectively known as "the light color," and the Dasyus as "the dark color." So far, there was nothing peculiar in the social conditions of North-Western India during the early Vedic period. The broad distinction between conquerors and conquered, and the growth of social orders are indeed universal and inevitable. But, while in other countries the barriers which man has thus set up for himself have been weakened or even entirely swept away by the tide of progress, in India they have remained firmly fixed. In India human institutions have received the sanction of a religion which has been concerned more with the preservation of social order than with the advancement of mankind.

Before the end of the period covered by the hymns of the Rigveda a belief in the divine origin of the four orders of men was fully established; but there is nowhere in the Rigveda any indication of the castes into which these orders were afterwards subdivided. The word "color" is still used in its literal sense. There are as yet only two *varṇas*, the light and the dark. But in the next period, the period of the Yajurveda and the Brāhmanas, the term denotes "a social order" independently of any actual distinction of color, and we hear for the first time of mixed *varṇas*, the offspring of parents belonging to different social orders. It is to such mixed marriages that the law-books (cf. Manu, X, 6 ff.) attribute the origin of the castes (*jāti*) strictly so-called. To some extent the theory is undoubtedly correct. Descent is a chief factor, but not the only factor, involved in the formation of caste, the growth of which may still in the twentieth century be traced in the Reports of the decennial Census. Primitive tribes who become Hinduized, communities who are drawn together by the same sectarian beliefs or by the same occupation, all tend to form castes. Tribal connection, religion, and occupation therefore combine with descent to consolidate social groups and, at the same time, to keep these social groups apart.

The caste-system is, as we have seen, a distinctive product of Brāhmanism, a code which regards the family, and not the congregation, as the religious unit. And so strong did this social system become that it has affected all the other religions. The most probable explanation of the very remarkable disappearance of Buddhism from

the ~~other~~ter part of the sub-continent, where it was once so widely extended, is that Buddhism has been gradually absorbed into the Brāhman caste-system, which has also, though in a less degree, influenced the followers of other faiths — Jains, Muhammadans, Sikhs, and even native Christians. We must conclude, then, that the caste-system has accompanied the spread of Brāhmanism from its first stronghold in the country of the Upper Jumna and Ganges into other regions of Northern India and finally into Southern India; and we must expect to find its complete record only in Brāhman literature. Caste must naturally be less perfectly reflected in the literature of other faiths.

Neglect of these fundamental considerations had led to much discrepancy among writers on the early social history of India. Students of the Brāhman books have asserted that the caste-system existed substantially in the time of the Yajurveda (say 1000–800 B.C.): students of the Buddhist books have emphatically declared that no traces of the system in its later sense are to be detected in the age of Buddha (c. 563–433 B.C.). Both parties have forgotten that they were dealing with different regions of Northern India — the former with the country of the Kurus and Pañchālas, the home of Brāhmanism (the Delhi Division of the Punjab with the north-western Divisions of the Province of Agra), the latter with Kosala and Videha, the home of Buddhism (Oudh and N. Bihār). They have forgotten, too, that the records, on which they depend for their statements, are utterly distinct in character. On the one hand, the Brāhman books are permeated with social ideas which formed the very foundation of their religion: on the other hand, the Buddhist books regard any connection between social status and religion as accidental rather than essential.

The caste-system is the outcome of a long process of social differentiation to which the initial impulse was given by the introduction of a higher civilization into regions occupied by peoples in a lower stage of culture. The Aryan settlers, as represented by the sacrificial hymns of the Rigveda, were both intellectually and materially advanced. Their language, their religion, and their social institutions were of the Indo-European type like those of the ancient Persians of the Avesta and the Greeks of the Homeric poems; and they were skilled in the arts and in the working of metals.

The prehistoric archaeology of India has not attracted the atten-

tion which it deserves, and many interesting problems connected with the earlier cultures and their relation to the culture of the Rigveda remain to be solved; but there is a general agreement as to the succession of cultural strata in Northern and Southern India. The discoveries of ancient implements seem to prove that in the North the Stone Age is separated from the Iron Age by a Copper Age; while in the South no such transitional stage has been observed — implements of stone are followed without a break by implements of iron. Bronze, it appears, is not found anywhere in India before the Iron Age. If these facts may be held to be established, we must conclude that the chief metal of the Rigveda, *ayas* (Latin *aes*), was copper; and the absence of a Copper Age in Southern India would seem to indicate that the earlier inhabitants generally were still in the Stone Age at the time when the Aryans brought with them the use of copper. Iron was probably not known in the age of the Rigveda; but it undoubtedly occurs in the period immediately following, when it was known to the Yajurveda and Atharvaveda as *çyāma ayas* or “black copper.” Its use was introduced by Indo-Aryan colonization into Southern India where the Stone Age of culture still prevailed.

Described in its simplest terms, the earliest history of India is the story of the struggle between two widely different types of civilization, an unequal contest between metal and stone. All the records for many centuries belong to the higher type. They are exclusively Indo-Aryan. They have been preserved in literary languages developed from the predominant spoken languages under the influence of the different phases of religion which mark stages in the advance of Indo-Aryan culture from the North-West. The language of the Rigveda, the oldest form of Vedic Sanskrit, belongs to the country of the Seven Rivers. The language of the Brāhmanas and of the later Vedic literature in the country of the Upper Jumna and Ganges (Brāhmarshideça) is transitional. It shades almost imperceptibly into Classical Sanskrit, which is the literary representation of the accepted form of educated speech of the time and region. As fixed by the rules of the grammarians it became the standard language of Brāhman culture in every part of India; and it is still the ordinary medium of communication between learned men, as was Latin in the Middle Ages of Europe.

2. Indian Caste Regulations²

For more than two thousand years the Brahmins have maintained, unchallenged, their position at the apex of Hindu civilization, and this, not merely in virtue of the supernatural endowments attributed to them, but by force of intellectual superiority. They have been the priests, the philosophers, the physicists, the poets, the legislators of their race. Yes: and we may say the rulers, too. The Abbé Dubois is strictly accurate when he tells us that "the rule of all the Hindu princes, and often that of the Mahomedans, was, properly speaking, Brahminical rule, since all posts of confidence were held by Brahmins." Even at the present time, they take by far the greatest share in the administration of the country, and their ascendancy, though merited by intelligence and culture, is not without its drawbacks. "They swarm in our public offices; and rightly too," Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff has remarked, "because they can do the work very much better than any of the other castes. At the same time, they *are* a caste, or rather a *congeries* of sub-castes, and they hold together like a vast Trades Union combined with a cousinhood." The Kshatriyas are now represented by the valiant and high-spirited Rājputs. Many claim the name of Vaisyaś. The Sūdras are, of course, the most numerous. But the sub-castes — to use Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff's phrase — have been exceedingly multiplied; and the lines of demarcation between them are strict. Thus ten great septs are reckoned of the Brahmins: five on the north, and five on the south, of the Vindhya range. And these are split up into a vast variety of divisions, the members of which cannot intermarry or eat together. Among the Mahrattas alone there are over two hundred castes.

Caste regulations are extremely arbitrary. Thus, in most parts of India the Kuman, or potters, are held to be a clean caste; in Guzarat they are regarded as exceptionally clean; but in the Central Provinces and Orissa they are considered unclean. There are various classes of Brahmins who, for one reason or another, are regarded as degraded, and who form, practically, castes apart. The "good Brahmin" will not intermarry with them, or even take a drink of water from their hands. It is notable that connection with the great Hindu temples involves this degradation: nay, even residence at a place of pilgrimage

² From *India and Its Problems*, by William Samuel Lilly; pp. 200-204. (London, Sands and Company, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

for a few generations tends to lower the status of a Brahminical family. But the Sompara Brahmins, who minister at the shrine of Somnath, appear to have escaped that social ostracism.

The principal rules of caste observed by Hindus at the present moment, Mr. Dutt tells us, in his work before quoted, are as follows: " (1) That individuals cannot be married who do not belong to the same caste; (2) that a man may not sit down to eat with another who is not of his own caste; (3) that his meals must not be cooked, except either by persons of his own caste, or by a Brahmin; (4) that no man of an inferior caste is to touch his cooked rations, or even to enter his cook-room; (5) that no water or other liquor, contaminated by the touch of a man of inferior caste, can be made use of — rivers, tanks, and other large sheets of water being, however, held to be incapable of defilement; (6) that articles of dry food, such as rice, wheat, grains, etc., do not become impure by passing through the hands of a man of inferior caste, so long as they remain dry, but cannot be taken if they get wetted or greased; (7) that certain prohibited articles, such as cow's flesh, pork, fowls, etc., are not to be taken; and (8) that the ocean is not to be crossed, nor any of the boundaries of India passed over."

To this let me add some weighty observations of Mr. Bhattacharya:

" The main agency by which caste discipline is still maintained to some extent is the religious sentimentalism of the Hindus as a nation. But in this respect there is no consistency to be found in them. For instance, there are lots of men who almost openly eat forbidden food, and drink forbidden liquors, and yet their fellow castemen do not usually hesitate to dine in their houses, or to have connections with them by marriage. But if a man goes to Europe he loses his caste, even though he be a strict vegetarian and teetotaler. Then, again, if a man marry a widow he loses caste, though such marriage is not in any way against Shastic injunctions, while the keeping of a Mohammedan mistress, which is a serious and almost inexpiable offence, is not visited with any kind of punishment by castemen. Similarly, a man may become a Brahmo, or Agnostic, and yet remain in caste; but if he espouse Christianity or Mohammedanism, his own parents would exclude him from their house, and disallow every kind of intercourse, except on the most distant terms: he cannot have even a drink of water under his parental roof, except in an earthen pot, which would not be touched afterwards by even the servants of the house,

and which he would have to throw away with his own hands, if no scavenger be available.

"The only acts which now lead to exclusion from caste are the following:

1. Embracing Christianity or Mohammedanism.
2. Going to Europe or America.
3. Marrying a widow.
4. Publicly throwing away the sacred thread.
5. Publicly eating beef, pork, or fowl.
6. Publicly eating *kachi* food cooked by a Mohammedan, Christian, or low caste Hindu.
7. Officiating as a priest in the house of a low class Sūdra.
8. By a female going away from home for an immoral purpose.
9. By a widow becoming pregnant.

When a Hindu is excluded from caste:

1. His friends, relatives, and fellow-townsmen refuse to partake of his hospitality.
2. He is not invited to entertainments in their houses.
3. He cannot obtain brides or bridegrooms for his children.
4. Even his own married daughters cannot visit him without running the risk of being excluded from caste.
5. His priest, and even his barber and washerman, refuse to serve him.
6. His fellow-castemen sever their connection with him so completely, that they refuse to assist him even at the funeral of a member of his household.
7. In some cases, the man excluded from caste is debarred access to the public temples.

"To deprive a man of the services of his barber and washerman is becoming more and more difficult in these days. But the other penalties are enforced on excluded persons with more or less rigor, according to circumstances.

"In the *mofussil* the penalties are most severely felt. Even in the towns such persons find great difficulty in marrying their children, and are, therefore, sometimes obliged to go through very humiliating expiatory ceremonies, and to pay heavy fees to the learned Pundits for winning their good graces."

3. Class Domination Defined³

All the class conflicts appear to be the consequence of that which we are accustomed to call "class dominance." The concept should be defined. Linguistic usage in this case is of two sorts, the one less inclusive, the other more inclusive. In the former case we understand by class-dominance the social dependency relations which result from the customary industrial connections between the upper and lower classes, between masters and slaves, between *entrepreneurs* and laborers, between creditors and debtors, between the strong merchants and the weak buyers. We have treated these relations in the whole of the preceding book. They rest upon the ground of private law. They have their origin in the spiritual, technical, economic culture of the persons concerned. They exert their share among the social influences of the situation according as morality, law, institutions, or civic constitutions are developed. The higher these latter have ascended, the easier it will always be to restrict or abolish the worst abuses incident to class dominance. In the second case we understand by class dominance (and this second sense is more correct: we are now using the phrase in this way) that dependence of the weak class upon the strong which comes about from the fact that the latter influences and controls the civic power, that the strong class exploits not merely its economic superiority, but the political power, the sovereign rights of the state, the machinery of government, for its special purposes, for its economic advantage. Wherever anything of this sort is the case the above-pictured abuses of private rights will be the more excessive. In this sense also we are concerned, under the concept of class dominance, with the more extensive, the more significant, the quasi-constitutional, concept of class dominance. This occurs not merely as a quasi-natural, never entirely alterable, phenomenon, but always at the same time as a degeneration, as a fact to be fought with all the means available. For it is a part of the essential idea of the sovereign power that it is to be used in the interest of the whole society, not in the special interest of a class. . . .

If we disregard very minute communities, consisting of members who are almost entirely equal, and which consequently are able to

³ From "Schmoller on Class Conflicts in General," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XX., No. 4 (Jan. 1915) pp. 509-515. Translated by Albion W. Small, from Schmoller's *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*.

govern themselves democratically by means of rotating presiding officers, and an assembly of all the citizens, not calling into requisition a compulsory force or machinery; with these exceptions all states of any size have developed a dominating civic power with far-reaching sovereign rights, with strong compulsory force, because power is essential to the nature of the state, because the domestic government of the state cannot possibly be on a high level without paramount power in the hands of the authorities, because the state cannot be strong against external enemies without this power. This power can never rest merely upon individual persons, and no more can it be exercised directly by the totality of thousands and millions of citizens. In order to be capable of decision and action it needs an organization of functionaries, of rulers and subjects, controllers and controlled. There must be groups of fighters, of priests, of noble families, of officials. The compact organization of these under a central head is the secret of the existence of the power of the state. With a chief or king supported by an aristocracy, a senate, we have the beginnings of all the higher civic constitutions of ancient times. The mass of the folk, originally participating in the national assemblies, sink more and more, even while retaining certain rights, to the condition of mostly passive members of the civic body. Slaves and serfs, moreover, have no voice at all. The kings, whose excesses and abuses were much more in evidence than their salutary functions, were, as we have seen, set aside by the aristocracy in Greece and Rome. The aristocracy, freed from control by a superior authority, easily fell eventually into the same abuses, and class dominance in the strict sense began. The attempt was made to reform the abuses by extension of civil rights to larger numbers—as in Rome by the admission of the rural plebeians. There was success along this line when, as in that case, the official and governmental laws were definite and comprehensive, and when the enfranchised had gone through a special discipline in the discharge of public duties. If this was not the case, there was danger that the masses would prevail with selfish, short-sighted, impossible demands dictated by class interests. Revolution and destruction followed. A dictatorship then became the only recourse. This has been the termination of almost all the great social revolutions and civil wars.

Accordingly the history of social classes and of constitutions in the larger and more complex states seems to run through the following

stages: (1) Establishment of a definite civic power, which rests exclusively upon the prerogatives of given monarchical or aristocratic groups. These narrow groups at first govern well and justly. In time, however, they fall into abuses of power, and class dominance begins. (2) The attempt is made to admit wider groups to power, electoral and legislative suffrage, and eligibility to office. At last the whole democratic mass is thus equalized. At first, if it is done wisely and temperately, this leads to good results, particularly so long as the administration remains in the hands of a firm, strong government. If the movement goes too far, if political incompetents gain too great influence, if the democratic masses acquire merely momentary advantage and profit, there follows, instead of the older aristocratic class control, the still worse democratic class control. All firm, secure civic leadership then ceases and with it all just government. (3) This can be prevented only if improvement and strengthening of the civic apparatus keeps pace in free states with the increasing influences of egoistic class interests. It is necessary also that the civic power shall remain in clean hands and shall continue to be stronger than the power and influence of the classes. This is possible through progressive development of a more and more precise and just constitutional and administrative law, by the education of civic officials of a non-partisan type in positions superior to class control, and who from highest to lowest govern state and society in harmonious coöperation.

We are thus in the presence of the perception that on the one hand there has been no folk of high civilization without certain onsets and inclinations toward class control; indeed, that all extensions of civil rights in the first instance increase the dangers of such class control; that, on the other hand, every folk of high civilization in the constitutional state has sought and to a certain degree has found in the development of the sense of law and of legal control a counterbalance against class dominance and abuse of civic power.

The evolution of the moral and legal judgment of countless generations worked toward the end that certain principles of law became the supreme power in the world. The most barbarous chief who administered law, or who professed to do justice, claimed to act in the interest of all. It became more and more necessary for all rulers to consider the total interests, and to restrain their class egoism. In spite of all retrogressions, of all new class abuses, history exhibits progress, which rests on the one hand upon growing insight into

political and social interdependences, upon increasing development of more refined sense of justice in the ruling and the ruled classes, and on the other hand upon the development of the legal institutions and the constitutional forms which hinder class abuses, and, in spite of those which cannot be prevented, make just government easier than formerly, and which consequently tend to assure to all classes their legitimate influence, while turning the mastery over to no single class. Of course this goal will never be fully reached. The great political movements however are incessantly making in that direction. . . .

Along with the entire phenomenon of the cleavage of classes and of passionate agitation for class interests, our modern literature and the press, much as they have also in certain cases served class interests first and foremost, have still been factors in developing a sound public opinion, the cardinal function of which is to be an emotional reaction against governmental and class abuses. Often as public opinion is petty and shortsighted and obstructive of reasonable reforms, yet at last it always flows into strong accord with the noble and the good, with right and truth. Every efficient and wise government has at last the support of public opinion, whenever it opposes class egoism and class abuses.

Government can do this the easier today because modern society in great states is never divided merely into *two* classes, a controlling and a controlled, but into a whole series of classes with very different interests. To be sure, even in those simple conditions in which only two classes were in question, a princely authority that was sure of its aims has time and again made common cause with the folk against an aristocracy hostile to the monarchy, and has strengthened its position by the policy. In ancient times all kingly power rested on this basis, as in later times the enlightened despotisms or the Caesarism of Cromwell and of Napoleon. Particularly was and is this true of the policy "divide and conquer," wherever a rural or an urban class of property-owners, or land-owners and manufacturers held each other in check, wherever in addition to these an aristocracy of money operators pursued independent interests, wherever an influential stratum of liberal callings had been formed, which, with little or no property, constituted a cardinal factor of government and of public opinion, and which voted now with the higher propertied classes, now with the lower and non-propertied. By the side of the aristocratic influential classes there is today in

most countries a large middle class of peasants, farmers, small artisans, and traders, ready to antagonize the class egoism of the upper and lower classes. All sorts of leagues of laborers with landed proprietors, with the bourgeoisie, with the middle class, occur today. The talented representative of a purely socialistic conception of the history of classes, Loria, admits this; and he makes it the explanation of most of the social advances that have thus far occurred. If the English Tories were the decisive factors in carrying through the English legislation for protection of laborers, and if Bismarck traded with Lassalle, and offered universal suffrage as his play against the bourgeoisie, these things are weighty evidences of the effectiveness of such combinations of different class interests and of their power to overcome opposing class interests.

We believe that we may thus prove that necessary internal causes of civic development can and will progressively limit class dominance. We have not therewith proved that class struggles will disappear. We may hope nevertheless that the types of their manifestation and the ways in which they will be settled will become better, fairer, and more reasonable.

4. Stratification as a Social Process ⁴

We seem to encounter a different order of phenomena [from the capitalistic interests] when we turn to the *rank interests*. These are of relatively little concern to Americans, except as we study comparative conditions in other States. In brief, however, the fact is that politically recognized social ranks are merely the survivals of successful struggle for advantage in respect to the primary interests. Men have tried to get the power of the civic and economic order permanently allied with themselves and their descendants, so that they would not be liable to the extremes of competition for means of subsistence, or for means of maintaining a relatively advanced standard of life. The larger the rights and customary claims of a rank in society, the farther they seem to be from any relation at all to primary needs. On the other hand, the people with the fewest privileges in the State seem to be concerned about those necessities of life alone to which the ranks are indifferent. The truth is, how-

⁴ From *General Sociology*, by Albion W. Small; pp. 247-279. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1905. Reprinted by permission.)

ever, that this indifference is merely the result of assured provision of the fundamental needs. The ranks have found a way of taking care of those preliminaries, so that they can devote themselves to something else. The masses are necessarily devoted to these fundamentals, because daily labor alone will secure them their daily bread. What the masses must secure by the hand-to-mouth process, the ranks have provided for by means of their privileged situation in the State. In short, rank, seen from the side of the individual interests that culminate in it, is genetically a labor-saving device, and is strictly a concession to the desire to escape disagreeable exertion. Seen from the side of the social interests that express themselves by sanctioning rank, it is an attempt to secure certain types of social efficiency. Every social rank strives, consciously or unconsciously, to assure its relative position in the economic and political process, so that, on the one hand, it may not sink back into the mass struggling for daily bread, and so that, on the other hand, it may have secure footing upon which to reach out after higher interests.

Whatever be the form of civic societies, each of them tends to stratification into the same essential components. There are always, either developed or developing, three chief groups: (1) *the privileged*; (2) *the middle class*; (3) *those without property, rights, or influence*. This stratification takes place at first not politically, but industrially. After people have attained some degree of economic prosperity, they attempt to assure their position by action in political groups composed of people similarly situated. They try to make their economic advantage permanent by surrounding themselves with institutional protection, or by providing themselves with means of defeating encroachments on the part of envious neighbors. We discover the beginnings of this process the moment nomads settle in permanent abodes. The individuals who act as umpires or referees in quarrels, who lead in battle or in religious rites, try to secure their place for themselves and their families. They may build up castes. They may succeed only to the extent of establishing hereditary offices. In all cases the same principle is at work. On the other hand, the State includes individuals who have neither skill nor power nor influence. These are gradually relegated by the others to permanent exclusion from the advantages of which the earliest skilled and powerful and influential had taken possession for their descendants.

In the third and fourth stage of development of the political

struggle, these two strata in the original stock are increased by the addition of the subject, or slave, stratum, taken in from conquered peoples. With this development we have the completed structure of ancient society, viz.: -first, the influential, dominant rank; second, the free rank; third, the slave rank. Under the influence of various circumstances, of which Christianity was probably most decisive, chattel slavery was at length abolished, but the lowest stratum remained relatively strangers to property, rights, or influence. It was only within the nineteenth century that these strata obtained real political standing as recognized factors in European States.

This process of adjusting, and even approximately equalizing, ranks is constantly going on as one of the incidents of the social process. On the other hand, stratification of ranks is at the same time always and necessarily present. We find societies which seem to be homogeneous masses. They have not developed visible structure. One man is apparently just what every other man is. Even in comparatively late times, approaches to this situation are found, under exceptional circumstances; *e.g.*, the members of our American colonies at the earliest periods of settlement; the citizens of the French Republic, say from 1789 to 1793; the pioneers of California in 1849. It is needless to say that even in these cases there was a certain division of functions, and a certain embryonic stratification.

Whether the division into ranks is clear or obscure, every society, whether ancient or modern, if it is in health, presently betrays distinct tendencies toward differentiation of ranks. There is a constant struggle against the prestige and privilege of those in superior social positions, on the part of those in lower positions. From the non-influential stratum a middle rank is always developing, and from this middle rank a quota is always forcing its way up into the privileged rank. The interest of the privileged rank is to keep its members as limited as possible. To this end institutional devices are invented, such as nobilities, aristocracies, patriciates, corporations of various kinds, like those of feudalism, chivalry, ecclesiasticism, etc.

In addition to these, arrangements of less rigid and legal sort are devised — modes of behavior and other externalities which serve to separate the sheep from the goats. Species of this genus are forms of social intercourse, styles of dress, amusements; in short, the whole realm of fashion.

Ratzenhofer ventures the thesis that fashion is primarily not an

affair of aesthetic taste at all, nor yet of love of novelty, but of politics: an incident and a means of social struggle. It is a method which the privileged adopt to make it difficult to intrude upon their preserves. The middle rank has no firm bond of coherence, because its members seize every opportunity to become, or seem to become, members of the upper rank. They are likely, in consequence of this tendency, to be constant traitors to their own class. The lower strata are usually inclined to deny their separateness as a rank; yet they constantly confront a condition of unsuccessful and exasperating rivalry with the middle class. Consciousness of this situation spurs them, at irregular intervals, to spasmodic class eruptions for violent adjustment of opportunities.

We may simply name, in passing, a specific differentiation of the rank interest, viz.: *the dynastic interest*. Although it has played a tremendously important rôle in history, we may restrict ourselves to bare recognition of it in the catalogue of social factors. More important in modern times, and particularly in America, is what we have called the *corporate interest*. We must remember that we are engaged in a teleological analysis of the social process, not a structural or merely a functional analysis. We are singling out separate interests, which create structure and stimulate function. At the same time, these interests combine in countless ways, and thus run across the structures which they produce. The content of the interests has been chiefly in mind, therefore, in our previous classification. The present detail is rather a form which nearly all the foregoing interests may take. That is, people who are pursuing identical or even similar purposes tend to recognize themselves as composing a body in society, distinguished by their interest, whatever it may be, from the rest of society. They are likely to keep that interest in mind, and to stimulate in each other attention to the interest. For instance, what we mean would be illustrated by the feeling which members of the criminal classes have for each other. Criminality is essentially un-social. Criminals work in as small groups as possible. Yet each criminal feels a measure of fellowship with all other known criminals, and of antagonism with the law-abiding portions of society. Other illustrations are the teaching body; the clerical body; the civil-service body; the military, medical, legal, and naval professions; employers; employees; etc., etc.

After all, this enumeration of interests is so general that it would

have to be accurately particularized before it would be of service in solving social problems, or even in stating the precise terms of actual social situations. Such a list as we have given is valuable, as far as it goes; but when we come to deal with the problems of civic progress in New York, or the problem of pedagogical reform in Chicago, or the problem of economic or political reform in Russia, we find that the situation has its setting within this general scheme of interests, to be sure; but we also find that the decisive interests are much more specific, and that these which we have enumerated are merely generic.⁵

Exercises

1. Discuss stratification as a social process, showing its range and importance.
2. Characterize the Northwest Tribes (Tlingit, Haida, Kwakiutl *et al.*) in this particular.
3. Define a caste.
4. What is its historical origin in India?
5. What is its relation to race differences? to conquest? to occupation? to religion?
6. Explain the caste-system of India in terms of culture stages.
7. Name and characterize the four great castes.
8. Name some caste taboos in general; some affecting membership in the caste.
9. According to Schmoller, what are the two fundamental forms of class dominance? In what sense is a dominant *class* different from a caste?
10. What is the secret of state power, and how does it become class domination?
11. Give the stages in the history of classes and constitutions. (Compare Reading 2 in the chapter immediately following.)
12. What conclusion follows from this, according to Schmoller, with respect to class domination?
13. What part do class oppositions play in developing constitutional liberty? Show exactly how the process works.
14. What is the probable future of class dominance? of class conflicts?
15. What is involved in Small's assertion that *rank* is a labor-saving device?
16. Describe the ranking-structure of ancient society. Has any society ever existed without ranks?

⁵ The general human "interests" named by Professor Small are those of Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty, and Rightness. See his *General Sociology*, p. 198.

17. Explain the statement that fashion is not an affair of taste but of politics.

18. What influences are constantly tending to create ranks in society? to reduce it?

Additional References

1. Collison, W. H.: *In the Wake of the War Canoe*. General view of the Northwest Tribes.

2. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*, Ch. XIX., "Conditions Favoring or Opposing the Growth of Caste."

3. D'Aeth, F. G.: "Present Tendencies of Class Differentiation," in the *Sociological Review*, Vol. III., No. 4. (Oct. 1910), pp. 268-276. Valuable statistical analysis of present tendencies in England.

4. Dealey, J. Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*. Ch. XX. "Social Gradations and Genius."

5. Goldenweiser, A. A.: *Early Civilization*, Ch. II. "The Flint and Haida of Northwest America." A fine brief description.

6. Holderness, Sir T. W.: *Peoples and Problems of India*, pp. 86-101. Exceptionably readable.

7. The Jesup North Pacific Expedition: "The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island." Report of above expedition, Vol. V., Part I.

8. Jones, L. F.: *Bulletin 30, Bureau of American Ethnology*. A study of the Flints of Alaska.

9. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Chapters XXVI-XXIX. Most searching account of the entire process of stratification available.

10. Woodburne, A. S.: "Can India's Caste System Survive in Modern Life?" in the *Journal of Religion*, Vol. II., No. 5 (Sept. 1922), pp. 525-532.

CHAPTER XXVI

EQUALIZATION OF OPPORTUNITY

THE process treated in this chapter is called simply "equalization" by some sociologists, but it amounts practically to equalization of opportunity, and we use that phrase because it is more familiar and hence seems less technical.

In the two chapters immediately preceding we have traced some of the stages by which social opposition crystallizes into a stratified social order, supremely exemplified in the castes of India. The present purpose is to show that a counter-process, namely equalization, is also at work in every human group. Even while the tendency toward the formation of social layers is most active and irresistible, this counter-process is present, tends to impede the advance of stratification, may hold it at a standstill for a longer or shorter period, and, as new conditions of life arise, undermines and finally overthrows it.

In its early stages the equalizing process takes the form of a mitigation of the rigors of caste distinctions and privileges, as shown in Reading 1. After castes, as such, are abolished by the overthrow of their *hereditary* feature, *classes*, often enjoying equally flagrant advantages at the expense of the masses, come to entrench themselves in forms less offensive but essentially unfair.

Then follows the long struggle for *democracy*, at first taking the form of a demand for equality before the law, and in political participation such as the exercise of the voting franchise and the holding of office. This great conflict is vividly passed in review in Reading 2.

But the abolition of castes and the forms of representative government together prove powerless to uproot special privilege and equalize opportunity in the fullest sense. The ancient enemy, exploitation, rises Phoenix-like from the ashes of its every defeat, but each time less odious, because less personal, and each time more dependent upon superior ability and service than upon aggression and entailed advantage.

In politically free countries this later stage in equalization takes the form of a growing sense of the rights of the people as a whole, whether these rights be envisaged as actual or potential. In either case the movement is reflected in court decisions concerning the public interest in enterprises long regarded as private preserves, and in what has come to be known as "social legislation." These are only two of the many tributary tendencies that unite into the great stream of

enlightened collectivism, earlier discussed in its broadest sociological bearings by Ward (Ref. 7), and clearly portrayed in Reading 3, by Professor Whitney, who has characterized it alternately as "the lessening sphere of individualism" and "the extension of the public interest." Whichever way it is stated, the movement represents a relatively advanced sub-process in the great process of equalization of opportunity.

1. Decline of Caste in India ¹

While it is quite true that caste still retains a grip upon the Hindu consciousness, yet indications are not wanting that the caste hold is in some small degree weakening. It is possible to indicate the movements that are at work in the direction of disintegration. The first of these influences is education. An educated man usually demands the right to enjoy the comradeship of other educated men, without respect to differences of birth. Moreover, he insists on freedom in the matter of choice of occupation, whether his choice happens to fall within the prescriptions of caste or not. The educated man declines to be bound by the orthodox regulations in regard to food. The old taboos have lost much of their hold. Even the old prohibition against caste men crossing the ocean or having to undergo *prayachitta* (a ceremony of atonement in which the subject has to partake of the five elements of the cow) on their return, is becoming a dead letter, and students who return from Europe and America, where they have quite disregarded caste, are received into Hindu society without prejudice.

But education is undermining caste not merely in the case of the educated, but also in the matter of treatment accorded to the less fortunately born. For education is inducing the spirit of social reformation and human brotherhood. Prohibitions against certain foods, against interdining and against intermarriage are declared to be contrary to progress and humanity. Organizations such as the Depressed Classes' Mission are definite attempts on the part of the caste communities to extend the privileges of education to those to whom it is forbidden by the regulations of caste, and this is but one phase of the tendency to accord as well as to demand social justice for all alike.

¹ By A. S. Woodburne, Madras Christian College, Madras, India, in the *Journal of Religion*, Vol II., No. 5, (Sept. 1922) pp. 532-537. (University of Chicago Press.)

A second influence that is working toward the corrosion of caste is the economic. India under the British Raj has become vitally a part of a larger world. Trade with Europe, America, and Japan has meant the introduction of commodities from these lands, enlarging the possibilities of the Indian market, and forcing competition upon some of the Indian industries. This has resulted on the one hand in a demand for broader economic opportunities than caste permits, and on the other hand in a necessity to choose other than caste-determined occupations through industrial rivalry. Even the Brāhman, with his inherited abhorrence of certain occupations of traditional pollution, will engage in the leather or any other business whereby he can be assured of a good income. Thus the old economic taboos are gradually but surely disappearing from the social consciousness. The expansion of transportation facilities within the past half-century has also stimulated the tendency toward disintegration. The railroad has on the one hand steadfastly refused to take cognizance of caste, and the low-caste man who pays for his ticket has the same right to a seat in any compartment where there is room as the high-caste man. On the other hand, this increase in transportation has made possible a great deal more movement among the people, and travel and new associations tend to break down conventions and to stimulate the spirit of freedom and adventure.

Another influence tending to undermine caste is the religious. The presence of Christianity has been more potent to that end than Islam. Mohammedanism recognizes no caste, but has neither emphasized education nor human brotherhood, so that its centuries in India have had little effect on the caste system. But Christianity has at once spread the light of science and the doctrines of equality and fraternity. Unfortunately there is an occasional community of converts which perpetuates its pre-Christian class consciousness; but for the most part Christians from all communities freely mingle in a common brotherhood. Moreover, Christianity has accomplished what orthodox Hinduism claimed to be the impossible in the elevation of the depressed classes. One of the by-products of this influence is to be seen in the reforming movements within Hinduism which seek the material betterment and the enlightenment of the out-castes in the interests of revitalizing Hinduism, and redeeming India from her social injustices.

Today there is a growing movement in opposition to caste from

the political angle. For the past quarter of a century India's political leaders have been holding before themselves and their fellow-countrymen the ideal of self-government. Increasingly these leaders of public opinion are expressing their conviction that political liberty cannot be attained without social liberty. Lala Rajpat Rai, the Punjabi leader, has declared caste to be "a disgrace to our humanity, our sense of justice, and our feeling of social affinity." Sir K. G. Gupta says that "the caste system has served useful purposes in the past, but it has not now a single redeeming feature." Dr. Rabin-dranath Tagore, the Bengali poet and prophet of internationalism, has said in frequently reported words:

"This immutable and all-pervading system of caste has no doubt imposed a mechanical uniformity upon the people, but it has, at the same time, kept their different sections inflexibly and unalterably separate, with the consequent loss of all power of adaptation and re-adjustment to new conditions and forces. The regeneration of the Indian people, to my mind, directly and perhaps solely depends upon the removal of this condition of caste." So there is a movement among the educated leaders in the direction of a direct repudiation of the old sanctions for the sake of a bigger, better India.

Still others are saying that the caste system must remain, but needs to be purged of its iniquitous features, and in the main of the doctrine of untouchability as applied to the out-castes. These men do not always define very clearly which features must go and which remain. Notably among the advocates of the inner reformation of the system is "Mahatma" M. K. Gandhi, the present leader of the Nationalist party. One of the insistent elements of Gandhi's program is the necessity of removing untouchability in the interests of attaining a solidarity, social and political. This is quite essential to the attainment and the maintenance of self-government. He further insists that social distinctions between Hindus, Mohammedans, Christians, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and Jews must give way, so that all the communities may make common cause the attainment of political liberty. In this effort Gandhi has a very influential following among Hindus and Mohammedans. The significance of this movement is far reaching. Never in her history has India attained so large a measure of national self-consciousness. And she is realizing in the person of her recognized leaders that one of the greatest barriers to the attainment of her national aspirations is this rigid social system.

The long historical associations of the system with all that is Indian, and its religious associations with all that is Hindu make it very difficult indeed for the Hindu to declare himself against it. Such a declaration, more especially where it is seconded by practice, demands great moral courage and determination. But men of moral insight are beginning to realize that the issue is clear. They stand faced with the alternative of caste reformation or abolition and national progress on the one hand, and orthodox adherence to tradition and the stifling of a national *esprit de corps* on the other hand. For no nation that shackles its personality by a system of social bondage can hope to achieve the possibilities of an unfettered life of progress.

There is another phase of the present political movement that is telling against caste. The progress of education has involved the training of a growing number of men from the lower castes who are able to take their places abreast of the Brāhman, and who resent the operation of any system which would rob them of the privileges they have earned. More especially from the great Sūdra communities a large number of such men have arisen, and the community of their interests has given them a group consciousness. Within the last decade this group mind has asserted itself in a definite political party, called the Non-Brāhman party. In South India the party has attained more strength than elsewhere as yet. It publishes a newspaper under the name *Justice* which is the medium of its platform. Sometimes it is known from the name of its organ as the Justice party. The avowed aim of the party is to put an end to the Brāhman ascendancy which has existed for centuries, and to place Non-Brāhmans instead of Brāhmans in office as rapidly as possible. Under the Reform Scheme which came into operation a year ago the Non-Brāhmans captured the majority of seats in the Madras Legislative Council, and the Council is led by Non-Brāhman ministers. Hitherto the Brāhman community, though only constituting about 3 per cent of the total population, has held 90 per cent of government positions. But the Non-Brāhmans have determined that this shall cease. Since they have come into power they are seeing to it that whenever possible vacancies that occur shall be filled with men of other than Brāhman castes. The success of the party in the Madras presidency is being watched and admired by other parts of India, and there are indications that it will spread as time passes. To be sure the movement is political rather than designedly social or religious. But the

influence upon the social and religious life is unavoidable. Occasionally one hears of a Brāhman priest being deposed, and a lower-caste man elevated to the priesthood. In the political arena, the Non-Brāhmans regard those of other religions as their allies. The continuation of the movement will in all likelihood involve much more far-reaching effects than any yet realized. Many Brāhmans feel that they see "the handwriting on the wall," and are beginning to prepare themselves for an inevitable change in the social order in which their ascendancy will be a matter of history.

Yet we must be guarded against hasty conclusions. The caste system is still a vital force in Indian life. It is still the recognized social organization for orthodox Hinduism. It took centuries to evolve, it may take centuries to devolve. The reforming movements are very powerful in the larger cities, but scarcely noticeable in the smaller towns and villages which hold the masses of India's people. But the reformation has begun and is gaining in impetus. We may well believe that India's final judgment on the caste system lies with the future rather than with the past.

2. The Evolution of Democracy²

No fact has been more firmly established by modern historical researches than the origin of the State in conquest. This is not a hypothesis, but a conclusion resting upon the inquiries of innumerable scholars, especially English and French: Stubbs, Maitland, Edward Jenks, and Fustel de Coulanges, to mention only a few. The conclusion has been reached by tracing the development of the State back into the earliest period of which we have written records.

The process is perhaps best illustrated in the constitutional history of England. If we take the English State, let us say in the sixteenth century, we find sovereignty vested in the King, Lords, and Commons, and that sovereignty extending over a definite geographical area. Moving backward in time we discover the methods by which the geographic unity was built up through conquest of smaller units. An analysis of the history of these latter units, as far as the records will permit, shows that each in turn was composed of still smaller elements

² By Charles A. Beard, in *Democracy in Reconstruction*, edited by Frederick A. Cleveland and Joseph Schafer; pp. 486-491. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919. Reprinted by permission.)

fused by the process of conquest. As the historian Gneist shows in his constitutional history of England, doubtless the pettiest kingdom of the Anglo-Saxon period, if we could but trace its history, was built up out of minor kingdoms of which no traces have come down to us.

A similar inquiry into the history of France reveals the construction of that geographic unity by the fusion through conquest of innumerable minor unities. A recent examination into the ancient history of Japan by a careful Japanese student, Siego Takahasi, of the University of Waseda, brings out the interesting fact that the story of the State in that Oriental Empire is substantially the same as the story of the State in the British Isles. The illuminating researches of a profound Hindu scholar, Benoy Sarkar, show us that from the dateless past the same process of state-building has been going on in Southern Asia — Akbar the Mighty desiring to stand by the side of William and the Count of Paris. Whoever questions this thesis or suspects with the ignorant that it is of Teutonic origin, will do well to read a remarkable little book by an English scholar of the highest standing — Edward Jenks — entitled the *History of Politics*.

The starting-point for the evolution of democracy is the origin of the State, for the roots of the present lie deep in the past, and the origin of the State is to be found in conquest and military rule. The State used in this sense means a definite and positive coercive power exercised by one man or a group of men over a people occupying a considerable geographical area.

When this definition is applied, it will be discovered, of course, that many institutions, even some coercive in character, lie back of the State, namely, communal institutions, patriarchal, tribal, and clannish organizations. The blood feud, and the "eye for an eye" code belong to the earliest stage of social evolution. In other words, society is older than the State, as the term is here used.

To speak concretely, we may outline the stages in the development of society and the State as follows, using the work of Jenks as a basis:

I. *Society before the State.*

1. Savage society without agriculture or domestic animals, and without those definite marital relations known as polygamy and monogamy.
2. Patriarchal society distinguished by property in domestic

animals, permanent marriage, the tracing of kinship through the males, and severe paternal authority. Examples of this type of society being found among the ancient Greeks, Jews, Romans, Arabs, Hindus, Japanese, Teutons, Celts and Highlanders. This is also the stage of social development, marked by the dominance of tribal religion and tribal law under the spell of the taboo. In this stage agriculture, metal-working, and the handicrafts are begun.

II. *The origin of the State.*

1. The development of the art of warfare — the increase of population causing a pressure on the means of subsistence and the increase in accumulated property tempting the bold to abandon agriculture and the handicrafts for the easier way, of conquest and exploitation through taxation.
2. The founding of the State. The State was established when a chieftain and his war band got permanent possession of a definite territory of considerable area occupied by a large number of people engaged in the arts of agriculture and industry.
3. The chief characteristics of the State thus formed are the predominance of military power, and loyalty to a sovereign exercising authority over the entire geographical area rather than to a tribe or organization based on blood relationship.
4. The early State, therefore, consists of the war lord who, after conversion to Christianity, became in Western Europe the anointed of the Church — the King — checked in the exercise of power by the members of his war band, who settled down upon the subject population as a hereditary nobility. Thus kings and warriors, as individuals, became institutions sustained by force and sanctioned by religion.

III. *The evolution of the State.*

1. The subjection of royal authority to institutional control by the military and the Ecclesiastical aristocracy — an illustration of this process being found in Magna Carta,

as any one will discover by reading McKechnie's profound study of that document.

2. The extension of State composed of the King and the aristocracy by the addition of representatives of the lower landed gentry and the higher bourgeois. This third stage in the evolution of the State was only completed by social revolutions, such as the Puritan Revolution in England, and the French Revolution of the eighteenth century.
3. The admission of the lower middle classes to sovereign power, as, for example, in the English Reform Bill of 1832.
4. The admission of the working classes to political power, as, for example, the English Reform Bill of 1867.
5. The admission of the agricultural laborers to suffrage, as, for example, in the Reform Bill of 1884.
6. The enfranchisement of women.

The progressive democratization of the State, it is true, has not followed the same logical process in all countries and there have been reactions as well as forward movements; but the grand result has been approximately the same throughout the nations of Western civilization. Moreover, the history of the United States differs from the history of European countries, in that the United States sprang from a nation in which the state-making process had been going on for many hundred years, and the agencies of the State—the army, the executive, courts of justice, and law-making bodies—and habits of obedience had already been well established. When the English colonies were founded in America the property-owners of England, for the most part, had won a share in the State, and that idea of the State was transferred to the new world. It is embodied in the colonial charters and laws which limit the exercise of the suffrage to property-owners and taxpayers—to freeholders in Virginia, and to freeholders and owners of personal property in Massachusetts, for example.

The history of the State in America follows along the lines of evolution in Europe; namely, progressive extension of the suffrage to groups and classes disfranchised in colonial times and under the first State constitutions. The white working men of New York were enfranchised under the constitutional revisions of 1821-26; an attempt was made

after the Civil War to enfranchise the black agricultural laborers of the South, whose position under slavery had been somewhat analogous to the status of the serfs from whom sprang the English agricultural laborers enfranchised under the law of 1884.

It is a matter for solemn reflection, after a review of the origin and evolution of the State, that up to the present time the work of democracy has been to conquer and control institutions already made by superior classes:

Executive agencies.

Councils and upper-class Parliaments.

Courts of law.

The common law made by courts of law.

Institutions of justice which were royal in their origin.

The jury system — which sprang undoubtedly from the Roman *inquisitio*, though older communal elements may have influenced it.

Municipal and local institutions.

Universities.

Secondary schools.

No doubt these institutions have been greatly modified and developed in the course of the process of democratization. No doubt also additions have been made to the original structures, but it will be remembered that in every case democracy has been at work on original materials created by other hands.

An English wag once remarked that everything in England was "royal" — the royal army, the royal navy, the royal mail, the royal courts of justice — and that only the debt was "national." The old titles are still retained, but the old institutions, like debt, have become national, subjected to democratic control.

Having conquered political institutions of royal and aristocratic origin, democracy is now at work on economic institutions. Here, too, democracy is attacking agencies and organizations built by master minds — gigantic railway systems stretching across whole continents, huge industrial concerns with employees as numerous as the subjects of ancient kings, revenues so enormous as to make the treasury of Henry VIII look like a poor-box of an orphan asylum. Along with the mighty state-builders of the past, the Akbars, the Mikados, the Norman Conquerors, and the Capetians, must rank the Rockefellers, Morgans, Vanderbilts, and Harrimans of our age. Democracy is at

work to subject to public purposes the magnificent economic structures erected by these creative pioneers — these mighty organizers of men, money, and materials. The task is magnificent beyond imagination. It falls in an age that has given the right to vote to Tom, Dick, Harry, Will, and even to Bridget and Jane.

Obviously, this task will try the ability of democracy as it has never been tried in any contest over parliamentary government, the tariff, or suffrage extension. In short, the supreme test of the power of the people to conduct government for themselves is now at hand. The achievements of the past, though splendid, throw little light upon the future. Those who work now must work under a sense of responsibility such as never has fallen upon those to whom it is given to teach or lead. The outcome can be seen by the eye of faith alone.

3. Extension of the Public Interest ³

It will seem a commonplace to the student of economic history to say that in the relations of men in industrial society there has been a struggle constantly between individualism and socialism, using the latter word in its most general sense. The conflict has not always been clearly defined; the words individualism and socialism have had, from time to time, a different content; and the great majority of men have not usually been conscious that they were living through and participating in such a contest; but, however interpreted, and whether understood or not, this has been the real nature of the forces which have been molding social relations and institutions now in one form and again in another.

If we draw on our scant knowledge of primitive peoples we note the transition from an individual economy, in which each supplied his own wants as far as possible, to a social alliance, for economic purposes, which took the form of a gens, a tribe, a clan, or a family. In more modern times the enlarging boundaries of the economic unit include, first, the manor, then the district — made up of the manors and the town — next the nation, and now the world. This suggests a steady progress from an individual to a social economy, but the real course has not been so smooth and uninterrupted as this. There have been numerous halts in the march, as when nations adopting

³ From *The Contracting Field for Individualism*, by Nathaniel R. Whitney, in *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. XVI., No. 4 (Oct. 1917); p. 303 ff. Reprinted by permission.

the mercantilistic philosophy and the nationalistic point of view sought to make themselves by means of protective tariffs and other restrictive devices almost completely self-dependent. There has even been retracement of steps at times, as, for example, when, during the latter part of the eighteenth century, the *laissez faire* philosophy impressed men as having a natural or divine approval. But, in spite of these delays, there can be no doubt in the mind of one who takes a bird's-eye view of the whole sweep of human history that the trend has been steadily away from individualism. This knowledge gives the modern socialist, and not without reason, his confidence in the inevitability of socialism.

As pilgrims participating in this never-ending crusade, which has been on the march since the earliest days of man, we are so shut in by the crowd about us that we are for the most part conscious only of the difficulties of the road and of our immediate surroundings. We pass new landmarks but they give us little idea as to our goal or the direction we are taking. This paper is designed to set up a few observation posts, from which we can look back over the road we have travelled and forward to the head of the column to see whither we are going.

The first aim of our observation will be to determine direction. Are we actually headed away from individualism, and, if so, how far from it have we departed?

That our steps are directed away from individualism is scarcely open to question. As soon as we raise our eyes from immediate surroundings and see our isolated experiences and observations in relation to other facts and experiences, we find that we have all been observing the same changes without realizing that these joint observations of changing conditions indicate pretty accurately the direction in which we are moving.

Students, especially in the allied fields of political science, sociology and economics, have been more and more conscious that the field for individualism is constantly narrowing. The clearest evidence in political science is found in the widening of the term "public service" and the rapid enlargement of the "police power" as there are manifested in legislative enactment and judicial decision. There has been a constant and rapidly increasing tendency to bring under public control businesses which formerly were regarded as strictly of private concern. Some businesses, such as railroading, have long been regarded

of special concern to the public, and, although they are owned by private individuals, their actions have been circumscribed by state authority. There is, then, nothing new in calling these public utilities and the service they perform a public service. But consider how this control has broadened even in the railroad business from a mere formal supervision to the detailed and constant control exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Now the railroads are required to keep their accounts in a prescribed manner; reports must be filed when demanded; even the number of men to be employed on the train is sometimes specified; the number of hours employees may work is limited; and the rates to be charged for service are fixed by public authority. Could public interference with private property go further than this without actual expropriation?

And the railroads are not alone in this class. One after another various private businesses have been brought under the regulations established by society in its own interest. As early as 1876, the Supreme Court in upholding a law which fixed the prices to be charged for storage in a grain elevator expressed the idea which now generally prevails when it said: "Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created."

The theory has long been accepted that when a business, even though privately owned, becomes intimately connected with the public so that it has the possibility of affecting for good or ill the public weal, such private business must submit to control by the people which it serves. The idea is not new, but the significant fact from the present point of view is the great number and variety of businesses which we are putting into this class of public servants. Within the last generation the charges of ferries, grist-mills, gas and electric lighting plants, telegraphs, stockyards, street railways, and telephones have been fixed by various legislatures. As a society we have been constantly reaching out and taking under our control the property of private individuals. Not only the property but even the formerly sacred private rights of individuals are invaded under the aegis of the public welfare. It need only be shown with sufficient clearness that the interest of society is

involved and immediately the right of the individual becomes of little weight. Vaccination, sanitation, and other prophylactic measures illustrate in common experience the extent to which social interest dominates our thoughts to the disparagement of the old theories concerning individual rights and privileges. . . .

This tendency to limit the individual's control over his private property in the effort of society to attain a certain social ideal is well illustrated in the philosophy underlying workmen's compensation laws. These laws provide for the payment of definite sums of money to injured workmen without regard to fault upon the part of the person making the payment. This amounts "to the taking of the property of one individual and handing it to another, not as a result of an expressed or implied contract, nor as damages for a tort, but because it is deemed socially expedient and just that the burden of the injury be shifted from the shoulders of him upon whom it first falls, to the shoulders of another."

This marks the adoption of the general theory of the socialist that no *a priori* limitations growing out of the nature of political authority can be used to prevent the state from doing what it can to secure the true interests of its people. The individual's rights to life, liberty and property have, however, in this country, been so fully guaranteed by constitutional provisions that it would seem that some of the most recent extensions of interference with the actions or property of individuals would be barred. But this expansion in legal reasoning has been accomplished through a broadening of the police power of the state.

To what extent can this power be invoked to curb private action in the handling of the individual's own property? There seems to be no assignable limit except the clear desire of the public. Even mere convenience to the public has been regarded as sufficient justification for the regulation of private rights. It seems clear from the foregoing that political science furnishes us with evidence to show that the direction of our march is away from individualism and toward some form of collective action, and the landmarks which we are leaving behind are designated "private property," "vested interests," "freedom of contract," and "*laissez faire*." . . .

The pilgrimage of mankind is unquestionably headed away from individualism and toward some form of socialistic ideal. What is the shrine; how far have we gone toward it; with what speed are we

moving? These are some of the questions we seek to answer by looking forward to the head of the column.

This paper has spoken of socialism as the shrine toward which the cavalcade is moving, but this word is not satisfactory because it is too specific. To each individual socialism connotes some fairly definite scheme of social organization, whereas the term as used here is intended to suggest no definite or predictable program of social reform. It is idealistic rather than real. Perhaps the column is following a mirage. Perhaps there is no possible form of social organization which will be satisfactory. But, at any rate, it is a much more attractive ideal than that of individualism. As we move toward this ideal, even though we may never reach it, we are constantly making the changes in the organization of industry and in life which we have noted and are developing a consciousness of our responsibility to our fellow-man and of his responsibility to us and all society, which makes life much richer and nobler than the crass individualism of several generations ago.

Exercises

1. Are stratification and equalization simultaneous or successive processes?
2. Indicate the principal stages in equalization.
3. How is education working for equalization in India?
4. In what way do the modern economic forces work against caste?
5. What is the effect of Christianity on caste? Compare it with other religions in this respect.
6. Show how political organization is affecting caste in India.
7. What are the chief characteristics of the early State, particularly in relation to personal domination, class control, and religion?
8. Name the steps in the evolution of the democratic State in England; in the United States.
9. Has democracy thus far shown any originality?
10. What is it now striving to capture?
11. How does Whitney picture the general trend of history?
12. What is the present tendency with respect to "public service" and the "police power?" (Cf. Ref. 3.)
13. Illustrate the extension of the public interest in the case of the railroads.
14. Name other industries where the same process is at work.
15. What bearing does workmen's compensation have on this whole tendency?
16. Does this trend from individualism toward the public interest indicate the oncoming of a socialistic state?

Additional References

1. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Ch. XII. treats of the results of exploitation upon the classes, and of their elimination.
2. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*. Ch. XX. "The Outlook Regarding Caste." (In U. S.) Ch. XXI. "Open Classes."
3. Ely, R. T.: *Property and Contract*. Vol. I., Ch. VII. Discusses "Property and the Police Power."
4. Giddings, F. H.: *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. Ch. V. "A Theory of History." Treats the rôle of human inequality, democracy, and the "urge to adventure," in a rapid sketch of world history.
5. Hayes, E. C.: *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. Ch. VIII. shows the necessity of social control if a just distribution of wealth is to be attained.
6. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Ch. XXX. "Equalization."
7. Ward, L. F.: *Pure Sociology*. Ch. XX. "Socialization of Achievement." See especially pp. 555-568.
8. Ward, L. F.: *Applied Sociology*, pp. 22-28. Distinguishes political and social freedom.

CHAPTER XXVII

SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

WE come now to co-operation, one of the two most fundamental social processes pointed out on an earlier page, the other being opposition. In coöperation, as the etymology of the word itself indicates, the forces within society *work together* toward common ends. This, of course, holds true in some sense under all circumstances—even opposition implying a certain degree of co-operation. One's opponent is indispensable if one is to have a fight, so that the *militarist* might speak, with entire truth, of "the dear enemy."

It follows from the above that social co-operation is a process that never ceases even during the darkest days of social stratification and exploitation. As Professor Ross has shown, caste reaches its bitterest depths only when the social inferior admits it into his very soul by acquiescing in his own degradation. This is profoundly true, and we may add that every case of exploitation and despotism in the world rests at bottom upon the fact that the victims always co-operate with their oppressors and so help to perpetuate the injustice from which they, themselves, suffer.

Regarded in this broad light, social co-operation presents a theme worthy of a whole volume. It becomes almost *the social process* itself. But the task of the present chapter is much more limited than that. We simply essay to illustrate here some of the subordinate processes upon which the great inclusive process of social co-operation rests.

These seem to fall under two or three categories. First is the fact that certain individuals have the power to dominate and impress the group. This individual ascendancy may rest upon personal ability or upon that unanalyzable sense of distance known as *prestige*. In Reading 1, Professor Webster shows that personal ability is by no means lacking even among primitive groups, as is commonly supposed. There is probably in such cases an element of prestige itself, as defined in Reading 2. By one or both these means leaders and followers are evoked in all groups, and they co-operate under the form of that relation.

In other situations the relation is reversed, and the mass dominates the individual, bringing about societal ascendancy. This may take the form of *consensus*, *i.e.*, the sharing of common ideas and emotions, as defined in Reading 3, and illustrated in Reading 4. In the latter passage, Bagehot's impressive account of the English monarchy shows that its inscrutable power is derived from the fact that the rank and

file of Englishmen all share similar emotions, sentiments, and notions of a certain kind with respect to it and its august and sacrosanct mystery.

In Reading 5, Professor Ross, who has long held the preëminence in the study of social control, shows how "from the interactions of individuals and generations there emerges a kind of collective mind evincing itself in living ideals, conventions, dogmas, institutions, and religious sentiments which are more or less happily adapted to the task of safeguarding the collective welfare from the ravages of egoism." (*Social Control*, p. 293.) This, manifestly, is still another source of social co-operation. That is to say, men co-operate because the social stage is so arranged and guarded that they have to play that part whether they completely wish to do so or not.

But according to Prince Kropotkin (Reading 6) there is an innate impulse toward mutual aid among men, and also among gregarious animals, which renders co-operation an irresistible expression of their very natures as social beings, and which accounts for much of the harmonious working together of the members of every group and species.

This chapter thus aims to show that social co-operation rests partly upon individual ascendancy, analyzable as superior ability, or inscrutable, as in the case of prestige; partly upon the ascendancy of the group either by the sheer weight of common feelings and ideas or by the machinery of deliberate social control; and partly as the spontaneous expression of the deep-seated impulse toward mutual aid.

A. INDIVIDUAL ASCENDENCY

1. Personal Ability¹

In the preface to *Social Control* Professor Ross declares that he began the work with the idea that "nearly all the goodness and conscientiousness" by which a community is held together can be traced to social influences. Further investigation, however, appeared to show "that the personality freely unfolding under conditions of healthy fellowship may arrive at a goodness all its own, and that order is explained partly by this streak in human nature and partly by the influence of social surroundings." Since these words were written more than sixteen years ago, something has been done, here and there, to set forth the actual contribution made by the "great man" to the society of which he forms a unit, but we still await the appear-

¹ From "Primitive Individual Ascendancy," by Hutton Webster, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XII., pp. 46-56. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1918. Reprinted by permission.)

ance of a work on "Individual Ascendency" as comprehensive, original, and path-breaking as was *Social Control*.

Sociologists have long been used to thinking of savage and barbarous peoples as firmly fixed in a "cake of custom." Such changes as occur in primitive society take place, we are told, not as the result of deliberate innovation, but rather in the way that fashions alter among ourselves, by scarcely purposive drifting. The crowd, rather than the individual, does the thinking. Emile Durkheim and his followers in the *L'Année sociologique* go even further, and see in the individual merely a product of social environment, the passive subject of social compulsion. *L'individu n'existe pas*. This ant-hill or beehive philosophy, it must be acknowledged, finds some confirmation in the accounts of uncivilized peoples which we have received from travellers as well as from trained anthropologists. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that closer acquaintance with primitive groups will show that they are very susceptible to the force of personality, that they do contain their share of eminent men, and that social progress, even in the lower culture, has been largely influenced by conscious leadership. . . .

Occasionally, after much reading of works of travel, one comes upon what Dr. Marett styles an "anthropological biography." A few instances of this sort may be cited, beginning with that of Jalina-piramurana, a headman of an Australian tribe fifty years ago.

"During the time I was with them there was only one headman who had supreme control over the whole tribe. From his extremely polished manners and his gestures I named him the Frenchman. He was feared and greatly respected by his own and by the neighboring tribes. Neither his two brothers, both of them inferior to him in bravery and oratorical powers, nor the elder men presumed to interfere with his will or to dictate to the tribe except in minor matters. It was he who decided disputes, and his decisions were received without appeal. Even the neighboring tribes sent messengers to him with presents of bags, pitcheri, red ochre, skins, and other things. He decided when and where the ceremonies of circumcision and initiation should take place. His messengers called together people from a circle of a hundred miles to attend the peace festivals (*mindari*), to attend his councils or in other matters which were considered to affect the welfare of the tribe. I have often been invited to attend his councils when they proposed to celebrate any grand ceremony. He possessed wonderful powers of oratory, making his listeners believe

anything he suggested, and at all times ready to execute his commands. His disposition was not naturally cruel or treacherous, as was that of many of the Dieri, but he was, when not excited, kind, considerate, patient, and very hospitable. I never saw anything low or mean in him. As a rule the Dieri, being separated from all but their own relations, speak ill of each other; but I never heard anyone speak of this man Jalina-piramurana but with the greatest respect and even reverence."

By the side of Jalina-piramurana, the Dieri headman, we may place two other figures selected from rude types of society. In his account of the natives of British New Guinea, Dr. Seligmann refers to the case of Geboka Namo as showing how greatly the influence generally wielded by chiefs can be exceeded when a suitable man arises. Geboka Namo is not only head of his own village, but all the members of the eastern section of the Garia tribe, to which he belongs, admit his authority and follow him to war, as they did his father before him. "His father, indeed, was so celebrated a fighter that the neighboring Sinaugolo asked him to lead them to war, and to this day the son Geboka Namo, who is recognized as the war chief of the Sinaugolo as well as of Garia, exerts a very real influence among the Sinaugolo." The third figure is that of Kuriolv, who Dr. Rivers declares almost entirely dominated the Todas at the time of his visit in 1902. Kuriolv acted as leader of the Toda council, or *naim*, a deliberative body of five or more members representing various clans. He was very intelligent and enjoyed a reputation for eloquence and great persuasive powers. When persuasion failed, he probably resorted to some kind of intimidation. "He seemed to me," says Dr. Rivers, "to afford an excellent example of the process by which one man may bring about considerable changes in the laws and regulations of a community; though I was told in several instances that the Todas would revert to their old customs as soon as Kuriolv died."

The opening up of the Pacific to European discovery revealed the fact that almost every island had its hereditary chief and that over some of the archipelagos reigned veritable kings. To William Mariner we owe an intimate account of the conditions which prevailed in the Tonga or Friendly Islands during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Mariner, a young Englishman of good birth and fair education, went to sea in the privateer "Port au Prince." After cruising in the Pacific for more than a year the ship put in at one of the Tonga

Islands, in the same place where Captain Cook had formerly anchored. Here nearly all the crew were murdered by the natives. For some reason Finau, the chief of Vavau, took a strong fancy to Mariner and gave orders that his life should be preserved. This formed the commencement of a friendship which lasted till Finau's death. Mariner lived within the chief's inclosure, and from one of the latter's wives received instruction in the language and customs of the Tonga people. Finau even adopted Mariner as his own son and admitted him to all his counsels.

"Finau's character, as a politician, at least in point of ambition and design, may vie with that of any member of more civilized society; he wanted only education and a larger field of action to make himself a thousand times more powerful than he was. Gifted by nature with that amazing grasp of mind which seizes everything within its reach, and then, dissatisfied with what it has obtained, is ever restless in the endeavor to seize more, how dull and irksome must have been to him the dominion of a few islands, which he did not dare to leave to conquer others, lest he should be dispossessed of them by the treachery of chiefs and the fickleness of an undisciplined army. His ever restless and ambitious spirit would frequently vent itself in such expressions as the following: 'Oh, that the gods would make me king of England! There is not an island in the whole world, however small, but what I would then subject to my power. The king of England does not deserve the dominion he enjoys; possessed of so many great ships, why does he suffer such petty islands as these of Tonga continually to insult his people with acts of treachery? . . . None but men of enterprising spirit should be in possession of guns; let such rule the earth, and be those their vassals who can bear to submit to such insults unrevenged.' "

A few years before Mariner began his enforced sojourn in the Tonga Islands the first English missionaries came to the shores of Tahiti. They soon succeeded in converting the king of the island, Pomare the Second, to Christianity. William Ellis has told us a great deal about this native ruler, who induced his people to destroy their idols and temples and forsake their heathen ways. Pomare learned to read and write, took a keen interest in the art of printing, fostered the establishment of a native missionary society, and promulgated the first Tahitian code of laws.

The conspicuous station Pomare had occupied in the political

changes of Tahiti, since the arrival of the missionaries, the prominent part he had taken in the abolition of idolatry, the zeal he had manifested in the establishment of Christianity, and the assistance he had rendered to the missionaries caused a considerable sensation to be experienced among all classes by his death; and as his name is perhaps more familiar to the English reader than that of any other native of the South Sea Islands, some account of his person and character cannot fail to be acceptable. . . . Tall, and proportionably stout, but not corpulent, his person was commanding, being upwards of six feet high. His head was generally bent forward, and he seldom walked erect. His complexion was not dark, but rather tawny; his countenance rather heavy, though his eyes at times beamed with intelligence. . . . He was, however, though heavy in his appearance and indolent in his habits, inquisitive, attentive, and more thoughtful perhaps than any other native of the islands; — a keen observer of everything that passed under his notice, although at the time he would not appear to be paying particular regard. He was not only curious and patient in his inquiries, laborious in his researches, but often exhibited a great degree of originality. I have sometimes been in his company, when he has kept a party of chiefs in constant laughter, as much from the coolness with which his expressions were uttered, as the humor they contained. He was not, however, fond of conviviality or society, but appeared to be more at ease when alone, or attended only by one or two favorite chiefs. In mental application Pomare certainly exceeded every other Tahitian; and, had he been free from practices which so banefully retarded his progress, and enjoyed the advantage of a regular liberal education, there is every reason to believe the development and culture of his intellect would have shown that it was of no inferior order. . . .

[Here we omit Professor Webster's accounts of the remarkable native African leaders, Dingiswayo and Chaka, whose achievements were principally along the line of military reorganization and conquest.]

The genius of Francis Parkman has made the name of the Ottawa Indian chieftain Pontiac familiar to all readers of American history. Having united most of the tribes northwest of the Ohio River, Pontiac planned a general uprising of the Indians against the British settlements from Fort Pitt to the Straits of Mackinac. Many frontier posts were destroyed, but the failure of the French to co-operate with

the Indians and the successful defense of the main points, Fort Pitt and Detroit, compelled Pontiac to relinquish his hope of driving the British from Canada. He made peace in 1765, and four years later was murdered by a Kaskaskia Indian.

Pontiac must have been a man of extraordinary executive ability. He created a regular commissary department based on promissory notes, these being written on birch bark and signed with the otter, the totem of his tribe. It is said that he employed two secretaries to attend to his correspondence and managed to keep each in ignorance of the business transacted by the other. Concerning his personality Parkman writes:

"The fact that Pontiac was born the son of a chief would in no degree account for the extent of his power; for, among the Indians, many a chief's son sinks back into insignificance, while the offspring of a common warrior may succeed to his place. Among all the wild tribes of the continent, personal merit is indispensable to gaining or preserving dignity. Courage, resolution, address, and eloquence are sure passports to distinction. With all these Pontiac was pre-eminently endowed, and it was chiefly to them, urged to their highest activity by a vehement ambition, that he owed his greatness. He possessed a commanding energy and force of mind, and in subtlety and craft could match the best of his wily race. But, though capable of acts of magnanimity, he was a thorough savage, with a wider range of intellect than those around him, but sharing all their passions and prejudices, their fierceness and treachery. His faults were the faults of his race; and they cannot eclipse his nobler qualities. His memory is still cherished among the remnants of many Alonquin tribes, and the celebrated Tecumseh adopted him for his model, proving himself no unworthy imitator."

Tecumseh, who took up and carried almost to a successful conclusion Pontiac's idea of a great federation of the native American tribes, was doubtless the most remarkable character in Indian history. Even his opponent, General William Henry Harrison, regarded Tecumseh as a genius and declared that were it not for the vicinity of the United States he would perhaps establish an Indian empire rivaling that of Mexico or Peru.

"He hated the whites as the destroyers of his race, but prisoners and the defenseless knew well that they could rely on his honor and humanity and were safe under his protection. When only a boy—

for his military career began in childhood—he had witnessed the burning of a prisoner, and the spectacle was so abhorrent to his feelings that by an earnest and eloquent harangue he induced the party to give up the practice forever. In later years his name was accepted by helpless women and children as a guaranty of protection even in the midst of hostile Indians. Of commanding figure, nearly six feet in height and compactly built; of dignified bearing and piercing eye, before whose lightning even a British general quailed; with the fiery eloquence of a Clay and the clear-cut logic of a Webster; abstemious in habit, charitable in thought and action, brave as a lion, but humane and generous withal—in a word, an aboriginal American knight—his life was given to his people, and he fell at last, like his father and his brothers before him, in battle with the destroyers of his nation, the champion of a lost cause and a dying race.”

All the biographical sketches which have been quoted agree in stressing the element of personal ability as the essential factor accounting for predominance. Strength of body and strength of will, unusual intelligence, a persuasive tongue, great energy, ambition, and force of character are the personal traits which raise a man above his fellows and constitute the leader. This is not to deny that other grounds for superiority may exist. In some parts of Australia age alone, unless accompanied by mental weakness is sufficient to insure influence. In the southern Melanesian Islands the chiefs seem to be those who rise to the highest rank in the secret societies. There are instances in North America and Africa where the richest man is he who rules his group. And Sir James Frazer has shown, by a vast collection of ethnographic evidence, how frequently among primitive peoples the magician has developed into the chief. To enumerate and illustrate all the methods by which men have secured authority in rude communities would form a valuable contribution to comparative sociology.

2. Prestige²

Prestige.—What we call prestige to-day is to be met with in every grade of permanent settlements of large numbers of people—from the Melanesian federations to the British Parliament, in connection

² From *Prestige: A Psychological Study of Social Estimates*, by Lewis Leopold; pp. 14-16, 21-22, 27-29. (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1913. Reprinted by permission.)

with the pearls of a barbarian barter, and on the New York Exchange. It propounds problems for leading articles and dramas, for budgets and wills. Often a miser is unable to amass it; a punctual man cannot keep it in order; and a spendthrift is unable to spend it. The most accurate book-keepers are incapable of showing the items of prestige in their yearly balance-sheets. Yet people are always alluding to it; it is feared and jealously guarded; sacrifices are made for it; it enables successes to be won, and serves as a cloak for weaknesses. Machiavelli commanded its entrance into princely courts; Retz and Richelieu drove the people away from it; Bagehot introduced it into the London Exchange, and, with a sarcastic smile, Schopenhauer recommended it to civil clerks as a supplement to their salaries. The want of prestige bars the way both of genius and of pushing intruders, of wise men and of parvenus; the book of a genius, if devoid of the help of prestige, is liable to moulder in the cellars of its publisher, even if it does not remain unwritten, for a genius without prestige often doubts his own strength and is himself under the unreasonable spell of those who impress by distance. And, though perhaps unable to harm an invention that is evident (because it has become a universal necessity), the want of prestige throws a thousand obstacles in the way of initiation, of the work of pioneering and experimenting; a professor of moderate capacity, who has no practical success to boast of as yet, has far less difficulty in finding a capitalist to finance his invention than a clever, ingenious mechanic in a blue overall, with his humble way of putting his case: most invalids would much rather trust their lives to a pompous professor practising in the capital than to the cleverest country practitioner: an artist without prestige has a veritable Calvary to go through before he can realize his compositions, his pictures, his carvings, or his skill with the violin; a commonplace furnished with prestige reaps far more tumultuous applause than an idea which possesses a logical value only but has no prestige: a man possessed of prestige is spared by the biting wit of the critic, the vindictiveness of his opponent, the sarcasm of the crown, and the suspicion of the magistrate, while the Aphrodite of Whitechapel, having no prestige, is driven to the brothel.

Luckily, however, prestige aids not only what is wrong, bad, and ugly, but what is true, good and beautiful too. Prestige does not necessarily involve the fall of truth, goodness, beauty; it merely

means that they have a dangerously common denominator, and may be confounded with untruth, badness, ugliness. Prestige may be a plant of protection for truth, goodness, and beauty, in the stiff, frozen world of a-logic, an-ethics, and an-aestheticism, allowing the value of nobility, too, an associative protection and a possibility of subsistence in permanency and mass. . . .

The use of the word "prestige."—Apart from any logical development that may have led to the present meaning of our word—even supposing the whole to be a mere change of significance, a mere "word-slide"—there can be no doubt that the pebbles of the ancient meaning have rolled along with the word. We state something of some one when we say that he possesses prestige; but our statement is not clear, and the predicate cannot be distinguished from the subject. It seems to be a fundamental value, not to be subjected to any other fundamental value—a sentiment like a value inclining towards misty, distant lines, which can scarcely be conceived as a reflected, intellectual phenomenon. We are unable to localize it otherwise than in person and are bound to refer it to a whole individual: but, as a sentiment, its limits become dimmed, it spreads "like a spot of oil" over the whole associative breadth of the supposed person, is automatically renewed, and seems absolute. Of what is analysable, well-known, commonplace, soulless habit, of what we succeed in understanding thoroughly, in attaining or imitating, we do not say that it possesses prestige. . . .

Prestige and Authority.—We have defined the distinction between prestige and public esteem: the boundaries of the two conceptions are demarcated by the surplus of personality in prestige, by its distinctiveness and irregularity. Do we find any difference in such cases too, where the individual is just as strongly emphasized—in the cases of persons enjoying not public, but peculiar esteem, who obtain recognition on account not of their absolute importance with the masses, but of their individual "specific gravity?" The man we have seen enjoying public esteem is the *integer vir scelerisque purus*, to whom a national respect is due—seeing that in common valuation the exchange of respect among persons capable of giving something in return, among people of the same manners, of a like class and of similar tastes is reasonable so long as none of them breaks through the bounds of the common sense. A man sharing in such expressions of approval does not make, but only obeys rules; he himself is a passive element

in the social order; in fact, his prime merit consists in being more effectually passive than the average and commonplace man — not to speak of those who commit breaches of social order. Such an individual or group does not supplant new conceptions or values; on the contrary, every movement of his is a strict compliance with the conceptions and values that have already become common currency — thus taking almost literally the teaching of the Gospel with reference to the Old Testament, “Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil” (Matt. V. 17). In the case of public esteem we have to deal not with a superiority of quality, but simply with a difference of quantity, a multiplication of the average.

Yet the difference of quality, too, is twofold in social matters. There are differences of quality that may be reduced to one of quantity and are to be rationally valued — the following, esteeming, and requiring of which is an intellectual phenomenon: and there are differences of quality that admit of no such reductions. I have found a few telling remarks in an essay by Professor E. A. Ross, which practically coincide with what I wish to say. Our civilization, he says, contains elements which strive after expansion by means of rational imitation, as, for instance practical crafts and sciences. In each of them we find authorities who are acknowledged and followed. And it could scarcely be otherwise, considering the enormous advantages of specialization. However, the basis of authorities of this kind is not prestige, but previous success. Consequently, says Professor Ross, it is quite rational to treat as an authority a general, who has won all his battles; a lawyer, who has never lost a case; a doctor, all of whose patients have recovered: but it is just as rational to withdraw our confidence from an engineer whose bridge collapses or an astronomer whose prognostications do not come true. The division of labor snatches the values of men out of our hands; but the respect due to them — the *authority* of the craftsman, the doctor, the clergyman, the teacher, and the farmer — is not irrational as long as we know *at what angle* the trend of their knowledge, conduct, and power diverges from our own. Our respect is not prestige as long as we are able, in the qualities and conduct of those before whom we bow, to define the point beyond which, as well as that up to which, we are incapable of following them. In this case their isolation is not absolute: they are the ramifications of a common trunk which, though they

grow widely apart and in knotty profusion, are connected by their whole being with the parent trunk and are organically united to every shoot of the same. A man who in my eyes possesses authority, is not the plural of my *ego*, but virtually my own self: I feel that — maybe at the cost of enormous pains, perhaps by dint of labor as hard as Jacob's when he tended those sheep — I feel that it is not a mere absurd dream that I may one day attain to what makes him an authority in my eyes and prevails on me to seek his company, to follow him and bow before him. Authority has a "specific gravity" of its own; it requires special appreciation and individual judgment — though not of a personal or exclusive character, and we are able to take our measure of it ourselves. How different the impressions made by the dominant-psychical object of our admiration! Evidently the *dominant-physical* character in itself shows decisively the importance of the impressions, recollections, and anticipations of the masses in respect of it: the recipient sees, hears, and reproduces, and expects of the man of prestige this or that impression; but the required standard he is unable to set up in himself or establish of himself. He is compelled to acquire such standard from the man of prestige, whom he is therefore incapable of measuring and discovering to be great or little by virtue of his own scale of judgment. The recipient does not observe the angle at which the man of prestige diverges from him; cannot demarcate the directions in which he would be able to follow him; and is unable to do anything with him intellectually. The impressions gained of the man of prestige themselves act as rules for guidance; and sentiment, not being under the restraint of conception, receives this tyrant of intellect with old-world warmth.

B. SOCIETAL ASCENDENCY

1. Consensus:

(a) Defined ³

Society exists through a process of transmission, quite as much as biological life. This transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older to the younger.

³ From *Democracy and Education*, by John Dewey; pp. 5-6. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1921. [First edition 1916]. Reprinted by permission.)

Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions from those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life could not survive.

Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge — a common understanding — likemindedness, as the sociologists say. Such things cannot be passed physically from one to another, like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces. The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions — like ways of responding to expectations and requirements.

Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity any more than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles removed from others. A book or a letter may institute a more intimate association between human beings separated thousands of miles from each other than exists between dwellers under the same roof. Individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for a common end. The parts of a machine work with a maximum of coöperativeness for a common result, but they do not form a community. If, however, they were all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a community. But this would involve communication. Each would have to know what the other was about and would have to have some way of keeping the other informed as to his own purpose and progress. Consensus demands communications.

We are thus compelled to recognize that within even the most social group there are many relations which are not as yet social. A large number of human relationships in any social group are still upon the machine-like plane. Individuals use one another so as to get desired results, without reference to the emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of those used. Such uses express physical superiority, or superiority of position, skill, technical ability, and command of

tools, mechanical or fiscal. So far as the relations of parent and child, teacher and pupil, employer and employee, governor and governed, remain upon this level, they form no true social group, no matter how closely their respective activities touch one another. Giving and taking of orders modifies action and results, but does not of itself effect a sharing of purposes, a communication of interests.

(b) Consensus and Prestige in the Government of England ⁴

The use of the Queen, in a dignified capacity, is incalculable. Without her in England, the present English Government would fail and pass away. Most people when they read that the Queen walked on the slopes at Windsor — that the Prince of Wales went to the Derby — have imagined that too much thought and prominence were given to little things. But they have been in error; and it is nice to trace how the actions of a retired widow and an unemployed youth become of such importance.

The best reason why Monarchy is a strong government is, that it is an intelligible government. The mass of mankind understood it, and they hardly anywhere in the world understand any other. It is often said that men are ruled by their imaginations; but it would be truer to say that they are governed by the weakness of their imaginations. The nature of a constitution, the action of an assembly, the play of parties, the unseen formation of a guiding opinion, are complex facts, difficult to know, and easy to mistake. But the action of a single will, the fiat of a single mind, are easy ideas: anybody can make them out, and no one can ever forget them. When you put before the mass of mankind the question, "Will you be governed by a king, or will you be governed by a constitution?" the inquiry comes out thus — "Will you be governed in a way you understand, or will you be governed in a way you do not understand?" The issue was put to the French people; they were asked, "Will you be governed by Louis Napoleon, or will you be governed by an assembly?" The French people said, "We will be governed by the one man we can imagine, and not by the many people we cannot imagine. . . ."

A *family* on the throne is an interesting idea also. It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life. No feeling could

⁴ From *The English Constitution*, by Walter Bagehot; pp. 101-102; 106-107; 112-113; 119-120; 127-128. (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1887.)

seem more childish than the enthusiasm of the English at the marriage of the Prince of Wales. They treated as a great political event, what, looked at as a matter of pure business, was very small indeed. But no feeling could be more like common human nature as it is, and as it is likely to be. The women — one half the human race at least — care fifty times more for a marriage than a ministry. All but a few cynics like to see a pretty novel touching for a moment the dry scenes of the grave world. A princely marriage is the brilliant edition of a universal fact, and as such, it rivets mankind. We smile at the *Court Circular*; but remember how many people read the *Court Circular*! Its use is not in what it says, but in those to whom it speaks. They say that the Americans were more pleased at the Queen's letter to Mrs. Lincoln, than at any act of the English Government. It was a spontaneous act of intelligible feeling in the midst of confused and tiresome business. Just so a royal family sweetens politics by the seasonable addition of nice and pretty events. It introduces irrelevant facts into the business of government, but they are facts which speak to "men's bosoms" and employ their thoughts.

To state the matter shortly, Royalty is a government in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions. A Republic is a government in which that attention is divided between many, who are all doing uninteresting actions. Accordingly, so long as the human heart is strong and the human reason weak, Royalty will be strong because it appeals to diffused feeling, and Republics weak because they appeal to the understanding. . . .

A principal reason why the monarchy so well consecrates our whole state is to be sought in the peculiarity many Americans and many utilitarians smile at. They laugh at this "extra," as the Yankee called it, at the solitary transcendent element. They quote Napoleon's saying, "that he did not wish to be fatted in idleness," when he refused to be grand elector in Sièyes' constitution, which was an office copied, and M. Thiers says, well copied, from constitutional monarchy. But such objections are wholly wrong. No doubt it was absurd enough in the Abbé Sièyes to propose that a new institution, inheriting no reverence, and made holy by no religion, should be created to fill the sort of post occupied by a constitutional king in nations of monarchical history. Such an institution, far from being so august as to spread reverence around it, is too novel and artificial to get reverence for itself; if, too, the absurdity could anyhow be augmented, it

was so by offering an office of inactive uselessness and pretended sanctity to Napoleon, the most active man in France, with the greatest genius for business, only not sacred, and exclusively fit for action. But the blunder of Sièyes brings the excellence of real monarchy to the best light. When a monarch can bless, it is best that he should not be touched. It should be evident that he does no wrong. He should not be brought too closely to real measurement. He should be aloof and solitary. As the functions of English royalty are for the most part latent, it fulfills this condition. It seems to order, but it never seems to struggle. It is commonly hidden like a mystery, and sometimes paraded like a pageant, but in neither case is it contentious. The nation is divided into parties, but the Crown is of no party. Its apparent separation from business is that which removes it both from enmities and from desecration, which preserves its mystery, which enables it to combine the affection of conflicting parties—to be a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol. . . .

Refined and original observers have of late objected to English royalty that it is not splendid enough. They have compared it with the French Court, which is better in show, which comes to the surface everywhere so that you cannot help seeing it, which is infinitely and beyond question the most splendid thing in France. They have said, "that in old times the English Court took too much of the nation's money, and spent it ill; but now, when it could be trusted to spend well, it does not take enough of the nation's money. There are arguments for not having a Court, and there are arguments for having a splendid Court; but there are no arguments for having a mean Court. It is better to spend a million in dazzling when you wish to dazzle, than three-quarters of a million in trying to dazzle and yet not dazzling." There may be something in this theory; it may be that the Court of England is not quite as gorgeous as we might wish to see it. But no comparison must ever be made between it and the French Court. The Emperor represents a different idea from the Queen. He is not the head of the State; he *is* the State. The theory of his government is that every one in France is equal, and that the Emperor embodies the principle of equality. The greater you make him, the less, and therefore the more equal, you make all others. He is magnified that others may be dwarfed. The very contrary is the principle of English royalty. As in politics it would lose its principal

use if it came forward into the public arena, so in society if it advertises itself it would be pernicious. We have voluntary show enough already in London; we do not wish to have it encouraged and intensified, but quieted and mitigated. Our Court is but the head of an unequal, competing, aristocratic society: its splendor would not keep others down, but incite others to come on. It is of use so long as it keeps others out of the first place, and is guarded and retired in that place. But it would do evil if it added a new example to our many examples of showy wealth — if it gave the sanction of its dignity to the race of expenditure. . . .

. . . Above all things our royalty is to be revered, and if you begin to poke about it you cannot reverence it. When there is a select committee on the Queen, the charm of royalty will be gone. Its mystery is its life. We must not let in daylight upon magic. We must not bring the Queen into the combat of politics, or she will cease to be revered by all combatants; she will become one combatant among many. The existence of this secret power is, according to abstract theory, a defect in our constitutional policy, but it is a defect incident to a civilization such as ours, where august and therefore unknown powers are needed, as well as known and serviceable powers.

2. Social Control⁵

Even in a mining camp, the issues are not always between man and man. In the keeping of arms or whisky from the Indians, or in the limiting of gambling, there comes to light a collective interest which only collective action can protect. There are offences that exasperate the group as well as offences that arouse the ire of the individual. In this common wrath and common vengeance lies the germ of a social control of the person.

So far as the fruits of a common enterprise can be reaped in full by the participants, coöperation may be left entirely free; but when the benefits of a coöperation will redound to the group as a whole and be enjoyed by all alike, it is necessary that all be required to assume their due share of the burden. Among the earliest signs of collective pressure is the endeavor to make kickers, cowards, and shirkers take part

⁵ From *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order*, by Edward Alsworth Ross; pp. 49-52, 53, 56-57, 59. (New York. Copyrighted by the Macmillan Company, 1901. Reprinted by permission.)

in joint undertakings which benefit all. Among the Iowa settlers the first symptom of contractile power in the social tissue appeared in the community defense of cases to test squatter land titles. Along the river the building of the levee is the first occasion for compulsory co-operation. In Egypt and China, the early river monarchies, the care of the waters had much to do with forming the state. In new lands, defense against the aborigines is the chief community interest and overrides masterfully the timidity or apathy of individual settlers.

In complex co-operation even the willing need an authority over them, for success implies such a delicate poise of numerous individual performances that the Word must go forth and with power. This is why warfare, the great primary co-operation, is usually the mother of discipline. The old Germans lived in absolute personal independence. Nevertheless, when they went on the war-path, they chose a war chief and gave him power of life and death. At the close of the campaign this authority disappeared with the occasion that called it into being; but when the war became chronic, the war chief held over through peace times, and his power became the embryo of the state.

Even in peaceful communities, the greater propinquity that comes with social growth and the greater intimacy of men in their dealings and relations subjects the natural order to a breaking strain. Friction wears away the good-will that prevails when men live "in open order." Disputes multiply and with them occasions for disturbance of the peace. Says Mr. Shinn of the mining camps: "How could there be much lawlessness when so few temptations to crime, and so few opportunities for its commission, existed? Men could quarrel, could steal, could kill each other; but nine out of ten of the misdemeanors and crimes that appear in the docket of an ordinary criminal court were impossible in the mining camps, while ninety-nine hundredths of the ordinary civil cases were equally out of the question. Land titles all similar, transfers verbal, commercial transactions for cash, borrowing and lending simply a matter between individuals — the best of lawyers would have starved in such a community. As society grew more complex, temptations and opportunities increased. . . ."

In every cluster there are predatory persons — moral idiots or moral lunatics, who can no more put themselves in the place of another, than the beast can enter into the anguish of its prey, or the parasite sympathize with his host. Even in a free and fluid association like the mining camp, there were "mean" and "low-lived" men; but in an

old society these degenerates, "sports," and men of prey constitute a formidable fraction. Now greater propinquity and growing complexity of relation give this class more power to do harm. Just as when men form a line for passing water at a fire, the man who spills or pours out some of the contents of each bucket he passes does more harm than when each man handles a bucket of his own; so when men who have been working apart enter into intricate co-operations, the mean man finds it easier to prey and inflict damage upon the others, and the individual reaction is less able to hold him in check. The development of mutual aid and higher forms of organization, therefore, necessarily thrusts upon society the problem of controlling the delinquent class.

The simplicity of the mining camp or the backwoods settlement is sure to vanish. Society, at first a direct association of men, becomes a congeries of associations, and the fellowship bond dissolves away. As population thickens we mark the genesis of sects and clans, each of them a natural community which forbids society to remain a natural community. The sect being a true social cell enjoys a natural order. It monopolizes sympathies. It becomes the object of devotion. It instigates heroism. It has its martyrs. It has, in fact, everything that society ought to have, and yet is only a segment or fragment of the mass. Hence the antipathies of sects threaten to tear society to pieces. The drawing apart into opposing camps of poor and rich, capitalist and worker, functionary and citizen, civilian and soldier, as well as the race enmity of white and black, or yellow and white, or Christian and Jew, summons society to act or perish. The folk mass becomes a dangerous compound ready to explode at a touch. Unless the all-inclusive group finds means to assimilate and reconcile its members and weaken the ties that bind men into minor groups, the social order will be disrupted. In the struggle for order, therefore, the group is not always pitted against the person, the social against the individual interest. It is often the big group against the little group, society against the sect or clan. And the danger is from fanatic and sectary, zealot and partisan, as well as from the egoist. Society must muzzle Jesuit and Mafioté, conspirator and anarchist, as well as the man of prey. . . .

Private property is . . . a great transforming force which acts almost independently of the human will. It has an evolution of its own, and the time comes at last when it violently thrusts men apart,

in spite of all their vows to draw closer together. As it warps society farther and farther from the pristine equality that brings out the best in human nature, there is need of artificial frames and webs that may hold the social mass together in spite of the rifts and seams that appear in it. Property is, therefore, the thing that calls into being *rigid* structures. It is the reagent that precipitates hard crystals, the lime that changes gristle into bone. . . .

The effect of conquest and the fastening of one race upon another as parasite is the razing of the natural community. The violent superposition of people on people forbids the establishment of the primal moral bonds between the upper and the lower. In the composite society, therefore, order seems to be wholly a creation of state and law, and its thinkers are apt to form too low an estimate of the social capabilities of human nature. Although the social fabric is at first held together by sheer force of arms, time gradually masks naked might, and moral and spiritual influences partly replace brute force. It is in the composite society, then, where the need of control is most imperative and unremitting, that the various instruments of regulation receive their highest form and finish. Here has been perfected the technique of almost every kind of control.

It may be that if society refrained from all control of its members, a natural order would arise. But such an order is crude and imperfect compared with artificial order, and the penalites of putting up with it are certain very grave and obvious general evils. . . .

It is, in fact, impossible to reap the advantages of high organization of any kind — military, political, industrial, commercial, educational — save by restraints of one kind or another. If the units of a society are not reliable, the waste and leakage on the one hand, or the friction due to the checks and safeguards, required to prevent such loss on the other hand, prove so burdensome as to nullify the advantages of high organization and make complicated social machinery of any kind unprofitable.

Men are therefore in chronic need of better order than the natural moral motives will provide. At this point and at that point they gradually become sensible of a drag on their prosperity. They find themselves in the presence of a degree of discord, collision, and general unreliability which shuts them out of real material advantages. Better order becomes "a long-felt want," and it would be most surprising if this "demand" called forth no "supply." If in their collective

capacity men did not find a means of guiding the will or conscience of the individual member of society, they would here betray a lack of enterprise they show nowhere else. The elementary personal struggle threatens the general prosperity just as the swollen river or the wild-fire. And if men raise levees and fire-brakes against the natural forces, why not against the human passions? Provided it be possible, a group control of conduct is, therefore, just what we should look for. The wonder would be if it were lacking.

C. MUTUAL AID

The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history. It was chiefly involved during periods of peace and prosperity; but when even the greatest calamities befell men — when whole countries were laid waste by wars, and whole populations were decimated by misery, or groaned under the yoke of tyranny — the same tendency continued to live in the villages and among the poorer classes in the towns; it still kept them together, and in the long run it reacted even upon those ruling, fighting, and devastating minorities which dismissed it as sentimental nonsense. And whenever mankind had to work out a new social organization, adapted to a new phasis of development, its constructive genius always drew the elements and the inspiration for the new departure from that same ever-living tendency. New economical and social institutions, in so far as they were a creation of the masses, new ethical systems, and new religions, all have originated from the same source, and the ethical progress of our race, viewed in its broad lines, appears as a gradual extension of the mutual-aid principles from the tribe to always larger and larger agglomerations, so as to finally embrace one day the whole of mankind, without respect to its divers creeds, languages, and races.

After having passed through the savage tribe, and next through the village community, the Europeans came to work out in mediaeval times a new form of organization, which had the advantage of allowing great latitude for individual initiative, while it largely responded

⁶ From *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*, by P. Kropotkin; pp. 168-172, 204-207. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1916. Reprinted by permission. First published as a series of articles in the *Nineteenth Century*, 1890-1896, appearing in book form first in 1902.)

at the same time to man's need of mutual support. A federation of village communities, covered by a network of guilds and fraternities, were called into existence in the mediaeval cities. The immense results achieved under this new form of union—in well-being for all, in industries, art, science, and commerce—were discussed at some length in two preceding chapters, and an attempt was also made to show why, towards the end of the fifteenth century, the mediaeval republics—surrounded by domains of hostile feudal lords, unable to free the peasants from servitude, and gradually corrupted by ideas of Roman Caesarism—were doomed to become a prey to the growing military States.

However, before submitting for three centuries to come, to the all-absorbing authority of the State, the masses of the people made a formidable attempt at reconstructing society on the old basis of mutual aid and support. It is well known by this time that the great movement of the reform was not a mere revolt against the abuses of the Catholic Church. It had its constructive ideal as well, and that ideal was life in free, brotherly communities. Those of the early writings and sermons of the period which found most response with the masses were imbued with ideas of the economical and social brotherhood of mankind. The "Twelve Articles" and similar professions of faith, which were circulated among the German and Swiss peasants and artisans, maintained not only every one's right to interpret the Bible according to his own understanding, but also included the demand of communal lands being restored to the village communities and feudal servitudes being abolished, and they always alluded to the "true" faith—a faith of brotherhood. At the same time scores of thousands of men and women joined the communist fraternities of Moravia, giving them all their fortune and living in numerous and prosperous settlements constructed upon the principles of communism. Only wholesale massacres by the thousand could put a stop to this widely-spread popular movement, and it was by the sword, the fire, and the rack that the young States secured their first and decisive victory over the masses of the people.

For the next three centuries the States, both on the Continent and in these islands, systematically weeded out all institutions in which the mutual-aid tendency had formerly found its expression. The village communities were bereft of their folk-motes, their courts and independent administration; their lands were confiscated. The guilds

were spoliated of their possessions and liberties, and placed under the control, the fancy, and the bribery of the State's official. The cities were divested of their sovereignty, and the very springs of their inner life — the folkmote, the elected justices and administration, the sovereign parish and the sovereign guild — were annihilated; the State's functionary took possession of every link of what formerly was an organic whole. Under that fatal policy and the wars it engendered, whole regions, once populous and wealthy, were laid bare; rich cities became insignificant boroughs; the very roads which connected them with other cities became impracticable. Industry, art, and knowledge fell into decay. Political education, science, and law were rendered subservient to the idea of State centralization. It was taught in the Universities and from the pulpit that the institutions in which men formerly used to embody their needs of mutual support could not be tolerated in a properly organized State; that the State alone could represent the bonds of union between its subjects; that federalism and "particularism" were the enemies of progress, and the State was the only proper initiator of further development. By the end of the last century the kings on the Continent, the Parliament in these isles, and the revolutionary Convention in France, although they were at war with each other, agreed in asserting that no separate unions between citizens must exist within the State; that hard labor and death were the only suitable punishments to workers who dared to enter into "coalitions." "No state within the State!" The State alone, and the State's Church, must take care of matters of general interest, while the subjects must represent loose aggregations of individuals, connected by no particular bonds, bound to appeal to the Government each time that they feel a common need. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century this was the theory and practice in Europe. Even commercial and industrial societies were looked at with suspicion. As to the workers, their unions were treated as unlawful almost within our own lifetime in this country and within the last twenty years on the Continent. The whole system of our State education was such that up to the present time, even in this country, a notable portion of society would treat as a revolutionary measure the concession of such rights as every one, freeman and serf, exercised five hundred years ago in the village folkmote, the guild, the parish, and the city.

The absorption of all social functions by the State necessarily favored the development of an unbridled, narrow-minded individual-

ism. In proportion as the obligations towards the State grew in numbers, the citizens were evidently relieved from their obligations towards each other. In the guild — and in mediaeval times every man belonged to some guild or fraternity — two “brothers” were bound to watch in turns a brother who had fallen ill; it would be sufficient now to give one’s neighbor the address of the next paupers’ hospital. In barbarian society, to assist at a fight between two men, arisen from a quarrel, and not to prevent it from taking a fatal issue, meant to be oneself treated as a murderer; but under the theory of the all-protecting State the bystander need not intrude; it is the policeman’s business to interfere, or not. And while in a savage land, among the Hottentots, it would be scandalous to eat without having loudly called out thrice whether there is not somebody wanting to share the food, all that a respectable citizen has to do now is to pay the poor tax and to let the starving starve. The result is, that the theory which maintains that men can, and must, seek their own happiness in a disregard of other people’s wants is now triumphant all round — in law, in science, in religion. It is the religion of the day, and to doubt of its efficacy is to be a dangerous Utopian. Science loudly proclaims that the struggle of each against all is the leading principle of nature, and of human societies as well. To that struggle Biology ascribes the progressive evolution of the animal world. History takes the same line of argument; and political economists, in their naïve ignorance, trace all progress of modern industry and machinery to the “wonderful” effects of the same principle. The very religion of the pulpit is a religion of individualism slightly mitigated by more or less charitable relations to one’s neighbors, chiefly on Sundays. “Practical” men and theorists, men of science and religious preachers, lawyers and politicians, all agree upon one thing — that individualism may be more or less softened in its harshest effects by charity, but that it is the only secure basis for the maintenance of society and its ulterior progress.

It seems therefore, hopeless to look for mutual-aid institutions and practices in modern society. What could remain of them? And yet, as soon as we try to ascertain how the millions of human beings live, and begin to study their everyday relations, we are struck with the immense part which the mutual-aid and mutual-support principles play even now-a-days in human life. Although the destruction of mutual-aid institutions has been going on in practice and theory,

for full three or four hundred years, hundreds of millions of men continue to live under such institutions; they piously maintain them and endeavor to reconstitute them where they have ceased to exist. In our mutual relations every one of us has his moments of revolt against the fashionable individualistic creed of the day, and actions in which men are guided by their mutual-aid inclinations constitute so great a part of our daily intercourse that if a stop to such actions could be put all further ethical progress would be stopped at once. Human society itself could not be maintained for even so much as the lifetime of one single generation. These facts, mostly neglected by sociologists and yet of the first importance for the life and further elevation of mankind, we are now going to analyze, beginning with the standing institutions of mutual support, and passing next to those acts of mutual aid which have their origin in personal or social sympathies. . . .

In connection with co-operation, I ought perhaps to mention also the friendly societies, the unities of oddfellows, the village and town clubs organized for meeting the doctors' bills, the dress and burial clubs, the small clubs very common among factory girls, to which they contribute a few pence every week, and afterwards draw by lot the sum of one pound, which can at least be used for some substantial purchase, and many others. A not inconsiderable amount of sociable or jovial spirit is alive in all such societies and clubs, even though the "credit and debit" of each member are closely watched over. But there are so many associations based on the readiness to sacrifice time, health, and life if required, that we can produce numbers of illustrations of the best forms of mutual support.

The Lifeboat Association in this country, and similar institutions on the Continent, must be mentioned in the first place. The former has now over three hundred boats along the coasts of these isles, and it would have twice as many, were it not for the poverty of the fisherman, who cannot afford to buy lifeboats. The crews consist, however, of volunteers, whose readiness to sacrifice their lives for the rescue of absolute strangers to them is put every year to a severe test; every winter the loss of several of the bravest among them stands on record. And if we ask these men what moves them to risk their lives, even when there is no reasonable chance of success, their answer is something on the following lines. A fearful snowstorm, blowing across the Channel, raged on the flat, sandy coast of a tiny village in Kent, and a small smack, laden with oranges, stranded on the sands

near by. In these shallow waters only a flat-bottomed lifeboat of a simplified type can be kept, and to launch it during such a storm was to face an almost certain disaster. And yet the men went out, fought for hours against the wind, and the boat capsized twice. One man was drowned, the others were cast ashore. One of these last, a refined coastguard, was found next morning, badly bruised and half frozen in the snow. I asked him, how they came to make that desperate attempt? "I don't know myself," was his reply. "*There* was the wreck; all the people from the village stood on the beach, and all said it would be foolish to go out; we never should work through the surf. We saw five or six men clinging to the mast, making desperate signals. We all felt that something must be done, but what could we do? One hour passed, two hours, and we all stood there. We all felt most uncomfortable. Then, all of a sudden, through the storm, it seemed to us as if we heard their cries — they had a boy with them. We could not stand that any longer. All at once we said, 'We must go!' The women said so too; they would have treated us as cowards if we had not gone, although next day they said we had been fools to go. As one man, we rushed to the boat, and went. The boat capsized, but we took hold of it. The worst was to see poor ——— drowning by the side of the boat, and we could do nothing to save him. Then came a fearful wave, the boat capsized again, and we were cast ashore. The men were still rescued by the D. boat, ours was caught miles away. I was found next morning in the snow."

The same feeling moved also the miners of the Rhonda Valley, when they worked for the rescue of their comrades from the inundated mine. They had pierced through thirty-two yards of coal in order to reach their entombed comrades; but when only three yards more remained to be pierced, fire-damp enveloped them. The lamps went out, and the rescue-men retired. To work in such conditions was to risk being blown up at every moment. But the raps of the entombed miners were still heard, the men were still alive and appealed for help, and several miners volunteered to work at any risk; and as they went down the mine, their wives had only silent tears to follow them, not one word to stop them.

There is the gist of human psychology. Unless men are maddened in the battlefield, they "cannot stand it" to hear appeals for help, and not to respond to them. The hero goes; and what the hero does,

all feel that they ought to have done that as well. The sophisms of the brain cannot resist the mutual-aid feeling, because this feeling has been nurtured by thousands of years of human social life and hundreds of thousands of years of pre-human life in societies.

“ But what about those men who were drowned in the Serpentine in the presence of a crowd, out of which no one moved for their rescue? ” it may be asked. “ What about the child which fell into the Regent’s Park Canal — also in the presence of a holiday crowd — and was only saved through the presence of mind of a maid who let out a Newfoundland dog to the rescue? ” The answer is plain enough. Man is a result of both his inherited instincts and his education. Among the miners and the seamen, their common occupations and their everyday contact with one another create a feeling of solidarity, while the surrounding dangers maintain courage and pluck. In the cities, on the contrary, the absence of common interest nurtures indifference, while courage and pluck, which seldom find their opportunities, disappear, or take another direction. Moreover, the tradition of the hero of the mine and the sea lives in the miners’ and fishermen’s villages, adorned with a poetical halo. But what are the traditions of a motley London crowd? The only tradition they might have in common ought to be created by literature, but a literature which would correspond to the village epics hardly exists. The clergy are so anxious to prove that all that comes from human nature is sin, and that all good in man has a supernatural origin, that they mostly ignore the facts which cannot be produced as an example of higher inspiration or grace, coming from above. And as to the lay-writers, their attention is chiefly directed towards one sort of heroism, the heroism which promotes the idea of the State. Therefore, they admire the Roman hero, or the soldier in the battle, while they pass by the fisherman’s heroism, hardly paying attention to it. The poet and the painter might, of course, be taken by the beauty of the human heart in itself; but both seldom know the life of the poorer classes, and while they can sing or paint the Roman or the military hero in conventional surroundings, they can neither sing nor paint impressively the hero who acts in those modest surroundings which they ignore. If they venture to do so, they produce a mere piece of rhetoric.

Exercises

1. In what ways does opposition depend upon an underlying co-operation? Give examples from your own reflection.
2. Discuss the fundamental nature of social co-operation.
3. Name the sub-processes upon which social co-operation depends.
4. Discuss the question whether great men are found in primitive tribes.
5. Describe the achievements and personal characteristics of Jalina-piramurana; Geboka Namo; Finau; Pamare; Pontiac; Tecumseh.
6. Name four other sources of leadership, aside from personal ability, in such cases.
7. Does the net result of the analysis indicate any difference in the basis and the amount of personal ascendancy in primitive societies as compared with those more advanced?
8. Taking prestige as the unanalyzable "spell of those who impress by distance," what is its relation to authority?
9. Distinguish leadership through previous success from leadership through prestige.
10. Explain: "The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions (*i.e., consensus*) — like ways of responding to expectations and requirements."
11. Explain: "Consensus requires communications."
12. . . . "within even the most social group there are many relations which are not as yet social." Does the foregoing imply that human co-operation apart from consensus is not truly social? Is it true?
13. In Bagehot's discussion of the English monarchy, make a list of all expressions showing its inscrutable, mysterious power (*i.e., prestige*).
14. Make a similar list showing its appeal to emotions and sentiments common to humanity, or to Englishmen (*i.e., consensus*).
15. Name six or more reasons for social control as given by Ross.
16. Analyze his definition of social control.
17. Compare Kropotkin's formula for "the ethical progress of our race," with the ideas expressed in the chapter below on Group Expansion.
18. Describe the mutual aid organization of Medieval Europe.
19. What relation existed between mutual aid and the Protestant Reformation?
20. What was the effect of the rise of modern national states upon mutual aid?
21. Contrast the earlier mutual aid arrangements with modern *individualism*.
22. How firmly rooted is the individualistic philosophy?

23. Following Kropotkin's description, show how mutual aid still operates in common walks of life.

24. Do you regard the spirit of mutual aid as a permanent or potent factor in social organization?

Additional References

1. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*. See the chapter on Leadership.

2. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*. Ch. XIII. "What the Masses Contribute."

3. Cooley, C. H.: *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Chapters on Leadership.

4. Giddings, F. H.: *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. Ch. X. "The Group-Making Rôle of Ideas and Beliefs." Very valuable.

5. *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XII. (1918). The entire volume treats "Social Control" in its various aspects.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

SOcial organization is inseparable from social coöperation, as discussed in the preceding chapter. It is the objective cultural aspect of group-life, whereas social coöperation represents the more subjective and psychological side. The *spirit* (*i.e.* attitudes) of unity and harmonious working together resulting from individual and social ascendancy, mutual aid, and other unifying factors, must become *embodied* in the social structure in order to function effectively and systematically. This is accomplished through the processes of organization.

In its generic sense organization means to be equipped with organs. An *organ* in turn, in the physiological field, is an aggregation of cells and tissues set apart to perform a special function for the organism as a whole. When a single celled being, such as the amoeba, moves about it extends its body-wall into pseudo-podia; when it takes food it wraps its whole body around the desired particle; when it breathes it is all lungs, as it were, because oxygen is absorbed directly through the body-wall. Such simple forms of life may be said to have a low organization because they possess few if any organs.

All higher forms of life, vegetable, animal, and social, have organs, set apart through division of labor to perform specialized functions for the whole organism. These organs are coöordinated through some connecting arrangement such as the nervous system in animals. Social groups are constructed in the same way, with mentally connected and interacting parts. This is the simple truth which lies at the bottom of the organic analogy so ridiculously overworked by some earlier sociologists. But here the analogy ends. Society is not an organism, but it is an organization, which amounts to the same thing, on its psychological, processual side.

The readings of the present chapter have been selected with this conception of social organization in mind. Reading 1 shows the essence of that social division of labor which produces specialized parts and is produced in turn by them. In their more advanced and permanent forms the folkways and *mores* becomes institutions, and form the more or less rigid framework of the social life, as presented in Reading 2. But, as shown by the authors there quoted, the firm and commanding character of institutions is due to the fact that they represent the socially sanctioned means for attaining ends desired by their members, and derive their authority from that vital fact. Moreover, even the

most venerable institutions are in constant process of modification and reconstruction in response to changing needs and attitudes. As shown in an earlier chapter of the present work, even *community* itself is a process, consisting largely in the creation and re-creation of social values. Thus, as Ward long ago remarked, even social *order* itself is not a static condition, but is so blended of stability and change, that it constitutes a moving equilibrium in the true sense of the term.

Free communication, touched upon very briefly in Reading 3, is the psycho-social connecting system by means of which the various social organs tend to form a harmonious, coöperating whole. A blow at free communication is, therefore, one struck at the very life centers of the social existence.

Finally, in Reading 4, it is suggested that public opinion represents the currents of mental and moral energy which play through the social body, connecting by mental interstimulation large and often over-lapping sections of the community (that is, the various "publics" who think and talk about the same things at the same time) but seldom, if ever, affecting the entire social group, especially if it be a multitudinous national one, no matter how well equipped with the apparatus and the traditions of free communication.

But happily the organization of society is more or less unconscious and automatic, so that *coöperation* goes on even when *consensus* languishes, for the time being at least. Social organization, moreover, is not so much a state or condition to be attained, as a complex *process* which constantly renews itself, and, in progressive societies, renovates and elevates itself to higher and more inclusive levels, co-ordinating larger numbers, with reference to more numerous interests, and upon the basis of more equitable and socially efficient principles.

1. Organization As the Unconscious Co-ordination of Adaptive Activities ¹

A process of adaptive "working" such as I have described is a process also of organization, because it tends to bring about a system of co-ordinated activities fitted to the conditions, and that is what organization is. If a theory, for example, is making its way into the minds of men and at each point where it is questioned or tested arguments and experiments are being devised to support it, then it is in course of organization. It is becoming an intricate whole of related parts which work in the general mind and extend its influence. The theory of evolution has its organs in every department of thought,

¹ From *Social Process*, by Charles Horton Cooley; Ch. II. (pp. 19-29). (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

the doctrine of eugenics, for example, being one form in which it functions.

The same is true of any living whole. Whenever a person enters upon a new course of life his mind begins to organize with reference to it; he develops ways of thinking and acting that are necessary or convenient in order that he may meet the new conditions. In this way each of us grows to fit his job, acquiring habits that are in some way congruous with it. A farmer, a teacher, a factory worker, a banker, is certain to have in some respects an occupational system of thinking. So a group, if it is lasting and important, like a state, or church, or a political party, develops an organization every part of which has arisen by adaptive growth.

A university, if we look at it from this point of view, appears as a theatre of multiform selective organization. The students, already sifted by preparatory schools and entrance examinations, are subject to further selection for membership in the various academic groups. They must pass certain preliminary courses, or attain a certain standing before they can take advanced courses or be admitted to honor societies. The athletic, dramatic, and debating groups have also selective methods whose function is to maintain their organized activities. And the university as a whole, and especially its various technical departments, acts as an agent of selection for society at large, determining in great part who are fit for the different professions. It is also a centre for the organization of ideas. Intellectual suggestions relating to every branch of knowledge, brought from every part of the world by books and periodicals as well as by the cosmopolitan body of teachers and students, are compared, discussed, augmented, worked over and thus organized, presumably for the service of mankind. . . .

Although we are a part of the growth of impersonal forms of life we seldom know anything about it until it is well in the past. We do not know when — for obscure reasons that even the psychologist can hardly detect — we use one word rather than another, or use an old word in a new sense, that we are participating in the growth of the language organism. And yet this organism is vast, complex, logical, a marvel, apparently, of constructive ingenuity. It is the same with tradition and custom. We never tell a story or repeat an act precisely as we heard or saw it; everything is unconsciously modified by passing through us and the social medium of which we are a part,

and these modifications build logical structures which human intelligence, in the course of time, may or may not discover. The students of folk-lore and primitive culture deal chiefly with such material. The working or vitality of one element of a tradition over another consists in some power to stimulate impulses in the human mind, which is, therefore, a selective agent in the process, but we are no more aware of what is going on, usually, than we are of the selective action of our digestive organs. The folkways and *mores* which Professor Sumner has so amply discussed are almost wholly of this nature.

The commercialism of our time offers a modern instance. Nobody, I suppose, has intended it: it has come upon us through the mechanical inventions, the opening of new countries and other conditions which have stimulated industry and commerce, these in turn imposing themselves upon the minds and habits of men at the expense of other interests. An epoch, like an individual, has its somewhat special functions, and a mind somewhat subdued to what it works in. Such a development as that of the Italian painting of the Renaissance, or of a particular school, like the Venetian, is a real organism, fascinating to study in the interactions and sequences of its activity, waxing and waning under the spur of immediate influences without thought of the living whole which history now discovers.

A city is a different sort of organism whose development is, for the most part, equally unconscious. A frontier settlement, we will say, is fortunately situated with reference to the growth of the country, its water-power, its port facilities, or something of the sort making it a functional point. The settlers may or may not perceive and co-operate with this advantage, but in any case the town grows; trade and manufactures increase, railroads seek it, immigration pours in, street-railways are laid, the different elements segregate in different localities, and we presently have a complex, co-ordinated structure and life which, however faulty from the point of view of the civic reformer, is a real organism, full of individuality and interest. Think of Chicago or New Orleans, not to speak of the riper development of London, Venice, or Rome. Here are social organisms with only gleams of general consciousness, growing by tentative selection and synthesis. The case is much the same with nations, with the Roman Empire, Spain, and Britain.

Any one who follows the large movements of history must perceive, I think, that he is dealing mainly with unconscious systems and

processes. At a given time there is a social situation that is also a mental situation, an intricate organization of thought. The growth of this involves problems which the mind of the time is bound to work out, but which it can know or meet only as details. Thus the history of the Christian Church in the Middle Ages presents itself to the students as the progressive struggle, interaction, and organization not only of specifically Christian ideas and traditions, but of all the ideas and traditions of the time working upon each other in this central institution. Whatever beliefs men came to were the outcome of the whole previous history of thought. Vast forces were contending and combining in an organic movement which we can even now but dimly understand, and which the men involved in it could no more see than a fish can see the course of the river.

Feeling has an organic social growth which is, perhaps, still less likely than that of thought to be conscious. The human mind is capable of innumerable types and degrees of sentiment, and the question what type shall be developed or how far it shall be carried depends upon social incitement. If certain ways of feeling become traditional and are fostered by customs, symbols, and the cult of examples, they may rise to a high level in many individuals. In this way sentiment, even passion, may have an institutional character. Of this too the various phases of mediaeval Christianity afford examples. Its emotions were slowly evolved out of Roman, oriental, and barbarian, as well as Christian, sources.

It is notable that not only may the growth of a movement be unintended by the persons involved in it, but it may even be opposed to their wills. The oncoming of a commercial panic, with the growing apprehension and mistrust which almost everyone would arrest if he could, is a familiar example. The mental or nervous epidemics which sometimes run through orphan asylums and similar institutions are of somewhat the same nature. They propagate themselves by their power to stimulate a certain kind of nerve action and live in the human organism without its consent.

Indeed, are not all kinds of social degeneration — vice, crime, misery, sensualism, pessimism — organic growths which we do not intend or desire, and which are usually combated by at least a part of those afflicted?

There has been much discussion regarding the use of such words as "organic," "organization," and "organism" with reference to

society, the last appearing specially objectionable to some persons, who feel that it suggests a closer resemblance to animal or plant life than does in fact exist. On the other hand, "organism" seems in many cases a fitter word than "organization," which is usually understood to imply conscious purpose. It matters little, however, what term we use if only we have a clear perception of the facts we are trying to describe. Let us, then, consider shortly what we mean by such expressions.

If we take society to include the whole of human life, this may truly be said to be organic, in the sense that influences may be and are transmitted from one part to any other part, so that all parts are bound together into an interdependent whole. We are all one life, and its various phases—Asia, Europe, and America; democracy, militarism, and socialism; state, church, and commerce; cities, villages and families; and so on to the particular persons, Tom, Dick, and Harry—may all be regarded, without the slightest strain upon the facts, as organs of this whole, growing and functioning under particular conditions, according to the adaptive process already discussed. The total life being unified by interaction, each phase of it must be and is, in some degree, an expression of the whole system. My thought and action, for example, is by no means uninfluenced by what is going on in Russia, and may truly be said to be a special expression of the general thought of the time.

But within this great whole, and part of it, are innumerable special systems of interaction, more or less distinct, more or less enduring, more or less conscious and intelligent. Nations, institutions, doctrines, parties, persons, are examples; but the whole number of systems, especially of those that are transient or indefinite, is beyond calculation. Every time I exchange glances with a man on the street a little process of special interaction and growth is set up, which may cease when we part or may be indefinitely continued in our thought. The more distinct and permanent wholes, like nations, institutions, and ruling ideas, attract peculiar study, but the less conspicuous forms are equally vital in their way. As to persons, they interest us more than all the rest, mainly because our consciousness has a bias in their favor. That is, having for its main function the guidance of persons, it is more vivid and choosing with reference to the personal phase of life than to any other. We know life primarily as persons, and extend our knowledge to other forms with some difficulty.

Another notable thing about this strange complex is the overlapping and interpenetration of the various forms, so that each part of the whole belongs to more than one organic system—somewhat as in one of those picture-puzzles where the same lines form a part of several faces, which you must discover if you can. Thus one's own personality is one organic system; the persons he knows are others, and from one point of view all human life is made up of such personal systems, which, however, will be found on close inspection not to be separate but to interpenetrate one another. I mean that each personality includes ideas and feelings reflected from others. From another point of view the whole thing breaks up into groups rather than persons—into families, communities, parties, races, states. Each has a history and life of its own and they also overlap one another. A third standpoint shows us the same whole as a complex of thoughts or thought-systems, whose *locus*, certainly, is the human mind, but which have a life and growth of their own that cannot be understood except by studying them as distinct phenomena. All are equally real and all are aspects of a common whole.

Perhaps the first requisite in the making of a sociologist is that he learn to see things habitually in this way.

If, then, we say that society is an organism, we mean—I suppose, that it is a complex of forms or processes each of which is living and growing by interaction with the others, the whole being so unified that what takes place in one part affects all the rest. It is a vast tissue of reciprocal activity, differentiated into innumerable systems, some of them quite distinct, others not readily traceable, and all interwoven to such a degree that you see different systems according to the point of view you take.

2. Social Institutions ²

We may sum up and extend what we have said of institutions, and of their relation to their members, by remarking on three points.

1. Although all institutions are the creation of will, the individual does not himself always, or even often, take part in the initiation of the institutions which matter most to him. His family, his school,

² From *Social Purpose*, by Hetherington and Muirhead. (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1918. New York, The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.)

his Church, his industry, his State, are all prior to him in time. He finds, and does not make. But that, as we saw, is because the social world is so organized as to afford to the individual the conditions under which his personality can develop. By his contact with these, his will acquires content and direction, and he rises from the estate of pupillage to that of active participation. If he does not create, he at least sustains; and what the social world requires of him is that when, by the influence and discipline of the institutions which it has provided, he has grown to the realization of his powers, he shall devote these powers to the maintenance of the institutions which have made him what he is. It does not ask that because of their nurture he shall maintain them as he found them. It asks much more than that—that he shall devote to them his mature powers, the powers which have sprung from the commerce of his mind and Society, and which may therefore transcend anything that Society has given him. He has not merely to maintain, but to bring observation, criticism, and suggestion to his institutions, and thus make them more adequately the embodiment of mind and the instrument of spiritual development.

2. Every institution imposes its own laws on its members, and prescribes certain modes of action. We are apt to think of law as peculiarly the characteristic of the State. But every other institution has its own laws; and though none of them has the same coercive power as those of the State, the nature of the laws is in every case the same. They embody the modes of action which seem to the members of the institution to serve the ends for which the institution exists. A trade union is designed to secure unity of action on the part of a group of industrial workers and to create a reserve of financial strength for the event of a strike. Hence it requires all its members to lay down their tools together, to observe certain rules in the course of their work, and to make a regular contribution to the Union funds. These are all essentially laws, enacted by the members of the institution as necessary to its success. One of the elementary functions of the State is to secure property and the observance of contracts. It therefore enacts laws which provide for these ends; and an infraction of these laws is not simply an injury to another individual, but an offence against the State itself. In both cases the enactments have the status of laws, because they are backed by force. Force is not their basis; their basis is the common consent, or rather the common will of the Society which recognizes that they are good. The kind of

force differs in the two cases. If an individual breaks the law of his trade union or his club, the most powerful weapon which the institution has against him is that it may expel him from membership. The State alone has the power to subject him to physical punishment, even in the last resort to require his life. But that the force which the State exercises is greater, and that its equipment of force is more complete, does not make the law which the greater force subserves different in kind. In every case, force is the instrument of will. It is the conditions which are believed to be essential to it, that make the application of force possible at all. If the will were lacking, all the organized force in the world could hardly make a law effective, still less confer on the institution which employed it a healthy and vigorous life.

To understand the relation of force and law, it is important to realize that a law plays the same part within an institution as the institution plays in the general system of social life. The institution marks and secures a level of social attainment; within the institution, the law does the same. It is enacted and supported by compulsory power in order to make it difficult for the members of the institution to fall below the standard it represents. It protects those who establish it, not only against others, but against themselves if at any time they should think less highly of their obligations to the institution than at the time at which they willed the enactment. And by taking its place in definite objective form, it makes the point of view which gave it birth the normal point of view of the members, so that from that stage they may move to other, perhaps more arduous, common activities.

3. Within every institution there is a system of rights and duties; that is, each institution defines a certain set of relations between its members, and, imposing on them the obligations consonant with these relations, it also confers on them the corresponding rights. The essential interdependence of these two conceptions — rights and duties — is a cardinal point in the theory of institutions. A right is not simply a claim. It is a claim which may be put forward in congruity with the character of the Society within which it is made, or — even a more decisive test — which can be put forward on the ground that its recognition by the Society will advance the object for the sake of which the Society exists. Its basis in the last resort is moral; for its justification is the belief that by refusing to admit it, the Society within

which it is made falls short, to that degree, of the life of which it is capable. A right differs from a mere demand, or a threat, just in that it belongs to a different world. It rests, not on force, but on a view of the nature and ends of a given Society. Plainly, therefore, every right, recognized or claimed, involves a corresponding duty; not merely in the sense that if I enjoy or desire a certain right, it is my duty to respect a similar or corresponding claim on your part, but in the sense that in enjoying or in claiming my right, I rely upon a definite social construction, and therefore I must admit as binding upon myself the obligations which attach to my place in that construction. Every new privilege that an institution confers on its members is a more precise articulation of the order embodied in that institution, and involves a more precise obligation.

These, then, are the characteristics of all institutions. In them the individual participates in the common activities of Society, and through them he comes to the attainment of his own personality. Institutions, therefore, are expressions of individuality, or at least the means of such expression. They are not encroachments, hostile to the free development of character and power, but the conditions under which alone such development is possible. They claim the loyalty and service of the individual, not as superior forces which he cannot evade, but as the media through which he has grown to the mastery of his own life.

3. Free Communication ³

Sometimes a struggle can be summarily closed by invoking some authority acknowledged by both sides; for example, the Pope on dogma, Tyndall on spontaneous generation, the Prince of Wales on some point of etiquette. Oftener, however, it is discussion that settles a struggle when it reaches an acute stage. For discussion *hurries conflicts to a conclusion*. Sixty years ago the silent struggle between man and woman became vocal, and the result has been a hasty removal of many barriers that hemmed in woman, and a rapid improvement in her social position. In the United States, African slavery would, no doubt, have died out in time by the silent operation of economic and moral forces, but discussion greatly hastened its end.

³ From *Social Psychology*, by Edward Alsworth Ross; pp. 307-309. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1912. Reprinted by permission.)

Since, about a generation ago, a few bold spirits began to ask "Why?" in public, the religious *tabu* on theatre, dancing, card-playing, secular literature and art, has loosened more than in all the previous interval since the Puritan Commonwealth. So, the disapproval of drinking has developed more in the seventy years since Father Mathew began the temperance agitation, than in the two centuries before. Hence, *all* losing sides dread discussion, for it shortens their lease of life. Silence is for them a kind of reprieve. Their instinct, then, is to choke off discussion at all hazards. The geocentrists got the Papal Index for nearly two hundred years to forbid the faithful from reading "all books which affirm the motion of the earth." The Index of the books absolutism forbids to be printed or circulated in Russia reads like a list of the monumental works of modern research and thought. The tottering Old Régime in France persecuted and hounded the Encyclopedists. The German monarchists long sought to withstand the rising tide of social democracy with a "law of associations and meetings." The French militarists endeavored to gag discussion of the Dreyfus case. In the lower South after 1835 all open criticism of slavery was prohibited, and on the border desperate means were taken to silence the abolitionists. In the state of Delaware and in the city of Detroit frantic attempts have been made by rich tax-dodgers to throttle single-tax speakers.

Conversely, the side that feels sure of its case does not persecute. Therefore it is safe to infer that the cause which courts publicity and discussion has time on its side, whereas that cause that ducks, slinks, or applies the gag, ought to rest under suspicion. Seeing that no great wrong can long survive open discussion, we may characterize free speech, free assemblage, and free press as *the rights preservative of all rights*. Safeguard these fundamentals, and the rest must come. This is why free government, although it is by no means the same thing as popular government, is usually the vestibule to it.

4. Public Opinion As a Process⁴

Public opinion, if we wish to see it as it is, should be regarded as an organic process, and not merely as a state of agreement about some question of the day. It is, in truth, a complex growth, always continuous with the past, never becoming simple, and only partly unified

⁴ From *Social Process*, by Charles Horton Cooley; Ch. XXXI. (pp. 378-381). (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

from time to time for the sake of definite action. Like other phases of intelligence, it is of the nature of a drama, many characters taking part in a variegated unity of action. The leaders of the day, not only in politics but in every field, the class group — capitalists, socialists, organized labor, professional men, farmers and the like — the various types of radicals and reactionaries; all these are members of an intricate, progressing whole. And it is a whole for the same reason that a play is, because the characters, though divergent and often conflicting, interact upon one another and create a total movement which the mind must follow by a total process. For practical uses as well as for adequate thinking this conception is better than the idea of public opinion as agreement. It aims to see the real thing, the developing thought of men, in its genesis and tendencies, and with a view to its probable operation.

The view that we have no public opinion except when, and in so far as, people agree, is a remnant of that obsolete social philosophy which regarded individuals as normally isolated, and social life as due to their emerging partly from this isolation and coming together in certain specific ways. It is this habit of thought, apparently, that makes it difficult for most persons to understand that a group which has maturely thought over and discussed a matter arrives at a public opinion regarding it whether the members agree or not. That is, the mental process has developed about the matter in question and there has come to be a unity of action, as in a play, which insures that, however opinions may differ, they make parts of a whole, each having helped to form all the others. No one would deny unity of action to *Macbeth* because the characters are various and conflicting; if they were not, the unity would be too mechanical to be of interest; and so it would be with opinion if it attained any such uniformity as is sometimes supposed.

It is true that a process of opinion can hardly exist without a certain underlying like-mindedness, sufficient for mutual understanding and influence, among the members of the group; if they are separated into uncommunicating sections the unity of action is lost. Race difference may do this (largely, perhaps, by making men think they are more unlike than they are), religious division has done it, also traditional hostility, as where one nation has subjugated another, and even social caste. But communicated differences are the life of opinion, as cross-breeding is of a natural stock.

The main argument for basing the idea of public opinion upon agreement is that this is the only method of decision and consequently of action; which is what all is for; in other words, that it is only as agreement that opinion can function.

It is true that decision is a phase of the utmost importance, corresponding to choice in the individual, and that the whole process of attention, discussion, and democratic organization is, in a sense, a preparation for it. It is equally true, however, that it is only a partial and often a superficial act, involving compromise and adjusted to a particular contingency. A real understanding of the human mind, both in its individual and public aspects, requires that it be seen in the whole process, of which majorities and decisions are but transient phases. The choice of today is important; but the inchoate conditions which are breeding the choices to come are at least equally so. We shall be interested to find whether Democrats or Republicans win the next election; but how much more interesting it would be to know what obscure group of non-conformers is cherishing the idea that will prevail twenty years from now.

The organic view seems to be the only one that does justice to the significance of minorities. If you think of agreement as the essential thing they appear as mere remnants, refractory and irreconcilable factions of no great importance. But if you have an eye for organic development, it is obvious that minorities, even small ones, may be the most pregnant factors in the situation. All progress, all notable change of any kind, begins with a few, and it is, accordingly, among the small and beginning parties that we may always look for the tendencies that are likely to dominate the future. Originality, faith, and the resolution to make things better are always in a minority, while every majority is made up for the most part of inert and dependent elements.

It is a fact of the utmost significance when a few, or even a single individual, are so convinced of something that they are willing to stand up for it in the midst of a hostile majority; their very isolation insuring that they have more convincing grounds for their action than the ordinary undecided and conforming citizen. So Liebknecht, who alone in the German Reichstag opposed and denounced the war, was perhaps of more significance than all the more docile mass of the Socialist party. All great movements have in their early history heroes and often martyrs who were the seed of their future success.

There is nothing more democratic than intelligent and devoted non-conformity, because it means that the individual is giving his freedom and courage to the service of the whole. Subservience, to majorities, as to any other authority, tends to make vigorous democracy impossible.

Exercises

1. State the relation between social coöperation and social organization.
2. Define and illustrate *organization*.
3. Does the organization of society depend more upon consensus, or on coöperation of an unconscious character.
4. Explain and illustrate fully Prof. Cooley's conception of organization as the unconscious coördination of adaptive activities.
5. Show how human beings may participate in organic social growths against their own wills.
6. In what sense, according to Cooley, is society an organism? In what sense is it not?
7. Show that a society is an organization of overlapping and interpenetrating minor organizations.
8. Following Hetherington and Muirhead, show the relation of institutions to will; to law; to rights and duties; to individuality.
9. What is the social function of *discussion*?
10. What are the "rights preservative of all rights"? Is the phrase justified by their importance?
11. In what sense is public opinion an organic process?
12. How important is *agreement* to the formation of public opinion?
13. What is the social significance of minorities? of conscientious objectors and non-conformists?

Additional References

1. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*. The entire volume is very valuable. See especially Part II., "Communication."
2. Lippmann, Walter: *Public Opinion*. Ch. XXIII., "The Nature of News"; and Ch. XXIV., "News, Truth, and a Conclusion."
3. Maciver, R. M.: *Community: A Sociological Study*; pp. 149-161. On social institutions.
4. Mill, John Stuart: *On Liberty*. A famous essay on the principles governing liberty of thought and discussion.
5. Milton, John: *Areopagitica; a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing; to the Parliament of England*.
6. *Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. IX.* (1915). The entire volume treats "Freedom of Communication," in various papers.

7. Rivers, W. H. R.: *Principles of Social Organization*. The last work of a very high authority in the study of primitive society.

8. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Ch. XXII., XXIII., and XXIV. treat, respectively, the Organization of Effort, of Will, and of Thought.

9. Wallas, Graham: *The Great Society*. Ch. XI., XII., and XIII., treat, respectively, the Organization of Thought, of Will, and of Happiness.

CHAPTER XXIX

GROUP BEHAVIOR

IN a sense this whole volume amounts to a discussion of group or collective behavior, because collective behavior signifies the characteristic responses of a group toward stimuli either within itself or in its external environment, physical or social. Since this is the theme of our chapters in a broad general way it seems superfluous to introduce a single chapter dealing specifically with group behavior. Nevertheless this seems desirable in view of the fact that there are several sub-processes connected with collective behavior, in the narrower sense of the "*crowd*," that possess extraordinary interest in themselves. These are crowd contagion, the fashion process, and mass movements.

The laws that govern collective behavior in these situations are largely those of social psychology, particularly the suggestion-imitation relation, and like response to like stimulus.

In the readings that follow, the first illustrates the mental and physical agitations that wrack the human frame under this intense emotional excitement produced by prolonged attention to ideas of great portent urged and responded to under the close physical contact of a crowded assembly. The third shows, in the case of the Crusades, how similar currents may sweep over a whole nation under the spell of dominant emotions and imagery, carrying great masses of human beings along bodily, and as helpless and unresisting as the flotsam and jetsam on the ocean tides. The second reading, on fashion, represents a form of group behavior which is less highly emotional but equally irrational in many of its expressions. Yet down beneath it there is operating the quite rational and more or less conscious desire for social recognition and distinction, or the corresponding desire to prevent others from enjoying these at the cost of one's own social deflation. The selection itself is taken from Bellamy's early Utopian novel, whose author, in dealing thus fancifully with the subject under the form of fiction, produced a penetrating analysis which antedates the similar explanations offered by sober social psychology in later years.

The fact that two of our illustrations chance to be taken from the field of religion should not be taken to indicate that it is peculiar in that respect. In politics, business, secret ritualistic orders, war, race conflicts, and many other social activities, fads, crazes, fashions, riots,

mobs, collective frenzies and every other form of group behavior could be illustrated. Ross gives the most comprehensive *brief* survey in Reference 7, below.

1. The Cane Ridge Camp-Meeting of 1800:¹ A Case of Crowd Contagion

The remembrance of that fateful gathering lingers in Kentucky after the lapse of a century. Nothing was lacking to stir to its profoundest depths the imagination and emotion of this great throng of men, women and children. It was at night that the most terrible scenes were witnessed, when the camp-fires blazed in a mighty circle around the vast audience of pioneers bowed in devotion. Beyond was the blackness of the primeval forest, above the night wind and the foliage and stars. As the darkness deepened, the exhortations of the preachers became more fervent and impassioned, their picturesque prophecies of doom more lurid and alarming, the volume of song burst all bonds of guidance and control, and broke again and again from the throats of the people, while over all, at intervals, there rang out the shout of ecstasy, the sob and the groan. When daylight came, the temper of the assembly was somewhat modified, but there was the same tendency to boisterous emotion. Men and women shouted aloud during the sermon, and shook hands all around at the close in what was termed the "singing ecstasy." There are many suggestive bits of testimony to the highly overwrought state of these susceptible people. One of the most careful observers, the Rev. Mr. Lyle, who kept a diary and journal through this whole period, and passed calm judgment in the midst of the wild excitement, to whom we owe the best account of the extravagances and disorders, has described the crowd at Cane Ridge rushing from preacher to preacher if it were whispered that it was "more lively" at some other point, swarming enthusiastically around a "fallen" brother, laughing, leaping, sobbing, shouting, swooning. If the assembly were languid, he says, a few shrieks and one or two instances of falling would quickly arouse them, and as far in every direction as the people could see or hear, others would be caught in the contagion and would likewise fall. Children were allowed to preach, a little girl of seven being propped up on the shoulders of a

¹ From *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, by Frederick Morgan Davenport; pp. 75-80. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1910. Reprinted by permission.)

man, and exhorting to the multitude "till she sank exhausted on her bearer's head."

And when we reflect that this mighty crowd did not break up on this occasion until the food gave out, but remained for days an agitated mass of humanity in the midst of such surroundings as these, contemplating the most momentous truths, ascribing every extraordinary nervous contortion to the mysterious agency of the divine, we can well understand how many, very many, would be physically and mentally overwhelmed. The whole body of persons who actually fell helpless to the earth during the progress of the meeting was computed by the Rev. James Crawford, who avers that he endeavored to keep an accurate account, to be three thousand persons, about one in every six. The number who fell in the ghost-dance on White Clay Creek was, it will be remembered, about one out of three. Measured by this test, the Kentuckian of 1800 is certainly entitled to the distinction of being twice as civilized as the savage. (Ref. 6.) Those who fell were carried to the meeting-house near by. "At no time was the floor less than half covered. Some lay quiet, unable to move or speak. Some talked, but could not move. Some beat the floor with their heels. Some, shrieking in agony, bounded about like a live fish out of water. Many lay down and rolled over and over for hours at a time. Others rushed wildly over the stumps and benches, and then plunged, shouting, 'Lost! Lost!' into the forest."

When the frenzy was at its height, these revival crowds were subject to a set of nervous and muscular manifestations probably as varied and terrible as ever afflicted a population in this world. There is no question of the truth of this sad chapter of pioneer history. The evidence is too over-powering and convincing. There is no question of the reality of the manifestations, though as elsewhere it is likely there was considerable humbug and deception. But there were many doubters, and the "fallen" subjects were often put to the proof. For instance, our friend the Rev. Mr. Lyle, furnished with a phial of hartshorn by a physician, "applied it to a stout young man who was lying flat on his back, and inadvertently allowed some to run into his nostrils. But he took not the slightest notice of it, so much was his attention absorbed by devotional feeling."

With respect to extravagances and disorders, there are a large number of corroborative references in Lyle, Peter Cartwright, Lorenzo Dow and other contemporaries. Next to the "falling" exercise the most

notable and characteristic Kentucky phenomenon was the "jerks." The unhappy victim shook in every joint. Sometimes the head was thrown from side to side with great rapidity. Again the feet were affected, and the subject would hop like a frog. Often the body would be thrown violently to the ground, where it would continue to bound from one place to another. Peter Cartwright declares that he had seen more than five hundred persons jerking at once in his congregation. And Lorenzo Dow, writing of a time some years later, when the epidemic again broke out in that section, remarks that on Sunday at Knoxville, "the governor being present, about one hundred and fifty had the jerking exercise." It is still a phenomenon in the religious life of that country. I saw mild cases of it in the summer of 1903 among the whites in the Chilhowee Mountains. In 1800 no one was proof against it, saint or sinner, white or black, except, as Lorenzo Dow naïvely remarks, "those naturalists who wished to get it to philosophize upon it, and the most godly. The wicked are more afraid of it than of small-pox or yellow fever."

It became an infectious disease. It passed the bounds of normal imitation and became a morbid contagion, and many a scoffer bit the dust in the midst of his contempt and derision. Peter Cartwright relates a serious instance of this which he vouches for as having taken place in William McGee's congregation. "There was a great work of religion and the jerks were very prevalent." A large man with a bottle of whiskey in his pocket reviled both the jerks and the religion. In a flash the contagion pursued him, caught him, and though he started to run, it was useless. "He halted among some saplings, took out his bottle of whiskey and swore he would drink the damned jerks to death. But he could not get the bottle to his mouth, though he tried hard. At this he became greatly enraged, fetched a very violent jerk, snapped his neck, fell, and soon expired, with his mouth full of cursing and bitterness."

Another phenomenon not so common was the "barking" exercise. The votaries of this dignified rite gathered into groups, on all fours, like dogs, growling and snapping the teeth at the foot of a tree as the minister preached, — a practice which they designated as "treering the devil!"

2. The Reign of Fashion²

In the following passage the author is describing his impressions on visiting the publicly owned garment factories of his imaginary "Republic of the Golden Rule." In the Utopia which he pictures, clothing was made of paper and cast aside for fresh attire as soon as it became soiled.

While we were at the factory the noon hour came, and I asked the superintendent and Edith to go out to lunch with me. In fact, I wanted to ascertain whether my newly acquired credit card was really good for anything or not.

"There is one point about your modern costumes," I said, as we sat at our table in the dining hall, "about which I am rather curious. Will you tell me who or what sets the fashions?"

"The Creator sets the only fashion which is now generally followed," Edith answered.

"And what is that?"

"The fashion of our bodies," she answered.

"Ah, yes, very good," I replied, "and very true, too, of your costumes, as it certainly was not of ours; but my question still remains. Allowing that you have a general theory of dress, there are a thousand differences in details, with possible variations of style, shape, color, material, and what not. Now, the making of garments is carried on, I suppose, like all your other industries, as public business, under collective management, is it not?"

"Certainly. People, of course, can make their own clothes if they wish to, just as they can make anything else, but it would be a great waste of time and energy."

"Very well. The garments turned out by the factories have to be made up on some particular design or designs. In my day the question of designs of garments was settled . . . for us, and we had nothing to do but to obey. I don't say it was a good way; on the contrary, it was detestable; but what I want to know is, What system have you instead, for I suppose you have now no society leaders, fashion journals, or Paris edicts? Who settles the question what you shall wear?"

"We do," replied the superintendent.

² From *Equality, a Novel*, by Edward Bellamy; pp. 56-61. (New York and London. D. Appleton and Company, 1910. Eleventh edition. Reprinted by permission.)

"You mean, I suppose, that you determine it collectively by democratic methods. Now, when I look around me in this dining hall and see the variety and beauty of the costumes, I am bound to say that the result of your system seems satisfactory, and yet I think it would strike even the strongest believer in the principle of democracy that the rule of the majority ought scarcely to extend to dress. I admit that the yoke of fashion which we bowed to was very onerous, and yet it was true that if we were brave enough, as few indeed were, we might defy it; but with the style of dress determined by the administration, and only certain styles made, you must either follow the taste of the majority or lie abed. Why do you laugh? Is it not so?"

"We were smiling," replied the superintendent, "on account of a slight misapprehension on your part. When I said that we regulated questions of dress, I meant that we regulated them not collectively, by majority, but individually, each for himself or herself."

"But I don't see how you can," I persisted. "The business of producing fabrics and of making them into garments is carried on by the Government. Does not that imply, practically, a governmental control of initiative in fashions of dress?"

"Dear me, no!" exclaimed the superintendent. "It is evident, Mr. West, as indeed the histories say, that governmental action carried with it in your day an arbitrary implication which it does not now. The Government is actually now what it nominally was in the America of your day — the servant, tool, and instrument by which the people give effect to their will, itself being without will. The popular will is expressed in two ways, which are quite distinct and relate to different provinces: First, collectively, by majority, in regard to blended, mutually involved interests, such as the large economic and political concerns of the community; second, personally, by each individual for himself or herself in the furtherance of private and self-regarding matters. The government is not more absolutely the servant of the collective will in regard to the blended interests of the community than it is of the individual convenience in personal matters. It is at once the august representative of all in general concerns, and everybody's agent, errand boy, and factotum for all private ends. Nothing is too high or too low, too great or too little, for it to do for us.

"The dressmaking department holds its vast provision of fabrics and machinery at the absolute disposition of the whims of every man or woman in the nation. You can go to one of the stores and order

any costume of which a historical description exists, from the days of Eve to yesterday, or you can furnish a design of your own invention for a brand-new costume, designating any material at present existing, and it will be sent home to you in less time than any nineteenth-century dressmaker ever even promised to fill an order. Really, talking of this, I want you to see our garment-making machines in operation. Our paper garments, of course, are seamless, and made wholly by machinery. The apparatus being adjustable to any measure, you can have a costume turned out for you complete while you are looking over the machine. There are, of course, some general styles and shapes that are usually popular, and the stores keep a supply of them on hand, but that is for the convenience of the people, not of the department, which holds itself always ready to follow the initiative of any citizen and provide anything ordered in the least possible time."

"Then anybody can set the fashion?" I said.

"Anybody can set it, but whether it is followed depends on whether it is a good one, and really has some new point in respect to convenience or beauty; otherwise it certainly will not become a fashion. Its vogue will be precisely proportioned to the merit the popular taste recognizes in it, just as if it were an invention in mechanics. If a new idea in dress has any merit in it, it is taken up with great promptness, for our people are extremely interested in enhancing personal beauty by costume, and the absence of any arbitrary standards of style such as fashion set for you, leaves us on the alert for attractions and novelties in shape and color. It is in variety of effect that our mode of dressing seems indeed to differ most from yours. Your styles were constantly being varied by the edicts of fashion, but as only one style was tolerated at a time, you had only a successive and not a simultaneous variety, such as we have. I should imagine that this uniformity of style, extending, as I understand it often did, to fabric, color, and shape alike, must have caused your great assemblages to present a depressing effect of sameness."

"That was a fact fully admitted in my day," I replied. "The artists were the enemies of fashion, as indeed all sensible people were, but resistance was in vain. Do you know, if I were to return to the nineteenth century, there is perhaps nothing else I could tell my contemporaries of the changes you have made that would so deeply impress them as the information that you had broken the scepter of fashion, that there were no longer any arbitrary standards in dress recognized,

and that no style had any other vogue than might be given it by individual recognition of its merits. That most of the other yokes humanity wore might some day be broken, the more hopeful of us believed, but the yoke of fashion we never expected to be free from, unless perhaps in heaven."

"The reign of fashion, as the history books call it, always seemed to me one of the most utterly incomprehensible things about the old order," said Edith. "It would seem that it must have had some great force behind it to compel such abject submission to a rule so tyrannical. And yet there seems to have been no force at all used. Do tell us what the secret was, Julian?"

"Don't ask me," I protested. "It seems to be some fell enchantment that we were subject to — that is all I know. Nobody professed to understand why we did as we did. Can't you tell us," I added, turning to the superintendent — "how do you moderns diagnose the fashion mania that made our lives such a burden to us?"

"Since you appeal to me," replied our companion, "I may say that the historians explain the dominion of fashion in your age as the natural result of a disparity of economic conditions prevailing in a community in which rigid distinctions of caste had ceased to exist. It resulted from two factors: the desire of the common herd to imitate the superior class, and the desire of the superior class to protect themselves from that imitation and preserve distinction of appearance. In times and countries where class was caste, and fixed by law or iron custom, each caste had its distinctive dress, to imitate which was not allowed to another class. Consequently fashions were stationary. With the rise of democracy, the legal protection of class distinctions was abolished, while the actual disparity in social ranks still existed, owing to the persistence of economic inequalities. It was now free for all to imitate the superior class, and thus seem at least to be as good as it, and no kind of imitation was so natural and easy as dress. First, the socially ambitious led off in this imitation; then presently the less pretentious were constrained to follow their example, to avoid an apparent confession of social inferiority; till, finally, even the philosophers had to follow the herd and conform to the fashion, to avoid being conspicuous by an exceptional appearance."

"I can see," said Edith, "how social emulation should make the masses imitate the richer and superior class, and how the fashions should in this way be set; but why were they changed so often, when

it must have been so terribly expensive and troublesome to make the changes? "

" For the reason," answered the superintendent " that the only way the superior class could escape their imitators and preserve their distinction in dress was by adopting constantly new fashions, only to drop them for still newer ones as soon as they were imitated. Does it seem to you, Mr. West, that this explanation corresponds with the facts as you observed them? "

" Entirely so," I replied. " It might be added, too, that the changes in fashions were greatly fomented and assisted by the self-interest of vast industrial and commercial interests engaged in purveying the materials of dress and personal belongings. Every change, by creating a demand for new materials and rendering those in use obsolete, was what we called good for trade, though if tradesmen were unlucky enough to be caught by a sudden change of fashion with a lot of goods on hand it meant ruin to them. Great losses of this sort, indeed, attended every change in fashion."

" But we read that there were fashions in many things besides dress," said Edith.

" Certainly," said the superintendent. " Dress was the stronghold and main province of fashion because imitation was easiest and most effective through dress, but in nearly everything that pertained to the habits of living, eating, drinking, recreation, to houses, furniture, horses and carriages, and servants, to the manner of bowing even, and shaking hands, to the mode of eating food and drinking tea, and I don't know what else — there were fashions which must be followed, and were changed as soon as they were followed. It was indeed a sad, fantastic race, and Mr. West's contemporaries appear to have fully realized it; but so long as society was made up of unequals with no caste barriers to prevent imitation, the inferiors were bound to ape the superiors, and the superiors were bound to baffle imitation, so far as possible, by seeking ever-fresh devices for expressing their superiority."

" In short," I said, " our tedious sameness in dress and manners appears to you to have been the logical result of our lack of equality in conditions."

" Precisely so," answered the superintendent. " Because you were not equal, you made yourself miserable and ugly in the attempt to seem so. The aesthetic equivalent of the moral wrong of inequality was the

artistic abomination of uniformity. On the other hand, equality creates an atmosphere which kills imitation, and is pregnant with originality, for every one acts out himself, having nothing to gain by imitating any one else."

3. The Crusades as Mass Movements³

The Legend of Peter the Hermit. There is a tradition which makes one immediate inciting cause of the First Crusade to have been the preaching of a monk named Peter the Hermit, a native of France. The legend tells how this monk, moved by devout longing, made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land; how his sympathy and indignation were stirred by the sight of the indignities and cruelties to which the native and pilgrim Christians were subjected by the infidels; and how, armed with letters from the patriarch of Jerusalem to the Christians of Europe, he hastened to Rome, and there, at the foot of Pope Urban II, begged to be commissioned to preach a crusade for the deliverance of the Holy City. The pope is represented as commending warmly the zeal of the hermit, and, with promises of aid, sending him forth to stir up the people to engage in the holy undertaking.

The legend now exhibits the monk as going everywhere, and addressing in the streets and in the open fields the crowds that press about him. The people look upon the monk, clothed in the coarse raiment of an anchorite, as a messenger from heaven, and even venerate the ass upon which he rides. His wild and fervid eloquence alternately melts his auditors to tears, or lifts them into transports of enthusiasm.

Such, in essential features, is the tradition of Peter the Hermit, which has come down to us in the history of William of Tyre, a chronicler who wrote towards the close of the twelfth century. The first part of this account is now discredited, and it seems quite certain that the monk's alleged pilgrimage to Jerusalem is a pure embellishment of the tale by later romancers. That the preaching of the monk, however, was of the most extraordinary character and produced a deep impression upon the popular mind is beyond doubt. But the real originator of the First Crusade was Pope Urban, and not the hermit, as the legend represents. It would appear also that the preaching of the monk took place after instead of before the great Council of Clermont, spoken

³ From *The Middle Ages*, by Philip Van Ness Myers; pp. 224-228; 241-243. (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

of in the next paragraph, and was probably confined to Northeastern France.

The Councils of Piacenza and Clermont (1095). While the religious feelings of the Christians of the West were growing tenser day by day, the Turks in the East were making constant advances, until at last they were threatening Constantinople itself. The emperor Alexius Comnenus sent urgent letters to the pope, asking for aid against the infidels, representing that, unless help were extended immediately, the capital with all its holy relics must soon fall into the hands of the barbarians.

Urban called a great council of the Church at Piacenza in Italy to consider the appeal (1095). It was a vast and enthusiastic assembly, for the religious feelings of Christendom had already been deeply moved. But threatening as were the dangers that impended above the sister church in the East, still so many other and discordant interests were represented by the different commissioners to the council that it was impossible to concert any measures looking towards the deliverance of the Eastern Church or the recovery of Jerusalem.

Later in the same year a new council was convened at Clermont in France, Urban purposely fixing the place of meeting among the warm-tempered and martial Franks. Fourteen archbishops, two hundred and twenty-five bishops, four hundred abbots, and of others a multitude that no man could number, crowded to the council. The town of Clermont could not hold the immense multitudes, which overflowed all the surrounding fields.

After the council had considered some minor matters the question which was agitating all hearts was brought before it. The pope himself was one of the chief speakers. He possessed the gift of eloquence, so that the man, the cause, and the occasion all contributed to the achievement of one of the greatest triumphs of human oratory. Urban pictured the humiliation and misery of the provinces of Asia; the profanation of the places made sacred by the presence and footsteps of the Son of God; and then he detailed the conquests of the Turks, until now, with almost all Asia Minor in their possession, they were threatening Europe from the shores of the Hellespont. "When Jesus Christ summons you to his defense," exclaimed the eloquent pontiff, "let no base affection detain you in your homes; whoever will abandon his house, or his father, or his mother, or his wife, or his children, or his inheritance, for the sake of his name, shall be recompensed a hundredfold, and possess life eternal."

Here the enthusiasm of the vast assembly burst through every restraint. With one voice they cried, "Dieu le volt! Dieu le volt!" "It is the will of God! It is the will of God!" Thousands immediately affixed the cross to their garments as a pledge of their sacred engagement to go forth to the rescue of the Holy Sepulcher. The summer of the following year was set for the departure of the expedition.

Mustering of the Crusaders (1096-1098). It was the countries of France and Southern Italy that were most deeply stirred by the papal call. In these lands the contagion of the enthusiasm seized upon almost all classes alike; for it was the common religious feeling of the age to which the appeal had been especially made. The Council of Clermont had proclaimed anew the Truce of God, with a very great extension of its prohibitions, and had pronounced anathemas against any one who should invade the possessions of a prince engaged in the holy war. By edict the pope had granted to all who should enlist for right motives "remission of all canonical penalties," and promised to the truly penitent, in case they should die on the expedition, "the joy of life eternal."

Under such inducements princes and nobles, bishops and priests, monks and anchorites, saints and sinners, rich and poor, hastened to enroll themselves beneath the standard of the Cross. "Europe," says Michaud, "appeared to be a land of exile, which every one was eager to quit."

The Vanguard. Before the regular armies of the crusaders were ready to move, those who had gathered about Peter the Hermit, becoming impatient of delay, urged him to place himself at their head and lead them at once to the Holy Land. Dividing command of the mixed multitudes with a poor knight called Walter the Penniless, and followed by a throng, it is said, of eighty thousand persons, among whom were many women and children, the Hermit set out for Constantinople by the overland route through Germany and Hungary. Thousands of the Crusaders perished miserably of hunger and exposure on the march. Those who crossed the Bosphorus were surprised by the Turks, and almost all were slaughtered. Thus perished the forlorn hope of the First Crusade. . . .

The Children's Crusade (1212). During the interval between the Fourth and Fifth Crusades, the religious enthusiasm that had so long agitated the men of Europe came to fill with unrest the children, resulting in what is known as the Children's Crusade.

The chief preacher of this crusade was a child about twelve years

of age, a French peasant lad, named Stephen, who became persuaded that Jesus Christ had commanded him to lead a crusade of children to the rescue of the Holy Sepulcher. The children became wild with excitement, and flocked in vast crowds to the places appointed for rendezvous. Nothing could restrain them or thwart their purpose. "Even bolts and bars," says an old chronicler, "could not hold them." The great majority of those who collected at the rallying places were boys under twelve years of age, but there were also many girls.

The movement excited the most diverse views. Some declared that it was inspired by the Holy Spirit, and quoted such scriptural texts as these to justify the enthusiasm: "A child shall lead them"; "Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast ordained praise." Others, however, were quite as confident that the whole thing was the work of the devil.

The German children, whose number is variously given at from twenty to forty thousand, were the first to move. They crossed the Alps and marched down the Italian shores looking for a miraculous pathway through the sea to Palestine. Beneath the toil and hardships of the journey a great part of the little crusaders died or fell out by the way. Those reaching Rome were kindly received by the pope, who persuaded them to give up their enterprise and return to their homes, impressing upon their minds, however, that they could not be released from the vows they had made, which they must fulfil when they became men.

The French children, numbering thirty thousand, according to the chroniclers, set out from the place of rendezvous for Marseilles. Their leader, Stephen, rode in great state in a chariot surrounded by an escort of infantile nobles, who paid him the obedience and homage due a superior and sacred being. The little pilgrims had no conception of the distance to the Holy Land, and whenever a city came in sight eagerly asked if it were not Jerusalem.

Arriving at Marseilles, the children were bitterly disappointed that the sea did not open and give them passage to Palestine. The greater part, discouraged and disillusioned, now returned home; five or six thousand, however, accepting gladly the seemingly generous offer of two merchants of the city, who proposed to take them to the Holy Land free of charge, crowded into seven small ships and sailed out of the port of Marseilles. But they were betrayed and sold as slaves in Alexandria and other Mohammedan slave markets. A part of

them, however, escaped this fate, having perished in the shipwreck of two of the vessels that bore them from Marseilles.

This children's expedition marked at once the culmination and the decline of the crusading movement. The fervid zeal that inspired the first crusaders was already dying out. "These children," said the pope, referring to the young crusaders, "reproach us with having fallen asleep, whilst they were flying to the assistance of the Holy Land."

Exercises

1. Define behavior; collective or group behavior in its widest sense; in its narrower meaning.
2. What laws govern it?
3. Make a comprehensive list of the various social activities which manifest crowd-mindedness.
4. Name the conditions favorable to crowd excitement in the Cane Ridge revival of 1800.
5. Describe the phenomena resulting and explain their rapid spread.
6. Show how Bellamy's ideal society differed from ours with respect to:
 - (a) Individual initiative in choice of dress;
 - (b) The possible range of choice;
 - (c) The opportunity to express taste;
 - (d) The authority governing fashion;
 - (e) Its relation to caste and class;
 - (f) The waste of goods and labor.
7. What are the movements of the fashion process according to Bellamy?
8. By what motives does he account for it?
9. Compare his views with those of social psychologists today.
10. What common ideas and sentiments lie back of the Crusades?
11. What physical conditions favoring crowd excitement attended their launching?
12. How extensive were the bodily mass-movements set in motion by them?
13. Give the social psychology of the Children's Crusade.
14. Show, by consulting Ross, Wallas, Trotter, LeBon, McDougall, Cooley, Bogardus, Park and Burgess, or others, how the *public* is similar to a crowd; how different from a crowd.

Additional References

1. Blackmar and Gillin: *Outlines of Sociology*. Ch. XX. "Collective Behavior."
2. Dealey, J. Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*.

Pp. 94-117 define behaviorism in psychology, and apply the concept to the "social behaviorism" of human groups genetically considered.

3. Giddings, Franklin: *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. Ch. XV. presents the author's conception of "pluralistic behavior." The reader should consider whether it is identical with the "collective," "group," or "social" behavior of other writers.

4. Goldenweiser, Alexander A.: *Early Civilization*. Pp. 224-231 treat the ghost-dance religions of the N. American Indians, referred to in Reading 1, above.

5. Park and Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Ch. XIII. "Collective Behavior." Very important for concrete illustrations and psychological analysis.

6. Ross, Edward A.: *Social Psychology*. Pp. 65-76 present numerous examples of mob mind in all realms of human activity.

7. Wallas, Graham: *The Great Society*. Ch. VIII. "The Psychology of the Crowd."

CHAPTER XXX

GROUP EXPANSION

THE expansion of groups into larger and larger peace-areas is one of the outstanding processes of world history. During all earlier ages it was brought about by conflict and conquest, but during very recent years economic and humanitarian motives have come to play a larger part.

Perhaps nothing in the entire course of social evolution is more striking than this tendency toward the formation of leagues to enforce peace in every nook and cranny of the world. In fact it is by this process that all the great, national states and empires of our present-day world arose, and the prevalent beliefs, sentiments and practices which center around the fortunes of these groups constitute what we know as *nationality*, and the nationalistic spirit. It expresses the *egoism* of the national group. Every nation, without exception, considers itself complete and final, the last word, the *ne plus ultra* of social evolution. But so does the handful of naked savages which makes up a miserable forest horde. The two groups are precisely alike in principle, and differ only in size and complexity. Neither one has any sound reason for considering itself the final work, the masterpiece, of social evolution, — although, to be sure, *reason* has little or nothing to do with such ethnocentrism. It is essentially an emotional attitude, a set of sentiments in the populace, the feeling-tone which accompanies the self-seeking activities of a competing group. But as for the logical merits of this nationalistic doctrine of finality, it is nothing but sheer dogmatism, and a nation of a hundred million Americans can no more hope to arrest the world-wide march of social integration than could a wandering score of Wood Veddahs in Ceylon.

Whether it concerns the League of the Iroquois Tribes or the proposed League of World Powers, social reconstruction means the re-direction of immemorial predispositions toward new objects, by means of institutional arrangements more compatible with social expediency as perceived by reason. It proceeds not by infinitely slow changes in the human constitution, but by the swifter methods of legislation and education, the former stretching the warp, the latter filling in the woof, of the new social activities which, in their totality, constitute the new social order. While the process requires no alteration in the original equipment of body or mind, it does involve a *change of mind*, both as its cause and its effect. The collective result is that altera-

tion in the traditions and institutions of men which constitutes social reconstruction. These are the living, changing fabric of the social order. The rigid frame-work of the loom of life, represented by environment and psycho-physical constitution, is fixed and rigid, as a loom should be, although even it is not absolutely unyielding. The threads of belief, sentiment, and practice, *i.e.*, of social attitudes, on the other hand, are indefinitely pliable, the richness and variety of the pattern depending largely upon the skill of the weaver. And the weaver in this case is the rational, idealizing, self-directing power of the collective, or social mind. With the same loom and yarn a thousand different patterns are possible. In both cases the figures that chanced to be woven earlier may determine to some extent the possible patterns of the future; or, in the language of ethnology, culture is predetermined in large degree by antecedent culture, or values by earlier values and attitudes.

The objections which are directed today against the proposed international league might have been urged with equal propriety, and in fact were urged in large part, when a similar league between the thirteen American colonies was under discussion. The world was full of very intelligent people at the end of the eighteenth century who were just as sure that American union under a constitution was a chimerical travesty on human nature as their spiritual descendants of today are certain that the League of Nations is a beautiful but pernicious dream. Against any who might attempt to argue that the two cases are not fairly analogous the facts seem overwhelming. The evident truth is that the two events are much more than analogous. They are identical. That is to say, they are nothing else but phases of a single social process, two stages in the same historical spiral, two upwellings of one continuous stream of tendency in the life of humanity.

Men fix the bounds of the peace-group according to their widest conception of a common interest, and this conception, or perception, has grown as the thoughts of men have widened with the process of the suns,—and, to put it prosaically, with the processes of world trade. Moreover it has expressed not only a conception of a common life that ought to be, but a perception of a community of interest which actually existed, both as fact and potentiality. Whenever the expanding range of common interests created by the developing industrial, intellectual, and moral relations of men has required it, the peace-group has never failed to extend its circle, and the patriotic devotion of humanity has in every instance undergone a corresponding enlargement; for where the treasure is there will the heart be also. In view of these simple facts of history there could be no greater piece of sheer dogmatism than the militaristic creed that patriotic devotion to the national state is the last word in the moral life of mankind.

The present movement toward a League to Enforce Peace is the concrete expression of men's growing perception of an actually existing

unity in the life of the globe which is denied and outraged by the political disunity and anarchy that blights the life of the whole international neighborhood.

In Reading 1 Professor Giddings shows with a few master strokes the steps in this world-old process of group expansion. Then in Reading 2 Dr. Pyle traces the present-day plan for a league of nations to its earliest historical beginnings. In Reading 3 we present a few paragraphs which indicate the most recent definite steps toward the actual establishment of a world-league and thus of a world peace-group.

1. Enlargement of the Peace-Group through Social Evolution ¹

While evolution continues, two standards are inevitable, and we must try as best we can to reconcile or coördinate them. As long as coördination is still imperfect, we must at one time be hostile, at another time benevolent; at one time remorseless, at another time compassionate, unless we are prepared to see all moral activity disappear in brutality on the one hand, or in degeneration on the other.

This is exactly what the practical world has always avowed, and what the theorists, dogmatists, and uncompromising idealists have always tried to get away from. The Nietzsches would go to one extreme, the Tolstoïs to another. Meanwhile, men in general try to find the reciprocal limitations of their conflicting standards.

The attempt has not been guided to any great extent by philosophy. The adjustment has been made tentatively, experimentally, more by groping than by thinking, and it has been continued through a long historical process. Only by glancing back over this history in rapid review can we discover whether, on the whole, we are still the primitive egoists that Nietzsche would approve, or sympathetic, if not always close and believing, followers of Count Tolstoï.

We must go back to that little group of blood kindred which was the earliest human community. A few brothers and sisters, recognizing their maternal kinship, maintained a common lair or camp, struggled together against beast and nature, and together obtained food supplies. Within that little band the competition of the Darwinian struggle had, in a measure, ceased. Toward all life that lay beyond the circle the rule was unrelenting war. Here, then, at the outset of human life, the two standards were already established.

¹ From *Democracy and Empire*, by Franklin Henry Giddings; pp. 354-356. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1901. Reprinted by permission.)

Helpfulness, compassion, forgiveness even, were right and expedient within the group. Remorseless enmity, cruelty, treachery, any expedient was right toward those men or creatures against which the band must struggle for its own existence.

By the combination of such small hordes, in relatively large aggregates, tribes were formed. By the federation of tribes, leagues or confederacies were formed. By the consolidation of leagues, nations and states were formed. By the consolidation of petty states, the vast territorial nations of modern times were formed. And practically all of this integration was accomplished by war.

At every stage in this progress the double standard of conduct has been assumed and maintained. Those within a society organized by confederation or consolidation have regarded themselves as allies, and as having more to gain from a suppression of the harsher features of the struggle for existence among themselves than by permitting them to continue. This conclusion they have derived from their experience of what Professor Karl Pearson has called the "extra-group struggle." That is to say, a nation has always obtained a larger sum total of benefits from a struggle *en masse* with other nations *en masse* than it has obtained from lesser struggles of its component groups against one another, or from still more minute struggles of its individual units against one another. This has happened because the extra-group struggle of nation against nation has afforded abundant opportunities for individuals to distinguish themselves and to develop their distinctive qualities, even when conflicts with tribal brethren or fellow-citizens have ceased; and because, also, the hardships of the extra-group struggle — the poverty, pestilence, and taxation resulting from war — have exterminated great numbers of the unfit within each nation. In short, intertribal and international struggles have thus far continued the processes of natural selection; and, notwithstanding the growth of sympathy and benevolence within the nation, panmixia has not yet in more than one or two important instances prevented a gradual accumulation of power, while its differentiation has continued.

A closer examination of the internal phenomena of human societies shows us, furthermore, that the extension of sympathy and the gentler virtues from horde to tribe, from tribe to nation, has proceeded only as fast as a conception of likeness among the incorporated elements of the enlarged community has grown up in the minds of the people. The notion of the stranger and the notion of the enemy were identical

in the early days of human struggle, and the identity has never wholly disappeared. In reality, it is only among those who regard themselves as in some sense brethren, as being either of one blood or spiritually akin, with agreeing ideas and common purposes, that non-resistance is a strictly natural, spontaneous phenomenon. Divergence of view and conflicting purposes normally provoke antagonism. Consequently, the growth of pacific forms of conduct, the gradual ceasing of strife, and the growth of habits of non-resistance have been made possible only by the spread of knowledge; by the better comprehension of one another by men who once misunderstood one another; by the perfecting of communication and of social intercourse; and by a gradual assimilation, through imitation and reciprocal instruction, of different men to a common type. In a word, non-aggression and non-resistance are an outcome of homogeneity.

A further inspection of the detail of the process shows us also that when men are in agreement upon fundamental matters of great importance for the purposes of every-day life, they may live in outward harmony, actually maintaining habits of non-aggression and non-resistance as far as physical combat is concerned, while differing radically in minor matters, and maintaining the fiercest kind of industrial, commercial, and intellectual struggles. As everybody knows, this is the state of things that exists at the present day in nations like the United States, where actual warfare of section against section, or class against class, is practically unknown; where riot and insurrection are rare; and where, as compared with the internal disorder of ancient times, individual assaults are infrequent. There is fundamental agreement in such a population upon certain great principles of civil organization, of individual liberty, of standards of conduct, and of loyalty to a human destiny. In all lesser matters there is the widest difference; and in its commercial and intellectual modes the struggle for existence is fiercely continued.

2. An Earlier League to Enforce Peace ²

The revolution of three centuries has brought the world, in the crisis of today, to a repetition of some old situations and a rebirth of some ancient plans. Negatively as warnings and positively as guides, the

² By Joseph Gilpin Pyle, in *The Unpopular Review*, No. 20, Vol. x. (Oct.-Dec., 1918) p. 244 ff. Reprinted by permission of Henry Holt and Company, publishers.

likes and unlikes of historic circumstances are supremely educative. There is some truth in the theory that the affairs of men move in cycles where events, situations, and constructive or reconstructive principles recur with monotonous regularity: for most national and international problems have their dim analogues somewhere in "the dark backward and abysm of time. . . ."

Europe in the sixteenth century was overshadowed by the House of Austria. Supreme in its own domain, commanding through Spain the resources of the mines of the New World, battling fiercely to crush out every form of freedom in the Low Countries, intriguing incessantly to bring France under its power, or, in default of that, to keep it always divided between bitterly warring factions, such was the position and the policy of the Hapsburgs. Their resolve to dominate Europe was perilously near realization. The wars of the League had made France almost a desert, and imbued its people with wild and bloody passions. Again and again Flanders had been on the point of collapse. All the valor of England could do little more than defend her own coasts from invasion. The House of Austria, enthroned in Spain, dominating the German princes, at home in the cities and principalities of Italy, besieging France with intrigues, wars, alliances, every form of wheedling or treachery or open hostility, was herding all Europe toward perpetual unrest or final submission.

Two rulers outside the house of Nassau felt the intolerable situation more keenly than any others: Elizabeth of England, and that Henry of France, still best remembered by his earlier title, "Henry of Navarre." Neither their dominions nor their lives would be safe from attack until the common enemy should be disabled. Nothing short of a decisive defeat at arms would stay the ambition or break the strength of Spain and Austria. And by no other exit could the war-weary people of all countries reach the permanent peace they sighed for with a longing proportioned to the ravages that centuries of struggle had spread all over Europe. So a peace plan was formed then, just as one has been framed now. The interesting thing is that it was the same plan.

Practically all the powers of Europe were to unite, each furnishing its quota of troops for the great war against the House of Austria. Henry, the most consummate captain of his age, and excelled by few in any age, was to lead in person with all the resources of a France rejuvenated and enriched by his wise administration under the guid-

ance of the great Sully behind him. When Austria should be compelled to sue for peace, she was to be restricted within the narrowest limits. All the rest of Europe was to be reconstituted into states fashioned by the ties of nationality, of political custom and of religion, then even more powerful than ties of blood to bind or to loose political union. Some of these nations would be monarchies, some republics; but their international relations, with the peace of the whole new world, were to be declared, safeguarded, maintained, by a great assembly, modeled on the Amphictyonic Council of Greece, in which all were to be represented. Here was a "League to Enforce Peace" fashioned to the last detail at least as long ago as the early years of the seventeenth century.

It is to Maximilien de Béthune, Baron de Rosny, best known to us under the name of the Duke of Sully, that we are indebted for an account so extraordinarily interesting and pertinent now. He tells his story as explicitly and gravely as if no portion of the life or work of Henry of Navarre were more amply documented than what he calls "le grand dessein" of a new Europe, and a world dedicated to peace. Sully was the confidant of the king in matters of the highest state policy, as well as in household and extra-household personal embarrassments. He was an austere man, flinching from nothing that he saw in the line of duty, daring to reprove the king to his face, refusing the offer of a marshal's baton in exchange for a proposed religious apostasy. His narrative tells freely the weaknesses he deplores in the man he so greatly loved. That such a man as Sully should invent out of whole cloth a plan like that of this old League to Enforce Peace, and credit it to Henry, seems out of keeping with his character, historically and psychologically. Sully could be bitterly prejudiced, and even let prejudice warp his judgment of men and his account of their acts. But of downright sycophantic lying, with luxurious invention, he was as incapable as John Calvin. . . .

If, however, one supposes that Sully invented the whole tale for the greater glory of the lord and master he idolized, which seems at war with his whole character, it makes the tale no whit less interesting or significant for us: for the thought was certainly there, and the date cannot be challenged. It was written down while Sully lived. He died in 1641, and the first volumes of the *Memoirs* had already been published. The conceptions embodied in *The Republic* and the *Utopia* are independent of the authorship of Plato or Sir Thomas

More. The most interesting comparative feature of the origin of great world-ideas is not the man or the place, but the time. Let the credit be Henry's or Sully's, the fact remains that three centuries ago a mind of very high reach and a very practical turn, no matter whether king's or minister's, believed that war could and must be brought to a final termination; that the earth and God were weary of it; that it could be abolished only through the armed conquest of imperial militarism; and that the efficient substitute for it would be a confederation of all the nations of the civilized world; united specifically to exercise the two functions of a board of international arbitration and a league to enforce peace.

Sully is not quite decided whether to assign the origination of this plan to his master or to Queen Elizabeth of England. He says: "If the first idea of it did not come from Elizabeth, it is at least certain that that great queen had conceived it by herself a long time before, as a means of avenging all Europe for the crimes committed by the common enemy." On the whole, he seems to lean to the conclusion that she originated it and suggested it to Henry. . . .

Sixty pages of this old copy of Sully are filled with a description and discussion of the plan, collated from the repeated mentions in different places in the original edition. It is possible to give only the briefest summary here. "Henry himself," says Sully, "expressed his idea by saying that Europe should be divided and governed as one family." Given three permitted religions, the Roman Catholic, the Reformed and the Protestant — for in those days, as Henry knew to his cost, religious agreement was a necessary first condition of territorial or political solidarity — the Turk was to be driven from Europe, and the Czar, or "Grand Duke of Muscovy," could join the federated nations or share the same fate. This is a curious foreshadowing of destiny now fulfilling itself. The great general confederation of all the other countries of Europe was to be called "The Christian Republic. . . ."

There must be laws and regulations to unite these powers closely, and to maintain order; reciprocal engagements and solemn guaranties of good faith in both religious and political affairs; mutual assurances of free trade; and measures to assure equal and just treatment of each state by all the others. For the adjustment of these matters and for the settlement of differences arising in the future, there would be the "General Council of Europe" already referred to.

Each of the governments included would send to it a number of representatives proportioned to its size and place. This body was to remain in continuous session, as a senate occupied with "informing itself upon and settling all the civil, political and religious troubles of Europe at home or abroad." The contemplated assignment of commissioners would constitute a body of about seventy persons, the membership of which should be subject to removal every three years. It would be divided into three sections of practically equal size, one of which should sit at Paris or Brussels, the others at Trent and Cracow. But if the council should decide it better to remain undivided, it could assemble as a whole in any of the great centrally located cities of Europe. Sully suggests that a number of subordinate councils might well have been added, with right of appeal from their decrees to the central body.

According to Sully's story, the plan was explained more or less fully, as seemed wise or safe, to most of the powers concerned, and received their more or less formal adhesion. . . .

The details of Elizabeth's or Henry's or Sully's plan, so far as it relates to the enforcement of peace, were less minutely worked out. This was not so much by reason of confidence that the new adjustment of Europe would prevent wars from arising, and that the General Council of the Christian Republic would set matters straight long before any strain reached the breaking point (although that was implicitly believed) as because this confederation was to be established, in the first place, as a peace league, by an international army; and that army would naturally and automatically be charged with its maintenance and defence. The allied powers, says Sully, had all agreed to furnish their contingents, and he enumerates them in detail. . . .

After the "*Memoirs*" were printed, debate centered, not upon the assertions of Sully, but upon the feasibility of executing the design if Henry had lived. To discredit the authenticity of the idea, to declare that Sully made up the tale "out of his own head," to credit this prosaic, truth-loving, crabbed Huguenot with such a wild imaginative flight, was reserved for a later period. But as already intimated, the truth about its authorship has not the least importance here: the interesting thing is the extraordinary correspondence between a dream of world-regeneration at the beginning of the seventeenth century and another at the beginning of the twentieth,—the rock basis to which the conduct of society and government is re-

duced under ultimate stress — Germany, like Austria, to be shackled in the interest of world safety and world peace; a division of territory on the lines of race and institutions; a world-wide popular propaganda as an aid to arms; and a league or council of all nations to maintain peace by removing or composing causes of quarrel — this is the historic parallel. . . .

Henry was ready to march at the head of his troops, when Ravaillic struck, and the world went topsy-turvy. Henry murdered, the Spanish party reigned supreme in France. Sully was forced to retire from his great employments, and leave the court. "Le grand dessein" became as if it had never been. It was a dangerous subject to be acquainted with. Only now is the world beginning to judge rightly the greatness of the mind that fathered it, no matter whether it was that of queen or king or minister, or some obscure unknown who first suggested it to one of them. Whoever he was, his mighty spirit walks abroad today in a vaster world, a more terrible crisis than ever came within the horizon of his dreams. So little is there new under the sun; and so wonderful, when we are willing to search for them, are the ancient true and unfamiliar things.

3. Recent Steps in World Organization ³

The establishment of a League of Nations was one of the results of the World War. All belligerents and the neutrals accepted the idea that when the war should end provision should be made for a permanent institution to promote peace.

Unlike previous wars, the World War was fought on so large a scale that belligerent governments found it necessary to make definite statements of their war aims in order to convince their peoples to carry on the conflict to a conclusion. The idea of a League of Nations was perhaps the most effective of the war aims serving that purpose.

The armistice with Germany was concluded upon the basis of the Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918. The 14th point was:

"A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

³ From *Handbook on the League of Nations*, 1920-1923; *passim*. World Peace Foundation, Boston.

This engagement and the great interest in the matter manifested by all the peoples made it necessary to give the subject a definite place in the negotiations of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

At its second plenary session on January 25, 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference passed the following resolution:

"The Conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

(1) It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international coöperation, to insure the fulfilment of international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

(2) This League should be treated as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

(3) The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and the functions of the League. . . ."

In ten sessions, February 3-13, this commission worked out a project, which was presented in a report to a plenary session of the Preliminary Peace Conference on February 14 and was published to the world for suggestions.

On March 20 and 21 a committee of the commission heard representatives of neutral states respecting changes which they desired. The neutrals represented were: Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela.

In the three sessions on March 22 and 24 the commission revised the draft and finally on April 10 and 11 gave the Covenant of the League of Nations its final form. The text was formally adopted at a session of the Preliminary Peace Conference on April 28, 1919. In editing the results of the negotiations of the Preliminary Peace Conference, the Covenant was made to constitute Part I of the treaties of peace.

At its final session on April 11, an organization committee was pro-

vided for by a resolution, which was made effective by the Preliminary Peace Conference on April 28. The organization committee held its first meeting at the Hotel Crillon, Paris, on May 5, 1919.

Functioning Since January 10, 1920

The League of Nations formally came into being by the official deposit of the ratifications of the treaty of Versailles at the French Foreign Office, at Paris, on January 10, 1920, at 4.15 P.M. By that deposit the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Czecho-Slovakia, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Poland, Siam and Uruguay became the first 14 members of the League of Nations.

Within the next two months 42 of the states named in the Annex to the Covenant — all except three — had become original Members of the League. . . .

United States — Represented by "unofficial observer" of Department of State at Brussels Financial Conference, 1920; "unofficial and consultative" representation on Anthrax and Emigration Commissions of the International Labor Office; Health Committee of League, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and Children.

Individual citizens of the United States have been or are now engaged in the work of the League as follows:

Elihu Root, former Secretary of State, served as member of the Committee of Jurists to formulate the draft scheme for the Permanent Court of International Justice:

John Bassett Moore, Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice;

Robert Andrews Millikan, member of Committee on Intellectual Coöperation;

Dr. Hugh S. Cumming, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, consultative member of the Health Committee;

Dr. Josephine Baker, member of the Health Committee;

George Ellery Hale, president of the National Research Council, member of the Committee on Intellectual Coöperation;

Abram I. Elkus, former ambassador to Turkey, judge of the New York Court of Appeals, member of the Commission of Rapporteurs for the Aaland Islands question;

Mrs. Hamilton Wright, assessor of Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium;

Emma D. Cushman, member of Committee on Deportation of Women and Children;

Royal Meeker, Chief of the Research Division, International Labor Office;

Raymond B. Fosdick, formerly Under Secretary-General of the Secretariat;

Manley O. Hudson, professor of law at the Harvard Law School, member of Legal Section of the Secretariat;

Sarah Wambaugh, temporary member of the Administrative Commissions Section of the Secretariat;

Arthur Sweetser, Assistant Director of Information Section;

Huntington Gilchrist, member of the Administrative Commissions Section;

Howard R. Huston, Head of Establishment Department;

Florence Wilson, Librarian.

The Rockefeller Foundation is appropriating \$60,080 for three years for the interchange of public health personnel, and \$32,840 for five years for an epidemiological intelligence service, both under the League. . . .

Permanent Court of International Justice

Origin—The Permanent Court of International Justice realizes a policy which has been advocated by the United States Government for over 50 years. The American delegations to the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 supported the formation of a court, which, however, failed to come into being.

Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for the establishment of such a court. In fulfilment of this provision the Council of the League on February 13, 1920, appointed an Advisory Committee of Jurists to formulate the scheme of its organization. . . .

The draft statute of the Advisory Committee of Jurists was examined by the Council of the League of Nations at its meetings at San Sebastian, July 30–August 4, and the Council decided to communicate the draft scheme for the institution of the Court to the Governments Members of the League. It was studied by the Council at Paris on September 16 and finally approved by it at Brussels on October 20–28.

The draft statute was submitted to the First Assembly of the

League at Geneva in November, 1920. The Assembly by a unanimous vote on December 13, 1920, approved the resolution providing that the Statute be appended to a protocol which should be submitted within the shortest possible time to the Members of the League of Nations for ratification. Ratifications were promptly made, and the Second Assembly and Council of the League of Nations on September 14-15, 1921, proceeded to the election of the 11 Judges and the four Deputy Judges of the Court. . . .

Proposal for Action by United States

The President of the United States on February 24, 1923, transmitted to the Senate a message in which he sought the advice and consent of that body to ratification of the protocol and Statute under special conditions. . . .

Exercises

1. How fundamental is the process of group expansion?
2. Is there any reason to think that it must end at the stage of national units?
3. What bearing does ethnocentrism have on the question?
4. Show the relation between enlargement of the peace-group and change in the original nature of man; change in social attitudes; change in institutional arrangements.
5. Show that the American Union and the proposed League of Nations are, or are not, essentially identical steps in social evolution.
6. What is the relation between the expansion of the peace-group and developing social interests?
7. What growing perception is reflected in the present movement for world organization?
8. What two conflicting standards does Giddings find in all societies?
9. Trace the peace-group from its smallest beginnings to the largest expression of it thus far attained.
10. Show how the double standard of conduct manifested itself at every stage.
11. Compare this "double standard" of Giddings with the "moral dualism" of Ross (in *Social Control*), and the "in-group and out-group" of Sumner (in *Folkways*).
12. What is the connection between this expansion of groups and the conception of likeness among the members?
13. Explain: "non-aggression and non-resistance are the outcome of homogeneity."

14. Show that life in any group is a combination of agreement and disagreement.
15. In a single world-society could there still be disagreement and conflict?
16. Compare conditions in Europe in the sixteenth century with conditions there at the end of the World War.
17. Show how the same solution was proposed in each case.
18. Sketch the Grand Design of the Duke of Sully.
19. What is known of its authorship?
20. Show how the present League of Nations grew out of President Wilson's fourteen points.
21. Give the substance of the resolution which actually launched the movement.
22. When and how was it actually established?
23. What part has the United States had in the League?
24. Discuss the origin and nature of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Additional References

1. Bogardus, Emory S.: *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 243-251. Discusses "The World Group."
2. Case, Clarence M.: "Instinctive and Cultural Factors in Group Conflicts," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVIII, No. I. (July, 1922). Indicates certain stages in the process of group expansion, and the comparative parts played by instinct and tradition.
3. Howard, George E.: "Ideals As a Factor in the Future Control of International Society," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*. Vol. XII. (1918).
4. Kropotkin, P.: *Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution*. See Ch. I. and II. for a refutation of the notion that struggle between individual members of a species is the law of nature. The entire volume is invaluable for the student of war and other forms of conflict.
5. Maciver, R. M.: *Community: A Sociological Study*; Appendix B. "International Community in Relation to the Institution of War."
6. Royce, Josiah: *War and Insurance*. Proposes to replace "dyadic" with "triadic" relations.
7. Sumner, William G.: *War and Other Essays*. Essay One traces the evolution of the peace-group.

PART FOUR
SOCIAL PROBLEMS

DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

ACCORDING to the etymology of the word, a "problem" of any kind is anything "thrown forward"; that is to say it is anything thrust upon the attention. This definition applies perfectly to what are commonly called "social problems." The phrase itself is one of those much used popular expressions which turn out to be incapable of exact definition when we pause to ask ourselves what we really mean by our phraseology. "Social problems" has long figured as just such a vague but useful expression. Popular as it is, it seems difficult to state, in exact terms, just what a social problem is. Yet while it can hardly be defined so exactly as "social processes," it is possible to state the idea in general terms.

A social problem, as the term is herein understood, means any social situation which attracts the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within a society, and appeals to them as calling for readjustment or remedy by social, *i.e.*, collective, action of some kind or other. The phrase "considerable number" is confessedly vague, but is chosen deliberately to indicate any number, from a vast majority to a small minority if capable and energetic.

The essential feature of this definition is its socio-psychological character. That is to say, a "social problem" is not a purely objective situation, which can be recognized by a *stranger*, no matter how proficient in the social sciences, who is not in membership with the social group concerned. In other words, the most learned of sociologists is not competent to go among the lowest of Australian tribesmen and point out to them that they have such and such social problems, — for example, improper child feeding, sexual immorality, or poor housing. One guilty of such impertinence would arouse astonishment and ridicule, if not resentment, and might very properly be informed that no such problems existed in that group. This would be strictly accurate, in so far as no considerable number of Australian tribesmen had come to be conscious of any unfavorable conditions of the character mentioned, and requiring remedial action. Consequently, for them no "problems" exist, and the concern of our statistical and philanthropic social scientist counts for nothing against this indifference on the part of the group involved.

This is true because, as shown above, a social "problem" is partly a state of the social mind and hence not purely a matter of unfavorable objective conditions in the physical or social environment. An expert statistician or social worker may be perfectly competent to point out

the existence and nature, and even the causes and remedies in some cases, of *adverse social conditions* in any society on earth, but neither he nor any outsider can single out the *social problems* of a social group except by studying the *collective mind* of that group. Social statistics can detect and analyze *adverse social conditions*, but only social psychology and sociology are competent to formulate the *social problems* of the group, because these sciences alone are able to ascertain what the particular life conditions are that have thrust themselves upon the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within the group, being thus "thrown forward" in the collective consciousness as conditions demanding remedial social action. Without this act of *attention*, which takes note and seeks to manipulate and control (See "Introduction" to *Source Book for Social Origins* by W. I. Thomas), there is no social *problem* existent. Hence a group may live under many unfavorable conditions yet have few social problems, or even none at all.

From this it follows that the number and character of "social problems" varies from time to time just as it varies from place to place. The social problems of the United States are quite different from those of native Australia, China, or Greenland, but they are also very different from those of the United States itself a hundred years ago, and doubtless not at all what they will be a hundred years hereafter. At the same time certain adverse social conditions may be identical in all these places and at all these times, for example dearth of natural resources, existence of a polluted water-supply, the presence of dangerous bacteria, unfair distribution of wealth, or ignorance of child care. These are objective natural and social phenomena, actually existent and constantly open to observation and tabulation, but they may or may not at any time or place exist for the group mind, particularly for the *public opinion* there existent on social welfare. When they do they become the objective element in that state of the group mind which consists in the recognition of a certain social problem. The corollary of this is that no complete and final list of specific social problems can be drawn up by the present writer or by any one else.

It is nevertheless possible, and also desirable, to *classify* social problems in a broad general way. This we have attempted to do in arranging the subdivisions of Part IV. The basis of classification used by the present writer may be said to be that of the *source* from which the social problems emerge, or, in the language of our definition, the quarter *from which* the problem in each instance is "thrust forward" upon public attention. From this point of view social problems fall into four groups, as presented in the following chapters, namely:—*First*, those which are presented by some *unfavorable aspect of the physical environment*. *Second*, those arising from defects in *the nature of population itself*, or unfavorable tendencies in its *rate of growth*, or its geographical distribution, or disturbing differences in

its racial types; *Third*, those growing out of faulty and disrupting social arrangements, i.e., poor social organization, between the members of the group; and, *Fourth*, those springing from the growth and conflict of divergent ideals or social values cherished by different classes or sub-groups within the society.

After the above conception and classification had been worked out a most valuable article, by Dr. Hornell Hart, entitled "What is a Social Problem?" appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology* (November, 1923). According to Dr. Hart, "A social problem is a problem which actually or potentially affects large numbers of people in a common way so that it may best be solved by some measure or measures applied to the problem as a whole rather than by dealing with each individual as an isolated case, or which requires concerted or organized human action."

It will be observed that in this definition the social nature of the "problem" is made to consist in the fact that social or collective action ("concerted or organized action") is required for the solution; while in our own definition the social character consists essentially in the fact that the collective or group mind, or in common speech the public mind, recognizes the existence of the problem; and perceives also the fact that it must be collectively solved.

In the classification of social problems the same contrast appears. Whereas our present classification indicates in each case the ground or source of the particular problem, that of Dr. Hart seems to be based upon the nature of the solution. Thus he introduces each group of problems with a general query, and in every case the question asks after the possible solution, as follows; A. "Economic Problems: How can poverty and excessive wealth be minimized?" B. "Health Problems: How may the average span of life be lengthened, health be made more intense, and sickness minimized?" C. "Political and Socio-Psychological Problems: How can human relationships be made most conducive to the general welfare?" D. "Educational Problems: By what social means may individual personalities be most enriched and rendered most serviceable to society?"

Dr. Hart, being himself a social statistician, defines a social problem in terms of objective data amenable to the processes of statistical method. From the point of view of the present writer these are not social problems in the full sense, but simply the adverse objective conditions of life which form one side of social problems, the other being the more or less prevalent social attitude toward those conditions. But while defining social problems from the viewpoint of the social statistician, Dr. Hart classifies them from the standpoint of the social worker, reformer, or social engineer; that is, on the basis of their mode of solution. In the present volume they are classified from the point of view of their source; more explicitly from the angle of the environmental conditions or social processes in which they have their origins.

As herein regarded, social problems turn out to be, in a very essential aspect, social processes. More exactly, the recognition and solution of adverse social conditions through the formulation of a series of so-called "social problems" constitutes in itself a definite social process, comprised, along with the other social processes discussed in Part III. of the present volume, under the one great all-embracing social process which we call social evolution. Consequently the era of social problems, or of any particular problem, arises in different societies at different stages of social evolution.

Among the relative few who have given special attention to the nature of social problems should be mentioned Professor Charles A. Ellwood: *The Social Problem*; Professor Ira W. Howerth: *Work and Life* (Ch. I. "The Social Problem of Today"); and Professor Carl Kelsey: "How Social Progress Causes Social Problems," in *Pub. University of Pennsylvania, Free Public Lecture Course*, 1914-'15.

A—PROBLEMS OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER XXXI

UTILIZATION AND CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

PROBLEMS of physical environment are concerned either with defense against injurious factors in the surroundings or with the utilization of the materials and forces of nature. When the obnoxious factors increase or the beneficial ones become scarce a problem arises and draws the attention of the individual and the group. The subject of the present chapter is that of deficit in the natural basis of society.

Utilization is the fundamental process of life, individual or social. As Sumner puts it in the opening sentence of *Folkways*, "the problem of life is to live." In the light of this fact, the most fundamental and elementary of virtues is *intelligence* sufficient to utilize the environment in avoiding enemies, securing sustenance, and finding shelter. (Cf. Perry: *The Moral Economy*). In Reading 1, the nature of utilization is tersely set forth by Professor Giddings.

Conservation is one aspect of utilization, coming late in social evolution as a conscious and definitely formulated social movement, but not entirely absent from those primitive groups wherein ethnologists find, occasionally, *taboos* that operate for the preservation of certain species of plants or animals. This, however, is probably an unintended and even unrecognized result in most of such cases.

Conservation of natural resources indicates, in fact, a very high degree of social responsibility and group intelligence, inasmuch as it represents a collective regard for the interests of unborn generations in the national estate. In the movement one can discern the following four stages: 1.—The primitive (or pioneer) era during which natural resources are freely consumed, wasted, or even destroyed as hindrances, as in the burning off of forests or the extermination of wild animal species such as rabbits or squirrels. 2. The era of lavish and thoughtless utilization and capitalistic exploitation for personal enrichment. 3. The first stage of conservation, where the slogan is to economize in the use of resources now recognized as not really limitless in quantity. 4. The higher stage of the conservation movement in which it comes gradually to be recognized that conservation is not merely a question of national parsimony but one of enhancement in the gifts of nature themselves and improve-

ment in the social distribution of their benefits. Scientific men stand out as leaders in the last two stages.

In the present chapter, Reading 2 analyzes conservation from the standpoint of this highest stage; Reading 3 formulates principles developed during the stage preceding it, while Reading 4 presents a brief sketch of the earlier steps in the conservation movement in the United States.

1. Significance of Utilization ¹

Motives of Utilization.—The motives which lead men to attempt to utilize their environment, and to adapt it to themselves, are certain organic demands, certain pleasures, and desires. They fall naturally into four classes, namely:

1. *Need*, or intolerance of pain, as seen, for example, in hunger, in thirst, or in cold.

2. *Appetite*, or craving for pleasure, as seen, for example, in the continuing enjoyment of savory foods and stimulating drinks after mere hunger and thirst have been appeased.

3. *The Sense of Power*, and the love of exercising power, as seen, for example, in the enjoyment of the hunter in taking game, of the ranchman in mastering his broncho, of the business man in conducting great commercial enterprises.

4. *Rational Desire*, or the craving of our entire intellectual and moral nature for the higher satisfactions,—of knowledge, of enjoyment of the beautiful, of friendship, and of the pleasures of hospitality and social intercourse.

These degrees of motive roughly correspond to the four degrees of appreciation and of utilization. The utilitarian motives of men whose experience is limited by consanguinity seldom rise much above the level of need. Only those whose experiences are of the widest range are greatly moved by rational desire in its higher developments. . . .

Methods of Utilization.—The motives of utilization work themselves out in actual utilization through four chief methods, namely, Attack, Instigation, Direction, Invention.

1. *Attack* includes the exertion of muscular force against any living or non-living object. It includes also the feelings and the ideas that are associated with such muscular efforts, and which range from a

¹ By Franklin Henry Giddings, in *Inductive Sociology*; pp. 76-78. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1914. Reprinted by permission.)

mere consciousness of strength to an active hatred of the object seized, if it resists or proves to be dangerous.

2. *Instigation* is the tempting, inducing, or urging other individuals to act, or to refrain from acting. It includes incitements, — the tempting or urging to act, — and placation, or the appeasing of those already excited.

3. *Direction* is the control and guidance of others. It includes *Impression*, which is the mental, as distinguished from the muscular power that one person has over another. Physically weak men, by sheer mental force, often awe and control men who are physically strong. Direction includes also *Domination*, or the active assertion of authority.

4. *Invention* is any new combination of forces and things for a useful purpose.

As here used, the word means more than mechanical invention. In the psychological and sociological sense, inventions include all new combinations of ideas, acts, things, and forces. The plot of a novel is an invention. A successful act of legislation, a new device in military or naval strategy are inventions.

2. The Meaning of Conservation ²

Conservation, narrowly and strictly considered, means the preservation in unimpaired efficiency of the resources of the earth, or in a condition so nearly unimpaired as the nature of the case, or wise exhaustion, admits. And broadly considered, it means more than the word itself implies, for it naturally includes an examination of methods whereby the natural inheritance of the human race may be improved; and still more broadly considered, — and as used in popular discussion, — it includes a treatment of the effects of productive conservation measures upon distribution. We shall give our attention briefly to the main points in this informal definition before we pass on to the thesis that conservation is largely a matter of property-relations — that a wise conservation policy means wise property-relations.

First, conservation suggests simply preservation, and, in the treat-

² By Richard T. Ely, in *The Foundations of National Prosperity: Studies in the Conservation of Permanent National Resources*, by Ely, Hess, Leith, and Carver; pp. 3-10. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1917. Reprinted by permission.)

ment of the subject which we have had in the United States, emphasis has been laid upon the past and present waste of natural resources and upon the means of putting a stop to this waste. The forests have been depleted; soil has been washed by rapidly flowing surface water from mountain sides. These rapidly flowing waters have produced high streams and devastating inundations, followed by low streams and impeded navigation. The forests have, moreover, been so removed as to bring great danger of fire, and destructive conflagrations have resulted in large waste of resources, including often a destruction of the humus, supplying essential elements in the fertile soil. As a remedy we must have measures to reforest mountain sides, and this means large social control, very frequently taking the form of public ownership and management; but in addition we always find actual and proposed measures of coöperation with private owners. Illustrations are afforded by the services of publicly employed foresters in giving advice and in making plans. Here the main emphasis is on cessation of waste and restoration of natural advantages. This means a great deal and involves hard tasks. It is said that there are places in southern Europe where it will take three hundred years to restore the soil washed from the mountain sides, as it is necessary to begin at the bottom and by planting trees gradually to build up a fertile soil from falling leaves, decaying vegetation, etc., etc.

Another feature of the existing situation much discussed is the enormous waste of good soil by erosion, even in the more level portions of the earth's surface, as in the Mississippi Valley where millions upon millions of tons of precious elements of fertility are being annually washed into that turbulent stream and then wasted. It has been proposed to construct at public expense mighty reservoirs to check the rapidity of flow and to hold back the soil, which would also facilitate navigation. Here is one suggestion, and without entering into the extent of its possibilities, it is again apparent that emphasis is laid on preservation as nearly unimpaired as possible, or as careful a using-up of supply as the nature of the case admits.

But in the second place we are concerned with measures to improve the natural inheritance of the race, and this is brought out more or less fully in discussions of conservation. Under a rational system of forestry it is claimed that an acre of ground will produce two or three times as much in a given period of time as the same acre in a wild state of nature, when the trees are allowed to grow up naturally

without man's care. Conservation of water adds to the fertility of the soil or at any rate brings about a better utilization of the fertile elements when the water is applied to the land in irrigation. Modern agriculture, which is at least partially included in discussions of conservation, is not content with the maintenance of an existing status, but wants to improve what is. Nearly everything needed to accomplish this purpose may be found in the land itself, and if not available, may often be made so by cultivation of green crops and plowing them under; and perhaps extracting from the air elements of fertility to be united with the soil. The phosphates and potassium seem to be the main, if not the only elements which must be added from without and which are in no physical proximity to the land. It must be admitted that the supplies of these are far more limited than we could wish, although it is highly probable that new sources of supply will be discovered, and certainly there is no ground for present alarm: and for this assurance there are several reasons. With a general appreciation of the natural scarcity of these elements, economy in their use will be practiced to a greater extent and this economy will be further promoted by an increase in price, accompanying growing scarcity. The natural result will be to establish something approximating a cycle, whereby these elements can be returned to the land again and again. We see something of this sort in countries like China and Japan. We are, therefore, warranted in the belief that for an indefinite time to come, certainly for several centuries, the productivity of the land may be maintained and even increased.

In the third place, we observe that conservation, considered as a part of economics, has to do first of all with that division of economics which we call production; not with production in the technical sense, but in the social sense; in other words, with relationships arising out of the associated efforts of men to produce wealth. The question here has to be asked, what institutions or what shaping of institutions is most favorable to conservation? Here, as elsewhere in economics, we have to do with property and contract; and we find we cannot make much progress until we have adopted the social theory of property and the social theory of contract. [See below, Ch. XXXVIII., Reading 5.]

And in the fourth place, conservation takes cognizance of distribution and aims to bring about justice. *In general, it may be said that the conservationists wish to cut off, or at least reduce, the private*

receipt of property and income beyond what is a fair return to capital and labor and enterprise, reserving the surplus for public use.

Notice, that we now get beyond the limits of conservation, strictly speaking, and are quite within the field of economics, but it would be arbitrary to stop the discussion at this point, where it yields fruitful results. This simply shows that conservation is in large part economics; one of our fundamental theses.

Conservationists seek to control franchises for the use of water power with this end in view, reserving surplus value for the public treasury. They wish also a complete public control of mineral treasures, brought about by leases for the exploitation of these treasures when in public ownership, so that the lessees may receive no more than fair competitive gains; but some conservationists are inclined to look favorably upon at least a limited public operation of mines as well as ownership. The equitable distribution of wealth and income is then always included as an aim in thorough conservation discussions.

But when we reflect seriously on the subject of conservation we see that we have to do here with two orders of inquiry; one of them falls within the broad field of the natural sciences; the other is economic in nature and is concerned with property-relations. The geologist must instruct us about the formations of mineral treasures, about their amounts, about their exhaustibility, etc., etc. The scientific agriculturist deals with the cultivation of the soil and discusses methods for the maintenance and even increase of agricultural productivity. Men who understand the natural laws governing the growth of trees are absolutely required if we would frame a wise forest policy. It is a question of natural science to determine the relative amount of forest products which can be expected under low and middle and high forest culture, all involving different periods of time.

But chief emphasis must be laid on the much neglected question of property-relations. Is the system of leasing public land to private parties favorable in the case of mines? We have to do in this case with the relations of public property to private operation and to private property in the implements of operation. Shall the federal government, the states, cities and other local political units acquire private lands for forestry? Here we are concerned with the extension of public property in land and the corresponding contraction of private property in land. How shall we encourage oyster culture?

Shall we make the beds of bays and rivers and bodies of water where oyster farming is feasible private property? If so, we extend private property and contract correspondingly public property. Shall we reserve public property in underwater-land and encourage oyster farming and similar production of other sea-food by a system of leases which will encourage private investments of capital? Again, we are concerned with property-relations. It is in the property-relations most suitable for conservation that the greatest difficulty arises; and it is on this account that the chief rôle in conservation belongs to the political economists, who must cultivate more diligently than heretofore that part of their field which we may designate as economic jurisprudence. When we decide upon what we want so far as property-relations are concerned, engineers and other technical men will be able to carry out the desired policy, and political science, including administration, must be called on for aid. Oyster-farming will flourish when we devise and put in force right property-relations, and furthermore it will flourish without the establishment of injurious private monopolies.

Irrigation furnishes also an excellent illustration. The government of the United States has encouraged technical investigation. Much effort, and very properly, has been put upon ascertaining the underground flow of water and what is called the duty of water, *i.e.*, the work which a given quantity of water may accomplish; the aim being to avoid waste and accomplish the maximum of effect with the minimum of effort. The questions of when and how to apply the water are involved here; and many other technical questions, some of them purely engineering, some of them primarily agricultural, could be mentioned. These are technical and essential. But litigation has been rife and in some parts of the country has ruined many a farmer, resulted in mutual hatred of neighbors, and occasionally even in bloodshed; while an appreciable proportion of the benefits of improved farming by means of irrigation has been swallowed up in the needless costs, direct and indirect. In the meantime the vital question of property-relations was neglected, one great department, the Department of Agriculture, at one time even taking a discouraging attitude towards economic study. However, this has all been changed under the efforts of the present Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. Now, when property-relations are settled, the rest becomes comparatively easy.

The United States Government in the Reclamation Service has not neglected property-relations so far as its projects are concerned: for they are based on a rearrangement of property relations in the interest of the public and the parties immediately interested. The giving up of old "priorities" so as to promote a better distribution of water is here referred to.

3. The Principles of Conservation As Applied to Different Resources³

Coal, peat, oil, and gas are limited in amount. Their process of manufacture is so slow as to be negligible. When extracted from the earth, they must be used, if not at once, within a short time, and when so used are gone forever. Therefore the principles of conservation applicable to them are as follows:

Conservation of coal, oil, and gas. In reference to coal, reduce the waste in mining and in use. The waste in mining, now 50 per cent, should be reduced to 25 or 10 per cent; beehive ovens should be abolished; the smoking chimney should be condemned as a nuisance; the gas engine should be substituted for the steam engine. So far as practicable, substitutes should be used for coal; and of these that of developing power by water instead of coal is the most important. Even if all possible economies and substitutes are introduced, the most sanguine cannot hope that the supply of fuels will be sufficient to meet the needs of the people for more than a small fraction of the time we look forward to as the life of this nation. In reference to oil, so far as practicable it should be saved for the higher uses; these are for light and lubricant; only those oils not adapted to these purposes should be used for fuel. Exportation of oil should be prohibited. New wells should be opened up only as fast as necessary to meet the needs under the above principles. In reference to natural gas, the great and pressing necessity is to stop its appalling waste by enacting and enforcing proper legislation. This ideal fuel should be used with the severest economy in order to prolong its life, which will be brief at best.

The metals, like coal, are absolutely limited in amount. Their quantity cannot be added to by any effort of man; but unlike coal,

³ By Charles Richard Van Hise, in *The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States*; pp. 359-363. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1910. Reprinted by permission.)

when extracted from the earth and reduced to metallic form, they may be used again and again. The principles applicable to the metals are as follows:

Conservation of the metals. First, reduce to a minimum the waste in mining and extracting. At the present time, for certain of the metals these wastes are extraordinarily high, especially for lead and zinc. In many cases by proper practice these losses may be reduced to one half or even one third their present amounts. Second, the metals should not be used for purposes such as destroy them by a single use, as is the case with lead and zinc when made into paint. Third, the metals should not be used in such a way as rapidly to deteriorate, as is the case when iron without a protective covering is exposed to the weather. At best the supply of metals is so limited that we cannot expect the amounts available will be sufficient to meet the needs of the vast numbers of people through thousands of years to come.

Use water fully. With water, the principles of conservation are different from those of coal and the metals. Each year, a vast quantity of water, through the power of the sun, is taken from the sea and added to the land supply. A roughly equivalent amount flows from the land to the sea. The water is ever in circulation, passing from the ocean to the land and from the land to the sea. The problem of the conservation of the moving water is therefore its complete utilization—and that for domestic purposes, for water power, for navigation, and for irrigation. Its use for one of these purposes does not exclude its use for others. Thus, water which is used for domestic purposes may be used for irrigation; indeed this use is most advisable for such water, because of its fertilizing contents. Water used for power may be used for domestic purposes, for navigation, or for irrigation. Water used for navigation may be later used for domestic purposes, for water power, or for irrigation. Water used for irrigation is in part evaporated, but in part goes back to the stream and may be again used for other purposes.

Renew forests as fast as used. The forests are unlike fuels and minerals in that they may be renewed, but slowly. To renew a forest takes from 50 to 100 years, and for some classes of forests an even longer time. The principle of conservation in reference to the forests is that we may use them, but not more freely than they can be renewed. This is the measure of their wisest consumption. To

the present time we have been using the forests much more rapidly than they have been produced. In order to secure this balance we must reduce fire losses; we must reduce the great waste; so far as possible we must utilize by-products; we must substitute cement and stone and brick for wood. Finally, we must increase the growth of the forests. This may be done by reforesting denuded areas better adapted to the growth of wood than to agriculture, and by improving existing forests. If the forests are maintained at their present area, in the United States, or even at a somewhat reduced area, there is every reason to believe that by the reduction of losses and waste, and by increasing the growth, we may secure the necessary balance between production and consumption.

Reduce erosion to rate of soil making. The principles of soil conservation are somewhat like those of the forests. The soils may be renewed by the processes of nature, but very slowly; indeed probably at a rate not to exceed one inch in from 500 to 1000 years. The first principle of conservation of the soils is not to allow erosion to occur more rapidly than it is manufactured. The second principle is not to deplete the soil in those elements limited in amount which are necessary for plant food, — nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus, and especially phosphorus, for the latter is the element which is very scanty in the soil, and the supplies of which are extremely limited. Phosphorus is the crucial element in soil productivity. The conservation of the soil is the greatest of all the problems of conservation; because upon its products we depend for food and clothing, the basal necessities of man.

Conservation is not a simple subject which can be treated with reference to a single resource, independently of the others; it is an interlocking one. The conservation of one resource is related to that of another. Thus the conservation of coal is to be accomplished in a large measure by the substitution of water as a source of power. The conservation of the metals is to be largely accomplished by the substitution of cement and stone and brick and other products.

Relation of water to other resources. The best utilization of water requires the maintenance of a uniform flow of the streams. This is true for domestic purposes, for water power, for navigation, and for irrigation. In order to get a uniform flow it is necessary that the forests be preserved in essential areas, especially the steep slopes of the mountains and hills, along the borders of the streams, and on

the shifting areas, such as sand; it is necessary so to practice agriculture that a large part of the precipitation goes underground. If a uniform flow be maintained, the water will give a vastly increased available water power; it will immensely improve navigation; floods and flood losses will be reduced; the erosion of the land will be diminished; the waters will be confined to their banks, and they will render available lands which are now inundated. If erosion be lessened, the streams will be kept pure for domestic and other purposes. The increase in the use of water powers will enormously reduce the draft upon coal. The use of water for irrigation will make highly fertile extensive areas which are otherwise barren.

Thus, whatever subject we begin conservation with, before we have finished we pass into other of its branches. A complete treatment of any part of the subject in all of its ramifications of necessity repeats a portion of the treatment of another part of the subject.

The principles of conservation above enunciated require for their practice a sense of social responsibility upon the part of the individual and corporation. They demand a self-denial which cannot be expected from the owners of private property. They require that the needs of mankind shall be placed before immediate results. Therefore it is too much to expect that these principles will be generally practiced except as they are embodied into law and the law enforced by the community.

The law and conservation. But what is the condition of the Law? Is it such that these principles of conservation if placed in the statutes will be upheld by the courts. The decisions of the highest court make it clear that the needs of our descendants may be protected. The United States Supreme Court declares: "It is recognized that the state as a *quasi*-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned." Again, in the same decision: "We are of the opinion further that the constitutional power of the state to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs." Further: "Rights of property," says Mr. Justice Shaw in the case of *Commonwealth vs. Tewksbury*, "like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limita-

tion in that enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in it by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient."

4. Early History of the Conservation Movement ⁴

Until late in the nineteenth century the resources of this country were commonly regarded as inexhaustible. Some of them were considered an obstruction to the country's development. Over very large areas of the country the forests were regarded as an enemy to be destroyed and burned. Indeed at the present time this is locally true. Our lands were supposed to be illimitable. Any man might have a farm for the asking. It was held, and indeed is held by many at this time, that our mineral resources will last through the indefinite future, and therefore that they may be drawn upon advantageously as rapidly as possible.

It is under the prevalence of these ideas that our laws and customs have grown up. The laws and customs have been adapted to the ideas of the people. If the ideas are incorrect, it may be that our laws in reference to the natural resources are defective.

Resources not illimitable. That these ideas in reference to the illimitable supply of our national resources are incorrect has been appreciated by the scientist for many years. The foresters, the physiographers, the geologists, have shown the severe limitations of many of them. These views have been emphasized by the situation in other countries. The mountains of France, of Spain, of China, have been denuded of their forests in large measure, so that the supply of wood is inadequate to meet the needs of the people. In consequence of the removal of the forests from the mountains, the soil and disintegrated rock have been carried away by the running water and the bare rocks left protruding where once was thick vegetation resting upon abundant soil. The débris carried down from the mountains to the lowlands has destroyed extensive areas of once rich land.

It has long been known that in Spain and Italy, warm countries, because of insufficient fuel, the people suffer more from the cold than

⁴ By Charles Richard Van Hise, in *The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States*; pp. 2-7. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company. 1910. Reprinted by permission.)

here in America. In the absence of forests and coal, fuel is so expensive as practically to be unavailable to the average citizens of those countries; and hence they shiver through the winter.

People go to bed hungry. Many intelligent men have appreciated that in India and China a large proportion of the people are insufficiently nourished. It is probably true that more than half of the people of the world to-night will go to bed hungry; at least they will not have received sufficient nourishment during the day to be the most efficient to-morrow. You, who have read history, know how, during the years of abundant rains, the people of India and China multiply, and how in dry years famine and scourge come and reduce them again to the number that can be supplied by the fruits of the land. In Scripture we read that the seven fat years were eaten up by the seven lean years; and this has been the history of eastern countries for thousands of years.

Conservation movement due to scientific men. The modern conservation movement is the direct result of the work of scientific men. The great question of conservation has been more forwarded by the rapid reduction of our forests than by any other cause. The forests are the one natural resource which has been so rapidly destroyed that in the early seventies it began to be appreciated that, if existing practices were continued, the end was not in the far distant future.

As the result of a memorial presented by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1873, reënforced by another memorial of the association in 1890, the movement was inaugurated which resulted in a forestry bureau in the department of agriculture, and in laws which led to the first national reserve in 1891. The national forest movement was further advanced later as the result of an elaborate consideration of the question by the National Academy of Sciences in 1897. The principle of the national forest once established, these forests were enlarged from time to time, but the great withdrawals of the forests from private entry have been during the past ten years.

Another line of forces which resulted in the modern conservation movement came directly from the work of Major J. W. Powell, and especially the publication of his "Lands of the Arid Region." Mainly as a result of this volume and the influence of Major Powell, in 1888 an irrigation division of the United States Geological Survey was established; and authority was given to the Secretary of the Interior

to withdraw from private entry reservoir sites and other areas which in the future would be necessary for irrigation purposes.

For the past quarter of a century many of the scientific men of the country have been raising a warning voice in reference to the other natural resources of the country. The limitations of our supplies of gas, oil, and coal have been pointed out. Many have described the denudation of the land and the wide-spread destruction of the soil; but notwithstanding the above facts, it cannot be said that there was any national movement for conservation. Indeed, it is probable that such a movement could not have been inaugurated until the situation had become grave, until the menace to the future had become serious.

Among the men who have promoted the modern conservation movement, Mr. Gifford Pinchot has first place. While his work was primarily directed to the conservation of the forest, his vision, with enlarging horizon, saw the connection of the forests to the other resources of the country; and he therefore extended his campaign of education to include with the conservation of the forest the conservation of all natural resources which are limited in amount.

It was seen by Mr. Pinchot and other scientists, notably McGee, that there is a close connection between the forests and waters. There was a strong public demand that our rivers maintain a uniform flow for water powers and for navigation. Therefore those primarily interested in forests and those interested in waters became associated in the conservation movement. In consequence of the public sentiment in reference to waterways and forests, President Roosevelt, on March 14, 1907, appointed the Inland Waterways Commission. This commission included a number of representative congressmen, an engineer, a statistician, a forester, an irrigation chief, and a geologist. This Inland Waterways Commission in its first report to the President emphasized the interlocking character of the problem of natural resources, and pointed out how the control and use of water would conserve coal and iron and the soil, and at the same time also make necessary the preservation of the forests.

The White House Conference. The White House Conference grew out of the Inland Waterways Commission. On a trip of that commission in May, 1907, it was suggested that there be a conference at Washington the ensuing year to consider the conservation of the natural resources.

Chairman Theodore E. Burton and Commissioner Gifford Pinchot

were authorized to convey to the President the ideas of the commission in reference to this matter. Later it was suggested that since the question of conservation concerned not only the nation, but every state, such conference should include the governors. On October 3, 1907, the Inland Waterways Commission, through its chairman and secretary, Mr. Burton, and Mr. W. J. McGee, sent to President Roosevelt a letter, requesting that he call a conference which should primarily be a congress of governors.

Conference called by President Roosevelt. The President approved the plan and in November of that year called a conference of the governors, each governor being invited to be accompanied by three assistants or advisers. But as the time approached for the meeting, the idea grew and there were finally included in the invitation of the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, both branches of Congress, heads of the scientific bureaus of Washington, representatives of the great national societies, both scientific and industrial, representatives of journals, and notable citizens.

Thus there assembled May 13, 1908, at the East Room of the White House, the President, Vice President, seven members of the Cabinet, nine justices of the Supreme Court, many members of Congress, the governors of thirty-four states, and representatives of the other twelve, the governors of all the territories, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, representatives of sixty-eight national societies, four special guests, forty-eight general guests, and the members of the Inland Waterways Commission.

Character of White House Conference. Never before in the history of the nation had so representative an audience gathered together. For the first time in the history of the country the governors were assembled to consider a great national question. Even during the extreme stress of the Civil War the governors had not been asked to consult with the President and with one another upon the state of the nation. Apparently President Roosevelt must have thought that the question of conservation was one of fundamental importance before he took so far-reaching a step. Never before in the history of the nation had the scientific men of the country met upon equal footing with those engaged in politics. This in itself was sufficient to mark the White House Conference as a meeting of the first importance in reference to the future of the nation.

The audience of the 13th of May was indeed an impressive one. Upon the right of the President sat the Vice President and the members of his Cabinet. Upon his left were the justices of the Supreme Court. Before him were assembled the governors, the members of Congress, many of the leading scientific men of the country, and numerous other delegates.

Address of President Roosevelt. The conference was opened by a notable address by President Roosevelt. And he, I think, above any other public man of the country has shown a wonderful capacity to quickly and broadly comprehend the salient points of a great new movement.

Hence he was able, although not a man of science, to present most effectively and in wonderful proportion the views which the scientific men had been developing through the past twenty-five years with reference to conservation.

Exercises

1. Distinguish a social problem from adverse social conditions.
2. Explain the *psychological* element in social problems, as understood in this book.
3. Classify social problems on two or more different bases.
4. Name two principal problems of physical environment.
5. Discuss the significance of utilization, and show its relation to conservation.
6. Indicate the four stages of the conservation movement.
7. Name the motives of utilization; the methods.
8. Define conservation in the narrow sense; in its broadest meaning.
9. Give examples of conservation as preservation.
10. Give examples of conservation as improvement of the natural inheritance.
11. Discuss conservation in the social sense; as a phase of economics.
12. Which does Professor Ely regard as the most important aspect? Give illustrations of its bearings.
13. Following Van Hise, state the principles which govern the conservation of coal, oil, and gas; the metals; water; forests; soil.
14. Show by examples how one aspect of conservation is connected with other aspects.
15. Which is the most important of conservation problems? Why?
16. Is American law favorable toward conservation methods?
17. When did the need of conservation in America first appear?
18. What foreign precedents could have been cited by scientists?
19. What organization inaugurated the conservation movement in the United States, and with what result?

20. Mention other scientific contributions.

21. Describe the White House conference of 1907 and indicate its antecedents.

22. Characterize the part played by President Roosevelt in the conservation movement.

Additional References

1. Bailey, L. H.: *The Country Life Movement in the United States*. Analyzes this phase of the conservation movement.

2. *Report of the Commission on Country Life*. See pp. 41-46 for President Roosevelt's Letter Appointing the Conservation Commission of 1908.

3. Vogt, Paul.: *The Church and Country Life*. Report of Conference held by the Commission on Church and Country Life under authority of Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 1915.

CHAPTER XXXII

EPIDEMIC DISEASES AND PUBLIC HEALTH

THE materials in this chapter are principally designed to emphasize the increasing recognition, in more advanced societies, of the *social* nature of many diseases, the relative helplessness of the individual in matters of hygiene, sanitation, and remedial treatment, and the consequent tendency of society to attempt the solution of such problems. Herein lies the significance of the term "social," or "sociologic," medicine, as used in Reading 2. The same tendency is reflected in the public health program outlined by Dr. Lovejoy, in Reading 3.

Professor Binder has a foremost place among American sociologists in his comprehensive discussions of sickness and health from the larger social point of view. In the selection from him (Reading 1) the sociological nature of these phenomena, formerly regarded as strictly biological and psychological, is clearly explained.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, we have here one of the two types of social problem arising from physical environment. *Endemic* diseases exemplify best this environmental aspect, inasmuch as they are due to some environmental condition favoring the development of injurious factors, such as the malaria-bearing mosquito, or, through deficiency of iodine in the drinking water, the prevalence of goiter in certain districts. In other instances the problem arises from the social rather than the purely physical environment. This is exemplified by hookworm in the Southern United States, and pellagra in Italy, produced respectively by poor sanitation and deficiency in the diet.

Epidemic diseases, on the other hand, are more truly social in character, springing from some defect in social arrangements, as in the familiar case of scourges of typhoid fever traced to contaminated milk-supply. In such situations the individual is practically at the mercy of the social environment. The press despatches recently reported a single instance of this kind in a Western city, where an epidemic, which suddenly prostrated thousands of persons without recognizable cause, was eventually found to be caused by the backing-up and overflow of a sewer into one of the city water reservoirs! In a case of this kind the individual is not only unable to protect himself against the noxious elements of his physical surroundings but becomes the victim of the incompetence or neglect of those charged with his protection by the community itself.

In connection with this whole subject it should be remarked that there is a noticeable tendency among advanced thinkers on these matters to favor the assumption of free medical treatment as a public social function by the State, as is now done in the case of public education.

1. The Social Nature of Sickness and Health¹

Health and the Community. Work, as explained in the preceding chapter, is no longer an affair of the individual, but of society. It, likewise, no longer rests within his own power alone to keep well but largely in that of the community. Hence, the justification of treating health as a sociological topic.

Interdependence of Individuals. The individual is linked up with thousands and millions of other individuals, most of whom he may never see. When people wore mostly home-spun, the bacteria of tuberculosis and diphtheria remained in the family, and killed, maybe, every member of it. Society was but little affected. But, in the manufacture of clothing in large quantities as carried on today in factories or sweat-shops, disease germs may be carried into hundreds, if not thousands of homes; because, owing to the minute division of labor, an affected person handling a large number of garments a day, may turn hundreds of pieces of clothing into carriers of disease. Again, if the morbidity rate is high in a community, even the well may have to stop work owing to the interdependence of the operators. Finally, the sickness of a highly placed man in business or politics may affect the stock exchange, and thus influence the lives of many persons. These are crude illustrations of the social aspects of disease. When nearly everybody is able to attend to his work, the social and industrial machinery moves more smoothly.

Difference between ancient and modern times. In ancient society health was, except in cases of endemics and epidemics, a matter largely within the power of the individual. When he drank water from his own spring and milk from his own cow, ate meat from his own beef or pig, he could protect himself against disease by being clean and killing only healthy animals. Now, when his water is carried over hill and dale through many miles of pipe, when his milk is brought from farms hundreds of miles away, and when he gets his meat prepared

¹ From *Major Social Problems*, by Rudolph M. Binder; pp. 118-122; 134-135. (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1920. Reprinted by permission.)

and canned from packing houses which send their goods all over the globe — he may become a victim of disease without knowing the reason why.

The demand for health is as strong as that for life. How to live long has been the problem, and how to live happily, that is, in good health, has been the desire of the ages. Nearly all that man did was directed toward finding an answer to these two questions. All his economic and most of his religious activities had a bearing on this matter. Life may be hard and full of trouble, nevertheless man will cling to it and try to prolong it as far as possible. The conditions of life were much harder in the past than at present, but even the slave preferred life to death, notwithstanding the lash and the toil to which he was constantly exposed. The love of life is inborn in every creature, and the struggle for existence is due to it. And to this struggle, in turn, is due whatever progress we have made. It meant exertion, systematic endeavor, and ultimately the development of all that is good and worth while in civilization and in ourselves. Whether life is short and miserable, or long and healthy, has an important bearing on the individual, history, and civilization.

Meaning of health. William James once stated that simply to live, breathe, and move should be a delight. It is so at present only, or at least chiefly, with healthy children. Good health means optimism and buoyancy. It means courage and willingness to attack difficult problems. What is called personal magnetism is essentially nothing but high vitality. It is always a pleasure to meet a person who is full of cheer and unbounded energy, overflowing with that indefinable something called attractiveness, which is largely the result of physical vigor, and which we justly call "high spirits." For good health is contagious in the sense that no one can escape its influence. It is this overflowing of "animal spirits" that makes some children so perennially happy and so unaccountably attractive. In the normally organized society of the future this will be the privilege not only of young children, but of youth, middle age, and even old age. This is entirely possible if we change our ideal of health from the mere avoidance of valetudinarianism to that of exultant and exuberant vitality, which may be not only conserved but increased.

Mental aspects of health. Mentally there is a considerable difference between a healthy and an unhealthy person. The former is alert, wide-awake, takes a keen interest in things, and delights in

overcoming difficulties. Nothing can daunt him; his whole nature is resourceful, because it is resilient and adaptable. If there are too many obstacles in his path, he seeks another way. But he never gives up. In proportion as he succeeds his confidence and self reliance increase and he passes from one victory to another. If reverses come he knows how to bear them cheerfully, for he is certain of one thing — that he must remain master of himself. He will not lose his soul. Things are, after all, things; and man is man. It is his business to master them, not be mastered by them. "He that ruleth his own spirit is greater than he that taketh a city." A true man will never permit mere things to conquer him. He has himself, his balance, his self-determination. His health enables him to keep them.

It is different with the man in poor health. There is a constant worry about this little slight or that little loss. Now it is some trifling ailment which disturbs the night's rest, again it is some insignificant trouble of a friend. Worry has been called the disease of the age, because so many lose valuable energy through caring too much for non-essentials. The man of low vitality can not help himself, though. His attitude is turned inward, because his body requires constant attention, now here, now there. He is never free to follow his desires, because he is afraid of a break-down. A community in which poor health prevails is characterized by sombreness and listlessness. Its attitude is apathetic and indifferent, while that of a healthy one is alert and eager for progress.

Health and intellectuality. — In a purely intellectual way there is, perhaps, a still greater difference between men in poor and those in good health. It is true that occasionally men in poor health have manifested great intellectual power, like Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. But in both of these cases there was a healthy vigorous youth based on sound structure; a break-down in later life could impair only the virility but not the constitution. Noted men, whose health was poor due to some faults of structure, have been either saints, poets or philosophers. They were not investigators of the objective world, but gave us pictures of the inner working of their often abnormal souls. But the greatest even among these classes of geniuses were healthy men, *e.g.*, Moses and Jesus, Goethe and Shakespeare, Kant and Hegel. The best and most useful work for human welfare has been done by men and women who enjoyed at least fair health. Modern poets and philosophers are generally healthy men

and produce something wholesome; scientists are notably so, *e.g.*, Pasteur and Virchow, Edison and Marconi, to mention only a few.

Two cases of notably long and useful lives may be mentioned. Alexander von Humboldt, a famous traveller, philosopher and scientist in the first half of the nineteenth century, reached the age of ninety-one years, or about twice the average. These years were, moreover, full of work; he was rarely ill, and always in condition to perform life's duty with speed and accuracy, thus accomplishing about four times as much work as the average man in his profession. A similar case is that of the French chemist Chevreul, who died in 1889 at the age of 103, and was almost to the day of his death busy as a laboratory experimenter, industrial chemist, university professor, writer, and lecturer. Centenarians in good health should not be the exception, which at present they unfortunately are; they should be the rule, and will be so as soon as we attack life's problems seriously and scientifically. For old men are essential to society, as a glance at history and civilization will show. . . .

Not so many years ago death was considered a matter beyond man's control. Now we know that thousands of deaths may be avoided, and succeed. England and Wales had a death-rate of 21.2 per 1,000 from 1866-70; it dropped to 13.5 from 1910-14. This means a difference of 7.7 per 1,000; or 77,000 per 1,000,000, or about 3,500,000 for the United Kingdom. Similar results have been obtained elsewhere. What is more important yet is the fact that the progressive men in every community are alive to the importance of the situation. Physicians, statesmen, and social workers are co-operating in educating the public with fair success, some remedies are applied, and new measures for avoiding disease and lengthening life are discovered almost daily. What is needed is to lay greater emphasis on health as a social factor; not here and there, now advocating this measure and then some other, but an ideal of health for the whole community; not merely absence of specific ailment requiring medical care, but a definite aim to utilize all the scientific means at our disposal and to procure others, in order that avoidable diseases may be looked upon as morally reprehensible and good health as socially praiseworthy. As a public recognition every civilized country should establish a department of health for directing all measures pertaining to the conservation of human vitality.

2. Social Medicine²

The war has taught us to question all our methods, and to ask for better efficiency. Now, efficiency means a scientific organization, and coöperation. Those two factors have really won the war. Think what improvements our munition factories, our army, the life of the nation at large, have shown in the last four years. The scientific and coöperative spirit have made the whole difference and have achieved wonders.

If we try to pervade our peace activities with those elements of success, we strike at two very paradoxical facts. The first is that the human-saving science has not kept pace with other sciences. We have gathered a few facts only about eugenics, about the psychology of labor, about the factories affecting the growth of children, all things of first-class importance for our prosperity and happiness. But sciences like archaeology (I do not want to attack the archaeologists; I have a number of friends in that branch) loom large in our museums and publications, at least in Europe, although they cannot boast the same usefulness. It seems that instead of doing the urgent job first, mankind has always preferred to begin with the less important task.

That is already bad enough. But here comes the second point: the utilization of science has not kept pace with its advance. Professor Frederick S. Lee has told us so in a recent book, in which he shows what we know about the working of the human machine, and the little use to which that knowledge has been put. You could take other examples; we know perfectly well how to eradicate malaria and yellow fever, yet these diseases still claim many victims. We know that we could prevent half of the deaths which occur every year, and yet we do not prevent them. Thirty per cent of our blind infants would see if only a few drops of an antiseptic solution were put in the eyes of every newborn child.

The reason for all these deficiencies is that there is no program for the scientific organization of mankind, no agency to study such a program, no teaching given on the matter. I think we will never reach the point where we will really govern ourselves and master the world, until we make the universities constructive. It is from these centers

² By Dr. René Sand, University of Brussels, Belgium, in *Standards of Child Welfare: A Report of the Children's Bureau Conferences, May and June, 1919*. U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau Publication No. 60.

that the laws ought to originate, and not from the political associations.

A university is not primarily a place where young men play football and learn Greek or mathematics; neither is it primarily a school for lawyers or physicians, nor a place where an expert studies at leisure, in a comfortable environment, some old Assyrian inscription. These activities are very valuable and necessary. But we must put foremost a higher and more general purpose; the building up of civic and human efficiency. The constructive university will not include many more sciences than it does now, but it will teach them from another viewpoint.

Let us take, for instance, public health. We tell our undergraduates how to prevent tuberculosis by avoidance of contact, a well-balanced diet, a comfortable home, and rest. Very well. But we do not tell them how to provide those things. I would have public health taught in a way that would strike at the root of the question and proclaim, as Surgeon General Gorgas did, that the greatest public-health measure you can introduce is a minimum wage law. I would have hygiene studied not only in the laboratory; I would take the undergraduates to the workingman's home and ask him and his wife about their needs and the reforms they themselves suggest.

In short, I would go a step further than preventive medicine, and teach sociologic medicine. There is a field between sociology, statistics, biology, medicine, hygiene, and philanthropy, which is a kind of no man's land. Some patrols start from the biology border, explore a little stretch, and then come back. The same occurs from all the borders. When two patrols, coming from different borders, meet each other, they sometimes fraternize; more often there is a big scientific fight. I do not mind very much this kind of fighting after having seen the other kind. The worst feature is that the patrols seldom meet, and so every bit of knowledge which one border gains about no man's land is lost for the others. There is no coördination of effort, no planning together, no team work.

I think this could be avoided and a real need be met if we started frankly to organize that field under the auspices of Sociologic Medicine. Sociologic Medicine means the medical end of social questions, or the social end of medical questions, as you prefer to put it. It would have been constituted long ago were it not for the fact that it requires teaching biological, statistical, and social methods to the physicians. Now, biological methods the actual or future physician

will accept without too great trouble. There will be more resistance to statistical methods; they need the use of higher mathematics, and fumbling about in terrible books like the Census. But even that, the better type of undergraduate or doctor will finally admit, on account of the scientific stamp that statistics receive from mathematics. When it comes, however, to sociological methods, the average medical man revolts; surveys, inquiries, social case work, all seem too humane to be scientific. And then they mix up with all sorts of social questions, nearly related to political questions. That is a slippery field.

And yet we have got to plough this field, and it will give us the richest crop that science has ever reaped, because then we will no more guess, we will know about the social questions. Marriage, child welfare, education, vocational guidance, labor, poverty, delinquency, all those problems have to be taken up by sociologic medicine. If this new science is comprehensive enough, if it is recognized and developed, I have no doubt results will follow quickly.

A conference like this where public officials, social workers, physicians, sociologists, and teachers meet together is already a step toward the reclamation of this common field. The school of industrial medicine organized recently at Harvard is another very valuable progression in that direction.

We constituted in Belgium in 1913 an association of sociologic medicine which published a bulletin (*Bulletin de l'Association Belge de Médecine Sociale Bruxelles*) and it was progressing favorably. Sociologic medicine was taught in our universities to doctors who wanted to take the public-health diploma. But war has nipped those activities in the bud. We will have to take them up again, however, as they will not only help toward making better laws, but also assist us toward enforcing them in an easier and more effective way. Constructive democracy means scientific democracy.

3. A Public Health Program ³

American mortality statistics. Over a million people die annually in this country, and nobody has the slightest idea how many are born.

³ From "Democracy and Health," by Esther Lovejoy, M. D., in *Democracy in Reconstruction*, edited by Frederick A. Cleveland and Joseph Schafer; pp. 170-172, 178-179, 180-181, 185-192. (Boston, 1919. This selection is used by permission of, and by special arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company, the authorized publishers.)

According to the 1916 census, the last available report, made up from the death returns of the registration area, which includes about seventy per cent of the population of the United States, 12,165 persons died of "senility" and the rest were cut off more or less prematurely by diseases, most of which were preventable, and many of which were inexcusable. Even the 12,165 who died officially of old age probably had something the matter with their vital machinery that did not appear on their death certificates.

Tuberculosis formerly led the procession of death, but as a result of education and preventive measures that dread malady had gradually slackened to second place and organic heart disease was in the lead, when a dark team resembling influenza and pneumonia speeded up and won with a record of *four hundred thousand* in the eventful year just passed.

This was a shocking deviation from the usual course. In a general way the returns of 1916 represent the regular order of mortality, and the following list will give us a fair idea of what is happening from year to year:

Organic heart disease	107,154	
Tuberculosis	101,396	
Bright's disease (nephritis)	75,316	
Violent deaths — including suicide	75,303	
Pneumonia and bronchitis	74,787	
Pleurisy and other respiratory diseases	43,619	
Cerebral hemorrhage and softening of brain	59,154	
Cancer and other malignant growths	58,600	
Diarrhoea and enteritis:		
Under two years	46,956	
Over two years	9,807	56,763
Appendicitis and typhilitis	9,157	
Hernia and obstruction	8,974	17,231
Diseases of stomach, non-cancerous		10,330
Cirrhosis of the liver	8,799	
Gall-stones	2,438	11,237
Epidemic diseases common during childhood:		
Diphtheria	10,367	
Measles	7,947	
Whooping cough	7,284	

Scarlet fever	2,355	27,953
Influenza		18,886
Typhoid fever		9,510
Childbirth (immediate effects, mothers)		11,642
Infants (stillbirths, not recorded)		55,676
The deadly plagues:		
Typhus fever	35	
Yellow fever	1	
Bubonic plague and cholera	0	
Rabies	36	
Smallpox	114	186
Other diseases		187,175
Grand total		1,001,921

The new scourge. This disease was epidemic in the United States in 1916. It came insidiously in the guise of "influenza" and attracted very little attention, although 18,886 persons died from its effects. Had it been called "pneumonic plague" or "Bolshevitis," it would have been arrested at the ports of entry. It gathered force in 1917, and spread over the country during the later months of last year like an old-fashioned plague given the advantages of modern travel.

The American Public Health Association held its annual meeting in Chicago recently. This was the greatest public health conference that has ever been assembled. The principal topic discussed was the "unknown disease" that had invaded the Nation. The sum total of definite information was that in three months' time approximately four hundred thousand people had died from this strange malady (most of whom were between twenty and forty years of age); that it kills by inducing a secondary pneumonia; and that those who go to bed at the onset and stay there until at least a week after full convalescence is established, usually escape the death-dealing complication.

On account of its vast range this has been the most fatal epidemic that the world has ever experienced. A London paper has estimated that six million people died during the year from this disease alone. It is a greater menace than war. Nothing should be left undone to identify it, in order that rational means of prevention and treatment may be adopted in case of its recurrence. This and other epidemics

are far more likely to recur than the War, and the death records show that they are attended with a higher mortality. . . .

Men's neglect of human welfare. The city, State, and national fathers have been running this our mother country since the beginning, and considering the lop-sided scheme of things they have done fairly well. They have represented men only, and the records would seem to indicate that men are not primarily interested in humanity. They are manifestly more concerned with enterprises of great pith and moment and variety, involving wealth and power and privilege. Men are the builders of the material world and they are interested chiefly in the work of their hands and hearts and brains. But woman's work is humanity itself, and in the interest of humanity she should be given her full and rightful share in the reconstruction and the future conduct of the nations of the earth.

Child-welfare workers often call attention to the fact that large sums are expended by the Nation yearly for the purpose of fostering animal industry. The amounts appropriated for child-welfare as compared with pig-welfare are very properly held up to scorn. But this is a perfectly natural thing under the existing system. Child-welfare is woman's work, and woman has only a wee, small voice in the affairs of the Nation. But men are interested in pigs. Ham, bacon, sausage, lard, head-cheese, and hair-brushes are commercial commodities. What would the packers do without pigs? Pigs are pork!

The subject of population is paramount at present, and this involves the rights and privileges of parous, parturient, and nursing women. The leaders of the dominant nations are looking into the future apprehensively — but why worry? The world has the habit of going round and it will probably keep right on in spite of all the indications to the contrary. There is at least one encouraging sign. Women are beginning to take more than a private and personal interest in this vital issue, and it is to be hoped that their intimate and sympathetic knowledge of all that it involves will show them the way for which men have been groping in the dark so long. . . .

Prevention of Disease. The first principle in the prevention and cure of disease is to remove the cause. This applies as truly to disease as it affects the entire population as it does to the individual case. The rational means of curing a fever due to an abscess is to remove the abscess; or preventing typhoid fever due to a defective water system is to correct the faults of the system.

The great predisposing cause of premature death is poverty. Illiteracy, intemperance, vice, dirt, and disease are intimately associated with destitution, and any social scheme that insures a fair standard of living will reduce the death-rate. We should have not only minimum wages upon which men and women can live without working themselves to death, but we should have minimum standards of living below which human beings should not be permitted to fall. If there are people who really want to live like swine, let them live in some other country.

The entire health service throughout the Nation is much concerned about the abatement of nuisances. A nuisance according to Blackstone, "signifies anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage." It is self-evident that conditions that condemn millions of people to premature death are public nuisances that should be legally abated without loss of time.

Rapid evolution leading to the establishment of an economic democracy, practical education, woman suffrage, prohibition—these are fundamental health measures. They work together against poverty, illiteracy, intemperance, vice, dirt, and disease.

Prohibition is the greatest public health measure ever adopted by a nation. Directly and indirectly it will affect the health of a large proportion of the population. It will tend to diminish the degenerative diseases which may be induced or aggravated by intemperance. It will remove one of the chief causes of poverty, and thereby reduce the number of those ailments due to destitution from which little children suffer so much. Accidents, murders, and suicides will be prevented by this measure, and the higher percentage of sobriety which follows its enforcement will surely result in a lower percentage of venereal disease.

Coördination of health agencies demanded. As matters now stand the health agencies of the country are in sad need of organization and coördination. In addition to the public health bureaus, national, State, county, and municipal, which might be advantageously combined in many instances, the private health societies are all operating independently, gathering and spending money and proudly proclaiming remarkable achievements which the mortality statistics quietly contradict at the end of the year.

There are fifty or more volunteer health organizations and most of them are doing good work, but their possibilities are limited by the lack of coördination. The American Red Cross might be taken as a

model for a national health organization. As a matter of fact it is a national health organization, reaching into villages, hamlets, and remote parts of the country where no other health agency is in existence, and the value of its service to this Nation during the recent epidemic is absolutely inestimable.

Red Cross emergency hospitals sprang up everywhere. Red Cross men and women devoted themselves to the community service. Milk stations were installed, and hospital supplies, war clothing, and blankets by the carload were provided for both civil and military use. It is a question whether any or all public health agencies put together were able to accomplish as much as the American Red Cross at the time of our national need. This society was ready when the call came. It had been organized for war service, and therein was its strength.

During the War the Red Cross supplemented the Army, Navy, and the United States Public Health Service in every possible way. It is doubtful if any organization effected during peace times could command such universal support. By supplementing the national, State, and municipal health agencies this society might make itself as valuable to the Nation in times of peace as it has been throughout the War.

At any rate, there should be a national health association auxiliary to the official health agencies, coöperating with the women's organizations of the Nation, coördinating and thereby increasing the usefulness of other health societies. This plan would conserve funds and energy, and these combined forces working together should establish health centers that would reach as far as the remotest rural school in the country.

The community health centers, or chapters, should be subordinate to the county, State, and national society of which they are constituents. They should be supervised by the State board of health, and it should be the duty of the State health officer and his staff to lend every possible assistance to their efforts for local betterment. A co-operative plan should, of course, be effected between the State board of health and the extension divisions of universities, colleges, and other school organizations, for the furtherance of this work. And educational health exhibits devoted particularly to the presentation of health needs of the community and practicable means for the prevention of diseases to which the different sections of the country are liable, should be shown at the county and State fairs.

Public health education. It goes without saying that the public is sadly in need of education regarding matters pertaining to health in which every individual is personally interested. Literature issued by the State and national health departments, including pamphlets and bulletins on water-supply, sewage disposal, balanced diet, and subjects of practical interest to special communities, should be distributed from these centers. Lectures should be arranged and pictures shown. Instruction should be given in the care of children, and the needs of prospective mothers should receive sympathetic attention. The work of rural nurses would be facilitated by such an organization of the health forces.

Under present conditions it is difficult for people living in the country to get proper care in case of sickness. The cost is prohibitive. To obviate this hardship some health insurance plan might be worked out. A coöperative scheme, with State assistance, perhaps, might provide for the services of physicians, nurses, and hospital care when necessary. This is especially needful for the protection of child-bearing women and their babies. It is a pity that death cannot be made a common loss, a pocket-touching experience to a community as well as a personal calamity. If the death-tax indicated the death-rate, those who paid the bills would be interested in maintaining healthful conditions, and the health officer would have the united support of the community in which he served.

In rural communities the water-supply and sewage disposal are still the principal health problems. The cities have gone further in regard to these important matters. The necessity for a pure water-supply is fully appreciated, and no expense is spared to provide it. But what about the milk-supply? The milk-supply is just as important as the water-supply, and when we depended upon private enterprise to deliver water, the supply was, perhaps, a little less precarious and polluted than our milk is now. While we have babies we must have milk, and it is the first duty of every city to see that its babies have pure milk.

Milk is life to little children. It is their sole sustenance, and it should not be subject to the fortuities of trade. Traffic in milk is traffic in life — the life of helpless infants.

Pure Milk — How can it be secured? All kinds of laws purporting to regulate the milk-supply have been enacted, but cities will never get a pure milk-supply until they go into the milk business, and the

sooner they do it the fewer babies they will lose. This is perfectly feasible. Dairies might be maintained in the country, and milk depots in every health center in the city. Milk might be sold at the cost of production, and in cases where parents were unable to pay for it, some plan to save their children from suffering might be made operative.

There might be a baby clinic in connection with these milk depots and health centers, where mothers might be encouraged to bring their babies to be weighed at intervals, in order to be sure that they were being properly nourished and developing normally.

All large cities maintain extensive laboratories for the examination of milk, and an army of inspectors to watch the different places and persons engaged in the business. Why not save the money and start a milk-producing and distributing system that does not need so much watching? This would give productive employment to a large number of returning soldiers, and a man who is a man would rather have an honest job milking a healthy cow than to occupy the false position of a person who is paid a salary to see that milk from tubercular cows does not reach the infant consumer without being properly pasteurized, when he knows in his soul that it is impossible to prevent this wicked thing happening.

The quarantine problem. Our quarantine regulations work a double hardship on poor people with large families. During epidemics in places where hospital facilities are inadequate, it is necessary to quarantine homes as a measure of public protection. This usually means that young children are confined in close quarters with a case of contagious disease. The sustaining member of such a family is either quarantined with the rest, and thereby deprived of his employment, or excluded from the home. The increased cost of living due to sickness is further increased in this way. These people have the same right to protection as the public at large, but instead of getting it they are officially subjected to a forced infection. One after the other is likely to develop the disease, the danger to life and health is increased in proportion to the number interned, the life of a young mother is jeopardized (the most valuable of all lives, for if she dies her children are less likely to survive), the quarantine is lengthened to the last possible point, and these poor people are compelled to pay a large part of the cost of protecting the public from which the contagion was originally contracted.

Hospitalize all contagious cases. Every city should be prepared to hospitalize all cases of contagious disease. Effective segregation cannot be maintained in any other way. This plan would obviate the necessity for quarantining homes, which usually spreads an infection through an entire family, multiplies the chances of a general epidemic, and works an unjust economic hardship on the hapless victims. These diseases belong to the public. They are spread by the public, and they should be cared for at public expense, except in those instances where people are well able to bear the financial burden.

The need for pre-natal clinics and maternity hospitals is equally great. Every child-bearing woman should be guaranteed the best possible care while she is in this service. The charges in private maternity hospitals are beyond the reach of people in ordinary circumstances, and the public ward of a lying-in hospital is the last place where a sensitive woman would want to go.

Maternity hospitals should be maintained by municipalities and a cost-covering fee should be charged people who are able to pay, and women who are unable to pay should not be subjected to humiliation on that account. There is no danger of pauperizing a parturient woman or a new-born babe. Nature has already pauperized them. They must depend on somebody. Under fair conditions a husband and father should be able to make proper provision, but in any case it should be the human duty of every person in every community to safeguard such a woman.

Any reconstruction plan which makes for social betterment will improve the health of the Nation. The prevention of tuberculosis, the abatement of industrial diseases, and the reduction of infant mortality, are some of the problems which must be met by the health agencies. In addition to a large number of measures promising indirect benefit, special health programs have been recommended by the Labor Department, the Children's Bureau, and the United States Public Health Service.

Exercises

1. What growing social consciousness is reflected in the term "social" or "sociologic" medicine?
2. Discuss endemic diseases as a problem of environment.
3. Show how epidemic diseases present a different problem of environment.

4. Give Professor Binder's contrast between ancient and modern times in matters of health.
5. What does health mean according to his account?
6. Contrast the mental poise and drive of the healthy man as against the sick man.
7. Give examples of the relation of health to intellectual work.
8. What, according to Binder, is the urgent need of today with respect to health?
9. State the two paradoxical facts pointed out by Dr. Sand, with the reason assigned for them.
10. What is comprehended in the term sociologic medicine as explained by Sand?
11. Indicate some of its applications, both possible and actual.
12. In the list of diseases presented by Dr. Lovejoy are all deaths accounted for?
13. Name those in the list which are especially related to physical environment; to social environment.
14. Is the charge against men for neglect of human welfare justified by facts?
15. Name some principles governing the prevention of disease.
16. What changes in social organization are suggested for making these principles effective?
17. Make a list of the unnecessary hardships in sickness now inflicted upon poor families by our health regulations.

Additional References

1. Binder, R. M.: *Health and Social Progress*. The outstanding sociological work in this field.
2. Cabot, Dr. Richard M.: *Social Work*. Correlates the functions of the trained social worker and the physician.
3. Chapin, Dr. H. D.: *Heredity and Child Culture*. Ch. XI. "Nerve Culture." Treats nervous control through early training.
4. McCulloch, James E.: (Editor): *The New Chivalry—Health*. Contains many valuable papers read at the Southern Sociological Congress, May, 1915.
5. Rivers, W. H. R.: (Editor): *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia*. Contains extraordinarily informing articles by missionaries, governmental administrators, and anthropologists, analyzing, upon the field, the devastating effects of the white man's culture and diseases.

B—PROBLEMS OF POPULATION

CHAPTER XXXIII

MALTHUSIAN ASPECTS

FUNDAMENTAL among problems of population lies that of its numbers and rate of increase. In illustration of this aspect we present in this chapter two selections. The first is from the classic work of Malthus himself, published just about a century and a quarter ago; the second is from a modern sociologist who has given special attention to the study of population in all its aspects and especially the problem of the declining birthrate among civilized peoples, with reference to both its causes and effects.

In the passage quoted, Professor Ross points out with great vividness some of the fallacies of those who think they are expounding the truth as it bears upon the Malthusian principle, and in so doing he formulates a new principle, which might justly be called Malthusianism brought down to date.

1. The Principle of Population¹

Statement of the Subject. Ratios of the Increase of Population and Food

In an inquiry concerning the improvement of society, the mode of conducting the subject which naturally presents itself, is:

1. To investigate the causes that have hitherto impeded the progress of mankind towards happiness; and,
2. To examine the probability of the total or partial removal of these causes in future.

To enter fully into this question, and to enumerate all the causes that have hitherto influenced human improvement, would be much beyond the power of an individual. The principal object of the present essay is to examine the effects of one great cause intimately united with the very nature of man; which, though it has been constantly

¹ From the *Essay on the Principle of Population*, by the Rev. T. R. Malthus. Eighth Edition. London, 1878. The following selection includes all of Ch. I, and some of the early paragraphs of Ch. II, Book I.

and powerfully operating since the commencement of society, has been little noticed by the writers who have treated this subject. The facts which establish the existence of this cause have, indeed, been repeatedly stated and acknowledged; but its natural and necessary effects have been almost totally overlooked; though probably among these effects may be reckoned a very considerable portion of that vice and misery, and of that unequal distribution of the bounties of nature, which it has been the unceasing object of the enlightened philanthropist in all ages to correct.

The cause to which I allude, is the constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it.

It is observed by Dr. Franklin, that there is no bound to the prolific nature of plants or animals but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other's means of subsistence. Were the face of the earth, he says, vacant of other plants, it might be gradually sowed and overspread with one kind only, as, for instance, with fennel: and were it empty of other inhabitants, it might in a few ages be replenished from one nation only, as, for instance, with Englishmen.

This is incontrovertibly true. Throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms Nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand; but has been comparatively sparing in the room and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in this earth, if they could freely develop themselves, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious, all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds. The race of plants and the race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law; and man cannot by any efforts of reason escape from it.

In plants and irrational animals the view of the subject is simple. They are all impelled by a powerful instinct to the increase of their species, and this instinct is interrupted by no doubts about providing for their offspring. Wherever, therefore, there is liberty, the power of increase is exerted, and the superabundant effects are repressed afterwards by want of room and nourishment.

The effects of this check on man are more complicated. Impelled to the increase of his species by an equally powerful instinct, reason interrupts his career, and asks him whether he may not bring beings into the world for whom he cannot provide the means of support.

If he attend to this natural suggestion, the restriction too frequently produces vice. If he hear it not, the human race will be constantly endeavoring to increase beyond the means of subsistence. But as, by that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, population can never actually increase beyond the lowest nourishment capable of supporting it, a strong check on population, from the difficulty of acquiring food, must be constantly in operation. This difficulty must fall somewhere, and must necessarily be severely felt in some or other of the various forms of misery, or the fear of misery, by a large portion of mankind.

That population has this constant tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence, and that it is kept to its necessary level by these causes, will sufficiently appear from a review of the different states of society in which man has existed. But, before we proceed to this review, the subject will perhaps be seen in a clearer light, if we endeavor to ascertain what would be the natural increase of population, if left to exert itself with perfect freedom; and what might be expected to be the rate of increase in the productions of the earth, under the most favorable circumstances of human industry. . . .

It may safely be pronounced, therefore, that population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, or increases in a geometrical ratio.

The rate according to which the productions of the earth may be supposed to increase, will not be so easy to determine. Of this, however, we may be perfectly certain, that the ratio of their increase in a limited territory must be of a totally different nature from the ratio of the increase of population. A thousand millions are just as easily doubled every twenty-five years by the power of population as a thousand. But the food to support the increase from the greater number will by no means be obtained with the same facility. Man is necessarily confined in room. When acre has been added to acre till all the fertile land is occupied, the yearly increase of food must depend upon the melioration of the land already in possession. This is a fund, which, from the nature of all soils, instead of increasing, must be gradually diminishing. But population, could it be supplied with food, would go on with unexhausted vigor; and the increase of one period would furnish the power of a greater increase the next, and this without any limit. . . .

Europe is by no means so fully peopled as it might be. In Europe

there is the fairest chance that human industry may receive its best direction. The science of agriculture has been much studied in England and Scotland; and there is still a great portion of uncultivated land in these countries. Let us consider at what rate the produce of this island (Great Britain) might be supposed to increase under circumstances the most favorable to improvement.

If it be allowed that by the best possible policy, and great encouragements to agriculture, the average produce of the island could be doubled in the first twenty-five years, it will be allowing, probably, a greater increase than could with reason be expected.

In the next twenty-five years, it is impossible to suppose that the produce could be quadrupled. It would be contrary to all our knowledge of the properties of land. The improvement of the barren parts would be a work of time and labor; and it must be evident to those who have the slightest acquaintance with agricultural subjects, that in proportion as cultivation extended, the additions that could yearly be made to the former average produce must be gradually and regularly diminishing. That we may be the better able to compare the increase of population and food, let us make a supposition, which, without pretending to accuracy, is clearly more favorable to the power of production in the earth than any experience we have had of its qualities will warrant.

Let us suppose that the yearly additions which might be made to the former average produce, instead of decreasing, which they certainly would do, were to remain the same; and that the produce of this island might be increased every twenty-five years, by a quantity equal to what it at present produces. The most enthusiastic speculator cannot suppose a greater increase than this. In a few centuries it would make every acre of land in the island like a garden.

If this supposition be applied to the whole earth, and if it be allowed that the subsistence for man which the earth affords might be increased every twenty-five years by a quantity equal to what it at present produces, this will be supposing a rate of increase much greater than we can imagine that any possible exertions of mankind could make it.

It may be fairly pronounced, therefore, that, considering the present average state of the earth, the means of subsistence, under circumstances the most favorable to human industry, could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio.

The necessary effects of these two different rates of increase, when brought together, will be very striking. Let us call the population of this island eleven millions; and suppose the present produce equal to the easy support of such a number. In the first twenty-five years the population would be twenty-two millions, and the food being also doubled, the means of subsistence would be equal to this increase. In the next twenty-five years, the population would be forty-four millions, and the means of subsistence only equal to the support of thirty-three millions. In the next period the population would be eighty-eight millions, and the means of subsistence just equal to the support of half that number. And, at the conclusion of the first century the population would be one hundred and seventy-six millions, and the means of subsistence only equal to the support of fifty-five millions, leaving a population of a hundred and twenty-one millions totally unprovided for.

Taking the whole earth, instead of this island, emigration would of course be excluded; and, supposing the present population equal to a thousand millions, the human species would increase as the numbers, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256; and subsistence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. In two centuries the population would be to the means of subsistence as 256 to 9; in three centuries as 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years the difference would be almost incalculable.

In this supposition no limits whatever are placed to the produce of the earth. It may increase forever, and be greater than any assignable quantity; yet still the power of population being in every period so much superior, the increase of the human species can only be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence by the constant operation of the strong law of necessity, acting as a check upon the greater power.

Of the General Checks to Population, and the Mode of their Operation

The ultimate check to population appears then to be a want of food, arising necessarily from the different ratios according to which population and food increase. But this ultimate check is nearer the immediate check, except in cases of actual famine.

The ultimate check may be stated to consist in all those customs, and all those diseases, which seem to be generated by a scarcity of

the means of subsistence; and all those causes, independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and destroy the human frame.

These checks to population, which are constantly operating with more or less force in every society, and keep down the number to the level of the means of subsistence, may be classed under two general heads — the preventive and the positive checks.

The preventive check, as far as it is voluntary, is peculiar to man, and arises from that distinctive superiority in his reasoning faculties which enables him to calculate distant consequences. The checks to the indefinite increase of plants and irrational animals are all either positive or, if preventive, involuntary. But man cannot look around him, and see the distress which frequently presses upon those who have large families; he cannot contemplate his present possessions or earnings, which he now nearly consumes himself, and calculate the amount of each share, when with very little addition they must be divided, perhaps, among seven or eight, without feeling a doubt whether, if he follows the bent of his inclination, he may be able to support the offspring which he will probably bring into the world. In a state of equality, if such can exist, this would be the simple question. In the present state of society other considerations occur. Will he not lower his rank in life, and be obliged to give up in great measure his former habits? Does any mode of employment present itself by which he may reasonably hope to maintain a family? Will he not at any rate subject himself to greater difficulties, and more severe labor, than in his single state? Will he not be unable to transmit to his children the same advantages of education and improvement that he had himself possessed? Does he even feel secure that, should he have a large family, his utmost exertions can save them from rags and squalid poverty, and their consequent degradation in the community? And may he not be reduced to the grating necessity of forfeiting his independence, and of being obliged to the sparing hand of charity for support?

These considerations are calculated to prevent, and certainly do prevent, a great number of persons in all civilized nations from pursuing the dictate of nature in an early attachment to one woman. . . .

The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of human

life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labor, and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, large towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.

On examining these obstacles to the increase of population which are classed under the heads of preventive and positive checks, it will appear that they are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery. . . .

The sum of all these preventive and positive checks, taken together, forms the immediate check to population; and it is evident that, in every country where the whole of the procreative power cannot be called into action, the preventive and the positive checks must vary inversely as each other; that is, in countries either naturally unhealthy, or subject to a great mortality, from whatever cause it may arise, the preventive check will prevail very little. In those countries, on the contrary, which are naturally healthy, and where the preventive check is found to prevail with considerable force, the positive check will prevail very little, or the mortality be very small.

In every country some of these checks are, with more or less force, in constant operation; yet, notwithstanding their general prevalence, there are few states in which there is not a constant effort in the population to increase beyond the means of subsistence. This constant effort as constantly tends to subject the lower classes of society to distress, and to prevent any great permanent melioration of their condition.

2. The Necessity of an Adaptive Fecundity ²

Not long ago President Harding noticed in the photogravure section of a Sunday newspaper the picture of Mr. and Mrs. Domenico Zaccahea of New York City and their sixteen children; whereupon he wrote Mrs. Zaccahea congratulating her upon being the mother of such a splendid brood. The gesture won the President friends, no doubt, but did it strike a note which needs to be struck? The father of this family is a porter at twenty dollars a week. There is no evidence that he has unusual gifts to endow his children with.

² From *The Social Trend*, by Edward Alsworth Ross; p. 17, and *passim*. (New York, The Century Company, 1922. Reprinted by permission.) Originally published in *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*; Vol. XVI.

By complimenting him the President of the United States encourages our millions of commonplace citizens to court the gratitude of their country by begetting families of sixteen children. Is the country in need of them?

The other day I greeted a former student of mine who was born in 1830 when the world had had but half as many inhabitants as to-day. *In her lifetime she has seen 850 millions of persons added to the human race.*

The Divine command, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," was uttered to seven people who were all that remained of mankind after the Flood. There are now 250,000,000 times as many people as there were then. How much longer is this emergency mandate to be considered as still in force?

Race suicide?

Since this phrase was launched twenty years ago, portentous big-wigs have been wont to send a chill down the spine of their hearers by picturing the enlightened stocks and peoples as headed for extinction because the full quivers of olden time are becoming rare. The clergyman with few children or none at all has felt entitled to thunder like a Hebrew prophet at couples who stop at three or four children whereas their grandparents gave the world ten or a dozen. Family restriction—which first showed itself in the vital statistics of France about the middle of the last century, became visible in England in 1878, began leaving its mark in Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Australia in the eighties, attracted notice in Italy, Hungary, and Finland just before the close of the century, and appeared in Germany and Austria in the last decade before the war—has been pointed to as if it were a spreading leprosy. No one stops to consider where these peoples would find themselves to-day if they had gone on having progeny in the old happy-go-lucky fashion.

Because it affords such a splendid text for jeremiads and because a hot controversy has raged about the morality of certain restrictive practices, the shrinkage in the size of families has attracted an enormous amount of attention. Every thoughtful person has heard of it, has been urged to confront it as "a grave problem." On the other hand, few but statisticians, life insurance actuaries, and public health officers have noticed the extraordinary lowering of the death-rate which has been brought about in the last forty years. . . .

The thing is as plain as the black and white squares on a chess-

board. Take the fourteen European countries which have worthwhile vital statistics running back for forty years or more. Compare their records for the half-decade 1881-85 with those of the last half-decade before the war, viz., 1906-10. You will find that in *nine* of them the death rate fell farther than the birth-rate; so that in 1910 their natural increase was actually *greater* than it had been a quarter of a century earlier, before forethought and prudence in the matter of family had given much evidence of its presence among the masses. Taking the average for the fourteen peoples, it appears that while the number of annual *births* per thousand of the general population was *five* less at the end of the period, the number of annual *deaths* per thousand was *five and one half* less!

Impatient with the limitations of ink-on-paper, a certain yellow-journalist used to wish, when he had something of great moment to communicate to the public, that he could "make a noise resembling thunder." The statistician laments that he cannot thunder to a public which admires families of the Zaccachea type that in the last quarter-century for which we have complete statistics (1881-1885 to 1906-10) the death-rate of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Scotland declined about a *fifth*. That of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland was lowered about a *fourth*; while that of Australia, Bulgaria, and Holland was reduced about a *third*. In the same period the mortality of the dozen chief cities of the world was reduced by *more than one third*.

Our own country has been tardy in collecting vital statistics. However, we have this most significant fact. In 1900 the death-rate in our "registration area"—which then included two fifths of the American people—was 17.6 per thousand of the population. In 1919 in a registration area which had expanded until it included three fourths of us, the rate was 12.9—a reduction of a fourth in nineteen years!

According to the committee on elimination of waste in industry of the American Engineering Council the duration of life in America has been increased by five years since 1909. In the last eight years the expectation of life of the industrial policy-holders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. has been extended from forty-six and one half years to fifty-one years. . . .

That in our huge composite American population clogged with some extremely backward elements Death should take, year after

year, but one in seventy or one in seventy-five is an utterly new thing in the experience of peoples. Even if we were a stationary people and not an expanding people, I suppose that only one in fifty or one in fifty-five would die in a twelvemonth. In all the life of our race, extending over a thousand centuries and more, the like of this has never been known. It behooves us to *adapt* our behavior to it as we adapt our behavior to artificial light or power machinery or the automobile. But we *see* these things, so we recognize at once the necessity of conforming our conduct to them. On the other hand, most of us *do not see* this latter-day crippling of Azrael and therefore do not realize that any change in our standards of judgment is called for.

For example, through its first millennium and a half—during which its doctrines crystallized—the Christian church was in the presence of a human mortality which must have been *from two to four times* that which we experience today. Naturally the church became fixed in the idea that overpopulation is nothing to worry about and in her profound wisdom she branded as a sin the deliberate curtailment of conjugal fecundity. Can this position be maintained indefinitely into the future in view of the astounding success of modern medical science and sanitation in enabling people to live out a normal life term? . . .

More than any other people in the world the French Canadians realize what we are authoritatively assured is the Christian ideal in this matter of reproduction. Nowhere are women so submissive to the admonitions of their spiritual director, so resigned to the burden of children that is laid upon them. Hence a fecundity in certain parts of the Province of Quebec which is not matched in any other part of the world where there is such a thing as vital statistics. In a year fifty-five babies are born per thousand of population—nearly *two and a half* times as many as in our “registration area.”

To be sure, it is the graveyard rather than the nursery that is populated by these heroic sacrifices. Students of the Loyola School of Sociology and Social Service in Montreal have established that a baby born in that city is twice as likely to die in infancy as a Toronto baby, more than twice as likely to die as a New York baby, and four times as likely not to survive the first year as a baby born in Brookline, Massachusetts. This, however, has really nothing to do with the matter of fulfilling one's duty in respect to reproduction.

Now if our people came to be as docile and devout as these *habitants* of French Canada, every couple willing to have "as many children as God sends," why, then about three thousand of those born among us this year would as octogenarians see our country peopled by *three billions* of human beings; that is, by thrice the population of Asia and Africa today with seventy million folks thrown in for good measure. Of course no such numbers could be maintained here, but the calculation shows what we let ourselves in for if we take the *Zaccahea* family for our ideal. . . .

There is, then, ahead of us an endless vista of restriction of the size of families. We shall leave unused an increasing portion of that fertility which became established in our species long ago in order to meet a rate of wastage which no longer presents itself in civilized life. In China about all of human natural fertility is needed in order to balance deaths, particularly the excessive mortality of infants. In southern and eastern Europe about half of this fertility is now required to maintain numbers; in central Europe a third; in Scandinavia, Great Britain, Australasia, and the United States a fourth or less. Some of us will live to a time when a fifth or even a sixth of human reproductive power will suffice to keep up our population. To be sure, after several decades a stationary population would include such heavy contingents of the later age-classes that the annual death-rate would hover in the neighborhood of fifteen, and perhaps 30 per cent of human fertility would be required if numbers were to be maintained. Even then, however, the calling into operation of as much as *half* of the reproductive power of our race would be sheer madness.

Fewer births in sympathy with fewer deaths, in order that human increase shall not outrun wealth production, signifies that a new thing has come into the life of mankind; viz., a fecundity that *adapts* itself to the economic prospect. In view of their miraculous victories over disease, *adaptive fecundity* is, indeed, the only safeguard of the enlightened peoples against the dismal fate of overcrowded China. If such deliberate limitation of family size is a sin, then what an appalling prospect of Divine displeasure opens up! For, with further reductions in the mortality rate, an increasing proportion of American parents, an increasing proportion of the members of the white race, an increasing number of the peoples of the globe *will either have to violate what they are assured is God's law or else multiply until it*

will be necessary to hang out on our planet the "Standing Room Only" sign!

If we have no cause to fear lest the advanced peoples grow too slowly it does not follow that all is well. Curtailment of fecundity is most practiced by the capable and ambitious and least by the inert and commonplace. Hence the people grows faster at the bottom than at the top. While the general American birth-rate is quite reasonable under the circumstances, there ought to be bigger families among the rising, and smaller families among the stagnating; more progeny left by the gifted, and fewer by the dull; less prudence in the good homes, and less recklessness in the hovels and tenements.

But that, as Kipling would say, is another story.

Exercises

1. State the twofold purpose of Malthus' inquiry as given by himself.
2. What does he find as the fundamental cause of human misery?
3. State the Malthusian principle of population growth as compared with subsistence.
4. Name the two kinds of checks on population indicated by Malthus.
5. State the Malthusian principle in its complete form.
6. What conditions in the modern world bear upon the earlier doctrine of multiplication as a moral obligation?
7. Indicate the trend of vital statistics in various modern nations as presented by Ross.
8. Discuss his striking picture of the results that would follow an unrestricted birthrate.
9. State the principle of "adaptive fecundity" as formulated by Ross.
10. Among the churches which take a definite position on this subject, the teaching will not be couched in identical terms. Others will probably be found in process of change one way or the other; still others announce no definite policy. Let the interested student look up the position of his own church, consulting its official teachers or its official publications. General works are also useful such as *The New International Encyclopedia*; *Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*; *The Catholic Encyclopedia*; *The Jewish Encyclopedia*; etc.

Additional References

1. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Ch. XIX. "The Laws of Population: The Birth Rate." Ch. XX. "The Laws of Population: The Death Rate."
2. Hewes, Amy: "Note on the Racial and Educational Factors in the Declining Birth Rate," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX., No. 2, pp. 178-187. A detailed study of the families from which the students in a woman's college come.
3. Holmes, Samuel J.: *The Trend of the Race: A Study of Present Tendencies in the Biological Development of Civilized Mankind*. Ch. VI. "The Decline of the Birth Rate." Ch. VII. "The Causes of the Decline of the Birth Rate."
4. Marshall, Alfred: *Principles of Economics*. Book IV., Ch. IV. "The Growth of Population."
5. Mangold, G. B.: *Problems of Child Welfare*. Ch. I. "Births and Birth Rates."
6. Wolfe, A. B.: *Readings in Social Problems*. Ch. I. "The Malthusian Theory."

CHAPTER XXXIV

EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION

THE second problem of population, after that which concerns its natural growth and numbers, has reference to its movements from region to region or from one country to another. Emigration and immigration are more modern aspects of the larger population movements known as migration and colonization. (Ref. 1). These have been going on for ages, as the evidences from archaeology and anthropology go to show. There were apparently great movements of population even during palaeolithic times, and it is quite clear that quite early in the neolithic period man entered North America and completed the girdling of the globe. (Cf. Ch. X and XI, above.)

We read in the most ancient recorded history of more emigration than is commonly supposed, but this movement has assumed the proportions of a social problem in very recent times. As such, it presents two aspects. One considers the difficulties involved in the amalgamation of distinct racial types; the other is the problem created by the juxtaposition of two or more divergent cultures. The latter turns out, upon the closer examination of modern ethnology and sociology, to be the more real and urgent of the two problems. The clash between the representatives of two so-called "standards of life" in the field of economic competition is a special phase of this larger problem of "culture conflict."

The emphasis in recent social thought with reference to the immigration problem is laid upon the recognition that *assimilation*, or "Americanization," as it is called in this country, is dependent upon *participation*. That is to say, if the immigrant in any land is to become essentially similar to the native-born inhabitants the latter must open the way for him to participate in the life and culture of the country, and must also show some appreciation for the immigrant traditions, now known as immigrant heritages. For an illuminating analysis of this aspect of the problem the reader will do well to consult Chapter XI, in the work of Park and Burgess, particularly pp. 762-769. See also *Immigration: Select Documents and Case Records*, by Edith Abbott, for illustrative materials. The five volumes of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, by Thomas and Znaniecki, present a mine of documentary information of first-hand nature.

Immigration as a Problem in Social Control¹

The general question of the application of social control to immigration presents five distinct aspects: the possibility of control, the right to control, the necessity of control, the purpose of control, and the method of control. These may profitably be considered in succession.

The possibility of the control of immigration rests upon the fact that true immigration always crosses a national boundary, and is therefore subject to arrest by either one or both of two states. Furthermore, effective control must take the form of state control for the reason that, inasmuch as the members of two distinct societies are concerned, the less authoritative and positive forms of control—broadly described as public opinion—will not operate.

History affords instances of efficient control by the country of source as well as by the country of destination. Until recent years Turkey had strict laws governing the immigration of her subjects, and while there were many evasions there was no real emigration current. At the present time emigration from Japan to the United States is held in check by the action of the Japanese government. This sort of control, however, is becoming increasingly difficult for modern nations. The growth of democratic ideas has caused even the most despotic nations to be exceedingly chary of attempting to restrain their subjects by force from emigration.

At the present time most of the effective restrictions upon immigration are placed by the receiving nations. This is certainly true of emigration to the United States. The character of the immigration stream is essentially what we choose to permit. The possibility of this form of control is enhanced by the fact that most European nations tacitly approve of any American measures which operate to keep their able-bodied subjects at home. Within recent years there have been no serious objections even to our measures for excluding foreign criminals and paupers. It is significant that the nations which are popularly supposed to threaten the possibility of our control in the future are oriental nations, with a largely redundant population, which until now, however, have lacked the force to impose their will upon us.

¹ By Henry Pratt Fairchild, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XII. (1918), pp. 158-165. Reprinted by permission.

Granting, then, that we have for the present the possibility of controlling immigration, the next question is whether we have a right to avail ourselves of this possibility. The whole question of rights lies so largely in the field of abstract speculation and intuition that it may seem incongruous to introduce it here. Particularly in the field of international relations we are witnessing an imposing demonstration of the facts that there can be no rights except on the basis of law and that there can be no law without an authoritative force to maintain the law. The notions that any of us may have as to what are rights vanish into thin air, and the agreements that nations make among themselves become scraps of paper, when the passions of men are turned loose without any force to restrain them. It might seem, then, that any nation had a right to control immigration as long as it was powerful enough to enforce its will, but that that right would disappear as soon as another nation whose interests were opposed rose superior to it in power.

The fact is, however, that many people in this and other countries question our intrinsic right to exert a control over immigration which involves keeping out from our territory those from foreign lands who wish to enter. Assuming that we have the power, these persons hold that it is an unethical act to exercise that power against the wishes of foreign individuals. Prominent among the exponents of this view in this country is Mary Antin, who speaks axiomatically of "the right of free men to choose their place of residence," and denies that we have the right to impose on foreigners any further restriction than we in fact put upon our own people. There are many others in this country who hold similar views, and the superficial humanitarianism of their arguments lends them a strong appeal. With a certain group of writers this contention takes an individualistic form. They maintain that it is selfish and inconsiderate to shut out from the benefits of American life suffering and ambitious residents of other lands. Still more important, perhaps, is that form of the rights argument which rests upon international grounds. There are those in foreign countries, and there are those in the United States, who support them, who deny that this government has the right to forbid entrance to the subjects of friendly nations, or at least the right to discriminate between friendly nations in granting admission.

The most imminent example of this at the present time is Japan. According to many authorities, as, for example, Mr. J. F. Steiner, the

Japanese believe — or profess to believe — that they have a right to enter America, which is to say that we have not the right to keep them out. According to some students of the oriental situation it is the denial of this abstract right, rather than any actual interference with the movements of Japanese, that lies back of whatever animosity toward the United States there may be among the Japanese on account of the immigration situation. It is clear, then, that the question of the ethical right of this nation to control immigration is not merely an academic question, but has an intensely practical bearing on public affairs.

Now no question of abstract right was ever settled by argument, and no attempt will be made to settle this one. All that is sought in the present connection is to throw into clear relief the basic importance of sound, logical thinking on the subject. It need only be observed, in passing, that if there are any inherent national rights at all, certainly foremost among them is the right to determine what constituent elements shall go into the body politic and into the electorate — that is to say, the right to control immigration and naturalization. Or perhaps the issue may be clarified by stating it in this way: are national rights of land ownership similar in any respect to individual rights to land? No one questions the right of the individual to keep others off his land. The "right to choose a residence" does not imply that any stranger has a right to come and settle down in your residence or mine.

An ironically humorous light is thrown upon the whole rights argument by the fact that it was Thomas Jefferson, whom Mary Antin sets in a class with Moses, who expressed the wish that there were an ocean of fire between this country and Europe, so that it would be impossible for any more immigrants to come here.

Having established the possibility of controlling immigration, and the right of any nation, which has the power, to control immigration, the next question is: What is the necessity of controlling immigration? To understand this question it is necessary to consider briefly the nature of the immigration movement.

Immigration is a great natural phenomenon. Like all natural phenomena, it results from the operation of natural forces, and, like all sociological phenomena, these forces play through human beings. The basic force which lies back of immigration is hunger, which in its more developed form becomes the desire for wealth. In response

to this force men from time immemorial have sought to gain possession of the ultimate source of all wealth, which is land, and immigration is merely the modern aspect of the world-old movement of men from poorer to better land areas, or from crowded to thinly settled areas. The social control of immigration does not imply the annihilation or transformation of this natural force—that is impossible; nor does it imply the encouragement of people to respond to this force—that is superfluous. It implies the placing by society of deliberate restraints, checks, or guides upon the way in which individuals respond to this force.

Why then is it necessary for societies to place arbitrary restraints upon the individual response to a purely natural force? The answer to this question is found in the ignorance, stupidity, and selfishness of the human individual. The essence of all applied science is the diversion or manipulation of natural forces to subserve human ends. The untrained individual does not know how to do this, and the lone individual often has not the power. In social science, where the human being is at the same time the controller and the object of the force, the problem becomes doubly difficult. Individual human beings do not sufficiently understand the nature of the forces which play upon them, nor the methods of controlling the operation of those forces, to be intrusted with the task of manipulating those forces; and, furthermore, those exceptional individuals who have the knowledge are likely to use it to control the situation in their own selfish interest, rather than in the interest of the group of which they are a part, or of society at large.

These generalizations apply with special aptness to the phenomenon of immigration. Those who feel the pressure of the motive force most directly and most powerfully are on the whole the less fortunate, less intelligent, and less informed elements of the population. They are the ones least able to comprehend the full meaning of the movement of which they are a part, to themselves, or to humanity. Their processes of thought are primitive, and their outlook very restricted. They do the thing which on the surface seems to promise them immediate advantage. And in this connection it is well to bear in mind the profound truth quoted by Norman Angell, that, as far as human conduct is concerned, "not the facts, but men's opinions about the facts, are what matter." Men emigrate because they *think* they are going to profit thereby.

Social control of immigration, then, is necessary for the protection

of the migrating individuals themselves. But this is not all. A social movement so extensive as immigration is sure to have effects upon all the countries concerned, but particularly upon the receiving country. In books dealing with all sorts of social and public problems in the United States nothing is more striking than the uniformity with which the authors assert that one of the great complicating factors in the problem which they are discussing is immigration. This is easily understandable. Immigration influences the very make-up of the American people, and therefore affects every one of the activities and interests of this people. These effects may be good or bad, desirable or undesirable, from the point of view of our society as a whole. Because the expedient of emigration offers, or seems to offer, advantages to the people of European countries, it does not at all follow that it will result in advantage to the United States. It is certain that some, at least, of the results of uncontrolled immigration will be unfavorable. Social control is therefore necessary for the protection of the receiving society.

This control is made all the more necessary because, in the absence of social control, intelligent and alert individuals will manipulate the immigration movement for their own personal profit, in ways that may be very deleterious to society. Examples of such action are furnished by capitalistic employers who wish to import contract laborers from abroad, by steamship companies who would gladly stimulate an artificial immigration of those elements which are almost certain to fail in this country and therefore will eventually furnish a remunerative return cargo, and by panders who might reap rich profits from the white-slave trade. The simple fact is that the possibilities of immigration are too great ever to be left uncontrolled. If they are not controlled by society, they will be controlled by more or less unscrupulous individuals.

We come now to the question of the purpose of control. All social interference with natural movements, to have any justification at all, must be intelligent, deliberate, and scientific. This implies a clear conception in advance of the ends sought. Much of the immigration legislation of the past has been opportunist in character. It is time that the people of the United States formulated on broad grounds a general idea of exactly what they wish to accomplish by immigration regulation. The statements which follow represent of course only the convictions of the present writer.

Broadly stated, the purpose of the social control of immigration

should be to protect and advance the welfare of the American people, and to safeguard and preserve those qualities of our national life which make this country an attractive and desirable place of residence for individuals of all classes. This involves several things: First, the preservation of our political ideals and standards, so that the United States may continue to be a favorable field for the growth of pure democracy. Any aspect of the immigration movement which threatens our democratic institutions calls for social restraints. Secondly, to safeguard the standard of living of the American working class. This object is closely associated with the foregoing, for one of the essentials of stable democracy is a comfortable, well-nourished, and well-nurtured common people. It is probably the most important concrete desideratum of immigration legislation at the present time. Thirdly, to protect the mental and intellectual standards of the American people. Those who regard immigration from the eugenic point of view are calling constant and much-needed attention to the appalling menace to our intellectual standards which inheres in the enormous numbers of immigrants annually admitted in ordinary times who are of inferior, if not absolutely abnormal, mental caliber. Fourthly, another eugenic consideration—the preservation of a certain physical standard of the American people, a standard, not only of health and efficiency, but of stature, bearing, and appearance. Fifthly—something which perhaps includes all of the foregoing—the maintenance of a degree of homogeneity in the American body politic which will enable it to deal harmoniously and consistently with the great social problems which will confront the nations of the future in increasingly complex and difficult forms, and with an increasing insistence and gravity. No national policy could be more suicidal in a democracy than one which limits or destroys the possibility of its people dealing with public questions in a spirit of mutual sympathy and understanding.

It may seem to some that the ideal of national self-seeking which has just been presented is narrow and illiberal. Even if it were narrow, it would not follow that it was unjustifiable, for the first law of nations, as of individuals, is self-preservation. Fortunately for any controversy, however, it is not a narrow view, but the broadest which can be taken. For the welfare of mankind demands that the peculiar advantages and merits of the social system of the United States, as represented concretely by our common standard of living, be preserved

at all hazards for future generations. The narrow point of view is that which would sacrifice one jot or tittle of our national superiority in the interest of the transitory welfare of the individuals of this generation. In a very special sense the United States is the custodian of the future of the common people, and she would be recreant to her trust if she relinquished her hold on any of the guaranties of the progress of the common people in response to the specious pleas of a short-sighted, individualistic, sentimental humanitarianism. Social control of immigration is necessary in the interest of future generations.

As to the methods of control of immigration, little need be said here. That is the technical side of the question, and the details change with changing conditions. All that needs emphasis in this connection is that, in determining and applying practical methods of controlling immigration, social rights and interests rise paramount in every instance to individual rights and interests. Granting this principle, the question whether control is to take the form of a literacy test, or a percentage restriction, or a minimum-wage provision, or a physical examination may be left to experts, to be decided upon grounds of practicability and expediency, and the probability or certainty of results.

2. The Immigrant and Community Planning²

Everyone knows that the immigrants coming to the United States usually change from a simple to a highly specialized and complex industrial life when they come from Galicia, or Croatia, or Russia to America. During their first years in this country they must, in consequence, abandon many old customs and adopt new standards of social relationship. They are usually young and suddenly released from the restraints which the village life at home imposed upon them and they have had no experience on which to draw during the critical period when they are becoming adjusted to the new conditions. Most of them meet this crisis simply and, in a measure, successfully. Sometimes, however, a tragic moral collapse or a general demoralization of family standards results from the inability of the immigrant to adjust his old standards to the new. Before any progress can be made toward eliminating the hardships of adjustment to American life these difficulties must be recognized and understood. The school teacher,

² By Grace Abbott, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, loc. cit., pp. 168-171. Reprinted by permission.

the social worker, the judge of the juvenile or the municipal court, is unable to help the immigrant out of his confused bewilderment unless he understands, not in a general way but quite concretely, the conflict with traditional standards of judgment which his life in the new world has brought.

To many Americans the so-called foreign colonies in New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, or Cleveland seem to be reproductions of sections in Italy, Greece, Poland, or Russia. But to the immigrant the street on which he lives here is so unlike the one on which he lived at home that he believes it to be thoroughly American. These "foreign neighborhoods" of ours are neither Italian, nor Polish, nor Russian, nor Greek. Nor are they American. A sympathetic knowledge of the life and hopes of the people of these un-American American neighborhoods is rare among us. An understanding of the racial history, of the social and economic development and of present political tendencies in the countries from which the inhabitants of such a neighborhood come is much more unusual. A knowledge of both their life here and their life at home is necessary for intelligent community planning. In the attempts made to help those who have been unable to make the necessary adjustments to the new conditions they encounter here, we have usually acted quite without the information which is necessary for the proper diagnosis of the source of their difficulties, and as long as individual cases are not properly diagnosed successful treatment is only a happy accident and cannot form the basis for a program of prevention.

In general, it is safe to say that the immigrant does not create new problems that can be solved apart from the general problems of our community life. This is not saying that he does not complicate American life. The barriers of language, the inherited antipathies and religious prejudices, cannot be ignored as sources of difficulties. These constitute serious complications which must be taken into account in our social planning.

To illustrate, our failure to effect an organization of the employment market has resulted in unnecessary hardships for all those who seek employment. The development of a system of labor exchanges is recommended as a remedy. But a system of public employment agencies would not serve the immigrant who is so peculiarly in need of disinterested help when he offers himself in the labor market, if such an agency has no interpreters, and if those who undertake to

advise the immigrant about his industrial future cannot evaluate his European training or experience or the lack of both, and if they do not understand the peculiar industrial problems which the non-English-speaking immigrant encounters here. A recreation program which is designed to reduce delinquency among girls will not meet the needs of the immigrant girl until special forms of recreation have been discovered which will appeal to the young people of each nationality and which will not run counter to the social traditions of their parents. A public-health program will not reach the immigrant when he most needs it unless it is related to his old-world experience and given to him in a language he can understand. Because he is changing from an outdoor to an indoor life, from a village to a city, he especially needs to be reached by the public-health propaganda long before he has had time to learn the English language and become acquainted with local conditions.

It is apparent to a growing number of people in the United States and Europe that fundamental changes in our social and political organization must be made in the near future. The causes which make this necessary and the evils to be corrected, while differing in degree, are the same on both continents. With us, because the immigrant is the weakest industrially he suffers most from the evils of the present system. His peculiar problems and difficulties must therefore be considered in any plans for the democratization of industry.

The problem of the immigrant in relation to our community life is then not so much a problem in assimilation as in adjustment. To assist in such adjustments, we must take account, first, of those traditions and characteristics which belong to the immigrants by reason of their race and early environment and, second, of the peculiar difficulties which they encounter here. These two elements in the problem must be known before we can hope to reach conclusions.

It need not be pointed out that it is impossible to work out any permanent scheme of adjustment. Changes in the sources of immigration must be constantly kept in mind. Advancing social and educational standards will make for both the immigrant and the native American what is adequate today, inadequate tomorrow. But what we are trying to do will remain the same. We should ask ourselves what special provision must be made to protect those among us whose helplessness makes their need of protection so great; what should be done to supplement the immigrant's as well as the native American's

lack of training and experience; how, in other words, to make the best that is in all of us available for the service of the whole community.

3. Immigration and the Quality of the Population³

Introductory Statement. The phenomenon of American immigration is not a discrete social fact, but a phase of the whole economic and social life of the community. It is interwoven into the social fabric, influencing it and in turn being influenced at every point. In consequence some violence inevitably is done to the unity of the social structure by any attempt to consider it in isolation. It is nevertheless possible and seems to be desirable to consider certain phases of the phenomenon aside from the complexity of the social situation of which it is recognized to be a part. There is no intention in the present connection to treat the whole problem. Only those phases bearing directly upon the question of the quality of the population are considered and by no means all of those.

In a previous chapter the effect of immigration on the population number was considered. That consideration led to the conclusion that, so far as the modern type of immigration is concerned, it has the effect of locally and temporarily increasing the population, but, over any considerable period of time, its effect on numbers is negligible. In the present connection we have to do with certain phases of the phenomenon that affect the quality of the population stock.

It must be at once evident that the introduction of a large number of people differing in any way from the existing population body makes an immediate change in the general average of the group. There is no question concerning the important influence that the incoming groups have had on the industrial, political, and social life of the country. The institutions, customs, and traditions have undergone important and somewhat radical changes in adapting themselves to the changing group they have had to serve. More important is the fact that changes that would otherwise have come about have not done so because of the changed character of the social group. It must be equally evident, owing to the facts of biological inheritance, on the one hand, and to the continuity of the social tradition on the

³ From *Population Problems*, by Edward Byron Reuter; pp. 285-288; 292-299. (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923. Reprinted by permission.)

other, that these effects will in some measure be transmitted, and possibly may be intensified with the passing of time. Any other assumption is in effect a denial of the existence of a causal relation in the sequence of social phenomena.

The question of immigration as affecting the quality of the population turns in the first instance on the relative capacity of the immigrant races and peoples as compared with the receiving population. This question has already received some attention and will be reverted to in a later paragraph of this chapter. In general the conclusion arrived at above was that, so far as innate human capacity is concerned, there is probably little choice between the different races and peoples immigrating to this country.

The second question, that in regard to the efforts of the amalgamation of diverse stocks, has also previously been considered. The question has not been made the subject of conclusive scientific study on the biological side and no dogmatic pronouncement may be made at the present time. It is not possible to assert that the blending of races will not be most satisfactory, nor is it possible to assert the contrary. The experiment of the blending of stocks, closely related and widely divergent, is in process in the Americas and elsewhere on an enormous scale and the apparent results are not such as to counsel that it be unnecessarily increased.

The third question, that of the sociological effects of the contact and commingling of diverse peoples and races on a large scale, is yet to be considered. The displacement of stocks, of standards of living, of national characteristics, and other social, psychological, and economic effects of the incoming groups are matters of consequence in this connection. Before passing to a consideration of these, it is necessary to give some attention to the racial and stock changes that immigration has made and is making in the population.

The American Stock. From the point of view of quality, the early American population was of a rather uneven sort. The New England Colonies were founded by religiously motivated persons of a hard and practical sort. They held to certain ideas and ideals with sufficient tenacity to be willing to suffer exile for them and this fact gives some justification to the common idea that they were a superior group of men and women. In Virginia, and in general in the other Southern Colonies, the stock was rather more mixed. The colony was a speculative enterprise on the part of a group of adventurers.

A few royalist families were added, especially during the rule of Cromwell, but the population was, in the main, made up of merchants, tradesmen, and other middle-class people, redemptioners, indentured servants, deported convicts, black slaves, and kidnapped children from the slums of the English cities. The Central Colonies were settled chiefly by other European peoples: New York by the Dutch; Delaware by the Swedes. Among the colonists there was some superior stock and a good deal of a rather poor quality. The average probably ranged somewhat downward from the European norm.

There is some evidence that the physical quality of the Colonial stock was improved by the voyage and by the life in the new country. The fearful hardships of the passage may have deterred some who would otherwise have come. As it was, a goodly share of each shipload died in passage, and it is probable that the death rate of the physically weak was higher than that of the more robust. The frightful death rate among the settlers was possibly also selective in its effects. . . .

The Displacement of Stocks. Concerning the change in the sources of the American immigrants of the earlier and later type, there is, of course, no difference of opinion. The facts are fairly well and pretty widely known.

Nor is there any difference of opinion among social students, that this change in the character of the population must reflect itself in the changing character of the American customs, institutions, and traditions. Education will do much to change the mental pattern of the incomers, but people modify institutions as surely as institutions mold people. The present standard of America in the scale of civilization is the result of the peculiar natural conditions and the type of people who settled the country. That it would have been different, politically, industrially, culturally, and socially, had it been settled by people of a different racial stock and different history, tradition, and culture, like that of which the later immigration is chiefly composed, there is likewise no difference of opinion.

And it is also a generally recognized social fact that where people, not too far apart in cultural standards, come into contact and competition the people of the higher standards of living are displaced by those of the lower standard. This is simply a specific case of the phenomenon of succession that may be observed anywhere in the plant and animal world; there is the frequent gradual replacement of one

type by another. That this is at present taking place in the American population is a much advertised fact. In all parts of the country where they come in contact, the immigrant is supplanting the elder American stock, and the older of the immigrant stocks are being supplanted by those of more recent entrance.

The only real point at issue concerning this population phase of the immigrant phenomenon, so far as the discussion runs on a basis of fact, is concerning the desirability of this displacement. There are those who, observing the process and rate of displacement, fear that the elimination of the older and the substitution of the newer stocks will carry with it a substitution of cultures and a corresponding decline in the American civilization; that with the stock will go the ideals and the aspirations which have given America her distinctive place in the family of nations. There is no sufficient reason to believe, as these people see it, that the immigrant type of South and East European and Asiatic origin is capable or willing to advance or even to maintain the civilization from which they are displacing the originators.

Others, with more faith in the permanence of a culture once produced and possibly with a greater belief in the modifiability of human nature, believe that a process of "Americanization" will fit the immigrants of the newer racial and cultural type to be worthy successors of the stock they displace. There is reason to believe, as they see it, that the blending of cultures and of races will result in something better in culture and people than the present or the past. The immigrant people of the newer stocks are industrious, thrifty, and intelligent, and are frequently said to be prolific in the artistic sensibility that is otherwise so deficient in America. Miss Jane Addams has advanced the theory that it is from the depressed immigrant groups of the American cities that the future ideals of civilization will come. The uprooting has destroyed the old traditions and they have not acquired an American tradition. There is nothing remaining but the fundamental human nature. Unencumbered by the impedimenta of a traditional culture, they are in a position to initiate new and higher ideals.

There are others who rejoice in the displacement process. Frankly hostile to America and to North European culture, they would gladly see it replaced by the standards and traditions of Central, South, or East Europe or of the Oriental world. Closely related in sentiment

are those who, hostile to the growth of democracy, or fearing its extension into the industrial world, see as the result of the phenomenon of modern immigration the growth of a proletarian class and thus a more stable basis for the farther development and the more certain perpetuation of the existing economic order.

The Quality of the Newer Stock. Aside from the matter of the changing racial stock of the American population is the question of the representative character of the immigrating individuals. Granting a substantial equality of racial stocks, the question is whether the incomers are a fair average of the intellectual and physical ability of their races or whether they are superior individuals and families, or individuals and families from inferior strains defeated in the social struggle at home.

The original American stock was, by and large, not a particularly superior one. There were individuals and possibly groups of a superior type. The New England stock contained a rather high proportion of superior men. The French Huguenots were a gifted group. The deported political prisoners probably represented a superior type. But there were also individuals in great number as well as whole immigrating groups of mediocre and probably sub-common type, whose entrance added little except numbers to the population. The pauper and depressed classes sent to rid English cities of the burden of their support probably contained a high percentage of poor material. The German Mennonites appear to have been of very mediocre ability, though it is possible that their inferiority may have been as much due to their cultural peculiarities as to their natural lack of sense. The bulk of the original stock, there is little reason to believe otherwise, was fairly representative of the North European population, but probably verged downward rather than upward from a representative group.

A closely similar statement will hold true of the older immigration: it was both good and bad. It is probably true that the opportunities and the open resources of the new country tended to attract a type of adventurous-minded men, gamblers with fate. Also the unsettled political and religious conditions in many of the European countries sent a type of bigoted as well as of independent-minded men. The German migration of the late forties contained a high percentage of talented men. But the conditions also sent an immense number of paupers, prostitutes, Negro slaves, and other degraded and outcast per-

sons. So far as there exists any correlation between social status and human worth, this social riffraff added little to the general average of ability and worth of the country's growing population.

As concerns the newer immigration, the motive for coming is somewhat more consistently an economic one. The conditions of life are more settled and so more attractive to gentler types of men. The demand is for manual labor and the incomers represent in large part the peasant class. The conditions of travel are easier and the means of transportation cheaper. The artificial stimulation to migration is greater and more persistent. The immigrants come because of the attraction of the higher wage rather than for the chance for free political and social life and the gambler's chance of large success. As a partial offset is the fact that there is now some official inspection of incomers and some are denied entrance who earlier would have been admitted. Some effort is made to exclude certain defectives and persons with certain beliefs and doctrines as well as certain racial groups. This doubtless excludes some valuable material but also excludes some that is physically bad. This selective process probably does a good deal to raise the quality of the stock admitted. There seems to be no evidence sufficient to prove the commonly held idea that the present incomers are seriously below an average of their separate racial groups. They may be so. They are preponderantly from the lower social and economic orders of society, and this is frequently taken to mean a less degree of native worth.

Social Effects of Immigration. It is probably true that the American population, so far as its biological quality is concerned, has undergone no particular deterioration because of the introduction of new racial elements. When the attention is turned from the biological to the sociological phase of the problem, the matter presents a somewhat different aspect.

The present-day immigration is quite radically unlike that of thirty years ago. The introduction of the new physical types, quite aside from any question of comparative race values, has intensified and extended the prejudice of race and color. The old immigration, excepting only the Chinese and the Negroes, had no outstanding physical features making for a permanent separation. In the latter-day immigration such physical marks are the rule. This change in the physical type of the incomers seems to have somewhat intensified the tendency toward a caste order of society.

In language, the recent immigration is nearly all non-English speaking. Catholicism is the prevailing religion. For the most part the recent immigrants are without experience or tradition of representative government. The average of education and literacy is very low. The psychology is, for the most part, that of an hereditary peasantry. Their moral customs are in many respects quite strongly contrasted to the prevailing American standard. Consequently, the immediate effect of immigration is a lowering of the average tone of the population. Religious matters settled some hundreds of years are reopened. Political democracy becomes more unworkable with the increase of the peasant-minded. Steps toward the emancipation of women and the education of the child are retarded. The literacy of the population is lowered. The power of the priesthood is increased. The result of the presence of the docile and stolid peasant is, at least for the time, to lower the intellectual, political, moral, and religious status of the country.

The crisis in the life of the peasant, uprooted from the traditional and fixed status and transferred to the American situation with its absence of fixed standards, is a severe one. The new social situation calls for a rather thoroughgoing readjustment in manner of life and manner of thinking, which the peasant is not in all cases able to make. In the process there emerges a large amount of failure expressing itself in poverty, pauperism, and miserable conditions of existence. The younger generation, without the standards of the parents and unassimilated by American life, erupts a large amount of criminality and other non-social phenomena.

The immigrant has been habituated to a standard of living lower in most respects than the American norm. His introduction, therefore, automatically lowers the average of the American standard. One effect of this lower standard of living is an economic competition in the labor market which lowers wages or prevents their rise. It is possible because of his lower standards of living and because his traditions and morals do not operate to exclude women and children from hard labor and do not call for a period of education for the young, for the immigrant to accept a wage that drives native workmen and partly Americanized immigrants of the older stock out of competition. The effect is to make certain callings disreputable, virtually caste callings, and to prevent the rise of wages and standards in others.

The lower standard of living expresses itself as well in the distribution of economic goods. The chronic excess of the labor supply, resulting from the size of the immigration, inhibits growth toward an industrial democracy, presumably the goal toward which an intelligent people should strive. The low wage and the conditions of work enable the capitalist to divert to profits all but a pittance in the distribution of the products of many industries. The massing of wealth in the hands of a few men and a small class, however desirable it may be from the point of view of these men or from the point of view of the most efficient production, is an unfortunate tendency when viewed from the point of view of the population.

The Question of Restriction and Selection. The question of the restriction of immigration inevitably arises and, in view of the large number of incomers at the present time and the prospects of greater numbers in the future, it is an important question of immediate interest. The effects on this country whether for good or ill will be permanent effects. Any complete consideration is out of place here; it involves the whole question of the type of society that it is proposed to build up in America. . . .

Exercises

1. Discuss the movement of population in its various forms.
2. How far back in human history may the phenomenon be traced?
3. Of the two aspects of the problem of immigration, which is the more important?
4. In discussing the control of immigration what five aspects does Fairchild treat?
5. Upon what consideration does the right to exclude immigration rest?
6. What arguments are brought against this alleged right?
7. State the nature of the immigration movement as explained by Fairchild, and the justification of arbitrary social restraints upon it.
8. What effects result from such restrictions?
9. State in detail the purpose of the American people in the control of immigration.
10. Is the basis of this purpose narrow or illiberal?
11. What understanding lies at the basis of successful dealing with immigrants, according to Miss Abbott?
12. Show by examples how a lack of this understanding leads to failure in various community efforts.
13. What is the fundamental problem of the immigrant in relation to community life?

14. Contrast the quantity and quality aspects of immigration as pointed out by Reuter.
15. Distinguish the question of biological amalgamation from that of sociological commingling.
16. On the biological side what has been the effect of immigration on American stock?
17. How serious is the replacement that has taken place, in Reuter's opinion?
18. What is said of the quality of the newer immigrant stock?
19. Indicate the social effects of immigration in detail.
20. As between the biological and social aspects of the problem of immigration, which seems the more important? the more amenable to social control?

Additional References

1. Fairchild, Henry Pratt: *Immigration: A World Movement and Its American Significance*. Pp. 1-6 show immigration as a world movement, and define the various terms.
2. Fairchild, Henry Pratt: "The End of Race Migrations," in the *Yale Review*, Vol. XI., No. 4 (July 1922). Argues for the exclusion of immigration.
3. Jenks, Jeremiah W., and Lauck, W. Jett: *The Immigration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs*. Replete with statistics and important documents. See pp. 6-9 for topical outline of a study of immigration.
4. Keller, Albert G.: *Colonization*. Valuable for the larger background of emigration and immigration.
5. Ross, Edward A.: *The Old World in the New*. A stimulating study.
6. Thomas, William I., and Znaniecki, F.: *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. 5 vols. A monumental collection of documentary evidence, analyzed from the standpoint of social psychology.

CHAPTER XXXV

RURAL DEPLETION AND URBAN CONGESTION

IT is obvious that we have here another phase of the general problem created by movements of population. But whereas in the case of emigration and immigration the difficulty arises from the intrusion of divergent racial types and national cultures upon the receiving nation, here we face a series of problems created by the shifting of a population within its own borders. The people concerned may be entirely homogeneous in blood and culture, yet the outflow of numbers from the rural regions brings forward there a train of social evils which center around the fact of *depletion*. This may be either biological, through drawing away the best family stocks, or sociological, in so far as the reduction of numbers below a certain point cripples, and eventually destroys, the efficiency of social institutions, such as the school, the church, the grange, or the meeting of voters. This aspect of the problem is touched upon in Reading 1, from one of the earliest and best of the numerous studies that the recognition of this problem has produced.

In the urban centers, created largely by this inflow of rural population, the situation is exactly reversed, so that all problems hinge upon the outstanding fact of *congestion*. Reading 3, from Mr. Bryce, brings out this side of the problem.

As remarked above, this twofold problem would arise even if the people were entirely homogeneous, that is to say, alike in physical type and culture. But as a matter of fact this is not often true. In some cases the racial sub-types are different in the various provinces of a great nation; and in any case different *attitudes* are developed, and different social *values* come to be cherished, in the two situations represented by rural and urban life. This more subjective aspect is touched upon in the other readings from Fiske and Wilson, and will be found more fully analyzed in Reference 1, by Professor Bernard.

1. Rural Depletion and Institutional Decline ¹

The early New England town-meetings were possible because the settlers were of the stock which had once enjoyed a highly socialistic

¹ From *The Country Town: A Study of Rural Evolution*, by Wilbert L. Anderson; pp. 245-47; 252-54; 263-67. (New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1916. Reprinted by permission.)

training. In a new country they quickly appropriated the greater part of the civic functions, exercising powers that have not been claimed in recent times. The assignment of lands, the regulation of agriculture, defense against the Indians, the maintenance of religion, fell to the towns. Whatever authority belonged to the lord of the manor had no duplicate in the wilderness; courts of wide jurisdiction were not available at the first; colonial—not to say national—government developed slowly. The town-meeting came into existence with unique responsibilities and powers. It was the most perfect local democracy that the world has ever seen; it was also the source of the delegated authority of the colonial assembly. It did not receive its charter from the central authority, but parted with its power to constitute a common government of towns in the same region.

Necessarily this robust offspring of the wilderness lost vigor as time passed. Judicial functions soon passed to more comprehensive courts. Military independence was impracticable after the first exigencies. Land titles became the care of the General Court under provisions of law, with local registry—in town or county—telling the tale of origins. Long ago religion ceased to be supported and controlled by the towns, being surrendered to voluntary societies. There has been a loss of functions on the one hand to the county, the state, and the nation, and on the other hand to voluntary societies and individuals.

[Note: The Western or Southern reader should bear in mind that Dr. Anderson is using the word "town" in the New England sense, to designate, not a village or city, but a section of country, such as a Western "township."
— C. M. C.]

In yet another way the town has suffered. In course of time the whole territory was occupied, as families pushed out upon the farms. This shattered the social solidity; it broke the closeness of acquaintance, altered the habit of coöperation, and tended to develop an unsocial individuality. Then came the splitting of the town into school districts, which became centers for a new crystallization with much sectional isolation and antagonism. Worse than all else was the rupture of the church, crossing the sectional with sectarian lines and making a maze in which society was lost.

When these changes had run their course, the town was very different from what it had been in the days when it was the one vital political institution in the beginnings of a nation. As new regions

were settled, they grew up in the later municipal feebleness rather than in the old social strength. In most cases there was no original social body — no village with school, and church, and neighborly life. The individual was first, the community afterward. From the start the school district had the right of way, and any sect that could sustain itself pressed in, to the confounding of the ecclesiastical order. There was too much individualism, too much sectionalism, too much sectarianism, too much of clique and faction; and if a town meeting was held, the town affairs were of little importance and awakened a slight interest once a year.

The changes in population, it need not be said, have weakened the towns throughout the depleted area. Not only are they relatively less powerful in consequence of the growth of cities, but there is a sensible loss of social force within their borders. A smaller number of people cannot keep the old machinery running at full speed. Social institutions as well as the social feeling require a certain density of population. If the people are thinned beyond that point, social disintegration threatens: schools become too small for proper organization and for enthusiasm; churches struggle hopelessly or surrender to insuperable difficulties; even the town-meeting succumbs to the universal discouragement as the voters no longer crowd the hall and the tax-list shortens. . . .

Within the town one most notable change has taken place. The strain upon institutions resulting from depletions was first apparent in the district schools. Many schools that once had scores of pupils became too small for profitable continuance. The financial burden upon the poorer districts suggested a more economical and more equitable method; it is probable, indeed, that common sense in adjusting taxes had quite as much to do with the downfall of the district system as any pedagogical considerations. The assumption of the support of all the schools within its limits by the town and the provision for their administration by a single school board, is an educational revolution of the first magnitude. The single district school was too slight a thing to command serious attention, and as long as the system lasted, it was impossible to make any advance in the direction in which the normal schools were leading. The combined educational interests of an entire town are a different matter; the field is large enough, and responsibility is definite enough, to assure the attention and the careful oversight that promise improvement.

Some of the smaller schools have been given up; here and there a more radical course has been followed, — the schools of a town being consolidated and graded. It is found entirely practicable to assemble the children in a central school, for transportation proves cheaper than the multiplication of schools of the same grade. Experiments of this kind are now so numerous and so well known and their result is so convincing that the method of improving the rural schools is plain to all who have eyes to see. The town system of administration is everywhere practicable, and consolidation and gradation have wide opportunity. The educational gains of these changes are beyond calculation; and better methods, and the enthusiasm of numbers, and the new sense of dignity promise for the country school a development that will make it for the coming time as effective as the much lauded district school in the old days.

The social consequences of this new method in education are here to be pointed out. The town itself gains dignity and importance as a political institution. Taking up the educational function, the town almost doubles its public business, and this by the addition of purely intellectual and moral elements. A town-meeting gains more elevation from a discussion of schools than from a discussion of roads. As soon as a public sentiment in favor of improved schools is developed and pride in the schools is justified, the community has a new social consciousness. Here is a coöperation of the finest kind, giving the people a common thought, a common object of devotion, and a common spirit of sacrifice. The consolidated school has powerful influence for good: the children from different sections are educated together; their acquaintance is wide as the town; life for them is in a larger world; they escape the provincialism of the remote school district. Children growing up with the town consciousness promise much for the uplift and enrichment of the community.

The library easily follows the introduction of an efficient school system. Privately established and endowed a library should be, for its provision and maintenance are too costly for taxation alone; but however founded and sustained a library for all the people should be in their control. This again adds to the functions of the town government a most honorable and ennobling element. . . .

The churches in those towns which have lost from ten to forty per cent of their people within fifty years have suffered a severe strain. In the more populous towns and the more religious communities strong

churches have been weakened; what then must be the experience where the people never were numerous, and the institutions of religion never were vigorous? That the supporters of churches leave the rural communities in exceptional numbers is probable, for they are quick to hear the call of larger opportunity and greater service in the degree in which they have received the Christian spirit. Certainly the greater number of those who pass into the ampler world by the highway of education have felt the stimulus of the church in their plastic childhood. When, therefore, depletion has run its course a weaker church is in a more irreligious community, unless other forces change the result. Obviously there must be many sad examples of spiritual and moral decay, — bewailed justly enough, but rightly interpreted as consequences of industrial changes. Innumerable witnesses voice lamentation and criticism, to whom we must listen, although what they deplore is part of the progress of the age.

The preservation of the churches in depleted towns calls for heroic measures. Of these the most certain to occur to every mind is the consolidation of enfeebled organizations. There is a limited sphere within which the consolidation of farms is demanded; there is a widespread movement for the consolidation of schools; why should the children of light alone fail to read the meaning of the times? The melancholy multiplication of churches is known to all; viewed from the social side, the division of the people, the splitting up of resources, the poverty and feebleness of congregations, the meagre equipment, the unholy competitions and jealousies, the utter failure to inspire and lead the community, constitute an arraignment of the common sense and Christianity of those responsible for this condition against which defense is impossible. Fortunately the case has been appealed to a higher court, and churches that cannot vindicate their right to existence are compelled to surrender to the new order of civilization. The people being too few, the number of churches must be reduced.

Thus far a strange and reprehensible stubbornness has given this promising movement a grim look. Churches have chosen to die in independence rather than yield in season to a prudent consolidation. This clears the field, but the process is painful and perilous, for religion may perish while the struggling churches are waiting for their competitors to expire. To persist in a forlorn hope when union would help the higher life of the community, to prolong the struggle for existence until the death of the weaker church determines to which

contestant the field belongs, is a spectacle that might be expected on the low levels of evolution, but ought never to be witnessed in the high places where love and fellowship are the ruling forces of civilization. And when a church is extinct, its house of worship, falling into ruin, remains to lend its sombre suggestions to the itinerant pessimist. So many of these abandoned edifices have provoked lamentation that one who appreciates their true meaning may take heart. The elimination of superfluous churches is well under way. The most divisive and the least servicable succumb. So great is this ecclesiastical mortality that a writer who has a sharp eye for it has boldly given his article the title, "The Passing of the Country Church." The cross-roads come-outers are the first to go. Indeed by the country church this observer seems to mean the church by the highway or in some petty hamlet.

The dissolution of churches may go far before real harm is done. At the centenary of the New Hampshire Home Missionary Society in 1901, the fact was brought to light that in twenty-eight towns Congregational churches had ceased to exist without apparent injury, inasmuch as forty Protestant churches and one Roman Catholic church still survived. It is a fair inference that these churches died because they served no useful purpose. There is little occasion to fear that the older parts of the country will ever have too few churches. In Vermont, the last decade developed a surprising mortality of churches; but more remarkable is the founding of new organizations, — eleven Protestant denominations making good their own losses, filling the gap created by the loss of twenty-four churches in six other denominations, and finally swelling the total number by thirty-five. It would seem evident that churches die only where they are not needed, and that they spring into being where they are required by changes in population. It is difficult, also, to resist the impression that just as they linger too long where mortality is desirable, so they multiply too easily where sectarian propagandism discovers a chance to repeat its old folly. Here and there towns are relieved of superfluous organizations, although we have to record a delay of the better order that tries our patience. How much wiser than the sinking of the feeblest to extinction would be the masterly meeting of the situation by a consolidation of organizations while there is a fair measure of strength!

2. Socialization vs. Urbanization in Country Life²

[In the more progressive rural communities] we find two parallel processes developing rather noticeably, the socializing and the urbanizing of country life. They are similar movements, but not identical. Socialization is a civilizing process in which individuals, by merging their rights, interests, and functions, develop community efficiency through group action. Very naturally this process develops most rapidly in the more favorable city environment; but it is now making progress also in the country against the conservatism and ultra-individualism of rural life.

Meanwhile in all but the most remote rural sections (and even there through the influence of the mail-order catalogues) you may observe the rapid urbanization of country life. I mean by this the spread of the social ideals and customs of the city. To the extent that these customs and ideals are constructive and adaptable to a wholesome country life, to that extent this urbanization makes for socialization and should be welcomed. Unquestionably this process, hastened by increasing intercommunication, is rapidly making country life and city life more alike, and is extending the limits of suburban life. It is to be hoped that this urbanizing will not destroy the unique social consciousness of rural civilization and make it simply imitative of the city. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that the city may more effectively teach the country the secrets of socialization, so that the social efficiency of urban life may be reproduced in the country. Rural people need to discover how city people work together in compactly organized business corporations; how they adjust, by many mutual concessions, their complicated civic relations, how they co-ordinate sympathy and human needs, and administer a network of social-service agencies, with greater and greater efficiency through perfected organization.

Why this lack of socialization? I hasten to avoid the suspicion of lack of sympathy with country life by saying that I believe this lack of socialization and co-operation in the country to be due less to selfishness than to lack of social opportunity and practice. In fact, these unsocial tendencies are largely the result of overdeveloped rural

² From "The Development of Rural Leadership," by G. Walter Fiske, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XI., (1916); pp. 56-61. Reprinted by permission.

strength of character. The pioneer life of the American farmers has developed heroic virtues in their personality which have made them as a class the most self-reliant in history. This self-reliance has been overdeveloped. It has led to self-aggrandizement, jealousy of personal rights, slowness to accept advice, proneness to lawsuits over property, thrifty frugality to a fault, indifference to public opinion, disregard of the opinions of experts. Doing so much of their thinking alone, they do not easily yield to argument. Working with the soil and with things more than persons, they do not easily respond to leadership. They are likely to view strangers with suspicion because they do not know them; and for the opposite reason often they do not trust their neighbors nor co-operate with them because they do know them. Self-reliance overstressed leads them to distrust any initiative but their own. They refuse to recognize superiority in others of their own class. Positively, the resulting failure in coöperation explains the jealousies and feuds all too common in rural neighborhoods; and, negatively, it accounts for the lack of social organization and effective leadership. Again let me remind you of my caveat, that I am not speaking of the more progressive rural communities, but of rural life in general. I believe that these generalizations are less true in the West, but most true in the South and the older sections of the North and East, outside of urban tracts.

The difficulty of developing rural leadership. I am now ready to offer a suggestion in answer to the question: *If country life furnishes so much leadership for the city, why is leadership a problem in the country?* I am confident that there is no dearth of latent leadership in the country. In general, I do not believe it has been depleted by the exodus to the city, though in some places this has been serious. In general, it is mainly the question of *developing* the qualities of the leadership which are *latent* in the finest types of young men and women living in the country.

You will readily grant me that there is much latent leadership in country boys. Some of these boys go to the city, and there under urban stimulus and opportunity this latent initiative develops strongly, and they become vigorously influential personalities. Others of them, equally well endowed, remain in the country, and though they may become successful along individualistic lines and accumulate property, their latent leadership fails to develop. It fails to develop because of certain elements in the rural environment: the lack of sufficient stimu-

lus and challenge, the lack of urgent opportunity for self-expression, possibly because of real social repression, an inhibition of social effort due to the positive disapproval of inhospitable minds. This is why, in so many rural villages there is a persistent and deep-seated conviction that it is impossible to develop effective leadership for coöperation in community welfare until there have been a few judiciously selected, providential funerals. Hence an utterly stagnant community, socially speaking.

Again let me voice a gentle plea for consideration and charity. Mentally I rate the average rural citizen high, but he is likely to be *socially awkward*—mainly for lack of social stimulus and practice. The term “social awkwardness” may seem a rather strange one until we consider it in its relations. The country boy is likely to be awkward *physically* because of the over-development of the large muscles and the under-development of the accessory muscles. Hence his very gait sometimes suggests that he is still walking the furrows. He may be awkward also mentally. Though possessing strong mentality and accustomed to do clear thinking, he has lacked variety of stimuli, and still lacks sufficient opportunity for self-expression. He probably thinks more profoundly than his city cousin, but less alertly and rapidly. His social awkwardness is a correlative fact of which he is deeply conscious, and which explains his proverbial bashfulness, especially evident in the presence of city girls accustomed to dancing-school escorts. This in turn acts as a powerful inhibitive and discourages any social prominence. He is socially awkward because of the lack of social practice and adequate self-expression.

What, then, are some of the elements in the rural environment which constitute this social repression to which I referred a moment ago, which inhibits the development of the strong latent leadership in rural personality? In summary I would suggest: lack of the social stimulus which comes from city crowds and city life; lack of sufficient challenge to self-expression, with personal growth under social pressure; lack of variety of social opportunities to challenge variety of personal talent; and lack of adequate training in leadership, acutely felt by conscientious people who would gladly lead in community welfare if they felt they could. Then there is strong positive inhibition by rural conservatism in general; positive repression of ambition by neighborly jealousy (a genial combination of terms!); the deterrent effect of long mutual acquaintance, with its leveling influence,

too apt to level down all latent leadership by saying in effect, "Start something if you dare! Show your head as a leader, if you want to lose it!" Such rural social democracy is all too common, and it keeps everybody plodding along in the ruts instead of venturing forth in community leadership. Hence the homespun leader is discounted and emerges from the crowd with great diffidence.

The call for leadership. In spite of these inherent difficulties in our problem, adequate rural leadership is somehow going to be developed. It cannot go by default, for the need is too urgent and the opportunity too challenging. Often, in this connection, I revert to an eloquent passage in the report of the first Country Life Commission (January, 1909). It is headed "The Call for Leadership."

"We must picture to ourselves a new rural social structure, developed from the strong resident forces of the open country; and then we must set at work all the agencies that will tend to bring this about. Most of the new leaders must be farmers who can find, not only a satisfying business career on the farm, but who will throw themselves into the service of upbuilding the community. A new race of teachers is also to appear in the country. A new rural clergy is to be trained. These leaders will see the great underlying problem of country life, and together they will work, each in his own field, for the one goal of a new and permanent rural civilization. Upon the development of this distinctly rural civilization rests ultimately our ability, by methods of farming requiring the highest intelligence, to continue to feed and clothe the hungry nations; to supply the city and metropolis with fresh blood, clean bodies, and clear brains that can endure the strain of modern urban life; and to preserve a race of men in the open country, that, in the future as in the past, will be the stay and strength of the nation in time of war and its guiding and controlling spirit in time of peace."

This paragraph rightly emphasizes the fact that the *farmer* is the natural leader in country life. Yet to a remarkable degree he falls short of his opportunity in leadership. He constitutes 30 per cent of the adult male population of the country engaged in gainful occupations, yet he has remarkably small leadership, for instance, in politics. There are about 70 times as many farmers as lawyers in the land, yet what about their relative influence? Almost 60 per cent of our present Congress are lawyers. Barely 3 per cent are farmers. The 120,000 lawyers in America constitute less than one-half of 1 per cent

of the adult male workers. Their representation in Congress is over 120 times as large as it should be, whereas the farmers' representation is but one-tenth of their proportionate share; that is, the lawyer's chance for political leadership, on the basis of our present Congress, is 1,200 times that of the farmer.

This condition, however, is not likely to continue. The farmer is beginning to discover and to wield for himself political leadership. It may or may not seem significant to you that practically every great rural state voted last November (1916) for the President who gave rural America the long-postponed rural-credit system, and that this President was elected over the protest of nearly every great urban state in the land. It is also worth noting that the "Farmers' Non-partisan Political League" which campaigned North Dakota last fall with the slogan, "A farmers' government for a farming state," swept the state clean last November, losing but one candidate on the state ticket and electing 81 out of 113 members of the legislature.

3. The Menace of Great Cities³

Now, it is an unfortunate though easily explicable fact that people seem to be proud of the size of their cities. I notice as soon as the census comes out what a peal of joy goes up from the cities that are growing fast. Why, but yesterday some citizens of a western city were so exceedingly eager that their city should distance in the swiftness of its growth all the neighboring cities, that they resorted to methods which were not justified by any rules of law or honor or morality in order to increase the census figures of their population. I believe they were indicted. I don't know about the conviction. Of course, in a certain sense one can understand this desire, because it appeals to business men. The business man naturally likes to think a city is growing, and that its trade is booming, for he will have more customers to deal with. And that, to some extent, reacts upon other parts of the community besides the business man. I might say it goes into the professional classes also. I can think of three professional classes—I need not name them—three leading professional classes that might conceivably be influenced by similar motives. But if we look at it, not from the point of view of business, but from the point of view of the community as a whole, and of the interest

³ By the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, in *National Housing Association Publications*, No. 20. New York, 1913. Reprinted by permission.

of the future, shall we not be led to believe that a big city is a big evil?

Of course there are some cities whose growth has been dictated by nature and cannot be controlled. Cities which stand upon great harbors must grow as long as they have an immense hinterland and an immense trade out of their harbors to other parts of the world. Nothing can stop the growth of cities like Baltimore, New Orleans, Philadelphia, San Francisco and, above all, New York. But if you stand away from those great cities which have now become and must go on growing into great centers of population, from their being centers into which transportation facilities converge, there is no reason why there should be a small number of huge cities instead of a much larger number of medium-sized cities, by which I mean cities of from ten to fifty thousand people.

I wish to give you some reasons why a great city is a great evil.

First: From the point of view of health. In the city, and most of the great cities are crowded, there must be less oxygen and more microbes. I believe it is a fact that no city has maintained itself and its standard of physical excellence without an indraught from the country. If you were to leave the city alone, stop the indraught of the people who have grown up and formed their constitutions in the air of the country, the population would decline physically and, perhaps, begin to die out.

Second: It is a great evil in the city that people are cut off from nature and communion with nature, so that they who would like to enjoy the sights and scenes and blessings of nature can do so only on rare occasions and by taking a journey.

Third: It is an evil in that it separates the greater part of the community into classes and disturbs the sentiment of neighborliness between the richer and the poorer, which existed formerly in smaller communities, and which ought to exist. You have endeavored to remedy that in your great cities by founding what are called Settlements, where a few members of the wealthy class go down and live among the members of the poorer class and try to help them. That is very excellent and wholesome, a very valuable remedy, but, after all, it is only palliative. It would be better for the community not only that the wealthier classes should have the other classes constantly in sight, but that neighborly relations of human fellowship could more naturally be cultivated, because they dwelt near at hand.

Fourth: Life in the great city tends to stimulate and increase beyond measure that which is the menace of the American city — Intensification of nervous strain and nervous excitability. Cities are the homes — especially in the United States — of every kind of noise, and nothing in the long run puts a greater strain on the nervous system than incessant noise. People live in crowds, under the ceaseless stimulus of always seeing one another in crowds, always moving to and fro in street cars and railroads and automobiles, backwards and forwards at an increasing rate of speed. They are always under that exciting influence which the mere sense of living in a crowd of people and of trying to pack so many things in the twenty-four hours, including the reading of numerous newspapers, produces. It tells injuriously upon the nervous system. All these things tend to increase the nervous excitability and the consequent neurasthenia from which we are told most of us are suffering. Some people think this is going to be the real danger in the future of the human race, and that unless the right means are found for the protection of our nervous system, its undue stimulation and consequent exhaustion may become a source of weakness for mankind.

Fifth: If these conditions are not favorable for the population generally, they are particularly unfavorable for the bairns — I mean the boys and girls. The boy living in the country has any amount of opportunity for the development of his vitality, full space to give vent to his natural exuberance of energy. He climbs trees, jumps over fences, throws stones at the birds — fortunately he does not usually hit them; he rambles about with his boy companions and gathers blackberries and sees all kinds of things upon which his natural activity expends itself. He has all sorts of winter sports in snow and on ice. So he gets insight into nature through his curiosity and can have in the country some little sense of adventure. But if he is cooped up in the city he takes to rambling the street at night with other boys, and if he is not well guided in his home he is very apt to fall into bad company and get into all sorts of trouble. I think the Boy Scout movement has done a great deal to meet and cure that danger, but still it is a danger for many boys. There has grown up in the large cities a class for whom names have been invented, like "hoodlums" in California, and "larrikins" in Australia, which denote an undesirable kind of boy citizen. It is a tendency much in evidence in huge cities among the younger part of the community, who have a

superabundance of energy which cannot work itself off in the old natural way.

Sixth: Great cities are liable to become great dangers in a political sense, because the more men are crowded in great masses, the more easily they become excited, the more they are swept away by words, and the more they form what might be called a revolutionary temper. All revolutionary movements or acts of violence are more apt to spring up in a dense city population, a population which is liable to be swept by excess of emotions, than among people living in the country.

Lastly: In the great city there is a deplorable amount of economic waste. In the city the manufactories, offices, warehouses and shops, all the large places in which people are employed, whether in distributing commodities or purchasing, are in the central parts of the city. The people want to live in the outer parts of the city, and as the city grows the people are driven more and more into the outskirts. If you will consider the amount of time that is taken from work to be given to mere transportation from the residence of the workingman to his working place in the city, you will see how great the loss is.

I used to make computations of that in London. In London a large part of our working people live on the eastern side of London, the northern side and the southwest, and come in ten, twelve or fourteen miles every day to work. The man walks ten minutes to the railway station from the place where he lives, and then walks another ten minutes from the station to his work in the city, and he spends from three-quarters of an hour to fifty minutes, sometimes perhaps as much as sixty minutes, on the railroad. In other words he wastes from fifty to seventy minutes in the morning, and as much in the evening, which might be given to work, or if not to work, then to mental recreation or improvement.

Think what that means in a year. Think what is the waste that is involved in a great city like London or New York in people spending an hour or more in the morning and another hour or more in the evening in going to and fro to their work, when if they were near their work they might either be working or enjoying themselves or having wholesome rest. It is an economic waste which is really an insult to our civilization; it ought to appeal to us on the mere business side, the need for saving the productive capacity of our people from such waste.

Now, what can you do about it? I am told that there are obvious advantages in great cities. No doubt there is an advantage in that you can have a certain amount of pleasure. You can have better libraries, finer museums and zoölogical and botanical gardens on a larger scale. You can have larger and more varied commercial interests and a fuller social life, and you can have a far greater choice of amusements, more music, more plays in the theater.

The business man says he must be where the greatest facilities for transportation exist, namely, where the largest number of railroads converge, and the place where he can have the largest supply of labor at short notice, and where he can get any kind of labor that he wants because there is a large floating population.

I do not deny that there is force in all this. But at the same time even the business man will surely admit that it ought to be a great advantage to him in the smaller place to be able to get land very much cheaper. There he can lay out his factory building on approved lines and provide not only larger spaces for his works but also larger and more convenient dwellings for his workingmen.

Of course we all believe that business looks after itself, that men know better their own business than anybody else could tell them. At the same time I do believe that there are cases where men go by rule of thumb, merely doing as other people have done, merely following in a trodden path, without stopping to think that it is worth while to give attention to those considerations which sometimes occur to us who look at things in a theoretical as well as a practical way. You all know that in matters of shop management suggestions of great value have been recently put forward by Mr. Frederick Taylor, which have attracted much attention, and I believe are being taken advantage of, which will effect a great saving of economic waste. These suggestions might have occurred to many other business men, but it was left to Mr. Taylor to think out the matter and show its importance. So, I am sure, there are many particulars of social mechanism in which it will be possible to remove waste if people would only begin to stop and think about it instead of blindly following in the pathways they have become accustomed to tread.

I am not prepared to say what are the remedies that can be applied. I have myself thought of some remedies, but it would not do for me to mention them to you here because they would require legislation and, of course, that is a subject on which I cannot very well speak.

Still I venture to urge you to take the matter into your serious consideration.

We have made a small departure in this direction in England in founding what are called garden cities, and in persuading employers of labor who can afford to try these experiments to move their works into the country, as also by laying out towns around these works upon well-considered lines with plenty of space, and by erecting attractive houses, which being built on lands that could be bought very cheaply can be let out at very moderate rents to the workingman. I believe that is a thing which might be carried further than has been done yet.

You have here far wider spaces than we have in England. For instance take Pennsylvania. Think as you go west, or northwest, or southwest of here what immense areas of country there are in which you might plant many cities of 20,000, or 30,000, or 40,000, or 50,000 people, while still leaving the country real genuine country, not urbanizing it as we have urbanized many parts of northern England. Instead of letting a few huge cities grow to more than a million in population, it would be far better to have more and smaller cities not exceeding 150,000 population, or perhaps even 100,000. These would furnish all the things that are needed for comfort and social enjoyment.

If you were to persuade the owners of large factories to plant their works in the country and let garden cities grow up around them, you might set a fashion, lay out a new line which people would follow, so that in the future the growth of the state would take the direction of increasing large numbers of smaller centers instead of inordinately swelling the few big centers.

4. Country versus City⁴

The population of the cities is now, for the nation as a whole, about equal to that of the country. In 1910, 53 per cent of the people of the United States lived in communities of 2,500 or less. The communities of 2,500 or over, which are called cities, were growing at such a rate then, and have so increased since that time in growth and in proportionate growth, that we may recognize the division of the people between city and country communities as equal. The division

⁴ By Warren H. Wilson, in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. XI. (1917). p. 12 ff. Reprinted by permission.

of the population at communities of 2,500, while arbitrary, is on the whole satisfactory. It marks the line of social, economic, educational, and religious differences which are vital and fundamental. The basis of this difference is the fact that there are two layers of people in this country, the rural and the urban. The rural are predominantly of the older colonial stock; among them are few of the immigrants of recent years. Irish, German, and Scandinavian immigrants used to go to the country, but Poles, Lithuanians, Slavs, Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Syrians, and Jews do not go to farms in any such numbers as to require notice here. They go to the cities. The cities reflect their character and activities. The farming and the village populations, on the other hand, are strongholds of older American conservatism.

It is contended by some authorities that there is a movement of the country population, not to the cities, but from farm to farm, from farm to village, and from one agricultural state to another. There are some country people moving into the cities, as is demonstrated by the slow growth of cities in the southern states where immigrants are few. But that this cityward migration is relatively small is indicated by the predominantly rural character of these states to which little of the more recent immigration has gone. The cities in the South constitute only a small part of the entire population, and they exhibit in this fact the lesser inclination of the older Americans to go into city life.

The contrast between city and country is expressed also in certain social habits. The compacted social forms under which people live in the congested cities are unknown in the country. They are not idealized by country people. Farmers live in homesteads far apart from one another. The village residence of some European tillers of the soil has not been translated to this country, though similar conditions appear in Utah.

The masterful and independent character of the American countryman explains his country residence and the lonely homestead in which he lives. Eloquent tribute is paid to this chief motive of country life in Bailey's *The Holy Earth*, p. 37:

"As you say, too many people confound farming with that sordid, selfish, money-getting game called 'business,' whereas the farmer's position is administrative, being in a way a dispenser of the 'Mysteries of God,' for they are mysteries. Every apple is a mystery, and

every potato is a mystery, and every ear of corn is a mystery, and every pound of butter is a mystery, and when a farmer is not able to understand these things he is out of place.

"The farmer uses the soil and the rains and the snows and the frosts and the winds and the sun: these are also the implements of the Almighty, the only tools he uses. . . ."

Strangely contrasted to this industrial independence of country people is the variety of minds one finds in the city. Every type of mind that is highly specialized, every industrial character, every mechanical gift that is highly rewarded, every business faculty that inclines its possessor to acquire and to use capital goes to the city. Into the city are thus brought the mechanical, the executive, the acquisitive, the musical, the literary, the humorous.

There are left in the country by this very drastic selection the possessors of an entirely different social mind. The characters entering into its make-up are fewer than in the city. The country lacks the variety and is without the original inventive elements of which the city has a surplusage. A somewhat uniform type of mind after a while characterizes country populations that are under city influence. Wilbert L. Anderson has described this severe conformity of country people to one type as a result of the removal of those who have characters of greater variation to the cities. The effect of this selection is to give the country and city populations an appearance of strong unlikeness each to the other.

Economic forms of the country differ from those of the city, where the joint-stock corporation prevails. Country people cannot endure to work together under joint-stock organization. They have invented in Europe and America, out of the necessity of collective action, a co-operative type of organization based upon the natural partnership of the country neighborhood. Farmers in every land of the earth are said by Sir Horace Plunkett to organize effectively in this form alone, which preserves the individual estate while securing collective action on a basis of personal acquaintance.

The schools of the country are very different from those of the city. The disposition to improve and adapt the city schools, and the degree of that educational progress, are not found in the country, where conservatism affects the school perhaps more than any other institution. The schoolmaster class may have exaggerated the antagonism between city and country because of this retardation of

country schools. This class has certainly not belittled it, and the more because the future of the country school is believed to lie in a different direction from that of the city schools. To this the books of Kern, Foght, Carney, Bruere, Eggleston, and Cubberley all testify. The science of agriculture occupies a great place in national education. Professing to be a whole and adequate training for country life, it greatly influences rural thought. The more it is developed as a formal statement of rural knowledge and practice, so much the more does country life differ from city life. The whole influence of the agricultural college and of the state and national departments of agriculture is exerted in the direction of a different society in the country from that in the city.

To this conviction of a dual organization of society further evidence is added by the country church. Between the city church and that in the country there is a wide divergence. So marked is this contrast that one brilliant observer has called the country church a form of "heathen Christianity."

There is a different personnel in the country ministry and different professional habits, especially in the open country churches. There is a strong tendency among country churches to conform to a common mode and both in liturgy and in relation to social life to resemble one another closely. This occurs, moreover, without abatement of denominational ardor. The same thing may be said of city churches of the protestant sort: they tend to conform to a city type. But city and country church modes are far apart. Two rural churches of different denominations are more like one another than either of them is like a city congregation of its own communion. The country church generally has an absentee minister. Its affairs are treated as of less importance than individual concerns. It is not an approved channel of benevolence as the city church is. And over-churching, especially in villages, seems to be a cherished expression of the rural religious spirit rather than an evil recognized or deplored.

The widest divergence between city and country is a spiritual one; by this I mean a contrast in the general attitude of either population toward life as a whole. The countryman has the attitude of one who produces his own living. The city man is characterized by the recognition that the sources of his income are invisible. That is country men think of themselves as producers, while dwellers in cities act the part of consumers. It is true that each farmer is now a consumer

of other men's goods; but his mental posture—what Professor Carver calls his “make-believe”—is that of a self-sufficing social life. He still sees before his eyes the most of his consumer's goods produced on the land which he owns or rents, and even manufactured on his own premises. This fact gives him an independence of the city and a resulting contempt for city people and antagonism for all urban concerns.

The relation between city and country may be understood in any one of three ways: first, it may be believed—as many do believe upon the evidence we have just mentioned—that rural society and urban have no connection whatever: that the one is independent of the other; or secondly, one may conceivably think of them as antagonistic and competitive—as the title of this paper implies; or thirdly, we may believe that urban society and rural society are closely interrelated, causes of either being found in the other.

The prevailing implication of social opinion among students of urban conditions is of the first of these three; that is, urban social students write and speak as if the city were self-sufficing. Rural students usually adhere to the second theory, that the city and country compete. Their proposals often imply that the prosperity of the country is to be secured only from rural sources by rural leaders, independently or at the expense of the city. It is the contention of this paper that the third opinion is the true one—that the city and country are dynamically one. Studies which ignore progress may regard them as separate and complete each in itself; but the consideration of growth and progress discovers sources of change for the city to be in the country, and the sources of rural progress in the city.

This is not to say that we are going to “urbanize” the country. So long as farmers persist in living in lonely homesteads, to speak of rural social life as “urban” because of better plumbing or screens on the door of the farm kitchen is simply to confess a poverty of words. But so long as the harvester machinery is made in Chicago and the price of butter is fixed in Elgin and the sale of citrus fruit is made in Los Angeles, just so long will the city be the center of country life. And until typhoid is abolished, the country and the city will require a unified health service.

Exercises

1. Point out the essence of the rural and urban problems.
2. In what is this problem similar to that of immigration?
3. Explain the greatness and the decline of the New England town-meeting. (Anderson uses the word "town," after the custom of New Englanders, to convey the same meaning that "township" carries in the West.)
4. Show how the depletion of population affects each of the rural institutions.
5. What compensation follows in the case of the school? Is something similar possible for the rural church?
6. From more recent literature, or from your own observation, show what is being done in rural churches.
7. State the relation between churches and population, according to Anderson.
8. Distinguish the socializing and the urbanizing of country life.
9. Discuss rural leadership, with reference to its deficiencies and its possibilities.
10. In the arraignment of great cities presented by Bryce, which of the evils named are most capable of reduction, and by what means? Which seem inseparable from city life?
11. Discuss the Garden-city plan, with special reference to American conditions.
12. What is the outstanding characteristic of rural social life? Is it more, or less, pronounced in the United States than elsewhere?
13. Contrast city and country with respect to the nature of the processes of getting a living; the social mind; economic forms; schools; churches.
14. Explain: "The widest divergence between city and country is a spiritual one."
15. Of the three ways of stating the relation between country and city indicated by Fiske, which is the most correct?

Additional References

1. Bernard, L. L.: "A Theory of Rural Attitudes"; in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXII., pp. 630 ff.
2. Boisen, Anton T.: "Factors Which Have to Do with the Decline of the Country Church"; *ibid.*, p. 177 ff. Extremely valuable especially for conditions in the South.
3. Butterfield, Kenyon L.: *The Country Church and the Rural Problem*. Remarkable for insight into both the aspects named.
4. Butterfield, Kenyon L.: *Chapters in Rural Progress*. Essays on special aspects.

5. Douglass, Harlan P.: *The Little Town, Especially in Its Rural Relationships*. By the Secretary American Missionary Assoc.

6. Howe, Frederic C.: *The Modern City and Its Problems*. Ch. V. "The American City: Its Success and Its Failures."

7. McKeever, R. A.: *Farm Boys and Girls*. Notable for first-hand facts and original suggestions for meeting the rural deficiencies.

8. *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XI. (1917). Papers by experts on various aspects of "The Sociology of Rural Life."

9. Unwin, Raymond: "The Overgrown City," in the *Survey*, Vol. XLIX., No. 2. (Oct. 15, 1922.) A suggestion for city-planning by the foremost British authority.

10. Zueblin, Charles: *American Municipal Progress*. A standard text-book of highest authority.

CHAPTER XXXVI

RACE PROBLEMS

THE general trend of racial investigations has been to show that the hostility between races in mixed populations occupying a common area arises largely from competition in the economic field. The different racial groups possess different standards of life, distinctly affecting their income requirements and consequent character as economic competitors. This economic motive is reinforced and usually overshadowed by traditional prejudices and prevailing social attitudes. The "race" problem thus transforms itself into a *culture* problem in two senses: First, because the standard of life is not truly racial but social and cultural; and second, because the antipathy manifested in such conflicts is not inherent, physical, and hereditary, but is inculcated through social attitudes passed along by social inheritance to young people who are naturally devoid of such feelings and notions. This is apparent in the entire freedom with which young children of different races associate until disrupted by older minds.

The extract from the Report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations printed below presents some of the finest investigations ever undertaken along the line of racial conflicts. The entire Report, of more than 600 pages, constitutes the most monumental piece of unprejudiced analysis ever attempted in connection with such subjects.

The section from Mahatma Gandhi on the race problem in South Africa is now out of date, and should not be taken as a report of the situation as it exists today. It is quoted here in order to show how many attitudes and situations which might be thought peculiar to the Negro Problem in the United States repeat themselves in other populations when similar economic and racial conditions arise.

1. Race Friction in South Africa¹

(The following is taken from a lecture delivered at the Pachaiyappa's Hall, Madras, on October 26, 1896, by Mr. M. K. Gandhi, on the "Grievances of Indian Settlers in South Africa.")

Mr. President and Gentlemen,—I am to plead before you this evening for the 100,000 British Indians in South Africa, the land of

¹ From the *Speeches and Writings of M. K. Gandhi*; pp. 1-5. (Madras, G. A. Natesan and Company, 1918. Reprinted by permission.)

gold and the seat of the late Jameson Raid. This document will show you (here Mr. Gandhi read a credential from the people of Natal deputing him to plead their cause) that I have been deputed to do so by the signatories to it who profess to represent the 100,000 Indians. A large majority of this number are people from Madras and Bengal. Apart, therefore, from the interest that you will take in them as Indians, you are specially interested in the matter.

South Africa may, for our purposes, be divided into the two self-governing British Colonies of Natal and the Cape of Good Hope, the Crown Colony of Zululand, the Transvaal or the South African Republic, the Orange Free State, the Chartered Territories and the Portuguese Territories comprising Delagoa Bay and Beira.

South Africa is indebted to the Colony of Natal for the presence of the Indian population there. In the year 1860, when in the words of a member of the Natal Parliament, "the existence of the Colony hung in the balance," the Colony of Natal introduced indentured Indians into the Colony. Such immigration is regulated by law, is permissible only to a few favored States, *e.g.*, Mauritius, Fiji, Jamaica, Straits Settlements, Damarara and other States and is allowed only from Madras and Calcutta. As a result of the immigration, in the words of another eminent Natalian, Mr. Saunders, "Indian immigration brought prosperity, prices rose, people were no longer content to grow or sell produce for a song, they could do better." The sugar and tea industries as well as sanitation and the vegetable and fish supply of the colony are absolutely dependent on the indentured Indians from Madras and Calcutta. The presence of the indentured Indians about sixteen years ago drew the free Indians in the shape of traders who first went there with a view to supply the wants of their own kith and kin; but afterwards found a very valuable customer in the native of South Africa, called Zulu or Kaffir. These traders are chiefly drawn from the Bombay Memon Mahomedans and owing to their less unfortunate position have formed themselves into custodians of the interests of the whole Indian population there. Thus, adversity and identity of interests have united in a compact body the Indians from the three Presidencies and they take pride in calling themselves Indians rather than Madrasees or Bengalees or Gujaratees, except when it is necessary to do so. That, however, by the way.

These Indians have now spread all over South Africa. Natal, which is governed by a Legislative Assembly consisting of 37 members

elected by the voters, a legislative Council consisting of 11 members nominated by the Governor who represents the Queen, and a movable Ministry consisting of 5 members, contains a European population of 50,000, a native population of 400,000, and an Indian population of 51,000. Of the 51,000 Indians about 16,000 are at present serving their indenture, 30,000 are those that have completed their indenture, and are now variously engaged as domestic servants, gardeners, hawkers and petty traders, and about 5,000 are those who emigrated to the Colony on their own account and are either traders, shop-keepers' assistants or hawkers. A few are also school-masters, interpreters and clerks.

The self-governing Colony of the Cape of Good Hope has, I believe, an Indian population of about 10,000 consisting of traders, hawkers and laborers. Its total population is nearly 1,500,000 of whom not more than 400,000 are Europeans. The rest are natives of the country and Malays.

The South African Republic or the Transvaal which is governed by two elective Chambers called the Volksraad and an Executive with the President at its head has an Indian population of about 5,000 of whom about 200 are traders with liquidated assets amounting to nearly £100,000. The rest are hawkers and waiters or household servants, the latter being men from this Presidency. Its white population is estimated at roughly 120,000 and the Kaffir population at roughly 650,000. This Republic is subject to the Queen's suzerainty. And there is a convention between Great Britain and the Republic which secures the property, trading and farming rights of all persons other than natives of South Africa in common with the citizens of the Republic.

The other States have no Indian population to speak of, because of the grievances and disabilities, except the Portuguese territories which contain a very large Indian population and which do not give any trouble to the Indians.

The grievances of the Indians in South Africa are twofold, *i.e.*, those that are due to the popular ill-feeling against the Indians and, secondly, the legal disabilities placed upon them. To deal with the first, the Indian is the most hated being in South Africa. Every Indian without distinction is contemptuously called a "coolie." He is also called "Sammy," "Ramasawmy," anything but "Indian." Indian school-masters are called "coolie school-masters." Indian

storekeepers are "coolie storekeepers." Two Indian gentlemen from Bombay, Messrs. Dada Abdulla and Moos Hajee Cassim, own steamers. Their steamers are "coolie ships."

There is a very respectable firm of Madras traders by name, A. Colandaveloo Pillay Co. They have built a large block of buildings in Durban; these buildings are called "coolie stores" and the owners are "coolie owners." And I can assure you, gentlemen, that there is as much difference between the partners of that firm and a "coolie" as there is between any one in this hall and a coolie. The railway and tram-officials, in spite of the contradiction that has appeared in official quarters which I am going to deal with presently, I repeat, treat us as beasts. We cannot safely walk on the foot-paths. A Madrassi gentleman, spotlessly dressed, always avoids the foot-paths of prominent streets in Durban for fear he should be insulted or pushed off.

We are the "Asian dirt" to be "heartily cursed," we are "chokeful of vice" "and we live upon rice," we are "stinking coolies" living on "the smell of an oiled rag," we are "the black vermin," we are described in the Statute Books as "semi-barbarous Asiatics, or persons belonging to the uncivilized races of Asia." We "breed like rabbits" and a gentleman at a meeting lately held in Durban said he "was sorry we could not be shot like them." There are coaches running between certain places in the Transvaal. We may not sit inside them. It is a sore trial, apart from the indignity it involves and contemplates, to have to sit outside them either in deadly winter mornings, for the winter is severe in the Transvaal, or under a burning sun, though we are Indians. The hotels refuse us admission. Indeed, there are cases in which respectable Indians have found it difficult even to procure refreshments at European places. It was only a short time ago that a gang of Europeans set fire to an Indian store in a village (*cries of "Shame!"*) called Dundee in Natal, doing some damage, and another gang threw burning crackers into the Indian stores in a business street in Durban. This feeling of intense hatred has been reproduced into legislation in the various States of South Africa restricting the freedom of Indians in many ways. To begin with, Natal, which is the most important from an Indian point of view, has of late shown the greatest activity in passing Indian legislation. Till 1894 the Indians had been enjoying the franchise equally with the Europeans under the general franchise law of the Colony, which entitles any adult male being a

British subject to be placed on the voters' list, who possesses immovable property worth £50 or pays an annual rent of £10. There is a separate franchise qualification for the Zulu. In 1894, the Natal Legislature passed a Bill disfranchising Asiatics by name. . . .

In the Transvaal we cannot own landed property, we may not trade or reside except in specified locations, which are described by the British Agent, "as places to deposit the refuse of the town, without any water except the polluted soakage in the gully between the location and the town." We may not as of right walk on the footpaths in Johannesburg and Pretoria, we may not be out after 9 P.M. We may not travel without passes. The law prevents us from travelling first or second class on the railways. We are required to pay a special registration fee of £3 to enable us to settle in the Transvaal, and though we are treated as mere "chattels" and have no privileges whatever, we may be called upon to render compulsory military service, if Mr. Chamberlain disregards the Memorial which we have addressed to him on the subject. The history of the whole case as it affects the Indians in the Transvaal is very interesting and I am only sorry that for want of time I cannot deal with it now. I must, however, beg you to study it from the Green Pamphlet. I must not omit to mention that it is criminal for an Indian to buy native gold.

The Orange Free State has made "the British Indian an impossibility by simply classifying him with the Kaffir," as its chief organ puts it. It has passed a special law whereby we are prevented from trading, farming or owning property under any circumstances. If we submit to these degrading conditions we may be allowed to reside after passing through certain humiliating ceremonies. We were driven out from the State and our stores were closed, causing to us a loss of £9,000. And this grievance remains absolutely without redress. The Cape Parliament has passed a Bill granting the East London Municipality in that Colony the power to frame By-Laws prohibiting Indians from walking on the footpaths and making them live in locations. It has issued instructions to the authorities of East Griqualand not to issue any trading licenses to the Indians. The Cape Government are in communication with the Home Government with a view to induce them to sanction legislation restricting the influx of the Asiatics. The people in the Chartered Territories are endeavoring to close the country against the Asiatic trader. In Zululand, a Crown Colony, we

cannot own or acquire landed property in the townships of Eshowe and Nondweni. This question is now before Mr. Chamberlain for consideration. As in the Transvaal there also it is criminal for an Indian to buy native gold.

Thus we are hemmed in on all sides by restrictions. And if nothing further were to be done here and in England on our behalf, it is merely a question of time when the respectable Indian in South Africa will be absolutely extinct.

2. Negro and White Contacts in Chicago²

RACIAL CONTACTS

The problems arising out of various occasions, both voluntary and enforced, for race association in Chicago, have, for convenience, been included in this report under the general classification of "racial contacts." Attention is given to contacts in the public schools, in public recreation places, on transportation lines, and in other relations exclusive of industry and housing which require special treatment. Negroes in Illinois are legally entitled to all the rights and privileges of other citizens. Actually, however, their participation in public benefits in practically every field is limited by some circumvention of the law.

(a) Contacts in Public Schools

The public schools furnish one of the most important points of contact between the white and Negro races because of the daily association of thousands of Negro and white children at an impressionable age. The Chicago Board of Education makes no distinction between the races and keeps no separate records. Certain schools, therefore, with white American, Negro, and white foreign-born preponderances, were selected for special study.

Physical equipment of schools.—Twenty-two schools located in and near areas of Negro residence were selected and visited. Of these only five, or 23 per cent, have been built since 1900, and four of these five schools are in regions where the Negro population is smallest. The ten schools serving the largest percentage of Negroes were

² From *The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot*, by the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, 613-623; 629-639. (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

built, one in 1856, one in 1867, seven between 1880 and 1889, and only one after 1890. Of the 235 schools attended almost wholly by whites, 133, or 56 per cent, were built after 1899. The old buildings will not accommodate modern equipment and cannot be enlarged. The absence of modern buildings is in part due to the old residence areas in which Negroes must live. The gymnasiums in fifteen of these twenty-two schools of predominant Negro attendance are poorly equipped, and in the other seven schools there are none. Playground space is about the same in all the schools, and there was no exceptional overcrowding in schools attended largely by Negroes except in one case where by the "shift" system a double attendance was made possible. In the schools of mixed attendance one instance was conspicuous: Fuller School—a branch of Felsenthal which is well equipped, and under the same principal, who is an advocate of segregation—is in a neighborhood where the percentage of Negroes is the same as that around Felsenthal, but it has no playground, is run down, and neglected. Yet it has 90 per cent Negroes, while Felsenthal has 38 per cent. Unmanageable white children are sent to Fuller.

Retardation.—The question of retardation of Negro children is of serious concern in race relations, since this fact is urged by advocates of separate schools as an unnecessary handicap for white children and a reason for segregation. Twenty-four schools were selected, with the aid of the Board of Education: six attended mainly by Negroes, six mainly by white Americans, and twelve mainly by children of immigrants. Of a total of 34,593 children there were 18,230, or 53 per cent, retarded—the same percentage as in the entire city; 10,250, or 30 per cent, normal; and 5,910, or 17 per cent, accelerated. In the schools attended mainly by white Americans, 49 per cent were retarded; in those attended mainly by children of immigrants 49 per cent; and in those attended mainly by Negroes 74 per cent. The percentage of retardation in schools attended mainly by negroes ranges from 57 to 80 per cent; in schools attended mainly by children of immigrants from 32 to 71 per cent; and in schools attended mainly by white Americans from 40 to 62 per cent.

Predominating causes of this retardation of Negro children, according to the Board of Education's classification, are: "late entrance to school," "family difficulties," "fathers or mothers working," "lack of education in parents." The majority of retarded Negro children are southerners, and their retardation can be readily under-

stood when the gross inadequacies of southern schools for Negroes are considered.

Among the whites, late entrance, inability to speak English, ill health, backwardness, and low mentality are the various causes. It is interesting to note that while it is often maintained that Negroes are mentally weak and incapable, classification of retardation figures according to causes does not bear out that theory. Negro children retarded from "late entrance" have made excellent records in attaining a normal rating, some completing three grades in a year.

One hundred and sixteen Negro children were picked at random for an intensive inquiry by the Commission into causes of retardation. Of these 101 had been in school before coming to Chicago; and of the 101 children, eighty had lived in the South and had gone to southern schools; those born and educated in the North showed no greater rate of retardation than the whites. For much of the retardation the school facilities for Negroes in the South appear to be responsible. In Mississippi, for example, only eighty days' schooling is required in counties that do not absolutely reject the compulsory-education law. Other causes found were inadequate care and instruction at home due to the ignorance of parents, mothers working out, poor parental discipline, and the physical condition of homes.

Contact problems.—A wide variety of opinions was found among principals and teachers concerning the relations of white and Negro children. Several principals were distinctly antagonistic to Negroes, and in their schools the race relations of the pupils were not cordial. The most important factor in determining the attitude of teachers as well as of pupils was the attitude of principals. Kindergarten teachers found a natural, pleasant relationship existing between the young white and Negro children. As children grew older they became more race conscious, and in the high schools friction frequently arose from race groupings in class and social organizations. Negro teachers are assigned to schools attended by both Negroes and immigrants, and apparently have no difficulties with pupils or parents. Difficulties and bad feeling have been provoked by the disposition of certain white teachers to adapt their instruction in accordance with their assumptions concerning Negroes' mental and emotional characteristics, putting stress on singing and handicraft instead of on basic studies in arithmetic and grammar.

(b) Recreation

In its investigation of recreation places, the Commission listed 127 parks, playgrounds, recreation centers, and beaches under the supervision of the Municipal Bureau of Parks, Playgrounds, and Bathing Beaches, and of the South Park, West Park, and Lincoln Park commissions. Of these, thirty-seven are in or near Negro areas. Though this figure represents a fairly adequate distribution, it is not an accurate picture. Twenty-three of these places are playgrounds attached to schools, fourteen being in, and nine near, Negro areas; and only thirteen have more than 10 per cent use by Negroes. Three bathing-beaches are within, and two near, Negro areas, while only one has more than 10 per cent use by Negroes. There are seven recreation centers near Negro areas, none within, and only one with more than 10 per cent use by Negroes. Armour Square, for example, is a recreation center bordering on the area of the largest Negro population; but the hostility of whites, especially gangs of hoodlums, attacks on Negro children, and the indifferent attitude of the director render attendance by Negroes extremely hazardous. Of a daily attendance of 1,500, less than 1 per cent are Negroes, despite the fact that over 50 per cent of the immediately surrounding population is Negro. Natural barriers of distance, unofficial discrimination of officials, and the hostility of neighborhood groups are largely responsible for the lack of participation.

The beaches have presented the most difficult problems of race control. The riot of 1919 began at the Twenty-ninth Street Beach, and since the riot numerous smaller clashes have occurred there. At Thirty-eighth Street, also on the edge of the largest area of Negro residence, Negroes are entirely excluded, the policeman on duty and the attendant in charge assisting in this exclusion to prevent clashes. In neighborhoods with a small Negro population, attendance at the recreation places is always much below the percentage of Negroes to the total population in such neighborhoods, this being due to the hostility shown by whites, especially of the hoodlum element, and also to the reluctance of Negroes to go where they feel unwelcome.

Contacts.—Most difficulties in parks and playgrounds have not been caused by the behavior of Negroes there. Such complaints against Negroes as have come from these contacts have concerned groups of rough or domineering children at the play-grounds rather

than adults. Two playgrounds on the South Side make such complaints.

Race relations of the children.—Lack of racial antagonism was reported at a large number of playgrounds. Apparatus was used by both groups without friction. Negro and white children mingled freely in their games and in the swimming-pools, and both Negroes and whites played on baseball and athletic teams. The occasional playground fights usually lack any element of racial antipathy. "There might be personal misunderstandings and disagreements between a white and black just the same as between two whites," said the director of Union Park, "but I wouldn't lay it to race prejudice. They work together and play together and seem to harmonize in most instances." When this director came to Union Park a year ago he found a tendency among Negroes and whites to separate into race groups, but steps were taken to bring them together in games of various kinds, and toward the end of the season the director felt that they "harmonized better and worked together more cordially than they did before." When the Commission's investigator visited Union Park Playground he saw small children of both races playing together on the same pieces of apparatus—a Negro child on one end of a teeter ladder and a white child on the other. Occasionally there is a disturbance, usually starting from a dispute over the apparatus; but on the whole the children play together peacefully.

Voluntary racial grouping.—Voluntary racial grouping appears to be more characteristic of the large parks and beaches which adults frequent than of the playgrounds, which are used mainly by children. One instance of voluntary grouping among children was found at Copernicus Playground. The playing space is in the shape of an "L," one end intended for boys and the other for girls, but by common consent the children divide along race lines rather than sex.

In the general use of Lincoln and Washington parks the Negroes and whites stay in separate groups. There has never been any difficulty, according to the Lincoln Park representative, arising from the fact that Negroes have taken possession of a spot desired by whites for a picnic or other amusement. No part of either park is especially set aside for the use of one race, and groups of both Negroes and whites are seen everywhere in the parks, but they do not mingle.

Some directors attempt to regulate these contacts to avoid any mingling of groups. At the Municipal Pier, for example, an investi-

gator learned that when Negro couples went on the dancing-pavilion floor the floor manager informed them that they were not dancing properly and took them to one side to acquaint them with the approved style of dancing; no matter how well they danced, they were to be prevented from going on the floor by the manager's judgment of their dancing. More recently, however, Negroes have reported that they have been able freely to use this dance floor.

Clashes in the various recreation places as early as 1913 were found to have been started mostly by gangs of white "roughs." On one occasion, for example, the secretary of boys' work of the Wabash Avenue department Y.M.C.A. (for Negroes) conducted a party of nineteen Negro boys to Armour Square. They had no difficulty in entering the park, but on leaving they were assailed by crowds of white boys. Some of them were tripped, trodden upon, and badly bruised. They took refuge in a neighboring saloon, where they remained for a half-hour, when a detachment of police scattered the white gang. On another occasion a group of boys from the same institution were driven from the lake at Thirty-first Street. In 1915 Father Bishop, of St. Thomas Episcopal Church, took a group of Negro boys to Armour Square to play basket-ball. The entire party, including Father Bishop, were beaten by white boys and their sweaters taken from them. In the same year an attempt was made by a Negro boys' club director to take seventy-five Negro boys through the Stock Yards. They had received tickets of admission to the stock show. In spite of the presence and efforts of four adult leaders, these boys were struck by sticks and other missiles while passing from one section of the show to another. Police assistance was required to get them from the pavilion to the street cars.

Gangs of white boys, sixteen and seventeen years of age, from the neighborhood of Fifty-ninth Street and Wentworth Avenue, frequently interfered with Negro participants in baseball games in Washington Park, especially during the spring and summer of 1918 and 1919. They also annoyed Negro couples on the park benches. Where the Negro showed fight, minor clashes resulted. Park officials have not been able to restrain the ill feeling which these conflicts engender.

Clashes were noted in Ogden Park as early as 1914 and frequently since that time. A Negro playground director testified that he and other Negroes had been slugged while attending band concerts or attempting to use shower baths after a game in the park. At the

boathouse in Washington Park, in the early summer of 1920, there were numerous clashes between Negroes and whites. In the following year, however, considerably fewer instances of friction were reported. Playground directors are of the opinion that friction is likely to occur where groups of Negro children for the first time come into parks theretofore exclusively used by whites. Adjustment is likely to follow after this period. In some cases, however, when the proportion of Negroes has grown larger than that of whites, a Negro director has been placed in charge of the park with the unofficial understanding that it should be turned over to Negroes.

The two causes of neighborhood antagonism back of the friction in the parks most commonly cited are the housing and sex problems. The playgrounds and parks usually share in a general way the sentiments of the mixed neighborhoods in or near which they are located.

One source of racial disorders is lack of coöperation between park and city policemen. The park police stop a fight between white and colored children and then send them out of the park. When the fight is renewed outside the park they have no power to interfere. Spectators may then get into the fight, and serious clashes may be well under way before the city police can be summoned.

The most important remedies suggested to the Commission for the betterment of relations between Negroes and whites at the various places of recreation were: (1) additional facilities in Negro areas, particularly recreation centers which can be used by adults; (2) an awakened public opinion which will refuse to tolerate the hoodlum and will insist that the courts properly punish such offenders; (3) selection of directors for parks in neighborhoods where there is a critical situation who have a sympathetic understanding of the problem and will not tolerate actions by park police officers and other subordinate officials which tend to discourage Negro attendance; and (4) efforts by such directors to repress and remove any racial antagonism that may arise in the neighborhood about the park.

(c) Contacts in Transportation

The study of contacts between whites and Negroes in street cars and other public conveyances was prompted by a usually unexplained emphasis on apparently trivial incidents connected with public conveyances, together with the observation that the greatest disturbances

during the riot of 1919 commonly occurred along transportation lines and at transfer points.

Although many clashes and other instances of racial friction on the street cars were not serious enough to be reported to the newspapers or to be made the subject of complaint, information obtained by investigators for the Commission showed that the attitude of both Negroes and whites toward each other was being affected by contacts on the cars.

As affecting attitudes on race relations, transportation contacts, while impersonal and temporary, are significant for several reasons. Many whites have no contact with Negroes except on the cars, and their personal impression of the entire Negro group may be determined by one or two observations of Negro passengers. Unlike contacts in the school, playground, and workshop, transportation contacts are not supervised, and if there is any dispute among passengers the settlement usually rests with themselves. Suspicion or prejudice on either side because of the difference in race accentuates any misunderstanding. And transportation contacts, at least on crowded cars, involve physical contact between Negroes and whites, which rarely occurs under other circumstances and sometimes leads to a display of racial feeling.

The Commission's investigators, white and Negro, men and women, made many trips for observation on the twelve lines carrying the heaviest volume of Negro traffic and therefore involving the greatest amount of contact. Counts of passengers, Negro and white, were made, behavior and habits were noted, and passengers and car crews were drawn into conversation. Officials of surface and elevated lines, starters, and station men were interviewed. Instances of friction which came to the attention of the Commission were noted and the circumstances studied.

Traffic counts made by the Chicago Traction and Subway Commission in 1916 showed 3,500,000 surface-railway and 500,000 elevated-railway passengers carried in a twenty-four-hour day. Negroes constitute 4 per cent of the city's population and probably about that percentage of the city's street-car traffic. Negro traffic, however, instead of being scattered over the city, is mainly concentrated upon twelve lines which traverse the Negro residential areas and connect those areas with the manufacturing districts where Negroes are employed. Because of this concentration the proportion of Negroes to

whites on these twelve lines is much higher than 4 per cent, and on such lines as that on State Street, the principal business street of the South Side Negro residence area, it often happens that the majority of the passengers are Negroes.

There is no "Jim Crow" separation of races on street cars in Chicago. Contacts of Negroes and whites on the street cars did not provoke any considerable discussion before the period of migration of Negroes from the South, when occasional stories of clashes began to be circulated; and even then, such friction as developed did not come prominently to public attention. Only one incident involving a clash was reported in the newspapers. Even since the migration began, there have been very few complaints based upon racial friction. The Elevated Railroad Company, whose South Side line has the largest Negro traffic of any elevated line, replied to inquiries that, except during the riot of 1919, when a few cases of racial disorder were reported, there had been no complaints from motormen or trainmen since 1918, when a trainman was cut by a Negro. No complaints from white passengers had been received since the spring of 1917, when white office workers objected to riding with Stock Yards laborers, mainly Negroes, on the Stock Yards spur of the elevated. White laborers in the Stock Yards mostly live within walking distance of their work, but Negroes found it necessary to use car lines running east to the main area of Negro residence. The Chicago Surface lines replied that complaints due to racial friction were negligible.

Many of the migrants are laborers who must use these lines going to and from work, and many of them are rough-mannered and entirely unfamiliar with standards of conduct in northern cities. Another serious factor is the recent entrance of Negroes into industry. Before the war the great majority of Negroes gainfully employed were engaged in some form of personal service which did not require use of transportation lines in their working clothes to and from the manufacturing centers. The migrants, many of them coming to a city like Chicago with no "Jim Crow" segregation, felt strange and uncertain as to how they should act. In fact, peculiarities of conduct on the part of these were noted by Negroes of longer residence in Chicago, and it has been remarked by whites and Negroes that they could tell a Negro migrant by his uneasy manner and often by his clothing. Conspicuous points of behavior of migrant Negroes before they became urbanized, which many whites noted and commented on were:

"loud laughter and talking," "old and ill-smelling clothes," "roughness and his tendency to sit all over the car." These are easy to understand when one considers the background of the southern Negro. There are, on the other hand, exceptional cases where Negroes have walked miles rather than take a car, thus avoiding possible embarrassment. A Negro who has been in Chicago for a long time is not self-conscious about sitting near white persons. Negroes who get into trouble with whites about insisting on their right to a seat often belong to the class of suspicious and sensitive Negroes who fear that an attempt is being made to segregate them, and sometimes they are simply "greenhorns."

Soiled and ill-smelling clothing was found to be an objection applying to white as well as Negro laborers. These complaints came, for the most part, from clerical workers who objected to physical contact with persons who might "rub off." A difficulty involving this feature was adjusted by one packing company by dismissing its clerical workers and its laborers at different hours. A frequent source of misunderstanding has been a situation in which it appeared that Negroes had taken seats intended for white women. In several such cases thoroughly examined by the Commission's investigators the difficulties were found to have resulted from misunderstood actions.

Most of the difficulties in transportation contacts reported and generally complained of seem to have centered around the first blundering efforts of migrants to adjust themselves to northern city life. The efforts of agencies interested in assisting this adjustment, together with the Negro press and the intimate criticisms and suggestions for proper conduct of Chicago Negroes, have smoothed down many of the roughnesses of the migrants, and as a result friction from contacts in transportation seems to have lessened materially.

(d) Crime and Vicious Environment

Many students of the race problem look upon public crime records as a register of the failure of Negroes to adjust themselves to the social fabric. Study of infractions of law by Negroes, of provocation to lawlessness, and of the history of their crimes would indeed reveal an interesting background of their present behavior in relation to whites, if such a study were possible from present records. The Commission carried its investigations into this field and found no

means of determining how great a proportion of the city's crimes is committed by Negroes.

The prevailing impression that Negroes are by nature more criminal than whites and more prone to commit sex crimes has restricted their employment, increased unfair measures of restraint, and blackened the name of the entire Negro group. Two important facts were apparent from the Commission's study: (1) the danger inherent in the vicious environment in which Negroes are forced to live, and (2) the misrepresentative character of the statistics of Negro crime.

Environment.—The limitations imposed on Negro residential areas have provided undue cause and occasion for crime. The entire population, good and bad, is thrown together, exposing children to the sight and temptation of vice and immorality. Ninety per cent of the Negro population has always lived near the city's former segregated vice districts, partly because white sentiment excluded them from other neighborhoods, partly because rents in the neighborhood of vice were low enough to meet their meager economic resources, and partly because their weakness made their protests against the proximity of vice less effective than the protests of whites. When the vice districts were broken up and the inmates scattered, they entered the better neighborhoods of Negro residence and clandestinely plied their trade. In fact, according to the report of the Chicago Vice Commission in 1911, at one time prostitutes were promised immunity by the police if they confined themselves to a certain area in which Negroes predominated. The spread of the Negro population has always been accompanied by the spread of clandestine prostitution. The Vice Commission's report said:

"The history of the social evil in Chicago is intimately connected with the colored population. Invariably the large vice districts have been created within or near the settlements of colored people. In the past history of the city every time a new vice district was created downtown or on the South Side, the colored families were in the district, moving in just ahead of the prostitutes. The situation along State Street from Sixteenth Street south is an illustration.

"So whenever prostitutes, cadets, and thugs were located among white people and had to be moved for commercial or other reasons, they were driven to undesirable parts of the city, the so-called colored residential sections."

Most of the vicious resorts in the "Black Belt" are owned and

operated by whites and are not interfered with by the authorities. Protests from Negroes have never succeeded in removing them. Opportunities for wholesome recreation in the Negro districts are limited, and commercial amusements, though probably no worse than in some other sections of the city, are of a distinctly inferior type and carelessly supervised. In such an infective environment it is not unnatural that many criminals should be developed.

But the study of crime statistics, aside from showing the unreliability of records due to careless methods of obtaining and presenting data, revealed that Negroes suffer gross injustice in the handling of criminal affairs. The general inaccuracy of criminal statistics is shown by the fact, for example, that the police reported 1,731 burglaries, or persons arrested for burglary, in 1919, while the Chicago Crime Commission reported 5,509 burglaries during the first eleven months of that year. The evidence at hand indicates that Negroes are debited with practically all their crimes, while others are not. It further appears, from the records and from the testimony of judges in the juvenile, municipal, circuit, superior, and criminal courts, of police officials, the state's attorney, and various experts in crime, probation, and parole, that Negroes are more commonly arrested, subjected to police identification, and convicted than white offenders; that on similar evidence they are generally held and convicted on more serious charges, and that they are given longer sentences. This bias, when reflected in the figures, serves to bolster by false figures the already existing belief that Negroes are more likely to be criminal than other racial groups. . . .

PUBLIC OPINION IN RACE RELATIONS

A. Opinions of Whites and Negroes

The "Negro problem" is deeper and wider than the difficulties which center about the more specialized problems of Negro housing, Negro crime, and industrial relations involving Negroes. All such special studies conducted by the Commission left a baffling residuum of causes of racial discord, deep rooted in the psychology of the white and Negro groups in contact. The beliefs and attitudes, firmly fixed and accepted prejudices of the one race as to the other, grouped under the term "public opinion," thus became the subject of a novel but most interesting inquiry.

Public opinion with respect to the Negro forms a body of sentiment so definite and compact as to make it an excellent laboratory case for analysis and study; but the Commission's aim in investigating it was merely to make apparent and objective its place and importance in race relations; to indicate some of the ways in which it has developed; how it expresses itself; how it affects both the white and Negro groups; how, in its present state, it is strengthened, weakened, polluted, or purified by deliberate agencies or even by its own action; and finally how it may be used to reduce, if not prevent, racial unfriendliness and misunderstanding.

Public opinion is regarded here as a phase of the social mind, but nevertheless as a definite reality. For purposes of examination, therefore, its study gives attention to that body of sentiments, beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices which, taken together, give to public opinion its content and meaning.

To present this subject intelligently, the following plan has been employed:

(1) Beliefs and sophistications regarding Negroes, which exercise so great an influence in determining the conduct of white persons in relation to them, are described as they apply in the local environment, and in origin and background are traced suggestively to their responsible sources in literature and circumstance.

(2) Types of sentiment, in Chicago and similar northern communities, as variants of these basic beliefs are presented with a view to making them intelligible and classified according to resolvable factors of misunderstanding.

(3) Since personal attitudes and beliefs are molded by traditions and heritages apart from the exclusive influence of literature, more significant material collected through intimate inquiry is presented objectively to describe the processes by which they appear to be created and grow. Replies to a searching questionnaire on attitudes and opinions are, in the instances quoted, the result of painstaking self-analysis.

(4) The opinions and sentiments of Negroes on these same issues are described and illustrated with a view to making them understandable, and their interpretations of current white sentiment are explained as far as possible.

(5) The report then turns to the agencies by which these opinions are made and perpetuated and the individual attitudes created. The

chief of these are: (a) the press, (b) rumors, (c) myths, (d) propaganda. The conscious and unconscious abuse of these instruments of "opinion making" is pointed out and explained.

(6) Finally, the study is intended to suggest means by which public opinion, where it is faulty, may correct itself and employ its own instruments in the creation of wholesome sentiments among Negroes with respect to whites, and among whites with respect to Negroes.

(a) Beliefs of Whites Concerning Negroes

The conduct of individuals is largely determined by their attitudes toward a subject and their general beliefs concerning it. Definite beliefs concerning Negroes may be found in the North as well as in the South, varying with the individuals who hold them, according to degrees of contact with the Negro group and the individuals' traditional background. These may be divided according to their character and effect into two general classes: (a) primary beliefs or those fundamental and firmly established convictions which have, all around, the deepest effect on the conduct of whites toward Negroes and are pretentiously supported by statistics, authorities, and scientific research; (b) secondary beliefs, or modifications and variants of important assumptions as to cardinal attributes.

(a) *Primary beliefs*.—Among these primary beliefs are the following:

1. *Mentality*: That the mind of the Negro is distinctly and distinctively inferior to that of the white race. Some believe that this is due to backwardness in ascending the scale of civilization; some that the Negro belongs to a different species of the human family.

2. *Morality*: That Negroes are not yet capable of exercising social restraints common to white persons; that they are unmoral as well as immoral.

3. *Criminality*: That Negroes possess a constitutional character weakness, and a consequent predisposition to sexual crimes, petty stealing, and crimes of violence.

4. *Physical unattractiveness*: That physical laws prompt whites to avoid contact with Negroes.

5. *Emotionality*: That Negroes are highly emotional and for that reason are given to quick, uncalculated crimes of violence as easily as to noisy and emotional religious expressions.

(b) *Secondary beliefs.*—As continued repetition of any plausible statement without correction of its error eventually gives it credence, these secondary beliefs have rooted themselves deep in the public mind. Among other things it is believed that Negroes are: (1) lazy, (2) "happy-go-lucky," (3) boisterous, (4) bumptious, (5) over-assertive, (6) lacking in civic consciousness, (7) addicted to carrying razors, (8) fond of shooting craps, (9) flashy in dress and like gaudy, brilliant colors, especially red.

(b) Background of Prevailing Beliefs Concerning Negroes

Soon after the first emergence of Negroes from slavery their illiteracy and general behavior in response to the novel experience of freedom created situations which appeared to justify judgments concerning their group traits. Scholars rationalized and tried to explain these apparent traits: If they were illiterate as a group they must be incapable of learning, and if they committed crimes, they must be fundamentally lacking in social restraints.

Dr. Jeffries Wyman, of Harvard, Professor A. H. Keane, author of *Man, Past and Present*, Dr. J. C. Nott, author of *Types of Mankind*, and almost all the other anthropologists of that period, gave the stamp of scientific authority to the view that Negroes were of a different species and could never reach the level of the Caucasian. Even more recently mental tests were carried out on the same assumption and were made to prove it in some instances where the facts were unexpectedly contrary. Students of the race problem in the South continued to generalize about Negro character from selected specimens, other more popular writers and speakers, with their anecdotes, stories, and jokes, all of which went uncorrected, tended to strengthen this body of beliefs to a point where any difference of views was intolerable. Although the status of the Negro has changed, the beliefs remain the same, and have led to bitterness and resentment among Negroes, with consequent misunderstandings and friction.

In Chicago sentiments collected from a wide variety of sources and involving the views of several thousands of white persons indicate the persistence of these archaic beliefs and fears, so deep set and of such long standing that they are assumed by many persons to be instinctive.

To secure definite information upon the traditional background of beliefs concerning Negroes, fifteen white persons with no special inter-

est in Negroes were selected at random from professions, business, and other vocations and submitted to a careful and searching inquiry. They were asked eighteen carefully prepared questions to draw out the raw material of their unqualified reactions on the question of the Negro, and as far as possible, the background in their early experience. They were asked for their opinions concerning Negroes, whether or not they believed that they possessed distinguishing traits of mentality and character; their attitudes were solicited by questions and propositions designed to provoke an expression of attitude. Questions were put regarding instances and experiences involving Negroes in their early experience; their first consciousness of racial differences; their first contacts; and information was sought on the definite sources of their knowledge or opinions concerning Negroes.

All the persons questioned had clear-cut opinions and thought that Negroes possessed distinguishing traits ranging from "affectionate loyalty" to "mental and moral handicaps imposed by evolution." An abolitionist's son, for example, thought that "Negroes should desire segregation"; a man who had observed Negroes at Tuskegee and Lewis institutes would increase their education and meet the demands produced by education. One whose only contact had been with his "black mammy" thought that the Negroes were "affectionate and loyal, but lacking in racial pride, though evolutionarily handicapped, possessing the qualities of children." Another who had had an unfortunate experience with his Negro chauffeur thought that Negroes were characterized by "distinctly inferior mentality, deficient moral sense, shiftlessness, good-natured, and a happy disposition." They knew little about the activities of Negroes, their leaders, their papers, or their problems, and the sources on which they relied for information, except in two instances, were undependable.

(c) Negro Opinion

Negroes, although exposed to various forms of social contact, have been intellectually isolated from the white group. They have not participated fully and freely in community and cultural activities. The pressure of the white group in practically every ordinary experience has kept their attention and interest centered upon themselves, and they have become race conscious. Their thinking, therefore, on general questions, whether they involve race relations or

not, is conditioned and largely controlled by the relation of these questions with group interests. The opinions of Negroes, therefore, on race relations are largely negative. White persons know very little about what Negroes are thinking, because they are not familiar with their experiences; they frequently do not accredit them with the sensibilities that they do possess; and are not acquainted with the processes of thought by which the opinions of Negroes are formed. Thus it is that many of the statements and expressions of feeling of Negroes are unintelligible to persons outside of their group. Similarly, many statements and expressions of feeling by white persons are unintelligible to Negroes. But in the understanding of white persons Negroes have the advantage, because they do read their papers, see them in the privacy of their homes, and are forced constantly to interpret their actions.

Among Negroes there may be found a group control as strong and binding as among white persons. One striking instance of the operation of this group control was the complete ostracism of a prominent Negro lawyer who was reported to have made a public statement contrary to the views and aspirations held by his group. When this Negro was reported in the press to have said, "This is a white man's country, and Negroes had better behave or they will get what rights they have taken away," he was first snubbed, then his life was threatened, and for several weeks he was forced to go about under police protection. He was seriously criticized and finally ostracized. In less than a year he died. His friends declare that he was slanderously misquoted.

The sentiments of Negroes fall into somewhat the same classification as those of whites, but with one or two notable exceptions: there is (1) more discussion of race problems, more criticism of the conduct of leaders, more discussion of the practicability of programs of action; and (2) a great deal of literature and other expressions concerning the development of a defensive philosophy. In this latter are included various defensive policies, the stimulation of race pride, the explanation of behavior, and the struggle for status. There might also be included frequent evidences of the development of race consciousness. The emotional background, class consciousness, and the influences of group control are as evident in the sentiments of Negroes as of white persons.

A wide selection of views was obtained from Negroes and pre-

sented under the classifications in which they appeared naturally to fall. To get a more precise statement of views, a questionnaire was sent to Negroes representing a class intellectually able to subject themselves to self-analysis and to discuss various confusing angles of the race question. They were asked concerning interracial problems; whether or not race relations appear to be growing better or worse; whether the acquisition of wealth, of 100 per cent literacy, or unrestricted suffrage could affect race relations; they were asked questions concerning their adjustment to the present social system, their most pronounced mental complexes experienced in adjusting personal desires to the present social system; whether they were prejudiced against white persons; whether or not they were conscious of a feeling of race inferiority, or of a desire to compensate for a supposed inferiority. Concerning Negro problems they were asked whether or not there should be recognized leaders of Negroes; their criticisms of the policies of Negro leaders. Their racial philosophy was solicited. They were asked the distinction that they made between segregation and racial solidarity, and information was sought on the agencies responsible for their opinions. A most interesting array of views was secured, ranging from suspicion and abuse of the questions themselves to dispassionate analysis.

The war has produced a new type of sentiment. It not only brought disappointment and disillusionment for Negroes led into a new hope by the promises that accompanied the manifest efforts to stimulate patriotism, but actually gave to Negroes new experiences. Following the return of Negro soldiers from France, measures of restraint were increased, and from the usual lawlessness of the period of reconstruction they probably suffered more severely than others because they are to a much larger extent dependent upon law enforcement for security and comfort. Race riots, which are an expression of both loose machinery of community control and the development of a more determined resistance on the part of Negroes, grew more frequent in number and more serious in consequences. A new note was sounded in radical Negro literature, which appeared to carry a very popular appeal.

*B. Factors in the Making of Public Opinion.**(a) The White Press of Chicago*

Aside from the agencies ordinarily responsible for providing the individual with his views, there are others equally as powerful in developing and influencing opinions. Most important of these is the press. For that portion of the public which depends upon the press for its contact with the Negro group and its information concerning it, this agency holds a controlling hand. Throughout the country it is pointed out, by both whites and Negroes, that the policies of many newspapers on racial matters have made relations more difficult, at times fostering new antagonisms and even precipitating riots by inflaming the white public against Negroes. A study was made of the principal white daily newspapers of Chicago, covering a two-year period. Included in this study were 1,347 news items, 108 letters to the press, and ninety-six editorials on the Negro.

As an example of the type of publicity given to racial news concerning Negroes and the types of articles considered to have good news value, of the 1,338 articles published, 606, or nearly 50 per cent, dealt with riots, crime, and vice. Each of these articles specifically identified the persons involved as Negroes.

Constant identification of Negroes with certain definite crimes could have no other effect than to stamp the entire Negro group in the public mind as generally criminal. This in turn contributes to the already existing belief that Negroes as a group are more likely to be criminal than others, and thus they are arrested more readily than others. Publication of their names with race identification and with the crimes alleged against them keeps up a vicious circle. The unfortunate emphasis on sex offenses involving race, the subtle fanning of latent animosities by innuendo and suggestion, attaching the crime not only to the individual but to the race, direct a current of fear, intolerance, and ill will against the whole Negro group. An apt illustration, frequently cited by Negroes, is that if each time a crime was committed by a red-headed man, he was so described in telling of his crime, a popular fear and prejudice would soon develop against all red-headed men.

Crimes involving Negroes alone receive little attention. As with the Italians, as long as crimes are committed within the group, and

this group is regarded as an isolated appendix of the community, they hold very little news value. When, however, a member of the isolated group comes into conflict with the community group, whether in industry, housing, or any relation, its representative significance is thus established, and the information becomes news. Publicity of housing, for example, stresses the conflict with other neighborhoods, the "invasion" of white districts, and plans for segregation. News items on politics involving Negroes get more space and prominence when they describe graft and corruption. In the list of articles studied are included sixty-three articles particularly ridiculing the Negro group.

Incidents occurring during the activities of the Commission were checked up with reports of them appearing in the papers, and serious misrepresentations of the Negro group were revealed. One example was an article in the *Herald-Examiner* on January 4, 1920, with two-inch headlines across the entire first page: "Reds Plot Negro Revolt," "I. W. W. Bomb Plant Found on South Side." The article mentioned the alleged secret activities of Negroes and their plans to revolt against the government. The bomb plant and many of their secret plans were reported to have been discovered by the state's attorney. The article further said: "In Chicago it was learned that the headquarters for Negro revolutionary propaganda are centered in these four organizations: the Free Thought Society, Universal Negro Improvement Association, Negro Protective League, and the Soldiers and Sailors Club." The article and the reported "discoveries" of the State's attorney's office are evidence of the absurd ignorance frequently manifested by members of the white group concerning the activities of Negroes. Each of the organizations named was known to the Commission and visited by its representatives on numbers of occasions. All of their meetings are open to the public, though attended almost entirely by Negroes. The Universal Negro Improvement Association publishes all of its plans in its newspaper, the *Negro World*. Its slogan is "Back to Africa" and not "Down with the United States." The Free Thought Society mentioned is an organization designed to provide a medium of expression for persons who seek the "attainment of truth." Its discussions concern religion and philosophy, and it numbers among its members prominent Negro and white professional men. The Negro Protective League is an employment office and day nursery. The full name of the organization is

the "Negro Equal Rights and Protective Association." The Soldiers and Sailors Club is a community house located on the South Side and a branch of the local War Camp Community Service. Eugene T. Lies, formerly of the United Charities, was its director. The occasion of the publicity in question was a convention of a national Negro Greek-letter fraternity, which held its meetings in the auditorium of the Soldiers and Sailors Club. This fraternity, like all others of its kind, excluded non-members and by so doing aroused the suspicion of the newspaper's informants. No correction appeared in the paper, and to date no further "discoveries" have been made.

Articles of this type illustrate the possible effect on the public mind of such misrepresentations of the Negro. One newspaper has abandoned its policy of identifying Negroes with reports of incidents, in recognition of the gross unfairness of the practice.

(b) The Negro Press

The development of the Negro press was stimulated by several necessities important among which were:

(a) The indifference of the white press to the Negro group; its emphasis on the unfortunately spectacular, and the consequent loss of items of interest about Negroes throughout the country.

(b) The importance of developing the morale of the Negro group, creating a solidarity of interest and purpose for measures of defense, correcting the impressions created by general opinion, and centering the attention of Negroes upon themselves and their advancement.

Three of the most important local Negro weekly papers were studied. Their news items showed bias in reporting just the reverse of that which characterizes the reports of many white papers. They emphasize the Negro's view and may be said to provide a compensatory interpretation of the news. When, for example, the *Chicago Tribune* reports the approval of the Illinois Constitutional Convention of a civil-rights bill with the headline: "Miscegenation is O.K'd in New Constitution; Negroes Given All the Rights of Whites," the *Chicago Whip*, a Negro newspaper, headlines the same incident: "Morris Gets Civil Rights into Constitution; Victory for Race Won at Springfield."

The most important function exercised by the Negro press is its control of the Negro group and of their education in conduct. All of these papers give considerable space to such popular education.

(c) Rumor

Rumor, if unchecked, can do incalculable damage to race relations. Included under the term "rumor" are those unfounded tales, incorrectly deduced conclusions, partial statements of fact with significant content added by the narrator, all of which are given wide circulation and easy credence by the public. Other forms of rumor are tales of unheard-of brutality and of plots and plans which are either fabrications or partial statements of fact and serve only to stimulate resentment, fear, and a desire for retaliation. Of the rumors predicting riots, one example will illustrate: During the riot a white man was caught in the act of crawling beneath a house in which Negroes lived. In his pocket was found a bottle of kerosene. He confessed that his mission was arson and justified his act by repeating to the police the current rumor that it was known that Negroes had set fire to the houses of whites "back of the Yards."

A persistent tale circulated during and for a long time after the riot was to the effect that the bodies of hundreds of Negroes were taken from Bubbly Creek where they had been thrown after being killed by white rioters. The story was so frequently repeated that it was accepted and even repeated in Congress. It caused an intense feeling among Negroes. Investigation by the coroner, Police Department, and other agencies showed that no bodies had ever been thrown into Bubbly Creek or recovered from it.

A rumor given official sanction and carried into the files of the Department of Justice illustrates other possible dangers of this kind. This rumor concerned two prominent and highly accredited organizations for Negroes. Rumors connected them with "I. W. W. plots and plans to overthrow the government." These reports were founded upon scarcely anything more than suspicion due to lack of information and acquaintance with the Negro group. The National Urban League, for example, an organization of responsible Negroes and whites with branches in thirty-one cities, was reported to have asked William D. Haywood, head of the I. W. W., to speak at its convention in Detroit. This report grew out of the misreading of the name William Hayward, a United States district attorney in New York, who is a member of the executive board and whose name appears on the stationery of the organization. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, also a reputable organiza-

tion of whites and Negroes, was reported to be "planning to flood the colored districts with I. W. W. literature." This was entirely false, but the reports went to the Department of Justice headquarters secretly and could not be corrected by the persons most affected.

(d) Myths

Group myths, like those about the American Indian, the Oriental, and the Jew, are very common. Usually they are the expression either of a wish or of fear, which sociologists call a negative wish. Mythical stories and anecdotes about Negroes, accepted by whites, are usually popular. Many of them may have had a reasonable origin, but as a matter of fact have long outgrown it. So long as they are uncorrected they hold and exercise a marked degree of control over personal conduct.

In the category of myths fall the popular beliefs of whites concerning the mentality of Negroes, and the more definite myth that the mind of the Negro child ceases to develop when he reaches the age of puberty. The sex myth is always in evidence. It involves the fear obsession of Negro men held by many white women, fear of miscegenation, the condonation of lynchings, repressive social restrictions, as well as attempts at legislative restraints. Negroes are by these myths shown to have a predilection for sex crimes. This sex myth has been stressed in almost every riot. It precipitated the Washington riot; it provoked the most brutal murder of the Chicago riot, and it was responsible for the brutality of the Omaha and Tulsa riots. Always resident in the background of popular consciousness, it shows the same head and features in almost every clash of races.

(e) Propaganda

Conscious control of public opinion by propaganda has been used with tremendous effect by social, political, and religious organizations seeking popularity and support for their movements and reforms. Both Negroes and whites employed propaganda, sometimes openly, sometimes insidiously. Racial propaganda has probably a more powerful appeal than any other type because it is based upon the instinct of race and race differences, rivalry and jealousy. The most common form of propaganda may be classified into the follow-

ing types: (a) educational, (b) racial and revolutionary, (c) defensive, (d) malicious.

The activities and programs of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People fall under the classification of educational propaganda; this propaganda is directed to the white public principally and is intended to change public opinion by providing a foundation of actual facts for the public's judgment.

The more striking examples of the radical and revolutionary propaganda are the appeals sent out by the Industrial Workers of the World to Negroes, carrying their doctrines and extending open arms to Negro workers and offering them what most other organizations refuse—privilege of association and membership on the basis of brotherhood.

Defensive propaganda is more apparent within the Negro group and is usually designed for the purpose of combating aggression and injury to their purposes and aspirations from without. The appeals of this propaganda are directed first to Negroes as a means of cementing the group from within, and indirectly to the white group by way of impressing them with the strength of solidified opposition to insults. The Protective Circle of Chicago, organized to "oppose segregation, bombing, and defiance of the Constitution," admitted employing propaganda to accomplish its purpose.

Malicious propaganda is by far the most dangerous because it is founded upon race antagonism. In the appeal to the emotions facts are soon lost. Anti-Negro propaganda is not wholly new in the North, but when employed it has usually been done insidiously because "Negro-baiting is considered in bad taste." Recently, however, there have been conspicuous instances of open and organized efforts to influence the minds of whites against Negroes. Ignorance and suspicion, fear and prejudice, have been played upon deliberately. The stated purpose of the propaganda was to unite white property owners in opposition to the "invasion" of other residential areas by Negroes, but in the actual carrying out of the propaganda it was extended to all Negroes, and many methods were employed which could have no other effect than to arouse bitterness and antagonism leading to clashes. The *Property Owner's Journal*, the organ of an association of real estate men, became so violent in its preachments that the protest of whites forced its discontinuance. Appeals were made not only to the instinct of race but to the sex instincts and the protective in-

instincts of white men. A pamphlet sent to the wives of prominent residents in that neighborhood, entitled *An Appeal of White Women to American Humanity*, recounted the "horrible conduct of French Colonials on the Rhine and the abuse of German white women," although there was little apparent connection between the conduct of Chicago Negroes and that of the black soldiers in the French Army of Occupation on the Rhine. This pamphlet, however, served to increase the fears of Negro men by white women and to arouse the resentment and hatred of white men.

Exercises

1. What seems to be the real root of race conflicts?
2. In what two senses is it a culture problem?
3. Account for the lack of race prejudice or antipathy among small children.
4. What light do the economic facts narrated by Gandhi throw on race friction in South Africa?
5. Compare the epithets and legal disabilities directed against Indians in South Africa with similar attitudes in the United States.
6. Does any difference appear in the two situations?
7. In the Chicago survey what relation was found to exist between retardation in school and educational opportunity?
8. What part did race prejudice play in the school situation?
9. Was the Negro given a fair deal in recreational matters?
10. Indicate the sources of recreational clashes.
11. What is peculiar about race contacts in connection with transportation?
12. What conditions favorable to vice and crime are forced onto the Negro? Why?
13. Describe the attitude of officials and newspapers in this respect.
14. How does the report define "public opinion" and what plan was used in studying it?
15. Define primary and secondary beliefs, giving examples of each as found in Chicago.
16. Sketch the historical background of these beliefs.
17. Compare the corresponding beliefs of the Negroes concerning whites.
18. Illustrate the part played by *rumor*.
19. Give examples of group *myths* affecting the racial situation.
20. Indicate the mischief wrought by *propaganda*.
21. In the light of this report estimate the percentage of accuracy in the average white person's impressions concerning the Negro; in that of the Negro concerning the Whites.

Additional References

1. Baker, Ray Stannard: *Following the Color Line*. A pioneer effort to get at the actual facts.
2. DuBois, W. E. Burghardt (Editor): *The Negro American Family*. Atlanta Univ. Publications, No. 13. A coöperative study made under patronage of the trustees of the John F. Slater Fund, 1908, by Negro students.
3. Johnsen, J. E.: *The Negro Problem*. This volume, in the Debater's Handbook series, contains a wealth of very valuable material, with further bibliographies.
4. Mossell, Sadie Tanner: "The Standard of Living Among One Hundred Negro Migrant Families in Philadelphia." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. XCVIII., No. 187. Nov., 1921, pp. 173-218.
5. Park, R. E.: "A Race Relations Survey," in *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VIII., No. 4. (Mar.-Apr., 1924.) Suggestions for a Study of the Oriental Population of the Pacific Coast, by Dr. Park as Director under appointment by the Commonwealth Fund.
6. Reuter, Edward B.: *The Mulatto in the United States*. A scientific and statistical study.
7. Scott, Emmet Jay: "Negro Migration During the War," Publications of the Carnegie Institution.

CHAPTER XXXVII

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL INADEQUACY

IN the preceding chapter the point of view shifted from the quantitative aspect of population to a more qualitative one. For *race* problems hinge upon physical and mental *differences* more exclusively than do the problems presented by the increase or decrease of numbers, the migration of peoples or persons from country to country, or the shifting of citizens from rural to urban districts. While this tendency toward qualitative evaluation enters into the racial problem, often without sufficient justification in objective facts, it fully dominates the consideration of the problem before us.

"Inadequacy" is believed by the present writer to be the best term yet proposed. The earliest phrase was "dependents, defectives, and delinquents," and, while cumbersome, it has not been displaced by such recent rhetorical aspirants as "the social debtors," or "the inner enemies." Reading 1 presents a well-balanced discussion of the term and indicates its social meaning. It need only be remarked in this place that, while shorter than the older phrase, "inadequacy" partakes of the descriptive accuracy which has kept the former phrase in use. "Inadequacy" is accurate because the outstanding fact is that there are individuals and family strains in modern society which are not endowed with the physical and mental traits necessary to enable their possessors to play an adequate part in the communities in which they live. Without indicting them as debtors or branding them as enemies we may simply recognize their inadequacy, without stigma or blame. This is first of all the dispassionate scientific attitude, and is even more appropriate to *social* science since Professor Giddings has shown that "sociology is the science of the production and distribution of adequacy, of man and in man." (*Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Ch. XVI.)

Adequacy, as defined by Professor Giddings (*Ibid.*, p. 291), comprises endurance, health, reproductive vigor, intelligence, self-control, ability to make adjustments with others and to get on helpfully with others in coöperation." Inadequacy is, of course, the absence of these traits, physical, mental, and social.

Inadequacy may be either inherited through a defective germ-plasm or acquired through the social heritage, in family, playground, neighborhood, or wider areas of social contact. In the space at disposal here we have chosen to treat the former aspect, which is equivalent to *eugenics*, because extravagant claims have been made for this so-

called science; and for the further reason that the critical reduction of eugenic pretensions to reasonable proportions offers the shortest road to an evaluation of the relative parts played by biological heredity and social environment in the production of inadequacy. In pursuance of this idea Reading 2 reproduces Sir Francis Galton's own statement concerning the nature of the theory founded by him, while, in Reading 3, Professor Hobhouse makes a well-tempered evaluation of the ill-matured movement of thought and social policy which has grown up around it.

1. The Meaning of Social Inadequacy¹

The Eugenics Record Office prepared for the Bureau of the Census a study of state institutions covering all types of individuals who require social care or attention of one sort or another, and headed the list, "State Institutions for the Socially Inadequate." The sub-list was given as follows: (1) Feeble-minded, (2) Insane, (3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward), (4) Epileptic, (5) Inebriate (including drug habitués), (6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the leprous, and others with chronic infectious segregated diseases), (7) Blind (including those with greatly impaired vision), (8) Deaf (including those with greatly impaired hearing), (9) Deformed (including the crippled), and (10) Dependents (including children and old folks in "homes," ne'er-do-wells, tramps, and paupers).

This was done because among students of social problems generally the older designation "defective, dependent, and delinquent" was considered as a term appropriately descriptive of neither a general non-enumerative title, including all special classes of persons needing social restraint, direction, or care, nor as even a roughly accurate list of the actual sub-classes included with this general group. The "three D's," in recent years, are rarely even mentioned in textbooks or in convention, institution, or social reports.

When a specific social, legal, biological, or medical class is meant, it is and should be given its specific type designation. If requests had been made for data on institutions for the defective, no one, even an expert psychiatrist, or institution superintendent, would have known exactly what was meant; "defective" in the literature has come to mean nothing by itself, but in the phrase "mentally defec-

¹ By Harry H. Laughlin, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVII., No. 1 (July, 1921), pp. 55-57; 67; 68; 69-70. Reprinted by permission.

tive" means feeble-minded. But when information was called for, descriptive of institutions for the feeble-minded, the blind, or the insane, everyone, even the laymen, knew exactly what was wanted. Again, "delinquent" has recently come to connote "juvenile delinquency," and unless accompanied by an explanation in each particular case does not refer to criminalistic persons in general. "Dependent" is a good term and is retained as one of the ten sub-headings as being less opprobrious, although etymologically just as good as the term pauper; but it serves no good purpose when included with two other vague terms in attempting to make a general heading inclusive of the specific subclasses. If not used to designate a subclass, the term "dependent" would, under properly developed connotation, as Professor W. F. Wilcox suggests, make a good and useful general title.

The term "socially inadequate" has more of the appearance of a general designation than have the three terms "defective, dependent, and delinquent." The former expression is shorter and more business-like. Moreover, the term "socially inadequate" means a condition whereby the individuals included are unable to meet the demands of organized society in properly caring for themselves, and in behaving toward their fellows in the manner required of useful citizens. The expression in itself connotes nothing concerning "hereditary nature, permanency, prognosis, blame, custodial care, or past social value. It means simply that now the individuals included within the general group need social attention.

The Bureau of the Census and text-book writers, by adopting in their future classifications the general heading "socially inadequate," with its ten definite descriptive subheadings, would serve the social sciences well in their efforts to classify social handicap. The Census Bureau should lead when opportunity presents itself.

In organizing the data for the census publication above mentioned, matters went smoothly enough until someone discovered that our old friend the "three D's" was cast aside for the totally inadequate, unsupportable, and unhistoric general title, "The Socially Inadequate." Then began a tempest in a teapot. A referendum was held, principally among the professors of sociology of the country. They almost all agreed that the old term, "defective, dependent, and delinquent," was very unsatisfactory, but they could not agree upon a single title to take its place. . . .

Letters were addressed to 576 state institutions included under the type list given in this paper. Only three of the institutions objected to the classification. . . .

To sum up the matter, all students of social structure agree that a general non-enumerative title is needed to designate all of those classes in modern society which need special care, restraint, or direction, who as a group do not contribute in net to the general welfare (nor at all except as they may awaken altruistic conduct in their more fortunate fellows), but who on the contrary in net entail a drag upon those members of the community who have sufficient insight, initiative, competency, physical strength, and social instincts to enable them to live effective lives without particular social custody. . . . A socially inadequate person may properly be defined as one who, by his own purpose, initiative, and efforts, chronically is unable to maintain himself as a self-supporting and useful member of the organized society in which he finds himself. In our modern society this inadequacy is generally the result of personal, mental, physical, or temperamental handicap, either inherited or acquired. It should be, however, provided that the term "socially inadequate" should not be applied to individuals whose personal or social ineffectivenesses are due solely to the normally expected exigencies of youth, old age, or temporary illness, when such ineffectivenesses are taken care of adequately by the respective families in which they occur.

The sub-classification may well defer to those medical, social, and legal classes as they are handled now by organized society. As institutions become more specialized, and the eugenical and social sciences have more influence upon practical care and treatment, doubtless other groups will be segregated for social treatment. Law, medicine, eugenics, sociology, and criminology have their special classifications for individuals who, in their social bearings, come within the ken of each particular science, but when one attempts the study of these classes from the standpoint of organized society he must treat them not from the viewpoint of any one science, but from their functioning in and their actual treatment by the social organism. By some the blind and the deaf are grouped together under one class, the cacaesthenic or those with defective sense organs, but for the most part organized society treats them separately, so that they are here made into separate classes.

The basis for the grouping here followed is found principally in the

classification of inmates of custodial institutions, modified somewhat by social, demographic, medical, and eugenical researches. It is not primarily eugenical. A classification based upon eugenical principles would divide mankind into two great classes, first, the eugenic group or those who, regardless of their personal social adjustments, are carriers in their blood of sound and racially valuable physical, mental, and temperamental traits; and second, the cacogenic or those who, regardless of personal social reactions, are potential parents of offspring handicapped by the inheritance of degenerate qualities. Within each of these primary groups there would be many sub-classes. In each of the socially inadequate classes there are both eugenic and cacogenic individuals. Doubtless most socially inadequate persons are cacogenic, but the two bases of classification are different — one is social adjustment while the other is quality of the germ-plasm.

Summarizing the problem, it appears appropriate to use the general title "socially inadequate" as quite properly and accurately including all of the social groups in need of special restraint, direction, or care, of which general group the following specific classes are definite sub-groups: (1) feeble-minded; (2) insane; (3) criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward); (4) epileptic; (5) inebriate (including drug habitués); (6) diseased (including the tuberculous, lepers, and others with chronic infectious segregated diseases); (7) blind (including those with seriously impaired vision); (8) deaf (including those with seriously impaired hearing); (9) deformed (including the crippled); (10) dependent (including orphans, old folks, soldiers and sailors in "homes," chronic charity-aided folk, paupers, ne'er-do-wells).

2. Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope and Aims²

Eugenics is the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage. The improvement of the inborn qualities, or stock, of some one human population will alone be discussed here.

What is meant by improvement? What by the syllable *eu* in "eugenics," whose English equivalent is "good"? There is considerable difference between goodness in the several qualities and in that of the character as a whole. The character depends largely on

² By Francis Galton, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, No. 1, (1904-05), pp. 1-6. Reprinted by permission.

the *proportion* between qualities, whose balance may be much influenced by education. We must therefore leave morals as far as possible out of the discussion, not entangling ourselves with the almost hopeless difficulties they raise as to whether a character as a whole is good or bad. Moreover, the goodness or badness of character is not absolute, but relative to the current form of civilization. A fable will best explain what is meant. Let the scene be the zoölogical gardens in the quiet hours of the night, and suppose that, as in old fables, the animals are able to converse, and that some very wise creature who had easy access to all the cages, say a philosophic sparrow or rat, was engaged in collecting the opinions of all sorts of animals with a view of elaborating a system of absolute morality. It is needless to enlarge on the contrariety of ideals between the beasts that prey and those they prey upon, between those of the animals that have to work hard for their food and the sedentary parasites that cling to their bodies and suck their blood, and so forth. A large number of suffrages in favor of maternal affection would be obtained, but most species of fish would repudiate it, while among the voices of birds would be heard the musical protest of the cuckoo. Though no agreement could be reached as to absolute morality, the essentials of eugenics may be easily defined. All creatures would agree that it was better to be healthy than sick, vigorous than weak, well-fitted than ill-fitted for their part in life; in short, that it was better to be good rather than bad specimens of their kind, whatever that kind might be. So with men. There are a vast number of conflicting ideals, of alternative characters, of incompatible civilizations; but they are wanted to give fullness and interest to life. Society would be very dull if every man resembled the highly estimable Marcus Aurelius or Adam Bede. The aim of eugenics is to represent each class or sect by its best specimens; that done, to leave them to work out their common civilization in their own way.

A considerable list of qualities can easily be compiled that nearly everyone except "cranks" would take into account when picking out the best specimens of his class. It would include health, energy, ability, manliness, and courteous disposition. Recollect that the natural differences between dogs are highly marked in all these respects, and that men are quite as variable by nature as other animals of like species. Special aptitudes would be assessed highly by those who possessed them, as the artistic faculties by artists, fearlessness of in-

quity and veracity by scientists, religious absorption by mystics, and so on. There would be self-sacrificers, self-tormentors, and other exceptional idealists; but the representatives of these would be better members of a community than the body of their electors. They would have more of those qualities that are needed in a state — more vigor, more ability, and more consistency of purpose. The community might be trusted to refuse representatives of criminals, and of others whom it rates as undesirable.

Let us for a moment suppose that the practice of eugenics should hereafter raise the average quality of our nation to that of its better moiety at the present day, and consider the gain. The general tone of domestic, social, and political life would be higher. The race as a whole would be less foolish, less frivolous, less excitable, and politically more provident than now. Its demagogues who “played to the gallery” would play to a more sensible gallery than at present. We should be better fitted to fulfill our vast imperial opportunities. Lastly, men of an order of ability which is now very rare would become more frequent, because the level out of which they rose would itself have risen.

The aim of eugenics is to bring as many influences as can be reasonably employed, to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute *more* than their proportion to the next generation.

The course of procedure that lies within the functions of a learned and active society, such as the sociological may become, would be somewhat as follows:

1. Dissemination of a knowledge of the laws of heredity, so far as they are surely known, and promotion of their further study. Few seem to be aware how greatly the knowledge of what may be termed the *actuarial* side of heredity has advanced in recent years. The *average* closeness of kinship in each degree now admits of exact definition and of being treated mathematically, like birth- and death-rates, and the other topics with which actuaries are concerned.

2. Historical inquiry into the rates with which the various classes of society (classified according to civic usefulness) have contributed to the population at various times, in ancient and modern nations. There is strong reason for believing that national rise and decline is closely connected with this influence. It seems to be the tendency of high civilization to check fertility in the upper classes, through numerous causes, some of which are well known, others are inferred, and

others again are wholly obscure. The latter class are apparently analogous to those which bar the fertility of most species of wild animals in zoölogical gardens. Out of the hundreds and thousands of species that have been tamed, very few indeed are fertile when their liberty is restricted and their struggles for livelihood are abolished; those which are so, and are otherwise useful to man, becoming domesticated. There is perhaps some connection between this obscure action and the disappearance of most savage races when brought into contact with high civilization, though there are other and well-known concomitant causes. But while most barbarous races disappear, some, like the Negro, do not. It may therefore be expected that types of our race will be found to exist which can be highly civilized without losing fertility; nay, they may become more fertile under artificial conditions, as in the case with many domestic animals.

3. Systematic collection of facts showing the circumstances under which large and thriving families have most frequently originated; in other words, the *conditions* of eugenics. The definition of a thriving family, that will pass muster for the moment at least, is one in which the children have gained distinctly superior positions to those who were their classmates in early life. Families may be considered "large" that contain not less than three adult male children. It would be no great burden to a society including many members who had eugenics at heart, to initiate and to preserve a large collection of such records for the use of statistical students. The committee charged with the task would have to consider very carefully the form of their circular and the persons intrusted to distribute it. They should ask only for as much useful information as could be easily, and would be readily, supplied by any member of the family appealed to. The point to be ascertained is the *status* of the two parents at the time of their marriage, whence its more or less eugenic character might have been predicted, if the larger knowledge that we now hope to obtain had then existed. Some account would be wanted of their race, profession, and residence; also of their own respective parentages, and of their brothers and sisters. Finally the reasons would be required why the children deserved to be entitled a "thriving" family. This manuscript collection might hereafter develop into a "golden book" of thriving families. The Chinese, whose customs have often much sound sense, make their honors retrospective. We might learn from them to show that respect to the parents of note-

worthy children which the contributors of such valuable assets to the national wealth richly deserve. The act of systematically collecting records of thriving families would have the further advantage of familiarizing the public with the fact that eugenics had at length become a subject of serious scientific study by an energetic society.

4. Influences affecting marriage. The remarks of Lord Bacon in his essay on *Death* may appropriately be quoted here. He says with the view of minimizing its terrors: "There is no passion in the mind of men so weak but it mates and masters the fear of death. . . . Revenge triumphs over death; love slights it; honour aspireth to it; grief flyeth to it; fear preoccupateth it." Exactly the same kind of considerations apply to marriage. The passion of love seems so overpowering that it may be thought folly to try to direct its course. But plain facts do not confirm this view. Social influences of all kinds have immense power in the end, and they are very various. If unsuitable marriages from the eugenic point of view were banned socially, or even regarded with the unreasonable disfavor which some attach to cousin-marriages, very few would be made. The multitude of marriage restrictions that have proved prohibitive among uncivilized people would require a volume to describe.

5. Persistence in setting forth the national importance of eugenics. There are three stages to be passed through: (1) It must be made familiar as an academic question, until its exact importance has been understood and accepted as a fact. (2) It must be recognized as a subject whose practical development deserves serious consideration. (3) It must be introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion. It has, indeed, strong claims to become an orthodox religious tenet of the future, for eugenics coöperate with the workings of nature by securing that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races. What nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to work in that direction. The improvement of our stock seems to me one of the highest objects that we can reasonably attempt. We are ignorant of the ultimate destinies of humanity, but feel perfectly sure that it is as noble a work to raise its level, in the sense already explained, as it would be disgraceful to abase it. I see no impossibility in eugenics becoming a religious dogma among mankind, but its details must first be worked out sedulously in the study. Overzeal leading to hasty action would do harm, by holding

out expectations of a near golden age, which will certainly be falsified and cause the science to be discredited. The first and main point is to secure the general intellectual acceptance of eugenics as a hopeful and most important study. Then let its principles work into the heart of the nation, which will gradually give practical effect to them in ways that we may not wholly foresee.

3. Value and Limitations of Eugenics³

We have seen that social life consists in the interaction of human beings, and social evolution — whether progressive or the reverse — in the consequent formation and modification of what, for lack of a better single word, we may call the social tradition. Social improvement therefore is not the same as racial improvement. It is quite conceivable that with no change in the average level of racial capacity, the cumulative efforts of generations to better their life might produce a very great change in the social structure, and in point of fact it appears to be mainly by such a process of the summation of effort that the actual achievements of mankind have been effected. But at this point the biological critic may very fairly break in with a new criticism. "Granted," he may say, "all that you urge on behalf of the social tradition. It still remains the incontestable truth that society is composed of individuals whose qualities determine the nature of their interactions. No doubt these qualities are very complex. Man is a being of mixed disposition. There is a mingling of gold and brass in every soul, and circumstances may decide which is to show on the surface. We grant then that there are wide limits of variation within which, without modification of the racial type, society may advance or retrograde. None the less we come back to the qualities of individuals as the ultimate determinants. Their average merit must affect the standard of social action. Conceive the racial level — by which we mean the average level of hereditary endowment — raised, and to that extent you facilitate social progress. Conceive it lowered, and to that extent you arrest progress and favor deterioration." The contention thus modestly put cannot be denied. The very efforts that men make to improve their individual condition and the social order are themselves of course the outcome of their

³ From *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, by Leonard T. Hobhouse; pp. 40-43, 46-48, 75-79. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1911. Reprinted by permission.)

qualities; and if these qualities take shape and find expression in the medium of the social tradition, it is equally true that they form the ultimate reserve of energy underlying the social changes by which that tradition is maintained, improved, or destroyed. "Very well then," the Eugenist proceeds, "it is admitted that the quality of the stock is of high importance. It is admitted also that natural selection is no longer capable of performing its function in weeding out inferior stocks. It is admitted that we cannot revert to the use of natural selection without destroying the characteristic work of civilization. We cannot undo the structure of mutual aid and mutual forbearance which civilized progress has painfully built up. What we can do is to substitute for natural a rational selection. We may discourage and even prevent the perpetuation of inferior stocks, and for this purpose a rational conception of fitness and a knowledge of the law of heredity is all that we require. All that has been urged above against the conception of the struggle for existence may be true. It holds true none the less that selection is necessary to racial progress and to the avoidance of racial deterioration, and even if the social reformer could ignore the need of improvement in the race, he must take a very serious view of the possibilities involved in deterioration. He must look very carefully at the reforms which he is proposing, for fear any such vital injury to the life-blood of society should be entailed by them."

Without examining all the details of this argument, we may admit the main contention to be theoretically sound. The improvement of the stock by rational selection is in the abstract a clearly legitimate object. It involves no such contradiction with the inherent trend of progress as is contained in the principle of leaving society to the operation of the unchecked struggle for existence. The child once born has a claim upon society which can only be ignored at the cost of abandoning the basic principles of the humanized social order. But the claim to bring children into the world is quite another matter. It is no novel point of ethics to forbid parentage to a person of deeply vitiated stock, and Eugenists who draw a distinction between the right to live and the right to bring to life are within their rights. So far then we admit that the eugenic conclusion follows from its premises. But what are the premises? We are to assume, first, that we have a true conception of social worth, of the nature of human progress and of the qualities making for it. We are to assume, sec-

only, that we have competent knowledge of the laws of inheritance whereby we can so play upon the race as to engender the qualities that we desire. This is, to succeed in eugenics we need a competent understanding both of the *eu* and of the *genics*. We must know what we want to breed for and how we propose to breed for it. Have we the clearness of conception as to the first point and the fullness of knowledge as to the second which are necessary to the useful development of eugenics?

As to the first question, the nature and criterion of social worth, I think we may trace two lines of thought among eugenic writers which it is highly important to distinguish. The more careful admit that for a thorough-going application of their principle we should need a well-grounded social philosophy. They admit that little is known as to the causation of many of the higher human qualities and fully grant that we should be very careful in, so as to say, passing sentence of execution on a stock which may after all contain serviceable elements mixed with its blemishes. But they say there are many qualities about which there can be no doubt. We do not want insanity; we do not want feeble-mindedness; we do not want alcoholism; we do not want syphilis; we do not want the stocks which are infected with such taint. We want to extinguish them as evil in themselves and as liable to infect sound stocks. We want to isolate those definitely infected much as we isolate an infectious disease. We want to prevent them from bringing into the world children in their own image. When the principle is admitted and the experiment has been made in these cases that are clear, it will be time enough to consider those that are more doubtful. We shall in the meantime have gained some knowledge of what can be done by these means and how it can be done with the least possible infliction of suffering. . . .

On such lines as these, physiological or medical lines as we may call them, eugenics may have a part to play in relation to the social problem. But meanwhile there is a second line of thought discernible among Eugenists and larger claims put forward bearing on political thought as a whole which must be very carefully scrutinized. By no means all eugenic writers are so careful in the application of the tests of unfitness as those to whom I have referred. To read a good deal of what is written on this subject one might suppose that the whole question is as simple as daylight. Often it would seem as if

the actual position of classes in society was taken as a measure of their worth. Thus we hear a great deal of the relative sterility of the richer classes and the fertility of the poorer, as if this were in itself sufficient evidence of the multiplication of the unfit. Now, the actual forces which determine a man's position in modern society are, first, the inheritance of property and other social privileges, and secondly, his capacity for making and keeping money. The first of these, far from affording a test of personal merit, tends to mask the actual inequalities of endowment. One knows people of the essential pauper character in all classes. But whereas if they are born among the well-to-do they exist on means of their own or find relations on whom they succeed in fastening, among the poor they drift to the street corner, the casual ward, the workhouse, and the gaol. One would suppose it axiomatic that without perfect equality of opportunity actual position in the social scale would be no criterion of relative merit; and yet we find at least one able writer so enamored of the qualities of the British upper and middle class that he manages on eugenic grounds to find reasons for the maintenance of class distinctions. But further, given a genuine freedom of competition and full equality of opportunity, the qualities which bring men to the top are not necessarily social qualities. Some qualities by which men get on are good, some indifferent, and some bad. Which of these will predominate depends on the character of the social organization. The financial abilities which bring men to the top today may come to be regarded by our descendants much as we regard the qualities of a robber baron who prospered under mediaeval conditions. Upon the whole it is probable that the harder and more self-regarding qualities still play a larger part than the gentler and more social in determining success, and we are not surprised when we find writers of the type to which I refer telling us plainly that self-reliance and endurance are the qualities which they wish to breed. Now self-reliance and endurance are very good qualities, and we must not depreciate them, but a view of human nature which centers on these to the omission of the other side of character is a view which has got out of focus. The possibility of such a view indicates the absolute necessity of a social philosophy as a basis of eugenics the moment that eugenic considerations are used to determine the main lines of social reform. . . .

So far as the eugenic principle advocates the substitution of rational for natural selection, it is, in the abstract, upon firm ground. Where it can be clearly established that a stock is tainted with a hereditary blemish so great as to outweigh its merits, it is desirable that that stock should not be perpetuated. That is already recognized ethically as a duty and is acted on by many individuals, in cases where there is such a taint as that of insanity. There is every reason why our knowledge on these matters should be carried further and systematized, and it is possible that in certain cases it may be found desirable to crystallize ethical sentiment in positive law; for example, in the case of such a class as the feeble-minded, where permanent care is desirable for the benefit of the individual, it may be right that, as a condition of such care, restriction from marriage should be insisted on by society in the future interest of the race. On the other hand, the use of eugenic arguments against legislation designed to replace the struggle for existence by ordered social coöperation is at bottom a misapplication of the principle. It rests on the survival of the older ideas of natural selection under a new form, in new terminology. The method of social legislation should not be to accommodate institutions to the survival of the stronger; it should be to bring the social structure into accordance with sound principles of social coöperation. In such a system those who are fit in the true sense of the term, those, that is to say, who are capable of becoming useful members of the social organization, can find their place; and it is only when all such persons are endowed with full opportunities to adapt themselves to social requirements that the failures of society can be legitimately regarded as the unfit. Those who so prove their unfitness are then legitimate objects for institutional tutelage, and it will then for the first time become possible to enter into the question of their right to propagate their like. That question would then be determined by the light that our knowledge of heredity could throw upon the future of their descendants. These views do not appear to me to be out of accord with the sounder teaching of the more cautious biologists. They conflict only with those enthusiasts who make rash applications based on confusion of the new teaching with the old. To illustrate this contrast I cannot do better than set side by side the sociological applications which Professor Bateson would make of Mendelian principles with the deductions drawn from his remarks

by an enthusiastic reviewer in the pages of the *Eugenics Review*. Let us hear first the reviewer, Mr. G. P. Mudge, in the *Eugenics Review* for July, 1909, p. 137:

"With regard to man, it is now clear that what social reform, legislation, and philanthropy have failed to accomplish, can be achieved by biology. Tell the student of genetics what type of nation we desire, within the limits of the characters which the nation already possesses, and confer upon him adequate powers, and he will evolve it. It is not too much to say that, if he were instructed to evolve a 'fit' nation, *i.e.*, one of self-reliant and self-supporting individuals, in the course of a few generations there would be neither workhouses, hospitals, unemployables, congenital criminals, or drunkards.

"Students of eugenics will turn with interest to the concluding pages of Professor Bateson's book; there he deals with the sociological application of the science of genetics. We commend every advocate of social panaceas and of legislative interference with natural processes to read this part of the book. In a few well-chosen sentences he gives expression to the judgment of every biologist, alike of the present and the past, who has given to social problems adequate and unbiassed thought. For nothing is more evident to the naturalist than that we cannot convert inherent vice into innate virtue, nor change 'leaden instincts into golden conduct,' nor 'transform a sow's ear into a silken purse' by any known social process. Our vast and costly schemes of free, compulsory, elementary education, of County Council scholarships and evening classes, which are among these social processes supposed to possess the magic virtue of transforming the world into a fairyland, may be a delusion and a danger. And so, too, may be all the other well-intentioned but costly panaceas that harass and tax and eventually destroy the fit in order to attempt, for they can never achieve, the salvation of the unfit."

Let us turn from these sweeping condemnations, these triumphant prophecies, these large assertions of the powers of the biologist, to Professor Bateson's own words, the very words to which we are referred in justification of Mr. Mudge's statement. They are, unfortunately, too long to quote as a whole, but I will take the leading points.

"To the naturalist it is evident that, while the elimination of the hopelessly unfit is a reasonable and prudent policy for society to adopt, any attempt to distinguish certain strains as superior and to

give special encouragement to them would probably fail to accomplish the object proposed and most certainly be unsafe."

Contrast with this the proclamation, "Tell the student of genetics what type of nation we require . . . he will evolve it." Let us turn back again to Professor Bateson:

"Some serious physical and mental defects, almost certainly also some morbid diatheses and some of the forms of vice and criminality, could be eradicated if society so determined. That, however, is the utmost length to which the authority of physiological science can, in the present state of knowledge, be claimed for interference. More extensive schemes are already being advocated by writers who are neither utopians nor visionaries. Their proposals are directed in the belief that society is more likely to accept a positive plan for the encouragement of the fit than negative interference for the restraint of the unfit. Genetic science, as I have said, gives no clear sanction to these proposals. It may also be doubted whether the guiding estimate of popular sentiment is well founded. Society has never shown itself averse to adopt measures of the most stringent and even brutal kind for the control of those whom it regards as its enemies.

"Genetic knowledge must certainly lead to new conceptions of justice, and it is by no means impossible that, in the light of such knowledge, public opinion will welcome measures likely to do more for the extinction of the criminal and degenerate than has been accomplished by ages of penal enactment."

With so cautious and reasoned a statement social philosophy can in principle have no ground of quarrel. It can only desire that the data may be as fully as possible ascertained and, in proportion as civic effort succeeds in reorganizing the social structure on the basis of justice and equity, it will be prepared to deal with the strains, if they exist, with which a life in accordance with equity is incompatible.

Exercises

1. How and why did the term "socially inadequate" arise?
2. What deficiencies are pointed out by Laughlin in the earlier terminology, and what is claimed for the term, socially inadequate?
3. Note the attitudes taken toward the new term, by the groups consulted. Which position do you support, and why?
4. Define a socially inadequate person.
5. Name the sub-groups that fall under this general title.

6. How would a eugenical classification differ from that given by Laughlin?

7. Give Galton's definition of eugenics.

8. What thought is conveyed by his fable of the zoölogical garden?

9. Scrutinize Galton's list of desirable human qualities.

10. State the functions which he laid down for a eugenic society.

11. Under his fifth division, which of the stages named have been realized in the United States or elsewhere?

12. How does Hobhouse distinguish social and racial improvement?

13. Does he concede that the latter underlies the former?

14. Distinguish the narrower and broader lines of thought which he finds discernible among eugenicists.

15. What fallacy does Hobhouse point out in the social reasoning of some eugenicists?

16. What obsolete notion underlies some eugenic proposals along legislative lines?

17. Frame a statement showing the claims of eugenics according to its extreme advocates.

18. Set in contrast with it the claims of such writers as Prof. Bateson.

Additional References

1. Blackmar, Frank W., and Gillin, J. L.: *Outlines of Sociology*. Part Five, on "Social Pathology," is unusually good.

2. Case, Clarence M.: "Eugenics As a Social Philosophy," in *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VII., No. 1. (Sept.-Oct., 1922.) Criticises the social assumptions of eugenicists.

3. Ford, James: *Social Problems and Social Policy*. Part III., "The Problem of Defectiveness," presents very full and significant treatment from various specialists.

4. Gillin, John L.: *Poverty and Dependency*. The outstanding treatise in this field.

5. Holmes, Samuel J.: *The Trend of the Race: A Study of Present Tendencies in the Biological Development of Civilized Mankind*. Ch. III. "The Inheritance of Mental Defects and Desires." Ch. IV. "The Heritable Basis of Crime and Delinquency."

6. Popenoe, Paul, and Johnson, Roswell: *Applied Eugenics*. Valuable on various aspects.

7. Reuter, Edward B.: *Population Problems*. Ch. XIII. treats "The Quality of the Population." Ch. XIV. "Qualitative Differences in Population Stock."

8. Wolfe, Albert B.: *Readings in Social Problems*. Ch. IV. "Eugenics."

C—PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER XXXVIII

POVERTY AND RICHES

THE problems in this group do not arise primarily from the hostility or niggardliness of physical environment; or from the inborn qualities of the population, except in a subsidiary sense. Perhaps poverty and crime come nearest to having such an origin, but even they are believed to be more nearly social than biological or environmental. It is true that a hostile or barren environment will cause a poverty-stricken condition in human groups residing therein, even to the extent of famine. But, under the communal organization of primitive society, when one is hungry all are hungry, and such tribes as the Siberian Chukchee simply cannot comprehend how some are left to starve in civilized lands while others roll in luxury. As no informed person would hold that there exists no innate difference of ability, no personal superiority, among primitive peoples, it is evident that the common level of dearth or plenty among savages and the incredible economic inequalities existent and constantly increasing among civilized men are attributable to their different forms of *social organization*. It is said that among the Eskimo a man seeks goods in order to have more to give away in winter, and that the leading man is allowed the distinction of placing his hut farthest north, *i.e.*, in the quarter from which the greatest terrors of life in the far North proceed. There is thus expressed some lurking notion that greatness should serve; while among civilized peoples those of superior ability are too often accustomed to demonstrate their superiority by enriching themselves at the expense of their weaker fellows.

The Readings are arranged to show, 1st, the emergence of the problem of poverty in the course of social evolution; 2nd, the actual distribution of income at present in the United States; 3rd, the real nature of poverty; and 4th, the social view of property as developed in the great socio-economic work by Professor Ely, as cited. The discussion by him is of such fundamental truth and momentous significance that extra space is devoted to the purpose of placing it before the reader.

The Readings require no further comment. For discussions stressing more widely the vast inequalities in possessions the References

should be consulted. We have only to add in this place, that, astounding as are the differences in actual wealth in modern nations, the greatest menace in such a situation lies not in the goods possessed, but in the irresponsible social and political power which great wealth places in the hands of its owners, without necessarily accompanying it with any superior mental or moral insight by which to use it beneficially for mankind.

1. The Emergence of Poverty¹

Poverty and dependency did not appear as social problems until tribal society began to give place to civil society. The reason is not far to seek. As long as society was a group of blood relatives individual capacity was used for the advantage of all members, while individual incapacity, if it was not ruthlessly eliminated, shared in the welfare of all. Only by group solidarity and mutual aid could any survive in conflict with unconquered Nature and hostile groups. Moreover, wealth was largely the fruits of Nature, which the individual had not yet learned to appropriate to himself. Most goods were free. With the growth of population, with the invention of a medium of exchange, with the growth in the number of wants to be satisfied, with the domestication of animals and their appropriation by individuals, families and small groups, with the development of agriculture and the ensuing demand for fertile land, with the development of prestige and the appropriation of certain scarce articles for purposes of social distinction by individuals with prestige, and with the consequent growth of commerce, came a strain upon the old tribal relationships which in the course of time broke them down and introduced a form of social organization based upon an entirely different basis. As a result, classes developed; control not only over luxuries, but also over necessities, developed. On the one hand appeared individual wealth; on the other hand, individual poverty. The invention of methods of developing and privately controlling natural resources resulted in a greater aggregate of wealth, but interfered with the old tribal methods of distribution. Poverty and dependency appeared in quite new forms and with a changed meaning. In a word, society paid what have been called "the costs of progress." Poverty and

¹ From *Poverty and Dependency: Their Relief and Prevention*, by John Lewis Gillin, pp. 3-4. (New York, The Century Company, 1921. Reprinted by permission.)

dependency, however, are not so much "costs of progress," as "costs" of the failure of social invention and social arrangements to keep pace with the exploitation of Nature, with economic organization, and with the development of individual initiative.

The importance of poverty and dependency lies not alone in the fact that they involve vast suffering for those immediately concerned. Their effects spread into all parts of society. They increase crime; they lessen prosperity both through the economic burden dependency involves and through the destruction of ambition and an independent spirit among the poor. They impair the health of very large numbers of people. They hamper the educational program by reason of the public money which must be spent on the care of dependents and by forcing into work children who should be in school. They lead to vice through overcrowding in houses and through the denial of the satisfaction of wants by normal means. They result in breaking up the home through desertion of families and divorce and by cutting the roots of prudential restraint on the size of the family. They prevent the development of culture, the social use of leisure time. They threaten civilization itself. Poverty and dependency must be controlled if the very foundations of democracy are not to be destroyed.

2. The Nature of Poverty and Pauperism ²

Legally, in England and in countries which have followed English usage, pauperism, as distinguished from poverty, consists merely in the habitual receipt of official public relief.

Etymologically, the word is derived from the Latin *pauper*, meaning, as in its modern French and Spanish equivalents (*pauvre*, *pobre*), simply poor, without means of support; but when pushed farther back to its Latin and Greek origins (*paucus*, Gk. *πau*; *pario*, Gk. *πορ*) the word signifies not indigence but inefficiency. Making little, rather than needing much, is its original suggestion. The pauper is thus not one who from sudden, unforeseen misfortune is reduced to need, even if that need is to be supplied by public relief, but one who brings forth little or nothing, the incapable, the non-producer.

² From a paper, "Pauperism: An Analysis," by Edward T. Devine, before the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, Washington, D. C., Dec., 1915. Printed as *Studies in Social Work*, No. 9. by the New York School of Philanthropy (now Social Work). Reprinted by permission.

Economically, pauperism describes the state of the social debtor, the one who is carried as a burden on industry and does not himself take any effective part in the production of wealth.

Biologically, pauperism represents a primitive type, surviving in the struggle for existence only by parasitism, or a pathological type, emerging from abnormal environment.

Sociologically, the pauper is a deviation from the normal, incapable of assimilation through ordinary economic motives and social forces; presenting a distinct social problem, as do the criminal, the inebriate, the prostitute, the monopolist, and the revolutionist.

Psychologically, pauperism is poverty plus a mental attitude in which are mingled discouragement, lack of ambition and imagination, thriftlessness, irresponsibility, passive resignation to a parasitic relation to society. Vagrancy, the technical offense of living without regular employment when not having other visible means of support, and mendicancy, the soliciting of alms from passers-by, are the more active expressions of pauperism, of which the ordinary, superficial test is simply the necessity for some form of permanent relief because of fault, deficiency, or weakness of character.

Pauperism must be clearly differentiated from poverty — the larger and more important problem—which presents many aspects that may be wholly unfamiliar to those who know only pauperism. Some of those aspects face towards economic reform; others towards health, housing, or the administration of justice.

In recent years there are two clearly distinguishable, often antagonistic views of poverty, one of which we may call, broadly speaking, the economic, and the other biologic. According to the first view, the differences among men are due mainly to their environment, their training and opportunities; according to the other, mainly to their inherent nature, their biologic inheritance, their protoplasm. True, biology concerns itself also with environmental influence, and economics recognizes unalterable differences in human beings; but there is justification for the distinction, if not pressed too far, in that the main preoccupation of economics is with the wants and activities of men in society, with their actual behavior in view of the rewards obtainable for given efforts; while that of biology is with generation, reproduction, and the development of characteristics derived from ancestors.

Both views are indispensable and they can be reconciled. By

economic, sanitary and social reforms, public hygiene, and social insurance, effective organization of charity and the development of educational measures, economic poverty can be reduced in amount and the distinct hygienic problem of pauperism can be isolated. This residual problem is largely one of mental defect, calling for segregation and humane treatment of individuals and the gradual elimination of defective strains; but it involves also far-reaching measures which affect pauperism incidentally and are to be advocated chiefly in the interests of those who are in no danger whatever of becoming paupers.

The reconciliation or assimilation of the biologic and the economic view of poverty justifies its consideration in a scientific congress. If we think of pauperism as mental disease or mental defect, and of poverty which is not pauperism as an economic and social condition, the former to be eliminated or relieved by eugenic and sanitary measures acting on the individual, the latter, to be eliminated or mitigated by economic progress and social reform, resulting in greater efficiency and more just relations, we are at least thinking in scientific terms, and relying upon remedies which science can examine and assess.

This view of pauperism and poverty is in contrast both with the legal conception which underlies English and North American poor laws and with the religious conception which has more especially colored the charity of Catholic countries in Central and South America. The English law recognizes a legal right to relief. It creates an elaborate machinery for the administration of this poor relief. The almshouse is its central feature. A hospital or infirmary, and in recent years a sanatorium for consumptives and other special institutions, supplement the almshouse proper, which is mainly for aged infirm or chronically disabled dependents. Outdoor relief, by which is meant assistance given to the poor in their own homes, is another recognized feature of poor relief in nearly all communities in which the traditions and customs of the English poor law have been established. The fundamental idea of the English poor law is that the state is responsible for the relief of destitution and for the prevention of mendicancy and vagrancy; that whatever is required to maintain life and prevent actual suffering from hunger and exposure is to be done from funds raised by local taxation, except of course in so far as these needs are met by relatives, neighbors, relief societies, churches, trade unions, or other voluntary agencies. When other sources fail, in the last extremity, there is always the public relief official — overseer of the

poor, as he is oftenest called — whose duty it is to relieve the distress. This is conceived to be one of the most elementary and imperative obligations of the state, to be discharged through some appropriate governmental agency.

The religious conception of charity, as a means of spiritual edification to the giver, not unfamiliar in English-speaking countries, but more emphasized and exemplified in Latin America, involves a different conception both of charitable relief and of the destitution which charity is to relieve. Not the right to relief, but the privilege of giving, is its central feature. Not the prevention of begging and of vagrancy, but the prevention of indifference and hardness of heart, is its aim. "Our families," says a writer in the Buenos Aires General Census of 1910, "have been essentially charitable at all times; the poor have never called at their doors in vain. Religious by tradition, inheritance and personal connection, our ancestors were imbued with such definite charitable principles that they never passed a poor person by." "This is the cause," adds the Argentine commentator, "of the existence of the legion of false beggars."

The scientific view of poverty is that it is the result of maladjustments, biologic, economic, and social, but above all psychologic, *i.e.*, the survival of instincts and motives suitable to an earlier and more primitive stage of existence, but out of place in the modern world, and especially in the conditions of life of the western hemisphere in our generation. The scientific view of pauperism is that it is one of the worst, the most extreme of these maladjustments, with no adequate defense or justification from the religious point of view, no adequate provision either for relief or for prevention in any system of poor law yet devised, yielding neither to such coercive measures as have been applied by the state nor to acts done under the charitable impulse, however self-sacrificing or heroic those actions may be.

The bad tradition, inherited equally through church and state, is that poverty is a part of the natural order of things, to be constantly relieved by charity or by the poor law, but constantly repeated in each generation in order that charity may be kept alive and that the poor law may function. The new view, the natural view, as I venture to suggest, for North and South America, if by natural we mean that which corresponds to the conditions among which we live, is that poverty is not necessary or tolerable, that we may confidently look forward to a time when misery, squalor, a positive lack of the neces-

saries and ordinary decencies and comforts of life, shall be absolutely unknown among us; when a standard of living sufficient for physical and moral well-being shall be possible for every class in society; when education, recreation, and leisure shall be within reach of all; when childhood shall be universally protected, the efficient working life prolonged, disease greatly diminished and its financial burdens distributed through insurance, old age postponed and amply provided for, so that it does not mean economic distress.

3. Distribution of Wealth in the United States ³

1. The size of the National Income in the United States during recent years can be determined with a margin that is probably less than 10 per cent.

2. The final estimate of the National Income in 1909-1918 runs as follows:

	(Billions)
1909	\$28.8
1910	31.4
1911	31.2
1912	33.0
1913	34.4
1914	33.2
1915	36.0
1916	45.4
1917	53.9
1918	61.0

These figures do not include any allowance for the money value of the work done by housewives for their own families, an item which would add several billions to the money total if all housewives were paid on a commercial basis.

³ From *Income in the United States. Its Amount and Distribution*, by the Staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Incorporated; Vol. I. (Summary), Ch. 4, "Conclusions." New York, 1921.

3. The final estimate of the National Income on per capita basis is as follows:

1909	\$319
1910	340
1911	333
1912	346
1913	354
1914	335
1915	358
1916	446
1917	523
1918	586

4. Most of the huge increase in the National Income during the war was due merely to the rise of prices. If the preceding figures are reduced to terms of prices in 1913, we get the following results:

	National Income (Billions)	Income per Capita
1909	\$30.1	\$333
1910	32.2	349
1911	31.7	338
1912	33.2	348
1913	34.4	354
1914	33.0	333
1915	35.2	350
1916	40.7	400
1917	40.8	396
1918	38.8	372

5. Not only the National Income but also the Per Capita Income is much larger in the United States than in any other country. The following figures show the National and Per Capita Income at the outbreak of the war in countries for which estimates with a margin of error probably not exceeding 10 per cent. have been made.

1914	National Income (Billions)	Income per Capita
United States	\$33.2	\$335
United Kingdom	10.9	243
Germany	10.5	146
Australia	1.3	263

6. The share of the *net value product* of different industries which is paid to employees as compensation for their services (not by any means equivalent to the "share of labor" in industry) varies from about one-eighth of the total in agriculture to about three-quarters of the total in mining, manufacturing, water transportation and government work.

This share in most industries declined with the sudden rise of prices in 1914-16 and rose again with the advance of wages and salaries in 1917-1918. The average for all industries was a trifle higher in 1918 than in 1909, but not so high as it had been in 1913.

7. In the highly organized industries conducted on a large scale, the pay of employees, including the salaries of officials, absorbs in most years some 69-72 per cent. of the net value product. The remaining 31-28 per cent. is the share of "management and capital." From it are paid interest, rent, and profits. Even in these highly organized industries, part of the work of management is paid for under the form of profits, and in some cases, the subordinate officials and wage earners also share in the profits.

From 1909 to 1918, the extreme fluctuations in the share of management and profits varied from 33 per cent. of the net value product in 1916 to 23 per cent. in 1918.

8. Of the total payments to employees in the highly organized industries, about 92 per cent. goes to the manual workers and clerical staffs, while 8 per cent. goes to officials.

9. In 1918, the year for which the best data are available, about 86 per cent. of persons gainfully employed had incomes of less than \$2,000 per annum, and about 14 per cent. had incomes exceeding that sum.

In the same year, about 60 per cent. of the National Income was divided among the 86 per cent. of the gainfully employed who had

incomes less than \$2,000 per annum, and about 40 per cent. of the National Income was divided among the 14 per cent. of the gainfully employed who had incomes exceeding \$2,000.

The net effect of our participation in the war was to diminish somewhat (at least temporarily) the inequality in the distribution of American incomes.

10. If we consider the 5 per cent. of those gainfully employed who had each year the largest incomes, we find that their share in the aggregate of personal incomes declined from about 33 per cent. in 1913-16 to about 25 per cent. in 1918-19.

11. Data regarding the detailed distribution of personal incomes are scanty and difficult to systematize; but the best approximation this Bureau has been able to make indicates that in 1918, the most prosperous one per cent. of the income receivers had nearly 14 per cent. of the total income, the most prosperous 5 per cent. of the income receivers had nearly 26 per cent. of the total, the most prosperous 10 per cent. of the income receivers had nearly 35 per cent. of the total, and the most prosperous 20 per cent. of the income receivers had about 47 per cent. of the total income.

It should be noted that when we start from the top of the income scale, we must go down to people receiving \$8,000 per annum, in order to include one per cent. of the income receivers. Similarly, to include 5 per cent. of the income receivers, we have to descend to incomes of \$3,200-\$3,300. To include 10 per cent., we must take in part of the \$2,300-\$2,400 class; and to include 20 per cent. we must include part of the \$1,700-\$1,800 class.

4. Inequalities of Consumption ⁴

"For anything I know," wrote the second President of the United States to Jefferson, "this globe may be the Bedlam, *le Bicêtre*, of the universe." The events of the last hundred years almost seem to strengthen the suggestion that, in a universe of transmigrating souls, our particular planet may have been assigned to be the lunatic asylum for the solar system. At least, the way in which the most civilized communities upon our globe consume or use the commodities and services produced by the arduous daily toil of their millions of men and women, appears to be consistent with this hypothesis. . . .

⁴ From *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb; pp. 22, 23-27. (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923.)

THE REPORT OF THE COSMIC INSPECTOR

Imagine the report of the Spirit Expert in Scientific Consumption deputed by the government of the ALL GOOD to investigate the progress towards sanity of the inmates of the planetary lunatic asylum. "I cannot agree," he writes, "with my colleague, the Inspector of Scientific Production, that the inhabitants of the Earth are showing any approach to sanity. I need not discuss what is sanity. It will be remembered that we are forbidden, by our instructions, to inquire into the ultimate aims or ideals of the Earthians, seeing that the rightness of ends as distinguished from means has always been a matter of controversy even in the Court Circle of the ALL GOOD. I take as the test of the sanity of individuals or races, sanctioned by the law of the universe, the capacity of selecting the appropriate means to a given end, as verified by the subsequent event. The end or ideal of the Earthians is not in dispute. They are never tired of asserting to each other, with fatuous smiles, that the end they have in view is the health and happiness of the whole community. They admit that, in the earthly state, this depends, in the first place, on the effective application of the necessary commodities and services. My colleague tells me that, in the production of most commodities and of some services, they are showing signs of increasing intelligence in the use of materials and the organization of manual labor and brainwork. In the consumption of wealth they seem to me to be going from bad to worse. Former generations produced less, but what they did produce they seem to me to have consumed more intelligently. Take the three primary necessities of earthly life — food, shelter and clothing. I first made it my business to review the consumption of clothing. In the Idle Quarter, there were a number of women, each of whom prided herself on consuming in the manufacture of her garments the whole year's toil of from one hundred to two hundred garment workers. I overheard one of them say, in a debate on possible economies, that the whole annual product of one worker would barely suffice to supply her 'with a hat and a nightgown.' A younger woman, about to be married, had provided herself, for her exclusive use, of no fewer than seventy-nine nightgowns, besides other garments on which many hundreds of persons had worked for more than a year. In order to consume the toil of one or two hundred persons on the

garments of one woman, labor had to be wasted in barbaric decoration, in using materials which would not last long in wear, and in providing separate suits for each occasion (I observed one woman, closely attended by a worker, changing her clothes five times in the day); and, most idiotic of all, in discarding whole wardrobes of garments once or twice a year in order to introduce a new fashion. As Earthians are apparently valued according to their capacity to consume without producing, this inefficient consumption of the garment workers' toil was imitated by women of more limited means, so that the clothing of the whole population reflected the fantastic and unhygienic habits of the wealthy members. Passing from the Idle Quarter to the homes of the garment workers themselves, I found these persons living day and night in the same clothes — ugly, badly fitting, scanty and foul. Their children were attending school in leaky boots; and, in hot weather and cold alike, wearing rags of the same thickness and texture. The explanation was simple. These makers of garments were each of them restricted, for the whole year, to what could be produced by a single person working for one, two, or three weeks, as against the hundred or two hundred persons working for fifty-two weeks to equip each woman of the Idle Quarter. This example is typical. Hence, as a means to attain the end of the health and happiness of the whole community, the consumption of clothing on Earth cannot but be considered as a symptom of insanity.

"Then as to the shelter which the climate of these parts of the earth makes essential. The homes in the Idle Quarters are often so large, and contain so many empty rooms, that the constant labor of from five to twenty-five persons is required merely to keep them clean, and to serve the daily needs of the so-called occupiers, who might or might not have wives and children to share them. Meantime, even in the wealthiest cities, 20 per cent of the total population are herded together in one- or two-roomed tenements. I actually discovered a number of cases of two or more families working and living in a single room, the resulting indecency and disease being unfit for publication.

"Even in the matter of food — the one absolute necessary for continued existence on earth, the consumption is madly inefficient. It is noteworthy that the Earthians have now discovered the facts with regard to the consumption of food. They know, within a narrow margin, exactly the quantity and quality of food required for healthy, human existence; they know that less than this means starvation and

more than this means disease. And yet, if we compare the normal consumption of food-values of the bulk of the inhabitants with the normal consumption of food-values in the Idle Quarters, measured in the labor required for their production, we find it ranging in the proportion of something like one to twenty, with the result that the mass of the people, and those who are working hardest, are habitually undernourished, whilst a select few, who are very often absolutely unproductive, are not only wasting food, but are actually making themselves inert and deformed in consuming it."

So far the imaginary report of the Spirit Inspector on Earthian Consumption. The mundane economist not merely confirms this criticism but even pushes it further. The present inequality of income conspicuously leads, not only to inefficient consumption, but also to the production of wrong commodities. The power of commanding from the world just what commodities and services the several owners of the unequal incomes elect to enjoy, vitiates, at a blow, all the assumptions of the earlier economists that production would, on the whole, be automatically directed to the satisfaction of human needs, *in the order of their urgency*. It gives us the state of things in which a vast amount of labor is lavished on the most futile luxuries, whilst tens of thousands of infants are perishing from lack of milk, innumerable children are growing up without adequate nurture, millions of men and women find themselves condemned to starved and joyless lives, and the most urgent requirements of the community as a whole — to say nothing of the essentials to the well-being of future generations — remain unprovided for. Under a system of private property in the means of production, the "effective demand" of individuals affords no sort of assurance of the fulfilment of the most indisputable national needs.

5. The Social Theory of Private Property ⁵

We have established the proposition that there are two sides to private property, and that both sides are so essential, that if either one is removed the right of private property must cease. Not only is it true that if the individual side is removed private property ceases, but it is just as true, though generally this is not fully understood, that

⁵ From *Property and Contract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth*, by Richard T. Ely; Vol. I., pp. 165-176. (New York, 1914. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.)

if the social side of private property ceases to exist, the right must likewise cease to exist because private property then becomes an impossibility, inasmuch as it would destroy social life.

But we have not yet squarely faced the question. Which is dominant? This question we must ask and it must be answered. Which side is to be dominant, the social or the individual side? One side or the other must be dominant, because in the very nature of things the two have to come into contact, and one side or the other must yield in case of conflict. We must face this question, and we therefore lay down this proposition, which constitutes *the social theory of property, namely: Private property is established and maintained for social purposes.*

We are not now discussing the actual historical origin of property, but rather its logical and ethical basis and justification, namely, what is the nature of the institution and what are the reasons for its maintenance?

Now what is the proof of this proposition? The proof is found partially in the actual facts, present and historical, of our social life and partially in the nature of organized society and its needs. We may begin with a very simple illustration, taken from comparatively modern history; namely, landed property in the United States. Why was landed property established in the United States? And why has it been maintained? Why is land made private property to-day? We had to choose in regard to this. There was a time when very little land in our country was private property. For a time after the country became settled only relatively small areas of land were taken up, and even the land put under cultivation was not always private property. We had to some extent the old institution of common property, common pasture land, and common forests, etc. But gradually private property in land was extended and now it is dominant throughout the country, there being in the older States comparatively little land which is still public property. And private property was established for social purposes. The arguments and discussions concerning our public domain show this, more and more clearly as time goes on. It was indeed very generally assumed as something so self-evident that private property in land would conserve the general interests of society to a greater extent than public property, that the contrary view did not even occur ordinarily in the discussions of the subject. It was a general principle of our common law that to every piece of property

should be assigned an individual owner, and this view and way of looking at rights was greatly strengthened by the individualism of the frontier. It was felt to be right that the individuals who settled the domain should own it; and this is still the belief of the vast majority of Americans who give their approval to the institution of private property in land; although now there are those who say it is not a good institution. These are, however, a small minority, compared with the whole population. This institution of private property was not established secretly. The thing was not done in a corner in any hidden manner. There was no conspiracy about it. It was all open and above board. And it was established because Americans believed that private property was better than public property, holding that the people as a whole would derive the greatest benefit thereby.

Now, however, arguments are brought forward by those who think that private property in land is not the best institution and that not being the best institution, it does not promote to so great a degree the general public weal as some other institution would. These arguments have produced an impression and the result is that a desire is felt by many not to go so fast in converting our public domain into private property, in making the change from public to private property in land. And so here and there in the United States we are beginning to move a little more slowly in this particular. In some of the North-western States as in the Dakotas there are legislative and constitutional provisions, making it more difficult to change from public property to private property than it has been heretofore by putting a high price on public school lands and providing that they must not be sold until they reach the established price. The people who have been instrumental in bringing about these changes do not generally accept the proposition that public property in land is better than private property, but they desire that a portion of the increment in land values shall accrue immediately and directly to the general public, holding that the increment is partly due to the general social growth. Still more recently the Conservation movement has strengthened the feeling that we must proceed cautiously in changing public property in land into private property, especially in the case of mineral lands and forests.

When we turn to other countries we find that the arguments of those who oppose private property in land have produced a still stronger impression than they have in the United States. Under the

influence of the belief that private property in land was preferable to public property, and under the influence of English economic thought, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Prussia began to sell her public domain, following in American footsteps, except that she charged the market value for the land which was sold. This policy continued for some time in Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere, and then came a reaction. There were those who said in effect, "We are not sure about the proposition laid down by Adam Smith and others that the private cultivation of land is better than cultivation under public authority. We are not so convinced of that as we once were. We see that in some cases public cultivation is as fruitful as private cultivation, in some cases more so, for example, forests. We see also that under public authority land can be leased as advantageously as by private individuals. So let us keep the public land which we have. Let us not part with that."

But very generally those who hold the opinion that private property in land is desirable have separated forest land from arable land in so far as property is concerned, and have come to the conclusion that not private property but public property is desirable as the dominant form of property in the case of forests. In the case of mineral lands in the United States, the view of conservationists, following opinions of economists previously laid down, is inclined to favor public ownership.

New Zealand and other Australian colonies also illustrate the trend of world opinion. They have gone further than Americans have or than any European state has in the effort to retain public property, and even have changed back property from private to public, New Zealand having purchased some great estates in order to break up concentration in the private ownership of land, besides taking various other measures to the same end.

The point of the argument is this: That in every case it is the social purpose which is dominant or becomes dominant and which controls the institution of private property in land. If it were clearly perceived by the people that public property is better than private property, then we would have public property in land. It is the social purpose, the general welfare which has been in control. It is not generally as a result of conscious processes on the part of the many that the general welfare triumphs, but as a result of a social philosophy which few in the past could have stated. Doubtless in Athens in the

time of Aristotle few reached the conclusion by a process of reasoning that slavery promoted the general welfare. The Stagirite presented this theory in his social philosophy, but social purpose becomes clearer and clearer to an ever-widening circle. Private influence, to be sure, can make itself felt, more or less, sometimes properly, sometimes improperly. But the general view in regard to public interest will ultimately carry the day.

When we consider the establishment of new kinds of property, we see very clearly that it is the social purpose which decides the matter. "Intellectual property" as seen in copyrights, trade-marks and patents affords proof. Until quite recently the United States had only national copyright, and did not allow foreigners to acquire American copyright for their books. Arguments were, however, brought forward for the extension of intellectual property, and a few years ago copyrights were made international by the United States, following the previous practice of other countries. The arguments largely turned upon the social welfare. So also with trade-marks and with patents. There was no effective patent law in Germany until some forty years ago, when the German Empire was established, and it was argued that by the absence of such a law Germany suffered. In the United States social utility was urged in behalf of international copyright. And the argument of individual justice was also brought forward; for it was held unjust that Americans should enjoy the results of the toil of an author and give him no reward for his labor. But is this "justice" anything else but social welfare? It certainly includes it. And the one who argued the question mainly on individual grounds, always had arguments to show that the interest of society would be promoted by the desired reform.

And why should the duration of these rights be limited, — the right of property in books and the right of property in inventions, etc.? What are the arguments advanced for the limitation of these rights? Nothing but the general welfare. We make a sacrifice for the time being in order to reward the inventor or the author because we think that thereby the social welfare will be promoted and inventions will be stimulated, but we do not propose to suffer the disadvantages of monopoly in regard to these things for more than a limited term in years. We do not hold that the rule of reasonable returns demands that we should do more.

A still more important and convincing kind of proof is seen in argu-

ments defending private property when attacked as a whole, or when any particular species of private property is attacked. Those who urge the defence of private property feel it incumbent upon them to show that because private property as a whole or a particular species of private property does promote the general welfare, it is therefore worth while to maintain the institution; and in these arguments designed to show the benefits resulting to society from private property we find these proofs brought out. The arguments of Henry George and of the socialists, and also those of John Stuart Mill afford illustration. They all endeavor to show that private property in land is or is not more beneficial than public property.

But that is not all. We have something that is perhaps even more convincing. Laws and institutions at present clearly assert the superiority of the claims of society over those of the individual. Whenever conflict is clearly perceived between the general public interest and the individual interest with respect to property, and when at the same time a way to prevent harm is clearly perceived, then there is no hesitation. The individual has to yield his claim every time. It is not always perceived how harm can be averted, but whenever it can be prevented the individual side has to yield to the social. As previously seen, abuses exist, not because they are part of the institution, but because no way has as yet been perceived of removing them by general rule; and laws must operate by general rule. When we go beyond this, as already stated, we have nothing left but appeal to the individual conscience.

The institution of eminent domain affords further illustration. What does it mean? It means precisely this, — that there is a conflict between the individual interest and the public interest. The use of certain land is required for public purposes and the individual use of that land is injurious to society. That is, it keeps society from carrying forward certain undertakings which society deems important and valuable. So the individual side of property has to give way to the social side. Private property disappears and public property takes its place. The individual may insist very strongly that he desires to retain his property. He may say, "It is my property, and I am attached to it; it belonged to my father and to my grandfather before him. You offer me compensation but I do not care about that. What I want is this particular property." But however much he may protest he has to give it up. And increasing use of eminent domain and

demands for its further extension have this basis. Probably nowhere has this point been brought out more clearly than by Mr. Justice Holmes, in the following utterance:

" . . . The dogma of equality makes an equation between individuals only, not between an individual and the community. No society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence. If conscripts are necessary for its army, it seizes them, and marches them, with bayonets in their rear, to death. It runs highways and railroads through old family places in spite of the owner's protest, paying in this instance the market value, to be sure, because no civilized government sacrifices the citizen more than it can help, but still sacrificing his will and his welfare to that of the rest."

There are public purposes and even private purposes which make it for the general interest of society that one private party should give way to another, and even in such cases the exercise of the right of eminent domain is not unknown. In the State of New York and probably in most of our States, that is the case with land which is surrounded by other land, when a right of way or right of access to the land may be condemned; and it generally obtains as a common law right. In New York it is necessary to summon two juries, one to decide whether a right of way is needed and then another jury to condemn the land and award the damages which must be paid. It is probable that somewhat similar arrangements exist in most, if not all, of our States.

We find further proof in the sanitary laws of disinfection and quarantine. There the public interest is very sharply enforced against private property. Private property has to yield and it is sometimes destroyed, either with compensation (partial or complete) or without compensation. Boards of health are usually given arbitrary power in regard to contagious diseases and to nuisances, and the citizen who thinks himself aggrieved has no redress. The procedure is regulated by statute.

The laws with respect to cruelty to animals give further proof. An animal is property. Can I not, therefore, do what I will with my own? The law says: "No, you may not do what you will with your own, because what you do offends the conscience of society. Your right is a limited but not an absolute right; and therefore you may not do what you will with your own." It cannot be replied that

this simply regulates the manner of use and does so in the public interest, for this concedes the entire principle, because regulating the manner of use for the public interest is establishing the social side of private property and making that dominant. And that is all we contend for,—the right of regulating the manner of use of private property in the public interest. The laws against cruelty to animals afford a peculiarly interesting development of the theory that society has a real interest in private property. The courts not only punish a cruel owner who maltreats his beast upon the street or in public, but the vigilance of the law in many states reaches the acts of cruelty committed in private called “passive cruelty.” Overdriving and overloading horses and other work animals, shooting captive pigeons for sport, cock-fighting, even hunting a captive fox, have been declared cruelty to animals and the offenders punished.

Or, consider certain laws which govern the consumption and use of opium. May I not do what I will with my own? No. Because in this case and in that of intoxicating beverages what you wish to do is considered injurious to the general public.

The laws concerning marriage also modify and restrict individual rights of property, and do so for what is considered the general welfare.

In the laws which attempt to prevent suicide and which punish attempted suicide we see clearly that the right is not recognized to do as we will with our own. From these we see also that we cannot say, “The right to do what I will with my own proceeds from my right over my own person.” Your right over your own person is a limited right. In New York State and elsewhere legislation with respect to suicide punishes an unsuccessful attempt at suicide. On the other hand, however, while I may not take my life, I am compelled to yield life itself, to give my own person completely, for my country. So we cannot trace an absolute-right of private property to the absolute right over one’s person, because on the one hand we may have to give our life for the general welfare, and on the other hand we must not take it.

This then is the theory of the social side of private property: it is what Professor von Ihering calls the *Gesellschaftliche Eigentumstheorie*. And by him it is stated in almost classical form in these words:

“It is, therefore, not true that property according to its idea

carries with it an absolute right of control. Property in such a form cannot be tolerated by society and never has been tolerated. The idea of property cannot carry with it anything which is contrary to the idea of society."

It is asserted frequently by the pulpit and by the press that private property is a social trust. This is a true statement. It is true not only in a vague and general way, but in an economic and legal sense. We have here given us a solid foundation for the doctrine of stewardship. It is possible, however, that to many this doctrine of stewardship is agreeable precisely in proportion as it is vague and indefinite. The view here presented gives us the point of departure for a criticism of existing social institutions, and also for the work of social reconstruction, and progress.

Exercises

1. When and why did poverty appear, according to Gillin?
2. Define pauperism legally, ethnologically, economically; biologically; sociologically; psychologically.
3. Distinguish poverty from pauperism.
4. How does Devine reconcile the two antagonistic views of poverty?
5. Show how this view contrasts with the earlier English and present South American views of poverty.
6. Comment upon the per capita income of the United States.
7. What share of the net value product of industry goes to the employees?
8. What is the *annual income* of these employees? Which is more significant from the sociological point of view?
9. Placing per cent of population in one column and the per cent of national income received by the same in the other column opposite, show how unequally the national income is divided.
10. Why does Wells suggest that the Earth may be the lunatic asylum of the solar system?
11. How does he show existing inequalities in consumption of clothing? of shelter? of food?
12. Does economic science corroborate the picture?
13. How does Ely state the "social theory" of property? Contrast it with the popular notion.
14. What is the proof of this theory in the history of American public lands? in European lands?
15. Support this view of property by reference to copyrights; arguments in defense of particular property rights; conflicts between public and private interests; eminent domain; public sanitation; cruelty to animals; suicide.

16. State the theory of the social side of private property, according to von Ihering.

17. In what light does this theory place the religious doctrine of the "stewardship of wealth"?

18. What is the bearing of this theory upon the asserted right of unlimited inheritance? upon an inheritance tax?

Additional References

1. Devine, Edward T.: *Misery and Its Causes*. Ch. I. "Poverty and Maladjustment."

2. Feinberg, Louis (Translator): *The Shulhan Arukh* ("Table prepared") in *Studies in Social Work*, No. 6, by the New York School of Social Work. (A pamphlet; 25 cts.) A rabbinic plan of systematic charity from the sixteenth century; still held as authoritative among orthodox Jews.

3. Hayes, Edward C.: *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. Pp. 103-108 vividly portray wealth distribution in the United States.

4. Hunter, Robert: *Poverty*. Distinguishes between poverty and pauperism; also between the poor quarter and the slum.

5. King, Willford I.: *Wealth and Income of the people of the United States*. A statistical study.

6. Nearing, Scott: *Income: An Examination of the Returns for Services Rendered and from Property Owned in the United States*. Pp. 185-199 treat the ethical aspects of unequal distribution.

CHAPTER XXXIX

CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT

THE problem of the criminal himself pertains to the quality of the population, in so far as there is any such thing as hereditary criminality. But the extreme views of Lombroso and others who have attempted to identify a "criminal man," characterized by hereditary physical stigmata, have not been generally accepted. The more sociological views of Ferri, founded in part upon the work of Lombroso, are, however, fundamentally important for modern criminology, the tendency of which is to emphasize social organization as the principal factor in the production and treatment of crime.

The older criminology took no account of the personality and environment of the offender. The law prescribed such and such penalties for such and such crimes. The individual convicted in the case figured as an impersonal connecting link between the offense and its penalty. He committed the one; he must suffer the other. The fact that the "crime" was the stealing of a few penny's worth of paint and that the penalty was "to be hung by the neck until dead" could not be shaken by the further fact that the individual involved was a little lad of ten years—the outraged law must be satisfied! In such a case, which is not fictitious, but a fact of English history, the judicial procedure was appropriately conducted on the fighting pattern, and the trial became a duel between legal champions, while the judge confronted the trembling culprit as the embodiment of an outraged and vengeful society.

In modern criminology this barbarous procedure is softened, and in the case of juvenile offenders it is entirely abolished by enlightened communities. The personality and circumstances of the offender have become the main consideration, especially if youthful, and the idea of reform and cure is coming to control penal procedure in court and prison.

The Readings attempt, first, to state the sociological view of crime; second, to analyze the psychology underlying punitive justice past and present; and, third, to show the latest and best thought with reference to the personal aspects of criminal procedure. The selection from Professor Burgess constitutes a distinctive contribution to this newest phase of the problem.

One aspect of this whole subject, which should receive more attention from all humanely disposed students, is not treated in the Read-

ings because of lack of space. We refer to the grossly unjust legal procedure by which accused persons are held for long periods in vile jails and upon being found innocent are turned out without indemnity or even compensation for the time and strength thus wasted. That innocent individuals should thus be required to bear in their own persons the misdirected efforts of society along self-protective lines is nothing less than barbarous. The least that the community could well do in such instances would be to pay for its own blunders.

1. The Sociological View of Crime ¹

The conclusion is that judicial repression, in France and Italy, has grown stronger and stronger, whilst criminality has increased more and more.

In this fact, again, which confutes the common opinion that the sovereign remedy of crime is the greater rigor of punishment, we may fairly find a positive proof that the penal, legislative, and administrative systems hitherto adopted have missed their aim, which can be nothing else than the defence of society against criminals.

Henceforth we must seek, through the study of facts, a better direction for penal legislation as a function of society, so that, by the observation of psychological and sociological laws, it may tend, not to a violent and always tardy reaction against crime already evolved, but to the elimination or diversion of its natural factors.

This fundamental conclusion of criminal statistics is so important that we must confirm it by adding to the statistical data the general laws of biology and sociology. This is the more necessary because my position as first stated has met with some criticism.

In the first place, it is easily seen, when we compare the total result of crime with the varied character of its anthropological, physical, and social factors, that punishment can exert but a slight influence upon it. Punishment, in fact, by its special effect as a legal deterrent, acting as a psychological motive, will clearly be unable to neutralize the constant and hereditary action of climate, customs, increase of population, agricultural production, economic and political crises, which statistics invariably exhibit as the most potent factors of the growth or diminution of criminality.

It is a natural law that forces cannot conflict or neutralize each other unless they are of the same kind. The fall of a body cannot

¹ From *Criminal Sociology*, by Enrico Ferri; pp. 91-95. (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1896. Reprinted by permission.)

be retarded, changed in direction or accelerated, save by a force homogeneous with that of gravity. So punishment as a psychological motive, can only oppose the psychological factors of crime, and indeed only the occasional and moderately energetic factors; for it is evident that it cannot, as a preliminary to its application, eliminate the organic hereditary factors which are revealed to us by criminal anthropology.

Punishment, which has professed to be such a simple and powerful remedy against all the factors of crime, is therefore a panacea whose potency is far beneath its reputation.

We must bear in mind a fact which is familiar enough, though it has been too often forgotten by legislators and criminalists. Society is not a homogeneous aggregate, but on the contrary an organism, like every animal organism, composed of tissues of varying structure and sensibility. Every society, in fact, with its progressive and increasingly distinctive needs and occupations, is a product of the union of social classes which differ greatly in their organic and psychical characteristics. The physical constitution, the habits, sentiments, ideas, and tendencies of one social stratum are far from being the same as those of other strata. Here again we have, as Spencer would say, the law of evolution through a departure from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex, or, in the words of Ardigò, a natural formation by successive distinctions. Amongst savage tribes this distinction of the social strata does not exist, or it is far less marked than in barbarian societies, and still less than in civilized societies.

Every schoolmaster with a bent for psychological observation separates his pupils into three classes. There is the class of industrious pupils of good disposition, who work of their own accord, without calling for strict discipline; that of the ignorant and idle (degenerate and of weak nervous force) from whom neither mildness nor severity can obtain anything worth having; and that of the pupils who are neither wholly industrious nor wholly idle, and for whom a discipline based on psychological laws may be genuinely useful.

This is the case with large bodies of soldiers or of prisoners, for all associations of men, and for society as a whole. These partial organisms, due to the constant relationships of a life more or less in common, are in this respect reproductions of society as a whole, just as a fragment of crystal reproduces the characteristics of the unbroken crystal.

In the same way, from the standpoint of criminal sociology, we may divide the social strata into three analogous categories—the highest, which commits no crimes, organically upright, restrained only by the authority of the moral sense, of religious sentiments and public opinion, together with the hereditary transmission of moral habits. This class, for which no penal code would be necessary, is unfortunately very small; and it is far smaller if, in addition to legal and apparent criminality, we also take into account that social and latent criminality through which many men, who are upright so far as the penal code is concerned, are not upright by the standard of morality.

Another class, the lowest, is made up of individuals opposed to all sense of uprightness, who, being without education, perpetually dragged back by their material and moral destitution into the primitive forms of the brute struggle for existence, inherit from their parents and transmit to their children an abnormal organization, adding degeneration and disease, an atavistic return to savage humanity. This is the nursery of the born criminals, for whom punishments, so far as they are legal deterrents, are useless, because they encounter no moral sense which could distinguish punishment by law from the risk which also attends upon every honest industry.

Lastly we have the other class of individuals who are not born to crime, but are not firmly upright, alternating between vice and virtue, with imperfect moral sense, education and training, for whom punishment may be genuinely useful as a psychological motive. It is just this class which yields the large contingent of occasional criminals, for whom punishments are efficacious if they are directed in their execution by the axioms of scientific psychology, and especially if they are aided by the social prevention which reduces the number of opportunities of committing crimes and offences.

2. The Remedial Treatment of Crime ²

If then we undertake to deal with the causes of crime in a fundamental way, and as dispassionately as we are dealing with the causes of disease, and if we wish to substitute negotiation and international adjudication for war in settling disputes between nations, it is of

² From "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," by George H. Mead, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 5, (March, 1918); pp. 594-597. This selection continues, without break, the extract from the same author in Ch. XVIII., above. Reprinted by permission.

some importance to consider what sort of emotional solidarity we can secure to replace that which the traditional procedures have supplied. It is in the juvenile court that we meet the undertaking to reach and understand the causes of social and individual breakdown, to mend if possible the defective situation and reinstate the individual at fault. This is not attended with any weakening of the sense of the values that are at stake, but a great part of the paraphernalia of hostile procedure is absent. The judge sits down with the child who has been committed to the court, with members of the family, parole officers, and others who may help to make the situation comprehensible and indicates what steps can be taken to bring matters to a normal condition. We find the beginnings of scientific technique in this study in the presence of the psychologist and medical officer who can report upon the mental and physical condition of the child, of the social workers who can report upon the situation of the families and neighborhood involved. Then there are other institutions beside the jails to which the children can be sent for prolonged observation and change of immediate environment. In centering interest upon reinstatement the sense of forward-looking moral responsibility is not only not weakened but is strengthened, for the court undertakes to determine what the child must do and be to take up normal social relations again. Where the responsibility rests upon others this can be brought out in much greater detail and with greater effect since it is not defined under abstract legal categories and the aim in determining responsibility is not to place punishment but to obtain future results. Out of this arises a much fuller presentation of the facts that are essential for dealing with the problem than can possibly appear in a criminal court procedure that aims to establish simply responsibility for a legally defined offense with the purpose of inflicting punishment. Of far greater importance is the appearance of the values of family relations, of schools, of training of all sorts, of opportunities to work, and of all the other factors that go to make up that which is worth while in the life of a child or an adult. Before the juvenile court it is possible to present all of these and all of them can enter the consideration of what action is to be taken. These are the things that are worth while. They are the ends that should determine conduct. It is impossible to discover their real import unless they can all be brought into relationship with each other.

It is impossible to deal with the problem of what the attitude and

conduct of the community should be toward the individual who has broken its laws, or what his responsibility is in terms of future action, unless all the facts and all the values with reference to which the facts must be interpreted are there and can be impartially considered, just as it is impossible to deal with any problem scientifically without recognizing all the facts and all the values involved. The attitude of hostility which places the criminal under the ban, and thus takes him out of society, and prescribes a hostile procedure by which he is secured, tried, and punished can take into account only those features of his conduct which constitute infraction of the law, and can state the relation of the criminal and society only in the terms of trial for fixing guilt and of punishment. All else is irrelevant. The adult criminal court is not undertaking to readjust a broken-down social situation, but to determine by the application of fixed rules whether the man is a member of society in good and regular standing or is an outcast. In accordance with these fixed rules what does not come under the legal definition not only does not naturally appear but it is actually excluded. Thus there exists a field of facts bearing upon the social problems that come into our courts and governmental administrative bureaus, facts which cannot be brought into direct use in solving these problems. It is with this material that the social scientist and the voluntary social worker and his organizations are occupied. In the juvenile court we have a striking instance of this material forcing its way into the institution of the court itself and compelling such a change in method that the material can be actually used. Recent changes of attitude toward the family permit the facts bearing upon the care of children which earlier lay outside the purview of the court to enter into its consideration.

Other illustrations could be cited of this change in the structure and function of institutions by the pressure of data which the earlier form of the institution had excluded. One may cite the earlier theory of charity that it was a virtue of those in fortunate circumstances which is exercised toward the poor whom we have always with us, in its contrast with the conception of organized charity whose aim is not the exercise of an individual virtue but such a change in the condition of the individual case and of the community within which the cases arise that a poverty which requires charity may disappear. The author of a mediaeval treatise on charity considering the lepers as a field for good works, contemplated the possibility of their dis-

appearance with the ejaculation "which may God forbid!" The juvenile court is but one instance of an institution in which the consideration of facts which had been regarded as irrelevant or exceptional has carried with it a radical change in the institution. But it is of particular interest because the court is the objective form of the attitude of hostility on the part of the community toward the one who transgresses its laws and customs, and it is of further interest because it throws into relief the two types of emotional attitudes which answer to two types of social organization. Over against the emotional solidarity of the group opposing the enemy we find the interests which spring up around the effort to meet and solve a social problem. These interests are at first in opposition to each other. The interest in the individual delinquent opposes the interest in property and the social order dependent upon it. The interest in the change of the conditions which foster the delinquent is opposed to that identified with our positions in society as now ordered, and the resentment at added responsibilities which had not been formerly recognized or accepted.

But the genuine effort to deal with the actual problem brings with it tentative reconstructions which awaken new interests and emotional values. Such are the interests in better housing conditions, in different and more adequate schooling, in playgrounds and small parks, in controlling child labor and in vocational guidance, in improved sanitation and hygiene, and in community and social centers. In the place of the emotional solidarity which makes us all one against the criminal there appears the cumulation of varied interests unconnected in the past which not only bring new meaning to the delinquent but which also bring the sense of growth, development, and achievement. This reconstructive attitude offers the cumulative interest which comes with interlocking diversified values. The discovery that tuberculosis, alcoholism, unemployment, school retardation, adolescent delinquency, among other social evils, reach their highest percentages in the same areas not only awakens the interest we have in combatting each of these evils, but creates a definite object, that of human misery, which focuses endeavor and builds up a concrete object of human welfare which is a complex of values. Such an organization of effort gives rise to an individual or self with a new content of character, a self that is effective since the impulses which lead to conduct are organized with reference to a clearly defined object.

3. The Delinquent as a Person³

In sociology the distinction is now clear between the individual and the person. The study of the individual, of the reaction of the organism to its environment, falls in the fields of psychiatry and psychology. The study of the person, the product of social interaction with his fellows, lies in the domain of sociology. Park thus defines the person:

"The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status, and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. Every smaller group, likewise, has a status in some larger group of which it is a part and this is determined by its relation to all the other members of the larger group."

The significance of this distinction between the individual and the person for the study of behavior is indicated by the following case. Here the individual handicap, a special defect in mathematical ability, gets its meaning in its effect upon the status of the boy in his social group.

Case 1

"George, a boy of fourteen years, is the eldest of three children, all of whom are living. The other children are girls—one twelve, in grade 7b; the other ten, in grade 5b. Both girls are bright-eyed, alert, keenly interested children. George can do seventh-grade work in all subjects but arithmetic. For this reason, he was placed in the subnormal room in one of the city schools. He at once became truant, disobedient, and much given to fighting.

"George is a tall, well-built boy; looks his age, and 'holds his own' physically among boys of the same age. He is not interested in school, nor in anything that goes with it, and was very anxious to quit school when I first saw him. He told me rather scornfully that he hated the school and the teachers. 'They put me in the feeble-minded room,' he said, 'and I ain't feeble-minded; I just can't do fractions.'

"His mother is an intelligent woman; she was a school teacher

³ From "The Delinquent As a Person," by E. W. Burgess, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVIII., No. 6, (May, 1923), pp. 662-668; 671; 679-680. Reprinted by permission

before marriage. She is keenly alive to George's need for careful supervision at this particular time. She recently passed a civil service examination, and is now employed at the post-office. As a girl she was always good in all subjects but arithmetic; she managed, however, to do the work required. The children's father died five years ago of heart trouble. His only living relative, a brother, is a minister with a small church.

"George, since he was ten years old, has sold papers after school and on Saturday. He recently won a prize for selling the second highest number of copies.

"When I talked with him about fighting, he said, 'O, you don't understand, I've got to fight. I don't want to, but you see, these here boys say I'm feeble-minded, and I'm going to fight 'em 'til they quit saying it.'

"George worked manfully with me to bridge the gap between fractions and seventh-grade arithmetic. He made rapid progress at first, due both to interest as well as to the novelty of having a tutor; but as the work became more difficult, his progress was slower. One day he came to me with a badly battered face, and acknowledged that he had been 'licked,' but felt confident that he would 'lick the whole school tomorrow.' 'But why waste your energy that way, George?' I asked him, 'why not put it on arithmetic?' He had never thought of that; but he didn't think it would work; those boys had not only to 'be shown,' they had to 'be beat.' He struggled and perspired and accomplished very little that day.

"Now, after three months of hard 'digging,' he is beginning to feel rather hopeful. The teacher says he may leave the subnormal room at the end of the year, and if his progress continues, he may make his grade next year. His truancy has become negligible, and his fighting has perceptibly diminished. He declares he has 'come near licking the whole school, single-handed, and they are beginning to think I ain't feeble-minded after all.'"

In this case the distinction between a diagnosis of behavior from the standpoints of psychiatry and sociology is clear. As an individual the boy had a special defect in mathematical ability; as a person he had suffered a degradation in status in his group. Although from superficial observation he had charged against him the delinquencies of truancy and fighting, actually he was putting up a desperate struggle to maintain his status.

Among the types of mutation in status, the simplest example is

perhaps that caused by movement, as by change of residence. Moving from one group to another in order to acquire a new status is a familiar fact. A person who has lost status in his home town by failure, misconduct, or crime, may take refuge in a distant community "to make a fresh start" or "to begin life over again." Healy found, in cases of delinquent children, that a change of neighborhood by the family was correlated with a high ratio of success in reformation.

The person, as previously defined, is the individual with status. Personality may then be regarded as the sum and coördination of those traits which determine the rôle and the status of the individual in the social group. Certain traits of the individual—as his physique, mentality, and temperament—definitely affect his social standing. Primarily, however, his position in the group will be determined by personal relations such as his group participation, his character, his personal behavior pattern, and his social type. The following outline offers a scheme for studying behavior in terms of individual and personal traits.

OUTLINE FOR THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL AND PERSONAL TRAITS

I. *Study of the Individual*

1. Physical examination.
2. Mental tests.
3. Affectivity score.
4. Will profile.
5. Temperamental type.

II. *Study of the Person*

1. Participation.
 - a Extent of membership of groups.
 - b Intimacy of membership (social world).
 - c Rôle in groups
2. Character.
 - a Stabilized
 - b Unstabilized
3. Personal behavior pattern.
 - a Objective or direct
 - 1 equable, 2 enthusiastic, 3 frank, 4 aggressive

b Introspective or indirect

1 imaginative, 2 secretive, 3 sensitive, 4 inhibited

c Psychopathic or perverse

1 eccentric, 2 egocentric, 3 emotionally unstable, 4
psychic inferior

4. Social Type.

a Practical or Philistine

b Liberal or Bohemian

c Idealistic or Religious

5. Philosophy of Life.

The technique for the study of the individual is naturally much further developed than the technique for the study of the person. The physical examination now represents a diagnosis based upon the latest researches of medical science. Since 1905-11 when Binet and Simon devised a scale for the measurement of intelligence, mental tests have been undergoing a process of constant revision and standardization. Pressey's affectivity test may be noted as one of the attempts to gauge emotional reactions. Dr. June Downey on the basis of handwriting material has worked out what promises to be a valuable method of measuring will reactions. For example, her tests differentiate twelve volitional traits, namely: volitional perseveration, coördination of impulses, interest in detail, motor inhibition, finality of judgment, resistance, reaction to contradiction, motor impulsion, speed of decision, flexibility, freedom from load, speed of movement. Attempts to determine or measure experimentally temperamental types are still in the tentative stage. Shand, Jastrow, and others have, however, at least restated the problem. The tendency seems to be to accept the classic names for different temperaments—the choleric, the sanguine, the melancholic, and the phlegmatic—and to redefine these permanent moods in terms susceptible of measurement.

The outline suggested for the study of the person includes aspects of behavior for which no standardized technique of measurement has been accepted. It may be that the description of factors like participation in groups, character, personal behavior patterns, and social types will always remain primarily a matter of qualitative definition. Our investigation here is too recent, however, to abandon at the start the hope of securing quantitative indices. For illustration, the extent of membership in groups may be stated as the ratio of the groups

with which the person is affiliated to the total number of the groups in which membership lies open to him. Or the degree of intimacy of membership in one group may possibly be expressed by the fraction of his total leisure time devoted to the life of this particular group. The classification of character in terms of stability is obviously relative to the social norms of particular groups or to the social standards common to all forms of group life.

The threefold division of personal behavior patterns into objective or direct, introspective or indirect, psychopathic or perverse, is one made tentatively by the writer of this article. These differential types of behavior are not personality, and are not even the spontaneous expressions of temperament or other traits of human nature. They seem to be what the general term personal behavior patterns implies, namely, characteristic types of the behavior of the person fixed in the matrix of social relations in infancy and childhood. Naturally original differences in mentality, in temperament, and in volition enter into the determination of the form of personal behavior patterns, but their organization and fixation occur in social interaction.

Mentality, affectivity, temperament, and will are not uninfluenced by social experience. They are all more or less profoundly modified by education and social contacts. But personal behavior patterns like egocentrism, instability, and secretiveness take form and become fixed in the social interactions of the family and of the play group. These personal patterns of behavior are not biologically transmitted as temperament seems to be. Nor are they derived by imitation of others as is the social type or the philosophy of life of the person. The personal reaction of the individual to his social world is the resultant of the play of social forces in infancy and early childhood. Whether the fixed responses of the person to his social environment will be in the main (*a*) direct, (*b*) indirect, or (*c*) perverse are apparently determined by the rôle which he assumes, or which is forced upon him in his earliest social interactions. In the molding of a social type of personality and in the acceptance of a philosophy of life the influence of the group is definitely exerted. At the same time, the social copies which the person takes for models appear to him to be but the realization of his most ardent wishes. . . .

While both individual and personal traits enter into the organization of personality, its essential mark is to be found in social relationships, that is, in the status and rôle of the person in the social group.

In an article in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, the Allports, Floyd H. and Gordon W., give explicit recognition of this fact.

"The true criterion of personality is without doubt to be found in the field of social interaction. We are incapable of giving complete popular description of personality without indicating the manner in which the personality in question stimulates or influences other human beings and the manner in which the behavior of other human beings produces adjustments or responses in the personality in question. In describing this personality we inevitably take the viewpoint of those 'other human beings.'"

"Robinson Crusoe, alone on a desert island, undoubtedly displayed a very measurable degree of intelligence in his adaptation to his environment. It was only with the advent of Friday, however, that his personality could be said to stand forth in its full significance. Not only is the language of personality a social one, but the problems arising from the interaction of various personalities are in the truest sense social problems. They include every form of social maladjustment—from the whims of the eccentric to the worst deeds of the criminal. In general it may be said that the aim of personality measurements is the establishing of adjustments between an individual and his fellows which are a benefit to both. . . ."

The Sociology of Delinquency

Sociology is now undergoing a transformation like that which has almost completely changed psychology from metaphysics to an experimental science. From a philosophy of society sociology is emerging into a science of society. Consequently the interest of the new sociology is now turned to defining the experimental point of view, to classifying problems for investigation, and to developing a technique of research.

Not only criminality, but all social problems, indeed the entire area of group behavior and social life, is being subjected to sociological description and analysis. The person is conceived in his interrelations with the social organization, with the family, the neighborhood, the community, and society. Explanations of his behavior are found in terms of human wishes and social attitudes, mobility and unrest, intimacy and status, social contacts and social interaction, conflict, accommodation and assimilation.

The study of the delinquent as a person opens up a fertile field. Materials in the form of case-records, personal documents, and life-histories, are now available for analysis. Psychiatry and psychology in attacking the problem of the criminal from the standpoint of individual behavior have made contributions of high value, which have prepared the way for sociological research. The psychiatric, psychological, and sociological methods of investigation are not in conflict with each other but rather complementary and interdependent. The sociologist will continue to rely upon the findings of these other sciences of behavior for a knowledge of individual differences in mentality and temperament, while they in turn will be disposed to look to sociology for light upon the adjustment of the person in the social organization.

In conclusion, the point may be raised that this article deals with the sociology of personality rather than delinquency. The criminal, however, is first of all a person, and second a criminal. Therefore, it is well to study him primarily as a person and secondarily as an offender against the laws of organized society. The basic fact to an understanding and control of the behavior of the criminal seems to be that the law-breaker is a person, that is an individual with the wishes common to all human beings and with a conception of his rôle in group life.

Exercises

1. What is the tendency of modern criminal procedure as compared with that of earlier times?
2. Describe a trial conducted on the fighting pattern.
3. Why, in Ferri's opinion, has punishment failed to repress crime?
4. What three classes does he find in society, as seen from the standpoint of "criminal sociology"?
5. Are his classes well defined? Are they permanent? Does his inclusion of the fact of their being "without education" support his own view of his lowest class as "born criminals," or that they "inherit from their parents and transmit to their children an atavistic return to savage humanity"?
6. Why is Ferri's *classification* of criminals a step forward, apart from the objective validity of his classes?
7. Following Meade's account, show how juvenile court procedure expresses a radically different attitude of society toward the offender.
8. Compare the range of facts examined in the new and the older procedure. Explain the difference.
9. What new interests and emotional values are awakened in the community by the new procedure?

10. Distinguish between the study of the individual and the personality.

11. In the case of "George," as quoted by Burgess, show how the diagnosis of psychology and of sociology would differ.

12. In the outline constructed by Burgess, explain each item, and show why some are classed as individual and others as personal.

13. Describe the "Philistine" type of personality, the "Bohemian" type. (See definitions by W. I. Thomas, in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*, by Jennings, Watson, Meyer, and Thomas; p. 178 ff.)

14. What bearing does the "will profile" have on the analysis of personality? (See "The Will Profile," by June E. Downey, *University of Wyoming Bulletin*.)

15. What are the older terms for different temperaments as recognized in present-day studies of personality? (See Ross: *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 299-306; Giddings: *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 82-89.)

16. What suggestions are offered by Burgess for the quantitative measurement of personality?

17. What personal behavior patterns are shaped by group-life?

18. In what sense was Robinson Crusoe an individual? a person?

19. What is the most important contribution of the new sociology to the study of delinquency?

20. Compare this point of view with that of Meade; of Ferri.

Additional References

1. Abbott, Grace: *The Real Jail Problem*. A pamphlet issued by the Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago, 1915. Discusses the injustices inflicted on accused, and sometimes innocent, persons.

2. Dealey, James Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*. Ch. XXVI., "Intemperance and Sexual Immorality." Comprehensive and constructive.

3. Ford, James: *Social Problems and Social Policy*. Part V. treats "The Problem of Criminality" in many extremely valuable readings.

4. Mangold, George B.: *Problems of Child Welfare*. Part V. is especially valuable for all aspects of juvenile delinquency.

5. Parmelee, Maurice: *Criminology*. Ch. XIII. "The Types of Criminals." Ch. I. A concise account of the nature of criminology as a study.

CHAPTER XL

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CHILD WELFARE

NO social problem can be treated in isolation. Every one is connected more or less closely with all the rest. Thus juvenile delinquency has already been considered in part under the preceding chapter, while child welfare is most intimately related to *poverty* on the one hand (Ch. XXXVIII.), and to *ignorance* on the other. (Ch. XLIII.) In a sense the title of the present chapter is illogical, inasmuch as juvenile delinquency is simply one of several special problems included under the general term, child welfare; which, by the way, is not a problem, but a social *movement* for the study and solution of child problems. But the importance of juvenile delinquency in itself, together with the fact that it is almost wholly a reflection from and an index to the physical, mental, and social care bestowed upon the child, justifies its inclusion here.

The child welfare movement in its scientific and organized aspects is very recent, although solicitude for the weal of children is not exclusively modern or even civilized in itself. The so-called "savages" are anything but savage toward their little ones. On the contrary, it is well known among ethnologists that the punishment of children is practically unknown among primitive peoples the world over. Scolding is almost as rare as beating or cuffing among them, and, on the other hand, these savage parents devote considerable thought to the welfare of the child in the form of magical observances, bungling care, practical injunctions, and taboos. An examination of child care and training among a dozen primitive peoples, as described in ethnological monographs not centered, however, on this topic, has convinced the present writer that the principal difference between the child welfare of the Eskimo or the Australian aborigines and that of modern Americans or Europeans is that the latter possess more enlightened ideas and larger economic and scientific means for carrying them out, but that their interest in childhood and love for children is not essentially superior to that of the parents in the wilderness.

The literature of child welfare is already vast and is rapidly growing. The movement is complex and widespread, so that only a few aspects of it can be treated in this chapter. An effort has been made to include some of the most fundamental aspects of the problem. One of the most important and also the most recent is the work of those foundations dealing with *research* in the welfare of the normal

child. Such work lays the foundation for standards which serve as guides for all kinds of work with abnormal as well as normal children. It is thus fundamental in the truest sense. Another most vital phase of the movement is the establishment of *clinics* of various kinds — for the medico-psychological examination of delinquents; for dental correction; for nutrition; and for child guidance and parental instruction along all lines. Out of the unlimited riches of the literature available we have tried to quote in the Readings below some passages dealing with this last-named aspect of the problem.

1. Medico-psychological Study of Delinquents¹

The most fundamental need of courts which deal specifically with human problems is knowledge of the qualities of the human beings concerning whom a decision is to be made and knowledge of the causes of the behavior which is the affair at issue. Why should there be the slightest expectation of doing anything like the best that can be done in court work without following the guiding principles of science and common sense which have led to all improvement and success in other fields? These principles involve, primarily, scientific acquaintance with material handled, and with the relation of adequately ascertained causes to ascertained effects, including the effects of court action. The application of such principles requires, here as elsewhere, the development of a technique of studying causes — which, as we can readily show, are frequently not at all superficial or easy of discernment — and requires, as well, the building up of a rational system of observing effects.

It is certainly not impertinent to the dignity of the law — in this day of aiming at progress — to ask why this particular department of human effort, this deciding of human affairs under the provisions of legal procedure, should in any way be exempt from investigations of efficiencies and of the reasons for the failures which we know exist in such large measure. Indeed it is no small matter for wonderment that there has never been any keen necessity felt by the legal profession for at least the sort of critical and interpretative statistical treatment of success and failure that is considered an absolutely necessary periodical procedure in other human activities. It is plain, however, that the special study of fundamental causes has lagged be-

¹ By Dr. William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, in *Standards of Child Welfare. A Report of the Children's Bureau Conferences, May and June, 1919.* U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C. Pp. 382-388.

hind because it is only recently that a science of behavior has been even projected.

In this brief discussion of the part that medicopsychology can and should play in aiding solution of the problems of delinquents, we especially desire to make clear its function in gathering, differentiating, and interpreting the facts of the background and of the possibilities in the given case. This may perhaps best be done by centering about a concrete case; the last one seen before this paper was written is typical enough in many ways.

A boy, 11 years old, is in court as a night vagrant; repeatedly during the last few months he has been staying away from home all night, and sometimes even two nights. The police have several times found him after midnight. His parents appear with the officers to substantiate the complaint. The lad, Jim, is a very ordinary-looking boy, with nothing in any way remarkable about his appearance. What basis has the judge for decision in this case?

There is, of course, the lad's offense. Anyone with experience or imagination can apprehend that this is a very important case because of danger for the boy's future, danger to him and to society. His night habit of wandering about and sleeping here and there, will probably lead him straight into a thieving career, perhaps into burglary; he is likely to become acquainted with sexual misdemeanors and acquire bad sex habits; to say nothing of a general lowering of his moral standards and condition of health. The reputation of his misbehavior, of course, has greater weight than a single escapade, but any wise judge knows that the bare fact of repetitions of offense or of previous court record offers no criterion for safe judgment. The fact is that the day has long gone by when a decision concerning the juvenile offender can be regarded as good procedure if it is made merely on the basis of offenses, even when they are as serious as the above.

The boy's age signifies little; many a long career of crime has begun as early. His nativity—he was born in Boston, and his parents in Italy—denotes nothing in itself; similar misconduct is found equally among other nationalities, even our native stock. His physical appearance, his size and signs of normal health, offer no help for adjudication. The other facts presented to the judge—that the lad is normally advanced in school for his age and social group, being in the fifth grade, that the parents seem to be decent

people and partake in the complaint, that he lives in one of the most crowded districts — likewise suggest no solution.

The judge proceeds further, giving as much time as the press of other cases allows. He learns that the parents are intelligent above the average immigrants. According to the officers, they bear a good reputation and are not alcoholic. They are concerned about their boy, and have searched for him at night. They say that until five or six months ago he gave no trouble, and that since then they have punished and scolded and begged him to do better. He has made many promises, but very soon stays out again. They know nothing of his companions or of his night doings, and he does not answer when they ask him about this. He is a healthy boy, of good habits otherwise, and not peculiar in any way, as far as they can tell. The officers state that Jim engages in no other delinquencies; the boy bears a good reputation in school, except for occasional truancy. Then it comes out that he often attends school after he has been out all night. The boy himself insists that he always stays out alone and that he merely wanders about looking at things. Jim's attitude towards his parents is normal in the court room, and he says that they treat him well and that he loves them. Finally, he states in ordinary boyish fashion that he does not know why he prefers wandering on the streets to sleeping in his own bed.

The judge has taken nearly an hour, skilfully obtaining a clear statement of these essential facts to supplement the investigation already begun by an officer of the court. Here is a case without obvious intricacies; but what are the real guides to rational adjustment? The parents in genuine solicitude say they are willing that Jim be sent to an institution; that they have tried hard with him and have failed. The boy does not want to go, and renews his promises to remain at home. At this point the judge, without pretending to know the real personality of the boy or the causation of his misbehavior, may make the shrewdest decision he can. (Of course, sometimes there is pretense from the bench of ability from vast experience, and so on, that makes it possible to diagnose mentality, causation, and what not from an interrogation lasting even a few minutes — but then from other judges comes the more ingenuous assertion that a judge is paid to make a guess in these matters, to be sure, the best guess that he can make.)

On behalf of probation in this case the judge may think of the

possibility of modifying behavior through fear of the court, or through friendly supervision of the probation officer. But if we may judge by other careers which have begun with this type of offense these general measures are not particularly likely to prove effective, since they cannot meet special needs which are really not known. The probation officer without specific knowledge has no specific remedy to offer. The other usual alternative, an institution for delinquents, is the easiest solution. But would this, either, meet the boy's individual problem? Everyone knows what an institution for such a case means; artificial conditions of home life, repression of many normal activities and interests of boyhood, companionship with other older and worse delinquents, costliness to the State, and so on. Puzzled, the judge may continue the case for further information. This ordinarily means nothing but gathering more facts about the objective features of the home life and neighborhood.

The point of view of medicopsychological study and diagnosis may now be considered. First, what can be known through ordinary courtroom observation of the physical makeup of this boy? He may have some significant defect or irritative condition, not at all suggested by his normal appearance. He may have astigmatism and headaches in the evening, or even a heart lesion of which his parents do not know, or a hernia, or definite symptoms of some nervous disorder. Such physical findings may have significant relationship to causation, prognosis, and treatment of his delinquent tendencies.

The developmental history has not been ascertained; evaluated in the light of a careful professional inquiry, this history may in some cases be largely explanatory and show the limitations and possibilities of treatment for delinquency. For example, Jim may be subject to the slighter forms of epilepsy, readily overlooked, which in certain cases are so clearly associated with the impulse to wander. Or some fact of earlier disease or injury may throw light upon the present tendencies. The possible variations of antecedent causation are many.

Many facts told straightway in professional consultation, but rarely revealed in the court room, often include very significant data concerning the heredity, family life, habits, and behavior reactions of the young offender. And specially do we note that, naturally, this account of the boy's character and conduct often much more nearly approaches the truth than the picture given to the judge.

Most important of all, however, is what may be learned through medicopsychological study of the mental aspects of the boy's life. And we must insist, first and last, that by psychological inquiry we mean study of the functioning of ordinary normal mental processes and laws as well as possible abnormal phases of mental life. Mental habits, ideations, imageries, repressions, commanding interests, special abilities, particularized disabilities, form a field of greater importance for understanding if one is really to know the total range of problems presented by delinquents, than does the discovery of mental defect and psychotic conditions which all recognize as one of the big single factors in the production of delinquency. In the dynamic features of mental life and in the mental content itself we have material for explanation and for redirection and re-education that is invaluable. This is true even of some of the cases where there is abnormality of slight degree.

To come back to Jim; the fact that he answers fairly well the judge's questions and that he is reported to be in the fifth grade, means little concerning his mentality. He may be mentally defective in important ways and still be a fair conversationalist; he may possess the good memory powers characteristic of many of the feeble-minded, and so have progressed to the fifth grade; or, on the other hand, he may be above average or even be a genius in some particular ability or in general, and yet be no further advanced in school. We are acquainted with just such irrational school advancements and retardations, and have seen many individuals whose mentality it would have been quite impossible to estimate as they appeared in the court room. To what extent the offender may or may not be psychopathic, or what peculiar personality traits he may have, is also not in the least revealed without special psychological examination.

Moreover, without this study what can be known of his inner life in the aspects mentioned above? Who knows what he is thinking about or repressing, or what moods, or grudges, or feelings of limitation and conflict in his own household he may be harboring? The exciting cause or the underlying motive of such behavior, the force of which the experienced psychologist knows, ranges from such a general fact as feelings of distaste for old country standards in his home on the part of a young American, to some secret subtle revulsion against some one experience. Or what about an unknown hold

of a bad companion upon the boy, or some obsessive ideation concerning hidden knowledge, usually of sex affairs, one of the strongest driving forces towards delinquency?

It is perfectly clear, then, that to understand even the minor essentials of Jim's case he must be looked over physically (perhaps some special physiological tests being made), and be given a full round of psychological tests, not alone grading him according to a mental age-level, but also looking for specialized features of the mental functioning, strong or weak; and that then by the most skilful methods his inner mental life and mood and attitude must be explained in its relationship to his misbehavior.

Accepting, as always, the challenge of the practical issue, we may meet the fair question: What is ascertained through this study that the judge did not know, what facts that bear upon the really proper treatment of the case? Our answer is: The contributions are both positive and negative; the latter quite as valuable as the former. It is as essential in Jim's case, for instance, to rule out epilepsy, chorea, hysteria, syphilis, psychosis, mental defect, and various other possibilities which we have found active factors in other cases of delinquency, as it is to discover that he is physically healthy and particularly energetic, and that he is highly supernormal in general mental ability and possesses dynamic qualities that demand much in the way of interests, activities, and new material to satisfy them. Likewise careful summation of data shows that there are probably no very significant facts of heredity and development bearing upon the boy's tendency to delinquency.

Analysis of the boy's reactions as exhibited in his own account of them show no indication in this first study of him that there is clash of ideals in the households, or that bad attitudes and grudges have been formed. For the more positive side, it stands out clearly that though the household is well-managed and favorable in many ways for the development of a boy of the most mediocre capacities, and though there is quite normal affection displayed, there has been no understanding whatever of Jim's peculiar needs (perhaps this has led to a certain reserve which Jim shows towards his parents but has not exhibited elsewhere) and there is very little at home to hold the interest or provide outlets for such an active-minded and capable lad.

The necessary careful psychological analysis of effects of influences outside the home shows early acquaintance with bad companions, re-

jection of their modes of conduct, the dwelling on ideas of adventure in city life received from them, a first taste of it alone; and then, following the laws of repetition of pleasurable effect and of mental habit, frequent renewal of adventures in which much that was new and of great interest was experienced. Always alone, Jim found in his night wanderings satisfaction not obtained elsewhere. In the early morning hours, for instance, he would be held by the romance of huge printing presses turning off newspapers for the day.

The essence of such study is the focussing and interpretation of sufficient data, negative and positive, for the purposes of treatment. Brought together and evaluated are many more facts and even types of facts than the judge in court can ascertain. The way to a better adjustment of the situation concerning Jim is now obvious. It cannot be doubted that an institution would probably be his undoing; it is equally clear that there are special measures which very likely will prove reconstructive, even if he remains at home.

Summing up, we know on the basis of long experience that such medicopsychological study frequently brings out points that are absolutely essential to knowledge of causation, which, in turn, is the only rational and immediately effective approach to treatment. Short cuts to such knowledge are not possible; why should one expect to find them, considering the complexities of human behavior and mental life? And what are hours of diagnostic study compared to months of treatment which may be unnecessary, as in institutional life, or to efforts ineffectively directed during probation?

Without desiring in the least to usurp the functions of the law, and without the least argument against punishment in appropriate cases as a good therapeutic agent, and holding no brief for any theory of either causation or treatment, we may insist on medicopsychological study as representing a minimum standard of welfare in the treatment of delinquency.

A rational method of meeting the needs of the youthful offender, which indirectly affords, of course, the greatest protection to society by thwarting his prospective career, is only to be developed by utilizing the facts acquired through a good technique of medicopsychology. This procedure, carried out with sympathy and thoroughness, will contribute greatly to the effectiveness of courts and of other human agencies which attempt some solution of the problems of delinquency. Many of the huge number of failures which occur under the ordinary

system it will be possible to avoid. Moreover, concerning any method or régime, the only legitimate conclusions, as judged even by successes and failures, are possible when the essential facts that deal with the potentialities of the human material handled and with causation form the basis of judgment.

2. Nutrition Clinics ²

All children of preschool and school age may be divided for the sake of discussion into three groups: the sick, the well, and the malnourished. The sick are cared for at home and in the hospitals. The well are inspected and receive a certain amount of preventive care from school physicians. The malnourished, about a third of all, receive no treatment for their malnutrition as such because they are considered well by both private and school physicians. These under-par children make it impossible for the schools to reach reasonable standards of achievement. At the same time the system of school organization compels the teacher to attempt to crowd the pupils through the various grades at high pressure, thus adding to the burden of the under-developed and delicate child. As a result 20 to 40 per cent of those graduating from elementary schools are physically unfit.

It is remarkable that this group of children has received so little medical attention. They pass through hospital clinics unnoticed because malnutrition among older children is not considered a pathological condition.

Weighing and Measuring

The simple procedure of weighing and measuring each child will identify all but the border-line cases. All children habitually 7 per cent or more underweight for their height are not only undernourished but malnourished, retarded in both weight and height from one to four years.

Nutrition Clinics

The object of the nutrition clinic is to identify this group of children, and then on the basis of physical, mental, and social examinations to make a diagnosis of the cause of the malnutrition, thus leading to its proper treatment. It is of as much importance to make this

² By Dr. William R. P. Emerson, *United States Children's Bureau Publication* No. 60, pp. 238-244.

accurate diagnosis in malnutrition as it is in other illnesses. It would be absurd for a physician to ask a group of nurses to care for a ward filled with patients affected with various diseases without informing them of the diagnosis in each case. Yet we are asking school nurses, health workers, and parents to carry out general directions with practically no attempt at diagnosis, resulting in an enormous waste of time, energy, and expense. The nutrition clinic corrects all this by determining the cause of the malnutrition in each instance and then indicating measures for its treatment.

Physical and Mental Examinations. The physical examination reveals an average of more than five defects in each child. When defects interfering with nutrition, especially obstructions to breathing, are corrected, the child is considered free to gain. The mental examination is made in most instances during the course of the physical examination, when it is determined whether there is any question of mental deficiency or retardation. An essential part of the mental examination is to learn the child's disposition and reaction to his environment.

Social Examination. The home life of the child is investigated by a 48-hour record of his program, which includes a list of food taken during that time, his hours of sleep, of work, of play, time in the open air and in fact all his various activities.

Simple causes, such as the following, are found adequate to explain malnutrition of the most severe type: fast eating, insufficient food, the use of tea and coffee, late hours, closed windows at night, too little time in the open air, poor hygiene, over-pressure and long hours in school. Such definite diagnoses are essential to successful treatment.

Nutrition Classes

Having then found the causes of the malnutrition by means of these physical, mental, and social examinations, it requires the co-operation of the child, physician, teacher, and parent to remove them and at the same time to secure for the child the essentials of health. These essentials are the removing of physical and mental causes of poor nutrition, getting the children to take sufficient and proper food at frequent intervals, securing fresh air by day and night, preventing over-fatigue, and establishing sufficient home control to insure good food and health habits. If these results are accomplished, the child

should rapidly gain weight and become well and strong, because of a powerful force in nature that makes for health.

Preparation for the Class. Coöperation for the essentials of health is best obtained by means of nutrition classes of not more than twenty children in each. The nutrition worker prepares for the class by the weekly weighing of each child and the recording of this weight on a chart. The chart shows the average weight line, corresponding to the child's height, and also his actual weight line as he gains or loses. The worker also checks up the diet lists which are carefully kept by pupil or parent in a small record book for two consecutive days of each week. On these days each article of food taken is recorded; the amounts are indicated in tablespoonfuls or ounces. At this time errors in diet should be corrected and helpful suggestions made, especially in regard to taking milk and cereals. The 24-hour amount should be large enough for gain, usually 2,000 or more units (calories). A blue star is given for rest periods and a red star for lunches, if each has been taken every day of the preceding week. In case of failure to gain, personal conferences are held with each pupil in order to discover an adequate cause, which always exists, and therefore should be found by either the nutrition worker or the physician.

Class Conduct. The charts having thus been prepared, the children are assembled by the nutrition worker in a room by themselves where two rows of seats are arranged, ten seats to each row. The child gaining most is given a gold star and is placed at the head of the class. The other children are arranged in order of their gain. The weight chart of each child is hung opposite his place in the class. The nutrition worker keeps a history and record card of each child which contains the doctor's directions and her own follow-up notes. These cards are used by him in considering each child.

When the class is in order the doctor conducts the exercise in such manner as to leave a clear idea in the mind of each child as to what he is to do the following week that he may gain. The room should be quiet and free from interruptions. Parents should occupy the back seats, but the teacher and nutrition worker should be seated in front where they may show by their attention lively interest in each child's progress. The physician praises the children who have gained, but it is his special duty to discover the causes for loss in those who have not gained. These causes are usually failure to take regular lunches

or rest periods, overtime, late hours, etc. This gives an opportunity to show the importance of these factors in the gain or loss of the particular child. A half hour is sufficient time for the physician to take for this exercise. The nutrition worker makes notes and explains the recommendations to each child or parent. Usually the child losing one week is at the head of the class the following week. Where there is complete co-operation and the essentials of health can be wholly obtained, the child should reach his own normal standard of weight in ten or twelve weeks. From 5 to 10 per cent of the children present serious medical problems requiring most careful study by the physician. Even in these cases, however, the class method provides the most satisfactory method of treatment.

Coöperation with the Home. The nutrition worker should visit the child in his home in order to gain the coöperation of his parents and to learn his health habits, especially with reference to eating and sleeping. Plans should be made for open windows at night and for plenty of time in the fresh air by day.

Prevention of Over-fatigue. During the period of treatment the children should be placed in open-air or at least open-window classes and school pressure should be reduced. Some children will need only sufficient additional time for rest and lunch periods; many will work to best advantage on a half-day schedule; a few will need to be reduced to two hours a day, while certain cases cannot profitably attend school at all for a time. One rest period of at least half an hour should be taken before the midday meal. The child should lie flat on his back, thus correcting his usual fatigue position of stooping shoulders, retracted chest, and prominent abdomen. In the mid-afternoon a similar rest period should be taken but for a longer time.

Food. Mid-forenoon and afternoon lunches should contain about 250 units of such food as will not destroy the appetite for the following meal. Sweets should be avoided at this time. Children gain faster on less food taken in small amounts five times a day than when a larger amount of food is taken in three meals.

Authority of the Class Method. The class method appeals to the imagination of the child and makes him do for himself what no one else can do for him. It teaches and inspires him to "train for health" in the same way he trains to be a Boy Scout or a good athlete. Therefore ask him what you will and he will do it cheer-

fully if he is convinced it is good "dope." The boy of seven or eight years steals off by himself, wraps up in his blanket, takes his rest periods, or teaches himself to take and to like foods to which previously he had an aversion. He stops drinking tea and coffee, goes to bed early, prepares his bed with hot water jug and papers between blankets, that he may sleep with his window open on the coldest night. All this he does that he may see his weight line go up each week and the stars registered on his chart.

Successful treatment in the majority of cases is both easy and sure, provided either the physician, nutrition worker, or teacher has sufficient vision to paint true pictures in the child's imagination, thus securing his complete coöperation.

Theses on Nutrition Clinics and Classes

1. In the present organization of hospital clinics, school medical inspection and child-helping agencies there is little provision made for the care of a large group of malnourished children — fully one-third of all — who are not sufficiently sick to require hospital care nor are they "well," although they are reported as such because their true condition is so little understood.

2. The work of these nutrition clinics and classes, although fundamentally medical, is for the most part educational. They furnish a medium for the inspection, examination, and treatment of children in the schools, and should be an integral part of school organization.

3. These clinics and classes are especially adapted to make better use of the resources of the family and afford a means of giving training to mothers by teaching them how the child may become well.

4. All children found to be seven per cent underweight for their height require special consideration and treatment. This rule does not identify all cases of malnutrition, but it furnishes the best single standard of selection which we have been able to formulate.

5. The first step is the identification of the members of this group. This can best be done in the schools where all children should be weighed and measured periodically.

6. Those children who are found to be seven per cent underweight for their height should be given special treatment and relieved for the time from a part of the usual school pressure.

7. To each of these children should be given an intensive examina-

tion. This examination should be made in so far as possible in the presence of the child's parents. All clothing should be removed at least to the waist in order that no defects may be overlooked.

8. The data coming from this examination should be put in form so that they can be used by the specialists to whom the child may be sent for further examination and study. For the same reasons all data accumulated by the specialists should be available in duplicate form for the physician in charge of the nutrition clinic. The amount of time required for these records will be found to be less rather than more than that now used in reports and records which, on account of their lack of standardization and definiteness, are often of very little value.

9. The same plan should be followed with reference to the records growing out of the mental and social examinations and the agencies which these have brought into the case. No defect of any kind should be considered in isolation.

10. An organization similar to that used for open-air classes will be found most serviceable in caring for the malnutrition group. Even from the standpoint of the child's studies it will be found to be economical to reduce the pressure of school responsibilities and work on a program which without delay will make it possible for him to be brought up to his own normal standard.

11. It will be found that some children in this group will be able to attend school both morning and afternoon, provided adequate arrangements are made for rest periods. In other cases an alternation can be arranged placing one group in school mornings and another afternoons. Those who are excessively underweight cannot afford to attend school for more than two hours a day. Of course individuals may need to be removed from all school pressure for a time.

12. Children should be made free to gain by having all necessary medical and surgical attention given to them promptly. This should include the removal of diseased tonsils and adenoids, the proper care of the teeth, et cetera.

13. From 20 to 40 per cent of the children of school and pre-school age will be found to be in the seven per cent underweight for their height group.

14. It will be found that a reasonable program such as we have outlined will make it possible for the greater part of this group to return to their regular work in from three months to half a year,

and that practically all will come up to their own normal standards by the end of the school year.

15. The open-air class organization will serve best as a clearing house for the various types of health-need cases. It will accomplish more as a station in which these special needs can be met than as a more or less permanent retreat for chronic cases.

16. A certain number of problem cases will require a special station for diagnosis in which they can be under constant observation.

17. Special consideration should be given to children who are convalescing from any attack of severe illness so that it may become a custom in the school to help such children reach a state of complete recovery before they are allowed to return to the heavy pressure of the regular class-room work.

18. Relations should be established with summer camps to avoid children being sent to them without diagnosis.

19. It is desirable to keep the responsibility for improving the growth conditions of the child upon the parents. Permanent results require control by the forces nearest to the situation.

20. Under conditions of sympathetic coöperation between the members of the clinic staff, the school corps, and the other agencies involved, it should be possible to do some valuable experimental work with reference to the most favorable hours for school work, the length of school sessions, the conditions of recess periods, the value of school lunches, training in hygiene, et cetera.

21. Many of the conditions of the nutrition clinics are especially favorable for the work to be accomplished in the examinations given for working certificates. The most serious problems met at this stage of a child's life are those of growth. The more the results secured at this period are interpreted in terms of school life, the better will the school be able to work out an economical and efficient program.

22. There are many reasons why the work to be done with children of the preschool age should be in the hands of those agencies which have had charge of the period of infancy. Much of the waste met in the school years could be eliminated during these earlier years by means of more adequate provision for this most neglected period of growth. It is not infrequent to find serious cases at the school age who have excellent records with reference to nourishment and growth when they were infants. It is important that there should be close coöperation between those who are working with members of the

school and preschool groups. It is especially desirable that the latter group should not have a third set of agencies built up to compete in its demands upon the time of the mother with those already caring for the needs of the school children and the infants.

23. The nutrition clinic is especially well adapted to care for dependent, delinquent, and defective children. Nutrition classes for State wards having foster mothers have proved to be remarkably effective.

3. Mental Hygiene³

The outstanding fact that present-day psychiatry emphasizes is that mental illness is a type of reaction of the individual to his problems of adjustment which is conditioned by two factors—the nature of those problems and the character equipment with which they are met.

The first of these factors, the nature of the problems, we can dismiss with the general statement that any individual, theoretically at least, may break under the stresses of adjustment if only the stresses are sufficiently great. For any material, be it physical or mental, no matter how strong its make-up, a force may be conceived great enough to break it.

The second of these factors, the character equipment, is the important one for our consideration in this connection, for mental hygiene is calculated to reinforce the weak points in character while it may often be at a loss to change the nature of the problems which present themselves for solution, although both factors are proper subjects for its consideration.

A generation ago, psychiatry approached the various types of maladjustment from a purely descriptive standpoint, classifying the several disease pictures solely upon an enumeration of the symptoms. This was the period of studying mental illness in cross section. Later, under the influence of the Kraepelinian teaching, mental illnesses were classified upon the basis of their course and outcome. This was the period of studying mental illnesses in longitudinal section. Today it is generally accepted that mental illnesses are only reactions of the individual as a whole. Pathological reactions, then, are only

³ From "Childhood: The Golden Period for Mental Hygiene," by William M. White, M.D., Sup't St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C., in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. XCVIII., No. 187, (Nov. 1921); pp. 54-60. Reprinted by permission.

a portion of the total behavior of the individual and can be understood only after a sufficient analysis of the personality make-up has made clear how the symptoms are the outcome of a certain character equipment brought to bear upon certain problems of adjustment. This is the period of behavioristic psychology and interpretative psychiatry.

Mental illnesses, defects of adjustment at the psychological level, are therefore dependent upon defects in the personality make-up, and as this personality make-up is what it is as a result of its development from infancy onward, it follows that the foundation of those defects which later issue in mental illness are to be found in the past history of that development.

Origin of Character Traits

The preceding is a somewhat abstract statement of what is found, as a matter of fact, in every psychosis as it passes in review in our clinical work. A study of the individual patient always discloses elements in the character make-up which have made for maladjustment over a period of years until finally, owing to some acute disaster or merely to the accumulation of stresses, the breaks or, in individuals more seriously burdened, the defects, have conditioned a series of pathological symptoms which have resulted in marked and more or less continuous inefficiency. In other words, mental illnesses are found to be the outward and evident signs of intra-psychic difficulties — conflicts we call them — which conflicts in turn are found to be dependent upon traits of character that have their origins in the childhood of the individual. The capability of the individual for efficient adjustment becomes progressively weakened much after the analogy of two lines that start at a given point and pursue diverging courses. Finally they get so far apart that no bridging of the distance is possible; each pursues its own course independent of the other, and we have the symptoms, for example, of a split personality.

It is natural that character defects should first have attracted attention and been studied in those conditions in which the defects have produced gross and easily observable symptoms. A study of these gross defects of adjustment has shown, however, that the important etiological factors are not nearly as obvious as they were originally supposed to be, but on the contrary they are constituted of subtle

defects which have been, often for long periods, quite successfully hidden from view.

The particular trait of character with which the individual has been struggling all his life — suspicion, cruelty, jealousy, timidity, curiosity, overconsciousness, etc. — the trait about which his difficulties arrange themselves, will be found on analysis to have been unfortunately conditioned early in life as a result of the influences exerted by the various members of the family or their surrogates. There is as yet no adequate appreciation of the continuity with which we express our affective states in our postural attitudes, our facial expressions, our voices, mannerisms, remarks, opinions, interests, aversions, and how subtly, half-consciously, often quite unconsciously, we read these signs in those about us and are correspondingly influenced. This personal world we live in is “not a world of formal thought only, but more a world of feeling, and moreover a sentience so exquisitely fine and fluent as many times to be scarce conscious of itself and quite unconscious of its causal antecedents.” The child in the family is one part of an organism which is highly responsive to all that goes on in that organism. The influences which thus reach the child find it peculiarly plastic, much more so than later in life when the main character traits have become firmly established, structuralized.

All of this points quite unequivocally to the period of childhood as the golden period for putting into effect the teachings of mental hygiene. It is the period *par excellence* for prophylaxis and therefore the period, above all others, which must be studied if psychiatry is ever to develop an effective program of prevention.

These statements will, I think, be pretty generally agreed to, but in this connection I wish to refer to certain tendencies of thinking which I believe have operated against this enlarged conception of the importance of the personality. I refer particularly to the thinking which has been dominated by the germ-plasm theory of heredity and certain derivatives from this theory which have tended to the conclusion that practically all of our characteristics, mental as well as physical, are handed down to us by our ancestors and are something, therefore, which we can do very little about. The theory of the non-inheritance of acquired characters and the further theory that for every last trait there is a germ plasm determiner has introduced a fatalistic element into our thinking which has made for a therapeutic nihilism by turning attention away from a consideration

of the possibilities of effectively modifying the fundamental elements of the character make-up. In this connection Ritter very aptly says that the germ-plasm dogma is "chargeable with the grave offense of having added its weight to a conception of human life the overcoming of which has been consciously or unconsciously man's aim throughout the whole vast drama of his hard, slow progress from lower to higher levels of civilization — the conception that his life is the result of forces against which his aspirations and efforts are impotent."

Even allowing that certain fundamental traits are inherited, that does not mean that nothing is to be accomplished in an effort to utilize those traits to better advantage. A congenital deaf mute does not have to give up all effort to communicate with his fellows just because he cannot do it in the usual way. A person may be from early childhood intensely curious. That does not mean that he must always use his curiosity in a socially offensive way. With proper opportunity and guidance, he may learn to use this trait to better and better advantage and may become a scientist utilizing his curiosity in searching out the secrets of nature rather than the secrets of his neighbors.

Apart from such considerations, however, there is much evidence that the theory of the continuity of the germ plasm and the non-inheritance of acquired characters, in fact the whole subject of heredity, will have to be materially modified, particularly as it relates to those mental traits that we are accustomed to observe in our fellows and our patients. Not only are certain biologists beginning to think of the germ plasm as being a part of the organism as a whole rather than as a substance which is handed on from parents to offspring in unmodified form, but there is much evidence that mental traits, particularly those which later make for defects of adjustment, precisely because these have attracted most attention, are developed in response to certain facts in the environment. For example, it is as logical to suppose that a son may develop traits like his father because he seeks to emulate him as it is to suppose that these traits were handed down to him through the medium of specific determiners in the germ plasm.

If it is true that defects in the character make-up can be explained as originating in traits which were acquired in early childhood as reactions to certain factors in the child's environment, then the way is opened for an attempt to prevent such undesirable traits by an understanding of the child and a modification or elimination of those environmental factors which produce such results. For example, we

all know many persons who are afraid of lightning, yet Watson tells us that in all the babies he has worked with he has never seen a reaction of fear to sudden flashes of light. *

If the fatalistic ways of thinking engendered by the theories of heredity can be put aside, then we find another reason for considering that the period of childhood offers the golden opportunity for mental hygiene and for realizing that this is the period upon which effort must finally be centered in the development of a program of prevention.

Program of Prevention

What are the points of attack for the development of such a program?

First, there must be a real understanding and development of child psychology. This development must be along the lines of behaviorism, a study of what the child is trying to do in terms of the child-psyche. Here, as elsewhere in dealing with children, the tendency has been to think of the child as if it were a small adult and to project upon it those types of explanation which we as adults have found satisfying in our own personal experience. A behavioristic child psychology must get away from this tendency and get at the original data from first-hand observation. Such a study of the development of types of reaction, a study of the primitive instincts and their unfolding in the more complex reactions as the development progresses, is of the first importance.

Second, an understanding of the nature of the child's relations to its environment, particularly its personal environment and specifically to the members of the family, is also essential. Its relation to the family situation begins from the moment of birth, and from the symptoms that later develop in the psychoses we have come to learn how important those relations are for conditioning the later reactions for better or for worse. The fact has too long escaped notice that the family situation contains within itself certain elements of a disruptive nature. It is as essential that the child should ultimately escape from its bondage to the family as it is that it should, during a certain period, be a part of that family and more or less subject to its direction. The complex interplay of these attractions and repulsions needs to be more fully studied as they express themselves in the symbolic mosaic at the psychological level.

And thirdly, a full understanding of all these matters must reach their application in education. Here again the effort has too often been to project upon the child something which we as adults may think desirable rather than to understand the equipment of the child and then try to develop that equipment in the best possible way. Education has been largely empirical and too much confined to teaching; it needs to be developed as a scheme for assisting and guiding the developing personality, based upon a real understanding of the principles involved and the equipment.

And finally, inasmuch as it cannot be expected that the child is going to acquire all this information and then apply it to itself, it is essential to develop some means whereby such information can be translated into effectiveness. The child is so intimate and so all-pervading an element in our social structure that any organized effort to influence it profoundly in its development must needs touch every part of that structure. The obviously more important points of attack, however, are the home and the school, of which places probably the home offers the least encouragement. The relations between parents and children are governed, for the most part, by crude instinct, and it would hardly seem that we have either organized knowledge in a sufficiently practical form or means at our disposal to alter this situation materially or even to interfere with it on a large scale, except in a superficial way, with anything like a sure touch. To be sure, much can be done by the trained social worker, but this is usually in cases where trouble already exists, and even such approaches must come largely through the schools. That this is so is perhaps unfortunate, for there are of necessity many problems that can not be touched in this way except perchance through the family physician, who should become more and more a reliable source of information, advice, and strength as the teaching of psychiatry and kindred subjects broadens out in the medical schools. . . .

The school seems, therefore, to be the most practical place to work for results, although of course a great deal of knowledge must be acquired about the child before it is of school age. Work of this character we are trying to plan in Washington in connection with a private charity which ministers to the infant, helping the mother during her pregnancy and the child for the first six years. Arrived at the school, however, the teacher becomes the surrogate for the parent and perhaps in many ways, not only by education, but because

of emotional detachment, is better calculated to be of real service than the parent. If the teachers, with the machinery of the schools, are going to be of real value, it will mean that the education in the normal school will have to be broadened, the final result of which will be somewhat older, more mature, better teachers, better paid.

Correlation of Childhood and Adult Delinquence

All our approaches to the understanding of defective psychological adjustments point indubitably to childhood as the period when things first go wrong, and the indication is therefore clear that this is the period which must be studied and modified to prevent the failures of later life. A great mass of evidence has been accumulated which goes to show that serious breaks in adjustment do not ordinarily occur without the coöperation of some lack of balance in the personality make-up; that they are rarely to be satisfactorily accounted for by the influence of extraneous circumstances alone. This evidence has been accumulated from the study of actual breaks as we see them in our patients — breaks which we have come to look at only as end results.

The studies which have been made of delinquents show this very well indeed — for example, the young man who has finally come to a long-term sentence in prison will almost invariably show, if a careful survey of his past life is made, a long series of conduct anomalies which make the final outcome not only understandable, but often quite inevitable. I have in mind a recent case that came under my observation. A negro ran amuck, broke into several dwellings, and in one shot and killed a young woman. He was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be hanged. A behavioristic survey of this man disclosed the fact that he had shown traits of lack of control, impulsive and irresponsible conduct from his early youth, that he early began to drink and to take drugs, that he had been arrested and served sentences upon many occasions for both major and minor offenses, that there was all through his career a tendency to indulge in acts of violence and acts that were calculated to jeopardize the safety and the lives of others. The final homicide was the logical outcome of such a career, and at this late date execution seems rather a confession of impotence in dealing with this antisocial problem. No really intelligent plan had ever been brought to bear upon the problem he presented, but he was allowed to pursue his course to its logical out-

come; whereupon society washed its hands of him finally and for all time. From the standpoint of responsibility, it might well be questioned which was the more responsible — the society that permitted all this or the defective youth who went his way.

One of the most important issues in mental hygiene, then, as I see it, is to correlate the sick adult with the knowledge we have that his illness is traceable in its beginnings to his early life. I have already indicated that this must be done by a more developed knowledge of the psychology of childhood, which is reflected in the home, in the school, and in the principles and methods of education. While all of this is true, we need not lose sight of the fact that much work which is at present being carried on involves mental hygiene by implications, some very direct. Such work as the Child Bureau is doing in attempting to determine the minimum requirements of food, clothing, wages, etc., is obviously important. We must first have a live child if we are to have any problem at all. Efforts to improve the environment, even with reference to such obvious features as food, clothes, and ordinary sanitation, however, are not lacking in their general effect upon the mind of the developing child.

Recent investigations in the devastated countries of Europe have shown how quickly destitution, which takes all the joy out of life, is reflected in the mental make-up of the children. Here also come in such problems as the care of the pregnant woman, child labor, sex education, school sanitation, and more specifically the problems of the atypical child and juvenile delinquency, all of which can be better dealt with in proportion to our increased knowledge of child psychology, while such social problems as marriage and divorce, and birth control, have very direct bearings.

All of these several factors will be seen to have their bearings when it is realized that the child is not a finished product, but the result of influences which play upon it from all these sources. It is a product of the past through heredity, of the innumerable elements, largely personal, of its environment, of its instincts as they work out in relation to that environment, of social and family traditions, and of the social standards of its time and place, and all of the various approaches indicated can be made more effective in the light of such knowledge. I am minded at this point to compare the broad behavioristic program that I have indicated with the restricted scheme that is spanned only too often by the Binet-Simon scale. This scale, as devised by its

originators, may be a very valuable tool in the hands of a skilled observer, but as the "be all and end all" of child psychology it may become quite as vicious in its results as the fatalism inspired by the false theories of heredity I have already mentioned.

And finally, inasmuch as many of the breaks, perhaps most of them, occur in the adolescent period or the period of early adulthood, it would, to my mind, be of inestimable value if some help could be systematically extended to the youth when, if he has not as yet broken, the symptoms of final disaster are quite apt to be discoverable. This might easily be done while he is still in school or college, if there could be connected with each such institution an adviser skilled in matters psychological and sympathetic and understanding of the problems of the young. This is a matter to which Dr. Paton has called special attention. I feel sure that such an adviser, connected with our large universities, would soon establish a large and useful clinic to which a great number of the student body would resort for advice and assistance in dealing with their life problems as they are beginning to unfold at this most critical period of life. It is of the utmost necessity that not only should our schools and colleges be equipped to offer instruction in any branch of learning desired, but that the individual should be consulted as to his equipment, his personal tendencies and desires, his difficulties and shortcomings, as well as his special aptitudes and opportunities. Unless this is done, the big educational machines will go on grinding out their regular proportion of failures. When it is done, those failures can be minimized and it may be found that not a few may profitably be turned away from a higher education to a life of greater usefulness in some other direction.

This is the sort of effort that is calculated to adjust the educational machine to the needs of the individual. Today that machine offers a fixed structure into which the individual is fed, to come out well or ill in proportion to his capacity to meet the requirements. The means I suggest would have the effect of helping to adjust the educational opportunities to the needs of the individual and would be a movement towards individualizing the student just as we have learned in psychiatry that any material advances in therapeutic efficiency must come along with a further individualizing of our patients.

These are some of the directions in which my thought is led by a consideration of the mental hygiene of childhood. If we are to produce a better race of adults, we must be able to control the influences which

go to mold the adult character. A practical program in this field seems to me to be possible, and to offer a decidedly more workable scheme than an effort to go back of the returns with the eugenicist and control the material. The more we know of what can be accomplished with the material given us, the better position we shall be in to undertake the control of what that material shall be.

Exercises

1. Explain the relation of child welfare to other social problems. Is it a social problem or a social movement? (See Rainwater: *The Play Movement*, for a definition of "a social movement.")
2. Compare child welfare among savage and civilized people.
3. Name some of the most recent phases of child welfare.
4. Characterize the need and the attitude of the courts with respect to human problems.
5. What do Healy and Bronner seek to show by the concrete case quoted?
6. In the diagnosis of his case which facts revealed least? which most? Which were most illuminating, the physical, the mental, or the social?
7. Of the facts classed as psychological by these authors, which are really sociological from the viewpoint of Burgess? (See Reading 3, in preceding chapter.)
8. Comment on the following: "We may insist on medicopsychological study as representing a minimum standard of welfare in the treatment of delinquency."
9. Distinguish three classes of school children, and show which is most neglected. Why?
10. State the object and describe the methods of the nutrition *clinic*.
11. In the same way discuss the nutrition *class*.
12. What is the sociological secret of its success?
13. On the basis of the 23 "theses" quoted, make an outline for conducting a nutrition class.
14. Is the "character equipment" mentioned by White a matter of individuality or personality?
15. Show the connection between mental illnesses, conflicts, character traits, and social experience.
16. Estimate the part played by the family in this.
17. In what way does the theory of organic inheritance confuse this problem? What is the more correct view?
18. Of the three modes of preventing this problem, which is the most distinctly sociological? Why?
19. What is the theory of "end results" in the study of adult break-downs and failures? Illustrate.

20. What bearing does the work of the Children's Bureau of the U. S. Government have on mental hygiene?
21. What changes in the measuring scales and guidance methods of the schools are demanded by the new knowledge of mental hygiene?

Additional References

1. Baldwin, Bird T.: *The Physical Growth of Children from Birth to Maturity, in University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*. The most authoritative work in the anthropometrical and psychological aspects of research in child welfare.
2. Baldwin, Bird T. (Editor): *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*. The entire series, from the Iowa University Child Welfare Research Station, is of great value.
3. Chapin, Henry D.: *Heredity and Child Culture*. See especially Ch. XI., on "Nerve Culture."
4. Clopper, Edward N.: *Street Work and Juvenile Delinquency*. Pamphlet No. 221 (5c), National Child Labor Committee. Contains a list of the publications of the Committee.
5. Clopper, Edward N. (Director): *Child Welfare in Kentucky: An Inquiry by the Nat'l Child Labor Committee for the Kentucky Child Labor Assoc'n, and the State Board of Health, 1919*.
6. Drucker, Saul, and Hexter, Maurice B.: *Children Astray*. Twenty-four character sketches by Jewish workers and officials.
7. Grigg, Harry H., Haynes, George E., and Webster, Albert E.: *Junk Dealing and Juvenile Delinquency*. A pamphlet (25c) reporting an investigation made for the Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago.
8. Mangold, George B.: *Problems of Child Welfare*. The standard text-book, covering the whole field.

CHAPTER XLI

UNEMPLOYMENT, DISABLEMENT, AND SOCIAL INSURANCE

THE two problems named in the title are distinctly among those which arise from defective social organization. Every able-bodied and willing worker seeking in vain for a job is an eloquent indictment of the social order. Such an anomaly points to wrong social arrangements which cannot be justified. The right to work, to utilize the materials and forces of nature, comes as near being a "natural" and "inalienable" right as anything in human life. It ranks in dignity and force along with the claim of every child to the conditions necessary for *health* of body, mind, and soul, and that claim of the child is absolute, whether it be the child of an emperor or an "illegitimate" waif.¹

In its recognition of these two claims — that of the child for a chance to play and grow, and that of the worker for a chance to labor, lies one of the surest tests of the real enlightenment of a people. The social attitude toward these two human demands possesses this peculiar significance because they lie at the basis of life and the way they are met determines the ethical character of the social organization.

The growth of social insurance represents the effort of present-day societies to distribute the risks and burdens of unemployment (among other uncertainties of life), just as the child welfare movement is the modern answer to the problems of childhood.

In Readings 1 and 2 we seek to show, from a special study made on the Russell Sage Foundation, the meaning of unemployment to the workers themselves, both in immediate adjustments to it and in its after effects. In Reading 3 the actual efforts of a great industrial concern to meet the problem, only partly solved by national insurance, are described by the distinguished scholar and entrepreneur, Mr. B. Seeböhm Rowntree. In Reading 4 we quote from an official government document with respect to the value of social insurance. The particular object in the quoted report is *health insurance*, but the principle applies to unemployment, disablement, and all the forms of invalidity, which increase the uncertainties of life. The idea underlying all forms of social insurance is, of course, to make the bearing of these risks a co-operative, communal affair, in which "each for all, and all for each" shall be the spirit of social organization.

¹ It has been truly pointed out that there is really no such thing as an illegitimate child — there is only the illegitimate parent.

1. Meaning of Unemployment to the Workers²

To the typical workingman the first blow of unemployment is not a great shock. Very soon he will get his job back — or another one. Familiarity with his industry and experience of other times in finding supplementary work guide his first steps; later, however, as the situation becomes graver he calls successively upon his various resources, item by item. The first effect of unemployment, therefore, is a call upon the ingenuity of the worker to obtain the means by which to keep himself and his family from starvation. These are numerous and distributed in a variety of fields. The wealth of resources that he may tap has often surprised the social observer. Only when these diverse resources have been largely exhausted do the more serious effects of unemployment upon the family make their appearance. In the present chapter, therefore, these various methods by which the worker keeps his head above water are considered first, and the more deleterious effects are discussed later.

There is no uniformity in the procedure nor in available resources as between one family and another. Generally speaking, the skilled and better-paid laborer can hold out longer than the common or unskilled laborer, and can command a greater variety of resources. The degree of progress of the depression is reflected, indeed, in the extent to which distress reaches the groups that are ordinarily on a fair economic level. Thus, in the winter of 1921-22, social case work of organizations almost uniformly report a rapidly increasing proportion, among their applicants, of skilled artisans, small business men, and members of the professions. Other factors than the one of previous economic level also influence a family's method and degree of success in overcoming the menace of distress. Among these factors, race and nationality are, perhaps, the most important.

It is generally known, for example, that in the matter of eking out income Negroes more quickly than others double up in apartments, take in lodgers, and in general permit the number of occupants per room to grow beyond any reasonable limits. On the other hand, it is not generally known that Sicilians, unlike other southern Italians, are strongly against housing two families together or taking boarders;

² From *The Burden of Unemployment: A Study of Unemployment Relief Measures in Fifteen American Cities, 1921-22*, by Philip Klein; Ch. *passim*. (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1923. Reprinted by permission.)

that they do not pawn or sell the jewelry or household linens, on which they place great value. Negroes are generous in aiding one another in every way. Italians freely borrow from their friends, Jews utilize mutual aid societies, Scandinavians and Germans command considerable credit with tradesmen. In reducing the food budget, Polish families are likely to go to the extreme of dry bread and coffee, while Italians rarely allow themselves to make serious inroads on their bill of fare, and native Americans continue to buy milk longest.

Negroes universally fared worst in the cities visited. The slump in the steel and metal trades affected Slavic groups and Italians; in construction work, Irish and native Americans; in cotton (New Bedford), Portuguese and French; in office and sales work, native Americans and Jews, native and foreign born; in farming, native Americans and Scandinavians. Racial and national characteristics are, therefore, further complicated by local conditions and occupational distribution among the population, which may vary considerably from city to city.

Part-time Work. Recourse to part-time work at his own trade as a means of support may hardly be attributed to the initiative of the worker. It is the customary procedure in many firms in times of depression to cut down the amount of work per man rather than to discharge employees. To this natural practice was added, in 1921, the urgent appeal to manufacturers by the President's Conference on Unemployment, which met in Washington in September and October of that year, to extend that practice to its utmost limits. This method is also provided for in some contracts between manufacturers and trade unions. How general part-time work has been, it is impossible to say. Not only are records few, but by the time this study was undertaken — which was when the depression had progressed pretty far — part-time work was no longer much in evidence. The continued inactivity of business had made it an insecure policy for the manufacturer.

Change of Occupation. A well-considered, deliberate change in occupation, one that is calculated to improve the general economic condition of the family, may be regarded as desirable. But, barring isolated cases such as are likely to occur at any time, the changes of occupation brought about by the recent unemployment crisis, as reported in numerous instances during the depression just past, have been generally for the worse.

There has been an increase of small business enterprises on the part of workingmen during emergency, which shows energy and ingenuity,

but the adoption of which is rarely satisfactory in the end. The Chicago Urban League for Negroes reports:

. . . "the springing up of a number of small shops for barbecued meat, and the development of a string of hot tamale venders. These, while not unknown before the winter of 1921-22, at least were by no means so numerous before that period. A talk with some of the men concerned leads to the point of view that being unable to get work they conceived the idea of getting a little wagon and going out for what they could pick up. Others, seeing the success of the idea, followed it up and imitated it. Now there may be seen in Chicago a larger development of the same idea in a number of wagons — some of them small enough to be pushed by hand, others of them being reconstructed trucks or horse-drawn vehicles. These latter carry a much larger assortment of food, hot dogs, sandwiches of different kinds, fish, candies, cakes and so forth. . . ."

Temporary and Odd Jobs. Most of the emergency work during the period of depression was either temporary — lasting not more than a few weeks — or consisted of discontinuous odd jobs measured in hours or days. Wherever emergency public works came to the attention of the writer of the present study, this was the case. Usually these jobs were necessarily temporary because of the low wages paid. The wages made the work equivalent to a short job.

In bulk, therefore, temporary and odd jobs — more plentiful in some cities than in others, depending largely on the public interest and the energy of the unemployed individual — were the worker's greatest resource in the field of employment. . . .

Women and Children of the Family Going to Work. It was the practically unanimous opinion of local observers that the reduction of personnel in firms employing women was, by comparison, much smaller than in those employing men. Relatively, therefore, there was less unemployment among women than among men; and, conversely, the chances of finding work were better for women than for men. The Chicago Urban League reports:

" . . . for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1921, more women found work than men for the first time since the office has been open. There was a greater proportionate opportunity for domestic service, and a fair increase in the demand for power machine operators in the apron trade. . . ."

At any rate it was easier for unemployed women to find work during

the emergency than for unemployed men to find it, despite the fact that in the field of day labor in homes, such as cleaning, washing, and so on, as distinct from "domestic service," there was a serious shrinkage of opportunity — due to lower general prosperity — and a great increase in competition. Family welfare agencies that had previously been able to place their clients without difficulty for day labor found this avenue of income very much narrowed.

Stories such as the following are, therefore, more the type than the exception:

"Mr. H. could not find work after the strike (packing houses), but his wife found employment for three days a week in a nearby factory; so Mr. H. kept house and cared for the children. Although neither of them liked this arrangement, it was the best they could do. . . .

"Mrs. L. worked eight hours every night, although she had a four months' old baby. Her husband cared for the children and the house during the daytime, but she had to give up the work because of ill health."

There were some very unusual ways of solving the difficulty. One social worker's report is brief:

"Mr. X's mistress cares for the X children, while the wife works. Everyone concerned, including the wife, seems to be well satisfied with the plan."

The observations of another case worker are telling — and typical:

"The most forcible impression I gained from tabulating unemployment sheets was the number of surprisingly young married couples that applied to the United Charities. There were a few whose duration of marriage could still be counted in months, a far greater number who had been married less than five years. Some ask definitely for relief, but *the majority requested nursery care for the children so that the mother could work. . . .*"

Accepting Reduced Wages. Parallel with the shrinkage of employment came also reduction in wages. Those who were fortunate enough to be retained at work found themselves faced with a lowered scale of wages. The wage income of the worker decreased even where he continued to work full time, and necessarily more so when he was employed part time only. The worker had no choice. Even where powerful labor organizations resisted the reductions, as in the building, transportation, clothing, printing, and other industries, wages nevertheless frequently went down after strike, lockout, or compromise.

In the field of common labor and in the less well-organized trades there was nothing to stop the downward trend. While instances frequently occurred of men's refusing to accept new jobs at wages inordinately low, generally speaking they accepted any wages that were offered. Reductions in wages were greatest in the field of common labor and affected also the wages of women and children. Negro day labor in the South was frequently obtainable in the winter of 1921-22 at \$1.00 or \$1.25 a day, and this competition brought white labor down to \$2.50.

Credit. Tradesmen doing business with workingmen's families know the ups and downs of the worker's income and have accepted as a matter of course the system of extending credit to them in periods of unemployment. It is part of the "risks of the trade." The chances of loss (as compared with the long illness, for example) are slight, whereas refusal to give credit would seriously cut down trade.

It was expected, then, that credit would be a rich resource for the temporary relief of the incomeless workingman. The question was how far it would go. According to the testimony of competent observers the local tradesmen have been one of the strongest bulwarks of the unemployed against destitution. . . .

Savings. There is some discrepancy between the opinion of social workers and the records of many banks as to the extent to which savings were a resource in the emergency. But there is, nevertheless, sufficient common ground for recognizing that savings did serve materially to tide over the family of the unemployed man for a considerable period of the depression.

Social agencies uniformly report the use and often the exhaustion of savings before clients appealed for relief. Two and three hundred dollars in savings were common among the families known in Hartford, and occasionally they were as high as \$500 when the depression came. . . .

Help from Relatives. Help from relatives is expected as a matter of course by those in straits in the first place, and by social workers also where the expectation is reasonable. Yet, despite their importance as a resource in normal times and their usual generosity during depressions, relatives appear to have slipped down lower in the scale of active aids during the unemployment distress of 1921-22 than formerly. Heroic efforts abounded, but in the aggregate they were of comparatively little importance as the depression continued. The Children's

Bureau reported, in fact, that only 10 per cent of the 366 families studied by them received aid from relatives. The reason for this must be, not that relatives were less inclined to help than at other times, but that they were less in a position to do so. Unemployment was general. The chances were not more favorable for one than for another. The skilled, the efficient, the resourceful, were less affected than the unskilled. But *less* often was not much less.

Loans. In discussing the importance of loans in the wage earner's efforts to sustain his family during the employment depression of 1921-22, the Children's Bureau summarizes its findings as follows: "The principal source of maintenance, both as to aggregate amount and number of families reporting, was loans and other debts exclusive of credit for food." More specifically, "32 per cent were recipients of loans . . . 69 per cent had contracted other debts (than for food). . . ."

Other Financial Resources. It would be impossible to give a complete list of ways and means by which families have managed to raise funds to live upon while the breadwinner was idle. Credit, savings, help from relatives, and loans — a good many of the last from friends — were undoubtedly the most important quantitatively. In particular instances none of these aids may have been employed. Income from rent paid by lodgers tided over some families. The sale of houses, furniture, clothing, articles of luxury, produced money for others. Not a few mortgaged their homes or other real estate. . . .

Migration and Emigration. Past experience suggests that migration — change of residence from one community to another within this country — and emigration to the home country of immigrant workers have been attempted by the unemployed in their search for better luck. There was comparatively little evidence of either movement, however, in the recent depression. . . .

Reductions in the Scale of Living. Accusations against the whole working class have been made by unsympathetic critics to the effect that during the period of high wages they squandered their money on "silk shirts and automobiles." Against individual instances of extravagance that could undoubtedly be cited, should be taken into account the amount of financial reserve now seen to have been built up by this same class and used effectively for self-support when income was suspended during the depression. It is true that a great number of workmen had raised their scale of living during the

high wage period of 1918-20; and that, in addition to expenditures that brought returns in health and a richer life, they purchased what ordinarily would be considered luxuries quite beyond their means. Unwise though some of these expenditures may seem in retrospect, there is ample evidence that the "wild extravagance" charged did not prevent working families as a whole from laying up savings and other protection against a rainy day, and that they weathered two cruel seasons of unemployment with less suffering than they experienced in the comparatively brief depression of 1914-15.

There was, however, a narrow margin at best between the current scale of living and the usual standard of living of the workingmen. The reduction in scale soon ate into the standard.

2. Effects of Unemployment ³

The effects of unemployment constitute a tale that is not entirely told for years after the depression has passed. The inevitable aftermath of sorrow and suffering is generally admitted, but its extent cannot even be guessed. Of the more immediate and recognizable effects, the congestion of families, the reduction of diet, and the resulting illness and malnutrition are perhaps the most serious.

Congestion and Bad Housing. A family of twelve with a thirteenth in prospect is reported from Pittsburgh to have moved twice, each time to a poorer location — in one of the places occupying two rooms. The rent apparently mattered little, for they were not able to pay anywhere and in two or three months would have to move again. A Memphis family of five moved from a good detached house to one small room, where they cooked, ate, and slept.

"One of the most noticeable things which is probably due to the house shortage as well as to the general unemployment, are the small shacks being erected," says a Kansas City worker. "In some instances these are rented for a small amount. Often the lots are bought on small monthly payments, the lumber purchased in the same way. Here the family feel secure, as they will not be evicted when there is no money to pay rent."

In no other group of people, as already stated, has congestion due to unemployment been so severe as among Negroes. Overcrowded before the depression, because of the increase of colored population

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-37.

in cities to which industrial prosperity had drawn them, the distress of unemployment crowded them even more. In the winter of 1920-21, many of the homeless colored men in Chicago put up shanties on the lake front—a method of housing that was airy enough but had little else to recommend it. In the city itself, “where previously it was a problem where to get a flat,” says the Chicago Urban League, “recently it has been rather how to pay rentals. . . . A check of real estate offices revealed uniformly that more flats were for rent than in April of the two preceding years. This would indicate either a doubling up of families or a decrease in population, or both. It is unquestionable that there has been considerable doubling up, as the reports of express and storage men testify. Numbers of families have broken up, the man often going to nearby places in search of work, the other members of his family going with relatives or merely lodging.”

A family of five (reports one agency) were living in four rooms and paying \$14 a month rent (later raised to \$20). Developments of the unemployment situation found this family of five occupying one of the four rooms, another family of five occupying another room (both families using the kitchen), and the third bedroom rented to two lodgers. Another family, consisting of parents and three children, living in six rooms and bath, fairly prosperous, the man conducting an ice and coal business, took in various other members of the family on account of unemployment, until on the last date visited there were 14 persons in the household.

Cases of this type were being encountered by social case workers at every step. Under such circumstances, necessity on the one hand and the promise of profits on the other, conspired to increase congestion and unsanitary living conditions.

Reduction of Diet. Practically all the families observed in Hartford by social case workers were reported to be reducing their food budget, and a group of some twenty workers in conference in Chicago uniformly reported observations of similar reductions. While the observations of these reductions were not based on scientific count of calory values, they represent competent evidence in view of the intimate acquaintance of these case workers with the families under their care. One Chicago worker says:

“Certain items are eliminated almost at once from the food budget. Meat and fresh milk are dispensed with in a great number of cases, and condensed milk is used in a surprisingly large degree. Frequently

families are found who have been subsisting for a week or more on county agent supplies before they become known to the United Charities. Among the chief items of these supplies are coffee and dried beans, and the results of this diet are only too evident in the thin bodies and pasty faces of the children."

A worker in the Italian district of the same city reports that many families substituted dry legumes, such as horse beans, chick peas, and lentils for fresh vegetables and fruit, took reduced amounts of milk — where the milkman would give them credit to take any — and in some cases went so far as to live on black coffee and dry bread for the adults' breakfast, dry bread and coffee with milk for the children; dry bread and some olives for lunch, and plain boiled spaghetti for supper. One of the Polish families of the city lived a week on what they thought an ingenious scheme — bread soaked in coffee and then fried.

As a general practice, milk was given up with the idea of eliminating nonessentials, or because credit was cut off. The milk sales of the largest dairy "supplying milk to the great middle class and the poor" in Kansas City, Mo., showed a 15 per cent reduction in 1921 as compared with 1920. There is reason to believe that experiences such as are reported of a Memphis family which lived principally on mush and, for a while, on what the mother had rummaged from garbage cans in parks after picnics, are not isolated instances.

Illness and Undernourishment. While the effects of these deprivations admittedly do not manifest themselves immediately, a few of the more direct consequences, such as sickness and malnutrition, may be seen in the early stages of the depression. The diagrams presented elsewhere in this volume, show indeed an increase in free service in dispensaries and hospitals, but may indicate not an increase in illness but only a more extended recourse to free treatment. The Children's Bureau statement, in connection with its study of unemployed families, that 63 per cent of the entire number reported sickness or disability during the time of unemployment, while not statistically conclusive, is at least indicative of the existence of a close relationship between unemployment and ill-health. Other numerical data point in the same direction.

But more important than the available figures are the observations of health workers and social case workers confirming the figures. In Boston the first definite move toward concrete action by social agencies

in the matter of unemployment, came as a result of a call from the Instructive District Nursing Association, which had noticed an alarming increase in undernourishment in families of the unemployed. Findings of similar organizations elsewhere are corroborative. The Visiting Nurse Society of Philadelphia reports an increase of patients from December, 1920, to December, 1921, of 1,959, or 61 per cent (5,165 against 3,256), and a doubling of free services during the same month; in 700 of the cases the breadwinner of the family was known to be out of employment. The Hartford dispensary authorities after a phenomenal increase of work in 1922 (which alone might have testified only to lack of ability to pay for treatment), expressed the opinion that the noticeable increase in sickness could be traced directly to undernourishment. In resolutions passed by the West Philadelphia Community Conference on January 31, 1922, the Visiting Nurse Society went on record as reporting "an increase of 1,500 sick families over last year, due to decreased resistance to disease, a direct result of unemployment," and the Division of Child Hygiene of the Department of Public Health "found the effects of unemployment in the discouraged attitude of parents, the inability of undernourished mothers to nurse their babies, the lower vitality of the children, and the actual poverty and distress in over 1,600 families visited during the month of December (1921)."

An experiment conducted by the Cleveland Nutrition Clinic presents significant evidence: A group of children whose weights were carefully watched during seven months of two consecutive years showed an average gain in weight of two pounds in 1920-21, but only of three-quarters of a pound in 1921-22.

There is little reason to doubt the observations of case workers who report alarming conditions of undernourishment in their clients among adults as well as among children. One worker in Chicago records an extraordinary number of rickety children (a disease due to malnutrition). Another's tentative judgment was that the unusual amount of illness in one family under her care was attributable to undernourishment.

. . . "Evelyn had curvature of the spine, heart lesions, and was 12 per cent underweight; Eleanor had goiter, chronic sore throat, and was 6 per cent underweight; Marcel was 10 per cent underweight, had chorea and bad tonsils; LeRoy was 7 per cent underweight and had bad tonsils, and Richard was about 8 per cent underweight."

The visiting nurse reported some time later remarkable improvement in all the children after aid — chiefly food — had been given.

Tuberculosis, insanity, post-natal complications abound in the many cases cited by workers in all the cities visited. Statistics can never tell the tale. Pitiful stories of children and parents visibly shrinking for lack of food and unable to follow medical advice for the lack of the price of medicine, can give only flashes of insight into the suffering brought by unemployment. Only the families themselves, and possibly those who serve them in their need day in and day out, summer and winter, know what it means to be unemployed, hungry and sick, and without prospects.

Lowered Morale. Though lowered morale — whether due to unemployment or to other causes — cannot be measured and stated in quantitative terms, it was a persistent phenomenon that permeated every manifestation of the depression. Among the jobless breadwinners of families it took a variety of forms under different circumstances: strain and friction within the family, loss of ambition to seek work, occasionally desertion of family, temperamental upheavals, loss of mental balance even to the point of insanity, development of lawless habits, begging, the fostering of bitterness against the government and social institutions in general, or sheer laziness from the discontinuance of sustained application. This loss of morale complicated every task of the social case worker.

3. A British Factory's Plan for Enhancing Security of Life ⁴

It is coming to be generally realized that something must be done to render the economic position of the manual workers less insecure. Although an appreciable number of them are in situations which hold out every prospect of permanency, the majority have constantly hovering over them a cloud of uncertainty with regard to their future. At any time they may be discharged at a week's, or possibly an hour's notice, and since any reserve they have laid up is likely to be very slender, in times of trade depression they may be plunged, with their families, into serious want and privation. Even those who escape this tragedy, if they live to old age, will almost inevitably find themselves in very straitened circumstances. The man who has to bring up three

⁴ From *The Human Factor in Business*, by B. Seebohm Rowntree, Managing Director of the Rowntree Cocoa Works, York (Eng.); pp. 31-39. (Longmans, Green and Company, 1921. Reprinted by permission.)

or four children, unless he is a highly paid worker, cannot save enough to make adequate provision for his old age. Moreover, even if he could, such resources as he possessed would be insufficient to maintain his wife, if, for example, she were some years younger than himself, and survived him for a considerable time. Again, there is always before working people the risk of being reduced to abject want through chronic invalidity. There are few more pathetic sights than that of a young, keen workman struck down in early life with a disease which, although not mortal, prevents him from working. The State has accepted some liability in connection with the economic security of the workers, and it now helps to insure them to a certain extent against the hardships resulting from unemployment, sickness, invalidity, and old age. But, valuable as are these measures of relief, they are obviously inadequate. Nor are the earnings of the workers sufficient, if each acts independently, to enable them to safeguard themselves against the above contingencies. Some organized effort is required. It is possible that in future the scale of State Insurance will be more liberal. But, in so far as any increase involves considerably higher State contributions, it is likely to be long postponed, in view of the condition of national finance. Meanwhile, it is urgently necessary to guarantee to the workers a greater degree of economic security than they possess at present.

In this section, I propose to describe the steps taken at the Cocoa Works with regard to these liabilities.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Dealing first with the question of unemployment, let me quote the words of a Memorandum drawn up by a Committee of employers and Labor men, of which I was a member, and which formulated a scheme of national insurance against unemployment:

"The suffering caused by unemployment has been generally recognized, but too little attention has been paid to its reactions on production. Industry moves in a vicious circle. Additional production is necessary if poverty is to be abolished and unemployment relieved, yet Labour instinctively resists every kind of productive improvement, lest it should cause unemployment. Improvements in machinery, in the reorganisation of labour with a view to using skilled grades more effectively by means of dilution, and in other ways, and the intro-

duction of systems of payment by results which have been proved to stimulate production, are all resisted more or less openly; and in every case fear of unemployment is largely responsible for the resistance. It is true that the fear may be largely unjustified, and that 'ca' canny' may accentuate the very evil it is intended to prevent. But such facts are irrelevant; the rank and file workers believe that improvements bring unemployment, and no one has ever succeeded in convincing them that they are wrong. Nor is it any use to argue and make agreements with the leaders of labour; it is the instinctive action of the rank and file that counts. An immense potential increase in the productivity of industry awaits release, and only the complete removal of the menace of unemployment can release it.

"The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920, at best is a palliative rather than a remedy. The benefits it offers, 20s. for men and 16s. for women, only continue for a limited period—fifteen weeks in any year or one week's benefit for six weeks' payment, whichever is the shorter, and are not in themselves sufficient to prevent the household in receipt of them from deteriorating week by week in both physique and *morale*. Such provisions cannot banish the fear of unemployment, or the industrial policy to which this fear gives rise among workers."

Personally, I am of opinion that the problem can only be dealt with on effective and permanent lines by a universal scheme of unemployment insurance, on a scale which will provide adequate maintenance throughout their working lives for all adult wage-earners who are willing to work and capable of working. The amount of such maintenance should vary with the needs of the worker, and a larger benefit should be given to a married man with a family than to a single man. Provision might be made for industries to contract out if they could show that their alternative scheme was at least as liberal as that of the State.

One alternative to that proposal is for an industry to contract out of the present national scheme and to provide a scheme of its own. Such a policy has much to recommend it, but it is difficult to carry out in an industry such as our own, which is not highly organized, and in which much of the work is either unskilled or requires only very partial skill. Many of the workers do not definitely attach themselves to it permanently, as they usually do, for example, to the textile, engineering, steel-making, printing, and other industries, which are more highly organized and require a higher degree of skill. It is not

likely, therefore, that the cocoa and confectionary industry will in the immediate future contract out of the national scheme, and formulate one of its own, giving benefits on a scale high enough to remove from the workers the menace of unemployment.

A SCHEME TO SUPPLEMENT THE NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Recognizing this fact, we have at the Cocoa Works inaugurated a scheme of unemployment insurance for our own workpeople, under which every employee, no matter what his grade, can insure. As the scheme is somewhat novel in character I give it in full in Appendix II, but, broadly, it provides every employee of twenty years of age and over with unemployment benefit at the rate of:

- a. 50 per cent of the average earnings of the unemployed person;
- b. 10 per cent additional for a dependent wife; and
- c. 5 per cent additional for each dependent child who is under sixteen years of age, or is receiving full-time instruction at a school, university, college, or other educational establishment,

with a maximum of 75 per cent of the average earnings, or £5 a week, whichever is the smaller, and a minimum of £1 5s. a week. Full unemployment benefit will not be payable in respect of any period of less than one week, nor for longer than a period or periods amounting in the aggregate, in the case of each employed person, to:

- (1) One week for each two months up to two and a half years, for which such person has been continuously employed by the Company immediately before his unemployment and after attaining twenty years of age, and
- (2) One week for each complete year, beyond two and a half years, for which such person has been so employed.

The Company provides the whole of the benefit, less 26s. a week in the case of men and 22s. in the case of women. These deductions represent the benefits they receive under the national scheme (20s. and 16s.) plus 6s., which those employees who are members of the National Union of General Workers receive through their union, for a payment of twopence a week. Most of the men in the factory, and a large proportion of the women, belong to this union. It is made a condition of receiving the Company's unemployment benefit that the employee contributes not less than twopence either to his trade union

unemployment insurance fund, or to any other unemployment insurance fund that he may choose.

Partial unemployment benefit will be payable in respect of any period during which, owing to shortage of work through depression of trade, a worker actually works and is paid for an average of less than 90 per cent of normal full time, such average being calculated over such period as may be prescribed by the Company. Time so lost, in excess of 10 per cent, will be paid for at a rate proportionate to full unemployment benefit.

It may here be added that the general policy of the Company is to deal with any surplus of labor due to trade depression by working short time, rather than by dismissing a proportion of the workers. Such a policy is probably to the general advantage, so long as steps are taken to maintain the wages of all at a level which will not cause hardship.

In order to finance the unemployment insurance scheme the Company has set aside a lump sum of £10,000 to establish the unemployment fund. It will also, each year, commencing with the year 1921, set aside sums equal to 1 per cent of its wage bill, until the unemployment fund reaches £50,000, or reaches 5 per cent of the wage bill for the time being (whichever is the greater). Thereafter, the Company will set aside annually such sums (not exceeding 1 per cent of the wage bill) as are necessary to keep the fund up to the amount mentioned above. Industrial conditions are so uncertain at the present time that it is not possible to speak with certainty, but it is fully expected that these financial provisions will suffice to pay the benefits set forth above.

The scheme may be discontinued or amended by the Company at any time, on giving three months' notice, and it is their intention to discontinue it if an adequate scheme of industrial or national insurance comes into force. While fully recognizing, however, that the enactment of a general scheme is the only true method of protecting the workers from the menace of unemployment, it is well that employers should remember that it is possible for an individual firm to make provision for their own workers, before the nation as a whole adopts that policy.

REGULARIZING WORK

Of course, however, insurance against unemployment, although necessary to give reasonable security to the worker's lot, is only a second best. The best course is to prevent men from becoming unemployed, and definite steps have been taken at the Cocoa Works to regularize employment. Some of these have already been explained. It is not possible to dismiss a worker hastily or without sufficient cause. If a foreman or manager wishes to get rid of a man, he must explain the circumstances on a dismissal form, and send it to the Head of the Employment Department for approval. In the case of most departments, the dismissal form must also be signed by a director. Dismissal is only resorted to in the last instance. When a "round" man has been placed in a "square" hole, an attempt is made to rectify the error by transferring him to another job, and attempts are always made to regularize the demand for labor, both as between one season of the year and another, and as between one department and another. With care, a good deal can be done to reduce irregularity and to increase the security of a man's work. The task demands considerable thought and detailed attention, but, from the human standpoint, it is well-directed effort.

An illustration of the way in which work can be rendered more regular may be here given. Some years ago, it was the practice at the Cocoa Works to engage extra painters for the summer season only, and extra men in the packing room during the winter. Thus we had a double set of temporary workers. When we began trying to regularize the work, it was arranged to employ the painters in the packing room during the winter, paying them the wages suitable to that job, which were not very different from those which they received as painters. In the summer they returned to their normal occupation at the ordinary trade-union wages. In this way, we got one set of men with regular employment, instead of two sets casually employed. A number of similar illustrations could be given.

Whatever steps employers may take to protect workers against the evils of unemployment there can, I think, be little doubt that, by some method, industry should maintain the reserve of labor without which it cannot function successfully.

The capitalistic system is often defended by the argument that Capital is justified in taking the profits of industry, because it takes the

risks. But is it possible to say that Capital is taking all the risks if it is free to discharge Labor, without any retaining fee, as soon as ever trade slackens? Men with families dependent on them, turned away almost without notice, would be more inclined to think whatever risk existed was incurred by them, and not by Capital. A state of things in which this is happening, not as a rare occurrence, but continually, is utterly indefensible, and I am convinced that the workers will not tolerate it much longer.



4. Sickness and Social Insurance ⁵

The influence of industrial conditions, which often increase sickness among employees, emphasizes the need for special remedial measures which will be directly connected with industry. The nature of the responsibilities for disease-causing conditions among the industrial population suggests that they are divided among three groups—employer, employee, and public. With such division of responsibility and with each group working independently, without coördination and often without duplication of purposes and efforts, the best results can not be obtained. They can be obtained only by the coöperation of the three responsible groups.

The experience of foreign countries indicates that a comprehensive governmental system of health insurance will meet this need by securing coöperation of the public, the employers, and the employees, and will give to each a continuous stimulus for the prevention of sickness among the wage-earning population.

COÖPERATION AMONG EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, AND PUBLIC

Coöperative or collective action is not new in the field of industry in this country. Groups of people, once opponents in bitter disagreement and strife, are gradually adopting the principle of coöperation. Instead of aggravating the loss and waste that attend unnecessary conflict and of delaying the fulfillment of aims common to all, they are coming to seek a basis on which a common endeavor can be made. There is probably no more conspicuous example than the trade agreement. In a number of industries the unions, the employers, and the

⁵ From *Health and Insurance: Its Relation to the Public Health*, by B. S. Warren, Surgeon, U. S. Public Health Service, and Edgar Sydenstricker, Public Health Statistician, U. S. Public Health Service; pp. 47-50. *Public Health Bulletin No. 76*, 1916. (U. S. Public Health Service, Treasury Dept.)

public are acting together in a way which is bringing prosperity to the industries, a greater degree of satisfaction to the employees, and better service to consumers. It was the recognition of the responsibility of all concerned which laid the basis for success of conciliation and arbitration in the garment trades in New York City, as well as for the improvement of sanitary conditions in the shops. The same view of the situation in railroad disputes has prevented the trade paralysis of the country more than once. In the pottery industry, as shown by testimony at the hearing of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations in Philadelphia, coöperative effort has resulted in the maintenance of a joint health committee, composed of three manufacturers and three workmen, which plans and enforces sanitary regulations and satisfies the State commissioner of labor that bad conditions are eliminated.

INSURANCE A METHOD OF COLLECTIVE OR COÖPERATIVE ACTION

Experience has shown that insurance is an efficient method of co-operation. As defined by practically all authorities, insurance is primarily a method by which a group of persons, each singly in danger of some loss the incidence of which can not be exactly foreseen, can distribute such loss, when it occurs to any of them, over the whole group and in such a way that the burden of expense will be lightened of its most serious effects. Secondarily, and of equal importance, insurance means that the strongest of incentives — that of lessening cost — is given to efforts to diminish the frequency and the seriousness of losses. In this latter sense insurance is a *preventive* measure of a positive and direct sort.

Insurance as a preventive measure. — It cannot be denied that fire insurance has been one of the most potent factors in the now well-organized movement for the prevention of fires. Marine insurance has resulted in more rigid inspection of vessels, the erection of light-houses, and in many other measures designed to lessen the chance of wreck. Liability and compensation legislation — which is but another name for the insurance of employees against accidents — has resulted in the nation-wide movement for "safety first." Unemployment insurance systems are so closely connected with labor exchanges that they have already shown beneficial results in lessening irregularity of work wherever they have been adopted. Health insurance in Germany, where

it has been in operation for a quarter of a century, has admittedly exercised a positive influence upon the prevention of disease which is regarded as equal to, if indeed not more important than, the distribution of money benefits and the treatment of disease. Experience has shown in all instances that while the distribution of cost is primarily the *method*, prevention is primarily the *purpose* of insurance, and certainly its *result*.

GROWTH OF SOCIAL INSURANCE

The adaptability of the insurance method in the solution of modern economic problems is unmistakably shown in the spread of "social insurance" in countries whose governments embody widely different political ideals. As soon as certain economic risks have been recognized as menacing the wageworker and his family, the insurance method of meeting the risks has been used. These economic risks may be generally classified as those causing the death of the breadwinner in a family, the physical inability of the breadwinner to perform labor, and his inability to find employment. For a large proportion of the wageearners of any country these risks are too great to be provided for by individual effort and too little appreciated to be provided for even if the individual were able to do so. Hence, social provision through the distribution of loss has been found to be necessary. This kind of social provision has come to be known as "social insurance."

The recognition for the need of provisions of this character has been followed in every important modern industrial nation, with the exception of the United States, by various systems of social insurance. Even in this country accident insurance in the form of workmen's compensation is rapidly spreading. Accident insurance for workers has been established by governments throughout Europe and in many of the British colonies. Old-age insurance is established under governmental authority and is subsidized by the Governments of Italy, Belgium, Servia, and Spain, while the old-age pension systems have been established by the Governments of Great Britain, Denmark, Iceland, France, Australia, and New Zealand. Unemployment insurance is a governmental system in Great Britain and is rapidly being adopted in many European cities. Health insurance is probably the most prevalent form of social insurance.

Exercises

1. Discuss the fundamental character of unemployment and child problems.
2. How do they measure a civilization?
3. Discuss the nature and applications of social insurance. What does it have in common with the child welfare movement?
4. What is the first response toward unemployment on the part of the worker?
5. What factors prevent it from being uniform?
6. Show, by examples, how the different races and nationalities meet unemployment.
7. Describe and evaluate the new occupations that spring up.
8. Comment on the employment of women in comparison with men.
9. Describe the part played by credit and savings.
10. How much, relatively, was effected by reduction in the scale of living?
11. Of the other factors named, which counted for least?
12. What effect of unemployment is registered in the simultaneous growth of shacks and of empty flats?
13. What is the effect on diet?
14. Review the evidence showing the resulting undernourishment.
15. How is the lowered morale resulting from undernourishment manifested?
16. What situations, according to Rowntree, render the manual worker so insecure?
17. Discuss the fear of unemployment as both effect and cause of this insecurity.
18. Contrast the actual provisions of the English unemployment insurance with those named as imperative by Rowntree. Does the U. S. do better, or worse?
19. What is the purpose of the scheme in force at the Rowntree Cocoa Works?
20. Discuss the "regularizing of work" in relation to the whole problem.
21. Does capital bear the risks of industry?
22. Who, according to Warren, should bear the responsibility for industrial diseases? How?
23. Define insurance; social insurance.
24. Illustrate the *preventive* effects of insurance.
25. In what countries and along what lines has social insurance spread?

Additional References

1. Downey, E. H.: "The Present Status of Workmen's Compensation in the United States," in the *American Economic Review* (Supplement), Vol. XII., No. 1 (Mar. 1922).
2. Ely, Richard T.: *Outlines of Economics*, pp. 587-594. "Social Insurance."
3. Ford, James: *Social Problems and Social Policy*. Ch. XXII. treats unemployment.
4. Ogg, Frederic A.: *Economic Development of Modern Europe*. Ch. XXV., "The Spread of Social Insurance," A mine of information.
5. Taussig, Frank W.: *Principles of Economics*. Vol. II., pp. 323-340. "Workman's Insurance."

CHAPTER XLII

PUBLIC RECREATION AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

IN the preceding chapter attention was drawn to the child's right to play and the adult's right to work. We are coming to realize in recent decades that the *adult* likewise has a need, and consequently a right, to play. In the days of the Tudor kings the playing of the people of the parish on the village green was a recognized right, and it was one of the functions of the village priest to oversee the games on Sunday afternoon. When the country justices of the peace began to interfere with the exercises during the Puritan régime their action drew from James I the historic document known as the "Declaration of Indulgence," guaranteeing to the people by royal authority the undisturbed enjoyment of their ancient sports and games.

The church, however, did not reverse her policy and lost her control, or rather her leadership, over the play-life of the community. This unfortunate separation, a loss to both religious and recreational interests, continued for many centuries, but in very recent years the churches have begun to endeavor to bridge the chasm. The effort deserves support, where it is aimed, not at mere negative repression, but at broad-minded leadership of a positive type, for it is most highly desirable that the recreational side of life should be enjoyed under the sanction of the finest ideals.

Meanwhile modern society has drifted into the monstrous error of leaving amusement and recreation to be purveyed for profit, motivated by the grossest commercialism, and often under the auspices of the low ideals and coarse tastes of men and women entirely unfit for social leadership, especially among young people. Even where the moral side can be controlled by public opinion the profit-seeking motive, honorable enough in itself, is often out of place in this field, since public recreation should be a public or social function. Provision for play, like provision for education, should be taken, as far as possible, out of the hands of private business and lodged in the community itself.

This is the reason for treating *community organization* in this chapter. The sudden and wide vogue of the term near the end of the world war caused some confusion, the phrase often figuring in current discussions without a clearly defined meaning. It becomes clear, however, upon the reading of such a study as Professor Rainwater's *Play Movement in the United States*, that community organization is simply the culminating stage in the process by which our

modern society has come to a consciousness of the defects in its recreational activities and has worked its way to a plan for their democratic control by the community itself.

There should be mentioned another side to the movement, as expressed in the Community Unit Plan worked out in Cincinnati. (See the account by Dr. E. T. Devine, in the *Survey* for Sept. 20, 1919.) There the plan was closely connected with the organization of relief and social work, in a very ingenious and striking way. Community organization, however, as understood in this chapter, is essentially the culmination of the play movement and the growing public interest in wholesome recreation. This is not to deny, however, any larger aspects or tendencies of the movement. There are those who see in it the rejuvenation of democracy itself by re-founding the social and political life upon the *neighborhood*, as is eloquently portrayed by Mary Parker Follett, in her book, *The New State*. From this point of view community organization is related to the movement toward guild socialism in industry, as touched upon in Ch. XLV, below.

Reading 1 portrays some of the evils of commercialized amusements, including those where not the profits motive but the tendency to overspecialization and professionalization is the principal evil. Readings 2 and 3 present a glimpse of the evolution of the "play movement," with its relation to "community organization."

1. Unsocial Aspects of Public Recreation¹

Professionalism

Instead of the wholesome love of play, the love of being played upon has become a national passion. The spontaneity of playful activities, and the originality which creates them are being lulled to sleep by *the habit of being amused*. Among great groups of people it is wholly out of date to "make your own fun." Especially where congestion of living conditions and the fatigue of over-work make private recreation difficult for families or friends, the crowds are flocking to the public entertainers. They look on, wistful or jaded, while others do their playing for them. Yet not with these alone has the professional come to dominate the situation. Almost equally with those whose resources for private recreation are ample the compelling motive is *to be amused*.

The professional entertainer holds sway in every field from which

¹ From *Public Recreation*, by Richard Henry Edwards; pp. 125-127; 130-133. University of Wisconsin, Extension Division, 1915. Published also by the Young Men's Christian Association Press, New York City, under the title, "Popular Amusements." Reprinted by permission.

he is not rigidly excluded, every field in which the rights of the amateur are not vigorously asserted. He plays the game better than the rest of us. We pay him to devote his time to it. His work has high social value if he teaches the rest of us how to play the game better, and we keep on playing, but when his superiority shames us into inactivity, into merely watching him, we are in a dangerous way. This is what has happened to us and the line of division between entertainer and entertained is an ever-deepening line save where reassertions of the amateur spirit restrain it.

A social disease has been spreading broadcast among us. The professional, whether he be actor, dancer, athlete, or what not, is the chief source of infection. The disease of *spectatoritis* is abroad in the land. Its germs are in every breath we draw and most of us are affected with that paralysis of play activities which is its most striking, immediate symptom.

Here and there appears the aggravated case — completely infected — the fan who is nothing but a fan, a flabby creature symbolic of a multitude, a parasite upon the play of others, the least athletic of all men, never playing himself at anything, a spectacle hunter, not a sportsman.

Spectatoritis, like the professional who spreads it, depends upon crowds and crowd contagion. Our study of amusements has shown the crowd spirit at work in almost every phase of the problem. This means that great masses of people meeting in the highly suggestible state of crowd consciousness are daily exposed to the professional entertainer, the expert crowd stimulator who has unique power for "the contagion of virtues and vices, in the epidemic of degrading or up-lifting suggestions."

Spectatoritis is the crowd reaction to professionalism. It must be squarely faced if the amusement problem is to be solved, for its end is brutality and callousness at the loss of human life. We may yet avoid its full manifestations, familiar to other nations, ancient and modern, in established public spectacles of brutality. We are still a long way from the Roman amphitheater and the Spanish bullfight, but *spectatoritis* leads that way. Its way has ever been the path of a jaded sensationalism, and the sensational is the basis of appeal in an alarming proportion of our public spectacles. A clear-eyed public opinion must now reckon in advance with its full consequences. . . .

Commercialism

Inseparable from the evils of professionalism and *spectatoritis*, stands that of commercial domination. The distinguishing difference between the professional and the amateur is the entrance of the money element. It is clear enough that the money element dominates the amusement situation in America. Back of the professional stands the commercial promoter and the promoter is wont to take his cue from the cash box. He is not seeking chiefly the social welfare.

Walter Rauschenbusch has well stated the influence of commercial control in the following:

"Pleasure resorts run for profit are always edging along toward the forbidden. Men spend most freely when under liquor or sex excitement; therefore the pleasure resorts supply them with both. Where profit is eliminated, the quieter and higher pleasures get their chance. The institutions of pleasure maintained by the people for their own use, such as parks, playgrounds, museums, libraries, concerts, theaters, dance halls, are always cleaner than the corresponding ventures of capitalism, provided some rational supervision is maintained. I spent an evening in a small Missouri town waiting for a train. The streets were in possession of an amusement company and lined with tents and booths. The company evidently tried not to offend the public sense of decency and to supply a 'moral show.' The saloons were doing a rushing business, but the crowds flowing along the sidewalks were composed of clean American farmers with their wives and children or their sweethearts, trying to have a good time with the facilities offered. But those facilities were so meager and so monotonous! You could pay a nickel for pop corn and soft drinks; or pay a quarter to see the clowns and the girls in brilliant tights perform in a variety show; or pay a quarter to throw balls, or toss rings, or shoot a rifle to win a prize. That was all; pay, pay, pay, and nothing but a gambling thrill or satisfied curiosity to show for it. This is what capitalism can do for our people in catering to their desire for recreation. Can the people do no better for themselves?"

Commercial management has been well characterized as tending to sever the individual from the community, to prefer miscellaneous crowds to neighborly groups, to neglect the interests of the child, and

to make no provision aside from moving pictures for the mother of the wage-earning family.

We recognized, however, at the beginning of our study that amusements might be good or bad independent of commercial management, and likewise that commercial management is necessary and valuable in certain portions of the amusement field. Yet we ask if it might not be that the present situation is widely dominated by a type of commercial management which regards neither art nor spontaneity nor the basic demands of morality. Our study brings us to an inevitable affirmative as the answer.

Let us be wholly just, however, to amusement promoters. There are a considerable number of able men in the "amusement business," who serve society valuably. They explore new fields of human interest, serving as advance agents in the discovery of that which will "go" with the people. They stake large sums of money on experiments calculated to open some new approach to the social mind, and enlarge the borders of human happiness, — with profit, of course, for themselves, yet not without frequent benefit to society. The commercial promoter, indeed, often pays the cost of experimentation with the public, and in effect hands over to society a forged weapon as in the now accepted use of motion pictures in education.

There are charlatans here, however, as in other forms of business, very many of them — a large proportion of those engaged — men who stand for the exploitation of human life, not for its service. Let us see the amusement exploiter, just as he is, for he lies in wait for the spirit of youth at every corner. He is not a playful person, nor does he by his enterprises produce a playful people. With him the love of fun in the human heart is a cold matter of dollars and cents. He buys youth's freshness of feeling in return for sundry ticklings of sensation, and blights its glad spontaneities with his itching palm. He turns the pure upleaping spirit of play into a craze for mere sensation and coins up with an awful wastage one of the most priceless assets of the race. There follows in his train a jaded company of heavy-eyed, broken people who have lost the spirit of youth and the love of vigorous, wholesome play. The underlying fact in the amusement situation is this, that certain financial interests have discovered the natural resource of the play instinct and are exploiting it for gain as ruthlessly as they have exploited other great natural resources. The depleted emotions, the stimulated lust, and the criminal tenden-

cies which they produce by their exploitations cannot be traced back to source with the same deadly accuracy as bleak hillsides and slaughtered stump lots may be laid at the door of ruthless deforestation, but the methods and results are not essentially dissimilar. In no phase of our whole great modern struggle against excessive profits for the few in favor of human values for the many is the battle any keener than in this so-thought "superficial" question of popular amusements. As the congestion of city life thickens, and the daily struggle for a living wage grows sharper, the human need for release through real recreation becomes sharper also. It has, indeed, become for many a desperate need. "Leisure in an industrial city is life itself." The more tragic, therefore, becomes the loss of those spiritual values which are crucified by commercialism in association with play. The full significance of commercial domination is apparent only to those who realize how essential and how highly spiritual an expression of human life is made in play. If spontaneous, wholesome and well-ordered play is a profoundly educative and moralizing force, then the substitution of cold profit-seeking amusements, artificial and often nasty, can but exercise a correspondingly profound effect for demoralization.

Public opinion has before it the task of restoring to all groups of citizens a full opportunity for wholesome recreation unspoiled by commercialism, and also the parallel task of quickening for them that popular enthusiasm which is now so largely perverted by commercial interests.

2. Community Organization as a Phase of the Play Movement²

The variety of play activities that may take place in a given community is virtually unlimited because "play" is generic to all periods of personal experience, is determined by the response of inherited and acquired capacities of persons to the social situation, and is intrinsically related to what ethnologists describe as the culture of the group. Dewey implied it with respect to childhood by noting that "the interests and occupations of adults are the points of departure and the directing clues of children's actions," while Patrick stated it concretely with respect to adults as well as children as follows:

² From *The Play Movement in the United States: A Study of Community Recreation*, by Clarence E. Rainwater; pp. 7-11; 141-144; 298-304. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

"Play will thus include practically all the activities of children and the larger share of those of adults, such for instance, as baseball, football, tennis, golf, polo, billiards, and countless other games and sports; diversions such as traveling, hunting, fishing, yachting, motor-ing, flying, dancing, vacation outings, games, races, spectacles, fairs, tournaments, and expositions; the theatre, opera, moving pictures, lectures, and entertainments; the enjoyment of music, painting, poetry, and other arts; the daily paper, the magazine, the short story, and the novel."

"Play," then, as the concept is used in this report, is a mode of human behavior, either individual or collective, involving pleasurable activity of any kind not undertaken for the sake of a reward beyond itself and performed during any age period of the individual, the particular action being determined at a given time by the somatic structure and social attitudes of the agent in conjunction with the life of the group or groups of which he is a member. Thus the child does not behave as the adult at play; nor the savage as the civilized.

The use of the term "play movement." Until the later half of the nineteenth century, as pointed out by Newell, the children of the United States possessed a richer play tradition than those of any other civilized nation. This fact was due first, to our inheritance of play from Elizabethan England, and second, to two centuries of comparative isolation from events that might have impaired its traditional forms of expression. And play traditions were as strong, says Lee, in Puritan New England as in the South or the Middle States. But the *laissez faire* attitude of the public toward child play, the restrictions placed upon space in which to play as urbanization increased, and the differences between the languages and the games of the children of many nationalities mingled in the cities, resulted in a rapid disorganization of child play in urban communities, while isolation in rural districts wrought a similar effect upon the play of the children of that element of the population.

The same forces that caused disintegration of the play traditions of children were largely instrumental in disorganizing many recreational activities of adults. The creation of American folk music, folk dances, and folk games ceased with the decline of village social life. The gathering of May baskets, the singing of Christmas carols, the husking-bees, spelling-matches, and singing-schools, alike were discontinued with the growth of population in urban communities and of isola-

tion in rural districts. In the cities, where a consciousness of the social situation first arose, the behavior of children, youths, and adults during their leisure hours and holidays frequently became delinquent conduct, play became crime, while leisure pursuits became commercialized to an extent without precedent. Whereas formerly both children and adults had participated in play and recreation, now they became spectators. The motion picture accelerated this tendency; but it had begun long before the invention of the cinematograph. With the shifting of population from small communities, in which play and recreational traditions that were centuries old still survived, to newly grown and congested centers of heterogeneous population, the home, the neighborhood, the community, alike lost their former significance in the recreational life of the people. The social situation was fundamentally changed. Adjustments were necessary. The people *did* not participate in recreation because they *could* not under existing conditions since they lacked both the physical facilities and the social organization for doing so. The "first pathetic expression," said Robinson, "of a consciousness of this fact, and the first effort to make an adjustment to the changed social situation, came with the sand gardens for little children. Subsequent adjustments made provision for youths and adults, respectively, while the initial forms of each have been altered by more recent changes, especially in the last decade, in both the structure and the concept of the function of the play movement." These various attempts to bring about an adjustment of both the play life of children and the recreational activities of youths and adults to the social situation in both urban and rural communities, in so far as they form a series of related events, constitute the "play movement" in the United States as the term is employed in this report.

The "play movement" is a positive movement rather than a negative one. It seeks to bring about adjustments through the organization of social activities. Among these have appeared the sand gardens and the model playgrounds; the recreation center, and the community center; community music, community drama, and pageantry, municipal theatres, piers, bands and orchestras; community service and community organization. . . .

The origin of the concept of the structure and function of the "neighborhood organization" stage may be traced to two sources: the one, theoretical; the other, practical. These sources furnished the

explanations and the types of activities, respectively, of this stage of the movement and brought it into a functional union with scientific study of the problem of community organization on the one side and with the traditional community institutions and heritages of American life on the other. The former pertained to the re-valuation of the neighborhood by students of political and social science, the latter to the revival of the neighborhood relation under the changed social situation. As the nineteenth century had wrought a deterioration of the neighborhood, so the twentieth was to work out its reconstruction. The neighborhood, it was pointed out, could no longer be disregarded by either the politician or the social worker. Its function in the complicated society of today was held to be comparable to that which it performed in the evolution of society, and welfare movements including that of play and recreation must work *from* it as well as *toward* it, *by* it as well as *for* it. The process by which this end was to be attained was designated "neighborhood organization" or "neighborhood reconstruction" at the outset, and "community organization" after the plan of adjustment was perfected. The organization of the residents in the respective local districts was known variously as the "neighborhood association," the "neighborhood" or "community council," or the "organized community." Among the theoretical contributions involving a re-valuation of the neighborhood by students of social science was that of Cooley, in 1909, who designated the neighborhood as a "primary group" instrumental both in producing human nature and in molding institutions. Another widely read monograph was that of Wilcox, in 1911, in which the deterioration of the "local centers" of social organization in urban communities was deplored and their reconstruction recommended. In 1911, also, Woodrow Wilson, in a paper read before the first national "social center" conference at Madison, Wisconsin, pointed out the necessity of bringing "all men into common counsel and so discovering what is the common interest"; while Gulick, that year, declared in New York, that "the people themselves through the effort of organized voluntary groups, shall make their own recreation, govern it, and pay for it," in their uses of public playgrounds and school plants. In 1913, Ward stated that it was "of the greatest importance to point out the truth that without a basis in self-government, there is no positive moral training in the recreational use" of public facilities provided for that purpose, but it remained for Woods,

December, 1913, to indicate precisely the concept of the function of the neighborhood in the recreational provision of the community.

"The neighborhood is large enough to include in essence all the problems of the city, the state, and the nation. . . . On the other hand, it is small enough to be a comprehensible and manageable community unit. It is in fact the only one that is comprehensible and manageable; the true reason why city administration breaks down is that the conception of the city breaks down. The neighborhood is concretely conceivable; the city is not, and will not be except as it is organically integrated through its neighborhoods." . . .

An elaboration of the "group" concept of the structure and function of the play movement led to that of "community" organization and service and completed the transition from 'individualistic' interests. This phase of the transition came last as a natural consequence of the fact that the earlier stages of the movement were concerned with adjustments that involved juveniles rather than adults. When the concept of the structure and function of the movement involved provisions for persons of all ages in all wholesome uses of leisure time, as it did during and since the "recreation center" stage, a far more complicated situation faced its administrators. The problem, then, was how to develop self-control and self-support of leisure pursuits in harmony with the public welfare, in order that provision for play in all communities might be adequate to the demands of the changed social situation of modern times. "Community organization" as a form of "community service" represents the solution of this problem proposed by the movement. The history of this solution was presented, above, in the analysis of the last two stages of the movement. It is unnecessary to restate here the facts involved in its development. A further analysis of the concept of "community organization" as a method of administering play is necessary, however, to establish the fact of a transition from "individual" to "community" activities. Three aspects of that theory may be briefly mentioned in this connection:

First, it came to be the consensus of the promoters of the play movement, that a community may and therefore should do for itself many things that external forces alone are unable to do for it. It was pointed out that in the cities in particular, there were many neighborhoods or "little communities" in which large sums of money were spent annually by various social welfare agencies, that continued to

yield the usual harvest of poverty, crime, misery, because the population of these districts did not coöperate collectively rather than individually with the agencies at work in their vicinity. Philanthropic and governmental agencies, it was said, were working on the analogy of machine industry, "on the assumption that we are human beings, that the material we are dealing with through our ministrations, is passive material, like iron ore or cotton thread, which can be taken and put in a machine and hammered or woven and put through specialized processes and turned out at the end a finished product."

But people, it was pointed out, are not things; character is not a product, the result of an external application to their nature while they remain passive in the process, but an achievement and a collective achievement which was previously described by A. W. Small, who defines a person as "a center of conscious impulses which realize themselves in full only in realizing a society." Persons then are phases of social reality; they live in groups and, as shown by Cooley, in these group relations, "everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship; and it decays in isolation."

Both play groups and neighborhood groups are primary, that is, universal and fundamental, and in primitive societies concentric, the latter being marginal to the former. But in our present stage of social organization this face-to-face group is frequently disorganized, and play among many other types of behavior is treated "individually" and by a machine-like process, in which even families are divided in their recreation. Most of the types of commercialized recreations are of this character. The social situation is lacking, in such instances, in the factor essential to achievement. Play cannot be purchased, neither can it be given away. It can only be created, and it attains its most intense and highly developed form in co-operative, collective, life of the group. A group, a neighborhood, therefore, can do for itself, with respect to play as in certain other activities, what other forces cannot do for it. It must create its own play if its leisure is to yield all it may. "Community organization" was conceived as a device for mobilizing the resources of neighborhoods in adjustment to the changed social situation, in which face-to-face meetings had largely disintegrated, so as to make possible self-selection, support, and government of leisure pursuits in harmony with public welfare.

A second aspect of the theory that underlay "community organ-

ization" was the belief on the part of play leaders that communities may be over-organized, that is, may contain territorially more societies than they can support or utilize. Whatever may be the truth of that belief, it is history that the idea was held by many and that it served as a spur to the work of attempting not to add another organization but to correlate those already existing into a more or less unified whole. The "community council" was said to be an organization *of* the community, not an organization *in* the community. It was believed not to add *another* organization but *more* organization. It was designed to be comprehensive and to correlate all useful agencies, strengthening the weaker but essential ones, preventing duplicating ones from forming, and exposing those that exploit to the fresh air of public opinion. It sought to "put first things first, and second things second," by its allegiance to the good of the whole community. It would be presumptuous, of course, for an "organized community" to set up a claim to such a utopian function as the advocates of the "community movement" described "community organization" to be, but in many communities the movement doubtless did tend to give greater cohesion and unity to neighborhood life, to restore in part the instrument of social contact previous generations had found useful, the "face to face meeting" of the community.

The third element in the philosophy of the "community organization" movement, one directly related to the support and control of wholesome leisure pursuits, was the concept of the relation of the neighborhood to the perpetuity and efficiency of self-government, especially in municipal administration and national policies. The organized neighborhood was described as "a little democracy," and was said to be generically and dynamically related to the larger democracy of city, state, and nation. Past failures by the latter were attributed to the absence of the former. "Community organization" was roughly defined as a medium through which responsibility for efficient government in all its phases could be made real and personal to the members of the community. The leisure period, it was pointed out, was a fertile field for either commercial exploitation and anti-social behavior leading to political and cultural disintegration, or for behavior of quite the opposite kind. The determining factor, it was held, was the character of the "social organization" of the group. It should involve, it was said, the "little democracy," the "face to

face" association small enough to permit personal acquaintance and full communication, but large enough to enable every member to visualize the whole of society. "Community organization" seemed to many to meet these specific requirements. It was a leisure-time activity. Its action would make possible collective play, again, as in the more elementary stages of social evolution, with this difference, however, that in modern times greater variation and freedom of personality would prevail owing to the influence of the state and nation upon local organization.

Thus, in the sequence of stages and transitions in the play movement, "community organization" as a form of "community service" was conceived as a process for the conservation of leisure and the development of play as a mode of collective behavior. "Community organization" may be regarded as *a* scheme of "community service" and *the* scheme of community recreation today. Wherever it is utilized a play center becomes a community center, and play contributes directly to community interests instead of merely satisfying "individual" wishes as characterized the adjustment established during the earlier stages of the play movement.

3. The Nature of Community Organization ³

The Actuality of the Problem. The actuality of the problem of community organization is indicated by the efficacy of group discussion of public questions. This function is a distinctive feature of the reconstructed neighborhood. While our governmental machinery provides a suitable instrument—the ballot—for registering decisions upon questions of city, state or national policies, it does not furnish a correlative opportunity for arriving at those decisions which we are permitted to register at the polls. Consequently our people have never developed the art of forming public opinion through community action. They rely upon partisan newspapers and magazines, political bosses and propagandists to think and speak for them. Have the people a voice? They rarely congregate to consider any question except in response to a political party, a religious sect, an industrial class, an occupational group; and then it is to listen rather than to speak. Is there not need, therefore, for a community forum—non-

³ By Clarence E. Rainwater, in *Sociological Monograph* No. 15, published by the Southern California Sociological Society, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1920. Reprinted by permission.

sectarian, non-partisan, non-commercialized and presenting both sides of every question?

But many subjects discussed by the group at the community forum may not be disposed of either by casting a ballot or by passing a resolution. The solution is sometimes found only in action by the people themselves; and therein it frequently becomes necessary to call upon experienced officials or established organizations for assistance. This coöperative effort brings both children and adults into intelligent and personal relationship with welfare agencies at work in their neighborhood, with progressive movements of the day, with industrial corporations and labor organizations, and with the government of city, county, state and nation.

The reconstructed neighborhood is thus the fulfillment of democracy. In itself, it is a little democracy; in its relation to city, county, state and national government, it is a dynamo of greater efficiency; a bulwark against rule by a boss or a class.

Principles of Community Organization. Among the fundamental principles of community organization are those of participation, correlation, development, self-support and democracy. Social obligation implies opportunity for *participation* in conduct that fulfills the obligation. The organized neighborhood opens the way to active service on the part of every member, whether adult, youth, or child. The individual is more than beneficiary or critic; he is actor, playing a real part, however slight, in the drama of democracy. And in order to secure the minimum of duplication and the maximum of continuity of effort there must be *correlation* between individuals, agencies and movements. There must be no gaps in the line and the weak forces must be strengthened. *Development* is a third principle. In this respect community organization is a form of social telesis. It is self-directed growth toward a preconceived goal that harmonizes with the welfare of the nation. It frankly challenges the *laissez-faire* theory of the spontaneous development of collective sentiment and institutions. In keeping with self-direction, the community organization movement is *self-supporting*. While it is entitled to the free use of public buildings, including heat, light, and janitor service, it is both social justice to other communities and a safeguard of local autonomy for each community association to depend upon voluntary self-support. A fifth principle of community organization is that of *democracy*. The community association is all-inclusive, subject to control by

majority rule and grants both a hearing and a square deal to all. One does not become a member by joining, one is a member by the mere fact of residence. Every other movement divides the neighborhood politically, religiously, fraternally, socially or economically; this association unites it. In this respect it differs from sovietism, bureaucracy, or an oligarchy, all of which are forms of government by a particular class or element of the whole, as it is like the New England town meeting or the more ancient Saxon "mark," Russian "mir" or Swiss "canton." Some associations have adopted as their motto or slogan, "Each for all, all for each. . . ."

The Method of Community Organization. The mere federation of existing neighborhood agencies and movements would not constitute an organization of the community. Such an enterprise would be an inadequate instrument for the expression of collective interests; it would be conciliatory and advisory instead of authoritative and dominant. An organization of the whole is necessary. And this organization must correlate with both local institutions and individuals not members of organizations.

Among the local institutions there are: town government, schools, churches, business and improvement associations, civic leagues and women's clubs, athletic, social, dramatic and musical societies maintained by young people, and the children's playground. These, the organized neighborhood will stimulate and correlate as functional units of a single whole.

Among the city, state, and national agencies and movements with which the organized community will establish a functional relationship are departments of government and movements for the advancement of cultural interests and social welfare. To these the community gives publicity, personal service, patronage; from them it receives inspiration, technical assistance, and financial aid or the equivalent.

Exercises

1. Discuss the church and recreation past and present.
2. Should the providing of amusements be left to private parties?
3. Indicate some of the sources of the movement for community organization.
4. Describe some of the evils, and also the good, of professionalism in connection with play.
5. What is "*spectatoritis*" as described by Edwards?

6. Show its relation to gladiatorial brutalities. Are modern automobile races examples of this tendency?

7. Point out the good and the evils of commercialism in amusements.

8. What is play as defined by Rainwater?

9. Characterize the play tradition of early America, and show what influences disorganized it.

10. Describe the same degeneration in the recreational activities of adults.

11. What is the "play movement"?

12. What are the origins of the movement for neighborhood organization in its political aspect? in its recreational aspect?

13. Discuss three aspects of community organization as a method of administering play.

14. Explain: "Community organization may be regarded as a scheme of community service and *the* scheme of community recreation today."

15. Show how community organization affects discussion of public questions.

16. Explain: "The reconstructed neighborhood is thus the fulfillment of democracy."

17. State some principles of community organization.

18. Characterize the method of community organization.

Additional References

1. Jackson, Henry E.: *A Community Center: What It Is and How to Organize It*. By a Special Agent of U. S. Bureau of Education.

2. McClenahan, B. A.: *Organizing the Community*. Written from the viewpoint of an experienced social surveyor and worker. Defines "community" and "neighborhood."

3. Ross, Edward Alsworth: "Adult Recreation As a Social Problem," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII., No. 4, pp. 576-582. Interesting, and valuable especially for analysis of play impulses and methods for dealing with sports and amusements.

4. Small, A. W., and Vincent, G. E.: *Introduction to the Study of Society*. Book II., "The Natural History of a Society," traces in concrete detail the development of an imaginary frontier community.

5. Wilson, Warren H.: *The Evolution of the Country Community*. Ch. V. "Exceptional Communities." Ch. VII. defines "community" and related terms.

CHAPTER XLIII

IGNORANCE

IGNORANCE presents a major social problem in two forms: The first is that of lack in the total sum of knowledge possessed by the group in the absolute sense; the second concerns the *relative* lack of information on the part of individuals or classes within the group.

In the first case, the problem lies in the group's need of scientific understanding of its environment and of ways and means for utilizing it. Regardless of the question as to *who* is to know it, there looms the ever present fact that all of them together do not know how to live comfortably and effectually. This involves the problem of *achievement*, as discussed by Ward in *Pure Sociology*, and quoted in Reading 1 of Ch. VII, above. Achievement itself is the work of individual geniuses, who invent and discover, but its benefits are shared, more or less unequally, by all the members of society. No human group has yet attained to complete knowledge of its environment or of itself and its members, and many groups suffer enormously on account of individual and collective ignorance.

The second problem arises from the fact that some individuals and classes obtain possession of a larger share of the group's accumulated knowledge, and use it as a means for exploiting more ignorant individuals and classes. Ward also discussed, under the phrase "socialization of achievement," this problem of relative ignorance,—at the outset of his sociological career in *Dynamic Sociology*, and many years later in *Applied Sociology*, from which Reading 1 of the present chapter is taken. With all the advance that "education" as a departmental professional interest in colleges and universities has made, it has not gone, and can not go, much beyond this early statement (Reading 1) of the principles which govern *education* as a larger *social*, rather than a merely pedagogical, process. In Reading 2 Professor Todd restates, in terms of more recent developments, the aim and method of social education as conceived by sociology.

"Education," in the sense of special training for the teacher's career, began under the notion that it was a purely psychological subject. But psychology throws light only on school-room procedure, that is, on problems of pedagogy and discipline. It can tell nothing in answer to such questions as: Why does society maintain schools at all? By what justification are all the citizens taxed for their support? Which elements of the social tradition should be taught in them? How and

by whom are they, and should they, be controlled? Who should be not only permitted, but compelled and *enabled*, to attend them and by what means?

All these are problems of social science, and informed and progressive "educators" are coming to realize that their department and profession are as much sociological in character as they are psychological, to say the least. The reader is referred to Ch. XIII, above, for a review of education in this fundamental sense as a phase of social heredity. Mention should also be made of Professor Dewey's *Democracy and Education*. In this well-known book he does no more than duplicate Ward so far as the large cultural and institutional aspects of ignorance and schooling are concerned, but his social psychology is more adequate and his conception of education perhaps more dynamic. Where Ward treats education as a matter of *information*, Dewey sees it as a process of *communication*; and while Ward seems to have ascribed an almost wonder-working power to imparted *knowledge*, Dewey stresses the *attitudes* developed in the learning process itself. No doubt the whole truth includes both points of view, and ignorance is itself a principal obstacle in the way of a solution for the problem of ignorance.

A most recent sociological explanation of this larger aspect is contained in *Éducation et Sociologie*, by the eminent French sociologist and educator, Professor Émile Durkheim. Yet, while exceedingly lucid, Durkheim's educational philosophy does not advance beyond that of Ward in any essential respect. He does, however, show reasons why education has never been made perfectly uniform as between various nations, or various classes within nations.

1. Social Bearings of Ignorance and Knowledge ¹

In general this [drawing false conclusions from insufficient knowledge] is called ignorance or lack of intelligence. To realize the social import of this, it is only necessary to contrast the condition of the members of society classed as intelligent with that of the members classed as unintelligent or ignorant. In even the most advanced societies the latter always exceed the former numerically, usually constituting at least three fourths or four fifths of the population. They are as a rule very poor, often indigent, but industrious and overworked. The others are as a rule well-to-do, and if they work at all, as most of them do, it is at the lighter kinds of labor, mostly intellectual. This is considered by many as a natural, proper, and advantageous spontaneous classification of the population. The control of society

¹ From *Applied Sociology*, by Lester F. Ward; pp. 90-93; 299-302; 307-313. (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1906. Reprinted by permission.)

is also entirely in the hands of the intelligent few, and the ignorant mass can only submit to whatever regulations their superiors choose to impose. Of course these regulations are always in the interest of the intelligent class, and the ignorant mass is made to bear the chief burdens. In democratic communities where the uninformed have votes it is found easy to deceive them and cause them to vote against their own interests and for the interests of the well-informed, so that this vaunted right does them quite as much harm as good. If any one protests against any of these things, the answer is that it is a law of nature that intelligence shall rule, and this usually closes the argument.

It is to be specially noted that all this is habitually looked upon as a natural and necessary condition of things. The uninformed class is regarded as an inferior class. It is assumed that their ignorance is a natural condition and something that could not be otherwise. Their stupidity, gullibility, and susceptibility to deception and exploitation are supposed to be attributes inherent in their individual natures, which render them the natural dupes, tools, and servants of the intelligent class. Among all the writers on social questions with whom I am acquainted, however sympathetic or humanitarian they may be and often are, I have never met with but one who took a different view of the subject, and the writer is almost wholly unknown, and expressed his views in a book the publication of which during his lifetime he expressly prohibited. I have seen a number of attacks upon his doctrines, probably in all cases from persons who had never read the book, and who did so simply because this has become somewhat fashionable. Mr. Benjamin Kidd, who has perhaps the clearest insight of any living author into social conditions, who believes that the *élite* of modern society is intellectually inferior to that of antiquity and scarcely superior to that of the native Maoris of New Zealand, not only regards contemporary social inequalities as normal and unavoidable but sees the only possible mitigation of the attendant evils of them in the still more complete submission and resignation of the masses to "ultra-rational sanctions."

The intelligent classes of modern society possess a certain amount of knowledge of a highly practical character, which serves them as a guide to conduct looking to their personal advantage. It is for the most part superficial knowledge, it is true, but this is all that is required for the purpose. They have the tools necessary to keep familiar with current events, to look after their business interests,

and to forecast such future prospects as are needful in determining their action from day to day. They know enough of human nature to see how the uninformed class can be utilized in promoting their interests. They care nothing for reform except in their own affairs and are usually quite satisfied with the existing condition of things. They have complete control of the machinery of society and easily thrive on the productive labor of the much larger unintelligent classes. But they are not all alike, and there are always exceptional spirits among them who would change these relations and bring about a more equitable state of society. In fact nearly all the real amelioration, and it is considerable, that has taken place in the condition of the lower classes has been due to this disinterested sympathy on the part of members of the upper classes who have more to lose than to gain by it. The lower classes are so unintelligent, maladroit, unorganized, and generally inefficient that they cannot formulate a rational demand, and have no idea how to proceed in the effort to secure what they want. All attempts, therefore, on their part to bring about an amelioration of their condition usually do them more harm than good. Their recent attempts to organize, while emphasizing this fact, have not been wholly fruitless, and should have the hearty support of all truly sympathetic persons; but it is painful to see them constantly resorting to violence and injustice, which alienate thousands who are naturally friendly to them.

For these and other reasons I have never cherished much hope for any permanent social reform so long as society consists of the two classes described in this section — an intelligent or well-informed class and an ignorant or uninformed class. There is too much truth in the dictum that intelligence will rule. Inequality of intelligence necessarily results in the cleavage of society into an exploiting and an exploited class. If there is no way of equalizing intelligence, social reform in this direction seems out of the question. . . .

In my early work the philosophy of education was a sort of intuition. I saw it all, and I saw and fully worked out the reasons for it. But my method was synthetic. I had not the means, and indeed the means did not exist, to discuss the question analytically. The literature dealt with in the present work was nearly all subsequent to my earlier one, and if any of it was earlier it either failed to furnish the needed information, like Galton's works, or else I was unacquainted with it. And it was twelve years before the only book appeared that

really does furnish the data for an analytical study of the subject, viz., Odin's *Genese des Grands Hommes*. De Candolle's work is valuable so far as it goes, but it is utterly inadequate to the purpose. The work of Odin opens up the field and shows how such strictly social questions may be reduced to a rigidly scientific treatment. But the gratifying part of this analytic study has been that it at once and completely confirms the conclusions at which I arrived synthetically. The inductive proof is even more complete than the deductive, and I feel now that my entire system stands on an immutable foundation. Whatever power the local, the economic, or the social environment may have to stimulate and unfold the genius of man, it acquires solely by virtue of its educational quality, and, moreover, no form of privilege is sufficient in and of itself to develop the intellectual powers of average men and create a market for the products of achievement. This can be done only by positive education, or instruction, and without this popular demand there is an early limit to intellectual productivity.

Administration of the Social Estate

The method of applied sociology is the administration of the social estate. The social heritage, human achievement, which, as we have seen, consists of the knowledge that has been brought into the world by the labors of the *élite* of mankind, has been bequeathed to all the members of society equally, share and share alike. But through inattention, neglect, and general bad management it has got into the hands of a few privileged persons only. The case is analogous to that of a wealthy man with a large family dying intestate in a country whose laws provide that the children shall share the property equally, but in which, as often happens, a few of the children take possession of it all, and with the aid of shrewd and unscrupulous lawyers, succeed in keeping the rest from receiving any part of it.

But there is a fundamental difference between spiritual and material wealth. In the former its possession by one does not diminish the share of another. All the heirs inherit it all, and all may possess it all. And yet it has been thus far found impossible to transmit more than a very small amount of the social heritage to any but the most favored individuals. It is all transmitted, otherwise the social continuity would be interrupted and degeneracy would set in. But it is distributed in small parcels to many individuals, each of whom

has a different part and kind from the rest; or small groups possess one kind and other small groups possess another kind of spiritual wealth, the several individuals and groups knowing nothing of the possessions of the others. The consequence is that men move about together as at a masked ball, knowing nothing of those with whom they come in contact.

As regards skill, which is a form of knowledge, — knowledge of *How*, — and which has been acquired with great labor, it is to be supposed that the different kinds of skill are distributed among different groups of individuals, each group following its particular craft. This relates chiefly to the statical operations of society — reproducing copies, multiplying the same product, repetition, imitation — and, being mainly economic, there is no special complaint that society has not performed this function tolerably well. There is also a vast amount of very special and detailed knowledge, particularly of the kind that is called expert knowledge, which there would not be any advantage in rendering much more universal than it is. It partakes very closely of the nature of skill. Then there is much knowledge in the world that is of very little use, but most of this is not the result of prolonged research, unless it be by persons of unbalanced minds.

These and certain other kinds of knowledge which it is needless to particularize, even if they belong to the social heritage, could not profitably be universally distributed. The law of the division of labor has specialized this knowledge and restricted it to those who can use it to the advantage of society. It is not with these, therefore, that we have to do, but it seemed best to mention them in order to anticipate an objection that would almost certainly be made by a certain class who are habitually arrested by the threshold of a subject, however grave, if they see one seeming defect in the logic.

What then is the social heritage? What knowledge is it the duty of society to extend to all its members without exception? This of course is a very difficult question. It belongs rather to administration than to philosophy, and demands the serious and prolonged attention and study of practical men. All that can be done in a work on applied sociology is to suggest general principles. It would be of no use to take up one field of knowledge after another and try to decide on each one separately. It is necessary first to decide on some comprehensive canons to follow, and to adopt some practical classification

of the different kinds of knowledge, partly from the standpoint of their usefulness, but also from that of their logical connections with each other. The primary principle is that every human being of mature age and sound mind should be put in possession of all that is known. Such a proposition may sound utopian, but it is not at all so when the idea is fully grasped. It would perhaps be clearer to some minds to say that every such being should be in possession of all truth. When we say *knowledge* the idea of memorizing millions of facts is likely to rise in the mind. The proposition does not imply anything of the kind. The knowledge implied is that of laws and principles. It is generalized knowledge, under which all facts and details necessarily fall. These no more need to be specially attended to than we need specially to attend to every pulsation of the heart in order to live. When the great truths are known every minor truth, every small item of knowledge, every detail in the whole range of experience and of nature, finds its place immediately the moment it is presented to consciousness. And only to a mind in possession of general truths do such details possess any meaning or any value. To minds devoid of general knowledge all special knowledge presents a chaos. No item of it can be assigned a place where its relations to other items can be seen or where its position in the world as a whole can be fixed. The mind is in a state of confusion and bewilderment, and thought in such a mind, if it can be so called, forms no guide to life or action. . . .

The Diffusion of Knowledge.—In the administration of the social estate the first and principal task is to hunt up all the heirs and give to each his share. But every member of society is equally the heir to the entire social heritage; and, as we have already seen, all may possess it without depriving any of any part of it. And as the social heritage consists of the knowledge that has been brought into the world, this task is nothing less than the diffusion of all knowledge among all men. When this knowledge is properly classified it falls into natural groups and consists of a series of great truths. These truths contain within them a multitude of minor truths, but these minor truths need not be all actually possessed by every mind. They are really known when the general truths are known, but the extent to which they are specially appropriated may be left optional. All will select some of them, but different persons will require an acquaintance with different parts of this detailed knowledge according to

their tastes and pursuits. For general guidance in life, and in order to occupy a position of social equality with all others, the great groups of knowledge only need to be possessed. This general knowledge is embraced in the six great sciences of the hierarchy, and if they are acquired in the order of nature they will be both easily and thoroughly acquired. This of course presupposes that the necessary instruments for their acquisition be first supplied.—Such is an outline of the method of applied sociology. The rest is matter of detail.

Knowledge will always be increasing, and nothing can prevent this. Society does not need to concern itself with this. Its duty is to see that knowledge is assimilated. Its value to society not only increases with the number possessing it, but it increases according to some law of progression. It is difficult to formulate this law. A rough idea may be conveyed by saying that the value of knowledge relatively to the number possessing it increases in about the same ratio as does the value of a diamond relatively to its size. In general it may be said that the rate of increase grows constantly more rapid as universality is approached. Its full value can never be realized until universality is actually reached. When only a few possess it, it has little value. It may even be injurious. The inequalities engendered lead to all forms of exploitation and social misery. The differences of opinion that always arise from this source divide society into factions and cause all manner of strifes. Most of the evils of this nature are due to the ignorance of the most of mankind of truths that are known to a few. A large part of the war and bloodshed in the world is over matters that are already settled and may have been long settled, but only in the minds of a select number who have no means of placing the rest in possession of the truth which they possess. This is the duty of society, and the individuals possessing this knowledge are not to blame nor responsible for the resulting inequalities. Usually they do all they can to impart their knowledge to others, for, as was shown in *Pure Sociology* (p. 444), the mind is essentially altruistic, and next to the pleasure derived from the acquisition of knowledge and the discovery of truth, its greatest satisfaction is in imparting this knowledge and this truth to others. But those who possess knowledge are so few and those who are without it are so many that the influence of the former upon the latter is only that of a pebble dropped into the sea. Not only do wise men strive to teach everybody around them

what they know, but they make great sacrifices of time and energy in writing books to spread their knowledge throughout the world and hand it down to future generations. Many establish institutions of learning and conduct them, partly of course for profit or for a livelihood, but largely from a sense of their usefulness to mankind. In condemning private schools, as I did in *Dynamic Sociology*, and as I still do on the grounds there urged, for the most part, I did not and do not mean to condemn the motives that inspire them. Except where they are instituted for sectarian propagandism, or to influence public opinion in the defense of vested interests, they usually emanate from motives as disinterested as any — often very high and bordering on the humanitarian. Observing that society largely neglects the highest of all its duties, and continues to leave the great majority of its members, even in the most enlightened countries, in abject ignorance of what they need most to know, the founders of private institutions of learning seek to perform this function for society as well as they can. In so far as the supplying of the mere instruments for acquiring knowledge is concerned — and many get no farther than this — they are fairly successful, and certain ones rise to a position in which they become in large measure true public institutions.

But both public and private educational institutions have always been and still remain chaotic. False notions prevail as to what education is and is for. The moment a step is made beyond the rudiments all objects seem to be lost sight of, method is abandoned, organization is not thought of, and a vast mass of purposeless and useless rubbish is forced upon the learner. As Mr. Spencer says of England, and as is equally true of every country:

“The vital knowledge — that by which we have grown as a nation to what we are, and which now underlies our whole existence — is a knowledge that has got itself taught in nooks and corners while the ordained agencies for teaching have been mumbling little else but dead formulas.”

Most educationists deny that the conferring of knowledge should form any part of education, and consider that this belongs to experience in connection with affairs after school days are over. In *Dynamic Sociology* (Vol. II, pp. 554 ff.) I gave a number of definitions of education, confirming this statement. I have collected many more, all to the same effect. Scarcely any advance was made by the somewhat famous “Committee of Ten” near the close of the nine-

teenth century, who were appointed to report on the proper method of teaching science. They gave no concise definition of education, but their views are incoherently set forth in an extended report. Dr. Albion W. Small made some appropriate comments on this report which are quite in point. He summarized their views as follows:

"The end of education is, first, completion of the individual; second, implied in the first, adaptation of the individual to such co-operation with the society in which his lot is cast that he works at his best with the society in perfecting its own type, and consequently in creating conditions favorable to the development of a more perfect type of individual."

He then goes on to say:

"The Committee of Ten seems to have stopped at conclusions which tacitly assume that psychical processes in the individual are ends unto themselves. To be sure there are signs of a vague looking for of judgment, from the tribunal of larger life, upon the products of this pedagogy, but the standards of a real test seem to have had little effect upon the committee's point of view. We are told (p. 168) that the mind is chiefly developed in three ways: '(a) by cultivating the powers of discrimination observations; (b) by strengthening the logical faculty . . . (c) by improving the process of comparison, *i.e.*, the judgment.' We are further told that 'studies in language and the natural sciences are best adapted to cultivate the habits of observation; mathematics for the training of the reasoning faculties; history and allied branches to promote the mental power which we call the judgment.' The naïvely mediaeval psychology behind all this would be humorous if it were not tragical. . . . If I am not mistaken, a consensus is rapidly forming, both in pedagogy and in sociology, to the effect that *action in contact with reality*, not artificial selection of abstracted phases of reality, is the normal condition of maximum rate and symmetrical form of personal development.

"Once more, the Committee of Ten was content to remain in the dismal shadows of the immemorial misconception that *dissecta membra* of representative knowledge are the sole available resource for educational development. I do not find among the fundamental concepts of the report any distinct recognition of the coherence of the things with which intelligent pedagogy aims to procure personal adaptation. The report presents a classified catalogue of *subjects good for study*, but there is no apparent conception of the cosmos of which these

subjects are abstracted phases and elements. Nowhere in the report do I find recognition that education when it is finished is conscious conformity of individuals to the coherent cosmic reality of which they are parts. Until our pedagogy rests upon a more intelligent cosmic philosophy, and especially upon a more complete synthesis of social philosophy, we can hardly expect curricula to correspond with the essential conditions to which human action must learn to conform. . . ."

The only thing that can "develop" or "strengthen" the faculties or the mind is knowledge, and all real knowledge is science. The effect of this on the mind is to furnish it with something. It constitutes its contents, and, as we have seen, the power, value, and real character of mind depend upon its contents. Without knowledge the mind, however capable, is impotent and worthless. But there is a great mass of knowledge in the world. It does no good unless it is possessed by the mind. It is a power as soon as it is possessed by the mind. It is as useful to one mind as to another. It is the only working power in society, and the working power of society increases in proportion to the number possessing it, — probably in a greater proportion. Only a few minds possess any considerable part of it. All are capable of possessing it all. The paramount duty of society, therefore, is to put that knowledge into the minds of all its members.

There is only one point that seems to call for special emphasis, and this is the one to which the most strenuous objection is likely to be made. I fancy I hear some one ask, Would you expect society to go down into the slums and bring out and educate all the worthless rabble, — the canaille and the gamins, the prostitutes and criminals? The question is inapplicable except in so far as it relates to the youth of these classes, for no one supposes that society will undertake to educate adults, and the slums contain relatively few children. But it may as well be said that the denizens of the slums are the same kind of people as the inhabitants of the most respectable quarters. They are not fools by any means, but men and women with normal minds, susceptible, if surrounded by the same influences, of becoming as capable and intelligent people as any. And as to the criminals, they are the geniuses of the slums. They have, and must have in order to ply their vocation successfully, a large amount of true talent, and the only difference between them and other talented persons is in the field in which they exercise their talents. In a certain very proper sense society has forced them into this field and they are

making the best use they can of their native abilities. The slums can never be broken up by periodical raids and the occasional punishment of a few of their inhabitants. This has been tried from time immemorial without the least success. Is it to be supposed that the persons who are seized and fined and subjected to other annoyances and discomforts are going to be thus reformed and made good citizens? They go back with more bitter hatred of society and continue to injure it and endanger it more than before, and they fully justify their attacks upon it, realizing that it is responsible for their condition.

But there is no need of having any slums. The people that make up the slums and the criminal classes of society are capable of being made good and useful citizens, — nay, in the normal proportion of all classes, they become agents of civilization and may contribute to human achievement. But just as you cannot tame a full-grown wild animal, but must take the young and surround them with the proper conditions, so it is necessary to apply this principle to wild men and take them in their youth. This, so far from being an unreasonable demand is the most pressing of all social duties. There is no other class in society whose education is half so important as this lowest and most dangerous class. Society ought to have, and will one day have, the wit to devise means of reaching this class without its becoming a very heavy charge. It must apply scientific principles that will render the work automatic and self-executing (see *infra*, p. 331), but whatever the cost, it is a work that must be done, and which when done will a thousand times repay the cost.

2. Aim and Method of Social Education ²

Education . . . is both static and dynamic; in one age conservative, in another radical and progressive. What determines whether it is merely the handmaiden of a prevailing system of production or religious thinking, or whether it is the destroyer of superstition and special privilege? It is largely a question, first, of content and method of instruction; second, of incidence, *i.e.*, whether it is universal or the privilege of certain classes; third, of control, *i.e.*, by whom administered.

An archaic system of religion and morals or an ancient collection

² From *Theories of Social Progress*, by Arthur James Todd; pp. 514-518; 521-524. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1916. Reprinted by permission.)

of primitive writings (Bibles or "classics") if it become the chief subject of instruction, and if that instruction be rote-learning, cannot fail to land the learner in the bog of conservatism. China, we are told, is a choice example of systematic education as learning, of conservative education gone to seed, producing a succession of "stand-patters," of supporters of the old order, of tradition, of an educated caste in which religion, mores, politics, and literature were inextricably united in common adoration of the letter. Indeed social leadership by such a learned class of scholar-philosophers may become shameful retreat. Babington attributed Chinese stagnation to 2000 years of scholar-governors. He also rather pointedly insists that if James I of England had made Parliament a Witenagemot of the learned men of the country, and had placed the whole administration in the hands of men trained in the classics, a stationary condition would have ensued. We know, too, that during the nineteenth century the universities and other higher educational institutions, the so-called educated and intellectual classes, have pretty uniformly objected to and opposed the march of liberalism and democracy. The Factory Acts were attacked almost unanimously by economists and other public teachers. The intellectuals have frequently laid themselves open to the charge of fostering class domination. Professor Commons boldly told his fellow economists:

"that economists have had their greatest influence at these critical points of class struggle, when they have helped to shape the legislation of a class just acquiring new power (classical economists, 1815-45, in England, protectionist economists in United States, 1840-1900)."

Education for "culture" is always in danger of becoming the tool of classes and the badge of conservatism, especially if this culture has received the approval of past leisure classes. The uneducated frequently respect and honor what they do not understand; hence they may join in approving a traditionalist and static system of education which really perpetuates their own position of disadvantage. This accounts in part at least for the persistence of folk-superstitions and mores that have outlived their primitive utility. Since much of current education is powerless before superstition and the mores (as Mr. Dresslar and Mr. Chapin have shown), we may not illogically suspect that part of the difficulty at least may be traced to survivals of traditionalist subjects and methods in our schools.

Again, education that is not universal may result simply in fixing

upon a social group a system of classes and castes that is positively retarding as well as annoying and burdensome. Professor Ward gave what is perhaps the most eloquent and convincing argument for the spread of knowledge through education as the paramount means for social advance. But such knowledge must be *universally distributed*. A society with wide gaps between the intelligence of its several ranks may be much worse off than one whose general level of intelligence is much lower but in which intelligence is general. "The distribution of knowledge underlies all social reform." Why? Because the existence of great gaps between the ignorant and the more intelligent means that the social machine must be geared to the capacity of the less intelligent: consequently a loss of power. It means also wastage of energy through the cleavages between class and class; and this wastage is compounded where — as is the natural tendency — such cleavages are, so to speak, institutionalized. It means a régime of status, autocracy, and exploitation.

Third, the personnel or the authority that administers education has much to do with its character as static or dynamic. We have already discussed this phase of the subject in the section on government. It is obvious that if education be committed to priests or ministers of religion, it will be chiefly concerned with dogma, tradition, and a social system that will support them. If it be governed by a class, say the prosperous upper section of the middle class, it will reflect the mores of prosperity; if by an aristocracy, the prejudices and conservatism of the leisure class. This of course is what prompted Mr. Galsworthy to charge English "Public" schools with being caste-factories; they are under control of aristocrats and clergymen. German schools are presumed to turn out obedient and militarist students because of predominance of the military caste. French schools are accused by their critics of being socialistic, because the central school authorities to a considerable extent affiliate with the radical parties. American schools are accused of becoming feminized because of the overwhelming majority of women teachers. Private schools are sometimes condemned as not only bad, but worse than none, because they tend to increase the inequality of knowledge, because of bad methods, and, we might add, because they tend to magnify certain incidentals (military drill, sports, costume, manners) somewhat to the possible detriment of the more generalized branches of knowledge. Again, practical or vocational education may turn out to be only a thinly veiled scheme

to provide manufacturers with an abundant supply of cheap apprentices for whose training they no longer have to pay. There is evidence that the much vaunted German system has not benefited the worker himself, at least from the standpoint of real wages.

Hence it is evident that if we are to find in education the means to social improvement we must qualify the loose general meaning of the term, we must specify some particular and definite type of education. To cut the matter short, *social education* is the means by which change may become progress, and material achievement may be turned into improvement. It alone can supply that moral element which is the essence of real progress. It can turn exploitation into service, and capitalize achievement for the general weal instead of for personal aggrandizement. Freeing of the individual may be taken as the index of world-progress in the past. Man has come from status to contract, from no rights to nominally full and equal rights. It still remains for him to free himself from himself, so that he will voluntarily bind himself to the wheel of life, instead of being bound by some exterior constraint. Definite, purposive, social education is the most potent means in our hands for developing this spirit of self-dedication to the commonwealth. Social education offers the tools by which an articulate social philosophy may express itself in the conquest of a rational future for humanity. . . .

Social education is evidently not socialism nor socialistic education. Nor is it merely universal education; nor state or governmental schools; nor a combination of universal and state education as Ward thought. Nor is it simply secular. Neither is it synonymous with a sociological curriculum, nor with economic or industrial training; nor with "cultural" or "practical" education; nor with school subjects (for no one subject is inherently any more "social" than any other); nor for that matter with any sort of mere learning, as such. Nor is it tantamount to ethical culture, unless we mean social morality or conduct in its widest sense. Likewise it is not to be confused with ideas of equalizing property or standardization of desires. On the other hand, it does involve recognition that the individual is ineluctably social; that social mal-adjustment hinders individual development; that therefore social education must aim to prevent social waste and to develop social capital in men and goods. Moreover, it means that its business is to create a favorable atmosphere rather than precise solutions of social problems, to create in all of us social intelligence, power, effi-

ciency, and interests. It recognizes the school as a definite field of social relationships, where social tools are forged for future social situations, an institution which, however, scarcely so much fits for society as really is society—a co-operative and democratic society. In short, social education means conscious and definite training through and for certain specific types of social relationship. Social education for social progress, then, would use as means and end those types of social value and relationship which appear most likely to contribute to progress. Rightly conceived, it is a highly conscious instrument for selecting *contributive* rather than *adaptive* or *dependent* social types. Hence it must be universal and stand for generalizing opportunity, for distributing the products of human achievement in material goods and knowledge, and for a friendly, voluntary type of association in place of a coercive, exploitative relationship. *In a word, social education aims to create social solidarity by means of a social type marked by service rather than exploitation.*

That such a social type is theoretically possible it was our purpose to demonstrate in the opening chapters on the self. But that the type has not yet been achieved is all too pathetically obvious. Equally obvious, also, that our educational plant has not been organized for that purpose, and is not functioning in that direction. Nothing is easier than to mass the damaging evidence on a score of counts. Space and the spirit of charity will permit only the barest enumeration of a few. The United States confesses still to the shameful figure of 6,000,000 adult illiterates. Even more painful is the high rate of "school mortality." The National Child Labor Committee estimates that 1,000,000 children of school age are out of school. Only ten per cent. of the whole school population ever complete the high school; only a bare third ever finish the elementary grades; half of them never reach the sixth grade; and only one in every two hundred achieves a full college or university course. I heard an educational authority say recently that more children were out of school and unaccounted for in a single Middle West community of a third of a million inhabitants (who boast of their city as a second Boston) than in the whole German Empire! This deplorable record is only in part the fault of the school. It is referable to a whole complex social situation and a material philosophy of life as contemptible as it is shortsighted. It is the silliest fallacy to talk of industry outbidding the school for the child's interest as though that were all of it. The school is re-

mote from life, it is stiff with tradition and routine, it is individualistic as its critics claim; but it is also unable to compete on fair terms because hampered by scheming employers, greedy parents, jealous churches, complacent police, recreation purveyors and a none too generous body of taxpayers. Teachers, too, are not as efficient as we should like to see them. They fail in matters of personality, training, discipline, and genuine interest; perhaps most of all through their profound ignorance of the world in which they live. There used to be a good deal of justice in Shaw's maxim, "He who can does. He who cannot teaches"; but with the professionalizing of education the gibe loses more and more of its point.

The "undigested immigrant," meaning by that the failure to put into motion the machinery for social assimilation of the foreign born, is also in part an evidence of weak and "unsocialized" education. No small part of the nation's illiteracy and distress proceeds from this source. Our wasteful industrial system with its reckless unconcern for either natural or human resources is the biggest single item of reproach against American education. Losses through destruction of timber, coal, farm lands, birds, fish; through unemployment, underemployment, preventable disease and accident, infant mortality, child labor, haphazard vocations, and all the rest of a depressing list of items make up a bill of wastage, ten, twenty, fifty times the cost of an adequate national system of education. The fundamental cause of this orgy of destruction (in the name of development!), that is, the rampant spirit of exploitation and the philosophy of getting on at any price, is a confession of educational failure. The constant specter of from a tenth to a fifth of our whole population in the poverty zone is also a challenge to education to equalize opportunity and develop efficient industrial training. Crime, too, has failed to diminish in terms of one prison closed to every school opened. Classes and castes with class morals, class law, and class wars are still hatefully evident. The result of these causes is another mark of failure—an undemocratic democracy. Democracy is hypocrisy unless it is educated. We live in a pseudo-democracy, which is so big and so ignorant that it cannot govern itself, yet which is so suspicious of others that it denies full support to representative government. We are genuinely in danger of realizing Oscar Wilde's notion of democracy as "simply the bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people." We are certain to realize it unless the popular vision can be widened.

3. The Intellectual Aspect of Invention³

The following paragraphs are extracted from a much more extended discussion by Professor Bernard of the relation of invention to social progress, and might well be included in our own chapter on progress itself. The justification for including his remarks here lies in the fact that he so strongly emphasizes the accumulating *intellectual* factor, in both invention and the social progress which results from it.

An invention, of whatever kind, is the technic process by which man modifies his relationship to some phase of his environment. The invention is not necessarily either consciously or purposively made. It may, especially in the earlier stages of human or animal development, be unconsciously arrived at, but most later inventions have been instruments of conscious readjustments of the organism to its environment. Equally truly it may be said that only the more recent inventions have been purposive and premeditated. Now almost all of the important inventions are such. The environments to which an invention constitutes a readjustment are of three kinds: physical, social, and mental — the world of matter, the world of social relationships, and the world of ideas. Generally speaking there are three corresponding types of inventions, although adjustment to any one type of environment may, under certain circumstances, be mediated by an invention other than the type immediately corresponding. Thus a physical invention mediates directly an adjustment to the physical environment, but indirectly also it adjusts the organism to social and mental environments. Likewise a social invention is concerned directly with mediating adjustments to the social environment and indirectly to the physical and mental environments. Similarly also with the mental invention, which we may here speak of as the method invention.

Physical and social inventions, on the whole, are subsequent to mental or method inventions, although the former types, at least in their simpler forms begin quite early. All three types of invention are to be found in what we call conscious invention, although the mental or method invention usually precedes the other two types of invention, serving as a basis for their visualization or completion in consciousness. The evolution of conscious invention falls into two great divisions, the empirical and the projected invention. The empirical development of an invention is based upon experience. It grows up

³ From "Invention and Social Progress," by L. L. Bernard, in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, (July, 1923), pp. 1-33. Reprinted by permission.

and is perfected in use, so to speak. Thus grew our institutions and our tools from their early prehistoric beginnings to the present, increasing in perfection of adaptation as the insight and skill of men increased. Thus also our ideas and our mental technique or methods of thinking have developed from an early crude inductive experience basis to modern refinements of logic and mathematics. Data have piled upon data, tested by our revised logic of thinking, until we have vast empirical systems of thought, of varying degrees of accuracy and value.

The projected invention is primarily a recent development. It could arise only with the development of the method invention to the point where it was highly abstract and conceptual and transcended actual immediate experience. This type of invention is employed where the continuity in the adjustment process is broken and a number of intervening empirical steps are left out with the result that the adjustment is projected far ahead of anything then in existence. Thus the steam railway suddenly appears as a projected invention without waiting for the slow process of empirical improvement to develop it step by step. In the field of chemistry, new compounds are constantly being produced synthetically by this method. The projected invention depends on the utilization of science (method invention) and can not reach any marked development before the method invention has been perfected in science. The projected invention of the physical and social types had to await the appearance of the projected invention in the mental or method field. Now almost all important inventions are projected inventions; are thought out abstractly before they are made objectively or concretely. . . .

The earliest physical and social inventions, it was pointed out above, are adaptive modifications of existing patterns found in nature. The same is true, though less obviously so, of the method inventions also. Here it is an instinct or a reflex instead of the extended arm or a floating log, which is copied and modified into a habit, the better to adapt the organism to its environment. The habits of the animals and of primitive men are still very close to their instincts, just as their family life is in many respects like the pairing of the animals lower in the scale of development, and as their clubs are little more than sticks added to the hand and arm. Later inventions, the projected inventions of man, are so unlike their primitive prototypes that the relationship is not recognizable in form; it is to be traced only

through the similarity of names, which applies to functions, and this also at times disappears. The modern trip hammer or the ocean liner would never be mistaken in form for the corresponding instruments of the savage. Nor does the modern state show any considerable resemblance to the primitive herd or the pack of wolves—if we except the voracity of the spoilsman and the patient and fearful meekness of the exploited citizens of the modern state. Certainly the great habit complexes, such as those connected with child-care or industry, are so far removed from their instinctive foundations that elements of similarity are comparatively negligible. . . .

This early copying of patterns, with modifications, which is so characteristic of early inventions of all types, we may call invention by direct copy. That is, the thing is copied in the concrete form in which it exists. This is also empirical invention. Inventions are gradually improved on the basis of experience, or even unconsciously, by adding one by one increments of adaptive effectiveness to their forms. Thus the club becomes perfected and even differentiated into several forms according to the various functions it is to serve. The sharp stone is chipped, then polished, finally ground, into the shapes which render it most useful for arrow and spear heads, knives, hoes, and spades. Little by little the clan leader grows into a king or the family evolves from a breeding unit to a productive economic and cultural unit. Instincts give way to habits, which at first are only modified instincts, but which are now great acquired, adaptive complexes, possibly involving very numerous facts of science and looking forward to an adjustment with a perspective and inclusiveness, as well as selectiveness, which is wholly alien to the animal and largely so even to the savage. In invention by empirical direct copy there is transformation of the adaptive process or instrument, which we call the invention, but it is a slow transformation and at any one time the change in form is scarcely observable.

But it is different with the projected invention, which we may call invention by indirect copy. Here the resulting invention need not resemble in form the adaptive process which is next to it in the adjustment series. That is, the projected invention may represent such a mutation in adaptive technique that the evolution is suddenly thrown forward many generations, even ages or epochs, when measured in terms of the rate of advancement made possible by the empirical method of inventive modification. Consequently, the change in form

may be relatively complete. The reason why such a rapid advance in the inventive process and so complete a break in the inventive series can be achieved by means of projective invention is that this sort of invention is by indirect copy. That is, the visible or other sensorily perceived form is not copied at all, but only the function is preserved and copied symbolically. The function is reduced to a form of symbolic expression or representation, and this is copied, with necessary modification, into an ideal construct or symbolical organization, which then is actualized in experience or logic, according as the projected invention is physical or social, on the one hand, or a method invention, on the other. This indirect copying is therefore abstract copying, while direct copying is concrete. The latter grows directly out of sensory contact and perception; while the former is far removed from direct sensory elements and processes. The distinction can be made clearer by means of illustrations.

The difference between the empirical and projected inventions is easily seen in the case of physical inventions. Take, for example, the printing-press. The evolution of the press from movable printing blocks held in the hand along a straight edge to the improved Franklin press, still operated by hand, is a purely empirical one. Each step in the development was worked out in practical experience. But between this series of empirical inventions and the great machine presses which print and cut and fold half a hundred thousand newspapers in an hour there is a decided gap. This last type of press was not evolved out of experience, or empirically. It was *projected* from the mind to meet a felt need. It was teleologically constructed. First it was made in the mind with the aid of the scientific, mathematical formulas of physics. That is, the method inventions of physics and mathematics pertaining to strength of materials, mechanics, and the like, were employed in the mind for the creation of an ideal invention, which departed radically in form from any object or machine which had ever existed. The similarity of the new ideal printing-press to the old printing-presses was on the side of function rather than a matter of form. It did not look like them; it was vastly more complex in structure; it involved processes which they did not make use of; it agreed only in doing more efficiently and rapidly what they had done. For the new press to have been produced empirically would have required perhaps centuries and an intervening series of steps or forms of the printing-press which never came into existence.

The projected invention, such as the modern machine printing-press, was first made in the mind and consisted of a vast number of mathematical or mechanical formulas, which were reduced to logical order on paper. This is the first stage of the projected physical invention—the reduction to mathematical formulas on paper. The second stage is to visualize and transfer the mathematical formulas to blue prints. The third stage is making actual the blue prints through the construction of the machine to correspond to the blue prints. Thus in a sense the machine rises full blown from the inventor's brain. Within his own mind, he probably almost always visualizes the machine before he reduces it to formulas. This preliminary visualization might therefore be said to be a subjective stage preceding the three more objective stages mentioned above—stages which may readily be perceived by other minds. The inventor may himself perform all of the stages, including the final physical construction of the machine from the blue prints; or he may merely work out his idea and delegate the construction of the later stages to technicians. Usually, however, some elements of invention appear in all the stages and a more finished product may be assured if the inventor performs or closely supervises all the stages of the process. . . .

. . . There can be no question but that the superiority of modern over ancient society lies in its inventions, by means of which it can make more efficient use of natural forces, rather than in any improvement in the native abilities of modern peoples. Likewise the superiority of western over oriental peoples appears to be due to the same cause. Within two generations we have witnessed the rise of Japan to the front rank of nations by virtue of adopting our inventions, especially the physical and economic ones, and also most of the method inventions of first-rate importance.

Mechanical and industrial improvement, through physical inventions and method inventions in the physical sciences, has done much for the progress of mankind and may accomplish vastly more in the future. But the greatest advances in the future will probably come through the application of method inventions in the social sciences to the improvement of our social institutions and organization. Our social organization now lags behind our physical achievements. This is due in part to the fact that the social sciences are not so well developed as the physical sciences and consequently dependable and workable method inventions are not so easily produced in these

sciences. But our failure adequately to apply science to the perfection of social organization is also in large measure due to the opposition of prejudice, ignorance, and self-interest to interference with the old social order to which men have become adjusted. Adequate social progress can be achieved only by removing this opposition and by placing a premium upon social inventions and those method inventions which will be serviceable in the making of projected social inventions.

Exercises

1. Explain the problem of ignorance in the absolute sense; the relative sense.
2. Contrast the earlier and later conceptions of "education" as a professional discipline.
3. Following Ward, define ignorance and show its social import.
4. What is the customary attitude toward this condition of things?
5. Picture the practical knowledge of the intelligent classes, as described by Ward, with the helpless ignorance of the lower classes.
6. Why does Ward think that permanent social reform requires the abolition of these differences?
7. What is involved in "the administration of the social estate"?
8. Explain: "The consequence is that men move about together as at a masked ball, knowing nothing of those with whom they come in contact."
9. What kinds of knowledge do not need to be universally distributed?
10. What kind of knowledge is it the duty of society to distribute to all?
11. Contrast the evils of unequally distributed knowledge with the benefits of its universal distribution.
12. Summarize the criticism of the conclusions of the "Committee of Ten" as made by Ward and Small.
13. Give Ward's argument for educating the "worthless rabble," so-called.
14. What considerations determine, according to Todd, the progressive character of education?
15. Give examples of unprogressive education.
16. What is the danger in education for "culture"?
17. How does Todd state the evil of unequally distributed knowledge?
18. Show, by examples, how education may be perverted by those who control it.
19. What is social education, according to Todd, and what is its aim?

20. Give some facts illustrating the failure of our educational system to reach the people.

21. Following Bernard, define an invention; a physical invention; a social invention; a method invention.

22. Explain the difference between an empirical and a projected invention.

23. Show why the projected invention is little used among ignorant people.

24. If it be true that projected inventions must produce the greatest social advances of the future, what is the bearing of ignorance and knowledge upon national and international welfare?

Additional References

1. Carver, Thomas Nixon: "Conservation of Human Resources," in *The Foundations of National Prosperity*. (Ely, et al.) Pp. 308-319 treat "Ignorance As a Source of Waste."

2. Dealey, James Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*. Pp. 397-401 present an exceptionally valuable short account of *ignorance*, particularly in relation to *exploitation*.

D—PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL IDEALISM

CHAPTER XLIV

CAPITAL AND LABOR

THE problems of this and the following chapter arise in no essential sense from physical environment; neither do they reflect inherent differences in the quality of the population. It is yet to be proven, though often jauntily assumed, that there is any causal connection (or positive correlation, as the statistician would say) between eugenic worth and economic status.¹ Moreover, Ward showed clearly, in *Applied Sociology*, that the amount of potential genius, or latent capacity, is equal in all social classes. The problem of labor and capital is indeed akin to those which grow out of social *organization*, and it might have been included under the preceding group were it not for the fact that it is that and something more. The essential nature of this problem seems to lie in the further consideration that under these diverse life conditions created by social organization men come to cherish incompatible and conflicting systems of ideas, sentiments and attitudes. They cherish and pursue divergent social values, and the social problem resulting from their constantly increasing friction in modern industrial societies is thus pre-eminently a problem of social idealism. It is, specifically, an expression of the process of "estrangement in society" which has been so clearly described by Prof. Ross. (See Reference 1, below; also Reading 3 in Ch. XXIII., above.)

The plan in this and the following chapter is to permit the representatives of these conflicting idealisms to speak for themselves. Care has been taken to present both sides of the capital and labor controversy in the language of worthy exponents. The chapter closes with a plan for reconciliation by a writer peculiarly qualified to speak from a point of view that includes both sides.

¹ See the *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VII., No. 1. (Sept.-Oct., 1922), for a fuller discussion of this proposition by the present writer. Cf. also the passage from Hobhouse, in Reading 3 of Ch. XXXVII, above.

1. The "Open" and "Closed" Shop²

Much literature of an ephemeral character and often polemical in tone has been published on the "open" and "closed" shop issues and chiefly by partisans. An endeavor is made here to give a concise summary of the facts and an opinion upon the merits derived from many years of contact with both types.

The so-called "open-shop" of capital is merely a general label, sometimes a virtuous tag, for various practices extending from genuine democracy in the general selection and treatment of labor to the severest discrimination. It is more correctly styled a "non-union" shop policy, and such non-union shops—in the sense that unions do not and cannot control or even represent the whole or their own sections of labor there—are of four kinds. The third kind of "open shop" defined below, be it noted, comprises *by far the larger number of plants* in the country and is likely to be increasingly modified by the trend towards home-rule in the plant as a unit which the writer advocates as desirable regardless of the degree of union sentiment prevailing at any time amongst the employes.

Analysis of Terms.—The following tabular statement shows at a glance the actual conditions and a complex situation which is not revealed in partisan pronouncements upon the subject.

Non-Union Shops:

1. Anti-union shops closed to all union men. This is *a monopoly, for the employer*, of unorganized labor.
2. Anti-union shop where non-union men get the preference.
3. Real open-shop without discrimination or preference but no representation for employes.
4. Real open-shop with employes' representation of varying degrees of authority; some with equal powers with capital on all labor issues and with status for craft unions where such exist. This is the coming type of shop organization and, when fully developed, it should function as a court of first instance equally as well in the fully unionized shops as it promises to do in the non-union shop.

² From *Modern Industrial Relations: Policy and Practice*, by John Calder, Mem. Am. Soc. M.E., Mem. Soc. Industrial Engineers, Consulting Engineer, etc.; pp. 76-78. (New York and London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1923. Reprinted by permission.)

"Union shops" are much fewer in number than the public is aware of. They divide into five kinds, type six being most numerous.

Union Shops:

5. "Open-Shop" in which the union represents all labor in controversies. This type has practically passed out of existence. It is only possible through Federal imposition of it upon industry during the war.
6. "Open Union Shop" in which unionism is recognized only so far as it obtains but where the union makes no attempt to control the employer's hiring policy. The union's attitude towards non-unionized workers in such shops varies greatly and depends largely upon the character and policies of its current leaders and members. In practice it ranges from entire amity to open intimidation.
7. "Preferential Union Shop" in which the union is recognized and its members, when available and competent, are given a preference for vacancies.
8. "Closed Union Shop" of a union encouraging new applicants.
9. "Closed Union Shop" of a union closed as to new membership. *This is a sheer monopoly in the interests of a small group of craftsmen* at the expense of all other workers and of society.

Only Two Varieties of Shops of Consequence at Present.—In philosophizing upon the variants just described, a sense of proportion absent in much labor theory and in teaching about it must be preserved, for outside of the building trades and other hand-industries and of printing, clothing, transportation, and mining, and one or two others, there *are relatively few of the union shops* of types 7, 8, and 9 in existence, and shops of these types are likely to decrease in number. For all practical purposes the "union-shop" of type 6 is the most prevalent amongst organized plants. The "open-shop" of type 3 is the most common amongst the shops giving no specific union recognition but its transformation into type 4 is under way. "Recognition" of the union varies considerably in its nature and extent and "open shops" of type 3 do in some cases recognize the unions controlling certain crafts forming a minority of the employees. Sometimes these unions represent the majority but not the minority

of the employes in both types 3 and 6. In some shops of type 6 the union, because it represents the majority, is recognized by the employer — though not always by the minority — as representing all and, of course, complete recognition of the union holds where the shop is fully organized.

2. The Claims of Capital ³

Before discussing what capital and labor in coöperation can accomplish, it is well to record what capitalism has to say as to the service which that system renders to all of us, and to labor in particular. . . .

What Happens to New Wealth? — The right place to measure the distribution of wealth is not at the point of ownership, but at the point of consumption. Of the two kinds of wealth one consists of consumable wealth, of goods ready for consumption, such as food, clothing, and furnishings. This kind is valued for itself. The other kind consists of property which is used in producing things or in rendering direct service, such as land, factories, railroads, etc., etc. This kind of wealth is not valued for itself; it is valued for the things it will produce, for the flow of benefits that it can give, and all the value is in the flow. We have shown in Chapter II that the consumable wealth is very widely distributed, despite the assertions of the discontented to the contrary. It is different, however, with regard to the distribution of the ownership of productive property. The management and ownership of the latter gravitates under natural laws into the hands of those who are able to make it most productive. It is in the interest of the community — “all-of-us” — that it should be so.

Would it not be better for the community if the farmer who seldom gets more than thirty bushels of corn to the acre would sell out his place to a farmer who seldom gets less than fifty bushels to the acre, unless he can be stimulated by the latter's example to make a better use of his land? The farm is not alone in this contrast. All the industries without exception are subject to this tendency under the sys-

³ From *Capital's Duty to the Wage-Earner: A Manual of Principles and Practice on Handling the Human Factors in Industry*, by John Calder; pp. 83; 84-89; 90-91; 92-94. (New York and London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1923. Reprinted by permission.)

tem of competition in which we live, and the general interest of the community is clearly served by such progress in industry and by abundant production.

When we follow consumable wealth into the markets and thence into the ultimate consumer's hands we are able to ascertain the real distribution of benefits. When this is done, the baselessness of the charge that two or three per cent of our population enjoy most of the benefits of existing wealth is exposed. We know well that two or three per cent of the people do not eat most of the food-stuffs produced in this country or wear most of the clothing, or burn most of the coal, or do most of the riding on railroads, or own most of the automobiles. It is not that small portion of the population that is consuming the products of the industries. Certainly the great trade of this country is not in supplying the wants of two or three per cent of its people.

The Rich Do Not Consume Their Share.—In proportion to the total production of wealth in the country the portion of it consumed by the rich is trivial and insignificant. The bulk of the large incomes goes right back into industry to increase production. As a matter of fact the progress of industry absolutely depends upon the self-denying use of such surpluses. All the benefits of this procedure go to the great body of consumers. That part of the income of rich people which is saved and converted into capital and used to increase production for the public at large is as truly devoted to the public use, and far more effectually, than if it had been paid into the public treasury.

The same is true of any grade of saver and investor. The small farmer who uses the surplus income of his successful year to drain and otherwise improve his land and increase its productivity is also active in a manner which best serves the public interest. What better use can the present government or any conceivable substitute for it make of such a surplus? Russia, today, is the outstanding example of a foolish government, abolishing the motive for such saving amongst the agricultural people by declaring that it would take the whole surplus, apart from a bare subsistence, from the farmer, with the result that there was misery on the farms and no surplus and hardly anything for the people in the cities.

All Society Gains from Invested Savings.—The man who owns no property, and who spends all of his wages the same week he receives

them is benefited by an accumulation of capital which makes industry more productive and increases the supply of things he purchases.

The gains of society in the last hundred years have been accomplished for the most part by improvements in the methods of production through the use of power and machinery under increasingly able direction. They have been accomplished by the development of the industrial plant. The industrial plant represents the earnings and savings and profits of individuals, increasingly drawn from the ranks of the wage earners themselves. These individuals, both directly and through savings institutions, now constitute a huge army of stockholders and bondholders numbering many millions of people.

As a matter of fact, these private earnings and savings, these self-denials, these postponements of immediate satisfaction, originated with the more intelligent, more self-denying, and far-seeing people of all degrees of wealth. They spread gradually, lifting the whole level of social life far above what it was before massed capital popularly owned became an important factor in production. The "good old times" are a figment of the imagination, due largely to the circumstance that until the late eighties popular history had not recorded the misery and squalor and hopeless outlook of the laboring man less than a century ago.

Before the possibility of the worker contributing to the supply of capital arrived through improved status, and before the habit of thrift and self-denial to that end was cultivated, the progress of industry and the possibility of an increased quantity of goods in the world were wholly dependent upon a relatively few individuals.

The State Would Not Use Property More Wisely.—We still live under a régime of privately conducted but popularly owned industry which is a necessary part of the equipment of society. This equipment is rendering the same, and undoubtedly a better, service than if it were owned by the State, if we may take economic management of state and municipal and national affairs as a criterion of what management of industry and business is likely to be in government hands.

The section of labor which today advocates government ownership and operation of the railroads and some large industries does so upon the theory that society would thereby *escape from paying the profits of operation*. But aside from the question of guaranteed efficiency of government operation—on which recent experience on a large scale on railroads and shipping is wholly negative—they overlook the

fact that if there were no profits, there would be no fund for the improvement or development of industries and consequently no industrial progress. It is a fact well established that new capital equal to all the net earnings of the railroads of the United States should be invested in them annually if we are to keep them up to the growing needs of the country.

There are Limits to Reservations from Consumption.—A socialist or collective system of society would some way, somehow, have to create and invest this sum yearly to keep up and enlarge productive facilities—instead of dividing it up—just as is now the case with private initiative or capitalism at the helm. . . .

Reservations Subject to Law.—The truth is that economic law fixes a normal balance between compensation of capital and compensation of labor. If too much of current production is put into equipment and fixed investment and not enough is distributed for current consumption, the purchasing power of the people will fall behind production and further investment will be found unprofitable. This would remedy itself in the long run, would bring about a state of depression in industry profitable to nobody, but is held in check by the increasing knowledge that the good of all must be the goal. Society is alive to the fact that labor's interests are deeply affected by the short run of any economic change and excessive reservation of surplus. The governing fact in the distribution of wealth is simply this, that *there is practically no way of using capital productively except by employing labor and doing it in the service of the masses of the people.* . . .

In all progressive countries *capital increases faster than the population*, that is, faster than the supply of labor. In the ten years between 1899 and 1909 our population increased 21 per cent, while the amount of capital invested in our manufacturing industries increased five times as fast, or 105 per cent, and the amount of power employed in these industries four times as fast, or 84 per cent. Under these conditions labor comes naturally into a constantly stronger position. Every new fortune, every dollar of new capital which is saved, forthwith goes to work as a producer, to multiply the things that the world wants; and if things multiply *faster than the people*, the inevitable tendency must be "To Make Goods Plentiful, and Men Dear" in the best sense of the term.

Thrift, the Maker of Capitalists.—Capitalists know well that, de-

spite the conflicts and oppositions outlined here, the progress of the wage-earners does not depend upon the generosity or forbearance or upon the considerate favor of those whose natural talents have placed them higher in the social or economic scale. The wage-earning masses in all countries, and particularly in the United States, with its absence of social and traditional restraints and barriers, come up slowly but surely because of the resistless and everlasting laws which work for equality among men. In our day and in our country their rise is accelerated by the fast spreading program of goodwill on a thorough understanding of what employer and employe desire, where they want to go, and what capital, which is increasingly the massed savings of the worker, will do for them and for society in the hands of forward-looking co-operating people. . . .

Capitalists as Social Trustees.—Cordial acceptance of capitalism by all is a condition of the realization of its fullest possibilities for labor, capital, and the public. The forefront of the more persistent and intelligent criticism of capitalism in our day is not based upon Marxian fallacies or indeed upon any of the classical arguments for socialization. It is strictly pragmatic. It asserts that, even admitting all that can be said for capitalism, *the system does not work as it claims.*

It stresses the alleged undue power, unscrupulously and anti-socially exercised, which the control of surpluses, both necessarily and unnecessarily reserved from industry, gives to the very small portion of the people entrusted with them by an increasing and widely scattered public ownership. Capitalism must therefore prove itself a good social trustee, as well as maintain its position as the ablest and most fruitful producing force the world has known. We believe that through higher ideals and better practice, such as are outlined in this study, it can increasingly do both, and thereby solve the real problem of today, to make the existing system operate at its best.

Recently in Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, and England, the great majority of the gainfully employed have declared against the general strike in the interests of "labor" alone. They have emphatically affirmed their adherence to the Capitalism they know rather than to the Communism whose sample blessings have been rejected. They have been witnesses to and beneficiaries of modern capitalism organized for and successful in obtaining an impressive continuity and they have entered their protest against the contention that So-

ciety is at the mercy of Labor whenever its big chiefs turn their thumbs down in contemptuous unconcern for "the-rest-of-us." The majority of the gainfully employed in every industrial country have declared for equality of opportunity as against equality of condition. They prefer that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp." To meet the impact of true criticism of capitalism and of the false claims against it we need a chastened serious capitalism conscious that wealth and welfare are not necessarily the same thing, — more convinced than ever of its social usefulness and importance, incapable of asserting that Providence entrusted it with wealth or any divine right yet less sure than ever that this is the best of all possible economic worlds; bending its ear for "the new word," and ready to pass it on. Such a capitalism need have no fear of an inhospitable reception of its claims or lack of appreciation of its services by "the man in the street."

3. The Demands of Labor ⁴

At the risk of pedantry we define our meaning. By the term capitalism, or the capitalist system, or as we prefer, the capitalist civilization, we mean the particular stage in the development of industry and legal institutions in which the bulk of the workers find themselves divorced from the ownership of the instruments of production, in such a way as to pass into the position of wage-earners, whose subsistence, security and personal freedom seem dependent on the will of a relatively small proportion of the nation; namely, those who own, and through their legal ownership control, the organization of the land, the machinery and the labor-force of the community, and do so with the object of making for themselves individual and private gains.

That the land and the other instruments of wealth production should be the private property of a relatively small class of individuals, with hardly more public responsibility attached to it than to the possession of a watch or walking-stick; that this private ownership should constitute the basis of the arrangement on which the rest of the community obtain their livelihood; and that it should carry with it the control and organization of the production and distribution of the commodities and services that are the very life of the nation — and this is what is meant by capitalism — this amazing arrangement, far

⁴ From *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb; pp. 10-17. (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923.)

from being eternal and ubiquitous throughout human history, has become the characteristic feature of the civilization of the United States only within three or four generations; and of Europe only within the last few centuries, through the unregulated squattings of commercial adventure on the derelict sites left by the gradual failure of the feudal system of land tenure and agriculture in the country, and of a relatively less important gild organization of manufacture and trading in the towns. We know that, in Europe, before the feudal system and the craft gilds existed, civilizations were based on different forms of slavery or serfdom, the family or the caste. These in their times seemed rooted in human nature and as unchangeable as capitalism does. What is more, they lasted many centuries, and were thought out and organized in States and Churches as divine orders of society in which every man, from Emperor and Pope to serf and slave, was responsible to God for the use he made of his opportunities. The commercial squatting which, though it began in England under Henry VII., did not come into power until George III. was king, has never been authorized and organized politically and religiously in the old enduring fashion. The sages who thought it out as political economists declared that it had no concern with the Churches, and that the lawgivers must not meddle with it: its operations were to be godless and they were to be lawless. On these frankly buccaneering terms it undertook to secure the livelihood of the people, not as its aim, but as an incident of its devotion on principle to the art of getting rich quickly. Its sole claim to toleration was its success in fulfilling that cardinal condition.

It is the thesis of this book that though it never fulfilled the condition completely, and in many places violated it with every circumstance of outrage, yet there was a moment, roughly placeable at the middle of the nineteenth century, when it could claim that, in a hundred years, it had produced, on balance, a surprising advance in material civilization for greatly increased populations. But we must add that from that moment to the present it has been receding from defeat to defeat, beaten ever more and more hopelessly by the social problems created by the very civilization it has built up and the very fecundity it has encouraged. In short, that it began to decay before it reached maturity, and that history will regard capitalism, not as an epoch but as an episode, and in the main a tragic episode, or Dark Age, between two epochs. And, seeing that no individual owner

recognizes himself as a dictator, let it be at once added that, as will presently be explained, the dictatorship is a class dictatorship, and each separate capitalist is as helpless in the face of the institution of ownership for private profit as are the wage-earners themselves. His control of the forces of competitive capitalism is, at bottom, no greater than a sailor's control of the wind. But as the institution makes each owner a member of a privileged class, and could be superseded by more advantageous arrangements if the class would give up its privileges, it is not altogether unfair to hold each and every member of the class responsible for the results of these privileges.

The labor and socialist movement of the world is essentially a revolt against the capitalist system of society.

We believe that the most advanced races are today, in knowledge, character and intelligence ripe for dispensing with this relation; for the supersession of industrial oligarchy by industrial democracy, and of the motive of pecuniary self-interest by that of public service. We realize that there have been, and over the greater part of the globe still are, other dictatorships more vicious in their motives and more disastrous in their results than the dictatorship of the owners of the instruments of production over the wage-earners. Such are the coercion of slaves by their proprietors, of vanquished races by their conquerors, of whole peoples by autocrats or oligarchies, basing themselves on a monopoly of political power by an individual or by a restricted aristocracy or other minority of race, class or creed. Running in and out of all these systems of oppression, sometimes waning, sometimes waxing, are the domestic tyrannies of the man over the woman, and of the parent over the child. Each of these separate and distinct forms of coercion of one human being by another has been embodied in peculiar economic, political or social laws and conventions; each has provoked, among virile races, its complementary movement of revolt and reform. Socialists, so long as they are true to the democracy in which socialism is rooted, are in sympathy with all these movements and are desirous of promoting them. They realize that, in the normal development of society, the abolition of chattel slavery, the establishment of political democracy, and the emancipation of women, must precede any general adoption of democracy in industry. The existence of one or other of these more obvious despotisms masks the despotism of the owners of the instruments of production over those who are dependent for their livelihood

on being permitted to use them, and necessarily diverts attention from the specific evils of capitalism. But the primary purpose of the socialist is to focus attention on the peculiar kind of tyranny now exercised even in the most advanced political democracies, by a relatively small class of rich men over a mass of poor men.

The socialist indictment of the capitalist system of industry, and the society based upon it, has four main counts. History proves that, whilst national poverty may have other causes, whenever and wherever the greater part of the population are divorced from the ownership of the instruments of production, even where the aggregate production is relatively enormous, the bulk of the people live in penury, and large numbers of them are perpetually threatened by starvation. In the second place, this penury and its accompanying insecurity are rendered more hideous and humiliating by the relative comfort and luxury of the proprietary class, and by the shameless idleness of some of its members. The worst circumstance of capitalism is, however, neither the poverty of the wage-earner nor the luxury of the property owner, but, thirdly, the glaring inequality in personal freedom between the propertyless man and the member of the class that "lives by owning." Hour by hour, day by day, year in and year out, the two-thirds of the nation who depend for their daily or weekly house-keeping on gaining access to the instruments of production find themselves working under the orders of the relatively restricted class of those who own these instruments. The sanction for the orders is not legal punishment, but, ultimately, a starvation which is supposed to be optional. That is what is meant by the wage-earners when they complain of "wage slavery." Fourthly, the socialist believes that the very basis of the capitalist system is scientifically unsound, as a means of organizing the production and distribution of commodities and services, and fundamentally inconsistent with the spiritual advancement of the race.

We shall examine successively the four distinct evils that socialists believe to be demonstrably inherent in the capitalist organization of society. We shall deal first with three of them: the poverty of the poor, the inequality of incomes, and the disparity in personal freedom, all of which are invariably found associated with the divorce of the mass of the people from the ownership of the instruments of production. We shall then show that, whilst the capitalist system achieved an initial success in increasing the wealth of the nation, it

has been eventually found to fail even in maximizing the production of commodities and services; and thus not only to defeat its own professed object but also, by its exclusive reliance on the motive of pecuniary gain to individual owners, to be inimical to national morality and international peace; in fact, to civilization itself.

4. A Way Out of Industrial Conflict⁵

(a) Everywhere people are coming to realize that no permanent safety is to be found in treaties which aim at securing an even distribution of power between various possible combatants. That policy makes the world's peace a mere contingency depending on the perfect poise of a balance that is not held in the hand of justice. We must find some more stable basis if we are to achieve enduring peace.

And what is true of international relations is equally true of the relations between capital and labor. All over the world federated capital is today confronted by federated labor. Each is primarily seeking to adjust the balance in its own favor, or to gain such a predominance of power over the other that it can dictate terms. If, however, that is impossible, it endeavors at any rate to entrench itself so strongly that it is immune from attack.

Now, the conflicts which are continually devastating the whole field of industry show that these methods have failed, whether from the viewpoint of capital, or labor, or of the whole community. They have not tended to produce stability, but appalling instability. It is essential for the welfare of the world that we should devise and adopt better methods, and there has never in human history been a more favorable opportunity for doing this. Education has made progress during the last quarter of a century, and when people become educated they soon begin to analyze their own social relationships and to ask how existing laws and customs affect them, whether as individuals or as groups. Both in America and Britain profound changes have taken place; and there is a higher level of intelligence combined with a much stronger sense of group loyalty among the rank and file workers. This was true even before the war, but the war has intensified and hastened the development.

⁵ Reprinted from *Industrial Unrest: A Way Out*, by B. Seebohm Rowntree, by permission of the publishers, the George H. Doran Company.

Whether or not we welcome the new attitude of labor, we cannot afford to neglect it; and its direct message to those of us who, in our different spheres, have grave responsibility with regard to the conduct of industry is that we can no longer hope to arrive at industrial peace by the methods of the arena. Rather, we must attempt to establish relations of which peace will be the natural outcome. This will involve the discovery and the modification or removal of whatever conditions in our present system inevitably make for labor unrest.

In this, I think, the initiative should be taken by employers. *Noblesse oblige*. I have come to the United States as a student to learn how you are dealing with the labor problem, and being here I have been asked to tell you what we are trying to do on the other side of the Atlantic. I do not, of course, claim to represent British employers as a whole — that would be an unwarranted presumption. I believe, however, that what I have to say would be supported, probably with exceptions here and there, by a considerable number of the more progressive employers in England.

(b) Theoretically there are three ways in which industrial unrest may be allayed.

Making Employers All-Powerful

The first is for the employers to make their position so strong that the workers dare not raise their heads. This happened in the days of slavery and serfdom. Very occasionally the slaves were goaded to revolt against oppression, but their rebellion was put down with such savage brutality that a long interval usually elapsed ere "peace" was again disturbed. But slavery went long since, and the spirit of serfdom has been growing weaker and weaker among the workers for a generation, until the war finally destroyed it.

It is essential to a proper understanding of the situation today that we should realize that the spirit of serfdom has gone. Much unrest is due to the failure of certain employers to grasp this fact. Popular education began the process of destroying serfdom. An uneducated people might be willing, unquestioningly, to live and act and think as their parents did; but education leads men to ask questions, and the workers have been asking them furiously for thirty years and more. They are asking why the employer should always be the ac-

cepted master and the worker the submissive servant, and why the position of the worker in industry should not be that of co-operator. They are questioning, often with little capacity for making due allowances, but none the less insistently, what we call economic laws; and they are asking whether they are getting a fair share of the product of industry, and why there should be so striking a difference between the life of the workers and that of "the idle rich," of whom, even if they do not come into personal contact with them, they read in the newspapers. These and many other problems are being put forward daily by the workers. Their education, poor enough, forsooth, has nevertheless roused them forever out of the apathy which marked the servile mind.

But if education over a period of years has been slowly teaching men to think, and if thought has gradually changed their outlook, the war has swiftly banished the last traces of their servility. Just think what happened! Men who all their lives had worked at one job, perhaps in the same shop, following the trade that their fathers followed, living always in one town, often in one street, and largely accepting conditions as they found them as a matter of course, were suddenly seized by some great power and deposited in France, Flanders, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Greece, where they mingled with men from all nations — men from all over the British Empire and from America. And what happened, think you? Was there not, during the long waiting hours, close questioning among these men as to working conditions? Were not these critically contrasted? And has not this comparison of English wages and conditions with those of the Dominions and the U. S. A. had a profound effect on the British workers who fought overseas? They learnt, too, the meaning of good rations and ample clothing. And then there was the challenge: "Your King and Country need you!" They realized that they were needed in the trenches, and needed in the workshops at home. They realized that they were essential to the saving of the Empire; and this conviction sank into their minds and produced a profound effect. Oh! it was a time of intense education, very thorough and very rapid, and the men will never again be as they were when they left their accustomed grooves in 1914.

A Balance of Power

The second theoretical way in which to secure industrial peace is by establishing a balance of power among federations of employers and workers, each party endeavoring to render itself so strong that the other dare not start an offensive. This, broadly speaking, is the method whose potentialities we are exploring today—but it is a perilous experiment, as Europe and the world found to their cost in August, 1914. Such a course is no real preventative of war; it can but postpone its outbreak, but when that outbreak does occur its results are much more serious. We have already had evidence of this fact in the paralyzing strikes and lock-outs which characterize modern industrial warfare.

The Removal of the Causes of Unrest

There remains but one method of securing peace, and that is patiently and with open minds to explore the causes of unrest and to seek to remove them. That, after all, is the only road to a lasting peace; and really it is the only common-sense and scientific way of dealing with the situation. Unrest is an industrial disease, and can only be remedied as a bodily disease is remedied—first by careful diagnosis of the causes producing it, and secondly by taking the steps necessary to remove them.

I believe the first step is to rid our minds of the idea that, just because industrial unrest has lasted for a long time, it is inevitable while industry continues. Doubtless our British ancestors spoke in a similar way of cholera and the plague in the seventeenth century! So far from imagining that industrial unrest is inevitable, I think that its presence constitutes a serious reflection on the ability of the employers to do their job efficiently. It is easy, of course, to blame the other party. It is easy for employers to blame the idleness and perversity and short-sightedness of the workers, and for the workers to grow angry over the selfish avarice of the employers, but all this does not help to eliminate unrest! That can only be done by constructive thinking and the initiative must be taken by employers.

Now obviously if we desire to secure something so valuable as real industrial peace, we must be prepared to pay for it.

Let us consider what this will involve. Leaving out of account the unreasoning labor agitator, who only gains hearers from among

discontented people, I think the thoughtful worker would say that any satisfactory scheme of industry must provide the following minimum conditions:

The worker should have:

1. Earnings sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of comfort.
2. Reasonable hours of work.
3. Reasonable economic security during the whole working life and in old age.
4. A reasonable share with the employer in determining the conditions of work.
5. An interest in the prosperity of the industry in which he is engaged.

Are these claims such as employers can rightly entertain? Before we seek to answer that question may I suggest that it is essential to approach its consideration with perfectly open minds? It may be difficult for us to do this, because throughout our lives the economic relations of employer and worker have followed certain clearly defined traditions, and these have become so fixed that they almost seem to be an intrinsic and unalterable part of industry. Moreover, they are closely associated with the wonderful industrial development of the last seventy or eighty years. It is obvious that we cannot abandon or even modify them in a careless, irresponsible fashion, and it has often been argued that any interference with them might handicap industrial progress or even render it impossible.

Yet today that argument fails to convince the impartial observer who sees to what an extent progress is already checked and paralyzed by the perpetual struggle between Capital and Labor. It is incumbent upon us as employers, by one means or another, to get industry into sound working trim; and if we find that nineteenth-century methods will not fit twentieth-century needs we can but say: "After all, we are not living in the nineteenth century!"

Exercises

1. What is meant by a problem of social idealism?
2. Distinguish the four kinds of non-union shops.
3. Distinguish five kinds of union shops.
4. Which of these varieties are most important?
5. Where would Calder measure the distribution of wealth? Why?

6. What is his attitude toward the charge that two or three per cent of our population enjoy most of the benefits of existing wealth?

7. Explain his statement that the rich do not consume their share of goods.

8. Show how society gains from invested savings.

9. What is Calder's view of the state control advocated by socialists?

10. Explain: "The truth is that economic law fixes a normal balance between compensation of capital and compensation of labor."

11. How does the rapid increase of capital affect the position of labor?

12. What is meant by the phrase, "Capitalists as social trustees"?

13. What is capitalism as defined by the Webbs?

14. How far back does it extend in human history?

15. What part did "commercial squatting" play in the rise of modern capitalism?

16. What is the thesis of the Webbs?

17. What is the labor and socialist movement as stated by these authors?

18. State the four main counts of the socialist indictment of capitalism.

19. According to Rowntree, what failure is indicated by industrial conflicts?

20. In his view what should be the attitude of employers?

21. Discuss the strength and weakness of the three ways for allaying industrial unrest.

22. What does he think about the possibility of removing the causes of unrest?

23. What, according to Rowntree, must be the minimum conditions in any satisfactory scheme of industry?

Additional References

1. Adams, T. S. and Sumner, H. L.: *Labor Problems*. Ch. VII. "Labor Organizations and Employers' Associations."

2. Calder, John: "The Faith of An Industrial Engineer," in the *Survey*, Vol. XLIX., No. 3. Graphic Number. (Nov. 1, 1922.)

3. Ely, Richard T.: *Outlines of Economics*. Ch. XXII. "Labor Problems."

4. Laughlin, J. Laurence: "The Logic of Capitalism," in the *Yale Review*, Vol. XIII., No. 2. (Jan., 1924.) Distinguishes existing inequality of wealth from the workings of capitalism.

5. Parker, Carleton H.: *The Casual Laborer and other Essays*. An unusually penetrating analysis of labor unrest.

6. Taussig, Frank W.: *Principles of Economics*. Vol. II., Ch. 56, "Labor Legislation."

CHAPTER XLV

PROGRAMS OF SOCIAL REFORM

THE frequent recurrence in the literature of the capital-and-labor conflict of such phrases as "claims" of capital, "demands" of labor, "plans" and "programs," etc., reflects the fact that it is really a problem of clashing opinions, systems of thought, and ideals. The problem of the present chapter is even more clearly one of rival social idealisms and programs, as indicated by the title itself.

Karl Marx declared, with reference to revolutionary social change, that "In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic — in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."¹ It is with this conscious conflict of *ideological* forms that we are concerned in this chapter; although it is not denied that they arise, as Marx goes on to say, "from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production." This is true in a special sense of the "programs" sketched in the present chapter, because they are precisely programs for the reorganization of the industrial and economic side of the social order and are most intimately connected, as both cause and effect, with the objective facts and conditions of that organization. That is to say, the advocates of syndicalism or of socialism do not promulgate their doctrines as mere hypotheses and theories possessing only an intellectual interest for those of speculative turn. They are more or less definite programs of intended action, and express attitudes no less than ideas. They may even be taken as "myths" in the sense defined by Sorel, in his *Reflections on Violence*, and regarded as more or less accurate formulations and justifications of deep-seated wishes and intentions cherished by the masses who entertain the myth, as for example, that of the General Strike of the syndicalists.

We thus concede a close and powerful connection between these idealisms and the practical affairs of industry and politics, without

¹ In his *Critique of Political Economy*, quoted by Lichtenberger in *The Development of Social Theory*, p. 298. Professor Lichtenberger's estimate and summary of Marx's contribution to the theory of social evolution is extremely valuable. *Ibid.*, pp. 291-302.

accepting the Marxian doctrine of economic determinism from which he sought to derive all social ideas and attitudes. In the view of the present writer the ideological factors are themselves social forces of the highest order, and must be reckoned with as such.

The presentation of the various systems in the present chapter is of necessity grossly inadequate from lack of space. Moreover, the necessity of finding a very concise statement has caused some deviation from the original intention, which was to let each group speak for itself. It is believed, nevertheless, that the result is none the less fair and accurate. And it should be fully understood that the purpose here is merely to *indicate the nature of the problem*, and not to solve, or even fully expound it.

One important program of social reform which has been entirely omitted from the Readings deserves mention here. That is the idea of reform through the activity of minor, usually more radical, political parties. Professor Haynes has discussed this method most thoroughly. (In his book, *Third Party Movements Since the Civil War, with Special Reference to Iowa*. Pub. by the State Historical Society of Iowa.) "Looked at from the social point of view," he remarks, "the chief function of third parties has been to bring new issues before the people: they force new policies upon the older parties, and after accomplishing their work they pass away. . . . The real value, then, of third parties is that they stir the waters and prevent stagnation. What an agitator is among individuals the third party is in relation to the older party organizations." (Pp. 3, 5.)

1. Socialism ²

The Socialist remedy for the ills which confront society is, of course, the public ownership and the democratic management of all industry of social value. On the whole, the answer is definite and positive. True, the socialist ranks harbor various opinions as to what constitutes democratic management. One camp maintains that the socially-valuable industries, after becoming publicly-owned, should be operated by the Government. Another camp, feeling more impellingly the call of syndicalism and guild socialism, would have the publicly-owned industries operated primarily by their workers. The sudden apparition on the horizon of an actually-functioning Soviet system has caused within the Socialist citadel disagreement also as to whether the political state should be organized geographically or occupationally, and as to the method by which Socialism can be or should be achieved. Finally, there is room for legitimate Socialist disagreement

² From *The Larger Socialism*, by Bertram Benedict; pp. 1-5. (New York. Copyrighted by The Macmillan Company, 1921. Reprinted by permission.)

as to the gauge or gauges by which an industry shall be considered socially valuable.

Nevertheless, in all fairness it must be admitted that these points lie in the periphery and not at the hub of the Socialist wheel. Concerning the central conception of Socialism, there is substantial agreement. As at present the national Government owns and operates the mails, the Panama Canal, the Alaskan Railroad, the army and navy, the postal savings banks, the parcel post, the Government Printing Office, the Light-house and Coast Guard Services, the national parks;—as local Governments own and operate public schools, libraries, the police and fire departments, the water supply, streets and bridges, roads, street illumination, parks,—so in a socialistic state the national Government and the local Governments would own and be responsible for the operation of the mines, the railroads, the iron and steel mills, the steamship lines, the express systems, the oil wells, the power plants, the clothing factories, the meat-packing plants, the shoe factories, the shipping, the laundries, the commercial automobile plants, the cotton and woolen mills, the forests, the non-agricultural land, the commercial and savings banks, the apartment houses, the grain elevators, the gas plants, the street railways, the bakeries, the telephone and telegraph systems, the cold storage plants, the department stores, the ice plants, the agricultural implements factories, the fertilizer plants, the sugar refineries, the paper mills, the fish-packing plants, the lumber mills, the flour mills, and all other agencies of production and distribution which cannot cease functioning, or cannot function badly, without inflicting injury upon the great majority of the people. As the present national and local Governments furnish mail service, education, water, and fire and police protection to the people free or at cost, and in the amounts necessary for the people's welfare, Socialist national and local Governments would furnish to the people free or at cost, and in the amount necessary for the people's welfare, coal, oil, bread, meat, milk, ice, clothing, shoes, transportation, housing, sewing machines, calico, blankets, lumber, gas and electricity and insurance policies.

Side by side with this collective ownership and operation of all necessary industry, a Socialist state would enforce extensive welfare legislation. True, most of this legislation can be achieved by a purification instead of by the abolition of the present capitalist system, and much of it is advocated by ardent opponents of a socialist system. But

the consummation of most of these welfare proposals must be advocated by every Socialist, for even to those Socialists who would have the Government intrude but lightly into the actual processes of production, much of this protective legislation will appear the *sine qua non* of a successful coöperative commonwealth. Among other things, it would include maternity insurance, for a period before and after childbirth; pensions for dependent mothers; abolition of child labor, except possibly in abnormal cases, below the age of eighteen; higher schooling for all showing mental promise, even by the aid of scholarships for the support of the students preparing for the more advanced professions, such as medicine; extensive vocational guidance; generally available medical examinations; the guaranty to each worker of at least the minimum wage necessary for him or for his family to maintain a socially-useful standard of living; a maximum wage for even the most responsible administrators of the Socialist state and of the Socialist state's industries, dependent upon the total wealth productivity of the state and upon the margin remaining after all had been guaranteed the minimum wage; health insurance; liberal laws for workmen's compensation in all industries; regulation, preferably variable, of the hours of labor permissible per day, per week, per year; liberal sanitary and safety regulations for all work, especially for the more unhealthful and the more dangerous; high, if not confiscatory, taxes on the wealth descending from the previous capitalist system, on inheritances, on the unearned increment in land values; segregation of the feeble-minded; insurance against whatever unemployment might persist in spite of wide regulation of industry, against invalidity, against old age.

2. Guild Socialism ³

Rejecting both the theory and practice of the commodity valuation of labor, realizing that such rejection can only be attained in practice by organizing labor until it is "blackleg-proof," further, realizing that such a development means the downfall of the existing industrial system, by what economic organization shall production be continued and increased? No student of the problem will doubt that the trade-unions must be the nucleus of the new formation; every stu-

³ From *Guild Principles in War and Peace*, by S. G. Hobson; pp. 53-57; 60-61. (London, G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1918. Reprinted by permission.)

dent will agree that they are only the nucleus; that the other economic elements in society must be co-ordinated and brought into harmonious relations with the labor monopoly. When this unification has been achieved National Guilds will become an accomplished fact.

At the first blush it would seem as though the obstacles in the way to labor monopoly were insuperable. It would be foolish to underestimate the difficulties, but they are not so formidable as surface appearances suggest. Two lines of policy must be pursued: (1) the craft unions must be changed into industrial unions; (2) there must be a continuous process of amalgamation or federation of all unions in the same industry. In regard to the craft unions, we must remember that many of them were originally formed for the protection of their "craft and mystery"; in their wildest dreams they never imagined that they would become the representative labor organizations of the whole industry. Their rules and regulations were therefore based on the idea of exclusion; they were as deeply concerned to limit their membership as to argue-bargle with their employers. Two unforeseen developments have materially modified their first purpose: automatic machinery has created a semi-skilled class of workman who has become a standing menace; the organization of unskilled workers has taught them that their wages are ultimately governed by the cost of sustenance.

Apart, then, from any commodity theory of labor, or any grandiose scheme of National Guilds, economic developments are forcing the craft unions to widen their borders, to relinquish the craft basis of membership, and to become industrial unions. The process of amalgamation, often by federation, also proceeds apace. The miners are much more closely integrated than they were; the railwaymen have now practically one union; the cotton operatives, working federally, draw closer. Nevertheless, there is a long row to hoe. The table on the opposite page shows the situation, from this point of view, prior to the war. (In Great Britain.)

This table is perhaps misleading without an expert knowledge of trade-union organization. In most of the trades enumerated the excessive number of the unions only represents a degree of local autonomy. But the figures given are significant as they stand. They tell certainly of the need for further amalgamation and centralized direction; but they show that trade-unionism has flourished despite the adverse conditions of former times. Extension of membership in the future will

be largely automatic. It is also worth noting that a powerful movement is afoot to make membership in the unions compulsory by legal enactment.

TRADE GROUP	PERSONS EMPLOYED	WAGE- EARNERS	TRADE UNIONISTS
Buildings and Contracting	513,961	476,359	155,923 (68 unions)
Mines and Quarries.....	958,090	939,515	729,573 (84 unions)
Metals, Engineering, and Shipbuilding	1,426,048	1,330,902	369,329 (211 unions)
Textile Trades.....	1,229,719	1,189,789	379,182 (273 unions)
Paper, Printing and Bookbinding...	317,550	279,626	73,939 (38 unions)
Clothing Trades.....	645,233	552,165	67,026 (40 unions)
Woodwork and Furnishing Trades..	224,098	210,407	38,836 (91 unions)

It is evident, however, that when we have secured the labor monopoly we have only begun the construction of National Guilds, for we must bring in also the managerial and administrative elements. Just as the mediaeval Guilds were composed of masters, journeymen, and apprentices, the National Guilds here predicted are equally inclusive — administration, managerial, scientific, inventive, as well as every worker in the industry — nothing less than a regimented fellowship. Whilst I believe that as time goes on the standard of living of all Guildsmen will tend to approximate, I recognize that a hierarchy is necessary to the effective working of the Guilds. The appointments to the administrative and executive offices can no longer come from above; they must be democratic in principle. But it is wise to avoid any political analogy in this connection. When we speak of democratic election we generally mean the political system of counting noses. An industrial democracy means the choice of the men who know — a choice not obtained by any financial pull, or family influence, but solely based upon fitness. It follows that only those who have the means of knowing can, or ought, to vote.

Now, the British artisan is an uncommonly shrewd judge of workmanship. He knows the best men in his own shop. On the princi-

ple stated, it is the actual manual workers who should choose their own foremen and sub-managers. In every industry, in every locality of every industry, men work in groups. There are workshop groups, office groups, managerial groups, all these groups linked together in various ways. When I write of democratic election, the principle in mind is really group selection. But the system of choosing the hierarchy is only incidental to the argument; the point now to be emphasized is that a hierarchy is essential. It is rather important to stress this point because I find it assumed that, with the trade-unions as the existing nucleus of the future guilds, their rough-and-ready democratic methods must necessarily be adopted and regarded as sacred. There is absolute unity amongst thinkers of every school that industry must be democratically administered; but that broad fact by no means binds us to any inappropriate method of democratic election or selection.

And now let us suppose that we have finally discarded the wage-system and co-ordinated into National Guilds every industrial factor. What are the dimensions of these Guilds, and if the wage-system is abolished how are the Guildsmen to be paid?

Please observe that the use of the word "National" is deliberate. In former times the Guilds were local; in the county of Norfolk alone there were six hundred. Industrially considered now, locality has ceased to count. The railway, motor-car, telegraph wire, telephone have annihilated space, whilst the tendency of every industry is to concentrate and unify. A textile Guild for Lancashire only would be a futile undertaking; much more futile any local engineering Guild. The Guilds must be organized on the national basis or not at all. There is another convincing reason for the National Guild: We have already postulated that it must maintain its own unemployed; it logically follows that the care of the sick and the pensioning of the aged should be undertaken by the same bodies. If we are to have the Guilds on a national basis, it is clear that they must be numerically very strong. My own analysis of the industrial population leads me to conclude that not more than twenty-five Guilds are required.

[Here the author quoted presents a list of thirteen main industrial unions, each employing more than 100,000 persons.] . . .

When the Guilds are formed, and when they in their turn proceed to constitute a Guild Congress, it is easy to visualize a large national

organization responsible for practically all our economic activities. I welcome such a consummation for at least two reasons: Because I am sure that such an organization would carry on the business of production and distribution far more humanely and efficiently than under divided authority; and, secondly, because I believe the State should be relieved of all economic functions, that it may the more freely devote itself to those spiritual problems the solution of which is the distinguishing mark of a great people. I assert, without arguing, that the political life of Western Europe has sunk to so degraded a level that politics is no longer an occupation fit for gentlemen. Every great issue that emerges is now never dealt with on its merits; the "interests" confuse and choke it from its birth to its ineffective culmination. Education, foreign policy, public health, local government — every discussion upon these subjects, pregnant as they are with vital consequences, is vitiated by finance and selfishness. Either we must purge our Parliamentary procedure of these diseased elements or sink into spiritual inertia and shame. I am old-fashioned enough to wish for a return to the old "grand manner" in politics. It will come back only when the subjects discussed and the temper in which they are approached are worthy of it.

3. Syndicalism ⁴

Syndicalism is a program of trade union action aimed at the ending of the present capitalist system. Its organization is exactly the same as that of our own trade societies; it asks the workmen to combine in unions, to unite the local branches of those unions in trades councils, and to federate the national organizations in an all-comprehending central body, which in France is the famous *Confédération Générale du Travail*, commonly known by its initials, the C.G.T. Syndicalism might have borrowed all this part of its system from the old-fashioned British unions. In fact, it is British trade unionism applied to revolutionary purposes; it is British realism captured by French idealism. Like our unions, it is willing to work for increases of wages, reductions in hours, and improvements in conditions; although it is opposed to political action, as I shall show presently, it is willing to accept legislation beneficial to workmen. Its membership,

⁴ From *Syndicalism: A Critical Examination*, by J. Ramsay MacDonald; pp. 1-8. (Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company. No date. Reprinted by permission.)

its leadership, and its inspiration are, like our old unionism, working class, and its gates are jealously guarded against any other feet. In short, one can describe the organization of Syndicalism and the personnel of its ranks only by tearing a chapter from the history of British trade unionism relating to the time when the leaders of the last generation were on the ascendant.

Even in the dreaded weapon of Syndicalism, the strike, we find nothing but the ancient weapon of British trade unionism. Combinations of workmen, isolated in society, praised as our unions used to be for minding their own business and not interfering in legislation, can enforce their will only in one way. They can lay down their tools. It is, therefore, not by a servile copying, but it is a proof of the inevitability of certain sequences, that Syndicalism and trade unionism, with a vision narrowed to the experience of the workshop alone, and a field of operation confined to industrial action, should have so much in common that the former may be regarded as nothing more than a revolutionary form of the latter.

But one quickly comes to the point of divergence. The changes which I have said it is willing to work for and accept are not the goal of Syndicalism; they are not its vital purpose. They are incidents in the way. An unbending Syndicalist of the Left would say they are the apples thrown by the existing State at the feet of Labor to impede it in its race. For Syndicalism does not seek merely to reform. Modern society is wrong fundamentally. It is built up so that great masses must be poor. Possession is so arranged that it must exploit. Classes are allowed to control the means of production and distribution in such a way that they live on tolls which their economic power enables them to impose upon the working and producing classes. The difference between the modern wage-earner and the slave of old time is nominal and superficial; the likeness is essential. Both are absolutely under the thumb of employers, the workman being just as unable as the slave to think for himself or arrange his life for himself. Until the producers control the means of production, they cannot be free; until economic power is democratized as political power has been, men must live under an economic tyranny. This also is a Socialist diagnosis of social ill.

Hence, just as Syndicalism stands with one foot on trade unionism, so it stands with the other partly on Socialism—but only partly. For whilst Socialism asks that economic power should be put in the

hands of the community, Syndicalism asks that each industrial group of workers should control the instruments of production which it uses — the railwaymen, the railways; the miners, the mines, and so on. This is really not essential to Syndicalism, and consequently is not the characteristic difference between it and Socialism. At present the Syndicalist is opposed to nationalization because the State authorities are still capitalist, and so he argues: "If the railways were nationalized the workers on them would still be under capitalist conditions; therefore, I do not want the State, but the organized workers themselves, to own them."

Curiously enough, this is only a reiteration of the discredited doctrine of individualist labor co-partnership, which asked us to dream of "the self-governing workshop." The self-governing workshop puts an end to none of the evils of capitalism, and if it is federated, as the Syndicalists wish, into a national federation, it becomes a monopoly as dangerous to the community as any capitalist trust. But the Syndicalist really has in his mind the control of the means of production by a working-class State, because he is always careful to explain that industrial machinery, though owned by those who work it, would be used for the benefit of all. How this national interest in production is to be enforced he does not say, though on the whole he leaves one to assume that the controlling unions of workmen will be inspired by moral considerations—a very uncertain basis upon which to found revolutionary action. I think, however, there are some indications that Syndicalism will not insist upon this, but that by and by it will abandon the craft control of industry and accept community control. Be that as it may, the fact that the Syndicalist founds his community on common property in the means of production used for common convenience and benefit, gives him, without being a Socialist, a right to stand on a small bit of the same ground as the Socialist.

The Syndicalist, however, is poles asunder from the Socialist in method, and method counts for everything in the process of social change. The Socialist believes in a combination of political and trade union action, the Syndicalist believes in trade union action alone; the Socialist appeals to the whole body of public opinion, the Syndicalist considers the working classes only; the Socialist brings about his changes by legislative molding, he uses the organic State to transform itself by making such alterations in his own mind and circumstances as must precede all permanent change; the Syndicalist, cutting himself

off from these organic formative influences, has to fall back upon force, either the passive force of social paralysis or the active force of riots, to effect his changes with revolutionary suddenness. No one who has the least knowledge of Syndicalism on the one hand and of Socialism on the other can ever mix up the two.

In fact, Syndicalism is largely a revolt against Socialism. Socialism must be Parliamentary, or nothing. And there is nothing more galling to enthusiastic reformers, to whom the alluring vision of human perfection is very near as in a dream, than the heavy lumbering coach of Parliamentary progress, whether it is rolling creaking along in London, in Paris, in Rome or in Berlin. . . .

" . . . Workmen," says Sorel, the leading figure amongst the French revolutionary Syndicalists, "believe in the experience of a comrade who has never demanded anything from you, and who has seen too closely into men to be taken in by mere appearances; occupy yourselves with your own affairs, that is to say, organize your unions and your co-operative undertakings, federate yourselves with your fellow-countrymen to discuss practical questions, leave the politicians to injure themselves to the full."

That is the grand-plan of Syndicalism. Essentially and characteristically a program of action, it is being preached to revive trade unionism of the old kind, and to draw workmen away from politics as a means of social amelioration. In explaining and defending itself, it has had to commit itself to certain important consequences of its principles. It is anti-State, anti-militarist, anti-patriotic. It is opposed to industrial conciliation, whether voluntary or compulsory. Every dispute between employer and workman is but an incident in the universal and ceaseless war between the exploiter and the exploited. It comes to organize, to cheer, to discipline the workers for that war. It conceives itself to be the Napoleonic effort which is to end that war for ever and establish peace by the victory of labor.

4. Justifiable Individualism ⁵

Teachings of Social Scientists.

The economists have taught that all production of wealth is social in its nature; that at least involuntary coöperation is a necessary

⁵ From *Justifiable Individualism*, by Frank Wilson Blackmar; pp. 29-42. (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

process in the creation of every form of material wealth. A food product, a machine, a piece of furniture, a house, a work of art, even the smallest article of use, has been created directly or indirectly by the work of many hands. No man can say with truth, "By my hands alone have I made this or placed it for the use of others." Even the market gardener who tills his own little bit of land, uses the hoe made by others for cultivating the vegetables he brings to market. There is a sense in which these products belong to the community. The rights in the case are a right to toil and a reward for the results of labor expended. Also, by the traditional rights of usage, he holds in possession the product which his hands have finished to be disposed of at will. By the established legal rights of property it is his. But does this not deny the assertion that its existence is the coöperative product of many hands and brains? The vast mechanism of economic society demonstrates that the individual is overshadowed by the arts of production. This is a generally accepted theory of economists which the facts of human industry verify.

The sociologists, discussing the general laws of social being and social life, maintain that there is an organization of social forces, and that society is a vast system functioning as a whole and in groups; that the individual finally is created by social action. The personality which is the finished product of the individual is developed by the action and reaction of group life. The great social achievements are through group activity, and the individual survives and achieves only by coöperating with his fellows. The ideals of life, the dividends of moral conduct, even the conscience of man, are established by group activity. There is a public opinion that controls social organization and social life, and individual effort and life are subordinate to it.

The political scientists hold that over all social activities is an enveloping democracy which should control the actions of individuals and groups; that the liberty of the individual is, after all, determined by the rule of the majority of the group; that if democracy would only carry out in practice what it advocated in theory, justice and righteousness would pervade all phases of human association.

In the educational world all achievement comes from human association. The contact of mind with mind, the direction and leadership of others, the use of social heritage, are group processes without which no individual may receive an education. It is on this hypothesis that the educational systems of the world are framed. The very idea of

education involves a social use of the same; education is a social function. The individual inherits the learning of the past and society puts him in touch with it. Educational achievement is a group activity.

These theories of human social life advanced by the scientists in their several fields are pretty generally accepted by all right-thinking persons. In each case, it is simply a diagnosis of conditions as they actually exist in the various departments of human activity.

A False Assumption of Reformers.

A large number of reformers, accepting the above statements as true, and without a thorough estimation of values, are running up and down the country offering nostrums for social defects, and panaceas for the ills of what they deem a sick society. With a meager understanding of the principles advocated by the scientists, they jump at the conclusion that the present individualistic system cannot be maintained, and therefore we must go to socialism, sovietism, or some other "ism" in order to solve the problem. They base their arguments on the theoretical assumption that individualism is selfishness and, therefore, that the individual must go; that society and the community are the only forms of life worth considering. No doubt the individualistic system, when unrestrained, plays havoc in the industrial and political life. But restraint is also the essence of successful group activity. Without it the group becomes dominant and selfish, and the individuals that compose it become slaves to selfishness of the clan. The essential to success is an individual with good inherited traits, imbued with the ideals of efficiency and service, willing to live in fair and just restraint and well trained in the art of justice and coöperation.

The success of the form of government or of the form of group association is determined, after all, by the ability, character and spirit of the individuals entering into it. To force people into an organized group of a certain type is evidence of change, but may not be a step in human progress. By whatever name it is called, democracy, autocracy, industrial commonwealth, soviet, monarchy, communism, or world state, the element of progress must be sought in the intelligence and character of the individual.

In a normal society which has reached a fair degree of development, group activities are manifested in every field. The individual has his existence through a multiplicity of group activities. This is true in his

bread-earning vocation as well as in his ordinary social functions. He acts with his political party in general, and usually with smaller political groups as well. His religious functioning is usually through the process of an organized church; in his educational processes he is a member of a university, a scientific society or a literary group; for his pleasures the golf, the hunting or the billiard club takes the place of the lone fisherman or the lone hunter. In the bread-earning vocation a man is grouped with the men with whom he works. The banker has his associates, the lawyer his — so, too, those of the medical and other professions. All society is thus made up of a complexity of group activities, and the man is organized over and over again as an individual element in different group associations.

Within the group the individual has his liberty of opinion and action, his rights, duties and privileges, but these receive expression through coöperation with other individuals. His welfare is wrapped up more or less with that of the group, and, knowing that he cannot act independently, he becomes loyal to the association and its interests.

Here is where the member of a group tends to lose his independent individuality and to make the conscience and the opinion of the group his own. Thus, independent individuality is gradually merged into group activity, but the independence of the individual in his struggle for existence is supplanted by the independence of the group, and, thus, the contest is between groups, for all social achievement must recognize group relationships. It is to be noted that the group does not function in the same intimate manner as does the individual in reaching a judgment or a program of action. Thus, the individual may have a conscience while a group may be lacking in it. Individuals within a group may obey the Golden Rule in their dealings with one another, but the group which is composed of these same individuals may, in its struggle with other groups, obey the fundamental laws of organic evolution; it may exhibit the fangs and claws of the struggle for existence; it may be non-ethical in its relations to other groups. This is the main trouble with the world today. There is enough of the leaven of Christianity in the world, if properly applied, to redeem human action from selfishness, but the idealism of right and wrong has not entered the group, nor have ethical principles been as effective in group activity as in the individual. Thus, the banker may be a Christian gentleman, but a bank may be without soul or feeling. Individuals who compose a corporation which seeks to amass wealth

regardless of social welfare may be Christians in their relations with one another, but the corporation as an institution may be altogether unjust in its relationships. Hence, frequently a group organized economically, politically or religiously seeking its own survival and advantage, manifests the claws of redhanded nature. It proposes to survive in its contest with other organizations by elimination or domination of its competitors. Hence, a person may be to all intents and purposes a Christian, but when he joins such an organization the result of his action is pagan, for he is forced to act with an institution that is non-ethical. No ethical social order can be established where communities are dominated by selfish groups struggling with each other for supremacy and destroying and trampling upon the rights of individuals. Corporations and other organized groups must be controlled by the moral standard of the individual expressed through the machinery of the organization. The organized group cannot be better than the separate individual units out of which it is made, but usually it falls far below the moral standard of the individual, simply because the law of love has not yet been established between groups as it has between individuals, and the struggle for existence of the former permits actions which are non-ethical.

Exercises

1. State the declaration of Karl Marx with reference to the part played by ideological factors in revolutionary social changes.
2. Show how this applies to the "programs" sketched in the present chapter.
3. In what sense are these programs expressions of attitudes?
4. What is the relation of these attitudes and programs to the objective facts of social organization?
5. What is the social function of third parties?
6. What is Socialism as defined by Benedict?
7. Indicate some of the divergent opinions within the Socialist movement.
8. Despite these differences, mention some social changes concerning which there is substantial agreement by advocates of Socialism.
9. Mention some of the measures of welfare legislation advocated by Socialists.
10. From the list given by Benedict strike out those that might be advocated by non-Socialist reformers.
11. What does this leave as the essence of Socialism in the larger sense?

12. What is the essential difference between the Socialism defined by Benedict and Guild Socialism?

13. Name the two lines of policy set for Guild Socialism by Hobson.

14. State the difference between Trade Unionism and Industrial Unionism. (Consult the References below or other works, for definitions.)

15. Referring to the "Table," discuss the tendency toward amalgamation of Craft Unions into National Guilds.

16. How, according to Hobson, would these Guilds be governed? Does he hold firmly to democracy in his suggestions?

17. State some of the larger functions of the proposed National Guilds.

18. How would these Guilds, as pictured by Hobson, affect the State?

19. What is Syndicalism, according to MacDonald? Is his description essentially different from Hobson's picture of the National Guilds?

20. In what ways, according to MacDonald, is Syndicalism identical with British Trade Unionism? in what ways divergent?

21. In what ways does Syndicalism stand on the same ground with Socialism? In what ways is it in strong contrast with Socialism?

22. Explain: "Syndicalism is largely a revolt against Socialism."

23. Name some of the social corollaries of Syndicalism, as mentioned by MacDonald.

24. Following Blackmar, show how the dependence of the individual upon the group is set forth by economists; by sociologists; by political scientists; by educationalists.

25. What false assumption, according to Blackmar, do many social reformers promulgate through a misinterpretation of the above reasoning?

26. Explain and illustrate fully the following principle: "By whatever name it is called, democracy, autocracy, industrial commonwealth, soviet, monarchy, communism, or world state, the element of progress must be sought in the intelligence and character of the individual."

Additional References

1. Brissenden, Paul F.: *The I.W.W.—A Study of American Syndicalism*. Vol. LXXXIII, No. 193. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. By a Special Agt. of U. S. Dept. of Labor.

2. Brooks, John Graham: *American Syndicalism: The I.W.W.*

3. Carver, Thomas N.: *Essays in Social Justice*. Ch. IX. "Socialism and the Present Unrest." Ch. X., "Constructive Democracy."

4. Cole, G. D. H.: *Social Theory*. An exposition of the theories of Guild Socialism.

5. Finney, Ross L.: *Causes and Cures for the Social Unrest: An Appeal to the Middle Class*. Pp. 22-27 clearly distinguish individual and social justice.

6. Follett, Mary P.: *The New State*. Proposes a new organization of society upon the *neighborhood* as a unit.

7. Haynes, Fred E.: *Social Politics in the United States*. Very important for authoritative accounts of political reform movements by laborers, socialists, farmers, and others.

8. Hewes, Amy: "Guild Socialism: A Two Years' Test," in the *American Economic Review*, Vol. XII., No. 2 (June, 1922).

9. Ogg, Frederic A.: *Economic Development of Modern Europe*. Ch. XXI., XXII., and XXIII. describe the rise and growth of Socialism in Europe.

10. Perry, Ralph B.: *The Moral Economy*, pp. 134-147. Distinguishes constructive reform and revolution, conservatism and radicalism.

11. Russell, Bertrand: *Proposed Roads to Freedom*. Radical programs philosophically and ethically considered.

12. Watkins, Gordon S.: "The Present Status of Socialism in the United States," in *The Atlantic Monthly*. Vol. 124 (July-Dec., 1919), pp. 821-830. For earlier history see Bliss: *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*.

CHAPTER XLVI

NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

IT is impossible in this place to make even the barest beginning at an adequate statement concerning the nature of social progress, a question to whose elucidation gifted writers have devoted whole volumes. Let it suffice to say that the conception of social progress held by the present writer is the simple common-sense notion that progress is change in the direction of anything deemed good, either new good or more of the old. It is social improvement. Closely connected and often confused with it is another concept which we shall call social, or societal, self-direction. The latter is the *method* of conscious social progress, and the real *problem* is how to bring it to pass.

Men formerly submitted in blind resignation to well-nigh intolerable social conditions and had no thought of changing them by a deliberate effort at reconstruction. Society was until recent years a vague and formless thing which few, if any, sought to discern, to interrogate, to analyze and to reconstruct. Men dwelt as helpless units in a whole of which they possessed only the vaguest conception as a knowable thing.

Such is not the case to-day. Society has come to study about itself, its origin, its development, its condition and destiny, just as the child at a certain stage of his development stands for the first time in the presence of himself, conscious of his own identity. Society has become introspective and now demands an account of itself from itself. This is true because "history is humanity, becoming and being conscious concerning itself. History is humanity's knowledge of itself, its certainty about itself. It is not 'the light and the truth' but a search therefor, a sermon thereupon, a consecration thereto. It is like John the Baptist, 'not that Light but sent to bear witness of that Light.'"

Social unrest and agitation, with the many schemes and programs for reform, are the outgrowth and manifestation of that spirit. Men are no longer content to be miserable because they have a clearer comprehension of the social body, and begin to believe that they can understand its laws of life and growth and apply them in producing changes for their own betterment.

The mass of mankind, not merely those unfortunate multitudes who have never been trained to think reflectively at all, but practically all the intellectual leaders of humanity, down to yesterday, as History goes, have been accustomed to consider the problems of society and

social progress only in detail, and as specific, more or less isolated problems. The moral reformer has seen the whole consummation of social salvation in the abolition of intemperance or the suppression of divorce. The economist has pinned his faith to financial reform or factory legislation, or some other economic specific. The political philosopher has found, let us say, the panacea in electoral reform, the educator in centralized schools, or the "socialized recitation," the politician finds it in the tariff or free-trade—and so on down the list from popular election of Senators and judicial recall to vegetarianism and simplified spelling.

The catalog might be lengthened indefinitely, and made to include such notable achievements as jury trial, free assemblage and free speech, the Australian ballot, manhood suffrage, or even the enfranchisement of woman and social insurance—all of them great and salutary steps in social progress, as most would agree,—but each and every one of them constituting merely a single phase of the exceedingly complex life of a social group. They are analagous to the hour-by-hour activities of the immature individual—all more or less narrow and isolated, and representing in greater or lesser degree a *partial reaction* of the life of the group. Just as every succeeding moment has its more or less detached interest for the morally immature individual, a moment more or less sufficient unto itself and careless of the moments before or after, and of the interests which they bear with them, so these various reforms and movements represent only a *fragmentary*, and never a *total* reaction on the part of the social mind. They engage the interest and meet the demands of a certain section, class, or subgroup, and they have a value more or less temporary or permanent in proportion as they satisfy needs that are more or less permanent and universal. But in the very midst of a multitude of such practical social activities we await, in modern societies, the time when men and women in general shall come to themselves, as it were, and set their minds seriously and concertedly to the thought that the whole social life is a single, developing life, and that intelligent human beings have it in their power to direct that group life, in the whole as well as the parts, into channels of progress which shall be utterly different from what might otherwise have been, and with resulting differences of the utmost consequence to every member of the social order. In other words, there comes a time when the social group, like the maturing youth, comes to the crucial choice between the mere drifting of a loosely organized collection of comparatively isolated interests, on the one hand, or the calculated and purposeful progress of a closely knit and self-directed organization of activities, on the other. The woes which afflict humanity are in large degree the result of the policy of social drifting, and can never be cured except by a policy of societal self-direction.

The chapter is arranged to show, in Reading 1, the nature of progress, and especially its distinction from *evolution*, with which it is

often confused. In Readings 2 and 3 are quoted the views of a biologist and a sociologist, respectively, on the subject of the processes involved. In Reading 4 the question of the feasibility of "social telesis," or in our own terminology, *societal self-direction*, is ably discussed by a sociologist who has given special attention to that problem.

1. Progress versus Evolution ¹

By evolution I mean any sort of growth; by social progress, the growth of social life in respect of those qualities to which human beings attach or can rationally attach value. Social progress, then, is only one among many possibilities of social evolution. At least it is not to be assumed that any and every form of social evolution is also a form or a stage in social progress. For example, a caste system is a product of social evolution, and the more rigid and narrow the caste, the more complex the hierarchy, the more completely has the caste system evolved. In proportion, that is, as a loose and incipient caste system hardens into an extreme and rigid caste system, there is a distinct process of social evolution going forward; but most of us would question very strongly whether it could be considered in any sense as a phase of social progress. Judged from the standpoint of human values, it looks more like retrogression, or perhaps still more like divergence into a side track, from which there is no exit save by going back over a good deal of the ground traveled. So again there is at the present day a vigorous evolution of cartels, monopolies, rings, and trusts; there is an evolution of imperialism, of socialism, of nationalism, of militarism, in a word, of a hundred tendencies as to the good or evil of which people differ. The fact that a thing is evolving is no proof that it is good, the fact that society has evolved is no proof that it has progressed. The point is important because under the influence of biological conceptions the two ideas are often confused, and the fact that human beings have evolved under certain conditions is treated as evidence of the value of those conditions, or perhaps as proving the futility of ethical ideas which run counter to evolutionary processes. Thus in an article by a clever exponent of eugenic principles I find a contemptuous reference to "the childlike desire to make things 'fair,' which is so clearly contrary to the order

¹ From *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, by Leonard T. Hobhouse; pp. 8-12. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1911. Reprinted by permission.)

of a universe which progresses by natural selection." In this brief remark you will observe two immense assumptions, and one stark contradiction. The first assumption is that the universe progresses — not humanity, observe, nor the mass of organic beings, nor even the earth, but the universe. The second assumption is that it progresses by natural selection, a hypothesis which has not yet adequately explained the bare fact of the variation of organic forms on the surface of this earth. The contradiction is that progress is incompatible with fairness, the basic element in all judgments of value, so that we are called upon to recognize as valuable that by which our fundamental notions of value are set at naught. It may be replied that the process of things has nothing to do with human ideas of value. That of course is perfectly possible, and it is the point we shall have to examine. But in that case no one has a right to speak of progress, a term which connotes value, in relation to the process of things. If there exist laws of mechanical necessity which involve the defeat of human effort based on human judgments of value, then it is true that human effort must be forever frustrate, but it is untrue that human effort must seek to ally itself with its enemy. If the process of the universe is inherently opposed to the ethical order, it follows that the ethical order is inherently opposed to the process of the universe. In this state of things the position of humanity would be very unfortunate. It could not hope to achieve any permanent good. But it would still be the height of unreason for humanity to throw its efforts for whatever they may be worth on the side of those forces which by hypothesis are working against the best elements in its life. The only rational course in so bad a situation would be first to see what could be saved from the wreck, or, if nothing could be done, then to remain passive and endure with what patience we could command. Why we should take active pains to forward a process which conflicts with our fundamental conceptions of what is valuable is a question which answers itself.

Of course this is not the way in which the question ordinarily presents itself. By studying certain sides of organic evolution people arrive at a particular hypothesis of the nature of the process. They erect this hypothesis into an universal and necessary law, and straightway call upon every one else to acknowledge the law and conform to it in action. Unaccustomed to philosophical analysis, and contemptuous of that to which they are unaccustomed, they do not see that

they have passed from one sense of law to another, that they have confused a generalization with a command, and a statement of facts with the principle of action. They accordingly miss the starting-point from which a distinct conception of progress and its relation to human effort becomes possible. But for any useful theory of the bearing of evolution on social effort this conception is vital. We can get no light upon the subject unless we begin with the clear perception that the object of social effort is the realization of ends to which human beings can reasonably attach value, that is to say, the realization of ethical ends; and this being understood, we may suitably use the term "progress" of any steps leading towards such realization. Now it may be said that human valuations are themselves often obscure, confused, and contradictory. That is, in fact, the reason why we need a social philosophy to reduce them to a rational order. But we are not asking for the moment what the rational judgment of man would approve. We are contending for the preliminary point, that without its approval there can be no talk of progress, that to hold up a process to admiration, to praise it as good, to accept and forward it, is, in fact, to pass on it a judgment of approval, and that to do these things and in the same breath to scorn the principle which is the pivot of any ethical approval is a contradiction. If this and allied principles are false and meaningless, that requires independent proof. If justice, fairness, mutual aid, benevolence, pity, are inherently confused and contradictory ideas, they cannot serve as bases of rational approval or disapproval. But this has to be demonstrated, and there is no beginning of demonstration in the mere fact that such qualities as these are opposed to the naked struggle for existence.

Our conclusion so far is that the nature of social progress cannot be determined by barely examining the actual conditions of social evolution. Evolution and progress are not the same thing. They may be opposed. They might even be so fundamentally opposed that progress would be impossible, and whether this is so is one of the two questions which we distinguished above, and which I shall proceed to discuss. I take occasion only to remind you that the other question was — In what does progress consist? and to this we have given the preliminary answer that it means the realization of an ethical order; and we have now further seen that the nature of this order is not to be determined by asking whether it conforms to natural processes, but by asking whether it yields rational and coherent guidance to human effort.

To this question we shall come in due course. We have now to deal with the preliminary question whether in the light of the facts of life the idea of progress as an advancing realization of an ethical order can be regarded as a valid idea. That is to say, is progress possible? If so social effort has an intelligible and self-consistent goal.

2. The Outlook for Physical, Intellectual, and Social Evolution ²

For at least one hundred centuries there has been no notable progress in the evolution of the human body. The limits of physical evolution have apparently been reached in the most perfect specimens of mankind. The fact that man is not now evolving rapidly, if at all, is often taken to mean that he was always as he is now, that he never did evolve, but the evidence is all against this. On the other hand, it is said by those who believe in endless progress that ten thousand years is entirely too brief a time in which to look for marked evolutionary advance, and we are admonished to remember that evolution is slow and that time is long; but, after all, the time available for evolution is not infinite, and ten thousand years representing three or four hundred human generations is quite long enough to reveal any marked tendency in evolution.

There can be no doubt that human evolution has halted, either temporarily or permanently, and when we consider the fact that in every line of evolution progress is most rapid at first and then slows down until it stops, we cannot avoid the suspicion that in those lines in which human evolution has gone farthest and fastest it has practically come to an end. At least we may affirm that there is no prospect that the hand, the eye, or the brain of man will ever be much more complex or perfect than at present. It is, of course, possible that the hand of man might evolve into a more perfect climbing, swimming, or flying organ, but such specialization would unfit it to do the many duties which it now performs and upon which human progress has so largely depended. It is possible that man might develop the telescopic vision of an eagle or the microscopic vision of a fly, but what advantage would there be in such specialization when by means of his inventions he can have both telescopic and microscopic vision far better than any other creature in the world possesses? It is,

² From *The Direction of Human Evolution*, by Edwin Grant Conklin; pp. 59-61; 68-70. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. Reprinted by permission.)

of course, possible that the brain of man may undergo further evolution in the future, just as it is possible that the elephant may evolve a longer trunk or the giraffe a longer neck. But the size of the human brain has not increased since the times of the Cro-Magnon race, say 20,000 years ago, and the great prevalence of nervous disorders in the most highly intelligent classes of the present day indicates that the nervous system has already developed to a point where it is getting out of balance with the other vital functions. In every line of progressive evolution there comes a time when specialization can go no further without interfering with the harmonious interrelation of parts and thus breaking down coöperation. . . .

There has been no notable progress in the intellectual capacity of man in the past two or three thousand years, and it seems probable that the limits of intellectual evolution have been reached in the greatest minds of the race. Even in the most distant future there may never appear greater geniuses than Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Newton, Darwin.

Undoubtedly eugenics and education can do much to raise the intellectual level of the general mass, but they cannot create a new order of the intellect. Increasing size of brain and complexity of nervous organization lead to mental and physical instability and disharmony, and the great increase in nervous and mental diseases in modern life warns us that there is a limit to intellectual evolution.

The brain has its limits as a storehouse, and it necessarily follows that with knowledge continually increasing and intellectual capacity remaining stationary each individual mind can take in only a small portion of the sum of human knowledge. In this age intellectual specialization is absolutely necessary. There can never again be an Aristotle, nor even a Descartes or Humboldt. Progress in intellectual evolution, no less than in physical, lies in the direction of increasing specialization and coöperation, but this progress is no longer taking place within the individual but in the specialization and coöperation of many individuals. The intellectual evolution of the individual has virtually come to an end, but the intellectual evolution of groups of individuals is only at its beginning.

But if the evolution of the human *individual* has come to an end, certainly the evolution of human *society* has not. In social evolution a new path of progress has been found, the end of which no one can foresee.

Evolution has progressed from one-celled organisms to many-celled, from small and simple organisms to larger and more complex ones. By the union of individuals into families and tribes and nations, still larger and more complex units of organization were formed, until now, by intelligent human coöperation, we have governmental units which include hundreds of millions of men, and we are on the eve of bringing together into some form of league or federation all the peoples of the earth.

Three main stages in the past evolution of human culture (the material aspect of which may be defined as knowledge of, and control over, environment) are generally recognized, viz.: Savagery, Barbarism, and Civilization. The lowest stages of human culture, as contrasted with prehuman conditions, begin with the fashioning of crude stone implements and with the use of fire. Middle stages are marked by the making of beautiful stone implements and by the introduction of the use of copper and bronze. The highest stage is characterized by the use of iron, the invention of writing and all that goes with this, and by increasing knowledge of, and control over, the forces of nature. Possibly future historians may record that super-civilization began with the end of wars and the coöperation of all the peoples of the earth. At least there is every evidence that human culture is still advancing and that the end is not yet in sight.

3. Social Progress Through Better Adjustments ³

While it does seem true at the present stage of development of man and of culture that it is futile to think of man's ability freely to control cultural changes as he wills, still it is thinkable that a more harmonious adaptation of culture to man may be made without any such deity-like power over culture as a whole. In other words, to make a more desirable adjustment, it is not necessary to have all power or even to make wholesale changes in culture. Indeed it is conceivable that by making certain changes in culture, relatively minor compared to the plan of directing culture as a whole, a more harmonious adjustment may be attained. For instance, the acuteness of the lack of adjustment between culture and human nature is manifested in certain spots or areas like neuroses and social problems. To bring about

³ From *Social Change, With Respect to Culture and Original Nature*, by William Fielding Ogburn; pp. 346-356. (New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1922. Reprinted by permission.)

better adjustment the attention should be focused chiefly on the particular fields where the maladjustment is most serious. The achievement of better adaptation even in such problems may be very difficult to make. Yet such a program would appear to be much more practicable than the larger plan of directing the course of civilization. In the growth of culture there are probably limits to the lack of harmony with human nature, since in adopting new cultural forms human desires play some part. The bringing about of a more harmonious relationship, then, concerns certain special fields rather than culture or human nature as a whole.

This Part is not concerned primarily with amelioration. There are readers who are fired with so great a zeal for making the world more livable that plans of change for the better are to them the only things worth while. Such an attitude cannot be praised too highly. These individuals furnish the drive that results in making the world a better place to live in. Such readers will feel the inadequacy of the space given to constructive plans and the fragmentary nature of what are merely suggestions for better adjustment. In answer it may be said that there is a value to preliminary analysis, which characterizes the present and the preceding chapters. Plans may be worked out more fully after certain fundamentals are clear. Furthermore, there are a greater number of individuals doing most excellent work on important practical programs. It is because there is so much constructive work done on practical programs that the following suggestions are made less extensive and with less regard for emphasis and relative importance.

Nervous disorders. In so far as psychoses and neuroses are evidences of lack of adaptation, attention should be concentrated on preventing these functional nervous disorders. A very important group of psychopathologists claim that neuroses have a sexual origin and that disturbances of a somewhat sexual nature are found in psychoses. If the sexual theories of many mental and nervous disorders should prove true, then the problem of better adaptation would concern primarily the adjustment in regard to this complex sex instinct. It is not certain now just how this could be done. It might concern a more intelligent expression of parental affection. It might involve a wiser sexual education, particularly in very early life. Or it might involve certain changes in the general social attitude towards sex. Such social programs would be more or less difficult to attain. In

some cases serious mental conflicts are, it seems, impossible to prevent. Some form of therapeutic or prophylactic treatment might be devised so as to be widely accessible.

Sublimation. Some attention has been paid to a process known as sublimation as a happy solution of the sexual situation. There is a good deal of lack of agreement as to what the process is and some psychologists deny that there is such a phenomenon. Since there is so little agreement as to what sublimation is, we might be pardoned for passing it by. But if there is such a process its importance is quite great and some comment is desirable. According to most writers on sublimation the energy of the libido can be drawn into channels other than customary sexual channels. Thus the libido may be turned to social, religious, artistic or scientific aims. One would therefore expect better adjustments to be made by a general development of social, religious, artistic or scientific aspects of culture. There is some evidence to indicate that if this sublimation of the sex instinct occurs it takes place chiefly in very early life. Much sublimation in childhood, while it might make the individual more religious or more artistic, does not appear to be a guarantee against mental conflict. And, indeed, there are limits to the extent of sublimation. From certain ethical and social standards a high degree of sublimation appears to be desirable; and perhaps it may be desirable biologically and psychologically. We know very little about how sublimation may purposively and practically be brought about.

Strain. It is probable that neuroses and functional psychoses may be precipitated in adult life as a result of general strain, despite the fact that some individuals appear to stand strain remarkably well. But it is borne with only fair success by others. In any case, the severity with which mental strains affect individuals indicates a lack of adjustment. We may therefore consider what can be done to lessen the tension of life in modern civilization. The over-use of some instincts and the under-use of others may theoretically produce a very uncomfortable state which leads to great restlessness and nervousness. Whether such a state be a strain or whether it helps to precipitate a neurosis, it is frequently not a very satisfactory psychological state of being for an individual, particularly when persisting over a long time. It seems to be true that the division of labor and the social differentiation accompanying modern civilization do lead to a life where some types of response to stimuli occur very frequently and

monotonously. The specialization of modern life means for some an extensive use of only a part of the varied and wonderful equipment of man. Just how serious this unequal functioning is we do not know. The more normal adaptation would appear ideally to be one where all parts of man's equipment would function perhaps not exactly as it did in the days of the cave people, but nevertheless to a degree which would correspond to some normal biological standard. It may not be possible to define such a standard, and the human system may show a high degree of variability in this respect, but some such goal is desirable.

Obstacles to the use of our psychological equipment. Assuming on the part of some groups an unsatisfactory emotional and instinctive life, how can more normal functioning be attained? Prominent obstacles are long hours of labor, specialization of labor and social codes. There are also other obstacles. Our codes of conduct frequently show a certain rigidity apparently not suited to the variation due to change nor to the variability due to heterogeneity. There seems to be something akin to survivals in our codes. Perhaps well suited to earlier conditions, they have not changed to meet the changed material conditions. Also, no doubt, the great development of science reacts on our morals. Codes of conduct are undergoing, nevertheless, much change. However, there will always be social pressure to conform in conduct. There will always be a code of morals, resulting in repression of desires, even though they may be changed greatly in the interest of better adjustments.

With regard to specialization, the trend appears to be towards more rather than less of it. Specialization, particularly among the manual workers in modern industry, means less variety in occupation and an activity during working hours somewhat machine-like. Specialization plus the long working day, particularly at uninteresting tasks, does not give a picture of well-balanced activity. The shortcomings of specialization in labor may be counter-balanced by fewer hours of labor. The movement is still in the direction of fewer working hours per day. But to maintain production, probably for some time to come, a fairly large number of hours of labor per day will have to be worked. Under either socialism or capitalism, we shall have specialization. And we shall always have moral codes. So no doubt there will be tendencies to an unbalanced use of man's original equipment. There will always be repression of desires. What shall be done in the face

of specialization, social pressure, morality, ambition, repression, necessary hours of labor, and the inherent inevitability of conflicting interests and motives?

Substitution. The idea of substitutive activities arises as a solution. It is suggested from the partial use of man's physical equipment. Individuals following sedentary occupations do not in the course of their work use their muscles as fully as did the primitive hunter. To meet such a situation we have invented the gymnasium and devised various athletic activities. What seems to be needed is some invention that will do for the mechanisms of instinct what the gymnasium does for the muscles. That is, certain instinctive tendencies, certain desires, certain mechanisms of psychological reactions that do not find expression in the daily routine of life, need the use of substitutive devices that would provide the desired activity and yet be in accord with moral and social conduct. The urgency of such substitutions depends upon the harmfulness and extent of repression and upon the nature of instinct, matters previously discussed. But that such substitutions are desirable is unquestionable.

Recreation. While there is no such single institution as a gymnasium for the functioning of the instincts, nevertheless it is thought that such services are performed by certain activities which may generally be grouped under the term, recreation. We shall be interested in inquiring concerning recreation as an institution for the functioning of emotional and instinctive activities, particularly those not active during the daily routine. Such a possibility exists because of the fact that the same emotion or instinctive tendency may be incited by many different stimuli and there are many different motor outlets possible for the same instinctive tendency. Thus, self-assertion or acquisitiveness or anger may be aroused by many different stimuli and their manifestations may be various. In recreation a special set of stimuli are formed and special motor outlets are created. Recreation, as the term is here used, is seen as a possible substitute for certain functionings of human nature which are prohibited through the daily tasks of many occupations or through the prohibitions of the moral code or for other reasons. May not some substitute outlet for many of these tendencies be provided in recreation? Modern life provides a great many stimuli to desires which are not gratified. Such stimuli are the multitudinous advertising displays, the behavior of others, the various incidents that appeal to hope and ambition, types of recreation, and

pleasures possibly beyond our economic means. Some of these stimuli are popularly called temptations. Modern life arouses many desires and longings that are not satisfied. Is it not possible that recreation may furnish an outlet for some of these instinctive tendencies?

Psychological aspects of recreation. Obviously emotions and specific instinctive drives are found in recreations. In games, for instance, are seen fear, anxiety, anger, the desire for mastery, self-assertiveness, leadership, sociability. It is possible indeed, if the instincts were listed and the many types of recreation analyzed, that all the instincts would be found operating in one recreation or another. It is therefore quite feasible to provide for the functioning of instincts. Thus in the case of a factory "hand," recreation will enable certain instincts to function which find little opportunity to do so within the factory walls. But in the case where instincts are aroused in the course of daily life but do not complete their expression it is not quite so obvious that recreation will provide the desired outlets. It is a question of the time element between stimulation and expression. Can there be a delay between the beginning and ending of an act of instinctive behavior? One's tendency to self-assertion may be aroused in a committee meeting and not find expression there, but, our point is, can the self-assertion thus aroused find expression in a later meeting of the committee, or in a game of tennis? That the aroused state may hold for a time is true, as previously instanced, but perhaps the more immediate the completion of the response the more satisfactory it is. The efficacy of delayed substitution will vary with the different desires and in different situations. Much more definite information can be known by a study of particular situations. Generally, however, the use of substitution seems to be rather widely applicable.

Much substitution may occur through activities other than what is customarily known as recreation, as, for instance, in religion or in the pursuit of hobbies. Recreation is, though, a broad and fertile field for utilizing such substitutes.

The idea of substitution is thus seen to be a very fruitful one. It is not to be confused with sublimation. In sublimation an internal change of a more or less permanent character is supposed to occur; whereas in the substitution we are speaking of, manipulation is largely of external situations with no fundamental change in the personality. In substitution, the instincts as they exist in an individual are aroused, or their functioning completed, or both, by substituting stimuli

and outlets in the place of others, or in providing them where they do not exist.

4. On the Possibility of a Science of General Welfare⁴

In the preamble of the national constitution, among the purposes for which the constitution was established by the people, is mentioned the promotion of the general welfare. This phrase has quite the same meaning as the familiar Latin phrase *pro bono publico*, or the term commonweal or commonwealth as the translation of *res publica*, all emphasizing not so much the welfare of the corporate state as the welfare of the masses, the people who compose the nation as a whole.

The general welfare of the nation has been promoted in the past by our governments, both federal and local, but perhaps without a clearly defined policy for the attainment of the national welfare. But at this crisis in national history and in this period of world-reconstruction, may it not be worth while to focalize, as it were, into a single word, the many principles and processes that underlie national improvement? In so doing, one may hope that, by emphasizing the existence of such a field of study, the attention of students may be directed to it, and that these in due time will by their united contributions make scientific the study of the welfare of nations.

In employing the word eudemics to convey this thought, I do so with some trepidation, realizing that even now our dictionaries are sadly overworked. But, on the other hand, we already have alliterative and complementary terms in the words eugenics and euthenics, and these sciences, combined, work together admirably into a study of national welfare, since the one emphasizes improvement in heredity and the other in environment.

Furthermore, the meaning assigned to the word eudemics can be justified from the philological standpoint, since the Greek word *δημος* may be defined (1) as a political area, or (2) as the masses of a nation, or (3) as the body of citizens in their political capacity. The combination of these meanings, together with the prefix *εὖ*, should readily suggest national or general welfare, so that the word eudemics may properly be used to cover that field of study. If such a study can be developed into a science, a knowledge of its teachings will become

⁴ From "Eudemics, the Science of National or General Welfare," by James Q. Dealey, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XV., (1921) pp. 1-4. Reprinted by permission.

essential to the systematic promotion of the welfare of the whole nation, under the guidance, let us hope, of those philosopher-statesmen from whom Plato in his *Republic* expected so much.

National or general welfare is so broad a term, that clearly the subject-matter cannot be approached from a single point of view, but should be sociological or synthetic in kind, so as to give a comprehensive survey of the many factors that enter into a problem of human progress. The word eudemics, therefore, should imply a constructive attitude toward national welfare and the formulation of a national policy, not political only, but broadly social and based on as exact information as can be had. It should not be utopian nor given to panaceas, and in reaching conclusions should make haste slowly and should look long before it leaps far. Unquestionably, as the leading nations become capable of scientific policies for themselves, applications of national principles will experimentally be made on an international scale, and in later centuries eudemics may broaden into a synthesizing world-science, harmonizing and unifying the several policies of the States existing at the time, so as to bring about the ultimate "federation of the world."

Eudemics a subdivision of social progress. Eudemics should be thought of as a subdivision of the study of social progress, to which much attention has been given in the last fifty years. As a subdivision it should be made definitely concrete and should be related to the study of social progress as the special social sciences are to sociology. It should have also a purposive or directive aspect and, therefore, should be associated in thought with Comte's theory of *prevision* and Ward's theory of *telesis*. Both of these imply that before action be taken conditions must be understood, that the forces at work be under control, and that there be a fairly clear notion of the social end or goal desired. Relying upon this information, the human intellect, serving as a pilot, should then direct social activity so as to expedite, to some slight degree at least, the progress of mankind toward higher standards of social justice and happiness. Since human society is still in its infancy, not in its old age, it should not be expected that an exact program for human endeavor can yet be definitely made, but empirically at least some notion can be ascertained of the general direction of human progress. Society at present may be compared to a ship in a fog, which is guided onward rather than allowed to drift, since the pilot hopes that through precaution and careful judgment he

may avoid hidden dangers and steer the vessel safely toward its destination.

One cannot deny, however, that there are limitations to the possibilities of improvement. The cosmic situation is entirely beyond our control, barring what slight modifications can be made in the planet on which we live. On the other hand, our control of nature through such sciences as physics and chemistry is already so powerful that science itself through its destructive ingenuity threatens to become a peril to the progress of civilization. Social programs should be speeded up, so that the energy of nature through eudemic policy may be directed toward constructive ends, building up and strengthening the achievements reared with so great difficulty by past generations. As for our social environment, admittedly it is man-made, and what man has made he can unmake and remake. What social evils there are can be eliminated in due time, and what good there is should be made better through a wise social control over human energy. Action, therefore, is the keynote of eudemics, since progress must be made, not by merely dreaming of past achievement, but by constructive additions to what already exists. In our studies, to be sure, we should seek to comprehend the past as well as to strive to foresee the future, combining the two as were the Titan brothers of ancient mythology. Yet one should never forget that in the legend Prometheus (or Forethought), and not Epimetheus (or Afterthought), was the real benefactor of man.

Order and progress. Comte, in his teachings, emphasized the notion that order should accompany progress, and this has its counterpart in Spencer's teaching that integration should accompany differentiation. In other words, in a eudemic study progress should not be expected from violent revolutions that shatter the structure or polity of the nation, in the vain hope that a perfect system will arise spontaneously from the ruins. In revolutions every attempt rather should be made to maintain in its fundamentals the national organization, but this should be kept flexible and adjustable, so that it may adapt itself to the changing demands of a public opinion striving to become intelligent. Undue national rigidity means rebellion or decay, but a national order capable of adaptation has within itself the promise of progress through telic evolution. This stress on the maintenance of an orderly existence, this belief in progress and reliance on public opinion are, we trust, axiomatic in the United States.

But, unfortunately, in late years our officials have shown a distrust of public discussion and, fearing the entrance of new ideas, have become reactionary in their suppression of free speech. Yet after all there can be no intelligent public opinion nor any real national freedom unless there is open discussion of new issues, whether wise or foolish. As a nation we are not intelligent in proportion to our opportunities, and we can never aspire to world-leadership unless our statesmen acquire the art of mental growth and develop the open mind of the scientific investigator.

Exercises

1. What is the conception of social progress held in the present work?
2. Distinguish social progress from social self-direction. Which of the two presents a social problem?
3. Compare the life of the individual with that of society in the matter of self-direction.
4. What new thought is growing in modern societies? How does it stand in contrast with the numerous measures and programs of social reform?
5. Distinguish evolution and social progress, according to Hobhouse.
6. Give Hobhouse's definition of social progress. Is it essentially different from that given in the Introduction to this chapter?
7. What is Hobhouse's conception of the relation between the process of the universe and our notions of social progress?
8. Following Conklin, show that the evolution of the human body has halted.
9. Show, similarly, that the intellectual evolution of man has probably been completed.
10. State his thought concerning the evolution of *society* and its future possibilities.
11. Upon the basis of Ogburn's thesis that social progress is characterized by a more harmonious adjustment between human nature and human culture: what does he hold concerning the feasibility of minor changes as compared with wholesale changes?
12. In what forms does this lack of adjustment manifest itself in the individual and in society?
13. In so far as nervous disorders cause maladjustment, what can be done by way of remedy?
14. Discuss "sublimation" and "strain" in this connection, particularly with reference to the specialization of modern life.
15. How can the principle of "substitution" be applied to social improvement?

16. Explain: "We shall be interested in inquiring concerning recreation as an institution for the functioning of emotional and instinctive activities, particularly those not active during the daily routine."

17. Indicate other fields where this principle of substitution might be used for social improvement.

18. State Dealey's reasons for employing the term "eudemics."

19. What is the scope of the word, as he would have it employed?

20. Explain its relation to such terms as social progress, *prevision*, and *telesis*.

21. Indicate the limitations and the possibilities of social improvement, according to Dealey.

22. What is the connection between this principle or program of "eudemics" and social revolution? What is its relation to social reaction?

Additional References

1. Bury, J. B.: *History of the Idea of Progress*. Traces the development of the idea from earliest times.

2. Dealey, James Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*. Ch. XXII. "Social Progress."

3. Devine, Edward T.: *Social Work*. Ch. I. "Progress and Social Work."

4. Giddings, Franklin H.: *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. Ch. XIV. "The Costs of Progress."

5. Shafer, Robert: *Progress and Science*. Ch. II. "Social Progress."

6. Todd, Arthur J.: *Theories of Social Progress*. Ch. VI. "The Concept of Progress." Ch. VII. "The Criteria of Progress."

7. Ward, Lester F.: *Dynamic Sociology*. Vol. II., Ch. X. "Progress."

PARTIAL LIST OF TITLES AND PUBLISHERS

The following does not pretend to be a bibliography of the subject, but simply lists, with a half-dozen additions, the titles of books (not periodicals or documents) named in the *Additional References* at the ends of the chapters, giving the names of the publishers for the convenience of readers. The titles *quoted* in the *Readings* themselves are not included here, because the name of the publisher will be found in the footnote citation at the beginning of each selection. Readers making search for extended bibliographies should consult the works mentioned in the *Preface* to this book.

- ABBOTT, EDITH: *Immigration: Select Documents and Case Records*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1924.
- ADAMS, T. S., and SUMNER, H. L.: *Labor Problems*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1911.
- BAILEY, LIBERTY H.: *The Country Life Movement in the United States*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1911.
- BAKER, RAY STANNARD: *Following the Color Line*. Doubleday, Page and Company, New York. 1908.
- BALDWIN, BIRD T.: *The Physical Growth of Children from Birth to Maturity*. University of Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, Iowa City. 1921.
- BINDER, RUDOLPH M.: *Health and Social Progress*. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York. 1920.
- BLACKMAR, F. W., and Gillin, J. L.: *Outlines of Sociology*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1905 and 1915.
- BOAS, FRANZ: *The Mind of Primitive Man*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1911.
- BOGARDUS, EMORY S.: *Essentials of Americanization*. University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles. 1920.
- BONWICK, JAMES: *The Lost Tasmanian Race*. Kegan, Paul, Trench and Company, London. 1884.
- BRECKINRIDGE, S. P.: *New Homes for Old*. Harper and Brothers, New York and London. 1921.
- BRISSENDEN, PAUL F.: *The I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndicalism*. Columbia University, New York. 1920.
- BROOKS, JOHN GRAHAM: *American Syndicalism: The I.W.W.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1913.
- BURY, J. B.: *The Idea of Progress*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1920.
- BUSHEE, FREDERICK A.: *Principles of Sociology*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1923.

- BUTTERFIELD, KENYON L.: *Chapters in Rural Progress*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1908.
- —: *The Country Church and the Rural Problem*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1911.
- CABOT, RICHARD M.: *Social Work*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 1919.
- CARVER, THOMAS N.: *Sociology and Social Progress*. Ginn and Company, Boston. 1905.
- —: *Essays in Social Justice*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1915.
- CHAPIN, F. STUART: *An Historical Introduction to Social Economy*. The Century Company, New York. 1917.
- —: *An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution*. The Century Company, New York. 1919.
- CHAPIN, HENRY D.: *Heredity and Child Culture*. E. P. Dutton Company, New York. 1922.
- CLAGHORN, KATE HOLLADAY: *The Immigrant's Day in Court*. Harper and Brothers, New York and London. 1923.
- COLE, G. D. H.: *Social Theory*. Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York. 1920.
- COLLISON, W. H.: *In the Wake of the War Canoe*. E. P. Dutton Company, New York. 1916.
- Compiled: *Three Problem Children. Narratives from the case records of a Child Guidance Clinic*. Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency, 50 E. 42nd. St., New York City. 1923.
- COOLEY, CHARLES H.: *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1902.
- —: *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1909.
- DEALEY, JAMES Q.: *Sociology: Its Development and Applications*. D. Appleton and Company, New York. 1920.
- DEVINE, EDWARD T.: *Misery and Its Causes*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1909.
- —: *Social Work*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1922.
- DIXON, ROLAND M.: *The Racial History of Man*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1923.
- DOUGLASS, HARLAN P.: *The Little Town, Especially in Its Rural Relationships*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1919.
- DOW, GROVE S.: *Society and Its Problems*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1920, 1922.
- DRUCKER, SAUL, and HEXTER, MAURICE B.: *Children Astray*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1923.
- DUBOIS, W. E. BURGHARDT, (Editor): *The Negro American Family*. Atlanta University Publications, Atlanta. 1908.
- ELLIOT, G. F. SCOTT: *Prehistoric Man and His Story*. Seeley, Service and Company, Ltd., London. 1910. Third Edition.

- ELY, RICHARD T.: *Outlines of Economics*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1893, 1908, 1916.
- —: *Property and Contract, in Their Relation to the Distribution of Wealth*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1914.
- ELY, HESS, LEITH and CARVER: *The Foundations of National Prosperity: Studies in the Conservation of Permanent National Resources*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1920.
- FAIRCHILD, HENRY P.: *Immigration: A World Movement and Its American Significance*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1913.
- FINNEY, ROSS L.: *Causes and Cures for the Social Unrest: An Appeal to the Middle Class*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1922.
- FOLLETT, MARY P.: *The New State*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1918.
- FORD, JAMES: *Social Problems and Social Policy*. Ginn and Company, Boston. 1923.
- GAVITT, JOHN PALMER: *Americans by Choice*. Harper and Brothers, New York and London. 1922.
- GEDDES, P., and THOMSON, J. A.: *Evolution*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1911.
- GETTELL, RAYMOND B.: *Introduction to Political Science*. Ginn and Company, Boston. 1910.
- GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN H.: *Principles of Sociology*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1896.
- —: *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1922.
- GILLIN, JOHN L.: *Poverty and Dependency*. The Century Company, New York. 1921.
- GOLDENWEISER, A. A.: *Early Civilization*. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York. 1922.
- HAYES, EDWARD C.: *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. D. Appleton and Company, New York. 1916.
- HAYNES, FRED E.: *Social Politics*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 1924.
- —: *Third Party Movements*. Iowa State Historical Society, Iowa City. 1916.
- HEARN, WILLIAM E.: *The Aryan Household: Its Structure and Its Development*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1910.
- HILL, HIBBERT W.: *The New Public Health*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1916.
- HOBHOUSE, LEONARD T.: *The Elements of Social Justice*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1922.
- HOLDERNESS, SIR T. W.: *Peoples and Problems of India*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1912.
- HOLLANDER, BERNARD: *The Psychology of Misconduct*. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 1922.

- HOLMES, SAMUEL J.: *The Trend of the Race: A Study of Present Tendencies in the Biological Development of Civilized Mankind*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1891.
- HUNTER, ROBERT: *Poverty*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1904.
- JACKSON, HENRY E.: *A Community Center: What it is and How to Organize It*. Government Printing Office, Washington. 1918.
- JENKS, JEREMIAH, and LAUCK, W. JETT: *The Immigration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs*. Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York and London. 1912.
- JOHNSON, JULIA E.: *The Negro Problem*. H. W. Wilson Company, New York. 1921. (The Handbook Series).
- KEANE, A. H.: *Man, Past and Present*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England. 1920. Revised Edition.
- KEITH, ARTHUR: *Man: A History of the Human Body*. Henry Holt and Company, New York and London. No date.
- KELLER, ALBERT G.: *Colonization*. Ginn and Company, Boston. 1908.
- KING, WILLFORD I.: *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1915.
- KROEBER, A. L.: *Anthropology*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1923.
- KROEBER, A. L., and WATERMAN, T. T.: *Source Book in Anthropology*. University of California Press. 1920.
- LEACOCK, STEPHEN: *Elements of Political Science*. Houghton Mifflin Company, New York. 1906 and 1913.
- LICHTENBERGER, JAMES P.: *The Development of Social Theory*. The Century Company, New York. 1923.
- LOWIE, ROBERT: *Culture and Ethnology*. Douglas H. McMurtrie, New York. 1917.
- —: *Primitive Society*. Boni and Liveright, New York. 1920.
- MACIVER, R. M.: *Community: A Sociological Study*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1917.
- MANGOLD, GEORGE B.: *Problems of Child Welfare*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1924. (Revised Edition).
- MARSHALL, ALFRED: *Principles of Economics*. The Macmillan Company, London and New York. 1917.
- MASSART, J., and VANDERVELDE, E.: *Parasitism: Organic and Social*. George Allen and Unwin, London. 1895.
- McCLENAHAN, BESSIE A.: *Organizing the Community*. The Century Company, New York. 1922.
- McCULLOCH, JAMES: *The New Chivalry — Health*. Southern Sociological Congress, Nashville. 1915.
- MCDougALL, WILLIAM: *The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation*

- tion of National Life and Character.* G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. 1920.
- McKEEVER, W. A.: *Farm Boys and Girls.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1912.
- MYRES, J. L.: *The Dawn of History.* Henry Holt and Company, New York. No date.
- NEARING, SCOTT: *Income: An Examination of the Returns for Services Rendered and from Property Owned in the United States.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1915.
- OGBURN, WILLIAM F.: *Social Change.* B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York. 1922.
- OGG, FREDERIC A.: *Economic Development of Modern Europe.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1917.
- OSBORN, HENRY F.: *Men of the Old Stone Age.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1916.
- PARK, R. E., and BURGESS, E. W.: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1921.
- PARKER, CARLETON H.: *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays.* Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1920.
- PARMELEE, MAURICE: *Criminology.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1918.
- POPENOE, PAUL, and JOHNSON, R. H.: *Applied Eugenics.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1918.
- QUEEN, STUART A.: *Social Work in the Light of History.* J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and London. 1922.
- RATZEL, FRIEDRICH: *The History of Mankind.* The Macmillan Company, New York and London. 1897.
- — —: *Report of the Commission on Country Life.* Sturgis and Walton, New York. 1911.
- REUTER, EDWARD B.: *The Mulatto in the United States.* Richard G. Badger, Boston. 1918.
- — —: *Population Problems.* J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia. 1923.
- RIPLEY, WILLIAM Z.: *The Races of Europe.* D. Appleton and Company, New York. 1899.
- RIVERS, W. H. R.: *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia.* Cambridge (Eng.) University Press. 1922.
- ROBINSON, JAMES HARVEY: *The Humanizing of Knowledge.* George H. Doran Company, New York. 1924.
- ROSS, EDWARD A.: *Social Psychology.* The Macmillan Company, New York. 1908.
- — —: *Principles of Sociology.* The Century Company, New York. 1920.

- : *The Old World in the New: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People*. The Century Company, New York. 1914.
- ROYCE, JOSIAH: *War and Insurance*. (An address.) The Macmillan Company, New York. 1914.
- RUSSELL, BERTRAND: *Proposed Roads to Freedom*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1919.
- SAPIR, EDWARD: *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1921.
- SHAFFER, ROBERT: *Progress and Science*. Yale University Press, New Haven. 1922.
- SMALL, ALBION W.: *General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main Development in Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1905.
- SMALL, A. W., and VINCENT, G. E.: *An Introduction to the Study of Society*. American Book Company, New York. 1894.
- SMITH, G. ELLIOT: *Migrations of Early Culture*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. Printed in Manchester, England. 1915.
- SOLLAS, W. J.: *Ancient Hunters*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1911.
- SPENCER, FRANK C.: *The Education of the Pueblo Child: A Study in Arrested Development*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1909.
- STEINER, EDWARD A.: *On the Trail of the Immigrant*. Fleming H. Revell Company, Chicago. 1906.
- SUMNER, WILLIAM G.: *War and Other Essays*. Yale University Press. 1914.
- TAUSSIG, FRANK W.: *Principles of Economics*. 2 vols. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1911.
- THOMAS, WILLIAM I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*. Richard G. Badger, Boston. 1909.
- THOMAS, W. I., and ZNANIECKI, F.: *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Richard G. Badger, Boston. 1918, 1920.
- TODD, ARTHUR J.: *Theories of Social Progress*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1918.
- TYLER, JOHN M.: *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1921.
- VOGT, PAUL L.: *The Church and Country Life: Report of Conference Held by the Commission on Church and Country Life*. Missionary Education Movement of the United States, New York. 1916.
- WALLAS, GRAHAM: *The Great Society*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1919.
- : *Our Social Heritage*. George Allen and Unwin, London. 1920.
- WARD, LESTER F.: *Dynamic Sociology*. 2 vols. D. Appleton and Company, New York. 1883 and 1910.

- —: *Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1903.
- —: *Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society*. Ginn and Company, Boston. 1906.
- WHEELER, GERALD C.: *The Tribe and Inter-Tribal Relations in Australia*. John Murray, London. 1910.
- WILDER, HARRIS H.: *Man's Prehistoric Past*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1923.
- WILSON, WARREN H.: *The Evolution of the Country Community: A Study in Religious Sociology*. The Pilgrim Press, Boston and New York. 1912.
- WISSLER, CLARK A.: *Man and Culture*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1923.
- WISSLER, CLARK, (and others): *Societies of the Plains Indians*. The American Museum of Natural History, New York. 1916.
- WOLFE, A. B.: *Readings in Social Problems*. Ginn and Company, Boston. 1916.
- ZUEBLIN, CHARLES: *American Municipal Progress*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1916.

INDEX OF PERSONS

- Abbott, Edith, 678, 947
 Abbott, Grace, 685, 803
 Abdulla, Dada, 722
 Abercromby, John, 186
 Abraham, 122
 Adair, James, 141
 Adams, John (alias Alexander Smith),
 451
 Adams, T. S., 910, 947
 Adamson, James, 242, 245
 Addams, Jane, 77, 691
 Addison, Thomas, 205
 Aeschylus, 180
 Agnew, Dr., 167
 Allport, F. H. and G. W., 801
 Anderson, W. L., 697, 714
 Angell, Norman, 682
 Antin, Mary, 680, 681
 Ardigo, Roberts, 791
 Aristotle, 43
 Atwood, S. M., 411
 Augustine, Saint, 134
 Avebury, Lord. *See* Lubbock, Sir John

 Babington, W. D., 880
 Bacon, Sir Francis, 134, 758
 Baden-Powell, B. H., 418
 Bagehot, Walter, 550, 558, 563
 Bailey, L. H., 647, 713, 947
 Baird, Spencer, 289
 Baker, R. S., 749, 947
 Baldwin, B. T., 829, 947
 Barrell, Joseph, 106
 Barton, G. A., 373
 Bastian, Adolf, 290
 Bateson, William, 763, 764, 765
 Bayge, M. de, 226
 Bayliss and Starling, 210
 Bean, R. B., 89, 90
 Beard, C. A., 539
 Bellamy, Edward, 594, 598
 Benedict, Bertram, 912
 Berman, Louis, 74, 87
 Bernard, L. L., 717, 885
 Béthune, Maximilien de, 615
 Bhattacharya, Mr., 522
 Bibra, Ernst von, 191
 Binder, Rudolph M., 649
 Binet and Simon, 799

 Bishop, Father, 729
 Bismarck, Otto von, 528
 Blackmar, F. W., 766, 921, 947
 Blackmar and Gillin, 607
 Blackstone, Sir William, 116
 Bleek, W. H. I., 241, 245
 Bligh, Lieutenant, 450
 Blumenbach, J. F., 16, 231
 Boas, Franz, XXXI, 104, 105, 305,
 236, 373, 387, 394, 947
 Bogardus, E. S., 429, 435, 482, 498,
 579, 623, 947
 Boison, A. T., 717
 Bonwick, James, 171, 173, 947
 Boone, Daniel, 118
 Bourne, G. C., 212
 Breckinridge, S. P., 947
 Broca, Paul, XXVI
 Browner, A. F., 805
 Brown, A. R., 337
 Brooks, J. G., 926, 947
 Brouner, F. G., 97, 98
 Bücher, Karl, 418
 Bullock and Sequeira, 206
 Burgess, E. W., 789, 796. *See also*
 Park and Burgess
 Burton, T. E., 644, 645
 Bury, J. B., 945, 947
 Butterfield, K. L., 717, 948

 Cabot, R. M., 664, 948
 Calder, John, 894, 896, 910
 Cannon, W. B., 206, 211
 Cartwright, Peter, 596, 597
 Carver, T. N., 501, 716, 891, 926, 948
 Case, C. M., 623, 766
 Cassim, M. H., 722
 Catlin, George, 389
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 723, 724
 Chapin, F. S., 128, 344, 880, 948
 Chapin, H. D., 664, 829, 948
 Claghorn, K. H., 948
 Chevreul, M. E., 652
 Cleveland, F. A., 539
 Clopper, E. N., 829
 Coffey, George, 179, 193
 Cohen, Israel, 456
 Cole, G. D. H., 926, 948
 Collier, John, 411

- Collington, Dr., 224
 Collison, W. H., 533, 948
 Commons, J. R., 880
 Comstock and Troland, XX
 Comte, Auguste, XVI, XXVIII, XXIX,
 4, 26, 28, 39, 110, 942, 943
 Condorcet, M. J. A., 134
 Conklin, E. G., XXVII, 933
 Coole, Captain James, 286
 Cooley, C. H., 72, 73, 76, 87, 497, 517,
 533, 549, 579, 589, 592, 860, 862,
 948
 Couillault, Dr., 224
 Cox, E. T., 141
 Cranz, David, 351
 Crawford, Rev. James, 596
 Crookshank, F. G., 209
 Crusoe, Robinson, 801
 Cumming, H. E., 387
 Cunningham, J. T., 213

 D'Aeth, F. G., 533
 Dante, 353
 Darwin, Charles XXVI, 45, 110, 111,
 112, 213, 499, 651
 Davenport, Homer, 111
 Davenport, F. M., 595
 Dawson, Thomas, 166
 Dealey, J. Q., XVI, 28, 515, 533, 607,
 803, 891, 941, 945, 948
 DeCandolle, A. P., 499, 872
 De Greef, Guillaume, 155
 Dendy, Arthur, 213
 Devine, E. T., 769, 788, 853, 945, 948
 Dewey, John, 88, 105, 561, 857, 869
 Dixon, R. M., 230, 948
 Donovan, J., 254
 Douglass, H. P., 718, 948
 Dow, G. S., 282, 948
 Dow, Lorenzo, 596, 597
 Down, Langdon, 209
 Downey, E. H., 851
 Downey, June, 799
 Dresslar, F. B., 880
 Drucker, Saul, 829, 948
 Dubois, Abbé 521
 DuBois, W. E. B., 749, 948
 Duff, M. G., 521
 Durkheim, Émile, 267, 552, 869
 Dutcher, B. H., 305

 Edison, Thomas, 652
 Edwards, R. H., 853
 Ehrenreich, Paul, 111, 114
 Elizabeth, Queen, 614, 616
 Elliott, T. R., 206, 211
 Ellis, William, 544
 Ellwood, C. A., XXV, XXVIII, 48, 256,
 267, 630

 Ely, R. T., 326, 365, 549, 633, 767,
 779, 851, 910, 949
 Ely, Hess, Laith, and Carver, 949
 Emerson, W. R. P., 812
 Evans, Sir John, 176, 185, 198

 Fairchild, H. P., 679, 696, 949
 Faris, Ellsworth, 72, 365
 Farrand, Livingston, 400
 Feinberg, Louis, 788
 Ferri, Enrico, 789, 790
 Fewkes, J. W., 315
 Finau, Tonga chief, 554
 Fiske, G. W., 703
 Fison, Lorimer, 140
 Fletcher, A. C., 294, 310, 326
 Flower, W. H., 231, 234
 Follett, M. P., 485, 853, 927, 949
 Ford, H. J., 365
 Ford, James, 766, 803, 851, 949
 Franklin, Benjamin, 274, 666
 Frazer, Sir James, 344, 346, 386, 557
 Frobenius, Joannes, 283
 Fuller, R. G., 437
 Furneaux, Tobias, 165
 Fustel de Coulanges, N. D., 539

 Gabelentz, G. von der, 227
 Galsworthy, John, 353, 881
 Galton, Francis, 44, 751, 754, 871
 Gandhi, M. K., 537, 719
 Gavitt, J. P., 949
 Geboka, Namo, 553
 Geddes, Patrick, 515, 949
 George III, 902
 George, Henry, 784
 Gettell, R. B., 348, 949
 Giddings, F. H., X, 71, 230, 254, 416,
 448, 549, 579, 608, 611, 631, 632,
 750, 945, 949
 Gillen, J. L., 79, 278, 282, 341, 766,
 768, 947, 949
 Gladstone, J. H., 189, 191
 Gley, Professor, 207
 Glynn, E. E., 206
 Gneist, Rudolf von, 540
 Goethe, J. W. von, 651
 Goldenweiser, A. A., XXV, XXXII,
 XXXIII, 157, 267, 268, 344, 348,
 386, 387, 400, 411, 533, 608, 949
 Gomme, Sir Lawrence, 332
 Gompers, Samuel, 488
 Gorgas, W. C., 654
 Gowland, William, 177
 Gracchus, Caius, 427
 Gray, J., 227
 Grigg, H. H., 829
 Gulick, L. H., 860
 Gull, Sir William, 207

- Gunn, Ronald, 167
 Gupta, Sir K. G., 537
- Haddon, A. C., 188, 213, 252, 319, 401, 460
 Hampel, J., 191
 Harding, W. G., 671
 Harrison, General W. H., 556
 Hart, Hornell, 629
 Hart, J. K., 271
 Hartland, E. S., 335
 Hayes, E. C., 3, 71, 128, 549, 788, 949
 Haynes, F. E., 912, 927, 949
 Haynes, G. E., 829
 Hayward, William, 745
 Haywood, W. D., 745
 Healy, William, 429, 430, 805
 Hearn, W. E., 348, 949
 Hegel, G. W. F., 651
 Henry VIII, 902
 Henry of Navarre, 614, 615
 Herbert, W., 499
 Herder, J. G. von, 134
 Herodotus, 246
 Hesiod, 180, 196
 Hetherington and Muirhead, 558
 Hewes, Amy, 677, 927
 Hewett, E. L., 388
 Hexter, M. B., 829, 948
 Hill, H. W., 949
 Hirn, Yrjo, 387, 388
 Hobhouse, L. T., 515, 751, 759, 893, 930, 949
 Hobson, S. G., 914
 Hoernes, Moritz, 194
 Holderness, Sir T. W., 533, 949
 Hollander, Bernard, 949
 Holmes, Justice O. W., 785
 Holmes, S. J., 677, 766, 950
 Holmes, W. H., 236, 288, 412
 Holt, E. B., 487
 Homer, 197
 Howard, G. E., 25, 77, 623
 Howe, F. C., 718
 Howerth, I. W., 630
 Howitt, William, 278, 282, 340, 341
 Hrdlicka, Ales, 92
 Hull, E., 224
 Humboldt, Alexander von, 652
 Hunter, John, 205
 Hunter, Robert, 788, 950
 Huntington, Ellsworth, 106, 127, 128, 460
 Huschke, Emil, 89, 92
- Jackson, H. E., 867, 950
 Jalina-piramurana, 552
 James, I., of England, 852, 880
 James, William, 490, 650
- Jastrow, Joseph, 799
 Jefferson, Thomas, 118, 681, 776
 Jenks, A. E., 306, 418
 Jenks, Edward, 539, 540
 Jenks, J. W., 696, 950
 Jenness, Diamond, 388, 411, 480
 Jesus Christ, 651
 Jhering, Rudolph von, 786
 Jochelson, V. I., 126
 Johnsen, J. E., 749, 950
 Johnson, R. H., 766, 951
 Jones, L. F., 533
 Justinian, 61
- Kant, Immanuel, 651
 Keane, A. H., 188, 201, 220, 228, 231, 238, 253, 738, 950
 Keith, Sir Arthur, 201, 267, 950
 Keller, A. G., XXIV, XXXVI, 153, 157, 606, 950
 Kelsey, Carl, 630
 Kendall, E. K., 365
 Kidd, Benjamin, 870
 King, Irving, 367
 King, W. I., 788, 950
 Kirchhoff, G. R., 123
 Klaatsch, Hermann, 209
 Klein, Philip, 831
 Knight, F. H., 21
 Koch, Robert, 400
 Kolb, Peter, 284
 Kroeber, A. L., XVII, XXI, XXVI, XXVIII, XXXI, 35, 36, 41, 230, 253, 278, 280, 348, 450, 468, 950
 Kropotkin, P., 150, 551, 570, 623
 Kuriolov, 553
- Lafitau, J. F., 293
 La Flesche, Francis, 294, 310, 326
 Lamarck, J. B., 171
 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 528
 Lauck, W. J., 696, 950
 Laufer, Berthold, 398
 Laughlin, H. H., 751
 Laughlin, J. L., 910
 Leacock, Stephen, 28, 348, 515, 950
 Le Bon, Gustave, 292
 Lee, F. S., 653
 Lee, Joseph, 858
 Leopold, Lewis, 557
 Lichtenberger, J. P., 911, 950
 Lichtenstein, Heinrich, 389
 Liebknecht, Karl, 591
 Lies, E. T., 744
 Lilly, W. S., 521
 Lincoln, Harry, 445
 Linnaeus, Carolus, 231, 232, 501
 Lippmann, Walter, 592
 Livi, —, 115

- Livingstone, David, 67, 112, 114, 289
 Lombroso, Cesare, 789
 Loria, Achille, 528
 Lovejoy, Esther, 648, 655
 Lowie, Ritt, XX, XXV, XXXII, 49,
 123, 128, 143, 147, 157, 173, 306,
 319, 348, 480, 950
 Lubbock, Sir John, 31, 140, 163, 173,
 195, 199
 Lucretius, 180
 Lydekker, Richard, 231, 234
 Lyell, Charles, 499
 Lyle, Rev. Wm., 595, 596
 Lyon, Captain, 303
- MacBride, E. W., 213
 McClenahan, B. A., 867, 950
 McCulloch, J. E., 664, 950
 MacDonald, J. R., 918
 McDougall, William, XXVIII, 88, 97,
 98, 102, 104, 950
 McGee, W. J., 95, 597, 644, 645
 McGuire, J. D., 293
 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 558
 Maciver, R. M., 592, 623, 950
 McKechnie, W. S., 542
 McKeever, W. A., 718, 951
 Maine, Sir Henry, 149, 152, 419, 424
 Maitland, F. W., 148, 152, 539
 Malinowski, B., 327
 Mall, F. P., XXVIII, 89, 104
 Malthus, T. R., 500, 665
 Man, E. H., 337, 349
 Mangold, G. B., 677, 803, 829, 950
 Marconi, Guglielmo, 652
 Marett, R. R., 349, 367, 381, 552
 Marie, Pierre, 203
 Mariner, William, 553, 554
 Marion du, Fresne M., 165
 Marshall, Alfred, 18, 92, 376, 515, 677,
 950
 Martineau, Harriet, XVI
 Marx, Karl, XXIV, 494, 911
 Mason, O. T., 291
 Massart, Jean, 515, 950
 Matthews, W. D., 235
 Mead, C. W., 399, 403
 Mead, G. H., 353, 792
 Means, P. A., XXV
 Mendel, G. J., 38
 Meyer, Kuno, 261, 265
 Michelson, Truman, 429, 445
 Middendorf, A. T. von., 418
 Mill, J. S., 592, 784
 Milligan, Dr., 166
 Milton, John, 592
 Moffat, Robert, 242
 Mohammed, 56
 Mommsen, Theodor, 425
- Montelius, Oscar, 187
 Morgan, J. de, 190
 Morgan, L. H., XXIV, 135, 156, 329,
 348
 Morris, Sir Malcolm, 207
 Moses, 122, 651, 681
 Mossell, S. T., 729
 Much, Mathaeus, 191
 Mudge, G. P., 764
 Müller, Sophus, 185
 Murdoch, John, 298
 Myers, P. V. N., 603
 Myres, J. L., 128, 173, 951
- Namo, Geboka, 553
 Napoleon, Louis, 563, 565
 Nearing, Scott, 788, 951
 Newell, W. W., 858
 Nietzsche, F. W., 611
 Nott, J. C., 738
- Odin, Alfred, 872
 Ogburn, W. F., XXXIII, 49, 935, 951
 Ogg, A. A., 851, 927, 951
 Ollivier, Sir Sidney, 477
 Openshaw, T. H., 208
 Oppenheimer, Franz, 365
 Osborn, H. F., XXVI, XXVII, 253,
 412, 951
- Park, R. E., 102, 104, 749
 Park and Burgess, XVII, 72, 415, 430,
 448, 498, 515, 608, 678, 951
 Parker, —, 89, 91, 92, 93
 Parker, C. H., 910, 951
 Parkman, Francis, 555, 556
 Parmelee, Maurice, 803, 951
 Parry, W. E., 303, 395
 Parsons, E. C., 445
 Pascal, Blaise, 134
 Pasteur, Louis, 652
 Paton, Stewart, 827
 Patrick, G. T. W., 857
 Pearson, Karl, 44, 148, 612
 Peattie, Roderick, 480
 Perry, R. B., 631, 927
 Peschel, Oskar, 140
 Peter the Great, 118
 Peter the Hermit, 603, 605
 Pinchot, Gifford, 644
 Pfizner, —, 91
 Plato, 275, 277, 942
 Plunkett, Sir Horace, 714
 Pomare, of Tahiti, 554
 Pontiac, 555, 556
 Popenoe, P. B., 766, 951
 Portman, M. V., 337
 Powell, J. W., XXXIII, XXXIV, 643
 Pyle, J. G., 611, 613

- Quatrefages, J. L. A. de, 221, 225, 226,
 234
 Queen, S. A., 951
 Quiggin, A. H., 188, 252

 Rai, L. R., 537
 Rainwater, C. E., 852, 857, 864
 Ranke, Johannes, 94, 96
 Rapson, E. J., 517
 Ratzel, Friedrich, 284, 305, 951
 Rauschenbuch, Walter, 855
 Read, C. H., 389
 Reisner, G. A., 190
 Retz, Cardinal, 558
 Retzins, M. G., 16, 93
 Reuter, E. B., 688, 749, 766, 951
 Rhys, John, 227
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 558
 Ridgeway, William, 185, 461
 Ripley, W. Z., 200, 238, 951
 Ritter, Carl, 112, 822
 Rivers, W. H. R., 95, 96, 98, 100, 125,
 375, 376, 379, 428, 449, 460, 553,
 593, 664, 951
 Robinson, J. H., 9, 859, 951
 Rollings, James, 167, 168
 Ross, E. A., 32, 71, 104, 367, 416, 417,
 430, 448, 482, 497, 498, 509, 515,
 516, 533, 549, 550, 551, 560, 566,
 588, 593, 595, 608, 665, 671, 696,
 867, 893, 951
 Routledge, Mrs. Scoresby, 450
 Rountree, B. S., 830, 841, 905
 Royce, Josiah, 623, 952
 Rüdinger, Nikolaus, 93
 Rust, H. N., 278

 Sampson, John, 261, 265
 Sand, René, 653
 Sapir, Edward, 49, 267, 952
 Sarkar, Benoy, 540
 Schafer, Joseph, 539
 Schliemann, Heinrich, 193
 Schmaedel, —, von, 115
 Schoolmoller, Gustav, 505, 516, 524
 Schoolcraft, H. R., 309, 428
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 558
 Schwalbe, Gustav, 91, 92
 Schweinfurth, G. A., 31, 292
 Scott, E. J., 749
 Scott, James, 166
 Scott, Thomas, 167
 Seeley, J. R., 15
 Seligman, E. R. A., 28
 Seligmann, C. G., 553
 Semple, E. C., 109, 127
 Sequeira. *See* Bullock and Sequeira
 Sergi, G., 230, 238
 Shafer, Robert, 945, 952
 Shakespeare, William, 651
 Shand, A. F., 799
 Sharpey-Schafer, 206
 Shaw, G. B., 884
 Shaw, Jeremiah, 265
 Shaw, Lemuel, 641
 Shelley, P. B., 45
 Shinn, Mr., 567
 Shreiner, Olive, 480
 Sièyes, Abbé, 564
 Simpson, Dr., 298
 Simmel, Georg, 429, 438, 443
 Sinclair, A. T., 260
 Sittig, Otto, 230
 Small, A. W., XVII, XVIII, XIX, 73,
 415, 416, 438, 497, 516, 528, 862,
 867, 877, 952
 Smith, Adam, 782
 Smith, G. Elliot, XXV, 93, 189, 190,
 191, 192, 305, 952
 Smith, Goldwin, 28
 Smith, Stanhope, 112
 Socrates, 275, 277
 Sollas, W. J., 952
 Sorel, Georges, 911, 921
 Spencer, F. C., 282, 952
 Spencer, Herbert, XVIII, XXIX, XXX,
 5, 6, 29, 39, 40, 53, 65, 79, 94, 110,
 150, 278, 282, 341, 651, 791, 876
 Spicer, Captain, 293
 Spitzka, E. C., 89
 Spotswood, Alexander, 118
 Squier, E. G., 223
 Stanley, H. M., 241
 Starling, E. H., 211
 Steensby, H. P., 338
 Steiner, E. A., 952
 Steiner, J. F., 680
 Stephen, child crusader, 606
 Stokes, Whitley, 229
 Stolpe, Hjalmar, 389
 Stow, G. W., 239, 245, 412
 Strabo, 192
 Stubbs, William, 539
 Sully, Duke of, 427, 615
 Sumner, H. L., 910, 947
 Sumner, W. G., XXIV, XXXVI, 50,
 65, 73, 74, 153, 155, 499, 582, 623,
 631, 952
 Swift, Jonathan, 293
 Sydenstricker, Edgar, 847

 Tagore, Rabindranath, 537
 Takahasi, Siego, 540
 Taussig, F. W., 851, 910, 952
 Taylor, —, 140
 Taylor, F. W., 711
 Tecumseh, 556
 Temple, Sir R. C., 337

- Tennyson, Alfred (Lord), 448
 Theal, G. M., 244
 Thiers, M., 564
 Thirkell, —, 168
 Thomas, W. I., XX, XXI, XVIII,
 XXIX, XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXV,
 XXXVI, 3, 72, 73, 87, 88, 105,
 258, 278, 282, 348, 386, 412, 428,
 952
 Thomas and Znaniecki, 73, 81, 678,
 696, 952
 Thomson, J. A., 515, 949
 Thorpe, Benjamin, 365
 Thucydides, 427
 Tiedermann, Friedrich, 92
 Todd, A. J., 128, 868, 879, 945, 952
 Tolstōi, Leo, 611
 Topinard, Paul, 221
 Tubino, F. M., 227
 Tuckey, J. K., 31
 Tufts, J. H., 369
 Tyler, J. M., 200, 952
 Tylor, E. B., XX, XXIX, 140, 144,
 145, 146, 157, 165, 173
 Ujfalvy, K. E., 216
 Unwin, Raymond, 718
 Urban II, Pope, 603, 604
 Vandervelde, Emile, 515, 950
 Van Hise, C. R., 638, 642
 Veblen, Thorstein, 516
 Verneau, M., 225
 Villiers du Terrage, M. de, 190
 Vincent, G. E., 867, 952
 Virchow, Rudolf, 110, 195, 652
 Vogt, P. L., 647, 952
 Waitz, Theodor, 115
 Wake, C. S., 291
 Wallace, A. R., 232, 233, 390, 418
 Wallas, Graham, XXVIII, 88, 282, 497,
 593, 608, 952
 Walter the Penniless, 605
 Ward, L. F., XV, XVIII, XXXII,
 XXXIII, 3, 28, 87, 129, 156, 499,
 535, 549, 580, 860, 868, 869, 881,
 893, 942, 945, 952
 Warren, B. S., 847
 Warren, H. C., 73, 87, 88
 Waterman, T. T., 348, 950
 Watkins, G. S., 927
 Watson, J. B., 72, 87, 823
 Watson, R. R., 87
 Weatherly, U. G., 450, 474
 Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 776, 901
 Webster, A. E., 829
 Webster, Hutton, 347, 366, 550, 551
 Westermarck, Edward, 77, 327, 332
 Wheeler, G. C., 326, 327, 340, 366,
 953
 Whetham, W. C. D., XVII
 Whitney, N. R., 535, 544
 Widowson, Henry, 156
 Wilde, Oscar, 884
 Wilder, H. H., 253, 953
 Willcox, W. F., 752, 860
 William of Tyre, 603
 Wilson, W. H., 712, 867, 953
 Wilson, Woodrow, 494, 860
 Windelband, Wilhelm, XVII
 Windisch, Ernst, 229, 263
 Wissler, Clark, XXV, XXVI, XXVIII,
 XXXII, 49, 126, 173, 230, 235,
 257, 258, 267, 348, 449, 464, 481,
 953
 Woodburne, A. S., 533, 535
 Woods, R. A., 860-861
 Woodworth, R. S., XXVII, 89, 94, 104
 Wright, W. K., 88, 497
 Wyman, Jeffries, 738
 Yarros, V. S., 491
 Younghusband, Sir Francis, 118
 Zaccachea, Mr. and Mrs. Domenico, 671
 Znaniecki, Florian, XXI, 73, 81, 678,
 696, 952
 Zueblin, Charles, 718, 953

GENERAL INDEX

- Ability, personal, 550, 551
 Abnormal boy, 430
 Absorption, 486
 Acclimatization, 113
 Accommodation, 474; meaning, 450
 Acculturation, 449. *See also* Diffusion of cultures
 Accumulation, 44; of culture, 482; of wealth, 423
 Accused persons, injustice toward, 790
 Achievement, 129, 487, 490, 868; continuity of, 129; real products of, 132
 Achondroplasia, 208
 Acquaintance, 438
 Acquired characters, 133, 821, 822
 Acromelagy, 203, 211, 212
 Activities, sociology concerned with, 130
 Activity, 82
 Adaptive activities, 580
 Adequacy, 750
 Adjustments, 935
 Administration of the social estate, 872
 Adobe-brick, 138
 Adolescence, 827
 Adrenalin, 211
 Advertising, 63
 Affenspalte, 93
 Africans, 142, 150; metals and metal-lurgy, 177. *See also* Negroes
 Agreement, 589
 Agriculture, 635; beginnings of, 418; exploitation of labor in South America, 509; in national educa-tion, 715
 Ainu, 97, 98
 Alaska, 109; copper, 177; decoration of needlecases, 394; Indian tribes, 112
 Alatinja, 343
 Alcohol, 453
 Aleutian Islanders, 112
 Alphabet, 138, 139
 Alpine race, 219, 239
 Alps, 115
 Amazon, 113
 Amelioration, 936
 America, aborigines, 224, 236; antiquity of man in, 231; early French and English Settlers, 119; immigrants, 215; peopling of, during Stone Age, 223
 American colonies, 610
 American Indians, Northwest tribes, social stratification, 516; primitive religions, 373
 American Public Health Association, 657
 American Red Cross, 659
 American stock, 689, 692
 Americanization, 678, 691
 Amerinds, Faith and economic life among, 306
 Ames, E. S., 386
 Amusements, 255, 389; commercialized, 852, 853
 Anarchist Communism, 491
 Andamanese, 151, 164, 220, 319, 325; culture, 337; punitive law, 349
 Andes, plateau life, 110, 113
 Anglo-Saxons, laws, 352
 Animals, coöperation, 32; cruelty to, 785; man's distinction from, 41; taming of, 418
 Antagonism, 499
 Anthropistic coöperation, 499
 Anthro-po-geography, 117
 Anthropoid apes, 209
 Anthropology, XXII
 Ants, 31, 42
 Apaches, 351
 Appalachians, southern, English stock, 120
 Appetite, 632
 Arabs, 67, 95; in Spain, 121
 Araucanians, 67
 Archaeology, 217; date fixing, 187; pioneer laborers, list, 188; pre-historic, four epochs, 163
 Aristocracy, 423, 525; Greece ancient, 426; of wealth, 426
 Arreton Down, 185
 Arson, 491, 745
 Art, 132, 135; conventionalization in primitive art, 394; evolution of, 401; Haddon's theory of develop-

- ment, 401; original sources, 388;
Peruvian prehistoric design, 403;
primitive, 387; realistic and con-
ventional in punitive, 400; science
and, 45
- Artifacts, 217
- Aryans, 186, 187, 518; ancestral types,
143; in India, 113, 121
- Ascendency, 550, 551; individual, 551;
societal, 561
- Asia, center of dispersion, 235; desicca-
tion of central, 213; Mongolians
in, 220; origin of man, 218
- Assam, 214
- Assimilation, 429, 678; Meskwaki
children, 445
- Association, modes, 488
- Associations, 574
- Assyria, iron in, 197
- Astrogeny, 29
- Athapascans, 137, 140
- Athens, 147
- Atlas range, 115
- Attack, 632
- Attitudes, XXXV, 73; causes, 85; defi-
nition, 82; personal, and social
values, 72; personal, and social
values—exercises and additional
references, 87; social, XXXV;
social values and, 81; values and,
interaction, 482
- Austral Continent, 232, 233
- Australia, 233
- Australians, 66, 79, 137, 140, 142, 291;
individual parental kinship, 330;
language, 341; totemism, 344;
tribal organization, 340
- Austria, House of, in the sixteenth
century, 614
- Authority and prestige, 559
- Auvergne Plateau, 111
- Aymara Indians, 110
- Babylonia, 179, 183, 190; bronze in,
192
- Bacteria, 649
- Bag, decorated, 400
- Ballot, 864, 865
- Balonda, 67
- Baltic plains, 121
- Banks, 60
- Bantus, 115, 191, 247
- Barbarism, boundary line with sav-
agery, 137; periods of, 136, 137
- "Barking" exercise, 597
- Barotse, 112
- Barriers, 119, 215, 216; artificial, 216
- Barrows, 185
- Bashkirs, 418
- Basques, 226
- Battles, 6
- Bead work, 398, 402
- Beans, 108
- Bearla lagair, 261, 262, 264, 265
- Bears, 308
- Beavers, 32, 42
- Bechuana Land, 114
- Bedonius, 67
- Bees, 30, 42
- Beggars, 772
- Beginnings, 53, 161, 162
- Behavior, 66; group; 594 (*see also*
Group behavior); outline study
of individual and personal traits,
798; patterns, 798, 800; science of,
806
- Belenda women, 55
- Belief, 483; consumption and, 308;
production and, 307
- Berbers, 115, 225, 239
- Bermudas, 119
- Binder, R. M., 648, 649, 664, 947
- Binet tests, 799, 826
- Biology, 25, 36, 38, 764
- Birds, communities, 32; in Peruvian
art, 408; property in, 316, 318
- Birth rate, 671, 673
- Bison, 126, 308
- Black races. *See* Negroes
- Blackfoot Indians, 466, 467
- Blondness, 115
- Blood feud, 540
- Blood-fines, 351, 352
- Blood-revenge, 350; transition, 352
- Blue Ridge, 118
- Body, human, mechanism and gland
action, 202, 211, 212
- Boers, 122, 123
- Boomerang, 291
- Borrowings, 149, 152
- Botokudos, 114
- Boundaries, 119
- Bounty (ship), 450
- Bow and arrow, 137, 170, 284, 288
- Boys, anti-social case, 430; play-groups,
77
- Brachycephalic race, 219
- Brachycephaly, 422
- Brain, 75, 257; anatomical characters in
black and white races, 89; lan-
guage and, 257, 259; limits, 934;
speed of action in different races,
99
- Brahmanism, 517
- Brāhmans, 538
- Brahmins, 521
- Brazil, native tribes, 114
- Brissenden, P. F., 926, 947

- Britain, Angles and Saxons in, 123;
 Bronze Age, 185, 194
 British Indians in South Africa, 719
 British Columbia, Indian tribes, 112;
 totemism, 344
 Britons, ancient, 138
 Bronze, Babylonia, 192; Egypt, 192;
 Europe, 198; Mediterranean area,
 192; oldest piece, 181; origin and
 manufacture, 181; origins of tech-
 nique, 174
 Bronze Age, 136, 163, 174, 199; British
 Isles and vicinity, 185, 194; chro-
 nology, ancient, 193; method of
 establishing dates, 187; Peru, 223
 Brotherhood, 571
 Bryce, James, 480, 707
 Buddha, 116
 Buddhism, 517
 Buffalo dance, 389
 Buffaloes, 32; butchering, 294; Omaha
 hunt, 306, 311, 326; salt for, 379;
 Todas and, 375
 Bulldog breed, 208
 Burials, 185, 381
 Bush medicine, 476
 Bushee, F. A., 549, 677, 947
 Bushman, 54, 56, 111, 208, 284, 336,
 388; language, 241, 242; supposed
 origin, 239
 Business, 18, 421, 711; motive, 19;
 public interest in, 546; regulation
 of private business, 546
 Butchering, game, 294

 California, 107; Indians, 106, 108
 Camels, 55
 Camp-meeting, crowd contagion, 595
 Canada, French colonists, 122
 Cane Ridge camp-meeting, 595
 Canoemen, 112; Torres Islands, 125
 Canoes, Eskimo, 283, 208
 Capital, 423; claims of, 896; power
 of, 426
 Capital and labor, 893; economic law
 of balance of compensation, 899;
 way out of conflict, 905
 Capital punishment, 149
 Capitalism, 494; as a system, 900, 901;
 decay, 902; revolt against, 903;
 socialistic indictment, 904;
 Capitalists, 899; as social trustees, 900
 Capture of woman, 60
 Cassiterides, 192
 Caste, 56, 57, 559, 902, 930; in edu-
 cational control, 881; India, 516,
 517; India, decline in, 535; India,
 regulations, 521; West Indies, 477
 Cattle, 418

 Caucasians, characteristics, 202; origin,
 224, 238
 Cave men, 171
 Ceremonial institutions, 65; growth in
 complexity, 70; natural genesis, 66,
 68; origin, 372
 Cerro de Pasco Mining Co., 513
 Chaldaeans, 181
 Chalybes, 180
 Chancelade skeleton, 237
 Character, 18; formation, 19; origin
 of character traits in children, 820;
 problems of adjustment in chil-
 dren and, 819
 Characters, acquired, 133, 821, 822
 Charity, 772, 794
 Chicago, Negro and white contacts,
 724; Negro press, 744; white press,
 742
 Chicago Commission Race Relations,
 719, 724
 Child training, 430; Meskwaki Indian
 methods, 445
 Child welfare, 658, 804; clinics, litera-
 ture, and research, 804. *See also*
 Juvenile delinquency and child
 welfare
 Childhood, psychology of, 823, 826
 Children, character traits, origin, 820;
 childhood in its relation to adult
 delinquency, 825; crime and, 793;
 malnutrition, 812; mental hygiene,
 819, 823; Negroes, retardation,
 725; nutrition classes, 814; parents
 and, relation, 824; race relations,
 Chicago, 728
 Children's Crusade, 605
 Chilkat Indians, 398
 Chimu, 223
 China, 880; European influence on,
 461; iron in, 175; metals in, 182
 Chinese giant, 208
 Chinese Turkestan, 118, 219
 Christianity, 381, 382, 462, 530; effect
 on caste in India, 536; mediaeval,
 583
 Chudes, 219
 Chukchees, 125, 767
 Church, country churches, 700, 702,
 715; recreation and, 852; restraints
 of, 69
 Cincinnati, Community Unit Plan, 853
 Cities, 420, 421; country versus city,
 712; development, 582; mediaeval,
 571; menace of great cities, 707
 Civilization, 17, 40, 42, 106; beginning,
 139; chaotic character, 153; cli-
 matic factor in the evolution of,
 106; cumulative knowledge, 134;

- distinction between brute and man, 42; distinctness from the organic, 47; education as related to, 268; individuality in, 134; length and breadth, 134; persistence, 269; progress, 45
- Civilizational phenomena, 39
- Clan, 17, 79
- Class domination, 516; definition, 524
- Classes, caste and class in India, 516, 517; conflict, 505
- Classics, 25
- Clermont, 604, 605
- Climate, changes, 213; dependence on, 108; evolution of civilization and, 106
- Clinics, nutrition, 812
- Closed shop, 894
- Clothing, 287; disease germs in, 649; in Utopia, 598; women's, 777
- Clubs, 78, 574
- Coal, 109; conservation, 638
- Cocoa works, 841
- Codes of conduct, 938
- Collective behavior, 594
- Collective psychology, XXXVI
- Collective responsibility, 350
- Colleges, curriculum, 25
- Colombia, labor conditions, 511
- Colonization, 678
- Color, race, 212
- Color sense, 98
- Coloration, 115
- Comanches, 66
- Comer, Captain G., 395
- Commercialism, 582; in public amusement, 855
- Committee of Ten, 876, 877
- Common people, 493
- Commonweal, 941
- Communal spirit, 255
- Commune, 78
- Communication, 419, 429, 562; free, 580, 588; social value, 435
- Communism, 306, 319, 900
- Community, 76; Jews and, 457; law of, 486; personality of, 487; process, 482, 485. *See also* Neighborhood group
- Community council, 860, 863
- Community forum, 864
- Community organization, 852, 861; method, 866; nature of, 864; play movement as related to, 857; principles, 865. *See also* Public recreation and community organization
- Community service, 861, 864
- Community Unit Plan, 853
- Comnenus, Alexius, 604
- Competition, 498; economic, 501; for life, 499
- Compromise, 486
- Concertaje, 512
- Conduct, 21, 65; changing codes, 938
- Conflict, 498; class conflicts, 505; human, forms of (diagram), 504
- Congestion, 697, 837. *See also* Rural depletion and urban congestion
- Conquest, 539
- Consanguinity, 329, 334
- Consciousness, 37
- Consensus, 550, 561; English government, 563
- Conservation, 631; early history of the movement, 642; law and, 641; meaning, 633; principles as applied to different resources, 638. *See also* Utilization and conservation of natural resources
- Conservatism, 880
- Conspiracy, 495
- Consumption, 425; beliefs affecting, 308; inequalities, 776; reservations from, 899; wealth measured by, 896
- Contacts, 430; of peoples, 460
- Contagious diseases, 663
- Conventionality, 63, 152; in primitive art, 394, 400
- Coolies, 721
- Coopa Indians, 99
- Coöperation, 24, 550; important spheres, 76; insects and mammals, 32; parental, 30; social, 498, 550. *See also* Social coöperation
- Copernican doctrine, 43
- Copper, 164, 195; American Indians and, 164, 177; origin of technique, 174
- Copper age, 178; Europe, 190, 191; question of, 189
- Copyright, 306, 319, 783
- Cornwall, 197
- Corporate interest, 531
- Corporations, 17, 924, 925
- Costs of progress, 768
- Country, love of, 358
- Country boys, 704, 705, 709
- Country life, city versus country, 712; socialization versus urbanization, 703
- Country Life Commission, 706
- Country town, 697
- Court of International Justice, Permanent, 621
- Courts, criminal, 353; royal, 565
- Cows, 56

- Crafts, 915
 Credit, 60; for the unemployed, 835
 Cremation, 185, 195; Aryans and, 186
 Cretins, 207
 Crime, 24, 352, 353, 423; remedial treatment, 792; sociological view of, 790; treatment, 789; exercises and additional references, 802; vicious environment and Negroes, 733
 Criminals, 789, 792, 802, 878; hostile attitude of society toward, 357, 361; stigma on, 357; value to society, 361
 Criminology, 789
 Crisis, 383, 384; public opinion in times of, 484
 Crô-Magnon race, XXVI, 225, 226, 228, 237, 388
 Cross-bow, 290
 Crow Indians, 322; sacred Tobacco, 322
 Crowds, 594, 709; contagion, 594, 595; mind of, 54
 Cruelty to animals, 785
 Crusades, 594; as mass movements, 603; mustering crusaders, 605
 Cultural drift, 217
 Culture, XXIX; accumulation, 482; characteristics, 40; closed system, 143; definite stages, 135, 143; definition, XXIX; determinants, 145; development, XXV; distinctive nature, XVIII; environment, 106; ethnologist's contributions, 35; language as related to, 256; nature, 144; new meaning in popular use, 144; pattern, 464; present elements, 144; race and, 89; reflection of innate racial temperament, 102; socio-psychic theory, 260; Spencer's description, 33, 39; stages, 143, 148, 161, 163, 174, 935 (*see also* Stages of culture); subject-matter of ethnology, XXXII; superiority, and its influence on peoples, 462
 Culture contacts, XXV
 Culture history, XXI, XXXV. *See also* Ethnology
 Cultures, diffusion, 449. *See also* Diffusion of cultures
 Curiosity, 446
 Custom, 51; industrial, 153; primitive, 53
 Cyclops, 181
 Dachshund, breed, 208
 Dairy religion, 375
 Dance, 381, 389
 Danish archaeologists, 136
 Danube valley, 120
 Darwinism, 38
 Death, 652, 655, 758; destruction of dead man's goods, 55; folkways and, 54; poverty a cause, 659
 Death rate, 673
 Decency, 63
 Declaration of Indulgence, 852
 Decoration, 388; Alaskan needlecases, 394
 Deer, 309; butchering, 297
 Delinquency, adult, as related to childhood, 825; sociology of, 801
 Delinquents, 752; as persons, 796; medico-psychological study of, 805; study of, 802
 Democracy, 23, 147, 150, 422, 427, 922; community organization as related to, 863, 865; evolution of, 539; industrial, 489; rulers and ruled, 493; struggle for, 534; task for the future, 543; undemocratic, 884; work up to the present time, 543
 Denudation, 642
 Dependency and poverty, 768
 Dependent, term, 752
 Dependents, defectives, and delinquents, 750, 751
 Depletion, 697. *See also* Rural depletion and urban congestion
 Desert island, 801
 Desiccation, 213
 Desire, rational, 632
 Despotisms, 903
 Development and history, 14
 Dexterity, 293
 Dictatorship, 903
 Diet, reduction in times of unemployment, 838
 Diffusion, 147, 148, 450; parallelism and, 468
 Diffusion of cultures, 449; exercises and additional references, 479
 Dinkas, 116
 Direction, 633
 Disablement, 830. *See also* Unemployment, disablement, and social insurance
 Discovery, primitive peoples, 284
 Discretion, 440, 441
 Discussion, 588, 944
 Disease, prevention of, 658
 Diseases, 648. *See also* Epidemic diseases and public health
 Dispersion of races, Caucasian peoples, probable origin, 238; dispersion

- from a vanished Southern continent, 231; dispersion from Central Asia, 235. *See also* Origins and dispersion of races
- Doctrinaires, 496
- Dogs, 66, 318
- Dolichocephals, 219, 239
- Domestication of animals, 125, 138, 150, 318, 418
- Domination, 516, 550, 633. *See also* Class Domination
- Don'ts, 430
- Double-headed eagle, 471
- Dravidians, 220, 222
- Dress, fashion in, 594, 598
- Drift period, 163, 168
- Drinking-cups, 186
- Duel, 351
- Duodenum, 210
- Dutch in South Africa, 123
- Duties and rights, 587
- Dwarfism, 204, 208, 209
- Dynastic interest, 531
- Eagles, double-headed eagle, 471; nest ownership and migrations, 316; property right in wild eagles among the Hopi, 315
- Ear, 97
- Earth as Bedlam, 776
- East Indians in the West Indies, 478
- Easter Island, 286, 287, 450, 452, 454
- Economic activities, 22
- Economic competition, 501
- Economic institutions of primitive peoples, 306
- Economics, 18; contribution to the social studies, 22; definition, 19; money measurement of business motives, 18; organization of free exchange, 21; place among social sciences, 20
- Ecuador, labor conditions, 511
- Education, 24; aim and method of social education, 879; archaic system, 879; aristocratic control, 881; children's 824; civilization as related to, 268; definitions, 876; failure, 883, 884; outside of schools, 271; purpose, 876; rural changes, 699; social heredity and, 268 (exercises and additional references, 281); social process, 868; society's duty, 878; sociology and, 24; Spencer on, 6; universal, 881. *See also* Ignorance
- Educational institutions, 876
- Egypt, bronze, 181, 192; copper implements, 189; iron, 175, 194; metals, 190; sun and bird symbol, 47
- Electoral college, 60
- Elephants, 501
- Elite, 870, 872
- Elk, butchering, 297
- Elliot, G. F. S., 200, 253, 411, 948
- Emigration, European, 215
- Emigration and immigration, 678; exercises and additional references, 695
- Eminent domain, 784
- Employers, all-powerful, 906
- Employment, regularizing, 846
- Enactments, 61
- Endemic diseases, 648
- Endogamy, 345
- Enganche system, 513
- England, constitutional history, 539; government, 563; Rowntree Cocoa Works, employment measures, 841
- English colonies in America, 119, 510, 542, 689
- English language, 462
- English poor law, 771
- Entertainers, professional, 853
- Environment, 112; culture and, 106 (exercises and additional references, 127); geographic, 109; heredity and, 110, 751; limited influence, 123; crime and Negroes, 733; physical effects, 109, 112; population and, 113; transformation, 130. *See also* Physical environment
- Epidemic diseases and public health, 648; exercises and additional references, 655
- Equality, 901
- Equalization, 534
- Equalization of opportunity, 534; exercises and additional references, 548
- Erosion, 634, 640, 642
- Eskimos, 55, 66, 113, 237; hell, 116; idea of service, 767; inventive skill, 293; iron implements, 175; kaiak building, 298; mental speed, 99; needlecase decoration in Alaska, 394; social order, 338
- Estrangement in society, 482, 893; through divergent values, 491
- Ethical ends, 932
- Ethiopia, 246
- Ethical periods, 135, 136, 141
- Ethnocentrism, 600
- Ethnology, XX, XXXV; contribution to social science, 35; sociology and, XX; subject matter, XXXII

- Etruscans, 177, 187, 194
 Eudemics, 941
 Eugenics, XXVII, 750, 941; conditions, 757; definition, scope and aims, 754; importance, 758; mistake, 44; value and limitations, 759
 Eugenics Record Office, 751
 Eunuchs, 204
 Europe, bronze, 198; Copper Age, 190, 191; iron, 198; influence of her culture, 461; peace plan of early seventeenth century, 614
 Euthenics, 941
 Evil eye, 55, 154
 Evolution, 29; difference between organic and social, 41; limits, XXVII; organic and social, relation, 42, 46; outlook for physical, intellectual, and social, 933; progress versus, 929, 930; social (*See* Social evolution); super-organic, XXX, 29 (*see also* Superorganic); three kinds, 29
 Exchange, 419, 420
 Existence, struggle for, 499
 Exogamy, 345
 Experience, 273, 276; new, 74
 Expert knowledge, 873
 Exploitation, 499, 534, 882, 883; labor in South America, 509
 Extra-group struggle, 612
 Eyesight. *See* Vision
 Facts, unorganizable, 7
 Fairness, 931
 Faith, in the Amerinds, economic life, 306
 Falkland Islands, 111
 Fallacies, 493, 495
 Family, 15, 76, 327; individual family, 331; insect-families, 32; large and thriving families, conditions, 757; royal families, 563; shrinkage, 672; value, 484
 Fanatics, 496
 Fans, 854
 Fans (tribe), 290
 Farmers, 704, 706, 707, 713; organization, 714
 Fashion, 594, 778; reign of, 598
 Fasting, 446
 Favors, 446
 Fear, 74
 Fecundity, 671; adaptive, 671, 675
 Feeble-minded, 752, 763
 Feeling, 583, 821
 Fertility, 756
 Festal celebrations, 255
 Fetishism, 345
 Feudal system, 420, 427, 902
 Fiji, 114, 140, 454, 463
 Filipinos, eyesight, 95; hearing, 97; mental speed, 99
 Finney, R. L., 926, 949
 Fire, by friction, 284, 288, 293; use of, 137
 Fish in Peruvian prehistoric design, 403
 Fish subsistence, 137
 Fiume, 494
 Folklore, 58; diffusion and parallelism, 468
 Folknotes, 571
 Folk-tales, 218
 Folkways, 50, 579, 582; ceremonial institutions and social control through, 65; definition and mode of origin, 50; false inferences as a cause, 54; harmful, 55; made unconsciously, 52; origins mysterious, 53; process of making, 53; right ways, 57; societal force, 51; true ways, 58; world philosophy and, 59
 Food consumption, 778; population and, 665; taboo against, 56, 308
 Force, law and, 586, 587; Syndicalism and, 921
 Foreign trade, 419
 Forests, 216, 634, 642; clearing, 215; conservation, 639; national, 643
 Form-test, 101
 Forum, community, 864
 France, northern, fusion of races, 121; southern, 111
 Fraternities, 571
 Free speech, 589, 944
 Freedom, 487, 904, 922; law and, 487; migrations and, 214
 French Canadians, 122, 674
 French settlers of America, 119, 122
 Freudian psychology, 485
 Friendly Islands, 553, 554
 Friendships, 443, 502
 Frontal lobe of the brain, 91
 Fuegians, 164, 336
 Fuel, 638
 Gaelic, 261
 Games, hunting and butchering, 294
 Gangs, 77
 Garden cities, 712
 Garia tribe, 553
 Garment makers, 778
 Garments, in Utopia, 598
 Gas engine, 638
 Gellivara, 109
 General welfare, science of, 941
 Genetics, 764, 765

- Genital glands, 204
 Geogeny, 29
 Geographic influences, 109; distribution of mankind, 119; economic and social development, 118; four classes, 109; intellectual effects, 116; psychological effects, 116
 Geographical phenomena, 126
 Geometrical ratio of increase, 500
 Germ-plasm theory, 821, 822
 Germanic tribes, 139, 142
 Germans, 78; Roman Empire and, 422
 Gesture, 436
 Getting a living, 22, 153, 502, 504
 Ghetto, 456; modern, 458; Western, 460
 Ghost fear, 58, 59
 Giantism, 203, 211
 Gipsies, 260
 Girls, puberty ceremony, 278
 Glacial period, 218
 Glands, 202, 203
 Goats, 56
 Goblinism, 56, 59
 Goiter, 207, 648
 Gold, 164, 195
 Government, 7, 17, 421; earliest kind, 65; foundations, 349; management of industry, 898; monarchy and its prestige, 563; property and, 423. *See also* State
 Government ownership, 912, 913
 Grammar, 270
 Great men, 117
 Great wall of China, 216
 Greece, ancient walled towns, 214; fall of aristocracy, 426
 Greeks, Homeric, 139, 142
 Greenland, 175
 Greenlanders, 351; kaiaks, 302, 303, 304
 Gregariousness, 33
 Griquas, 247
 Group activities, 360, 922, 923
 Group behavior, XXXVI, 594; exercises and additional references, 607
 Group expansion, 609; exercises and additional references, 622
 Group life, 72; language and, 254
 Groups, 76; ethics, 924; ignorance, 868; primary value, 484; process, 486; rudimentary, 335. *See also* Primary groups
 Growth, 415, 930; of population, 417
 Guild, Socialism, 853, 914
 Guilds, 571, 573, 902; National, 915
 Habits, 51; as religious ceremonies, 376, 380
 Haïda Indians, 345
 Hallstatt, 176; graves, 198
 Hallstatt period, 194, 195
 Hatchets, 166, 169
 Hate, 74
 Hazing, 77
 Headmen, biographies, 552
 Health, 648, 708; intellectuality and, 651; meaning, 650; mental aspects, 650; social nature, 649; unemployment effects, 839
 Health agencies, coördination of, 659
 Health insurance, 830, 847
 Hearing, racial differences, 96
 Heart disease, 656
 Heaven, 116
 Hebrides, 125
 Heidelberg Man, 228
 Hell, 116
 Herdman'ship, 418
 Heredity, 42, 43, 45; actuarial, 756; civilization and, 44; environment and, 110, 751; germ-plasm theory, 821; social, 133
 Hereros, 116
 Heroism, 574, 575, 576
 Hidatsa, 149, 322; military clubs, 322, 323
 Hierarchies, 421
 Hindus, 521; caste, 517, 521; folkways, 57
 Hissarlik, 180
 Historical accident, 55
 Historical laws, 148, 149, 152
 History, 5; conception, transition from old to new, 5; contribution to social studies, 14; justification, 46; memory and, 11; new outlook, 9; popular, peculiarities, 10; record of development, 14
 Homeric heroes, 424
 Hominidae, 228, 231, 234
 Homo, genus, 232
 Homo Americanus, 224
 Homo Caucasicus, 224, 225, 226; family tree, 229
 Homo Mongolicus, 224
 Honor, 439
 Hookworm, 648
 Hopis, 107, 108, 124, 126; property right in wild eagles, 315
 Hormones, 210, 211, 213
 Horses, 126, 217, 265, 424, 467, 786; environment and, 111
 Hospitals, 663
 Hostility, 611; of society to the criminal, 357, 361
 Hottentots, 111, 242, 573; language, 241; traditional wanderings, 244

- Housing, 837
 Huichol Indians, 398, 471
 Human institutions, 133
 Human life, distinctive traits, 257; essential character, 254. *See also* Life; Living
 Human nature, 4, 24, 72, 79; genesis, 80; likeness, 79, 80; primary groups the nursery of, 76
 Hunger, 75, 643
 Hunting game of the Omaha Indians, 294
 Hygiene, 648
 Iberians, 227
 Ibero-Berber problem, 226
 Iceland, 119
 Idealism, 893, 911; realism and, 490
 Ideological forms, 911
 Ignorance, 868; exercises and additional references, 890
 Illegitimate child, 830
 Illiteracy, 883
 Illusions, 100
 Immigrants, 121; change in type, 690
 Immigration, 678; community planning and the immigrant, 685; quality of population and, 688; restriction question, 695; social control and, 679; social effects, 693. *See also* Emigration and immigration
 Impression, 633
 Improvement, 754, 759, 928; limited possibilities, 943
 Inadequacy, 750; social, 751
 Inadequacy, physical and mental, 750; exercises and additional references, 765
 Incantations, 319
 Income in the United States, 773
 Incorporeal property, 319
 India, Aryans in, 113; caste regulations, 521; caste system, 516, 517; decline of caste, 535; early history, 520; economic forces undermining caste, 536; education in its effect on caste, 535; European influence on, 461; evolution of, 540; harmful folkways, 56; metals, 182; self-government and caste, 537
 Indian corn, 108. *See also* Maize
 Indian Ocean, 220
 Indian problem in the United States, 468
 Indians, American, ethnical periods, 142; bison and, 126; California and Utah tribes compared with the Pueblos, 106, 108; copper, 164, 177; eyesight, 95; sense of pain, 98; South American, 113; Village Indians, 130; Village Indians of New Mexico, Mexico, Central America, Peru, 138
 Indians, British, in South Africa, 719
 Individualism, 544; justifiable, 921; State and, 572-573; trend away from, 545
 Individuality, 134, 924; in primitive society, 152
 Individuals, 421; ascendancy, 551; assimilation, 429; four wishes, 73; interdependence, 649; motives, 20; person and individual distinction, 796; social organization, relation to, 81; socialization of, 429 (*see also* Socialization, etc.); society and, 44; study outline, 798
 Indonesians, 220, 222
 Indo-African continent, 220, 232, 233
 Indo-Germanic languages, 218
 Industrial conflict, way out, 905
 Industrial customs, 153
 Industrial democracy, 903
 Industrial medicine, 655
 I. W. W. and Negroes, 745
 Industry, 488; group psychology and, 489; kinds of shops, terms, 804; primitive peoples, 283; society's gains by, 897; way out of industrial conflict, 905; wealth and, 897
 Inefficiency, 769
 Inequalities in men, 134
 Inequalities of consumption, 776
 Infants, 72
 Influenza, 656, 657
 Inland Waterways Commission, 644
 Inorganic evolution, 29
 Insects, coöperation, 32; social, 30, 40, 42
 Instigation, 633
 Instincts, 72, 938, 939, 940
 Institutions, 59, 133; change in character, 794; crevice and enacted, 59; democratization of, 543; development, 143; laws of, 586; mores and, 62; rights and duties in, 587; rural depletion and institutional decline, 697; social, 585
 Insurance, 848; as a preventive measure, 848. *See also* Social insurance
 Intangible goods and primitive peoples, 319
 Intellectual property, 783
 Intellectuality and health, 651
 Intelligence, lack of, 869
 Intelligence tests, 101, 799
 Interaction, 498, 584

- Intercommunication, 259, 260
 Interests, social, 528
 International relations, 680
 Interstate Commerce Commission, 546
 Interstitial glands, 203, 205
 Intoxicants, 61
 Invasions, 422
 Inventions, 131, 132, 133, 466, 633; intellectual aspect, 885; inventive genius in primitive peoples, 291; lost, 286; primitive peoples, 283
 Iodine, goiter and, 648
 Ireland, ancient nobles, 424; Bronze culture, 186; Copper culture, 179; masons and tinkers, secret language, 260
 Irish language, 261
 Iron, 109, 136, 165, 175; ancient fear of, 181; early use, 175, 194, 195; Europe, northern, 197, 198; industry among African tribes, 283, 289; metallurgy of, 196; smelting iron ore, 138
 Iron Age, 136, 163, 174
 Iroquois, 351
 Irpalvusthi, 378
 Irrigation, 138, 637, 643
 Islands, 111, 116, 118; large or remote, 120
 Isle of Man, 116
 Isolation, 416; geographical instance, 449, 450; individual and group, 491; Jewish community, 456; personal, 429, 430; social, 482
 Italian tribes, 139
 Italy, communities, 421; Fiume question and President Wilson, 494
 Japan, 889; European influence on, 462; evolution of, 540
 Japanese, 679, 681
 Jargon, 260
 "Jerks," 597
 Jewish community, 449; social isolation, 456
 Job, right to, 830; temporary and odd jobs, 833
 Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools, 5
 Judgment, errors of, 100
 Jurisprudence, 489
 Justice, punitive, psychology, 353
 Juvenile courts, 430, 793, 795
 Juvenile delinquency and child welfare, 804; exercises and additional references, 828
 Juvenile offenders, 789
 Kabyles, 115, 225, 239
 Kai, 320, 325
Kaiaks, 283; building, 298
 Kajariaak, 303
 Kalahari Desert, 111
 Kalmuks, 95
 Kashgar, 118
 Kentuckians, 595, 596
 Kindliness, 445, 447
 Kings, 525, 527, 563
 Kinship, 327; analysis of the concept, 327; Australia, 330; definition, 328, 329
 Kinship, individual parental, 330, 331
 Kirghis, 117, 418
 Knack, 293
 Knighthood, 424
 Knowledge, 133; diffusion, 874; generalized, 874; importation, 875; kinds, 873; social bearings, 869; society's duty in regard to, 878; value to society, 875
 Kordofan, 177
 Koryak, 126, 319, 325, 399
 Kwakiutl Indians, 345
 Labor, 893; demands, 901; disgrace, 425; monopoly, 915, 916; problems, 488; South America, 509; specialization, 938. *See also* Capital and labor
 Labor movement, 495
 Ladaki, 114
 Lake dwellings, 161, 200
 Lamut, 125
 Land, craving for, 214; landed property in the United States, 780; ownership, 901; private or public ownership, 780, 782
 Language, 42, 68, 132, 218, 270, 436; Bushman and Hottentot, 241, 242; group life and, 254, 256 (exercises and additional references, 266); secret, 260; secret, of masons and tinkers of Ireland, 260; study of, 25
 Lapps, 111, 113
 Law, 59; class conflicts in relation to, 507; commercial, 420; conservation of resources and, 641; force and, 586, 587; freedom and, 487; Greek, 468; impartiality, 355; mores and laws, 61, 62; public opinion in relation to, 483; respect for, 355; Roman, 468. *See also* Punitive law
 Lawbreakers, hostility to, 356
 Leadership, rural, 704, 706
 League of Nations, 489-490, 610; American citizens engaged in the

- work of, list, 620; extracts from Handbook of, 618; foundation, 620
- League to Enforce Peace, 610; an earlier League (early seventeenth century), 613
- Learning, 880
- Leggings, 399
- Legislation, 61; social, 534
- Leisure class, 425, 516
- Lemurs, 233
- Liberty. *See* Freedom
- Libido, 74, 937
- Libraries, rural, 700
- Life, competition and struggle for, 499; duration, and expectation, 673; organic character, 584
- Lifeboat Association, 574
- Lillooet Indians, 399
- Literature, 132, 135
- Living, 50; getting a, 22, 153, 502, 504; standard of, 836
- Loans, for the unemployed, 836
- Los Angeles, 107
- Louisiana Purchase, 118
- Love, 443, 502; christian, 443
- Luiseno Indians, 280
- Luxury, 425
- Lynch law, 355
- Madagascar, 55
- Magic, 344; basis, 346, 470; religion and, 381, 382
- Magic Flight, 468
- Magna Carta, 541-542
- Magyars, 117
- Maize, 467; cultivation, 310; names of parts and of preparations, 315; Omaha Maize Ritual, 310
- Malagasy, 67
- Malaria, 648
- Malnutrition, 812
- Malta, 119
- Malthusian aspects, 665; exercises and additional references, 676
- Mammals, coöperation among, 32
- Man, cradle of, 220; differentiation into racial types, 201; natural inequalities, 134; nature unchanged by time and invention, 131; origin in Asia, 218
- Mana (ship), 452, 453
- Man-tse, 220
- Mankind, classes, 16
- Manners, 66
- Manu, 61
- Marriage, 60, 443; individual, 332; influences affecting, 758
- Marshall Islands, 150
- Masai, 149
- Masons and tinkers, secret language, 260
- Mass meetings, 103
- Mass movements, 594, 603
- Mastery, 74
- Material things, 132
- Mathematics, not a science, XV; want of ability in, 796
- Mayas, zero symbols, 472, 473
- Medical treatment, 648; free, 649
- Medicine, preventive, 653; social, 653; West Indian Negroes, 476
- Medico-psychology, 805; case of boy vagrant, 806
- Mediterranean area, 224, 238; bronze, 192
- Mediterranean race, 239
- Mêdûm rod, 181, 182, 183, 191
- Melanesia, 125
- Melanesian Islands, 557
- Melanesians, 114
- Memory, 11
- Menomini Indians, 307
- Mental defectives, 751-752
- Mental hygiene for children, 819, 823
- Mental traits, racial differences, 94; speed of brain action, 99
- Meskwaki Indians, child-training, 445
- Mesology, 132
- Mesopotamia, 181, 182
- Metal Ages, 188; people, 195
- Metallurgy, Aryans and, 186; early development, 185
- Metals, 164, 174; conservation, 638, 639; early sequence, 189
- Middle class, 529, 530
- Migrations, 422, 678; barriers, 215, 216; causes, 213; control, 215; drift from Europe to America, 215; evidences, 217; ethnological data needed, 216; simplest cases, 214
- Milieu, 171
- Military organization, Hidatsa, 322, 323
- Milk, 376, 378, 648, 649, 838, 839; pure, 661
- Millennium, 154
- Minerals, 636
- Miners of the Rhonda Valley, 575
- Mining, in Peru, 513
- Mining camps, 567
- Minorities, 591
- Mir, 78, 866
- Mission Indians, puberty ceremony, 278; taboo on food, 309
- Mississippi River, 119
- Mistletoe, 500

- Modesty, 63
 Modification, 498
 Molemo, 54
 Monarchy, 563
 Money, 18; place in life, 19; power of, 426
 Mongolia, 112
 Mongolian idiots, 209
 Mongolian invasion, 209
 Mongolians, 98, 113, 121; characteristics, 202, 208, 221; diffusion, 222; transition from generalized human type to, 221
 Mongolo-American type, 222
 Mongoloid peoples, 219
 Mongoloid traits, 209
 Morale, 841
 Morality, 58
 Morals, 58; codes, 938
 Mores, XXIV, 52, 58, 579, 582, 880; definition, 59; difference from some cognate things, 62; goodness and badness in, 63; institutions and, 59; laws and institutions as differing from, 62; rational selection of the maintenance mores, 153; standpoint of the student of, 64; term, 153; usages distinguished from, 62
 Mortality, statistics, 655
 Mosquito, malarial, 648
 Motion pictures, 859
 Motives, business, 19; individual action, 20
 Mountain chains, 216
 Mountain Chant, 371
 Mountain passes, 117
 Mountaineers, coloring, 115; social life, 436
 Movements of peoples, 213. *See also* Migrations
 Music, 270, 390
 Mutual aid, 570; institutions of, 571, 573
 Mycenaean culture, 188, 197
 Myopia, 96
 Mythology, 57
 Myths about Negroes, 746
 Myxoedema, 207
 National Guilds, 915
 National income, 773
 Nationality, 609; temperament, tradition and, 102
 Natural phenomena, different orders, XVII
 Natural resources, 631, 642. *See also* Utilization and conservation of natural resources
 Natural science, term, XVII
 Natural selection, 45, 760, 763, 931
 Nature, 708; economy of, 499
 Nature, human, 4, 24, 72, 79; genesis, 80; likeness, 79, 80; primary groups the nursery of, 76
 Navajo Indians, 124, 310, 316; agriculture, 418; Mountain Chant, 371
 Neanderthal race, XXVI, 47, 161, 225, 228, 381
 Needlecases, Alaskan, 394
 Needs, 50, 74, 632
 Negritos, 99, 101, 102, 220. *See also* Andamanese
 Negro World, 743
 Negroes, 240; anatomy, 93; background of prevailing beliefs concerning, 738; beliefs of whites concerning, 737; brain compared with white races, 89; cattle among, 418; characteristics, 202, 208; Chicago, contacts with whites, 724; Chicago, crime, 733; Chicago environment, 733, 734; injustice suffered in criminal affairs, 735; myths about, 746; Negro family tree, 220; newspapers, development, 744; newspapers and, Chicago, 742; opinions of whites and Negroes on race relations, 735; opinions on race relations, 739; propaganda, 746; retardation of children, Chicago, 725; rumors about, 745; skin color, 114, 115; West Indies, 474
 Neighborhood, 853, 860, 865
 Neighborhood group, 76
 Neighborhood organization, 859, 860
 Neighborliness, 708
 Neolithic period, 163
 Nervous disorders, 934, 936
 Nervous strain, 709
 Neuroses, 935, 936
 New England, 123, 697
 New England stock, 689, 692
 New Guinea, 125
 New Zealanders, 286
 Newspaper, Chicago, Negro press, 744; Chicago, white press, 742
 Nicobar islands, 54
 Nirvana, 116
 Noise, 709
 Nomads, 117, 122
 Non-conformity, 591, 592
 Non-resistance, 611, 613
 Non-union shop, 894
 Nootka, intangible property, 320
 Notching-stones, 166, 168
 Novgowd, 118
 Nuisances, 659

- Numbers, 472
 Nutrition, children's classes, 814;
 clinics, 812
 Obeah, 476
 Observances, ceremonial, 66
 Obstacle Pursuit, 469
 Occupation, change of, 832
 Oil, conservation, 638
 Ojebway Indians, 346
 Omaha Indians, 308, 309; Buffalo
 Hunt, 306, 311, 326; hunting and
 butchering game, 294; Maize
 Ritual, 310
 Onas, 336
 Open country, 215
 Open shop, 894
 Opinion. *See* Public opinion
 Opium, 786
 Opportunity, equalization of, 539
 Opposition, 498. *See also* Social oppo-
 sition
 Order, maintenance, 151; progress and,
 943
 Organic evolution, 29
 Organisms, 579, 583-584; unconscious
 growths, 582, 583-584
 Organization, 21, 579; as unconscious
 co-ordination of adaptive activi-
 ties, 580. *See also* Social organiz-
 ation
 Organs, 579
 Oriental nations, 679
 Originality, 465
 Origins, 53
 Origins and dispersion of races, 201,
 231; exercises and additional refer-
 ences, 229, 252. *See also* Disper-
 sion of races
 Other half, life of the, 491
 Ovambo people, 418
 Own person, 786
 Oyster culture, 636, 637
 Pacation, 351
 Paddles, 302, 303, 304
 Pain, 58, 97
 Palaeolithic period, 163
 Palestine, 122; copper implements, 189
 Pancreas, 210
 Pangenesis, 213
 Paper garments, 598
 Papuans, 95, 97, 98
 Parallelism and diffusion, 468
 Parental coöperation, 30
 Parrots, 318
 Participation, 488
 Partnership, 438
 Part-time work, 832
 Past and present, 13
 Pastoral peoples, 215
 Patagonians, 99
 Patents, 319, 783
 Patriarchal society, 540-541
 Pattern phenomena, 466
 Pauper character, 762
 Pauperism, nature, 769
 Pawnee Indians, 466, 467
 Payaguas, 112
 Peace Conference, 1919, 619
 Peace-group, 609, 610; enlargement
 through social evolution, 611
 Pedagogue, 273, 274, 277
 Pedagogy, 875, 877
 Pellagra, 648
 Peons, 511
 People, "interests" versus, 493; rights
 as a whole, 534
 Peoples, contact of, 460
 Permanent Court of International
 Justice, 621
 Persecution, religious, 456
 Personal ability, 550, 551
 Personal attitudes, 72. *See also*
 Attitudes
 Personal behavior patterns, 798, 800
 Personal history, 11
 Personality, 438, 439, 443, 551, 585,
 798, 800; criterion, 801; in primi-
 tive society, 552; of a group, 487
 Persons, 584, 585; definition, 862; in-
 dividuals and, distinction, 796;
 study outline, 798
 Peru, 223; feudal character, 513; pre-
 historic design, 403
 Phenomena, eight groups of sciences of,
 37; four kinds, 36; social and
 psychic, 36
 Philosophy, XIX
 Phosphates, 635
 Physical environment, problems of,
 628, 631
 Physical examination, 799
 Piacenza, 604
 Picts, 226, 227, 229
 Pigmentation, 114, 115, 205, 212;
 climate and, 115; elevation and,
 115; environment and, 116
 Pillay (A. C.) Co., 722
 Piltdown Woman, 228
 Pineal gland, 202, 206
 Pioneer life, 704
 Pitcairn islanders, 449, 450
 Pituitary gland, 202, 203, 204, 212
 Plains Indians, 398, 400; bead work,
 402; religion, 321, 325
 Plants' struggle for life, 499, 500
 Play, 374, 398, 502; community organ-

- ization and the play movement, 857; concept, 858; right to, 830, 852; traditions. *See also* Public recreation and community organization
- Play-excitement, 255
- Play group, 76
- Play movement, term, 858
- Pleasure resorts, commercial, 855
- Pleistocene, groups, 234; precursors, 232; precursors, family tree, 228
- Pluralists, 488, 489, 490
- Pneumonia, 656, 657
- Point Barrow, 298
- Police Power, 545, 547
- Police regulations, 61, 62
- Political economy. *See* Economics
- Political parties, minor, 912
- Political science, 15; contribution to the social studies, 18; definition, 15; nature and field, 15; problems, 17
- Politics, 918
- Polyandry, 114, 147
- Polygamy, 338
- Polynesia, XXVII
- Polynesians, 114, 117, 137, 140, 142, 287, 453; mythology, 116
- Poor, the discontent and envy, 425. *See also* Poverty
- Popular amusements, 853
- Population, 24; American, early, 689; capital increase and population increase, 899; environment and, 113; general checks to increase, 660; growth, 417; immigration and the quality of, 688; principle, 665; problems, 628; qualitative aspect, 750
- Potassium, 635
- Potlatch, 516
- Pottery, 138, 287, 288; Barrow, Britain, 186; composition and manufacture, 141; Hebrides, 125; invention, 137; Navajo, 124; New Guinea, 125; Peruvian art in, 405; reasons for adoption, 140
- Poverty, 24, 904; biologic and economic views, 770; death-rate and, 659; emergence, 768; nature of poverty and pauperism, 769
- Poverty and riches, 767; exercises and additional references, 787
- Power, danger in possession of, 493; sense of, 632; state and, 524
- Prehistoric times, 193; fixing dates, 187
- Prejudices, 24
- Press. *See* Newspapers
- Prestige, 550, 557; authority and, 559; English government, 563; use of the word, 559
- Preventive medicine, 653
- Prevision, 942
- Primary groups, 72; nursery of human nature, 76; unity, 76
- Primates, 33, 235, 236
- Primitive peoples, 221; art, 387 (exercises and additional references, 411); biographies of certain leaders, 552; economic institutions, 306 (exercises and additional references, 325); foundations of government and law, 349 (exercises and additional references, 364); intangible goods, 319; inventions and industries, 283 (exercises and additional references, 304); inventive genius, 291; religion, social roots of, 367 (exercises and additional references, 385); rudimentary human groups, 335; social organization, 327 (exercises and additional references, 347); totem, taboo, and magic, 344; tribe, 340
- Primitive society, 147, 151; personality in, 552
- Printing-press, 888
- Private judgment, 152
- Private property, 306, 568, 901; birds, 315; intangible goods among primitive peoples, 319; public control of, 546; social theory of, 779; spiritual, 439, 440
- Private schools, 876, 881
- Privileged class, 529, 530
- Problems, 627. *See also* Social problems
- Process, 482; community as, 482, 485; definition, 416; public opinion as a process, 589; social organization as a process, 580. *See also* Social processes
- Production, beliefs affecting, 307; enlargement of, 423
- Professionalism in public amusement, 853
- Programs of social reform, 911; exercises and additional references, 926
- Progress, 885, 928; evolution versus, 929, 390; industrial, 897, 899; order and, 943. *See also* Social progress, nature and feasibility of
- Prohibition, 659
- Propaganda, Negroes and, 746
- Propagation, 334
- Property, 60; accumulation, and consequent social changes, 423; incorporeal, 319; intangible, 783;

- protection, 359; public and private relations, 636; rights, 641; social view, 767. *See also* Private property
- Propriety, 63
- Prostitution in Chicago, 734
- Proto-Nordics, 219
- Psychiatry, 802, 819
- Psychic phenomena, 36
- Psychological equipment, 938
- Psychological process, 83
- Psychology, XV, XXXVI, 802; social. *See* Social psychology
- Puberty ceremony of the Mission Indians, 278
- Public health, 648; education, 661; program, 655. *See also* Epidemic diseases and public health
- Public interest, extension of, 544; private property versus, 784
- Public lands, 636
- Public opinion, 61, 79, 483, 580; as a process, 589; formation, 864; in race relations (whites and Negroes), 735; making of (whites and Negroes), 742
- Public ownership of land, 780, 782
- Public recreation, unsocial aspects, 853
- Public recreation and community organization, 852; exercises and additional references, 866
- Public service, 545
- Public utilities, 546
- Pueblo Indians, climate as factor in their culture, 106, 108
- Pug-face, 209
- Pumpkins, 108
- Punishment, 352, 353, 484; harshness, 789, 790; purpose, 793
- Punitive law, 349; beginnings, 349; justice, 353
- Pupils, 276; three classes, 791
- Puritanism, 453
- Purpose, 488
- Pygmies, 101, 102
- Pyrography, Peruvian, 406
- Quality of life. *See* Eugenics: Inadequacy, physical and mental
- Quality of the human stock, 760, 761
- Quarantine, 662, 785
- Queen of England, 563
- Quichua Indians, 110
- Race, 44; Chicago, contacts of Negroes and whites, 724; culture and, 89 (exercises and additional references, 104); differences in mental traits, 94; problems, 719 (exercises and additional references, 748); public opinion on race relations (whites and Negroes), 735, 742; rumor, effect in race relations, 745; South Africa, friction, 719; temperament and, interaction, 102;
- Race suicide, 672
- Races, 16, 79; differentiation of mankind into, 201; distribution of principal divisions, 220; order of appearance, 234; origins and dispersion, 201 (*see also* Origins and dispersion of races); similarity, 79, 80; West Indies, 474
- Racial temperament and culture and, 102
- Racial differences, 43
- Racial drift, 217
- Radicals, 491, 492, 509
- Radio-activity, 466
- Railroads, 545, 898
- Rainfall, 107, 108
- Rajputs, 418, 521
- Ranks, social, 528
- Rational selection of the maintenance mores, 153
- Realism, idealism and, 490; in primitive art, 400
- Reasoning of primitive people, 55
- Reclamation Service, 638
- Recognition, 74
- Recreation, as an outlet for unsatisfied instincts, 939; Chicago, Negro and white contacts, 727; psychological aspects, 940. *See also* Play; Public recreation and community organization
- Red Cross, 659
- Reduction of wages, 834
- Reformers, 929; false assumption, 923
- Reforms, 911, 912; fragmentary, 929
- Regularizing employment, 846
- Reindeer, 125
- Relationships, social, 438, 443
- Relatives, help in unemployment, 835
- Relief, 771
- Religion, 60; business as related to, 19; difficulty in defining, 381; function, 384; mechanical and spiritual, 385; origin of practices and ceremonials, 372; persecution and, 456; revival sketch, 595; social genesis of the religious attitude, 367; social life in its relation to, 373; social roots, 367 (exercises and additional references, 385); sociological side, 384; solution of group crises, 381
- Renaissance painting, 582

- Reproduction, 671, 674
 Rescue, 574, 575, 576
 Reserve, personal, 439, 444
 Response, 74
 Responsibility, 350
 Restraint, 67, 923
 Restraints, 569
 Retribution, 354, 423
 Retrogression, 122
 Revenge, 350
 Revival, religious, 595
 Revolution, 491, 542; Negroes and, 743
 Rhythm of color and form, 399
 Rich, the, 426; consumption of wealth, 897; idle, 904, 907
 Riches, 767. *See also* Poverty and riches
 Rickets, 840
 Right, how found, 57
 Right-handedness, 99
 Rights, 58, 360, 422, 589; duties and, 587; general welfare and, 783; of the people as a whole, 534; ownership, 786; public control of private, 547
 Rigveda, 517, 518
 Riots, 921; race, 741, 742, 745, 746
 Ritual, 384, 466; Omaha Maize Ritual, 310
 Rivalry, 503
 River valleys, 215
 Rocky Mountain deserts, 112
 Roman army, 424
 Roman Empire, 216
 Roman numerals, 473
 Roman tribes, 139, 142
 Rome, 421, 422; luxury of the republic, 425
 Rooks, 32
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 644, 645, 646, 647
 Roots, 162
 Rowntree Cocoa Works, 841; plans to prevent unemployment, 841
 Royalty, 563, 564
 Rulers and ruled, 493
 Rumor and race relations, 745
 Rural depletion and urban congestion, 697; exercises and additional references, 717
 Russell, Bertrand, 927, 952
 Russell Sage Foundation, 830, 831
 Russia, 897
 Russians, 78
 Sage (Russell) Foundation, 830, 831
 Sahara, 225
 St. Lawrence River, 119
 St. Petersburg, 118
 Salt and buffaloes, 379
 Salt Lake City, 107
 Samoans, 67, 151
 Samoyedes, 111, 113, 117
 Sand gardens, 859
 Sane man, 486
 Sanitation, 648
 Santa Fé, 107
 Savagery, boundary line with barbarism, 137; periods of, 136, 137; Tasmanians as illustrating, 170
 Savages, 52, 79, 383; child care among, 804; food supply, effect of, 111; hearing, 96; reasoning, 55; sensory powers, 94
 Savings, 897; as a resource for the unemployed, 835
 School-teacher, 274
 Schooling, 268
 Schools, Chicago, contacts of Negroes and whites, 724; control, 881; education outside of, 271; failure, 883, 884; "mortality," 883; rural, 714; rural depletion and, 699
 Science, 382, 383, 878; applicability, 46; art, 45; conservation movement and, 643; definition, XV; key to knowledge, 9; natural science distinguished from, XVII; super-organic phenomena, 38
 Sciences, eight groups, 37
 Scythians, 219
 Secrecy, 438, 443
 Secret language of masons and tinkers of Ireland, 260
 Secretin, 210
 Sects, 568
 Security, 74
 Self-direction, societal, 928, 929, 930
 Self-governing workshop, 920
 Self-government, community organization as related to, 863; India, 537
 Self-maintenance, 155
 Semang, 220
 Semites, primitive, 370, 371
 Senses of savages, keenness, 94
 Serfdom, 902, 906
 Service, Eskimo idea of, 767
 Sewage, 648
 Sex, 41, 443, 936; differentiation, 205; intercourse, 330; Negro crimes of, 746; prematurity, 206
 Shelta, 261, 263, 265
 Shelter, 778
 Shop organization, 894; self-governing workshop, 920
 Sib, 147
 Siberia, 126

- Sickness, 648; as effect of unemployment, 839; social insurance and, 847; social nature, 649
- Silver, 164, 195
- Skill, 873
- Skin, color, 114, 115, 205
- Slavery, 419, 425, 426, 530, 588, 589, 783, 902; agricultural, in South America, 509; industrial, 902, 904, 906
- Slavs, 215
- Slums, 878, 879
- Smell, 97
- Smoke, 6
- Snake Indians, 112
- Snakes, 56
- Social adaptation, 474
- Social awkwardness, 705
- Social change, 417
- Social conditions, 84
- Social contact, 416
- Social continuity, 133
- Social control, 566; immigration and, 679; through folkways, 65
- Social-contract theory, 68
- Social coöperation, 550; exercises and additional references, 577
- Social education, 868; advantages, 882; aim and method, 879; description, 882; meaning, 883
- Social estrangement, 482, 893; through divergent values, 491
- Social evolution, XXIII, 106, 934; beginnings, 46; cause, XXV; continuity of achievement, 129; enlargement of the peace-group through, 611; ethnical periods, 135; interpretation, XXV; introduction, 3; laws of, XXIII; mainspring, 153; nature and course, 129 (exercises and additional references, 156); non-existence of innate or uniform laws of, 147; organic evolution and, 41; organic evolution as related to, 42, 46; significance, 3; social sciences and, XXIX
- Social forces, 3, 922
- Social germ-plasm, 134
- Social groups, 118
- Social heredity, 129, 133; education and, 268
- Social heritage, 872
- Social idealism, problems of, 629, 893
- Social inadequacy, meaning, 751
- Social inheritance, XXXIII, 268
- Social insects, 30, 40, 42
- Social institutions, XXXIV, 585
- Social insurance, 830; growth, 849; sickness and, 847. *See also* unemployment, disablement, and social insurance
- Social intercourse, 369, 438, 443
- Social justice, 942
- Social legislation, 534
- Social medicine, 653
- Social opposition, 498; exercises and additional references, 514
- Social order, 580
- Social organization, 579 (exercises and additional references, 592); individual, relation to, 81; inequalities among men, and, 767; primitive peoples, 327; problems growing out of, 629, 767
- Social origins, 161; two meanings, 161, 162
- Social phenomena, 29; actuality, 36; causes, 85; characteristics and classification, 50 (exercises and additional references, 70); conditions, 84; nature, 29 (exercises and additional references, 48). *See also* Super-organic
- Social philosophy, 761, 762, 932
- Social physiology, 129
- Social practice, chief error, 83
- Social problems, 627; classification, 628; definition, 627; Hart's classification, 629
- Social processes, 415; education, 868; factors, 417; nature, 415; social origins and, 416; sub-social processes, 417 (exercises and additional references, 427)
- Social products, 3
- Social progress, 885; better adjustments, 935; nature and feasibility of, 928 (exercises and additional references, 944)
- Social psychology, XXI, XXXVI; group activities and, XXVIII; position, XXIX; province, XX; science of attitudes, XXXV
- Social ranks, 528
- Social reconstruction, 609
- Social reform, 911. *See also* Programs of social reform
- Social relations, 438, 443
- Social sciences, XVII; culture concept in, XXIX; nature and field, 5 (exercises and additional references, 27); special, XXII
- Social stratification, 516, 529; exercises and additional references, 532
- Social structures, 3
- Social studies, contribution of economics, 22; contribution of history to,

- 14; contribution of political science to, 18; contribution of sociology to, 23
- Social teleis, 930, 942
- Social theory, XXI, 81; chief error, 83
- Social tradition, 759
- Social values, XXXV, 72, 73; attitudes and, 81; attitudes and, interaction, 482; creation of, 482 (exercises and additional references, 496); definition, 82; personal attitudes and, 72
- Social worth, 760, 762; nature of, 761
- Socialism, 911; central conception, 912; meaning, 548; progress from individualism toward, 545; Syndicalism as related to, 919
- Socialists, 903
- Socialization in country life, 703
- Socialization of the individual, 429; exercises and additional references, 447
- Socially inadequate, term, 751, 754
- Societal phenomena, 153; classification, 155
- Societal self-direction, 928, 929, 930
- Societal self-maintenance, 155
- Societies, 24; individuals and, 44
- Sociology, XXXVI; as a category and as a social movement, XXI; aspects, subjective and objective, XXIII; content, XXXV; contribution to the social studies, 23; data, 130; ethnology as a rival, XX; field, XVIII, 25; group behavior and, XXXVI; status as a science, 39; struggle for recognition as a science, 25; subject-matter, XXXII; transformation, 801
- Society, 561; ancient ranks, 530; control by intelligence, 869; organic nature, 791; stages of development before the State, 540; three classes, 792
- Sociologist, name, XIX
- Soil, conservation, 640; waste, 634
- Solomon Islanders, 289
- Songs, 319, 322
- Souian alphabet, 295
- South Africa, race friction, 719
- South America, labor exploitation, 509
- Spain, 510; Arabs in, 121; bronze, 179
- Spanish colonies in America, 510
- Spear-heads, bronze, 185
- Spear-throwers, 170
- Specialization, 934, 938
- Spectatoritis, 854
- Speech, 42; festal origin, 254
- Stages of culture, the, 163, 174 (exercises and additional references, 172, 199). *See also* Culture
- Standard of living, 836
- State, 16, 349, 490; division of mankind into states, 16; historical stages, 525, 526; origin, 539, 540, 541; political science and, 17; power of, 524; restraints of, 69; stages in evolution, 541; supremacy, 572
- Statement of vision, 387, 388
- Stature, 111
- Status, 796
- Steppes, 215
- Stewardship, 787
- Stimulation, 74
- Stone Age, 136, 163, 174
- Stone implements, 163, 164
- Stone-mason's secret language, 260, 262
- Strain, 937
- Stratification, 516. *See also* Social stratification
- Stream flow, 640
- Street cars, race contacts in Chicago, 730
- Strikes, 919
- Struggle, 573; extra-group struggle, 612; for life, 499
- Subject, 66
- Sublimation, 937
- Substitutive activities, 939, 940
- Suffrage, 542; extension, 542
- Suggestion, 54, 63; religion and, 384
- Suicide, 786
- Sumerians, 190
- Superior, Lake, 164, 177, 195
- Superiority of material culture, 462
- Supernormal, 383
- Super-organic, concept of, XXX; contemporary exposition, 41; fourth order of phenomena, 35; products, orders of, 34, 39; Spencer's use of the term, 29
- Superpsychic phenomena, 36, 41
- Suppression, 486
- Suprarenal glands, 203, 205, 206, 211
- Sweden, 109
- Swiss lake-dwellers, 161, 200
- Symbols, 436
- Sympathy, 612
- Syndicalism, 911; examination of, 918
- Synergy, 499
- Taboo, 152, 344; food, 308
- Tahiti, 450, 454, 554
- Tapa, 287, 288
- Tapping test, 99
- Tasmanians, 66, 337; language and religion, 172; mental and moral

- position, 171; native life, 170; representatives of Palaeolithic man, 165; stone implements, 166, 169
- Tatars, 112, 222
- Tattoosings, Eskimo, 395
- Taxation, 509
- Teaching, 875, 877, 884
- Teeth of Pacific Islanders, 455
- Teknonymy, 147
- Telesis, 930, 942
- Temperament, 799; race and, interaction, 102; tradition, nationality, and, 102
- Termites, 31
- Textiles, Peruvian art in, 403
- Third parties, 912
- Thompson Indians, 398, 399, 400
- Thrift, 898, 899
- Thyroid gland, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208
- Tian Shan, 118
- Tierra del Fuego, 112
- Tin, 164, 178, 181; early use, 196; eastern Mediterranean, 192; Europe, 197; occurrence, 182
- Tinkers, secret language, 260
- Tlingit Indians, 112, 345, 398
- Tobacco, 453; Crow Indians and, 322
- Todas, 553; dairy religion, 375
- Tomahawks, 166, 167
- Tonga Islands, 553, 554
- Tongas, 140
- Tools, 133, 136, 150; making of, 257, 258
- Topati, 320
- Torres Straits natives, 100, 125
- Totemism, 344; kinds, 344
- Touch, 97
- Town meeting, 422, 697, 866
- Towns, Middle Ages, 420; township and, 698
- Trade-unions, 488, 914, 918; British, 918. *See also* Unions
- Tradition, 57, 285; temperament, nationality, and, 102
- Transportation, Chicago race contacts in, 730
- Trial and failure, 50
- Tribe, 17, 327; Australia, 340; head-man, 343; meaning, 340
- Trojan war, 197
- Truths, 874; how found, 57
- Tsetse fly, 248
- Tsimshian Indians, 345
- Tuberculosis, 654, 656
- Tungus, 125, 398
- Turkeys, 315, 318
- Turki, 219, 222
- Turkomans, 112
- Typhoid fever, 648
- Tyranny, attitudes toward, 86
- Ugrians, 219, 222
- Unconscious processes, 580, 582
- Undernourishment, 839. *See also* Malnutrition
- Unemployment, effects, 837; meaning to workers, 831
- Unemployment, disablement, and social insurance, 830; exercises and additional references, 850
- Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920, England, 843
- Union shops, 895
- Unions, guilds and, 915; recognition, 895; Syndicalism and, 918
- United States, distribution of wealth in, 773; landed property, 780
- Unity and absorption, 486
- Universities, 581, 653, 654
- Urban congestion, 697. *See also* Rural depletion and urban congestion
- Urbanization of country life, 703
- Usages, mores distinguished from, 62
- Usuns, 219
- Utah, 107; Indians, 106, 108
- Utes, 107, 108
- Utilization, 631; significance, 632
- Utilization and conservation of natural resources, 631; exercises and additional references, 646
- Utopia, 598
- Vagrancy, 770, 806
- Valet, 439
- Values, 370; religious attitude and, 372; social group and, 371. *See also* Social values
- Variability of man, 110
- Veddars, 220
- Vegetation, 108
- Vegetative system, 75
- Veldt, 122
- Verification, 153
- Vice, 423
- Village communities, 77, 570, 571
- Village Indians, 140, 142
- Village life, 140
- Vision, 94, 934; "statement," 387, 388
- Vital statistics, 673
- Vocal communication, 254
- Vocational education, 881
- Volitional traits, 799
- Völkerpsychologie, 54
- Wage-earners, 900, 901, 904; minimum conditions, 909
- Wage slavery, 904

- Wages, reduction, 834
 Wales, Prince of, 564, 565
 War, 351, 484, 612; discipline of, 567;
 State as originating in, 541
 Wasps, 30
 Waste, economic, in city life, 710
 Water, conservation, 635, 659; stream
 flow, 640
 Water power, 636
 We, 76, 81
 Wealth, 132, 767; accumulation and
 its social results, 423; chief men-
 ace, 768; distribution in the United
 States, 773; governing fact in dis-
 tribution, 899; industry and, 897;
 methods of acquiring, 504; nature
 of, 503; spiritual and material,
 872; two kinds—consumable and
 productive, 896
 Welfare, 59; neglect, 658; possibility
 of a science of general welfare, 941
 West Indies, "colored" and black
 classes, 477; pen picture, 474
 Wheels, 291
 White, W. M., 819
 White House Conference (1908), 644,
 645
 White races, brain compared with
 black races, 89
 Wild rice, 307
 Wisconsin, wild rice, 307
 Wishes, 73, 483; four fundamental, 73;
 Freudian psychology of, 485;
 physical basis, 74; suppressed, 486
 Witchcraft, 383
 Witches, 64
 Wives, 503
 Wolf ritual, 320
 Wolfe, A. B., 677, 766, 953
 Women, capture, 60; emancipation,
 151; position, 588; unemployment
 among, 833
 Work, right to, 830, 852
 Workman's insurance. *See* Social in-
 surance; Unemployment
 World organization, recent steps, 618
 World philosophy, 58, 59; folkways
 and, 59
 World War, 484; results, 618, 907
 Worth, human, measurement, 425;
 notion of, 369; social character of
 the notion, 370
 Wu-suns, 219
 Yahgans, 336, 338
 Yakuts, 55
 Youth, problems of, 827
 Yucatan, 473
 Yumas, 278
 Zero, 472; Maya symbols for, 472,
 473
 Zoöculture, 316, 317, 318
 Zúñi, 315, 316

BR: 4S L# 42090900

